

Engel, Bruce

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PD0111

August 19, 2008

1|5.1 My name is Bruce Engel. I'm a former resident of ██████ itself. Even though that there're probably be some people that would probably think that I would probably be in favor of moving Plum Island, I am not. I would rather see it be left there because (1) is that one of the main reasons for Plum Island was that when it was first started that it had to be off the mainland of the United States. That was a Executive Order basically created by Congress, that was one of the criterias.

1 cont.| 5.1 Even though that some of the buildings are probably...needs to be upgraded, and everything else, that should be done. But to take away Plum Island from where it exists and put it on the mainland would be a very, very grave and very bad decision. If I...if it was me and I had to make that decision, I would keep Plum Island where it is. Maybe it's a political game that somebody's trying to play. It's a bad decision for several reasons. Number one, you don't have to build no fences. It's safe where it is because it's not on the mainland of the United States.

3|21.1 If an animal were to escape from Plum Island, he'd be easy to capture and a lot faster and a lot easier, definitely. Also, with you being on the mainland, you'd have a greater chance of having a plague livestock on the mainland where it is now there's no bridges, no nothing where an animal can escape. Even if a deer or other animal does come upon Plum Island, it is automatically destroyed. I remember a time when my mother saw ...and I both saw a (inaudible) being destroyed and we was wondering why, until my father let us know exactly what it was. Because stuff that goes on that island does not come off.

1 cont.| 5.1 We have a greater risk of stuff, plus Plum Island's self contained. That is one of the greatest things. It's self contained. In other words if you bring it on the mainland, it's not self contained. You have other accesses and (inaudible). There is none.

So in my opinion, leaving Plum Island where it is and adding that lab to that would be the greatest thing. Would be the best thing. No matter what anybody wants to say, I lived on that ██████ I know the island well, even though I was a small child when I did come to Plum Island. I'm one of the few that can actually say that they actually lived ██████ I remember taking the boat several times back and forth to school and everything else. I want to see it there.

Another reason is that my father was part of the security force that was there from the beginning up until 1970. So please keep it there. Not just because of my father, but because of all the men and women that gave their life, that sacrificed their lives day in and day out to make sure that that island was safe. And for the people who are also safeguarding it today. Keep it there.

1 cont.| 5.1 It'd be a very, very, very bad decision of moving and...moving it to the mainland would be the best....the worse decision that this administration has made...will make. And I hate to see the consequences of the things that could happen.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives and support for the Plum Island Site Alternative. The proposed NBAF requires BSL-4 capability to meet mission requirements (DHS and USDA). PIADC does not have BSL-4 laboratory or animal space, and the existing PIADC facilities are inadequate to support a BSL-4 laboratory. Upgrading the existing facilities to allow PIADC to meet the current mission would be more costly than building the NBAF on Plum Island, as discussed in Section 2.4.1 of the NBAF EIS. Additionally, the NBAF EIS does fully analyze the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS describes the purpose and need for DHS's proposed action to site, construct, and operate the NBAF. Section 7524 of the the Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 (Farm Bill) directs the Secretary of Agriculture to issue a permit to the Secretary of Homeland Security for work on live virus Foot and Mouth Disease at any facility that is the successor to the Plum Island Animal Disease Center. There are no limitations as to where in the United States the facility can be built.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS evaluate the potential effects on health and safety of operating the NBAF at the six site alternatives. The evaluation concludes that a pathogen release at the Plum Island Site would be slightly less likely to result in adverse effects than the mainland sites.

Engel, Bruce

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PD0111

If anybody would like to get in touch with me, like I said my name is Bruce Engel and my father was Edward L. Engel. He was a sentry rep there from 1953 to 1970 and was there almost 20 years. So I remember quite a bit.

I'm also a graduate of [REDACTED] which I am very proud of, to have been part of.

1 cont. | So whatever you do, please keep Plum Island where it is. Like I said if anybody needs to
5.1 | get in touch with me or to ask me any other questions, I'd be glad to do it.

Talk to you later. Have a nice day.

Bye, bye.

Engel, Mary

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WD0868

From: Mary Engel [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 10:38 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: No to NBAF

1) 25.2 I have been a resident of [REDACTED] Georgia for 17 years and I do not want NBAF in our
 2) 12.2 community. I have chosen to raise my family and work in [REDACTED] because I love our town. I
 3) 6.2 attended the first and most recent NBAF meeting and many in between. I feel our elected
 4) 19.2 officials were negligent in their duty to the citizens of Athens when they invited NBAF. Please
 do not build where you are not wanted for the environmental impact on the river and Botanical
 Gardens. It has been necessary to conserve water and there is not enough for your venture. The
 risk of the deadly diseases on the mainland is not one we are willing to take. Any one of the
 objections should be reason enough to prohibit NBAF building in Athens, added together it is
 unconscionable.

--
 Mary Engel



Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns. The NBAF EIS Section 3.2.3 describes the land use and visual resources associated with the South Milledge Avenue Site including references to the Botanical Gardens. Section 3.7.3 describes the water resources at the South Milledge Avenue Site including potential construction and operational consequences. Section 3.13.4 describes the waste management processes that would be used to control and dispose of NBAF's liquid and solid waste. Sections 3.3.3 and 3.7.3 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spills and runoff affects. During the NBAF's final design and site selection, continued emphasis will be placed on water conservation.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 6.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern and acknowledges the proximity of the South Milledge Avenue Site to the State Botanical Garden. As described in Section 3.8.3.1.1, 80% of the site consists of pasture, and the adjacent lands consist of forested lands and small, perennial headwater streams. Approximately 30 acres of open pasture, 0.2 acres of forested habitat, and less than 0.1 acres of wetlands would be affected by the NBAF. However, construction and normal operations of the NBAF would have no direct impact on the State Botanical Garden as indicated in Sections 3.8.3.2 and 3.8.3.3. Only minimal indirect effects would occur from operations due to increases in light and noise.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 19.2

