TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction ................................................................. 1-1
  1.1 Overview ................................................................. 1-1
  1.2 Public Scoping Process ............................................... 1-2

2.0 Categorization of Issues ................................................. 2-1

3.0 Summary of Scoping Comments ...................................... 3-6
  3.1 Accidents, Threat, and Risk ......................................... 3-1
  3.2 Air Quality .............................................................. 3-4
  3.3 Alternatives .............................................................. 3-5
  3.4 Biological Resources .................................................. 3-6
  3.5 Cultural Resources ...................................................... 3-8
  3.6 Design/Construction/Operation/Decommission ............... 3-9
  3.7 Environmental Justice ................................................ 3-10
  3.8 Geology and Soils ...................................................... 3-11
  3.9 Government Intentions and Capabilities ....................... 3-13
  3.10 Human Health and Safety .......................................... 3-14
  3.11 Infrastructure ........................................................ 3-16
  3.12 Land Use and Visual Resources ................................. 3-17
  3.13 Mitigation .............................................................. 3-18
  3.14 Noise ...................................................................... 3-19
  3.15 Purpose and Need for the Project ............................... 3-19
  3.16 Recreation .............................................................. 3-20
  3.17 Regulatory Compliance ............................................. 3-21
  3.18 Socioeconomics ...................................................... 3-23
3.19 Traffic and Transportation ................................................................. 3-26
3.20 Waste Management ............................................................................ 3-28
3.21 Water Resources ................................................................................ 3-29
3.22 Comments Outside the Scope of this EIS ........................................ 3-31
4.0 Conclusion ............................................................................................. 4-1

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1-1. List of Meeting Sites, Meeting Dates, and Advertisements in Local Publications ........................................................................................................... 1-4
Table 2-1. Issue Categories ................................................................................. 2-1

LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix A: Notice of Intent (NOI)
Appendix B: Sample Scoping Meeting Announcements
Appendix C: Scoping Meeting Forms
Appendix D: Scoping Meeting Fact Sheets
Appendix E: Scoping Meeting Posters
ACRONYMS

24/7 24-hours per day/7-days per week (i.e., round the clock)
ACC Athens-Clarke County (Georgia)
APHIS Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA)
ARS Agricultural Research Service (USDA)
BLM United States Bureau of Land Management
BSL Biosafety Level
BSL-4 Biosafety Level-4
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (HHS)
CEQ Council on Environmental Quality
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DHS United States Department of Homeland Security
DNA deoxyribonucleic acid
EIS Environmental Impact Statement
EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency
FR Federal Register
GAO United States Government Accountability Office
HHS United States Department of Health and Human Services
HSPD-9 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9
HVAC Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning
IBA Important Bird Area
LEED Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (U.S. Green Building Council)
LNG Liquid Natural Gas
LWRP Local Waterfront Revitalization Program
NBAF National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility
NEPA National Environmental Policy Act
NIH National Institutes of Health (HHS)
NOI Notice of Intent
OSHA United States Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PIADC Plum Island Animal Disease Center
SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SBGG State Botanical Gardens of Georgia
TRA Threat and Risk Analysis
UGA University of Georgia
UNC University of North Carolina
UPS United Parcel Service (a private mail carrier)
USC United States Code
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
WWII World War II
WWTP Wastewater Treatment Plant
GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS

Biocontainment—the confinement, as by sealed-off chambers, of materials that are harmful or potentially harmful to life.

Biodefense—biological protection from harmful biological methods or objects.

Biological Safety Cabinet (BSC)—the most effective and the most commonly used primary containment devices in laboratories working with infectious agents. There are three general types available (Class I, II, III). Properly maintained Class I and II BSCs, when used in conjunction with good microbiological techniques, provide an effective containment system for safe manipulation of moderate and high-risk microorganisms (biosafety level 2 and 3 microorganisms). Class II BSCs also protect the research material itself through high-efficiency particulate air filtration (HEPA filtration) of the air flow down across the work surface. Class III cabinets offer the maximum protection to laboratory personnel because all hazardous materials are contained in a totally enclosed cabinet.

