

COMMENT DOCUMENTS NOT RECEIVED IN TIME FOR PUBLICATION IN THE NBAF FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (EIS)

DHS received a small number of comment documents that were postmarked before the end of the comment period (August 25, 2008), but were not delivered to the NBAF Program Office in time for publication in the CRD. DHS did consider these comments and this document includes the comments and responses as part of the CRD.

Additionally, comments that were postmarked after August 25, 2008 were reviewed and considered to the maximum extent practicable during the development of the Final EIS.

TABLE 1 - Index of Commentors, Private Individuals

Commentor Information	Document Page Number
Anonymous MD0152, Anonymous MD0152, GA	4
Anonymous MD0169, Anonymous MD0169	6
Anonymous MD0181, Anonymous MD0181	7
Beall, Ninian, NC	9
Gallagher, Eileen, NY	18
Hodges, Susan, GA	21
Jackson, Barbara, NY	27
Kirkwood, Arlen, KS	29
Koenig, Marie Hodgson, GA	30
Koenig, Marie Hodgson, GA	32
Primos, Houston C, MS	35
Sikora, Walter B, GA	39
Stallbaumer, Patricia, KS	41
Strickland, Mary	42
Thrasher, III, Grady, GA	43
Thrasher, III, Grady, GA	44
Turner, Terry and Debra, NC	47

TABLE 2 - Index of Commentors, Organizations and Public Officials

Commentor Information	Document Page Number
AT&T Mississippi, R. Mayo Flynt, III, Jackson, MS	16
Allen & Hoshall, John H Almond, Canton, MS	3
Athens Regional Medical Center, John A Drew, FACHE, Athens, GA	11
Brunini Attorneys at Law, Walter S Weems, Jackson, MS, MS	49
Central Mississippi Planning and Development District, F. Clarke Holmes, Jackson, MS	25
First Commercial Bank, Alan H Walters, Jackson, MS	48
Mississippi State Medical Association, J. Patrick Barrett, MD, Ridgeland, MS	8
Prudential Select Properties, Michael G Garrett, Henderson, NC	19
Royster, Cross and Hensley, LLP, T.S. Royster, Jr., Oxford, NC	38
State of Connecticut, Jodi Rell, Hartford, CT	36
The Daily Dispatch, James D Edwards, Henderson, NC	12
The Wilson Research Foundation, Chris Blount, Jackson, MS	10
UGA - The State Botanical Garden of Georgia, A. Jefferson Lewis, III, Athens, GA	33
University of Kansas, Office of the Chancellor, Robert E Hemenway, Lawrence, KS	20

TABLE 3 - Index of Commentors, Multiple Signatory Documents

Commentor Information	Document Page Number
Multiple Signatory Letter 1	50
Thomas, Patricia	

Additional Signatories to Campaign 12 Comment Response Document Page Number 2-2838	
Gale Bachman	Casey Kimberlin
John Baugher	Steve Kimberlin
Karen Bulkley	Carl Martin
Johnnie Brackett	Debra M Martin
Brandon Conkle	Larry Martin
Marty Crystal	Mark Martin
Don Davied	Sherri Martin
Ron Davied	Flora McKee
Russell Dierkin	Mark McKee
Dara Dillinger	Larry Meyer
Wade Dillinger	Bernard O'Brien
John Ellis	David A. Pape, Sr.
Duane Elrod	Greg Peck
Mike Elsworth	Carl Peterson
Richard Freeman	Randal Readinger
John Gaither	John Rife
Mel Geier	Ronald Rife
Dennis Graham	Shae Seaton
Jim Haddan	Jim Smith
Milford Hall	Michael Smith
James Hanson	Pat D. Smith
Roy D. Hart	Galen L. Snow
Terry L. Hart	James C. Street
Mike Hucke	Chuck Waggoner
Richard Hucke	Lafe Wilson
Rus Jones	

Additional Signatories to Campaign 17 Comment Response Document Page Number 2-2851	
Elizabeth Marbut	Tony Vismor
Sandra Shubert	Trisha Vismor
Steve Shubert	Jennifer <Illegible>

Almond, John

Page 1 of 1

MD0173

JOHN H. ALMOND

16 Aug 2008

Dear Mr. Johnson,

I live in [REDACTED] near Flora. I am pleased that the Flora site is a finalist for the location of your research facility, and I hope that our site is selected.

[REDACTED] county is a great place to live and work and the new facility will be an asset.

Sincerely,
John H. Almond

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Anonymous MD0152, Anonymous MD0152

Page 1 of 2

MD0152

1|27.0

pub notes

KEEP ATHENS WEIRD

There are so many arguments for and against locating the National Bio- and Agro- Defense Facility (NBAF) here in Athens that it appears something else besides specific issues determines people's attitudes toward NBAF. Two people, neither one knowing anything about science, decide that NBAF would and would not be hazardous to our health. Two scientists decide the same. Two business people decide that the benefits are worth the risk, or not. Anybody you talk to, who has made up her mind, stresses the benefits, or the dangers, of NBAF.

The NBAF facility would study deadly pathogens, but there are already labs right in the middle of campus doing the same thing, as do the Centers for Disease Control adjacent to the Emory campus in Atlanta. NBAF would impose a giant facility onto everybody's favorite greenspace out Milledge Avenue, next to the river and the botanical garden, but the university will eventually build out that land, NBAF or not.

If you add up all the negatives—the Department of Homeland Security as managers of the facility, the risk of exposing livestock and wildlife to hoof and mouth and other diseases, infected mosquitoes, the water use, the giant lit-up buildings, the impact on the botanical garden and the river and the bird flyways; the secrecy, the Bush Administration, the threat of terrorist attack, the phony science, the torture of animals, the disposal of infected carcasses into our air or our water—how could anybody want such a place in Athens?

If you add up all the positives—the jobs and economic impact of the construction and operation of the facility, including the scientific synergy with the university and bio-tech firms already here and sure to come—how could anybody not want such a perfect example of the kind of research node deemed right for Athens?

One clue to this conundrum is the opposition of artists.

One clue to this conundrum is the opposition of artists. Our local community of artists is opposed to NBAF in Athens. The artists are not an organized group, but a lot of them know each other and they know when a wrong element messes up the picture. The artists, among many other citizens here, sense that this giant facility is out of scale with Athens and they are offended. That it is also dangerous and foisted upon us by a dictatorial administration just makes it worse and easier to oppose and talk about. Think of Athens as a canvas—a landscape, a cityscape, an abstract—if Lamar Dodd were looking over your shoulder, jaw clamped on his pipe, he would point to that big, out-of-scale excrescence and growl, "What's this?"

If it were not NBAF but, say, a giant Mercedes-Benz factory, the artists would probably be up in arms over seeing our community dominated by one powerful corporate presence squatting in that green Eden out Milledge.

That's not to say that the leaders who support NBAF don't have any art appreciation. They do, but they don't let it interfere with business. For artists, art is their business. Herein lies the disconnect. Both sides are right. We do need the jobs; we don't need a giant, potentially dangerous Homeland Security installation dominating our town.

THIS W NEWS &

City Dope . . .
Athens News and View
The panhandling clamp-down

Athens Rising
What's Up in New Dev
A look at the creative communi

ARTS &

Art Notes . . .
From Muralists to Mo
A run through the OMAA, a lo

What's It Like
A Day on the Set of B
You've seen them filming ar

MUSIC

Ken Will Mort
Kickin' Out the Rung
Three upcoming shows, two

From Boys to
Oh No! Oh My! Gets
Austin's latest buzz band deb



LETTERS

CITY DOPE

CITY PAGES

CAPITOL IMPACT

CONVENTION PROTEST

ALT PREZ

DREAMS OF OBAMA

ATHENS RISING

COMMENT

THE CALENDAR

ART AROUND TOWN

DOWN THE TUBE

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 27.0
 DHS notes the information submitted by the commentor.

Anonymous MD0152, Anonymous MD0152

Page 2 of 2

1 cont. | 27.0

posing livestock and wildlife to hoof and hooves... seases, infected mosquitoes, the water use, the giant lit-up buildings, the impact on the botanical garden and the river and the blind flyways; the secrecy, the Bush Administration, the threat of terrorist attack, the phony science, the torture of animals, the disposal of infected carcasses into our air or our water—how could anybody want such a place in Athens?

If you add up all the positives—the jobs and economic impact of the construction and operation of the facility, including the scientific synergy with the university and bio-tech firms already here and sure to come—how could anybody not want such a perfect example of the kind of research node deemed right for Athens?

One clue to this

conundrum is the opposition of artists.

One clue to this conundrum is the opposition of artists. Our local community of artists is opposed to NBAF in Athens.

The artists are not an organized group, but a lot of them know each other and they know when a wrong element messes up the picture. The artists, among many other citizens here, sense that this giant facility is out of scale with Athens and they are offended. That it is also dangerous and foisted upon us by a dictatorial administration just makes it worse and easier to oppose and talk about. Think of Athens as a canvas—a landscape, a cityscape, an abstract—if Laima Dodd were looking over your shoulder, jaw clamped on his pipe, he would point to that big, out-of-scale excrescence and growl, "What's this?"

If it were not NBAF but, say, a giant Mercedes-Benz factory, the artists would probably be up in arms over seeing our community dominated by one powerful corporate presence squatting in that green Eden out Milledge.

That's not to say that the leaders who support NBAF don't have any art appreciation. They do, but they don't let it interfere with business. For artists, art is their business. Herein lies the disconnect. Both sides are right. We do need the jobs; we don't need a giant, potentially dangerous Homeland Security installation dominating our town.

While our artists have always celebrated creativity and the life it gives to Athens, our government and business leaders have always sought for ways to sell Athens to industry. And of course we're all here because of the university, which makes the artists possible and sustains our community whether or not industry comes. To say that the artists are among those who are doing okay, thanks to the university, and don't need those factory jobs would be to miss the point. The artists understand the soul of Athens, the kairoi, the right thing that, if lost, makes Athens unplace, or worse. The artists are fighting NBAF as they would a prison facility or any other industry that would so dominate the landscape as to change the Classic City. We've been through all this before: years ago the Chamber tried to change the Classic City into Advancing Athens, and though they've pretty much dropped the term, that's still the aim.

Neither the artists nor the Chamber will decide this one. The federal bureaucracy will make this call, and we'll either get NBAF or not. If we don't, let's remember what the artists are telling us and come to some kind of community consensus about what kind of growth we need, how to grow yet preserve the soul of Athens, how to look together at the big picture.