DHS notes the commentor's opinion that the proposed NBAF research could not be safely conducted at any of the five mainland site alternatives and the commentor's concern about the risk to health and safety from the NBAF operation. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art biocontainment features and operating procedures to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Engelken, Lillian

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WD0791

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 4:55 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager

1| 5.4 | I wish to protest the putting of that Bio lab at Manhattan Kansas. Please
 2| 5.1 | leave it on that island by New York away from humans and also animals. We
 3| 21.4 | do not need to have them experimenting in the heartland of the U.S. and
 then a catastrophe will happen and it will be too late.
 Lillian Engelken

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative and support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the impact of a pathogen release on the local population, livestock industry, businesses and infrastructure. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. The chances of an accidental release are low. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. The need for an evacuation under an accident conditions is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

England, Charles

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WD0882

From: Charlie England [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 4:42 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Comments, Location of NBAF facility in Flora MS

1| 25.5 | I am opposed to locating the new bio-lab in Flora MS, or anywhere else on the mainland. There are many reasons why it should not be located in Flora MS.

2| 26.0 | According to DHS's own documents and internal memos, recently made public, at least sixteen other sites scored higher than Flora in the evaluation process, leading to questions about the decision being driven by powerful politicians instead of best interests of the country.

3| 5.1 | Previous problems with leaks and security breaches on Plum Island prove that an island is the best place to contain any mishaps.

4| 2.0 | Previous failures to report problems at the facility in a timely manner, as required by law, prove that officials cannot be trusted to tell the public the truth about the adverse effects when there are problems, and point to the possibility that officials aren't being honest with the public about the dangers inherent in having such a facility near livestock and people.

Statements in official documents vs. answers to questions at town meetings indicate that there is an attempt to conceal the true nature of the research, with only eight diseases mentioned in official documents but under direct questioning, it was admitted that there is no limit to what might be studied in the lab or to the level of risk to citizens in the surrounding area.

5| 12.5 | Citizens in North Carolina have been unable to get satisfactory answers on how waste water will be processed & returned to the public water supply. Since the water table in and around Flora is often only inches below the surface, any problems at the site are very likely to pollute natural runoff water.

4| 2.0 | Given DHS's enthusiasm for restricting personal freedoms, it seems likely that *any* security related incident at any bio lab anywhere in the country will result in more restrictions on personal freedoms of citizens living near *all* bio labs. I don't want to risk the loss of personal freedoms of movement for the citizens in and around Flora.

6| 15.5 | Huge increases in the required civic infrastructure to support this facility will certainly cause significant increases in property and personal tax burdens on the citizens of Mississippi.

History shows that government facilities, especially Federal facilities are a net drain on the resources of the area where they are located.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.5

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative as well as the other mainland sites.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS held a competitive process to select potential sites for the proposed NBAF as described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. A team of federal employees representing multi-department component offices and multi-governmental agencies (i.e., DHS, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Department of Health and Human Services) reviewed the submissions based primarily on environmental suitability and proximity to research capabilities, proximity to workforce, acquisition/construction/operations, and community acceptance. Ultimately, DHS identified five site alternatives that surpassed others in meeting the evaluation criteria and DHS preferences, and determined that they, in addition to the Plum Island Site, would be evaluated in the EIS as alternatives for the proposed NBAF. The Final Selection Memorandum found on the NBAF website cites why the decision authority selected the Flora Industrial Park Site as an alternative.

DHS prepared the NBAF EIS in accordance with the provisions of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and CEQ's regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1500 et seq.). The primary objective of the EIS is to evaluate the environmental impacts of the no action and site alternatives for locating, constructing and operating the NBAF. As summarized in Section 3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS analyzed each environmental resource area in a consistent manner across all the alternatives to allow for a fair comparison among the alternatives. The decision on whether to build the NBAF will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS and support documents; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in section 2.3.1; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.

The Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, with other Department officials, will consider the factors identified above in making final decisions regarding the NBAF. A Record of Decision (ROD) that explains the final decisions will be made available no sooner than 30 days after the Final NBAF EIS is published.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS state that the specific objective of the hazard identification is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The NBAF would provide state-of-

the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Appendix B describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF then site-specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed the NBAF. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of confidence in the DHS. DHS has made every effort to explain the operational aspects of NBAF and has conducted a thorough and open public outreach program in support of the NBAF EIS that exceeded NEPA requirements. DHS prepared the NBAF EIS in accordance with the provisions of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and CEQ's regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1500 et seq.). Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program and has been as forthcoming as possible in disseminating information about NBAF as program planning has matured over time. The primary objective of the EIS is to evaluate the environmental impacts of a range of reasonable alternatives for locating, constructing and operating the NBAF.

DHS notes the commentor's concern that all possible pathogens to be studied at the NBAF are not listed in the NBAF EIS. The pathogens to be studied at the NBAF as provided in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS include Foot and Mouth Disease virus, Classical Swine Fever virus, Vesicular Stomatitis virus, Rift Valley Fever virus, Nipah virus, Hendra virus, and African Swine Fever virus. Should the NBAF be directed to study any pathogens not included in the list of pathogens included in the NBAF EIS, DHS and USDA would conduct an evaluate of the new pathogen(s) to determine if the potential challenges and consequences were bounded by the current study. If not, a new risk assessment would be prepared and a separate NEPA evaluation may be required.

