

**Meisinger, Rick**

**Page 1 of 2**

WD0782

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**From:** Rick Meisinger [rick@rimdevelopment.com]  
**Sent:** Monday, August 25, 2008 4:32 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Cc:** E. Arthur Robertson III; Jack Irons  
**Subject:** Support letter for Manhattan National Bio & Agro-Defense Facility  
**Attachments:** RIM Letter of Support for Manhattan National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility.pdf

James V. Johnson  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Please see letter of support attached.

Meisinger, Rick

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WD0782

James V. Johnson  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
Science and Technology Directorate  
Mail Stop #2100  
245 Murray Lane, SW  
Building 410  
Washington, DC 20528

RE: Public Input Regarding the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility for Manhattan, KS

Mr. Johnson;

1| 5.4 It came to our attention that the public comment period regarding the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility for Manhattan, KS was nearly over. RIM Development wanted to let you know of our support for building this facility in Manhattan, KS.

RIM Development owns a 500 acre mixed use development, River Trail Development, in Ogden, KS which is adjacent to the Manhattan city limits. It is RIM development's opinion, that the benefit of this facility to Manhattan and surrounding communities substantially outweighs any of the safety concerns for this facility.



Rick Meisinger, Partner  
RIM Development  
3735 Saddle Horn Trail  
Ogden, KS 66517  
402-537-2288

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

**Melamed, Nancy****Page 1 of 1**

WD0129

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**From:** Nancy Melamed [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 30, 2008 11:24 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** citizen opposition to NBAF

1|25.3 | -- I'm writing to state my opposition to locating the NBAF in Butner NC. I have many reasons, but I'll give you one you may not have heard before. Over the last 11 years of living here, I've seen the most appalling incompetence in the building, maintenance and repair of residential and commercial structures. Many, many of the folks that are employed in construction in Granville County are drug addicts or alcoholics. Contractors tell me it is impossible to avoid hiring them. Many are High School drop outs and cannot read an instruction manual. In addition, the people running the Water and Sewer Authority are total incompetents. If NBAF comes here, I'm going to move my family out of the area.

Thank you for reading

this,

Nancy Melamed  
Citizen of

[REDACTED] County

Using Opera's revolutionary e-mail client: <http://www.opera.com/mail/>

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

**Melly, Bernice**

**Page 1 of 1**

PD0127

August 15, 2008

1| 25.1

My name is Bernice Melly. I'm a resident of the town of [REDACTED] I want to voice my very strong objections to the upgrading of Plum Island facility.

2| 5.1

I've been a resident for 40 years. My family resides here as well and I live in a complex of 99 condo units and the criticism of the upgrading of Plum Island is universal here as well.

I do hope my opinion will be given strong consideration.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Melly, Bonnie

Page 1 of 1

PD0135

August 20, 2008

Yes,

1|24.5

This is Bonnie Melly and I live in the [REDACTED] area, which is part of [REDACTED] Mississippi. I think this would be great for the Flora area. It would also help the rest of the counties around there, because we need some more jobs.

Flora needs a little boost and it's a great little growing town. The quality of people there is great.

So, just think ya'll should give us a chance.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Merrill, Rebecca

Page 1 of 1

WD0256

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**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 13, 2008 8:27 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** Plum Island

1|25.1 | As a resident of [REDACTED] Ct. I am, without hesitation, completely OPPOSED to raising the level of National Bio and Agriculture research @ the above location to the BSL-4 level.

Rebecca Merrill

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Looking for a car that's sporty, fun and fits in your budget? [Read reviews on AOL Autos.](#)

Comment No: 1      Issue Code: 25.1  
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Mersereau, K

Page 1 of 1

WD0783

**From:** K. K. Mersereau [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, August 25, 2008 4:33 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** NBADF

Dear Sirs,

1| 12.3

Please, no National Bio and Agro Defense Facility in Butner, near Durham, with the potential of contaminating water resources and causing diseases, etc. This kind of facility belongs on a deserted island in the middle of the ocean somewhere, not near communities

2| 5.3

where people live and work.

Please, no NBADF in Butner!