Biosafety Level (BSL)—there are four levels of biosafety used to designate and regulate lab work with microorganisms. The range is BSL-1 in which the microorganisms are not known to cause disease in healthy adult human beings to BSL-4 in which the microorganisms pose a risk of life-threatening disease and for which there is no known vaccine or therapy. BSL-3Ag refers to research involving large agricultural animals. There are guidelines in place to ensure safe work sites through a combination of engineering controls, management policies, work practices, and procedures. Increasing levels of personnel and environmental protection are provided for by the different biosafety levels used in microbiological/biomedical laboratories. The higher the level of the biosafety lab, the more stringent the level of protection.

Biosafety Level-4 (BSL-4)—required for work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high individual risk of aerosol-transmitted laboratory infections and life-threatening disease. Highest level of containment for biological safety per the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories guidance (a publication of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] and the National Institutes of Health [NIH]; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [HHS]). Agents with a close or identical antigenic relationship to Biosafety Level-4 agents are handled at this level until sufficient data are obtained either to confirm continued work at this level, or to work with them at a lower level. Members of the laboratory staff have specific and thorough training in handling extremely hazardous infectious agents and they understand the primary and secondary containment functions of the standard and special practices, the containment equipment, and the laboratory design characteristics. They are supervised by competent scientists who are trained and experienced in working with these agents. Access to the laboratory is strictly controlled by the laboratory director. The facility is either in a separate building or in a controlled area within a building, which is completely isolated from all other areas of the building. A specific facility operations manual is prepared or adopted.
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)—a document required of federal agencies by the National Environmental Policy Act for major federal actions that may significantly affect the quality of the environment. A tool for decisionmaking, it describes, analyzes, and compares the potential environmental impacts of the alternatives to accomplish the purpose and need to which the agency is responding.

High Consequence Foreign Animal Disease (FAD)—diseases not present in the United States that are capable of rapidly spreading and causing high numbers of deaths and/or devastating economic consequences (e.g., foot and mouth disease).

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF)—proposed facility that would address both current and future requirements in research, diagnostics, and training for combating high-consequence agricultural threats. Research would focus on early development and discovery of vaccines and diagnostic tests for these important agricultural diseases.

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)—requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) for major federal actions that may significantly affect the quality of the environment. In NEPA, the term “environment” encompasses the natural and physical environment (i.e., air, water, geography, and geology), as well as the relationship of people with that environment (i.e., health and safety, socioeconomic conditions, cultural resources, noise, and aesthetics).

Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) —United States (U.S.) laboratory for the diagnosis, research, and training for foreign animal diseases. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory is located at PIADC. This laboratory has the capability of diagnosing more than 30 foreign animal diseases and is responsible for educating veterinarians in the recognition and diagnosis of these diseases. The USDA Agricultural Research Service (ARS) operates a program focused on basic discovery and research of foreign animal diseases. The DHS scientific program focuses primarily on the advanced development of vaccines and other countermeasures.

Zoonotic—a term for diseases transmitted by animals to humans.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 OVERVIEW
This scoping report summarizes the public scoping process for the United States (U.S.) Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) proposed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). Its primary intent is to summarize what DHS heard from the public in regard to the proposed facility during the scoping period. DHS is charged with the responsibility and has the national stewardship mandate for detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to terrorist attacks within the United States. These responsibilities of DHS as applied to the defense of animal agriculture are shared with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and require development of a coordinated strategy to adequately protect the nation against biological threats to the animal agriculture industry.

Consultations between DHS and USDA on a coordinated agricultural research strategy, as called for in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, have revealed an infrastructure gap that must be filled by an integrated research, development, test, and evaluation infrastructure for combating bio- and agro-terrorism threats. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate is responsible for filling the gap in our biocontainment infrastructure as defined by the related homeland security efforts of DHS and USDA. The proposed NBAF will enable DHS to fulfill its mission of detecting, preventing, protecting against, and responding to bioterrorist attacks within the United States.