Pete McCommons editor@flagpole.com

NEWS & FEATURES | CALENDAR | MOVIES | A&E | MUSIC |

Ken Will Morton MD0152

Kickin' Out the Rungs with These upcoming shows, two new records

From Boys to Met

Oh No! Oh My! Gets Serious Austin's latest buzz band debuts its n



LETTERS CITY DOPE CITY PAGES CAPITOL IMPACT CONVENTION PROTEST ALT PREZ DREAMS OF OBAMA ATHENS RISING COMMENT THE CALENDAR ART AROUND TOWN DOWN THE LINE BULLETIN BOARD

EDITOR & PUBLISHER Pete McCommons ADVERTISING DIRECTOR & PHOTOPRODUCTION DIRECTOR Laima Dodd MANAGING EDITOR Christine Chamberlain ADVERTISING SALES Austin DeLoe MUSIC EDITOR Michelle O'Neil CITY EDITOR Ben Chamberlain CLASSIFIEDS, DISTRIBUTION & AD DESIGNERS Ian Rickard ILLUSTRATORS Jason Coombe CARTOONISTS James Allen, David Moch, Gene McElroy ADOPTEE Special Agent G. CONTRIBUTORS Paul Avery, Chris Hasselwell, Tom Hayden, Matthew Palmer, Scott Polk CIRCULATION Claudia Gray WEB DESIGNER Neil Rickard EDITORIAL ASSISTANT Jessi MUSIC INTERNS Christalyn ADVERTISING INTERNS Al

VOLUME 22 ISSUE NUMBER

Anonymous MD0169, Anonymous MD0169

Page 1 of 1

MD0169

D6 / Saturday, July 19, 2008

1/27.0

Outage at CDC lab adds to concerns

Absence of two generators cited in backup power failure; congressman says agency 'must act now to address problems in its system.'

By ALISON YOUNG
ayoung@ajc.com

A critical germ lab at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention lost power last week because the agency had taken two backup generators out of service for upgrades, CDC officials said Friday.

Their absence from a complex, centralized backup generator system created a power fluctuation when the system was activated during a July 11 power outage, causing the whole system to shut down, CDC spokesman Dave Daigle said. The problem is being fixed, he said.

The backup power failure — the second in 13 months — is the type predicted years ago by some CDC engineers.

And it has heightened concerns in Congress about lab safety at the Atlanta agency, which experiments on smallpox, Ebola, anthrax and other deadly germs.

"For high-containment labs, repeated power failures are repeated safety failures," said U.S. Rep. John Dingell, chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, which has been investigating biolab safety nationally.

"Fortunately, there were no adverse consequences this time," Dingell (D-Mich.) said Friday. "However, the fact that these incidents continue to occur raises serious concerns about the future and highlights the fact that

► Please see CDC, D6

CDC: Nation's biolabs probed

► Continued from D1

CDC must act now to address problems in its system."

Last week's incident began when a bird shorted out a Georgia Power transformer about 5:40 p.m., cutting off power to part of the CDC's main campus on Clifton Road.

The agency's backup generator system initially came on, but quickly shut down, and power remained off for one hour and 15 minutes at four agency buildings.

Three were office buildings. But the fourth, Building 17, housed infectious-disease labs, where scientists work with the H5N1 avian flu virus and other dangerous germs. Without power, the labs can't run negative airflow systems that help contain germs in Biosafety Level 3 labs, such as those in Building 17.

CDC officials have said neither workers nor the public was at risk, and that the labs have many other safety systems that don't require electricity.

At the time of the outage, no work was going on with high-risk pathogens such as flu, tuberculosis, meningitis or rabies, Daigle said.

The backup generator system is being recalibrated to work with the two missing generators, Daigle said. A test is scheduled for 5 a.m. Monday.

After the two generators were removed in April for "refurbishment," tests showed the system worked, Daigle said.

In June 2007, another new CDC lab tower, Building 18, lost power for about an hour after a lightning strike.

CDC construction officials had warned since 2001 against removing generators from critical lab buildings and clustering them to create a centralized system, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported last summer. But agency officials have said

"Even though we espouse that the laboratories are the most critical, anyone looking at the electrical system would question that."

JOHNNIE WEST
CDC mechanical engineer

the consensus among other experts supported the centralized system.

In a September 2002 e-mail, CDC mechanical engineer Johnnie West wrote: "I have very little confidence in the generators being able to operate as designed, due to the complexity of so many generators being connected."

In an August 2003 e-mail, West warned that linking the generators in a centralized yard created a "slim" likelihood they would work because "they are all controlled by one control system. This system hasn't worked properly since it was installed 4 years ago," he wrote.

"Even though we espouse that the laboratories are the most critical, anyone looking at the electrical system would question that."

West, who has previously declined to be interviewed, could not be reached Friday.

Daigle said that the CDC has completed a recent assessment of the reliability of its centralized backup generator system. He said the agency would soon release that information to congressional investigators.

The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress, has been examining the concerns raised by West and others as part of its probe of the safety of U.S. labs working with potential bioterror agents.

To reach staff writer Alison Young, call 404-526-7372.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 27.0

DHS notes the information submitted by the commentator.

Anonymous MD0181, Anonymous MD0181

Page 1 of 1

MD0181

FORUM

NBAF isn't best idea for development

1 | 27.0

By Matt DeGennaro

The Department of Homeland Security has issued the 1,000-page Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility, which Athens-Clarke County remains on the short list. If you read the headlines in local media — “Risk from biolab nil, DHS claim.” — “Government study says NBAF safe” — you’d think everything is A-OK. If you read just the executive summary of the DEIS, you’ll find a paragraph that says “potential adverse effects” range from “negligible” to “moderate,” while “potential beneficial effects” are “significant.”

But if you read the entire draft, you might be surprised to find some things you didn’t know about NBAF, and question whether it’s really such a great idea.

We heard the site selection process for NBAF was going to be transparent. The idea would fight poverty by providing Georgians lots of jobs. It’s going to be safe. When the recent foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in England was discussed, we were told not to worry. That was from a vaccine manufacturing plant, so produce vaccines, one needs more than just the “teaspoon-sized” amounts that NBAF would study, we were told.

But, the DEIS tells a different story. NBAF will house a “laboratory for small-scale vaccine and reagent production . . . with a BSL-3 Enhanced Viral Reduction Area . . .” So it looks like NBAF will be manufacturing some vaccines, storing considerably more pathogen than “teaspoon-sized amounts.” According to the DEIS, “the largest scale envisioned for manufacturing needs in this facility is 30L - 50L.” That’s liters vs. teaspoons.

Then there’s the bugs, or rather the vectors. In the DEIS we learn NBAF will have its own “insectary” to keep infected live insects or arthropods for

virus transmission studies to and from both infected and non-infected large animals and small animals.” Insects like mosquitoes and ticks, subject to escape, which — due to our warm climate — would be a big problem. According to the DEIS, “establishment of infected mosquitoes in one of the southeastern sites could lead to a more rapid dispersal of the disease to larger human populations such as in the Atlanta or San Antonio areas and ultimately lead to a permanent reservoir of virus.”

The Department of Homeland Security has recognized we are in a severe drought, but this still hasn’t eliminated Athens as a potential NBAF site. In fact, NBAF’s original estimate of using 21 million to 32 million gallons of water per year has turned into a 43-million-gallon estimate.

And all those jobs NBAF supporters strongly implied would go to the poor? First, we heard NBAF would employ 500, then 250 to 350, with “many” jobs staffed locally. Finally, in the DEIS we read, “NBAF” would directly employ 326 people. The majority of these employees would be research scientists and other specialized staff, and based on census journey-to-work data, 257 would be expected to relocate to the study area from elsewhere in the country.”

This would leave Athens with 69 permanent positions to fill. About the same as a couple of fast-food joints and a muffler shop.

A lot has happened since the DHS came to town in February. There was talk of a secret \$21 million incentive package offered by Georgia officials. We learned no details of a needed “central utilities node” at the NBAF site, University of Georgia Vice President for Research David Lee told us he was not obligated to release information that may put us at a competitive disadvantage.

And, just a few months ago, the Government Accountability Office, investigat-

ing whether it would be safe to move foot-and-mouth disease research from a federal facility on Plum Island, N.Y., found “DHS has not conducted or commissioned any study to determine whether FMD work can be done safely on the U.S. mainland.” It also found that “given that releases can occur from any biocontainment facility, an island location can provide additional protection.” DHS says “with the exception of Plum Island, each of the proposed sites resides in an area where the wildlife, vegetation, agriculture, and human populations provide ample opportunity for each of the viruses to become established and spread rapidly once released from NBAF.”

The GAO findings aren’t anywhere in the DEIS. The NBAF site selection process has never been driven by safety first. The DHS threw a big shiny, disease-ridden ball in the air to see which town would jump highest to catch it. Neither DHS, UGA nor our local elected officials will ever take off their blinders and see the risks of this project; they will just continue to talk about the “perfect fit,” the economic benefits, the prestige.

You can prevent NBAF from forever changing the face of Athens, and the time to do so is now. The DEIS says some of the original applicants were eliminated because of “weaknesses or deficiencies” including “insufficient community support.” Send your comments to nbaflprogrammanager@dhs.gov before Aug. 25. Go to one of the Aug. 14 meetings at the Georgia Center for Continuing Education and speak out. Politics, prestige and pandering should take a back seat to our community’s safety and unique character. If we don’t continue to shout “no” to NBAF, come December the DHS may say “yes” to Athens.

• Matt DeGennaro is a local freelance writer who lives near the South Millidge Avenue site proposed for NBAF.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 27.0

DHS notes the information submitted by the commentor.

Barrett, MD, J. Patrick

Page 1 of 1


MD0155

MISSISSIPPI STATE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION

P.O. Box 2548 • Ridgeland, Mississippi 39158-2548 • 408 West Parkway Place 39157 • (601) 853-6733 • Fax (601) 853-6746 • 1-800-898-0251 • www.MSMAonline.com

PRESIDENT
J. Patrick Barrett, MD
Jackson

PRESIDENT-ELECT
Randy Easterling, MD
Vicksburg

PAST PRESIDENT
Dwalia S. South, MD
Ripley

SECRETARY-TREASURER
J. Clay Hays, Jr., MD
Jackson

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Steven L. Demetropoulos, MD, Chair
Pascagoula

R. Scott Anderson, MD, Vice Chair
Meridian

Tim J. Alford, MD, Secretary
Kosciusko

W. Mack Gorton, MD
Belzoni

James A. Risk, MD
Taplo

Mary Gayle Armstrong, MD
Jackson

Claude D. Brunson, MD
Jackson

Jeffrey A. Morris, MD
Hattiesburg

Daniel P. Edney, MD
Vicksburg

Timothy Beacham, MD
Resident Fellow, Jackson

Patricia Honea
Medical Student, Jackson

EXECUTIVE STAFF

Charmain Kanosky
Executive Director

Linda McMillen
*Deputy Director
and General Counsel*

Steve Simmons
Director of Government Affairs

Deborah Batzing, CPA
*Director of Finance
and Administration*

Barbara Shelton
*Director of Membership, Specialty
Society and Alliance Services*

Karen A. Evers
Director of Communications

Susie Pettit
Director of Education

Janet Wagner
Executive Assistant

August 22, 2008


U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW,
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

On behalf of the 3,800 physicians and medical student members of the Mississippi State Medical Association, I am writing to endorse the efforts of the Gulf States Bio and Agro-Defense Consortium to bring the National Biological and Agro Defense Facility to Flora, Mississippi. We, too, believe that Flora is the best possible location for this new Department of Homeland Security facility.