K. K. Mersereau  
 [REDACTED]  
 [REDACTED] NC

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's watershed and water contamination concerns. The NBAF EIS Section 3.13.8, describes the waste management process that would be used to control and dispose of liquid wastes and Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describes standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spill and runoff affects. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur and consequences of those accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 2                      Issue Code: 5.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

**Meyers, Craig**

**Page 1 of 3**

**WD0764**

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**From:** Craig Meyers [CMeyers@bop.gov]  
**Sent:** Monday, August 25, 2008 3:44 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** Comments on NBAF Draft EIS  
**Attachments:** BOP Comments on DEIS of Aug 25, 2008.pdf

Dear Mr. Johnson - Attached are the Federal Bureau of Prison comments re: the proposed Butner site.  
Respectfully, Craig Meyers

Craig F. Meyers  
Federal Bureau of Prisons  
Associate General Counsel  
Real Estate & Environmental Law  
320 First Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20534  
Telephone # (202)-307-1240  
Fax #: (202)-514-8482  
E-mail: [cmeyers@bop.gov](mailto:cmeyers@bop.gov)

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## Meyers, Craig

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U.S. Department of Justice  
Federal Bureau of Prisons

**WD0764**

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Washington, DC 20534  
August 25, 2008

U. S. Department of Homeland Security  
Science and Technology Directorate  
James V. Johnson  
Mail Stop #2100  
245 Murray Lane, SW  
Building 410  
Washington, DC 20528

Re: Comments - Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS)  
Proposed U. S. Department of Homeland Security National  
Bio and Agro-Defense Facility

Dear Mr. Johnson,

The Federal Bureau of Prisons (Bureau) has reviewed the DEIS above and submits the following comments for your consideration:

The Bureau's Federal Correctional Complex (FCC) is briefly described in discussion of the proposed Umstead Research Farm Site in Butner, North Carolina (Butner Site) as a potential location for the proposed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). The Bureau is concerned that the DEIS does not accurately reflect the size or proximity of the FCC to the Butner Site, and, therefore, does not accurately reflect the scope or significance of the potential human impacts in the event of a release of RVF or other virus/pathogen from the NBAF.

For instance, the DEIS, (under 3.10.7.1 Affected Environment, at pages 3-283 and 3-284), simply states that:

“The C.A. Dillon Youth Development Center, the Butner Federal Correctional Complex, and the John Umstead Hospital are located in the Town of Butner and are located in close proximity to the proposed site....”, and that “[t]he Butner Federal Correctional Complex is comprised of three low to medium security facilities with a total population of 4,572 inmates (FBOP 2008).”

The DEIS, however, does not make it clear that the Federal Correctional Complex (FCC) is not simply “in close proximity” to the proposed NBAF but it is immediately adjacent to

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 26.0  
DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

Comment No: 2                      Issue Code: 19.3  
DHS notes the commentor's concern. Section 3.14 and Appendix E evaluate the potential effects on health and safety of operating the NBAF at the six site alternatives. A site-specific emergency response plan would be developed if one of the action alternatives is selected and prior to the commencement of operations.

Comment No: 3                      Issue Code: 26.0  
DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

## Meyers, Craig

## Page 3 of 3

WD0764


cont. 3| 26.0 it.<sup>1</sup> Also, the FCC includes not only the federal inmates confined in three secured facilities. The FCC includes a Federal Medical Center (FMC) and a Federal Prison Camp (FPC). The FMC, in particular, is a vital medical health facility for the Bureau that provides psychiatric and critical health care beds for several hundred patients, including approximately one hundred oncology patients. Further, the FMC is supported by a work cadre of approximately 295 inmates who also are housed at the FCC. Also omitted from the DEIS are the substantial number (approximately 1,400) of medical and correctional staff who, in shifts, work at and ensure the security of the Federal Correctional Complex twenty-four hours a day.

4| 21.3 In this regard, missing from the DEIS is information to address one of "the fundamental questions" that Appendix E, at page E-6, indicates is to be addressed, namely: "What would be the consequences of such a sequence of events (e.g., the impacts of a release including transmission of disease, morbidity and mortality)?" However, not found in the DEIS are hazard scenarios that address the "human impacts after the release of FMV, or any other virus/pathogen affecting humans, that is not contained within the NBAF (emphasis added).

5| 19.3 The DEIS provides no site specific plans for either the Butner or other proposed sites, as to how such a release would be mitigated or responded to should it occur. No specific plans of action are provided for whether and how to train, prepare and equip first-responders, or for how the worst-case release/exposure scenarios would be handled to deal with the substantial and unique health, security, and law enforcement related impacts that a release be likely to pose. Also not addressed is how notification and response would be coordinated among local, state, and federal authorities, or how lines of authority among police, fire, health and other agencies within the different governmental levels would be determined or implemented. What emergency resources and specialized equipment or medical teams would be appropriate to respond, and where would they be maintained and come from? Would there be monitoring of the environment outside the NBAF to ensure that a release, as unlikely as it may be, was discovered and could be responded to as soon as possible?

6| 2.0

I appreciate the opportunity to submit these comments on behalf of the Bureau for your consideration.