The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) has historically conducted much of the research that would be conducted at the NBAF. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 recognized that protection of U.S. agriculture is a critical element of homeland security and transferred ownership of PIADC from USDA to DHS in 2003. Recognizing the growing need for veterinary countermeasures to protect the nation’s agricultural sector and recognizing the limitations posed by the current PIADC facility to meet this requirement, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-9 (HSPD-9), “Defense of United States Agriculture and Food”, directs that the “Secretaries of Agriculture and Homeland Security will develop a plan to provide safe, secure, and state-of-the-art agriculture biocontainment laboratories that research and develop diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases.” Furthermore, HSPD-9 requires that DHS, USDA, and others will “accelerate and expand development of current and new countermeasures against the intentional introduction or natural occurrence of catastrophic animal, plant, and zoonotic diseases.” The Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating these activities.

Based on bio- and agro-defense mission requirements, as well as facility limitations at Plum Island, such as aging Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) space and its lack of Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) space, the need was identified to enhance the U.S. Government’s current research capabilities in the animal agricultural field to meet the requirements of HSPD-9. DHS therefore began exploring potential sites, including Plum Island, for a proposed new national research and development BSL-3 and BSL-4 asset, the proposed NBAF. The publication in the Federal Register on July 31, 2007, of the Notice of Intent (NOI) to prepare an environmental impact
statement (EIS) began the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process for the proposed NBAF (Appendix A).

Six alternative sites are being considered for the location of the proposed NBAF (referred to as “Action Alternatives”), along with the “No Action” alternative. These alternatives will be evaluated in the EIS. The site alternative sites are:

1. Plum Island, New York (i.e., a new replacement facility)
2. Flora Industrial Park, Flora, Mississippi
3. Manhattan Campus, Manhattan, Kansas
4. Texas Research Park, San Antonio, Texas
5. Umstead Research Farm, Butner, North Carolina
6. South Milledge Avenue, Athens, Georgia

Three of the six states (Georgia, North Carolina, and New York) have NEPA-like state statues. Compliance with the federal NEPA regulations is considered compliant with the state equivalent.

1.2 Public Scoping Process

DHS is preparing an EIS for the NBAF pursuant to NEPA, as amended (42 USC 4321 et seq.), and in accordance with the Council on Environmental Quality’s (CEQ) Regulations for Implementing the Procedural Provisions of NEPA (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508) and the DHS’s Policy and Procedures for Implementing the NEPA (FR Vol. 71, No. 64). The public scoping process is an integral part of NEPA compliance and ensures consideration of the full range of issues and alternatives that should be evaluated and helps identify the potential for significant environmental impacts. The NBAF public scoping process will directly affect the development of the NBAF EIS, because the members of the multi-disciplinary technical resource team preparing the EIS receive all public scoping comments applicable to their section and will consider or address the comments as applicable in their respective sections.

The NOI to prepare an EIS, published in the Federal Register on July 31, 2007, marked the beginning of the 60-day public comment period (July 31 through September 28, 2007), known as scoping, and announced DHS’s intention to hold public scoping meetings. Additionally, DHS mailed postcards providing the NOI information to approximately 2,650 initial stakeholders on July 31, 2007 (Appendix B). The initial stakeholder database was provided by PIADC and was expanded to include relevant federal agencies, state NEPA points of contact, non-governmental organizations, and associations, as well as mailing lists developed by the potential site consortia. DHS also developed a web page at http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf where the meetings were announced and interested stakeholders could request to be added to the mailing list.

DHS held eight public scoping meetings in the vicinity of each proposed NBAF alternative site and in Washington D.C. The meeting dates and locations are as follows:
In the NOI, DHS invited individuals, organizations, and agencies, including minority, low income, disadvantaged, and Native American groups, to submit oral or written comments concerning the scope of the EIS. Comments could be submitted by mail, e-mail, fax, voice mail, or handed-in during the public scoping meetings. Meeting attendees were also afforded the opportunity to provide oral comments, which were recorded by a court reporter. Commentors who provided contact information were automatically included in the stakeholder database to receive future NBAF information and public outreach opportunities.