Flora has rated high on each of the four areas named by the Department as important criteria for site selection. Infrastructure and workforce are strengths of our region. Our workforce is healthy in all occupations. Mississippi maintains more than 500 faculty members and produces more than 700 graduates annually in NBAF-related fields. The site north of Flora offers not only a wonderful location, but also the most cost effective site on which to build the facility.

Quality of life in Mississippi is consistently ranked high nationally. Just in Madison County alone we have two cities recently awarded the designation of being among the best cities to live in the U.S. With our state headquarters located in Madison County, the MSMA would welcome the NBAF as a neighbor. We welcome the project and want to be part of the Department of Homeland Security's efforts to protect all Americans.

Sincerely,



J. Patrick Barrett, MD
President

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Beall, Ninian

Page 1 of 1

MD0168

Name and complete address:Ninian Beall, Jr.

_____**Comment:**

^{1|21.3} I am opposed to locating the NBAF at Butler because of the risk of catastrophe to both the humans and animals living in the local area and the region at large. It doesn't make sense to bring into the US incurable, epidemic diseases that don't already exist here. I think the risk of disease escaping from a facility as the NBAF is at least as great as that one of the diseases studied will be used against us as a biological weapon. This facility, which is proposed to be used for fifty years, will be more and more subject to failure as it ages.

^{2|5.3} Study these diseases in the countries where they already exist. If they escape, it will be into an environment where they already occur. It would provide economic development and improve public health there (assuming cures or preventatives can be found). Pay researchers "hardship pay" as necessary to get them to go there.

^{3|2.0} I am concerned that the NBAF would be exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. We would not know what diseases were actually being studied, and we'd have no guarantee that biological weapons research was not being conducted there.

Ninian Beall, Jr.
8-21-2008

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentator's suggestion. However, as described in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS, the purpose and need for the proposed action encompasses the need for integrated, BSL 4 laboratories in the United States necessary to conduct research and develop countermeasures for zoonotic and foreign animal diseases. The NBAF would assist in ensuring a safe, affordable food supply. The NBAF would allow a fully coordinated approach to research, diagnostics, vaccine and antiviral development, and responses to outbreaks in agricultural animals including cattle, swine, and sheep at a U.S. facility. The purpose and need for the proposed action is discussed in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS disagrees with the commentator's opinion that the risk of escape is greater than the risk of a pathogen being introduced through an act of bioterrorism. DHS would maintain the NBAF and ancillary facilities in compliance with applicable environmental, safety, and health requirements and provide for safe operation and maintenance.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.3

DHS notes the commentator's suggestion. However, as described in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS, the purpose and need for the proposed action encompasses the need for integrated, BSL 4 laboratories in the United States necessary to conduct research and develop countermeasures for zoonotic and foreign animal diseases.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentator's question regarding whether NBAF operations would be disclosed to the public. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include the Institutional Biosafety Committee, which will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS. Should a decision be made to build NBAF and the site selected, DHS would begin transition and operational planning which would include consideration of policies and procedures for public participation, education, and also public advisory initiatives. After DHS determines the viability and nature of such a public advisory and oversight function, appropriate roles and responsibilities would be defined. As previously stated, the NBAF's mission is defensive and would not involve offensive bioweapons research or development. The international treaty, known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, to which the United States is a signatory, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of such weapons. DHS's mission is to study foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The purpose of the NBAF would be to develop tests to detect foreign animal and zoonotic diseases and develop vaccines (or other countermeasures such as antiviral therapies) to protect agriculture and food systems in the United States.

Blount, Chris

Page 1 of 1



MD0153

THE WILSON RESEARCH FOUNDATION

August 15, 2008

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson,

I am a 21-year resident of [redacted] Mississippi. I serve on the chamber of commerce board of directors for the City of Madison, and as a trustee for the county chamber as well. Until very recently, I worked for nine years as director of communications and public affairs for L-3 Communications and its division based in Madison County, whereupon I held a US Government security clearance. I am invested in Madison County and the Greater Jackson area; I raise two children in the county, and I understand the community and business dynamics very well.

The purpose of this letter is to advocate on behalf of the proposed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility to Flora, Mississippi. I believe this would be an outstanding opportunity for our community and for DHS. We do not take lightly this proposal and would be tremendously honored to serve our national security interests, to have a role in safeguarding our nation against the very real threat of bioterrorism.

As for the advantage to DHS, you would be locating in an area populated with the finest people you can imagine. Madison County is warm, friendly, its citizens resourceful and principled. The schools and community are top-shelf.

L-3's facility here (L-3 Vertex Aerospace), is among DHS's top 10 largest contractors (turnkey aviation support for your CBP aviation program). Two successive presidents of L-3 have said publicly that a key to the division's success has been having its headquarters in Madison County. The work ethic and skill sets at that 400-employee plant is amazing, employee retention high. The community embraced that company years ago when it first located here, and most of their key, highly-skilled employees are from this area. Others have moved in — most with government/military service backgrounds and they have been embraced as well. It's simply a great place to have a business and to raise a family. I believe this is highly comparable to the success your facility will have in locating here.

I know that the proposed facility will be safe and truly world-class in every way. I am deeply appreciative that Homeland Security is seriously considering Madison County, and I believe with all my heart this is the best location you could choose. I, along with other community leaders, will do everything we can to make this the crown jewel of Mississippi and Madison County.

Sincerely,

Chris Blount
Executive Director

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commenter's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Drew, FACHE, John

Page 1 of 1

MD0177



August 18, 2008

U. S. Department of Homeland Security
 Science and Technology Directorate
 James V. Johnson
 Mail Stop #2100
 245 Murray Lane, SW, Building 410
 Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson:

1|24.2 | This letter is written in support of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility being located in Athens, Georgia.

2|8.2 | As the Chief Executive Officer of Athens Regional Medical Center, a 315 bed regional hospital that serves seventeen counties in and around Athens, we will commit to furnishing whatever services are required to support the proposed facility. This could include maintaining a state of emergency preparedness by providing training and specialized equipment to deal with any emergency situation, should it arise. Although, from my attendance at public hearings, the likelihood of such an event occurring is minimal, our institution would still be prepared to deal with an occurrence.

Athens Regional Medical Center, while it provides tertiary care up to and including open-heart surgery in an affiliation with the world recognized Emory Clinic, also has a robust and highly advanced occupational medicine program that can support the requirements of a specialized workplace environment.

If Athens becomes a finalist in the selection process, I and my staff would be available to meet with anyone to provide an inventory of our specific capabilities in providing medical care.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "John A. Drew", is written over a faint circular stamp.

John A. Drew, FACHE
 President and CEO

JAD:pdI

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.2

DHS notes the commentor's support for the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.2

DHS notes the information submitted by the commentor with regards to the Athens Regional Medical Center's ability and its role in emergency preparedness.

Edwards, James

Page 1 of 4

Page 1 of 1
MD0142

Michael Wilkins

From: Susan A. Carroll [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2008 3:47 PM
To: Michael Wilkins
Subject: DHS info

Submit Comments on the NBAF Draft Environmental Impact Statement

The comment period is June 27 through August 25, 2008. All comments, both oral and written, received during this period will be given equal consideration when finalizing the NBAF EIS. Comments may be submitted at the meetings or by:

U.S. Mail: U.S. Department of Homeland Security; Science and Technology Directorate; James V. Johnson; Mail Stop #2100; 245 Murray Lane, SW; Building 410; Washington, DC 20528

Toll-Free Fax: 1-866-508-NBAF (6223)

Toll-Free Voice Mail: 1-866-501-NBAF (6223)

Online: e-mail nbafprogrammanager@dhs.gov

Susan A. Carroll [REDACTED]

1/27.0

*Mr. Johnson —
 Please find enclosed two
 editorial opinions from our
 newspaper.*

*J. Edwards
 The Daily Dispatch*

**IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT YOU SEND A LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR
 THE BIO-DEFENSE FACILITY IN BUTNER!**

THE DAILY DISPATCH
 James D. Edwards
 [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 27.0

DHS notes the information submitted by the commentor and the commentor's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Edwards, James

Page 2 of 4

1 cont. | 27.0

Page 1 of 1
MD0142

OUR OPINION

Goodness, bravery and the biolab

Area residents have the opportunity next week to make their voices heard on whether the region, and the Butner vicinity specifically, should be chosen as the home for a new National Bio and Agro Defense laboratory, a top-level security facility to study diseases that primarily affect animals.

The editor of this newspaper has gone on record as believing the facility could be a positive development for Granville County and the surrounding area. It should create jobs; not just high-dollar opportunities for ultra-educated individuals with doctorates in biology or some other science, but also many everyday jobs for everyday people — jobs in security, clerical work, building maintenance, animal care and other fields. The construction of the lab would be a shorter-term economic boost for an area that really needs it, as local contractors and subcontractors will have opportunities to secure work on the site. Individuals, including those PhDtypes, who choose to relocate to the area for their job at the lab, should it be constructed here, will be looking for homes, helping a struggling housing market.

Of course there are criticisms of the potential project, and people who oppose it. The Granville Nonviolent Action Team — born of the successful movement to stop a hazardous waste incinerator from being built in the county — has come out again to protest the NBAF. They have fears and complaints. Some of them are wellconsidered and legitimate concerns, such as a federal report that unsurprisingly determined that an accidental release of a disease from an inland lab like the Butner site would be more damaging to livestock and more economically devastating than such a mishap at a site like Plum Island, in New York, where the federal government presently operates an aged Biosafety Level 4 facility in dire need of replacement. Others border (or worse) upon foamongering, such as a recent letter to this newspaper that declared that Butner could become "the most dangerous place to live in America."

Opponents who have contacted this newspaper have seen nothing but negatives, no matter how the project might turn out.

Scientists might chose to live in the Triangle and commute (less likely with gas prices the way they are), so the biolab might not really attract any new residents to the area to boost the housing market and retail economies, they say. And even if the well-paid workers do live here, that creates a problem of having to build more schools to accommodate their children, or other infrastructure to support growth.

Damned either way, in their minds.

The newspaper has been informed both that there aren't enough inspectors keeping tabs on such labs to make sure they don't foul up, and that there are too many different agencies inspecting such labs for the supervision to be organized and effective.

Well, which is it?

Our biggest concern regarding this issue is that residents approach the topic with level heads and fair minds, and we're not confident that has been the approach of many of the lab's opponents. That same recent letter, for instance, stated it was "time for all good people" to sound off in opposition to the biolab at the upcoming hearings. That passage implies that those who support the lab, or even those who are indifferent, are not "good people." That suggestion is both unfair and manipulative.