Sincerely,  
  
 Craig F. Meyers  
 Associate General Counsel  
 Real Estate and Environmental Law Branch

<sup>1</sup> Based on Figures 2.3.6-1 and 2.3.6-2 (at pages 2-23 and 2-24 of the DEIS), existing facilities at the FCC may be within 3,000-3,500 feet of proposed facilities at the NBAF.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area, to include agricultural livestock. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. Emergency response plans will include the current USDA emergency response plan for foot and mouth disease (FMD).

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS would offer coordination and training to local medical personnel regarding the effects of pathogens to be studied at the NBAF. Emergency management plans would also include training for local law enforcement, health care, and fire and rescue personnel.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding safe facility operations. The NBAF would be designed and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment.

Micheel, Gary

Page 1 of 1

WD0187

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**From:** Gary Micheel [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 05, 2008 4:19 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** NBAF in Kansas

1|24.4

I am writing in support of locating the NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas. This location, on the campus of a major agricultural research university offers access to expertise that will be invaluable to the ongoing mission of the NBAF. Manhattan anchors one end of the animal-health corridor that offers access to world leaders in the animal health industry. And finally, there is widespread public support from legislators, the academic health industry. And finally, there is widespread public support from legislators, the academic community and the general public that you will not find at other candidate sites. Thank you for your consideration.  
Gary Micheel

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

**Michel, Karl****Page 1 of 1**

WD0396

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**From:** info@athensfaq.org on behalf of Karl Michel [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 20, 2008 9:40 AM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** NBAF in Athens, Georgia

Dear NBAF Program Manager,

1|25.2 | Due to work obligations, I have not been able to attend the community meetings on NBAF in Athens, GA. I am  
2|5.0 | writing to voice my opposition to the proposal to locate this highly dangerous and undesirable facility here. Please  
use common sense and keep the lab on Plum Island or find some other remote place.

Thank you,

Karl Michel  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] GA [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2                      Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

As described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's site selection criteria included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or semi-urban areas. Nevertheless, it has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF.

## Mikesell, Gordon

## Page 1 of 1

WD0762

**From:** Gordon Mikesell [gordonm@sktice.com]  
**Sent:** Monday, August 25, 2008 3:32 PM  
**To:** nbafprogrammanager@dhs.gov  
**Subject:** 'National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, KS

Dear NBAF Program Manager,

- 1) 5.4 | This email is being sent to express my support for locating the proposed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas.
- 2) 8.4 | As a land grant university located in the breadbasket of food production, KSU is strategically located to serve as a world-class research center focused on the protection of America's food supply. The university has a long and outstanding history in crop disease research and has also been of unmeasurable benefit to the animal-health industry.
- 3) 8.4 | The state of Kansas has also been instrumental in the developing of a Bioscience infrastructure with additional support by public investment. Locating the National Bio and Agro Defense Facility at Kansas State University will provide an opportunity for these public-private partnerships to expand. Furthermore, Kansas State University provides the access to talent and research expertise that will effectively complement the protection of America's food supply and agricultural economy.
- 4) 5.4 |
- 5) 1.0 |

Gordon Mikesell  
 SKT Chairman  
 Phone: 620.584.8373  
 Fax: 620.584.2268  
 e-mail: gordon.mikesell@sktcompanies.com

Please note the change in my e-mail address.

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2                      Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 3                      Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 4                      Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 5                      Issue Code: 1.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Miles, Lewis

Page 1 of 2

MD0122

Lewis Miles

NC

August 13, 2008

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
 Science and Technology Directorate  
 James V. Johnson, Mail Stop #2100  
 245 Murray Lane, SW, Building 410  
 Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson:

- 1) 25.3 I am opposed to the siting, construction, and operation of a National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in North Carolina, specifically as proposed in the Town of Butner, North Carolina. As I have previously noted to the Department, our metropolitan region is dependent on water supplied entirely by reservoirs. These in turn are completely dependent on the weather, namely on precipitation. The past year, our region of more than one million residents nearly ran out of water due to a record-breaking drought which has not as yet ended.
- 2) 12.3
- 3) 19.3 Another reason for my opposition is the danger to the residents of the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill metro region, and all of Granville County in which Butner is located. There are just too many people in this area that would be at risk should this lab be built.
- 4) 21.3 Also, as reported in today's newspaper (The News & Observer, Raleigh, NC, August 13, 2008), there are already too many scientists involved in this type of research which poses additional risks to populations by the deliberate or accidental release of deadly bio-pathogens without a cure or vaccine.
- 5) 2.0 Finally, I believe that unless a lab is developing vaccines for the cure of possible epidemics, there is **absolutely no moral (or sensible) reason** that our government should be working on the development of germs, with or without cures, that are developed to harm and/or kill anyone including our enemies! It would be akin to planting hidden and uncharted mines across the landscape and in bodies of water to maim and kill people for generations to come, and possibly to end all life on earth.