In addition to the announcement in the NOI, scoping meetings were advertised in local newspapers prior to meeting dates (Table 1-1, Appendix B) and consortia made outreach efforts in their respective locales. The DHS Press Office also sent press releases to the local media inviting them to cover the meetings. Because the regional meeting held in Washington, D.C. was planned to reach a different audience, direct notifications were made by mail, and the congressional liaison for the DHS Science and Technology Directorate contacted their stakeholders via e-mail and phone.

An open house held before each scoping meeting provided attendees the opportunity to view informational materials; talk informally with subject matter experts from DHS, USDA-Agricultural Research Service (ARS), and USDA-Animal Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS); and obtain forms and fact sheets to guide them in fully participating in the NEPA process (Appendices C and D). In Texas, fact sheets were available in both English and Spanish. During each meeting, the DHS NBAF program manager presented an overview of the NBAF EIS and DHS’s approach to meeting its obligations under NEPA.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting Site: Old Saybrook, Connecticut</th>
<th>Meeting Date: August 22, 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harbor News</td>
<td>Thursday, August 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New London Day</td>
<td>Sunday, August 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tuesday, August 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Site: Southold, New York</td>
<td>Meeting Date: August 23, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsday</td>
<td>Sunday, August 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wednesday, August 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Hampton Star</td>
<td>Thursday, August 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thursday, August 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Site: Manhattan, Kansas</td>
<td>Meeting Date: August 28, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattan Free Press</td>
<td>Wednesday, August 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wednesday, August 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattan Mercury</td>
<td>Sunday, August 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monday, August 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Site: Flora, Mississippi</td>
<td>Meeting Date: August 30, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison County Herald</td>
<td>Tuesday, August 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saturday, August 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarion Ledger</td>
<td>Sunday, August 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wednesday, August 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Site: San Antonio, Texas</td>
<td>Meeting Date: September 11, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio Express News</td>
<td>Sunday, September 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monday, September 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Presna de San Antonio</td>
<td>Sunday, September 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wednesday, September 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Site: Creedmoor, North Carolina</td>
<td>Meeting Date: September 18, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Butner-Creedmoor News</td>
<td>Thursday, September 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thursday, September 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxford Public Ledger</td>
<td>Monday, September 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monday, September 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Site: Athens, Georgia</td>
<td>Meeting Date: September 20, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athens Banner-Herald</td>
<td>Sunday, September 9</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Wednesday, September 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Red and Black</td>
<td>Friday, September 14</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Wednesday, September 19</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The presentation was followed by a question and answer period in which subject matter experts responded to questions and concerns from the attendees. The majority of the time was devoted to the formal comment period, which was facilitated by a moderator who kept the process flowing to ensure anybody who wanted to speak was given the opportunity to do so. Additionally, posters were set up at each meeting and provided information on the meeting agenda, site selection process, the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, biocontainment laboratories and facilities, Plum Island Disease Center, NBAF EIS alternative sites, and “What is an Environmental Impact Statement?” (Appendix E). Some of the attendees provided written comments while at the meeting and some commentors handed in their prepared written statements.
2.0 Categorization of Issues

More than 1,350 individuals attended the eight scoping meetings, at which 292 individuals provided oral comments. In addition, more than 880 comment documents and voice messages were received, including some petitions and letters with multiple signatories, and when analyzed, yielded more than 3,870 comments categorized by subject (Table 2-1). All comments received during the 60-day comment period were given equal consideration. The key issues identified by scoping to be analyzed in the EIS per the CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1501.7) and scoping guidance are contained in Table 2-1. Comments received after the comment period were considered, as long as it was practicable to do so.