The issue isn't about who are "good people" and who aren't, but rather whether siting this lab in Butner is or isn't a good idea, and we still think that it is.

Opponents have suggested it is "valiant" to oppose the NBAF. Well, it is no less brave, especially when facing a few vocal opponents, to speak one's mind in favor of a controversial project.

We invite those who hold opinions on either side of the issue to be present at the hearings — Tuesday, at Butner-Stem Middle School, first from 12:30 to 4:30 p.m. and later from 6 to 10 p.m. — and let your thoughts be known.


Powered by TECNAVIA © Copyright 2008-The Daily Dispatch

*July 27, 2008
The Daily Dispatch*



Edwards, James

Page 3 of 4



http://www.hendersondispatch.com/eebrowser/frame/3_of.ver/php-script/xmlart.php?pSetup=ben... 8/20/2008

Edwards, James

Page 4 of 4

1 cont.| 27.0

Page 1 of 2

MD0142

Going on record for the biolab

I'm scheduled to participate in an informative lunch meeting today with proponents of the National Bio and Agro Defense facility proposed for the Butler-Creedmoor area. So, while I've sat on my opinion until now, I decided I'd better share it with you in advance of that session rather than after, so it doesn't appear that I've been bought. (Even though I suspect some of you will think that anyway.) Unless and until I receive more damning information about the facility, I think it would be a good addition to the regional economy.

I recognize that there are opponents; most of them, I believe, are operating from insufficient or at times downright incorrect information about the lab and its mission.

And, I blame the government and the NBAF's supporters for that lack of information. The sort of tour being made today should've been undertaken long ago. And these informational sessions shouldn't be limited to the media, but spread as widely as possible among the communities, with visits to civic clubs, schools, churches — any group anywhere that would entertain speakers on the subject.

The biolab would serve a valuable purpose: Researching organisms and diseases that pose a potentially catastrophic health risk to animals and humans, and in some cases that can be used against the American public by terrorists. That makes the facility scary to some folks, and I understand why. But that doesn't make the lab any less necessary.

To get an educated perspective on the lab, I asked an expert; at least, the only "expert" I know who also happens to sleep on the other side of the bed at night. ... Makes it easier to catch her and get on-the-record comments.

My wife, Robin, is a few weeks away from her PhD in microbiology at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill School of Medicine. And, just about every day, she works with similar deadly organisms in a lab on the campus at UNC.

I asked her whether local residents should fear the proposed biolab. Actually, I got a little bit less overwhelming endorsement than I had expected.

"These labs handle dangerous agents and they must be taken seriously. That's why there are so many rules and safety protocols to be followed," she said. "But that is not a reason for the community to panic."

At risk of being accused of "dumbing" this down — largely because the explanation can't be too smart or I wouldn't understand it — I'll try to offer details. I hope they're on the mark or I'll hear about it when I get home.

The most secure lab in which my wife works is rated BSL3 — that is, the second-highest level of security precautions and "biocontainment" practices in a four-level system policed by the Centers for Disease Control. The Butler-Creedmoor lab would be considered a Biosafety Level 4 facility, the highest required security level, because it would deal with the most dangerous agents and diseases in captivity (so to speak). The proposed lab is considered a "bio-agro defense facility" because the agents it would study are animal diseases, but include those that could be used to taint our food supply or perhaps even "weaponized" for employment against humans.

The proposed lab is not a "biological weapons plant," as some opponents persist in saying.

Whether these individuals are just sorely misinformed or are choosing to use this term as a means of striking fear into the public and heightening opposition to the lab, I couldn't say.

There are eight BSL4 locations presently operational in the United States. Another seven, including NBAF, are in the works.

Where are the eight functioning BSL4 labs? Here's the list: • Fort Detrick, Md.

• The CDC in Atlanta (two buildings operational).

• The National Institute of Health's campus in Bethesda, Md.

• NIH's location in the Twinbrook III buildin, Rockville, Md.

• The Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research in San Antonio, Texas • The University of Texas Medical Branch's Shope Laboratory in Galveston, Texas • Georgia State University's smaller, "glovebox" facility, which, like the CDC, is in Atlanta.

• And, the Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services Lab, Richmond, Va.

Among the new locations planned or under construction is a site at Boston University. And in the United Kingdom, a new BSL4 lab is under construction in London, one of Europe's most populous cities.

The locations of these facilities, in my mind, help defeat three arguments made by opponents:

1. That the lab is too dangerous to be placed near people (meaning "us"); 2. That having a high-security biological lab in the area will necessarily destroy property values; and 3.

The government just likes to dump distasteful facilities in Butler.

PLEASE SEE BIOLAB, PAGE 11A

MARCH 20, 2008
The Daily Dispatch

Flynt, III, R. Mayo

Page 1 of 1



MD0157

R. Mayo Flynt III
President

AT&T Mississippi
175 E. Capitol Street
700 Landmark Center
Jackson, MS 39201

T: 601.961.2600
F: 601.961.1412
mayo.flynt@att.com

August 18, 2008

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson,

Within the last few years, an increasing number of successful companies such as Toyota, GE, Eurocopter, and SeverCorp have located business operations in Mississippi. Each of these announcements produced great enthusiasm and support from our citizens. Mississippians understand and appreciate the benefits and opportunities major investments such as these bring to their communities and our state.

I believe the Department of Homeland Security will experience similar, if not greater, enthusiasm and support when it selects Mississippi as the location for the National Bio Agro-Defense Facility. Our community is excited about the prospect of being home to this world-class research facility and will warmly welcome the opportunities it will produce.

As a native Mississippian who moved home last year after living in Washington, D.C., Atlanta, GA, and Birmingham, AL for the last twenty years, I am confident the NBAF's personnel will enjoy living in Mississippi. Our quality of life is excellent and our communities welcoming. Mississippi is a special place.

We look forward to calling NBAF "neighbor".

Warmest regards,



Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Gallagher, Eileen

Page 1 of 1

MD0171

[Redacted]
[Redacted] NY [Redacted]

August 20, 2008

U. S. Department of Home Land Security
Mr. James Johnson
Science and Technology Directorate
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528


Dear Mr. Johnson,

I am writing to express my opinion about Plum Island as a location for a new Bio and Agricultural Defense Facility.

1| 25.1 I am strongly AGAINST this idea. Plum Island is an easy target for terrorism and that
2| 21.1 would leave both Connecticut and Long Island exposed to diseases for which there may
3| 17.1 be no cure or that could not be treated quickly enough to safeguard our population. It
4| 12.1 would be impossible to evacuate Long Island. Our road system can't even handle
weekend traffic effectively. In addition, the proximity to the water increases the chances
that our shoreline can be contaminated and that could never be contained.

5| 27.0 In the past, our government has mismanaged the labs there and on more than one
occasion there have been "accidents". Most of us are convinced that the spread of Lyme
disease, beginning on Long Island and Connecticut, occurred because of the release of
contaminated ticks from Plum Island that were spread by migratory birds and deer who
swim to and from the island.

1 cont. | 25.1 Plum Island is not a safe location for this new lab. Since the new lab has to be built, there
is no reason to consider this location. Please close the existing facility and move the new
operation to a location that is more secure.

Sincerely,

Eileen Gallagher


Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.1
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.1
DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the pathogens that would be studied in the NBAF. By definition and as identified in Section 1.1 of the NBAF EIS, BSL-4 facilities are specifically designed to safely handle exotic pathogens that pose a high risk of life threatening disease in animals and humans through the aerosol route and for which there is no known vaccine or therapy. It is because of the risks posed that the NBAF is needed in order to provide a modern, integrated high-containment facility to safely and effectively address the accidental or intentional introduction of animal diseases of high consequence into the United States.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 17.1
DHS notes the commentor's concern. A site-specific emergency response plan will be developed and coordinated with the local emergency management plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF. DHS would offer coordination and training to local medical personnel regarding the effects of pathogens to be studied at the NBAF. Emergency management plans will also include training for local law enforcement, health care, and fire and rescue personnel. The need for an evacuation under an accident conditions is considered to be a very low probability event. Evacuation would not be needed in case of an accidental release of FMD because FMD is not a public health threat. Cats, dogs, birds and other non-cloven hooved household pets are not also affected by FMD.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 12.1
DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding contamination. To control this risk, and as stated in Section 2.2.2.5, the NBAF would develop a Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan (SPCC) that specifies operating procedures to prevent spills, control measures to contain spills, and countermeasures to contain, cleanup, and mitigate the effects of a spill reaching a water body. Additionally, as stated in Section 3.1 disposal of medical, hazardous, and industrial solid waste is governed by federal and state regulations promulgated under the RCRA. The NBAF will be required to comply with each and every applicable waste management regulation.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 27.0
DHS notes the commentor's questions regarding the history of accidents at the PIADC facility on Plum Island. Since 1954, there has been one accidental release of FMD from biocontainment (but not off Plum Island) and that occurred in 1978 when some cattle that were maintained by the research facility in outdoor confinements became infected. This release did not spread from the island. In addition, there have been five incidences involving a compromise of biocontainment, however, no pathogens were released. DHS will consider these incidents and their outcomes, as well as other such historic biocontainment incidents and laboratory-acquired infections, in the United




States and worldwide, described in Appendix B, to improve the structural and engineered safety of the final NBAF design and to incorporate lessons learned from incidents of human error into the operating procedures. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large.

Garrett, Michael

Page 1 of 1

MD0170



August 18, 2008

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science & Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson, Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW, Bldg. 410
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson,

1| 24.3

I am writing this letter to express my support for the placement of the **BIO-Defense Facility in Butner, NC (NBAF)**. I know there has been a lot of negative media attention given to this project from a few vocal opponents to the project but as you and I both know, the news media does not want to report good news, only something controversial that will sell news papers. Here in the [redacted] as well as Vance County area, we have lost all of our textile industries and are a "distressed rural" community in desperate need of businesses that will provide jobs.

2| 15.3

We are working closely with the State for tax break assistance for the newly created HUB to draw new industries to our area and I believe that this facility will be a "beacon of light" to show other businesses and industries that our community is a viable place to work and live. Please don't be swayed by the vocal minority and stay the course to build the facility in Butner.

Respectfully,

Michael G. Garrett
Broker

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.3

DHS notes the commentator's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the information submitted by the commentator.

Hemenway, Robert

Page 1 of 1

MD0163



August 8, 2008

DHS Science and Technology Directorate
 James Johnson (Mail Stop #2100)
 245 Murray Lane SW, Bldg. 410
 Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson:

1| 24.4

I write in support of locating the National Bio-and Agro-Defense Facility in Kansas.