Sincerely,



Lewis Miles

*News article enclosed*

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's water quality concerns and DHS acknowledges the current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.7.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Granville Water and Sewer Authority has 3 to 4 million gallons per day of excess potable water capacity and could meet NBAF's need of approximately 110,000 gallons per day, currently less than 0.4% of the Authority's total current capacity. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 210 residential homes.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the NBAF. The purpose and need for the proposed action is discussed in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS can not guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident. However, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, modern biosafety design substantially diminishes the chances of a release as the primary design goal is to provide an adequate level of redundant safety and biocontainment that would be integrated into every component of the building. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 21.3

See Comment No 3

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. Chapter 1, Section 1.1 of the NBAF EIS identifies DHS's mission which is to study foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The goal or benefit of NBAF is to prevent these animal diseases from spreading in the United States through research into the transmission of these animal diseases and the development of diagnostic tests, vaccines, and antiviral therapies.

Miles, Lewis

Page 2 of 2

MD0122

# Other Opinion

& Comment on these columns, or letters at [NEWSOBSERVER.COM/OPI](http://NEWSOBSERVER.COM/OPI) of cartoons by McClatchy artists at 

8| 27.0

## Boosting our own bio risks

We're putting deadly agents into the hands of too many researchers

BY ELISA D. HARRIS COLLEGE PARK, Md.

The government's charge that Dr. Bruce Ivins, a top Army biodefense scientist, was responsible for the 2001 anthrax mailings has focused renewed attention on the important question of whether we are adequately prepared to protect against a future bioweapons attack. More than \$20 billion has been spent on biodefense research since 2001. But the genetic analysis demonstrating that the anthrax powder used in the 2001 letters was a formulation first made at the Army biodefense research center at Fort Detrick, Md., suggests that our biodefense program risks creating the very threat it is meant to fight.

Spending on biodefense research began to edge up after the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo's failed attempts to develop and use bioweapons in Tokyo in the 1990s. After the anthrax letters killed five and injured 17 others, some argued that it was not a question of if but when terrorists would again use bioweapons against Americans, and biodefense spending exploded.

At the National Institutes of Health, research on bioweapons agents has increased 3,000 percent, from \$53 million in 2001 to more than \$1.6 billion in 2008. During the same time, the Department of Defense has more than doubled its investment in biodefense, to more than \$1 billion.

An unprecedented expansion of research facilities is also under way. Once these laboratories are completed, we will have 10 times as much lab space as we had in 2001 for working on the most dangerous agents — Ebola and Marburg viruses, for example — and 13 new regional labs for working on moderate and high-risk agents like tularemia and plague. Thousands of scientists are now working with bioweapons agents, many for the first time. More than 14,000 scientists have been approved to work with so-called select agents like anthrax that usually pose little threat to public health unless they are used as bioweapons.

Experienced anthrax researchers now speak of a community that has grown so large, so rapidly — more than 7,200 researchers are now approved to work with this deadly agent — they no longer know everyone else in the field.

Since the boom began, bioweapons agents have been mishandled in a number of incidents. In 2004, live anthrax was accidentally shipped to a children's hospital research lab in Oakland, Calif., and three lab researchers at Boston University developed tularemia after being exposed to the bacteria that causes it. In 2006, researchers at Texas A&M were exposed to brucellosis and Q fever.

As an investigator for the Government Accountability Office told Congress last fall, the greater number of researchers handling bioweapons agents has increased the risk of such accidents.

Even more worrying are the security risks. The United States' own biodefense program has now been tied directly to the deadliest biological attack ever in the country. That alone demonstrates that we need a rigorous, fact-driven assessment of bioweapons threats, both from other countries and from terrorists, domestic and foreign.

The first step is to ensure that we have a full public examination of all the government's evidence in the 2001 anthrax mailings, so that we can find out what went wrong and how to keep it from happening again.

Then we must re-examine our overall biodefense research strategy, set clear priorities and strengthen the safety, security and oversight of laboratories working with dangerous agents. Rather than add more laboratories and create more research projects, we need to focus on key efforts in fewer facilities. This should include pursuing diagnostic techniques, vaccines and treatments that can be applied to more than one biological agent. Most of this research does not require working with actual deadly agents until the very final stages.

Our excess biodefense research capacity could then be used for research on everyday public health threats like tuberculosis and antibiotic-resistant bacteria, many of which have not received sufficient attention since 9/11.

To defend against bioweapons, we need not more but better research efforts. The probability that biological weapons will be used against Americans is low, but the consequences of such an attack could be devastating. We cannot meet the threat safely or effectively with a strategy that puts bioweapons agents in more and more people's hands.