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the state and local government's cost associated with constructing the NBAF. Funding for the design, construction, and operations for the NBAF will come from the Federal government. Proposals for offsets to the site infrastructure (part of the construction costs) were requested by the Federal government. The decision as to what to offer (land donation, funding, other assets) is solely as the discretion of the consortium, state and local officials as part of the consortium bid site package. The amount of funding and how the funding is paid for (bonds, taxes, etc) is determined by the state and local government officials and not the decision of the

Federal government.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 12.5

DHS notes the commenter's wastewater treatment concerns. The NBAF EIS Section 3.3.5.1.4 describes the Town of Flora's wastewater treatment process and capacity. On average the system is at approximately 33% of its total capacity and a 10-inch gravity sewer line servicing the Flora Industrial Park has 100% excess flow rate capacity. Section 3.13.1 describes the NBAF's solid and liquid waste management methodologies. Following final site selection and facility design, a detailed geotechnical report will be produced and subsurface conditions including water table elevations will be taken into construction and operational consideration. Sections 3.3.5 and 3.7.5 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spills and runoff affects. Potential stormwater abatement options include but are not limited to grassy swales, retention ponds, pervious pavement, and facility grounds' reuse.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 15.5

DHS notes the commenter's viewpoint. Section 3.10.5 of the NBAF EIS discusses the socioeconomic effects of the NBAF operations at the Flora Industrial Park Site. It is not anticipated that routine operations of the NBAF will negatively affect the fiscal condition of the local area. On the contrary, tax revenues are expected to increase as annual state and local tax payments directly and indirectly generated by the operating facility and its employees are estimated at \$1.9 million. Due to the small percentage of the overall population growth that would be attributed to the facility, the population increase associated with the NBAF, which is discussed in Section 3.10.7 of the NBAF EIS, would have a negligible effect on the infrastructure.

England, Charles

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WD0882

6 cont.
15.5

This is due to the fact that taxes must not only support the facility itself, but surrounding property owners and tax payers must 'pick up the slack' caused by the large asset being removed from the tax rolls.

Please answer the following questions:

2 cont.
26.0

Please place in the public record of these proceedings ALL communications, including voice, written, electronic or in any other form, between any and all elected or appointed officials and DHS and/or its agents regarding locating the new facility in Mississippi.

Please place in the public record of these proceedings ALL communications, including voice, written, electronic or in any other form, between any and all corporations and/or lobbying entities and DHS.

Please place in the public record of these proceedings accounts of all breaches of security and all leaks that have occurred at existing facilities in the past.

Please place in the public record of these proceedings a complete list of all diseases that might be studied at the facility in the future, not just the ones named in the 'sales pitch', and provide risk assessments for each of these diseases as has been done for the three selected in the 'sales pitch'.

Please place in the public record of these proceedings a detailed accounting of the costs to the citizens in our area to provide the support infrastructure for this facility. In particular, include the fact that the land is to be donated by the citizens of the state and that the state has committed to borrow almost ninety million dollars to prepare the site.

Thank you,

Charles England

[Redacted Signature] MS

Engle, Nelson

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WD0635

From: Nelson Engle [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 22, 2008 11:06 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: I support NBAF in Kansas

^{1|24.4} **NBAF belongs in Kansas on the merits due to our unique ability to protect America's food supply and agricultural economy. I strongly support this effort..**

Nelson Engle, [REDACTED] Kan.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4
DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

English, John

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WD0779

From: John English [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 4:28 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF

- 1| 24.2 | My name is John English, and I'm a cattleman from [REDACTED] Kansas. I write in strong support of the NBAF and its siting on the campus of Kansas State University.
- 2| 1.0 | Currently, my operations in [REDACTED] account for over 8,000 cattle on feed. It is my strong opinion that our nation's best defense against foreign animal diseases is a strong research program, including a modern biocontainment facility for large animals. The NBAF fits that bill and would be a crucial investment to protect our nation's food and agriculture economies.
- cont.| 1| 24.2 | I've taken the time to better understand the NBAF and, once convinced of its merits, have reached out to my fellow ranchers to make sure they are aware of it. With slight exception, there is strong support for the NBAF in the Kansas ranching communities proximate to Manhattan. This support also includes the Kansas Livestock Association, the state's largest industry group for ranchers. What opposition I have experienced includes wild misstatements, such as an FMD outbreak will result in the euthanization of all pets in the region; that FMD can kill humans; and that the NBAF will be a weapons lab. I'm sure these statements have been made at other sites. You should know that KSU and a state agency called the Bioscience Authority have been very proactive in reaching out to producers to inform them of the merits of the NBAF, and in correcting these fallacies.
- 3| 21.4 |
- 4| 5.4 | As you consider the best location to site the facility, I encourage you to take into account what we as ranchers and as a state have done to prepare for the unlikely event of an FMD outbreak. Every county in the state has a foreign animal disease plan, that is regularly exercised and updated from those exercises. I've personally hosted international visitors interested in learning more about our efforts in this regard and I believe Kansas' plan is generally regarded as the 'best-of-the-best'. Again, KSU has been a great resource for that. I believe our efforts here can mitigate the scant chance of an FMD outbreak.
- cont.| 3| 21.4 |
- 5| 8.4 | I also encourage you to consider the region's excellent research capabilities. We built a biocontainment lab here already, with strong local and state support. We understand the perils of foreign animal diseases and embrace enhanced research. In many cases the state has stepped up to fund this research and new facilities. I know my colleagues in other states are envious of the capabilities Kansas has developed in this area.
- I'll close with comment aimed at Secretary Cohen, who I understand is a former submariner. As I'm sure he knows well, in order to preform safely and effectively in an alien environment, submarines must be rigorously designed, built and maintained...their operators must be carefully screened and trained. Kansas ranchers have the same respect for foreign animal diseases. We are proud of our agricultural heritage, our animal health industry and our excellence in foreign animal disease research and incidence preparedness. I urge you to site the NBAF in Kansas. Doing so, will ensure its long-term success.
- cont.| 1| 24.4 |

John English

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 1.0

DHS notes the commentor's support for the NBAF and the proposed research that would be conducted within the facility.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