2| 8.4

As a member of the Kansas Bioscience Authority Board, I have been involved in this process from its inception. The State of Kansas has a very strong case for hosting the NBAF. In addition to its strong agricultural base and history, the populace of Kansas has demonstrated strong support for this project. Our sister institution, Kansas State University, is well-positioned to provide support and expertise for this facility. The KSU College of Veterinary Medicine is widely recognized and enjoys the strong support of its administration. Kansas State has a proven record of mobilizing resources and industry collaboration in agricultural research. The University of Kansas has extremely strong pharmaceutical and other scientific researchers and tools that we will make available for this project.

The support for NBAF is not limited to the academic world. The Governor has made this a priority for the State, and there has been unprecedented bi-partisan support for this project from the Kansas Legislature. The level of focus and commitment that the NBAF project has generated is remarkable by any metric.

We are confident that the resources and the level of commitment by all agencies and institutions in Kansas make this state the best choice for the NBAF project. I would be pleased to talk with you and your colleagues to provide further information if you wish.

Sincerely,


 Robert E. Hemenway
 Chancellor

REH:glc

Office of the Chancellor

Strong Hall 1100 Jayhawk Blvd., Room 230, Lawrence, KS 66045-7535 | 785) 864-3111 | Fax (785) 864-4120 | www.ku.edu

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the information submitted by the commentor.

Hodges, Susan

Page 1 of 4

WD0799

From: Susan Hodges [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 5:04 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Comments re NBAF

1|4.0 Please NOTE: the fax number in the literature I received from DHS at a public presentation about the NBAF proposals did not work. Also, the audience was told that comments had to be POSTMARKED today, but the printed materials say it has to be RECEIVED by today. These problems do not give me confidence in your process...

Susan Hodges 25 August 2008
 [REDACTED]

Comments:

2|25.2; 3|12.2 There are many reasons why Athens-Clarke County (the South Milledge Avenue site) is NOT an appropriate site for the proposed NBAF facility. However, the most pressing reason is that our county does not have enough water to support the current population, let alone a facility that would use **43,000,000 gallons** per year. So this site is NOT APPROPRIATE and should be TAKEN OFF THE LIST of possible sites.

3|12.2 It is telling that the authors of this study think both that Athens-Clarke County can support these water needs, and that the impact of this additional water use is considered "minor" -- the same impact noted for water for the No Action alternative. Where have the authors been? To whom have they spoken? Where do they think this water will come from?

(cont.) During about half of the 25 years I have lived in Clarke County, we have experienced some level of drought. The worst has been the last few years, and has entailed draconian water-use restrictions just to get by. Global climate change experts predict that this region will have more droughts in the future. While the residents have worked hard to cut back on water use in response to the drought, the NBAF lab would have permanent needs for care of large animals and research methods and could not drastically cut back the way households generally can.

Neither the Athens-Clarke County government nor the proponents of the NBAF facility have presented the public with ANY credible plans for meeting the future water needs of the current population, let alone the needs of a facility that would add this large extra water demand.

It is completely irresponsible for the Federal Government and its agents to suggest that

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 4.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns about DHS's toll-free fax number and the date by which comments on the NBAF Draft EIS had to be received in order to be considered by DHS. DHS is not aware of any misprints of the toll-free fax number in its public outreach literature but does regret any inconvenience or miscommunication of information in this regard during the public meetings. DHS did receive approximately 100 comments documents via fax. The 60-day public comment period on the NBAF Draft EIS ended on August 25, and DHS considered and has responded to in this Comment Response Document all comment documents postmarked on or before August 25, 2008.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and DHS acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site alternative would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.

Hodges, Susan

Page 2 of 4

WD0799

3|12.2 (cont.) Athens-Clarke County is an appropriate site for this facility, because **this region DOES NOT HAVE ADEQUATE OR DEPENDABLE WATER RESOURCES!**

Please take South Milledge Avenue site OFF THE LIST!

Sincerely,
Susan Hodges

Relevant quotes from the Draft Environmental Impact Statement:

**Page ES 7
Infrastructure.**

4|8.2 Potable water Potable water use would vary to some degree for each site, but operation would result in use of approximately 36 million (Plum Island Site) to 52 million (Texas Research Park Site) gallons per year. **All sites have available capacity to meet this demand.**

The South Milledge Avenue and Umstead Research Farm sites would need new water lines, and the Plum Island Site would need new groundwater wells and a new water tower.

This is NOT TRUE South Milledge / Clarke County site does NOT have available capacity!

Page ES 10

3|12.2 (cont.) **Cumulative Effects.** There would be minor cumulative effects to air quality, water supply, wastewater treatment capacity, and traffic with some of the site alternatives. **Water use at the South Milledge Avenue Site and the Umstead Research Farm Site would contribute to regional water use during the current drought conditions, although there are few large regional development projects planned for the near future.**

...
No significant adverse effects to environmental or human resources would be expected from any of the alternatives with normal operation of the NBAF. Moderate effects that would occur would be to the following resources:

• **Potable water use of 36 million to 52 million gallons of potable water per year.**
NOTE: This is a SEVERE EFFECT, not a "moderate" effect.

Chapter 2:
Description of site selection process does not mention availability of water resources as a factor.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 8.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the impact of the NBAF operation at the South Milledge Avenue Site on the area's potable water infrastructure and general water resources. An evaluation of the impact from the proposed operation of the NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative on the potable water supply and infrastructure is located in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.3 of the NBAF EIS. Based on planned improvements that comply with NBAF design criteria, no potable water infrastructure constraints have been identified for the South Milledge Avenue Site. In addition, an evaluation of the impact from the NBAF operation on the area's general water resources, to include surface water and groundwater, is located in Chapter 3, Section 3.7.3 of the NBAF EIS.

Hodges, Susan

Page 3 of 4

WD0799

Page 2-48:

Significant Adverse Environmental Effects

No significant adverse effects to environmental or human resources would be expected from any of the alternatives with normal operation of the NBAF. Moderate effects that would occur would be to the following resources:

- **Potable water use of 36 million to 52 million gallons of potable water per year.**

- Wastewater treatment capacity generation of 25 million to 30 million gallons of wastewater per year.

- Visual Quality visual prominence of the NBAF at four of the alternative site locations.

- Air Quality Potential for air emissions to affect local air compliance plans in Suffolk County, New

York and Bexar County, Texas.

- Traffic Potential adverse traffic flow effects at the South Milledge Avenue Site and the Texas

Research Park Site.

Chapter 3

3.3.3.3.1 Potable Water Supply [at the South Milledge Ave site]

Potable water would be supplied to the NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue Site by the Athens-Clarke

County Public Utilities Department. The NBAF designers recommended that municipal water service be

brought to the NBAF via redundant or looped feeds such that maximum water demand may be satisfied even

with loss of one feed line (NDP 2007b). The projected water consumption at the NBAF ranges from

50,000 gpd to 275,000 gpd, with a peak flow rate of 657 gallons per minute (gpm) at a minimum delivery

pressure of 35 psi. The maximum daily consumption projections, substantially impacted by ambient

temperature and humidity and, therefore, specific to a geographic region, include

cooling tower make-up

water for peak cooling days during the summer months and reduced usage projections for the cooler parts of

the year. **The estimated total annual water consumption at the South Milledge**

Avenue Site is

43,000,000 gallons (NDP 2007b). An ir retrievable commitment of 2.15 billion gallons of potable water would

be required over the 50-year project life.

The current Athens-Clarke County Public Utilities infrastructure of an existing 8-inch force main on South

Milledge Avenue would not meet the potable water feed redundancy specifications or the consumption/peak

flow requirements for the proposed NBAF without substantial improvements. The proposed upgrades to the

municipal potable water system include the installation of a dedicated, on-site 200,000

3|12.2

(cont.)

Hodges, Susan

Page 4 of 4

WD0799

3|12.2
(cont.)


gallon elevated water tank at the South Milledge Avenue Site. The new elevated tank can be fed from the existing 8-inch water lines on either Whitehall Road or South Milledge Avenue. Based on the information provided, **the proposed improvements would not comply with the redundancy specifications and the peak flow requirements for the proposed NBAF.** An alternate infrastructure improvement plan, authored but not recommended by Athens-Clarke County, is to extend a 12-inch water line to the South Milledge Avenue Site along Whitehall Road from the intersection of Barnett Shoals Road and Gaines School Road and to extend a second, redundant 12-inch water line to the South Milledge Avenue Site from Riverbend Road. Should this alternative be selected, the alternate improvements would comply with both the redundancy specifications and the peak flow requirements.

Holmes, F. Clarke

Page 1 of 2

FD0054

TO:	James Johnson	FAX NUMBER:	1-866-508-6223
COMPANY:	U. S. Department of Homeland Security Science & Technology Directorate		
FROM:	F. Clarke Holmes	DATE:	8-25-08
SUBJECT:	Support for the Flora, Mississippi Bio and Agro-Defense Facility		
COMMENTS:			



Holmes, F. Clarke

Page 2 of 2

[REDACTED] FD0054

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

August 25, 2008

Mr. James V. Johnson
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

RE: Locating a Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Flora, MS

Dear Mr. Johnson:

The Central Mississippi Planning and Development District, which promotes area-wide progress through regional planning and development concepts in areas such as local planning, government management, and human resource coordination, fully supports locating a Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Flora. The District strongly believes that locating this facility in Central Mississippi will create a positive ripple effect on the entire state for generations to come. This facility will not only help in keeping some of the state's brightest from leaving, but bring new opportunities to all of our schools, colleges and universities. Locating this facility in Flora is truly a once in a lifetime opportunity for Mississippi.

Sincerely,

F. Clarke Holmes

[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.5
DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Jackson, Barbara

Page 1 of 2

MD0162



OFFICE OF PLANNING AND BUDGET

Sonny Perdue
Governor

Trey Childress
Director

GEORGIA STATE CLEARINGHOUSE MEMORANDUM
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12372 REVIEW PROCESS

TO: James Johnson
U. S. Dept. of Homeland Security

FROM: Barbara Jackson
Georgia State Clearinghouse

DATE: August 20, 2008

SUBJECT: GA 080627018 -- NBAF DEIS: Construction and Operation of the
National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (to be located at one of 6 tentative site
alternatives - South Milledge Avenue, Athens, GA)

Enclosed comments were received from the reviewing agency after the review
period and after the project had been closed out. Although the reviewing agency may
have already responded to you directly, I have gone ahead and sent you a copy of their
comments for your files. We will retain a copy with our files also.

Thank you.

/bj
Encl.

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

Office: 404-656-3855

270 Washington Street, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334

Fax: 404-656-7916

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 3.0

DHS notes commenter's suggestion. Should a decision be made to build NBAF, DHS would meet all
federal, state and local regulations.