THE NEW YORK TIMES

*Elisa D. Harris is a senior research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland.*



Comment No: 6

Issue Code: 27.0

DHS notes the information submitted by the commentator.

Miller, Brad

Page 1 of 2

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|---|--|---|
| <p><b>BRAD MILLER</b><br/>13TH DISTRICT, NORTH CAROLINA</p> <p>WASHINGTON, DC<br/>1722 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING<br/>WASHINGTON, DC 20515<br/>(202) 225-3032</p> <p>REGIONAL WHIP</p> <p><a href="http://www.house.gov/bradmiller">www.house.gov/bradmiller</a></p> | <br><b>Congress of the United States</b><br><b>House of Representatives</b> | <p>MD0005</p> <p>COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES<br/>CAPITAL MARKETS, INSURANCE AND GSEs<br/>FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND<br/>CONSUMER CREDIT</p> <p>COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND<br/>TECHNOLOGY<br/>CHAIRMAN, INVESTIGATIONS AND OVERSIGHT</p> <p>COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS<br/>AFRICA AND GLOBAL HEALTH<br/>EUROPE</p> |
|---|--|---|

August 18, 2008

James V. Johnson  
Director, Office of National Laboratories  
Science and Technology Directorate  
Department of Homeland Security  
Mail Stop 2100  
245 Murray Lane, SW.  
Building 410  
Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Director Johnson:

1| 25.3 I am writing this letter to notify the Department of Homeland Security that I do not support locating the National Bio Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) at the proposed Butner, North Carolina site. This letter is to follow up on a phone call my staff made to your department on August 5, 2008, informing you that I was withdrawing support for the Butner site.

I have worked with other members of North Carolina's congressional delegation to urge the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to work closely with elected officials and the citizens in Granville County to address concerns about the proposed facility. I appreciate the Department's willingness to hold additional public forums earlier this year, at all of the potential NBAF sites.

2| 2.0 Many of the arguments against NBAF are not credible, or even responsible, but the Government Accountability Office and the House Energy and Commerce Committee, among others, have raised sober, serious concerns about the facility, and these concerns have not been adequately addressed. I understand that the purpose of a draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) is to examine what would be necessary to build the NBAF at each proposed site, and not to create a detailed plan for each site. However, the DEIS has raised more questions for my constituents than it has answered.

If democracy means anything, local elected officials speak for the people of their community, and local elected officials in Granville County now oppose bringing the facility to Butner. I cannot support bringing a federal facility to a community in my district that does not welcome it.

|   |   |
|---|---|
| <p>RALEIGH, NC<br/>1300 ST. MARY'S STREET, SUITE 504<br/>RALEIGH, NC 27605<br/>(919) 836-1313</p> | <p>GREENSBORO, NC<br/>126 SOUTH ELM STREET, SUITE 504<br/>GREENSBORO, NC 27401<br/>(336) 574-2809</p> |
|---|---|

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

Comment No: 1      Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the Representative's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2      Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the Representative's concerns. DHS has made every effort to explain the operational aspects of NBAF and has conducted a thorough and open public outreach program in support of the NBAF EIS that exceeded NEPA requirements. DHS prepared the NBAF EIS in accordance with the provisions of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and CEQ's regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1500 et seq.). Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program. DHS has conducted public meetings in excess of the minimum required by NEPA regulations; to date, 24 public meetings have been held in the vicinity of NBAF site alternatives and in Washington D.C. to solicit public input on the EIS, allow the public to voice their concerns, and to get their questions answered. DHS has also provided fact sheets, reports, exhibits, and a Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). Additionally, various means of communication (mail, toll-free telephone and fax lines, and NBAF Web site) have been provided to facilitate public comment. It is DHS policy to encourage public input on matters of national and international importance.

Miller, Brad

Page 2 of 2

MD0005

3| 1.0 | I continue to believe that we must do the research that would be conducted at the  
4| 5.1 | proposed facility to protect public health and our food supply, whether at the current  
5| 5.0 | location at Plum Island or elsewhere, and that wherever the research is done it must be  
done safely. Thank you for you and your staffs' work on NBAF and the time and effort  
you have spent in Butner both assessing its' potential as a location for NBAF and  
speaking with local residents.

Sincerely,



Brad Miller  
Member of Congress

Comment No: 3                      Issue Code: 1.0  
DHS notes Representative's statement.

Comment No: 4                      Issue Code: 5.1  
DHS notes the Representative's statement.

Comment No: 5                      Issue Code: 5.0  
DHS notes the Representative's statement.