Epperson, DVM, MS, William

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WD0734

From: Bill Epperson [epperson@cvm.msstate.edu]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 2:00 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Cc: pace@cvm.msstate.edu; hoblet@cvm.msstate.edu
Subject: NBAF comment
Attachments: NBAF EIS error livestock number Madison.pdf

Please see attached pdf regarding a comment on the NBAF EIS

Bill Epperson, DVM, MS
Head, Pathobiology and Population Medicine
College of Veterinary Medicine
Mississippi State, MS
(662) 325-1300
epperson@cvm.msstate.edu

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes commentor's correction. There was a mistake in the numbers represented twice in the NBAF EIS. There should be 19,148 livestock, not 191,448 livestock, in Madison County. Table C-71 and Section 3.10.5.1.1.2 of the NBAF EIS have been changed to 19,148 livestock for Madison County. Any resultant socioeconomic data has also been appropriately modified. Additionally, this was a typographical error that was not carried forward to any analysis done by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).

Epperson, DVM, MS, William

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Mississippi State
UNIVERSITY

College of Veterinary Medicine

WD0734

August 25, 2008

Dr. James V. Johnson
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Dr. Johnson,

I am writing to bring to your attention a potential error in the NBAF Draft EIS.

Table C-71 "Livestock Proximal to Proposed NBAF Site (Flora Industrial Park Site)" gives livestock data for 8 counties near the Flora, MS site. The livestock estimate given for Madison County, Mississippi, is incorrect (given as 191,448 in Table C-71).

126.0

Livestock was defined to include hoofed animals such as cattle, hogs, sheep, goats, horses, and mules (NBAF EIS pg 3-266). Available data on livestock in Madison County, Mississippi indicate there are 17,900 cattle and calves (USDA NASS 2006), 102 total hogs and pigs (USDA NASS Census of agriculture 2002), 1,489 horses and ponies (USDA NASS Census of agriculture 2002), 96 sheep and lambs (USDA NASS Census of agriculture 2002), and 70 milk goats (USDA NASS Census of agriculture 2002).

This brings the total livestock in Madison County, Mississippi to 19,657, or 10% of the population estimate given in C-71. Using this Madison County figure of 19,657 plus data derived for the other 7 counties from the cited sources, the livestock population of the 8 Mississippi counties surrounding the NBAF in Flora is 160,288. This figure is 49% of the 324,556 given in Table C-71.

This potential error is very significant, since the livestock population is used to calculate livestock density (which may be half of that reported in the EIS) and the economic estimate of a release of FMDV. As stated in the public forum on August 5, 2008, the risk and consequences of a FMDV release are largely a function of livestock density. An investigation of the EIS livestock population for Madison County is warranted, since the error is large enough to affect the risk profile and economic consequence estimates for the Flora site.

Sincerely,

William B. Epperson
Professor and Department Head
Pathobiology and Population Medicine
Mississippi State University
Mississippi State, Mississippi 39762

dg



P.O. Box 6100 • Mississippi State, MS 39762 • (662) 325-3432

Epperson, DVM, MS, William

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WD0462

From: Bill Epperson [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2008 7:39 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Cc: Kent Hoblet; [REDACTED]
Subject: NBAF comment Flora MS
Attachments: NBAF support letter.doc

Please see attached letter for public comment on NBAF in Flora, MS

Thank you.

Bill Epperson, DVM, MS
Head, Pathobiology and Population Medicine
College of Veterinary Medicine
[REDACTED] MS
[REDACTED]

Epperson, DVM, MS, William

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WD0462

James V. Johnson
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security
 Science and Technology Directorate
 Mail Stop #2100
 245 Murray Lane, SW
 Building 410
 Washington, DC 20528

Dear Dr. Johnson,

1| 24.5 I am writing to express support for the NBAF facility in Flora, Mississippi. As department head
 of the Department of Pathobiology and Population Medicine at the [REDACTED] University
 College of Veterinary Medicine ([REDACTED] CVM), our faculty welcomes the opportunity to interact
 2| 8.5 with NBAF personnel. Our department includes 23 faculty with assignments in the Mississippi
 Veterinary Research and Diagnostic Laboratory System, and other faculty with research interest
 in biosecurity, food safety, public health, and epidemiology. These areas are all strongly aligned
 with the NBAF mission. We are presently engaged in expanding capabilities in biosecurity and
 epidemiology from our current level (8 faculty) within the department. Our faculty expertise in
 applied research, outreach, and education would complement NBAF work.

3| 15.5 Having relocated from Ohio to Mississippi within the last year, I have been impressed with the
 welcoming environment. All the out-of-state faculty candidates we have hosted at [REDACTED]
 were very surprised with the natural beauty, recreational opportunities, and home town
 atmosphere of Mississippi. The common misperceptions associated with the South of many years
 ago were eliminated, and all left with a sense that Mississippi was a great place to live, work, and
 raise a family.

It has been my experience that there is a good pool of technically competent people available to
 staff laboratory positions. I have been very impressed by the candidate pool we have encountered
 for the diagnostic laboratory positions we have filled in the past year. I believe NBAF would find
 the same.

4| 1.0 We realize that the events of recent years have forced a change in the way we must view
 agriculture and public health risk. Our faculty desire to be active in mitigating agricultural and
 zoonotic disease risk. We want to compliment our NBAF colleagues and draw positive attention
 to this important work. We have a willing and committed faculty and Mississippi poses an ideal
 1 cont. |
 24.5 site for NBAF. I ask that you consider all this support as you contemplate the NBAF location.