Jackson, Barbara

Page 2 of 2

Resend08-20-08;10:35AM; ;404-463-7669 # 2/ 2 MD0162

**GEORGIA STATE CLEARINGHOUSE MEMORANDUM
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12372 REVIEW PROCESS**

TO: Barbara Jackson
Georgia State Clearinghouse
270 Washington Street, SW, Eighth Floor
Atlanta, Georgia 30334

FROM: DR. CAROL COUCH *Carol Couch*
DNR/EPD/DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

SUBJECT: Executive Order 12372 Review

APPLICANT: U. S. Dept. of Homeland Security

PROJECT: NBAF DEIS: Construction and Operation of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (to be located at one of 6 tentative site alternatives - South Milledge Avenue, Athens, GA)

STATE ID: GA080627018

FEDERAL ID:

DATE:

1|3.0 This notice is considered to be consistent with those state or regional goals, policies, plans, fiscal resources, criteria for developments of regional impact, environmental impacts, federal executive orders, acts and/or rules and regulations with which this organization is concerned.


This notice is not consistent with:

- The goals, plans, policies, or fiscal resources with which this organization is concerned. (Line through inappropriate word or words and prepare a statement that explains the rationale for the inconsistency. (Additional pages may be used for outlining the inconsistencies. Be sure to put the GA State ID number on all pages).
- The criteria for developments of regional impact, federal executive orders, acts and/or rules and regulations administered by your agency. Negative environmental impacts or provision for protection of the environment should be pointed out. (Additional pages may be used for outlining the inconsistencies. Be sure to put the GA State ID number on all pages).
- This notice does not impact upon the activities of the organization.

NOTE: Should you decide to FAX this form (and any attached pages), it is not necessary to mail the originals to us. [404-656-7916]

RECEIVED
AUG 20 2008
GEORGIA STATE CLEARINGHOUSE

Form SC-3
Sept. 2007



Kirkwood, Arlen

Page 1 of 1

MD0166

Aug 21 08

Dear James V Johnson

I never take the time to sit and write letters but I feel the Bioterror they are considering for K-State is a very Bad Idea.

If an accidental release would happen it would bankrupt thousands of Farmers and would totally destroy many farms and families Please do not put this anywhere in the Midwest, Thanks for your time

Sincerely,
Arlen Kirkwood

PS I could say a lot more but I am sure you have heard it all

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the economic effects of an accidental release of a pathogen. Chapter 3, Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. DHS cannot guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident; however, the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen from the NBAF is extremely low. The economic impact of an accidental release, including the impact on the livestock-related industries, is presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. The major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a potential ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free.

1| 25.4

2| 15.4

Koenig, Marie Hodgson

Page 1 of 1

MD0179

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 27.0
DHS notes the information submitted by the commentor.

1)27.0



Koenig, Marie Hodgson

Page 1 of 1

MD0167

Aug. 14 '08

Dear Mr. Johnson,

I respect you for doing your job -- searching for an NBAF site.

And I know you will respect my opposition to having NBAF in Athens.

Placing the largest high consequence bio-containment research facility in the world next to our Botanical Garden is really an incredibly awful proposal.

The General Accounting Office May 22 report to Congress finds that DHS "lacks evidence to conclude that Fort-and-Mount's disease research can be done safely on the U.S. mainland."

The State Botanical Garden has just received a state grant to protect its bird-life. Your DEIS says NBAF's 4-year or more, construction will scare the birds away.

So for human safety + love of the garden, I oppose NBAF in Athens!

Sincerely,
Marie Koenig

1| 25.2

2| 6.2

3| 21.2

4| 23.0

1 cont. | 25.2

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 6.2


DHS notes the commentor's concern and acknowledges the proximity of the South Milledge Avenue Site to the State Botanical Garden. As described in Section 3.8.3.1.1 of the NBAF EIS, 80% of the site consists of pasture, and the adjacent lands consist of forested lands and small, perennial headwater streams. Approximately 30 acres of open pasture, 0.2 acres of forested habitat, and less than 0.1 acres of wetlands would be affected by the NBAF. However, construction and normal operations of the NBAF would have no direct impact on the State Botanical Garden as indicated in Sections 3.8.3.2 and 3.8.3.3.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives and reference to the U.S. Government Accountability Office report (May 2008) as justification. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable it to be safely operated on the mainland. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS show that even though Plum Island has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites. The lower potential effect is due both to the water barrier around the island and the lack of livestock and susceptible wildlife species.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 23.0



DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the effects of construction of the NBAF on birds. Section 3.5.5.3 addresses operational noise impacts associated with the proposed NBAF. Minor noise impacts would result from an increase in traffic and operation of the facility's filtration, heating, and cooling systems. Section 3.5.5.3 describes noise-attenuating design features that would minimize noise emissions. In the event of a power outage, operation of back-up generators could have a short-term impact on wildlife by discouraging utilization of immediately adjacent habitats. Routine operations at the NBAF would not be likely to have significant noise impacts on wildlife. Security requirements at the proposed NBAF would require continuous outdoor nighttime lighting. Nighttime lighting has the potential to impact wildlife through astronomical and ecological light pollution. Unshielded lighting can shine upward and interfere with bird migration, disorienting birds and causing them to collide with structures. Birds are attracted to lights and may collide with lighted structures. Most concerns involve lighting associated with high-rise buildings and tele-communication towers; however, even residential lighting can affect some birds. The USFWS advocates the use of shielded lighting to minimize adverse impacts on migratory birds. Shielded fixtures direct light downwards and can be used to keep light within the boundaries of the site. The NBAF would employ the minimum intensity of lighting that is necessary to provide adequate security. Mitigative measures, such as those described above, will be considered in the final design of the NBAF. Lighting would have the



potential for adverse impacts (i.e., repulsion and interference with foraging behavior) on resident wildlife immediately adjacent to the NBAF. However, the use of shielded lighting would minimize the potential for impacts in adjacent habitats. Given the relatively low profile of the building and the use of mitigative measures, significant lighting impacts on migratory birds would not be likely to occur.

Lewis, III, A. Jefferson

Page 1 of 2



Lewis, III, A. Jefferson

Page 2 of 2

MD0160

Mr. James V. Johnson
August 21, 2008
page 2

The majority of comments related to me deal with the aesthetic impact that such a facility would have on South Milledge Avenue and the dismay that such beautiful land would be used for such a purpose. I am aware that another Athens site was offered for consideration, but have not learned why it was rejected.

1/26.0

If I might inject one personal concern, it is that the State Botanical Garden, arguably the unit that would be most impacted by NBAF, has been largely ignored by DHS and the EIS team. To my knowledge, no one other than UGA Vice President for Research, Dr. David Lee, ever visited the Botanical Garden, met with any member of my staff, made any concerted attempt to keep us informed, or requested any data about the natural environment and biodiversity represented here.

I realize the decision to locate NBAF is a complex scientific, economic and politically charged issue. I appreciate the attempt of DHS to hear all views and carefully weigh all considerations in the decision making process.

Sincerely,



A. Jefferson Lewis III
Director

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the proximity of the site to the State Botanical Garden and the Whitehall Forest Important Bird Area (IBA). As indicated in Sections 3.8.3.2 and 3.8.3.3 of the NBAF EIS, construction and normal operations of the NBAF would have no direct impact on the State Botanical Garden or IBA. The NBAF would affect primarily pasture areas that have low wildlife habitat value due to their disturbed condition, lack of native vegetation, and lack of wildlife food and cover. The forested portion of the NBAF site along the Oconee River is a high-value riparian wildlife corridor that connects the State Botanical Garden with the IBA. However, impacts to the forested riparian area would be minor (0.2 acre), and these impacts would occur within the existing pasture fence-line in areas that have been disturbed by grazing. The high-value forested riparian corridor would be preserved; and therefore, the NBAF would not have significant direct impacts on wildlife dispersal between the State Botanical Garden and the IBA. The potential impacts of an accidental release on wildlife are addressed in Section 3.8.9. Birds are not susceptible to diseases that are currently designated to be studied at the NBAF. Although the NBAF EIS acknowledges the potential for significant impacts on other species of wildlife in the event of an accidental release, the risk of such a release is extremely low (see Section 3.14). It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas and in areas with abundant wildlife. State-of-the-art biocontainment facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF. Furthermore, the purpose of the NBAF is to combat diseases that could have significant effects on wildlife. Research at the NBAF would include the development of vaccines for wildlife that could prevent adverse impacts from a foreign introduction.

Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program. DHS has conducted public meetings in excess of the minimum required by NEPA regulations; to date, 24 public meetings have been held in the vicinity of NBAF site alternatives and in Washington, D.C. to solicit public input on the EIS, allow the public to voice their concerns, and to get their questions answered DHS has also provided fact sheets, reports, exhibits, and a Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). Additionally, various means of communication (mail, toll free telephone and fax lines, and NBAF Web site) have been provided to facilitate public comment. It is DHS policy to encourage public input on matters of national and international importance.

Primos, Houston

Page 1 of 1

MD0151

James V. Johnson
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson;

I am a landowner in the [redacted] Mississippi, [redacted] and am writing this letter to show my support for the building of the National Bio-Agri Defense Laboratory in my community. I believe the Bio Lab would be a great asset to the state of Mississippi, as well as the Flora area.


1|24.5

I would be proud for Mississippi to be a part of protecting our nation's security against bioterrorism. I trust in our government to keep this facility safe in my community. I understand that some of the other communities do not support some of the sites under consideration. I do not think that you will meet this roadblock in the state of Mississippi; the community is behind this effort.

As a father I support this opportunity as a chance to keep Mississippi's young bright people working in our state. With access to several accredited Universities, Community Colleges, and trade schools, I believe we are ready to meet this demand. I also believe that we have a high quality of life as well as a low cost of living, that will attract talented people from all parts of this country. I think this facility will improve the quality of life here in Flora by bringing a significant economic boom to my state.

Thank you for your time and attention in this matter. I hope you will take my comments and the comments of other people from our state into consideration when deciding where to build the new National Bio-Agri Defense Laboratory.

Sincerely,



Houston C. Primos

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Reil, Jodi

Page 1 of 2

4
10/1



STATE OF CONNECTICUT
EXECUTIVE CHAMBERS

RECEIVED BY REGISTER CLERK
2009 SEP 17 PM 2:41

M. JODI REIL
GOVERNOR

August 21, 2008

The Honorable Michael Chertoff
Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, D.C. 20528

Re: National Biological and Agriculture Defense Facility

Dear Secretary Chertoff:

11.0 In an era when we face new and increased threats to the security and safety of our nation, it is critical for the United States to maintain a strong capacity for researching, detecting, protecting against and responding to bioterrorism threats. Vital to the success of this mission is ensuring that this country has the most up-to-date facilities possible in order to keep pace with the development of any new threats.

As the federal government considers potential locations for new or expanded biological research facilities it must, however, give ample consideration to factors that would render some sites inappropriate for these types of installations.