## Miller, Forrest

## Page 1 of 1

PD0094

August 18, 2008

1|25.4 | I am totally opposed to locating NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas right in the middle of so  
| many livestock farms and facilities.

2|21.4 | It's insane to place this thing, these dangerous viruses in this area.

There, it will always be a mistake. There's no fail safe system in the country, and the  
consequences are so catastrophic that it's just unconscionable to place it here.

1 cont. | I just am completely opposed to this. I live in [REDACTED] Kansas. My name is  
25.4 | Forrest Miller.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2                      Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the NBAF. The purpose and need for the proposed action is discussed in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS can not guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident. However, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, modern biosafety design substantially diminishes the chances of a release as the primary design goal is to provide an adequate level of redundant safety and biocontainment that would be integrated into every component of the building. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14.

Miller, Jim

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WD0290

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**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, August 15, 2008 3:32 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** Re: National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility

NABF Directorate:

1|24.4 This memorandum is in full support of locating the new NABF research facility on the campus of Kansas State University. On the merits, Kansas State is the logical and preferred location for this most important National security research institute.

Sincerely,

Jim R. Miller  
[REDACTED] CO

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Looking for a car that's sporty, fun and fits in your budget? [Read reviews on AOL Autos.](#)

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Miller, Kenneth

Page 1 of 1

WD0809

**From:** info@athensfaq.org on behalf of Kenneth Miller [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, August 25, 2008 5:25 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** NBAF in Athens, Georgia

Dear NBAF Program Manager,

Born in 1966, I grew up in Central Pennsylvania during the 1970s. I was fascinated by the nuclear power plant situated just a few miles downriver--Three Mile Island. Many times I visited GPU's visitors' center, which faced the plant from across the river. Many times I watched demonstrations and read free handouts about the safety precautions in place. We were told how different a reactor was from a bomb, how it couldn't "blow up." I largely bought the industry's claims that an accident was, essentially, unthinkable. This, course, was before 3/28/79. I was in 7th grade at Linglestown Elementary outside of Harrisburg when the entire student body was called into the auditorium, told that something had happened at the plant, and that we'd be going home early. That afternoon my mother and father, grandmother, brother, our dog, and I left to stay with relatives, not knowing if we would ever be able to return to our homes. Luckily, of course, we were. But I am left with an overwhelm

1) 19.2 ing suspicion of dangerous industries that try to impress me with talk of safeguards and precautions. The safeguards at TMI failed, just as the safeguards at NBAF may fail. I thus oppose any attempt to locate this facility in Athens--or  
 2) 25.2 in any other populated or vulnerable area. While I cherish the Botanical Garden my concerns are for the entire region, and I unequivocally oppose the siting of NBAF at the proposed location in Athens GA.

Sincerely,  
 Kenneth Miller

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 19.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the NBAF. The purpose and need for the proposed action is discussed in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS can not guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident. However, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, modern biosafety design substantially diminishes the chances of a release as the primary design goal is to provide an adequate level of redundant safety and biocontainment that would be integrated into every component of the building. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14.

Comment No: 2                      Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF.

Miller, Richard

Page 1 of 1

WD0676

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**From:** Richard L. Miller [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, August 25, 2008 9:07 AM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Cc:** Richard L. Miller  
**Subject:** NBAF in Kansas

1|23.0 | Attended briefing at KSU. Am engineer concerned with present backlog of maintenance perhaps equal to the cost of the NBAF facility. Then who pays for the maintenance of the NBAF facility? Are the sustainability funds programmed and source identified?  
Thank you, Richard Miller, [REDACTED] KS

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns about long-term funding for the NBAF to ensure safe operations. The U.S. Congress and the President are responsible for determining funding priorities for government programs. DHS spends funds in accordance with congressional intent. DHS would maintain the NBAF and ancillary facilities in compliance with applicable environmental, safety, and health requirements and provide for safe operation and maintenance.

Miller, Rose

Page 1 of 1

PD0268

August 24, 2008

1|24.4

My name is Rose Miller and I've been a Kansas resident for twenty...forty years, since 1966. And I'm calling to say I support NBAF in Kansas.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Miller, Therese

Page 1 of 1

WD0691

**From:** Therese Miller [therese.miller@cfnbmanhattan.com]  
**Sent:** Monday, August 25, 2008 10:14 AM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** NBAF in Manhattan, KS

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
 Science and Technology Directorate  
 James V. Johnson  
 Main Stop #2100  
 245 Murray Lane, SW  
 Building 410  
 Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Johnson,

1|24.4 I am writing to express my support for locating the NBAF research  
 facility in Manhattan, KS. A decision to locate here is not only  
 right for this community but right for the success of the research of  
 the facility. We have such a wonderfully diverse population that  
 truly thinks out of the box in solving problems. Locating a research  
 2|8.4 faculty of this type in this Midwest City that already has a passion  
 for solving the problems of animal health and food supply protection  
 is a "perfect fit".