Sincerely,

William B. Epperson
 Professor and Department Head
 Pathobiology and Population Medicine
 [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] Mississippi [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.5

DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 15.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative. As described in
 Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's site selection criteria included, but were not limited to, such
 factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 1.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Erickson, Chilena

Page 1 of 1

PD0033

July 29, 2008

1|25.3 | My name is Chilena Erickson and I just wanted to say that I'm opposed to this lab being
2|21.3 | in North Carolina because I think that security issues have not been taken into
consideration enough, and I'm concerned about the safety of people living in the area.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern about the risk to health and safety from the NBAF operation. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art biocontainment features and operating procedures to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, 3.14, and Appendices B, D, and E of the NBAF EIS, provide a detailed analysis of the consequences from an accidental or deliberate pathogen release. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

Erickson, Larry

Page 1 of 1

MD0022



National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Draft Environmental Impact Statement Comment Form

Personal information is optional as this document is part of the public record and may be reproduced in its entirety in the final National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement.

Name: Larry E. Erickson

Title: Director, Center for Hazardous Substance Research

Organization: [REDACTED]

Address: [REDACTED]

City: [REDACTED] State: KS Zip Code: [REDACTED]

Comments: I am in favor of Kansas State University as a location for NBAF. It is appropriate to have a facility centrally located and at this location. I am also in favor of continued operation of a facility at Plum Island. The facility at Kansas State University would be conveniently located for cooperative research and field samples for many central U.S. locations. With two facilities, risk can be reduced by selecting the most appropriate laboratory for each area of investigation. This area of research needs more than one U.S. laboratory facility with the highest level of containment.

Larry E. Erickson (Continued on back for your convenience)

1|24.4
 2|24.1

NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY
 Science and Technology Directorate/Office of National Laboratories

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4
 DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.1
 DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative and continued operation of the facility at Plum Island.

Erickson, BS, MT (ASCP), Cindy

Page 1 of 1

WD0359

From: Cindy Erickson [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 2:17 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Flora, MS Bio Lab

1|24.5 | Dear Mr. Johnson, I would like to see Flora, Ms. chosen as the site for a Bio Lab. I live in [REDACTED] Ms., which is about [REDACTED] from the proposed site. I have a BS degree in medical technology. I have worked in microbiology at [REDACTED] for thirty years. I have attended the bioterrorism wet workshop, and have received the yearly updates on chemical and biological agents of bioterrorism. This is area that really interests me. Hopefully, I would be able to apply for a job at this lab. I totally support this project as a member of this community and as a microbiologist.

Cindy Erickson, BS, MT(ASCP)

Laboratory Manager

[REDACTED] Ms

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Erlanger, Mary

Page 1 of 1

WD0865

From: Mary Erlanger [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 10:08 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF in Athens

1| 25.2 | NO, emphatically No to NBAF in Athens!

Mary A. Erlanger

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Ga.]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2
DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Esary, Dave

Page 1 of 1

WD0268

From: Dave Esary [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, August 14, 2008 12:47 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Athens, Georgia, SUPPORT

1|24.2 | Good day from [REDACTED] I just wanted to send a quick notice of support for the site to be placed in Athens, Georgia. Athens is the best fit for the NBAF due to it's close proximity to the CDC in Atlanta, the top level Veterinary College at UGA, and the Savannah River Nuclear site in Augusta, Georgia, not to mention all the top level researchers and scientists associated with the University of Georgia. We have the research, location, and proximity to all existing national facilities that are needed for a successful expansion to what Plum Island is already doing.

On top of this, the Savannah River Nuclear site in Augusta just completed a 3 year transition period to upgrade the facilities.
<http://www.savannahrivernuclearsolutions.com/index.html>

1 cont. | Throw in free land the University is offering and the choice should be clear.
24.2

Thank you for your time.

--
Dave Esary
[REDACTED] GA

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.2

DHS notes the commentor's support for the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Esry, Brett

Page 1 of 2

WD0763

From: Esry [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 3:42 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF in Manhattan, KS

NBAF Program Manager:

This email is in response to the request for public comments on siting NBAF in Manhattan, KS. As you can see, I am a professor at [REDACTED] but my comments represent only my own opinions and not those of my Department, College, or University.

- 1| 25.4 | I oppose locating NBAF in Manhattan. The bottom line for me is safety. While I do believe a pathogen release is unlikely, it is not impossible.
- 2| 5.1 | In that case, why not add yet one more layer to the security of the facility by taking advantage of geographic isolation? It seems only prudent to do so. Why not spend extra money up front to refurbish the Plum Island site, for instance, in order to prevent the catastrophic losses that would result from the release of hoof-and-mouth disease in a place like Kansas? It is simply an insurance policy that benefits all.
- 3| 21.4 |

cont| 1| 25.4 | I can tell you that I would have to think long and hard whether I would remain at [REDACTED] should NBAF come here. Even though I am a third generation [REDACTED] graduate, a native Kansan, a native of [REDACTED] and have family in the area, I would strongly consider positions at other universities. I know I'm not the only faculty member thinking this.

Having NBAF in Manhattan could also materially damage K-State's efforts to recruit top notch faculty in areas other than bio-security. We already have several strikes against us in many recruits' eyes, and we really don't need another.

K-State has apparently not taken these issues into consideration, nor asked for such comments as far as I can tell. I hope that they will be taken into consideration for the final decision, however. I do not believe that K-State administrators and Kansas politicians are really up to the task of properly judging the impact of NBAF in Manhattan, and I do not believe they have been particularly thorough in considering the possible consequences for K-State and Kansas. They can only see the presumed prestige, the money, and their legacy.

Best regards,

Brett

 Brett Esry

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS evaluate the potential effects on health and safety of operating the NBAF at the six site alternatives. The evaluation concludes that a pathogen release at the Plum Island Site would be slightly less likely to result in adverse effects than the mainland sites.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the impact from a release of foot and mouth disease (FMD) in Kansas. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. While the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area, to include agricultural livestock. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Esry, Brett

Page 2 of 2

WD0763

Professor

Department of Physics

Kansas

Etchepare, John

Page 1 of 2

MD0065

Wyoming Department of Agriculture

2219 Carey Avenue, Cheyenne, WY 82002 ■ Phone: 307-777-7301 ■ Fax: 307-777-6993 ■ Cost. Serv. Hotline: 888-413-0114 ■ Website: wyagg.state.wy.us ■ Email: wda@state.wy.us

The Wyoming Department of Agriculture is dedicated to the promotion and enhancement of Wyoming's agriculture, natural resources and quality of life.