I would strongly argue that the Plum Island Animal Disease Center is just such a location and that it should not be considered as a site for the proposed National Biological and Agricultural Defense Facility. While it has served as one of the world's foremost animal disease centers for more than fifty years, Plum Island is simply not the proper location for a facility that will be involved with research on the world's most deadly biological threats.

2125.1 The existing Plum Island facility is located just nine miles off the coast of Connecticut and the town of Old Saybrook and is a relatively short distance from many population centers, both in Connecticut and New York. It is within one of the most densely populated regions of our nation. Plum Island is also located in Long Island Sound, one of the most important estuarine habitats in the entire country. Over the last decade, the states of Connecticut and New York have invested billions of dollars to protect and preserve the sensitive natural resources of the Sound.

Locating this laboratory on Plum Island, with its close proximity to the shores of Connecticut, Long Island, and New York City, could place the health and safety of millions of people at risk. Further, its presence in Long Island Sound could threaten a delicate ecosystem.

As you are well aware, a great deal has changed since the animal disease research facility was first constructed on Plum Island in the 1950s. At the time Plum Island was constructed, shortly after the Second World War and during the Korean War, the world and this country was entering a period when the threats to national security were fewer and better known. The world is different today - the threats to our national security are no longer limited to a handful of nation-states, today's threats now include small

STATE CAPITOL HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06106
TEL (860) 566-6840 • FAX: (860) 524-7396
www.ct.gov

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 1.0

DHS notes the Governor's support for the proposed research that would be conducted within the NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.1

DHS notes the Governor's opposition to the Plum Island Site Alternative. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF. Regarding the threat of terrorists, a Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only) was prepared that evaluated site-specific security issues including those from a terrorist threat. Regardless of location, the NBAF would have the levels of protection and control required by applicable DHS security directives.

Reil, Jodi

Page 2 of 2

sects of individuals who utilize both crude and sophisticated means to threatened the well-being of our citizens.

2/25.1
cont. This shift is important to note when considering whether or not build a new biological and agricultural research facility on Plum Island. Beyond the environmental concerns of constructing a new laboratory on Plum Island today, isolating such an important research facility in the middle of Long Island Sound, and in the middle of a major population center, and in the vicinity of critical defense capabilities such as the submarine base in New London is strategically and logistically more problematic than when the facility was constructed more than fifty years ago.

3/5.0 Residents of Connecticut and the entire country would be better served by locating this facility at a site that minimizes the dangers of working with deadly infectious agents and in area that can be better supported by critical infrastructure, including utilities and transportation networks – the present day facility on Plum Island is primarily accessible by ferry. In fact in March of this year, I sent a letter to Kansas Governor Kathleen Sebelius expressing my support for siting the National Biological and Agricultural Defense Facility in her state, which has expressed interest in locating it at a suitable venue there – combining it with existing research capabilities.

The current facility on Plum Island has served its useful purpose and it is clear this country is in need of a new research facility that can protect our citizens from biological threats and protect the nation's food supply. I feel strongly that the country should begin transitioning the research capabilities presently located at Plum Island to a new facility on the mainland. Such action will not only ensure this country has the most advanced bioterrorism research capabilities in the world thereby protecting the citizens of this country, but it will also ensure the valuable natural resources of Long Island Sound are preserved.

Thank you for your consideration of my concerns.

Sincerely,



M. Jodi Reil
Governor

cc: Jay Cohen, Under Secretary for Science and Technology

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.0
DHS notes the Governor's statement and opinion supporting the Manhattan Campus Site.

Royster, Jr., T.S.

Page 1 of 1

MD0172

ROYSTER, CROSS & HENSLEY, LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW

T.S. ROYSTER, JR.
JAMES E. CROSS, JR.
DALE W. HENSLEY

135 COLLEGE STREET
P.O. DRAWER 1168
OXFORD, NORTH CAROLINA 27565

TELEPHONE: 219) 695-5131
TELECOPIER: 219) 695-2919
E-MAIL: att@roystercross.com
jec@roystercross.com
dwh@roystercross.com

August 19, 2008

Mr. James V. Johnson, Science and Technology Directorate
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW; Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

Re: Bio-Defense Facility, Butner, N.C.



Dear Mr. Johnson:

1) 24.3 Our firm has been practicing law in Granville County since 1888. We feel that we have a good pulse on the community. Therefore, it is important to let you know that not only do the three of us support the proposed Bio-Defense Facility in Butner, North Carolina, but we also think that the Granville County business community and a vast majority of citizens support the project as well.

It is our personal feelings that such a facility would be a very worthwhile scientific and technological endeavor which would enhance our county. Regrettably, too often the voice of the few is the one that is heard louder than the rest. Therefore, we appreciate the opportunity to join in the support of the Bio-Defense Facility.

Sincerely yours,

ROYSTER, CROSS & HENSLEY, LLP


T.S. Royster, Jr.

James E. Cross, Jr.

Dale W. Hensley

JECjr/tsb

cc: The Honorable James W. Crawford, Jr.
North Carolina House of Representatives

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.3

DHS notes the commentator's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Sikora, Walter

Page 1 of 1

MD0178



U.S. Homeland Security Section
 Science & Technical Directorate
 James V. Johnson Bldg.
 Mail Stop 2100
 245 Murray Lane S.W.
 Building 410
 Washington D.C. 20528

August 21, 2008

ATTN: NBAF Program Manager;

1| 25.2 | Moving the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility to Athens, Georgia is a very bad idea for at the very least two reasons:

2| 21.2 | 1) The risks are much too great. The safety of an island away from any livestock operations is the reason the U.S. hasn't had any major outbreaks of hoof and mouth disease or other contagious diseases. This safety shield would be compromised despite the best efforts since these very contagious diseases can be transported on human clothing, skin, hair and even respiratory systems. Keep this facility on an island.

4| 12.2 | 2) Athens Georgia has limited water resources. Last year we came within one step of the severest water use restrictions, as the water supply came close to running completely out, which would have necessitated the trucking in of water in order to survive. The idea of relocating a huge water user such as the NBAF, whose water needs would have to be met or risk dire consequences, is pure folly.

5| 4.2 | Lastly, the fact that the address to which public comments should be sent was not published in the local newspaper or included as a flier with public mailings such as the monthly water bill, is a strong indication that both the U.S. and local governments are disingenuous about receiving citizen input. That in itself is enough reason to say **NO** to NBAF in Athens, Georgia.

cont.
1| 25.2

Sincerely yours,

 Walter B. Sikora

cc: Congressman Paul Broun

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF. No-fly zones would be considered along with other security measures for the proposed NBAF regardless of the site selected.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.0

See response to Comment No. 2.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water, an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 4.2

DHS prepared the NBAF EIS and all associated advertisements and mailings in accordance with the provisions of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and CEQ's regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1500 et seq.). Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program. DHS has conducted public meetings in excess of the minimum required by NEPA regulations; to date, 24 public meetings have been held in the vicinity of NBAF site alternatives and in Washington, D.C. to solicit public input on the EIS, allow the public to voice their concerns, and to get their questions answered DHS has also provided fact sheets, reports, exhibits, and a Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). Additionally, various means of communication (mail, toll free telephone and fax lines, and NBAF Web site) have been provided to facilitate public comment. It is DHS policy to encourage public input on matters of national and international importance.

Stallbaumer, Patricia

Page 1 of 1

WD0576

From: Patricia Stallbaumer [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2008 3:25 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF

Dear Sir:

1|25.4 | I am writing this to protest the building of the NBAF Lab in Manhattan, Kansas. This lab should
 2| 5.1 | be kept where it is on Plum Island. It was put there for a good reason.

Now, since the meeting in Manhattan is over, I hear on TV etc. that there is little protesting being done in Kansas. The reason is, that this has been kept as secretive as possible. Before the meeting there were next to no articles in our papers, on TV, or on radio. That is why when I mention it to someone, they have no idea what I am talking about, or what it really is. This is the reason there has been little protesting done.

4|13.4 | Within the sixty mile radius of Manhattan, there are numerous dairies, hog farms, cattle feed lots, ranches and dog kennels, as well as people. There is also an abundant amount of wild life, deer, raccoons, squirrels and rabbits. There would be no way to control contaminated wildlife.

5| 19.4 | We are told that this will be a safe building. Even you do not say it is impossible for so called "accidents", quoting DHS "The risk is moderate if there is an explosion from a buildup of gas or flammable chemicals in an enclosed area". The Government accountability Office has also cited the lack of safety study done by Homeland Security. There is also the fact that we do have F5 tornado's in Kansas, plus fault lines, close enough to do damage if they become active. This
 6| 21.4 | along with the fact that all the viruses and microorganisms will be transported across our state. How safe will that be?

cont.| 2| 5.1 | Arnold G. Wedum PhD in his Laboratory Safety Research paper states that accidents have, and will continue to happen. These "accidents" could end our civilization as we know it. Why are we considering this awful lab. Keep it where it is." I definetly agree with him. We do not want it in Kansas,

Sincerely,

Patricia Stallbaumer

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.1


DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 13.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the potential effects of an accidental release on wildlife in the vicinity of the Manhattan Campus Site. The potential impacts of an accidental release on wildlife and the potential response measures are addressed in Section 3.8.9. Although the NBAF EIS acknowledges the potential for significant impacts on wildlife in the event of an accidental release, the risk of such a release is extremely low (see Section 3.14). It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas and in areas with abundant wildlife. State-of-the-art biocontainment facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF. Furthermore, the purpose of NBAF is to combat diseases that could have significant effects on wildlife. Research at the NBAF would include the development of vaccines for wildlife that could prevent adverse impacts from a foreign introduction.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 19.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period. In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado.



DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the NBAF. The purpose and need for the proposed action is discussed in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS can not guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident. However, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, modern biosafety design substantially diminishes the chances of a release as the primary design goal is to provide an adequate level of redundant safety and biocontainment that would be integrated into every component of the building. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS believes proven procedures for the movement of select agents via ground and air transportation is quite safe. Only qualified and trained carriers will be used. For detailed information on the transport and handling of pathogens see 3.11.9.

Strickland, Mary

Page 1 of 1

MD0149

August 16, 2008

Dear Mr. Johnson,

I am writing because I am very concerned regarding the proposed site for a Bio-lab in Athens, Ga. Our family lives about [redacted] from there and it greatly distresses my family and our neighbors to think of the ultimate effect that a bio defense lab in our neighborhood ^{might have} regarding our health, safety and peace of mind.

It is difficult to understand why the Dept of Homeland Security would want to put a facility that is twice the size of the Super Flores in such a beautiful, unspoiled area. It seems that there would be alternative options where the land itself is more isolated and undesirable.

The proposed site adjoins one of the treasures of this community: The Botanical Gardens. We have always prided ourselves and felt incredibly blessed to be so close to the Gardens. Our family has spent hours hiking, picnicking and enjoying time on the trails and along the river with our children and grandchildren.