On a personal note I have had the privilege of living in this  
 community for almost 40 years and I am sure anyone relocating to this  
 area would find this one the "best places to live" areas ever.

1 Cont.|24.4 Please give the utmost consideration to Manhattan, Kansas; I think you  
 will find that it will truly meet all of your long term expectations.

Therese Miller  
 Vice President  
 Community First National Bank  
 215 S Seth Child Road  
 Manhattan, KS 66502  
 785-323-1111  
 Personal Residence:  
 1911 Blue Hills Road  
 Manhattan, KS 66502

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2                      Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Miller, DVM, PhD, DACT, Carole

Page 1 of 1

WD0624

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**From:** Carole Miller [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Saturday, August 23, 2008 11:35 AM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** Support for NBAF in Athens, Georgia

Dear Sir or Madam:

There has been a great deal of comment relative to the proposed NBAF site in Athens, Georgia, much of which has been negative in tone. My reason for communicating with you today is to offer my support for locating the facility in Athens.

1|24.2 My personal residence is less than 1.5 miles from the proposed site and I drive by the location daily. However, that does not dissuade my approval for the facility. As a veterinarian, Program Chair of the Veterinary Technology Program at Athens Technical College, adjunct faculty member at the University of Georgia's College of Veterinary Medicine and private citizen, I am in favor of the development of this essential facility in my area. There are risks, but the benefits outweigh the risk potential in my personal opinion.

Regards,  
Carole C. Miller, DVM, PhD, DACT  
[REDACTED] GA [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1      Issue Code: 24.2

DHS notes the commentor's support for the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Milligan, Nancy

Page 1 of 1

WD0361

**From:** info@athensfaq.org on behalf of Nancy Milligan [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 19, 2008 2:50 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** NBAF in Athens, Georgia

1|25.2 | I am a long-time resident of [REDACTED], a student at UGA, and an employee of a prominent downtown  
 business in Athens, and after much consideration, have come to the obvious conclusion that the construction of the  
 NBAF facility in our community would be a serious mistake at best, and catastrophic at worst. While it is obvious  
 why the scientific community is practically wetting themselves in order to procure this prestigious project, and the  
 city government has convinced themselves it is for our own good, I have seen little by way of information  
 describing any significant benefit to our community, and many attributes that could have seriously dire effects. I  
 2|21.2 | certainly realize that the government will do all it can to make the facility safe, but we all know how even the best  
 of intentions can go awry, and meanwhile many issues have not even been addressed to any degree of satisfaction to  
 3|12.2; | my mind. Issues like water use, river impact, air quality, significant local employm  
 4|9.2 | ent numbers, and many others have been seemingly brushed aside in favor of big business and big government. Not  
 to mention the fact that the very idea of the establishment of a permanent DHS presence in our community makes  
 5|5.1 | me bristle. Finding the safest location should be your utmost priority, and you have apparently located that at Plum  
 Island. That should be the end of the discussion. Period.

The only people who I have talked to who are in favor of NBAF are the ones who know little or nothing of the facts at hand. Once informed, the generally reply, "I didnt know about that". The support of the ignorant on this issue is not enough to get you the public support you need in this community. --- Nancy Milligan

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2                      Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the siting, construction and operation of the NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue Site. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur and consequences of those accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 3                      Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding possible impact to the area's water resources. The NBAF will be operated in accordance with the applicable protocols and regulations pertaining to hazardous materials handling, spill prevention, and hazardous waste management. Section 3.13.4 describes the Waste Management processes that would be used to control and dispose of NBAF's liquid and solid waste. Sections 3.3.3 and 3.7.3 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spills and runoff affects. With respect to the rate of water use at the NBAF, it is noted that the anticipated rate of 118,000 gallons per day is approximately 0.76% of Athens' annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day.

Comment No: 4                      Issue Code: 9.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern for air quality. The potential effects of NBAF operations on air quality are discussed in Section 3.4 of the NBAF EIS. Site-specific effects at the South Milledge Avenue Site are discussed in Section 3.4.3. Carcass/pathological waste disposal, including incineration, is discussed in Section 3.13. Air pollutant concentrations were estimated using SCREEN3, a U.S. EPA dispersion modeling program. Conservative assumptions were used to ensure the probable maximum effects were evaluated. Once the final design is determined, a more refined air emissions model will be used during the permitting process. The final design will ensure that the NBAF %does not significantly affect% the region's ability to meet air quality standards.