Dave Freudenthal, Governor
John Etchepare, Director

August 20, 2008

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson:

Following are the comments from the Wyoming Department of Agriculture (WDA) regarding the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Draft Environmental Impact Statement (NBAF DEIS).

Our comments are specific to our mission within state government: dedication to the promotion and enhancement of Wyoming's agriculture, natural resources, and quality of life. As this proposal has major impacts upon our agriculture industry, our natural resources and the welfare of our citizens, it's important that we be kept informed of proposed actions and decisions and that we continue to be provided the opportunity to express pertinent issues and concerns.

We have reviewed the NBAF DEIS for no action as well as the construction and operation at one of the six alternative sites: 1) South Milledge Avenue Site, Athens, Georgia; 2) Manhattan Campus Site, Manhattan, Kansas; 3) Flora Industrial Park Site, Flora, Mississippi; 4) Plum Island Site, Plumb Island, New York; 5) Umstead Research Farm Site, Butler, North Carolina; and 6) Texas Research Park Site, San Antonio, Texas.

1| 1.0 We support continuing research on foreign animal diseases for not only the negative impacts on American agriculture, but also for the health and safety of American citizens. The Plumb Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) is the current location for research on foreign animal diseases. It is our understanding there are no known cases of released contaminants or diseases from the PIADC, most likely due to the isolation of the Plumb Island facility.

2| 24.1 The WDA strongly supports and encourages the U.S. Department of Homeland Security select Alternative Number 4, Plumb Island Site, Plumb Island, New York. The current location of the PIADC is successful in retaining harmful diseases with little to no ability for livestock or wildlife to reach its shores. No other alternative site has this natural barrier. Additionally the close proximity of Plumb Island to Long Island is ideal for continuing to bring in high caliber researchers. Many researchers may want the close proximity to metropolitan amenities and cultural diversity other locations simply may not provide.

After comparing the environmental effects on Table ES-3 of the Executive Summary on the six alternatives, there is simply no single site that stands clearly above and beyond the others. We

BOARD MEMBERS

Juan Reyes, District 1 ■ Jack Conson, District 2 ■ Jim Mickelson, District 3 ■ Jim Bernage, District 4 ■ Joe Thomas, District 5 ■ David J. Graham, District 6 ■ Gene Hanly, District 7

Patrick Zimmerman, Southeast ■ Dale Winters, Northwest ■ John Hansen, Southwest ■ Bridger Kukowski, Northeast

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 1.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement regarding the operation of PIADC at Plum Island.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Etchepare, John

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MD0065

8/20/2008
National Bio and Agro Defense Facility
Page 2

2 cont. | 24.1

have reviewed the preliminary costs of the NBAF alternatives and understand the Plumb Island site is the most expensive of the six alternatives. If we understand this correctly, this is due to removal of the old research facility in addition to the construction of the new site. Despite this increase in cost, we continue to support the Plumb Island site due to the isolation for contaminants and disease as well as the proven track record to employ and house staff in the Long Island, New York area.

We thank you for the opportunity to comment and look forward hearing more about the construction and operation of the new facility.

Sincerely,



John Etchepare
Director

JE/jw

Cc: Governor's Planning Office
WDA Board of Agriculture
Wyoming Stock Growers Association
Wyoming Wool Growers Association
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union
Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation
APHIS: Veterinary Services
Wyoming Livestock Board

Exdell, Judy

Page 1 of 3

WD0875

From: Judy Exdell [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 11:54 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF proposal citizen comment from Manhattan Kansas

- 1| 25.4 I'm writing to express great concern about putting the NBAF in Manhattan KS, especially in light of the Environmental Impact Statement and other recent news. Many other [REDACTED] area residents feel the same way about this.
- 2| 8.4 I think it is a drawback that Manhattan has neither the open area of an isolated or rural setting nor the infrastructure of an urban setting to safely accommodate the physical size and activities of NBAF which will apparently be one of the largest facilities anywhere.
- 3| 4.4 Also, Manhattan and Kansas State University have a tradition of open and public discussion of issues, especially since K-State is a land grant university with the obligation to share knowledge (allowing for publication and patenting rights, of course).
- Area farmers have come forward on this issue saying that they feel excluded and are not represented by pro-nbaf speakers. When some of them went to the public meeting they were told they could not ask questions.
- A huge secret lab on a main campus street, owned by the federal government, would be way out of character here. The rosy hazy picture painted by endless pro-nbaf press releases has made many of us uneasy.
- 4| 28.0 Here are some quotes from the pro-nbaf [REDACTED] website, followed by my comments:
- "Are there safety and security issues?
No."
well, maybe...now that the first GAO report has been issued, and the anthrax case details have surfaced.
- "What are zoonotic diseases? Zoonotic diseases are diseases that can be transmitted from animals to humans. Examples are rabies, tuberculosis, and lyme disease."
...tuberculosis is not zoonotic is it?... Aside from this "educational" example list, the list of diseases actually proposed for study at NBAF is a slippery subject – different every time – of course we are really not supposed to know anyway.
- "Ninety percent of the research facilities for the new NBAF will be biosafety 3 or 3-Ag."
...we have that level here already, what's the deal? Oh, I forgot, it's the main argument: \$\$\$.
- "Having livestock producers, university faculty scientists, animal health companies and NBAF scientists in close geographic proximity will promote improved communication..."
...except that activities in the NBAF are supposed to be top secret, and it takes dedicated snooping and freedom of information requests to find out what is going on in high security level

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the adequacy of the utility infrastructure to support the NBAF operation at the Manhattan Campus Site. Section 3.3.4 of the NBAF EIS includes an assessment of the current infrastructure, a discussion of the potential effects from construction and operation of the NBAF, and the identification of any infrastructure improvements necessary to meet design criteria and insure safe operation. Should a site be selected for NBAF, any needed infrastructure improvements to ensure service reliability would be identified in accordance with the final facility design.

