National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility

Threats to U.S. Food and Animal Agriculture

The United States’ food and animal agriculture supply is a highly integrated, open, global, and complex infrastructure. Increased imports of agricultural products and growing numbers of international travelers to and from the United States have had positive effects, but have also opened our food and agricultural supply to possible foreign animal disease outbreaks. The recent global H1N1 outbreak and other regional foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks have demonstrated the vulnerabilities present when there is a lack of available vaccines, countermeasures, and other rapid response capabilities to curb an outbreak. The food and agriculture industry is a significant contributor to U.S. economic prosperity; therefore, the loss of a significant food market would have dire economic and potentially human health consequences.

Current and previous Administrations have affirmed these threats and the need to prepare and respond through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food (January 2004) and the National Security Strategy for Countering Biological Threats (November 2009). In addition, the Congressional report, The Clock Is Ticking, pointed to the likelihood of biological threats and advised the United States to “strengthen our resilience by developing the capability to produce vaccines and therapeutics rapidly and inexpensively.” To supply the needed capabilities, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) have the joint responsibility to protect our Nation’s animal agriculture and public health from these threats. The Department is leading these efforts through the construction of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Manhattan, Kansas.

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NBAF Mission and Research

NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas, will be a state-of-the-art biocontainment facility for the study of foreign animal, emerging and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten the U.S. animal agriculture and public health. NBAF will provide and strengthen our nation with critical capabilities to conduct research, develop vaccines and other countermeasures, and train veterinarians in preparedness and response against these diseases. For the past 50 years, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) has served our nation as the primary facility to conduct this research. However, PIADC is nearing the end of its life-cycle and needs to be replaced in order to meet U.S. research requirements and ensure the timely development of countermeasures in the event of an outbreak. NBAF meets that need and will serve as a replacement for the PIADC facility. Strategically, NBAF will boast of new and expanded capabilities, specifically, Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 containment for the study of high-consequence diseases affecting large livestock.

Specifically, NBAF will meet its mission by:

• Providing enhanced research capabilities to diagnose foreign animal, emerging and zoonotic diseases in large livestock
• Providing expanded vaccine and countermeasure development capabilities for large livestock
• Replacing and expanding research currently done at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) in New York, and continuing the partnership between the Department and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (ARS) and (APHIS)

NBAF rests on a strategic partnership between DHS and USDA. These agencies set research priorities based on threats to animal agriculture, and conduct risk assessments, gap analysis and other necessary evaluations to protect our nation from threats to our animal agriculture and public health. Within the facility, DHS and USDA will continue the work of PIADC at NBAF to conduct research, diagnostics, vaccine development and testing, and training in preparedness and response for veterinary and animal agricultural specialists.

The following diseases would be studied at NBAF which would require BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratory capabilities:

• Nipah Virus
• Hendra Virus
• African Swine Fever
• Rift Valley Fever
• Japanese Encephalitis Virus
• Foot and Mouth Disease
• Classical Swine Fever
• Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia

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Facility Information

The NBAF is being designed by the NBAF Design Partnership (Perkins & Will, FLAD & Associates, Merrick & Co., AEI Engineering Inc., CCRD Partners, and Affiliated Engineers, Inc.) an award-winning team of architects, engineers and planners. The NBAF will be a state of the art laboratory with critical research adjacencies for DHS and USDA to carry out their unique and congruent missions.  NBAF will contain 500,000 gross square feet of facility space which includes BSL-2, 3, and 4 shared research space for the development of vaccines and other countermeasures. 10% of the space will be for BSL-4 research.

• Why Build a New Facility? No facility currently meets the requirements identified in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9.
• Facility Research & Staffing describes diseases that would potentially be studied at the NBAF and staffing plans.
• Facility Design & Construction describes facility space requirements and contracts awarded for design and construction services

Read more about the laboratory biosafety levels and definition of terms used in the NBAF discussion.

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NBAF Site: Manhattan, Kansas

Manhattan, Kansas was selected as the NBAF location after an extensive three-year site selection process that included a thorough risk assessment, environmental impact assessment, and security assessment. The Manhattan location puts the NBAF in proximity to research of NBAF-related missions in veterinary, agriculture, and bio-security research expertise, and resources. This location also puts NBAF in proximity to a major hub of the veterinary pharmaceutical industry. The NBAF will be built on a site on Kansas State University adjacent to the existing Biosecurity Research Institute.

More about the NBAF site location in Manhattan, Kansas

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Site-Specific Risk Assessment

The Department of Homeland Security completed a Site-Specific Biosafety and Biosecurity Mitigation Risk Assessment (SSRA) (PDF, 463 pages - 37 MB) in June 2010, and submitted it to the National Academy of Sciences for review. The SSRA was reprinted in October 2010 with Academy updates included. Appendices referenced in the SSRA are available in the SSRA Appendices (PDF, 290 pages - 43 MB) document.

The National Academy of Sciences reviewed the SSRA and found the site-specific risk analysis to be an important "first step in an iterative process aimed at identifying and minimizing risk" and supported the need for the capabilities NBAF provides. With a risk assessment completed at such an unusually early stage in facility design, DHS has taken proactive steps to build in risk mitigation and management measures for NBAF. Homeland Security issued a fact sheet (PDF, 2 pages - 132 KB) summarizing the SSRA process.

The SSRA evaluated 13 different scenarios, including accidental scenarios, such as operating errors, natural phenomena (i.e. earthquakes, tornados), and intentional acts, such as theft and sabotage. The SSRA concludes the greatest risks for NBAF operations pertain to the human errors for which inherent design, training, and personnel reliability programs must be developed.

The SSRA contained 17 recommended actions to mitigate risk. All of the recommendations will be implemented in the design or future operational plans for NBAF. One of the recommendations was that NBAF be designed to maintain containment following at least an F2 tornado and preferably an F3 tornado. The Department is designing the NBAF laboratories to meet or exceed the high wind design standards for nuclear facilities (as defined by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or a 230 mph basic wind speed) and a FEMA tornado shelter constructed in Kansas. The NBAF laboratories will also be designed to meet or exceed the design standards in the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) 5^th Edition.

The updated high wind design for NBAF – currently undergoing a third party review by a risk assessment team – incorporates features which provide a multi-layer approach to maintaining containment during and following a tornadic event. The rigorous construction requirements and operational procedures in place today have successfully protected the local environments around federal high biocontainment facilities on the U.S. mainland for decades, and modern technologies only improve that protective capability for future facilities like the proposed NBAF.

The Department will not build or operate the NBAF unless it can be done in a safe manner. The Department will continue to work with USDA and Centers for Disease Control (CDC) to ensure all recommendations from the SSRA are properly implemented and all biosafety and biosecurity requirements have been met. No permits will be issued by USDA and/or CDC until all requirements are met.

As part of the ongiong design and operational planning, DHS is continuing to identify appropriate risk mitigations for biosafety and biosecurity and will complete the next iteration of the SSRA in January 2012.

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NBAF Project Timeline and Transition from Plum Island

The timeline for designing, constructing, and operating the NBAF is as follows:

Once construction of NBAF is completed – an estimated five-year project – the current mission activities at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) will begin to transition to the new facility. The transition process is expected to take approximately two years.

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Project Documentation

The Department of Homeland Security is committed to open communication and providing stakeholders with access to pertinent information and relevant documentation regarding the planning, design, construction, and operation of the NBAF.

• Sites Evaluated in Environmental Impact Statement
• Environmental Impact Statement and Supporting Documents
• Department Response to May 2009 GAO Report (PDF, 30 pages - 347 KB)

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