Comment No: 5                      Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Mills, Helen

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GAD004



## National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Draft Environmental Impact Statement Comment Form

Personal information is optional as this document is part of the public record and may be reproduced in its entirety in the final National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement.

Name: Helen Mills

Title: retiree

Organization: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

City: \_\_\_\_\_ State: \_\_\_\_\_ Zip Code: \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

*Support support support. Great opportunity for confluence of expertise, resources & community. Voices should also be heard from positive side.*

(Continued on back for your convenience)

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.0

DHS notes the commentor's support for the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Minihan, Joseph

Page 1 of 1

WD0506

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**From:** Joe Minihan [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, August 22, 2008 2:30 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** Protest E-mail on the Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan Ks  
**Importance:** High

1| 25.4 | This e-mail is in protest of bringing this facility to Kansas which is in the Heart of the US, were a possible leak would not only bring very damaging events to both human life and industries in the Manhattan area. I can not believe anybody with a sense of duty to their country would even think of placing such a unit in a college town and in the heart of cattle country. Please add my name to any protest list for the Bio and Ago-Defense Facility unit in the Manhattan area.

Joseph M Minihan  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Ks [REDACTED]  
August 21, 2008

Comment No: 1      Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative based on risks to residents and livestock. The NBAF would be designed and constructed using modern biocontainment technologies, and operated by trained staff and security personnel to ensure the maximum level of worker and public safety and least risk to the environment in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

Mitchell, Mary

Page 1 of 1

WD0179

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**From:** Mary Mitchell [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, August 05, 2008 11:03 AM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** No Testing LAB in North Carolina.

To whom it may concern:

- 1| 25.3 | I vigorously oppose the establishment of a testing lab in Butner, N.C.!!
- 2| 21.3 | Take your risk of contamination elsewhere.

Sincerely,  
Mary Mitchell  
[REDACTED] NC [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2                      Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the NBAF. The purpose and need for the proposed action is discussed in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS can not guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident. However, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, modern biosafety design substantially diminishes the chances of a release as the primary design goal is to provide an adequate level of redundant safety and biocontainment that would be integrated into every component of the building. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14.

Mitchell, Susan

Page 1 of 1

WD0011

**From:** Susan Mitchell [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 26, 2008 12:23 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** nbaf.

1) 25.4 | I am very much against Manhattan having this facility brought into our town. With the most  
 2) 21.0 | recent tornado fresh in our minds makes me very worried of how easily something to this  
 3) 24.1 | magnitude could disrupt alot of lives and put many people in dangerous. I am very much in  
 favor of leaving it where it is on Plum Island, NY. I think there is a reason its on an island.  
 Thank You.

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2                      Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site. The basis for establishing the anticipated wind speeds were the International Building Code, ASCE 7 and the local jurisdictions. However, because of code specified building importance modification factors and normal factors of safety incorporated into the structural design, the facility would resist wind pressures up to 170% of the code specified 50-year wind pressures. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period.

In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first, and this breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. The loss of these architectural wall components would decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building and therefore diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Even with the failure of these interior and exterior wall systems under an extreme wind loading event, the robust construction used to construct BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces, reinforced cast-in-place concrete walls, would resist these wind forces and the primary bio-containment envelope would not be breached. The containment walls will be designed to withstand a 200 mph wind load, which is equivalent to an F3 tornado according to the FEMA Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters standards.

Comment No: 3                      Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Mitchell, Ph.D., Jim

Page 1 of 1

WD0188

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**From:** Jim Mitchell [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, August 06, 2008 12:14 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** Locating NBAF in Kansas

1|24.4 | My name is Jim Mitchell and I work for the Kansas Bioscience Authority here in Kansas. As you have heard, our organization is fully behind the establishment of the National Bio and Agro-defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas. As an individual who has spent the last 28 years in R&D in the pharmaceutical industry, my experience indicates that optimizing the location proximity of various groups working for a common goal is critical to rapid innovation. In the case of NBAF, locating it in the heart of the agricultural area in the United States is very logical to facilitate exchange of information between the innovators and the potential users of subsequent breakthroughs. This communication will greatly enhance the opportunity to quickly address the security issues identified.

While there is certainly concern that has been raised by those who oppose the location here in Kansas, these concerns are based on the extremely low probability of a release of an agent that would harm animals, plants and potentially humans. The technology today, with its level of security and redundancy of backup systems, in my opinion, addresses any concerns related to safety of the facility to the point that it is many orders of magnitude more risky to drive to a public meeting related to NBAF than it is to locate the facility in Manhattan Kansas.

It is for the above reasons that I personally support the location of NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas.

Sincerely  
Jim Mitchell, Ph.D.

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.