As described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's site selection criteria included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or semi-urban areas. Nevertheless, it has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 4.4

Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program. DHS has conducted public meetings in excess of the minimum required by NEPA regulations; to date, 24 public meetings have been held in the vicinity of NBAF site alternatives and in Washington D.C. to solicit public input on the EIS, allow the public to voice their concerns, and to get their questions answered DHS has also provided fact sheets, reports, exhibits, and a Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). Additionally, various means of communication (mail, telephone and fax lines, and NBAF Web site) have been provided to facilitate public comment. It is DHS policy to encourage public input on matters of national and international importance.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives and reference to the U.S. Government Accountability Office report (May 2008) as justification. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable it to be safely operated on the mainland. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS show that even though Plum Island has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites. The lower potential effect is due both to the water barrier around the island and the lack of livestock and susceptible wildlife species.

DHS notes the commentor's concern that all possible pathogens to be studied at the NBAF are not listed in the NBAF EIS. The pathogens to be studied at the NBAF as provided in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS include Foot and Mouth Disease virus, Classical Swine Fever virus, Vesicular Stomatitis virus, Rift Valley Fever virus, Nipah virus, Hendra virus, and African Swine Fever virus. Should the NBAF be directed to study any pathogens not included in the list of pathogens included in the NBAF EIS, DHS and USDA would conduct an evaluate of the new pathogen(s) to determine if the potential challenges and consequences were bounded by the current study. If not, a new risk assessment would be prepared and a separate NEPA evaluation may be required.

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the NBAF. As described in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's mission is to study foreign animal, zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) and emerging diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The NBAF would enable research on the transmission of these animal diseases and support development of diagnostic tests, vaccines, and antiviral therapies for foreign animal, zoonotic and emerging diseases. By proposing to construct the NBAF, DHS is following policy direction established by the Congress and the President.

DHS notes the commentor's concern about communication. Currently the PIADC facility publishes its research in publicly available journals; NBAF would publish its research in publicly available journals as well.

Exdell, Judy**Page 2 of 3**

cont.| 4| 26.0

WD0875

labs, especially getting information about accidents.

Other things that never get mentioned by pro-nbaf writers and speakers: hazardous waste incineration (tons of pollutants); 24 million gallons of pre-treated wastewater into the public sewer system; geographic area quarantine plan.

Our local newspaper, the Manhattan Mercury, and various paid lobbyists/funding-seekers have repeatedly insulted the intelligence of local citizens here who oppose the NBAF. Meanwhile, more and more distressing news is coming to light about BSL-3&4 labs, including the recent GAO Report and the Bruce Ivins story.

Here is an excerpt from a recent (8/2008) letter to Pres. Bush from Rep.'s Dingell and Stupak, referring to the "FBI's recent allegations" about scientist Bruce Ivins and the 2001 anthrax attacks, but also addressing a wider scope of concerns:

Our concern about the security at USAMRIID and other BSL 3 and 4

- > laboratories is neither new nor solely based upon the FBI's recent
- > allegations. It stems in part from our Committee's year-long investigation
- > into the risks associated with the proliferation of such laboratories since
- > September 11, 2001. The Committee has already held two hearings on the
- > subject on October 4, 2007, and May 22, 2008, the records of which are
- > available on our Committee's Web site at <http://energycommerce.house.gov/>.

- >
- > Our investigation identified serious shortcomings with the security at
- > facilities that are run by universities and the civilian agencies of the
- > Government, especially those run by the Science and Technology Directorate
- > of the Department of Homeland Security, which I note with some trepidation
- > has a new BSL 4 lab on the Ft. Detrick grounds adjacent to USAMRIID.

- >
- > What we have learned so far has been frightening. We have found poor
- > training, sloppy security, and very little, if any, oversight by the
- > Government agencies who are supposed to be responsible for protecting our
- > community. We also uncovered a number of serious releases of dangerous
- > pathogens and injuries to lab workers.

- >
- > Our preliminary findings indicate there appears to have been no overall
- > planning to justify the massive increase in the construction of these labs
- > since 2001, which was almost entirely paid for by the American taxpayer. We
- > found that many of the labs are probably unnecessary or redundant.
- > Shockingly, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that no one
- > in the Government even knows the total number of BSL 3 and 4 labs currently
- > in existence. Ironically, their proliferation has only exacerbated the
- > potential risk of a terrorist incident or accidental release, not enhanced
- > our Nation's security.

- >
- > The bottom line, Mr. President, is that no one is in charge of all of these
- > laboratories from a safety and security perspective. We urge you to rectify
- > this issue in the course of your inquiry.

Exdell, Judy

Page 3 of 3

WD0875

- >
- > We plan to continue our investigation working not only with the Government
- > Accountability Office, but also with community groups that have brought a
- > number of serious concerns to us. In early September 2008, we expect to
- > receive yet another report from GAO, an interim report on its assessment of
- > physical security at the five BSL-4 laboratories currently in operation.

cont| 1| 25.4

This is very distressing, especially after the state of Kansas has invested so much money in promoting the NBAF, and Kansas State University has hired highly paid consultants to work towards getting it.

I've lived in [REDACTED] for 36 years and work for [REDACTED] I admire the work done at the College of Veterinary Medicine, College of Agriculture, and by scientists in the College of Arts and Sciences. But I think this project is wrong for Manhattan and K-State.