Comments received by DHS were grouped by similar concerns into issue categories. The identification and categorization of individual comments is subjective, however every effort was made to ensure that all public input was carefully considered and placed in the most appropriate issue category possible, given the spirit and context of each comment. The technical resource specialists preparing the NBAF EIS will review and address the comments in their respective technical issue categories, as appropriate, to ensure that the NBAF EIS benefits from the full import of the comments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE CATEGORY</th>
<th>NUMBER OF COMMENTS RECEIVED</th>
<th>SCOPE OF COMMENTS INCLUDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accidents, Threat, and Risk</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>- Intentional accident (e.g., purposeful sabotage of the facility by a disgruntled employee).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Unintentional accident (e.g., a system malfunction, such as an inadvertent air release or disruption of a vital system like heating or cooling).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Natural threats (e.g., severe weather, like tornados and hurricanes, and extreme events like wildfires and meteors) [note: the threat of earthquakes is also included in the Geology and Soils issue category].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Human-induced threats (e.g., a range of terrorist activities, such as arson, a purposeful theft and release of a dangerous organism, bombing of the facility, and purposeful sabotage or disruption of ongoing scientific investigations).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Risk (i.e., the degree [magnitude and duration] to which any of the potential accidents and threats could adversely affect human populations, animal populations, and economic activities).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Quality</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>- Emission of particulate and chemical constituents into the air, so that air quality or visibility is adversely affected.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Emissions resulting from incineration at the facility or increased traffic and congestion around the facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Construction activities that would create dust.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2-1. Issue Categories (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE CATEGORY</th>
<th>NUMBER OF COMMENTS RECEIVED</th>
<th>SCOPE OF COMMENTS INCLUDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Alternatives         | 995                         | - Statements of opposition to the facility at a certain location.  
- Statements of support for the facility at a certain location.  
- Suggestions for selecting one of the other alternative locations being evaluated in the EIS or the No Action Alternative.  
- Suggestions for alternative locations outside the range of alternatives being evaluated in the EIS. |
| Biological Resources | 135                         | - Ecosystem health and function (e.g., wildlife populations, endangered species, and their corresponding habitat).  
- Areas of special ecological importance (e.g., botanical gardens, migratory bird stopovers, fish spawning areas).  
- Potential effects on wildlife from an accidental or intentional (e.g., terrorist) release of a dangerous pathogen. |
| Cultural Resources   | 16                          | - Known and suspected archaeological resources and historical and architectural resources, such as lighthouses, military buildings, structures suitable for listing on the National Register of Historic Places, and designated cultural areas (e.g., Georgia’s Heritage Highway).  
- Potential Native American sites that should be avoided during construction or excavated and recorded prior to construction. |
| Design/Construction/Operation/Decommission | 103                         | - All aspects of the facility’s design and management throughout its life cycle.  
- Design components such as the building’s visual façade, energy efficiency, and overall sustainability.  
- Construction components such as construction materials, construction standards, quality assurance and quality control, and construction schedule.  
- Operation components such as how the facility would be managed, decisions on what organisms would be studied, how they would be studied, who would study them, how those actions would be coordinated with other research entities, and the level to which the public would be kept apprized of these decisions.  
- Decommission captures all aspects of planning for the end of the useful lifespan of the facility, including demolition, reuse, and potential contamination.  