Why spoil a pristine parcel of land for these purposes? I humbly implore you to NOT choose Athens as your site and to assure those of us who live peacefully within the neighboring territory - our homeland security.

Sincerely,
Mary Strickland (a nurse, mother, grandmother & concerned citizen)

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 19.2

DHS notes the commenter's concern regarding the NBAF. DHS can not guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident. However, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, modern biosafety design substantially diminishes the chances of a release as the primary design goal is to provide an adequate level of redundant safety and biocontainment that would be integrated into every component of the building. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commenter's preference for siting the NBAF in a more isolated location. As described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's site selection criteria included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or semi-urban areas. Nevertheless, it has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 6.2


DHS notes the commenter's concern and acknowledges the proximity of the South Milledge Avenue Site to the State Botanical Garden. As described in Section 3.8.3.1.1 of the NBAF EIS, 80% of the site consists of pasture, and the adjacent lands consist of forested lands and small, perennial headwater streams. Approximately 30 acres of open pasture, 0.2 acres of forested habitat, and less than 0.1 acres of wetlands would be affected by the NBAF. However, construction and normal operations of the NBAF would have no direct impact on the State Botanical Garden as indicated in Sections 3.8.3.2 and 3.8.3.3. Only minimal indirect effects would occur from operations due to increases in light and noise.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commenter's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Thrasher, III, Grady

Page 1 of 1



Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 27.0
DHS notes the commentor's request.

Thrasher, III, Grady

Page 1 of 3

CD1514

FAQinc. "For Athens Quality-of-life"
 196 Alps Road, Suite 2, Box 205
 Athens, Georgia 30606
www.athensfaq.org

April 14, 2008

James V. Johnson
 U. S. Department of Homeland Security
 Science and Technology Directorate
 Mail Stop #2100
 245 Murray Lane SW
 Building 410
 Washington, DC 20528

Re: NBAF DEIS Scoping Information
 for the record.

Dear Mr. Johnson,

1| 25.2

Groups of hand-held fans like the ones enclosed, each signed by one or more citizens of the Athens, GA area, will be arriving in your office in installments between now and August 25. Each fan is a visual scoping comment for the record and a reminder from the people of Athens/Clarke County and Oconee County, Georgia area that we oppose locating the proposed NBAF in Athens.

It is important to note that the opposition in Athens is much more broad-based than the local news media or UGA officials are willing to admit. UGA economic intimidation (both actual and perceived—UGA is by far the largest employer in town) plus a compromised local press (the publisher of the Athens Banner-Herald is affiliated with the Georgia Consortium) may have kept the vocal outpouring of dissent quieter in Athens than in Butner, NC, but strong dissent is here, both visible and simmering beneath the surface, and represented by much greater numbers than perhaps anyone realizes.

Even more important, however, is that we ask DHS take a clear-headed and clear-eyed view of the 67 acres on S. Milledge Avenue so casually offered up by UGA as a proposed site for NBAF. We hope you realize by now that this acreage would be a dreadful site for the NBAF. NBAF, with its massive size and difficult mission, is not an appropriate tenant for this unique and distinctive landscape. It is not even close.

2| 11.2

The DEIS is gravely deficient in analyzing what a poor and inappropriate choice the proposed site on S. Milledge would be to even try to build the world's largest high consequence bio-containment research facility. Safety issues aside, the invasive construction methods required to be employed to blast through layers of bedrock alone would destroy or degrade the sensitive environmental and ecological balance of an area

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 11.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the effects of construction on bedrock in the area. The NBAF EIS Section 3.6.3 describes the South Milledge Avenue Site alternative's soil and geological conditions and Section 3.6.3.2 describes potential construction consequences. A detailed geotechnical report will be prepared for the selected site and will be used in the NBAF's final design specifications including subsurface rock strata and construction implications. The proposed NBAF developed footprint will reduce the allowable area for groundwater recharge, however preliminary design parameters such as pervious pavement and stormwater reuse will minimize the effect. Section 3.5.3 of the NBAF EIS describes the potential construction and operational consequences from noise affects at the South Milledge Avenue Site alternative. Once a site is selected, a detailed geotechnical report will be prepared and results included in construction management efforts. If blasting is required, steps will be taken to minimize the blast number(s), intensity, and duration. A blasting plan would be developed implementing blasting measures such as minimizing explosive weights, stemming depths and material, and delay configurations all to mitigate potential noise levels.

Thrasher, III, Grady

Page 2 of 3

CD1514

2 cont. | 11.2

of Athens that has been enjoyed and valued by our community for generations. If UGA's experience with its own BSL-3 Animal Health Research Center is any indication, because of bedrock and resulting design and construction problems, the costs could triple (they did with AHRC), and the time to build could extend for many years past the four year estimate (it took over ten years to construct AHRC, a facility barely one-seventh the size of the proposed NBAF).

3 | 6.2

To ignore or minimize the permanent degradation the proposed NBAF would impose on that entire lovely and beloved stretch of S. Milledge, devoted to outdoor activity and nature appreciation (the Botanical Garden, the river and wetlands, the Equestrian Center, Whitehall Forest, and public sports facilities) would be an outrage and insult to the people of Athens. UGA has already damaged its reputation in Athens and insulted the community by offering the site without meaningful community input or careful consideration of the proposed NBAF's destructive impact on this valued and sensitive area. **Please do not add injury to this insult.**

Sincerely,



Grady Thrasher
for FAQinc "For Athens-Quality-of-life"


Comment No: 3

Issue Code: 6.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the proximity of the site to the State Botanical Garden and the Whitehall Forest Important Bird Area (IBA). As indicated in Sections 3.8.3.2 and 3.8.3.3 of the NBAF EIS, construction and normal operations of the NBAF would have no direct impact on the State Botanical Garden or IBA. The NBAF would affect primarily pasture areas that have low wildlife habitat value due to their disturbed condition, lack of native vegetation, and lack of wildlife food and cover. The forested portion of the NBAF site along the Oconee River is a high-value riparian wildlife corridor that connects the State Botanical Garden with the IBA. However, impacts to the forested riparian area would be minor (0.2 acre), and these impacts would occur within the existing pasture fence-line in areas that have been disturbed by grazing. The high-value forested riparian corridor would be preserved; and therefore, the NBAF would not have significant direct impacts on wildlife dispersal between the State Botanical Garden and the IBA. The potential impacts of an accidental release on wildlife are addressed in Section 3.8.9. Birds are not susceptible to diseases that are currently designated to be studied at the NBAF. Although the NBAF EIS acknowledges the potential for significant impacts on other species of wildlife in the event of an accidental release, the risk of such a release is extremely low (see Section 3.14). Recreational amenities would not be substantially affected by construction or operation of the NBAF.

Thrasher, III, Grady

Page 3 of 3



Turner, Terry and Debra

Page 1 of 1

MD0180

RECEIVED BY S&T EXEC SEC

2008 NOV 19



Dear Secretary Cohen;

1|25.3

According to your own criteria for locating the NBAF, community acceptance is one necessary requirement. As you are aware that criteria is not met in North Carolina. Since you have already rejected sites with less opposition, please add North Carolina to that list of rejections.

Why, site your proposed facility where you sure to encounter legal battles and strong protest? Regardless of the other criteria, lack of community support will only hinder and/or halt your efforts to build the lab.

With local and state support eroding, it time to remove North Carolina from your list of potential NBAF sites.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "T. Turner".

Terry Turner

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Walters, Alan

Page 1 of 1

MD0158

August 18, 2008



U. S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW. Bldg. #410
Washington, DC 20258

Dear Mr. Johnson:

11
24.5

As a resident of the Jackson Metropolitan Area, I am writing you to support the pending decision to locate the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Flora, Mississippi. I attended one of the recent sessions that were held in Flora and I appreciated you and your associates being here with us. As President and CEO of a bank that is based in the Jackson Metropolitan area, and focuses on servicing the business and professional communities, I can tell you that we are excited about the possibility of having the facility locate here. It is an honor to have our area to be considered to play such a vital role in protecting our nation's security against bio-terrorism.

21
8.5

The quality of life here in the Metropolitan Area is excellent and I know that your employees and their families will be pleased with what they find when they move here. In addition, there are numerous outstanding educational institutions, both public and private, which offer excellent educational opportunities in both the sciences and the arts.

If I might be of any assistance to you or your staff in this evaluation process or after the decision to locate the facility in Flora is made, please do not hesitate to call upon me.

Sincerely,

Alan H. Walters
President

AHW/lm

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 8.5

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Weems, Walter

Page 1 of 1

MD0161



WALTER S. WEEMS
 1400 Trustmark Building Post Office Drawer 119
 248 East Capitol Street Jackson, Mississippi 39205
 E-mail: wweems@brunini.com
 Direct: 601.960.6863 Jackson, Mississippi 39201
 Telephone: 601.948.3101 Facsimile: 601.960.6902

August 20, 2008

United States Department of Homeland Security
 Science and Technology Directorate
 James V. Johnson
 Mail Stop # 2100
 245 Murray Lane, SW
 Building 410
 Washington, D. C. 20528

Re: National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility ("NBAF")

Dear Mr. Johnson:

I am Chairman of my law firm and Chairman-Elect of the Greater Jackson Chamber Partnership, the regional chamber of commerce for the Hinds, Rankin, and Madison County, Mississippi, area. I attended your scoping meeting in Flora approximately a year ago, and I also attended the meeting in Flora two weeks ago in which you solicited comments on the draft Environmental Impact Statement for our area. I have attended several briefings on the proposed NBAF in which the need and security features were discussed, and I have also hosted a meeting in my home for a number of friends and neighbors to educate them on the possible location of the facility in Flora, Mississippi.

People in our community understand the need for the NBAF to provide security against bioterrorism, and there is a strong sentiment in central Mississippi that we want this facility to be located here. I understand that the facility will be safe and secure, and both your team and our local scientists have done an excellent job in educating the public here about the security features. I can assure you that our business and professional community will embrace NBAF if it is located in Flora, and we will make sure that both the institution and its personnel receive the warm welcome and hospitality that Mississippians are known for. We also have a skilled workforce with a strong work ethic, and you will have no problem in hiring locally to fill needs not required to be imported from elsewhere.

We appreciate the strong consideration that your team is giving Mississippi, and I just wanted to write this letter to let you know that the vast majority of informed citizens in our area understand the need for NBAF from a national security standpoint, appreciate the benefits that NBAF would provide our area in terms of economic development and high-level job opportunities, and genuinely want the NBAF to be located at the Flora site.

Sincerely,

Walter S. Weems

WSW/vmp

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.5

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

1) 24.5

2) 8.5

1 cont.

| 24.5

Multiple Signatory Letter 1

Page 1 of 1

MD0176

1|25.2

It would be dangerous & irresponsible to place the bio-containment research facility at any location in the Allen Area.

1. Patricia M. Shoras



2. Francis J. Fumally



Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentors' opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.