Judy Exdell

[REDACTED] KS [REDACTED]

Farmer, Mark

Page 1 of 1

WD0592

From: Mark Farmer [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2008 10:37 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF in Athens

This is a letter that was published in the Athens Banner-Herald earlier this year. I received a great many compliments from my friends and neighbors who said they agreed and were very glad that I wrote it. This includes Mayor Jim Mercer of Winterville.

Don't let the negative voices be the only ones heard.

-Mark Farmer

Many who oppose the possible location of the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Athens-Clarke County seem to be offering the same unsolicited advice - "Why not build the NBAF in the middle of nowhere, far away from where it could harm anyone?"

15.0

In doing so, they are taking a NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) view. They seem to have lost sight of one very important fact: In order to fulfill its mission of protecting the United States from the accidental or intentional release of agricultural pathogens, the NBAF must be staffed by some of the most talented scientists in the country. Is it likely that a bright young researcher who has been offered a position at the NBAF will tell her spouse, "Let's take the kids and move to the middle of the Mojave Desert where there are no schools, no supermarkets and no community of neighbors"?

The bottom line is that this community has been selected as a finalist for this important and essential facility in large measure because this is such a great place to live. With the promise of excellent colleagues at the University of Georgia, and a terrific quality of life, we have much to offer those who will dedicate their lives to keeping us safe from current and future threats. We, and the nation as a whole, stand much to gain by welcoming the NBAF into our community.

There may still be other and sound reasons to oppose NBAF, but NIMBYism is not one of them.

Mark Farmer
[REDACTED]

Published in the Athens Banner-Herald on 022508

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0
DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Farmer, Rebecca

Page 1 of 1

WD0046

From:

[REDACTED]

Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2008 12:10 AM

To: NBAFProgramManager

Subject: NBAF

1|25.2 | No NBAF in Athens!
Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Farrar, Joe

Page 1 of 1

WD0528

From: Nancy Farrar [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2008 9:32 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager

To: NBAF Program Manager
FROM: Joe E. Farrar, President

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
Kansas [REDACTED]

I am writing this to tell you that the best possible location for the new NBAF facility is Manhattan, Kansas. You already know about the strong support of the State of Kansas, local community leaders, and Kansas State University. You already know about the research going on at Kansas State University that would support the efforts of the new laboratory. You already know that Kansas is located right in the middle of the agricultural center of the United States.

1) 24.4 With all of the talk of the people running for political offices right now saying that the economy is not in very good shape it is time for the government to step up and make the right economic decision by placing the facility in the most economical location. It is time for the leaders of this project to step up and make the right decision and not bow to political pressure. Do the right thing for America, not for politicians.

The vast majority of the people in Kansas and in the Manhattan community support locating the facility in Manhattan. We are confident in the safety precautions that will be built into the facility to protect it from potential weather conditions in this region and to protect the people in the surrounding area and livestock in the region from potential danger. The most vocal people against this project are the same people who are against just about anything new in this community.

I run a family owned manufacturing business that will not benefit in any way from this project so I do not expect to gain from it being located here in any way. What I am concerned with is what is best for the American people and using our hard earned tax dollars in the most efficient way.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Faulkner, Garnet

Page 1 of 1

WD0006

From: GARNET FAULKNER [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, June 23, 2008 1:19 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NO NBAF IN ATHENS,GA.

1| 25.2 LET US KEEP OUR TOWN AS IT IS. PLEASE STAY OUT OF ATHENS,GA. garnet faulkner

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Faulkner, Garnet

Page 1 of 1

WD0079

From: GARNET FAULKNER [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 2:18 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NO!!

1|25.2 | PLEASE STAY AWAY FROM ATHENS,GA. garnet faulkner

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Faulkner, Garnet

Page 1 of 1

WD0368

From: GARNET FAULKNER [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 3:59 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: athens.ga.

1/25.2 | please do not ruin our town and environment. you are not welcome in athens.ga. g.faulkner

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Faust, Lynn

Page 1 of 1

PD0372

August 25, 2008

Hi.

1/ 24.2 | My name is Lynn Faust. I live in [REDACTED] Georgia and I am just calling to say I support this being....research lab being built in Athens, Georgia.

Thank you.

Bye.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.2

DHS notes the commentor's support for the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Favre, Tommye

Page 1 of 2

20-AUG-2008 09:42PM FROM:MOES EXECUTIVE OFFICE +1-501-921-6034 T-244 P 001 F-741

FD0030



Mississippi Department of Employment Security
Haley Barbour
Governor
Tommye Dale Favre
Executive Director

FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL

TO: James V. Johnson **FROM:** Tommye D. Favre
FAX: (866) 508-6223 **DATE:** 8/20/08
PHONE () **PAGES:** (2)
RE: Bio & Agro-Defense Facility **CC:**


URGENT FOR REVIEW PLEASE COMMENT PLEASE REPLY

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Favre, Tommye

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20-AUG-2008 09:42PM FROM:WDES EXECUTIVE OFFICE *1-501-321-6034 T-244 P.002 F-741



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MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT of EMPLOYMENT SECURITY
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
MS TOMMYE DALE FAVRE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

August 20, 2008

Mr. James V. Johnson
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
Mail Stop # 2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528


Dear Mr. Johnson:

At Mississippi's Department of Employment Security, we eagerly await the decision on the location of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility and hope that the decision will be to locate the facility in Flora, Mississippi.

Mississippi's workforce has the skills to meet the needs of this facility. Our universities provide first class research which will supplement the efforts in this important field. And - our communities have turned out to support the location of the facility.

Mississippi's Department of Employment Security has the technology, Mississippi's Online Job Opportunities system, in place to help recruit top-flight professionals, as we are currently doing for some of the nation's top employers who have located to our state.

We look forward to collaborating with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Sincerely,


Ms. Tommye D. Favre
Executive Director

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commenter's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.