**NOTE:** Comments regarding decommissioning of the existing PIADC facility were put into this issue category; however, if an action alternative is selected and the NBAF is built, decommissioning of the existing PIADC facility would be evaluated through a separate NEPA process in the future.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE CATEGORY</th>
<th>NUMBER OF COMMENTS RECEIVED</th>
<th>TYPES OF COMMENTS INCLUDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Justice</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>➢ The effects of the facility on the health, safety, and economic activity of minority populations, institutionalized populations, and lower income populations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Geology and Soils                    | 36                         | ➢ Surface and subsurface soils at the site, especially in the actual construction zone, as well as characteristics of the site’s underlying bedrock.  
  ➢ Removal and movement of soil, soil erosion, agricultural suitability, bedrock blasting, and seismic risk. |
| Government Intentions and Capabilities | 46                         | ➢ Potential for “secret” work.  
  ➢ Potential for expansion of research and development beyond what is covered in EIS.  
  ➢ Ability of DHS to appropriately handle dangerous organisms and complicated, high-level activities.  
  ➢ Decision-making transparency of the DHS’s management of the facility.  
  ➢ Accountability of for the type of research conducted at the facility. |
| Human Health and Safety              | 320                        | ➢ Potential effects on surrounding communities from an accidental or intentional (e.g., terrorist) release of a dangerous pathogen.  
  ➢ Effects on humans, such as injury, sickness, or death from released pathogens (including potential contamination of the food supply) as well as the health and safety of facility employees.  
  ➢ Questions regarding potential evacuation, quarantine, vaccines, and the ability of local public responders to handle the special requirements of a BSL-4 facility. |
| Infrastructure                       | 329                        | ➢ Physical Infrastructure  
  ➢ All utilities and building requirements necessary to properly operate a BSL-4 facility.  
  ➢ Energy consumption, water usage, and the capability of each site to meet the building’s requirements.  
  ➢ Business Infrastructure  
  ➢ All existing and planned academic, non-profit, and business enterprises that would support and synergistically benefit the scientific investigations at the facility.  
  ➢ Related research centers, manufacturing facilities (e.g., vaccines), and public investments in supporting research and development.  
  ➢ Opportunities for research collaboration and research partnerships. |
### Table 2-1. Issue Categories (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE CATEGORY</th>
<th>NUMBER OF COMMENTS RECEIVED</th>
<th>TYPES OF COMMENTS INCLUDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Land Use and Visual Resources   | 123                           | ➢ Current ownership of potential sites and relationship of potential use to adjoining land uses and prior land use.  
                               |                               | ➢ Local land use regulations, zoning ordinances, management plans, master plans, city codes, and resolutions.  
                               |                               | ➢ Viewshed of potential site, and impact of facility on local visual resources.  
                               |                               | ➢ Facility lighting and the size of the facility. |
| Mitigation                      | 3                             | ➢ Requirement for mitigation plans to ameliorate potential impacts to the environment.  
                               |                               | ➢ Suggestions for mitigation measures. |
| Noise                           | 31                            | ➢ Noise due to the construction, operation (e.g., generators), and management of the facility.  
                               |                               | ➢ Noise from increased traffic to the facility. |
| Purpose and Need                | 135                           | ➢ Rationale and justification for a BSL-4 facility.  
                               |                               | ➢ Stated needs for such a facility, including national food security, developing advanced counter-terrorism measures, and economic considerations. |
| Recreation                      | 14                            | ➢ Impacts to recreation from placement of the facility (e.g., disruption of greenway trail network).  
                               |                               | ➢ Availability of recreational opportunities for facility staff. |
| Regulatory Compliance           | 140                           | NEPA  
                               |                               | ➢ NEPA procedures and public scoping process.  
                               |                               | ➢ Management of the public scoping meetings.  
                               |                               | Policy  
                               |                               | ➢ Policy and regulations outside of the NEPA process, such as Congressional approval of the facility and compliance with international treaties and state and local regulations. |
| Socioeconomics                  | 568                           | ➢ Quality of life.  
                               |                               | ➢ Job creation.  
                               |                               | ➢ Local taxes.  
                               |                               | ➢ Local tax base.  
                               |                               | ➢ Cultural diversity.  
                               |                               | ➢ Long-term community impacts.  
                               |                               | ➢ Regional industries (e.g., poultry, swine, cattle).  
<pre><code>                           |                               | ➢ Land values. |
</code></pre>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISSUE CATEGORY</th>
<th>NUMBER OF COMMENTS RECEIVED</th>
<th>TYPES OF COMMENTS INCLUDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traffic and Transportation</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>➢ Existing and required transportation infrastructure (e.g., roads, airports).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Increased traffic as a result of the facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Transportation of pathogens.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Evacuation routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste Management</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>➢ Sanitary waste.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Animal waste.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Hazardous waste.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Local landfills.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>➢ Incineration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Resources</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>➢ Concerns about water consumption.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Suggested water conservation practices for the facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Concerns about local water availability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Potential for contamination of local water resources (e.g., from stormwater runoff).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Identification of local water resources and watersheds and their proximity to the facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>➢ Questions regarding the amount of water needed for the facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments Outside the Scope of this EIS</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>➢ Individuals seeking employment at the facility.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 2.0, Categorization of Issues

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3.0 SUMMARY OF SCOPING COMMENTS

This section presents a summary of the comments by issue category, with specific examples provided for each issue category. Examples are given because of the large number of comments received; however, all comments are uniquely identified and documented as part of the Administrative Record. The examples presented were chosen to reflect the range of comments received in each issue category. In most cases, one example comment represents several other comments of a similar nature. The number of example comments shown for each issue category is not a reflection of the total number of comments for that category; rather, the number reflects a representation of the range of issues for each particular issue category.

Issue categories are ordered alphabetically. Example comments within each category appear in random order. Example comments are verbatim, meaning they are presented as the commentor provided; therefore they are shown in italics. Example comments are not edited for grammar or content. Occasionally, explanatory text is added, and is shown in regular text. If an example comment begins or ends mid-sentence or if portions of a comment are not included for brevity or irrelevancy, this is indicated by three dots.

3.1 Accidents, Threat, and Risk

Comments concerning accidents, threats, and risk were wide-ranging (e.g., they came from all sites) and broad in scope. Comments concerning accidents included weather-related events, other natural disasters, and accidental release of pathogens into the environment. Many of the threat and risk comments were related to terrorist threats (e.g., the facility would be a terrorist target), both foreign and domestic; threats from disgruntled workers; theft; and security procedures in the lab (e.g., control and inventory of reproducing pathogens, worker security procedures, etc.). Some questions were raised, and suggestions provided, concerning security features of the facility; others asked where funding would come from to pay for security. Many commentors provided examples of past accidents or breaches of security at other labs and institutions for consideration. Some of the local governments provided information about their abilities to handle accident and security situations.

Both a detailed Consequence Analysis and a specific Threat Risk Analysis (TRA) are being conducted for the proposed NBAF. These analyses cover a wide range of potential accidents, threats, and risks to the proposed facility including the scenarios raised during public scoping. While the detailed Consequence Analysis will be included in the EIS and will incorporate in a qualitative manner the major findings from the TRA, the TRA is a separate stand-alone document that is used to develop the detailed security plan as required by federal regulations. Because the TRA includes specific details associated with the security layout and facility design, the TRA document will not be included in the EIS. However, the potential adverse consequences that could arise from intentional acts such as theft, sabotage, or destruction at the NBAF, including pathogens or sensitive information and technology, will be described in the EIS. The qualitative summary of the potential adverse consequences resulting from intentional acts is necessary to support the final decisions related to selecting the final site for the NBAF, as well as the determination of whether the facility will be constructed and operated.
Specific details and results from the TRA will be incorporated into the final facility design and operational procedures as part of the overall security plan to minimize threats and risk to the facility. The Threat Risk Analysis is compliant with current NIH operational standards that have been established for other BSL facilities as identified in federal regulations.

- Placing a prime terrorist target in an area like this [Plum Island] could have disastrous consequences.
- ...we have been hearing in the media that we are overdue for a massive hurricane. If that should happen, aside from the location of the nuclear plant and security and so forth, ... it would just be a tragedy, a tragedy for the island, a tragedy for all of us living here in Southold.
- Post-9/11, hospital facilities throughout Georgia have come to recognize the nontraditional roles we play in serving the public, such as supporting the NBAF.
- I am concerned about a disgruntled individual or somebody with an ax to grind and Athens paying the price... there was a disgruntled employee in Berkel, India, and thousands of people died there. It was tunic, a simple chemical, but it killed a lot of people because the man was disgruntled.
- We would also wonder if we could expect federal funding for our security forces.
- I was very concerned when I saw the proposal with the drawing of the possible site to see that parking was shown right next to the building one side, the loading dock on the other side with no evidence of any effort to provide barriers to vehicular access that was not vetted and properly taken care of. I was a visitor at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory site some years ago, and at that time they were just then figuring out that they needed to place barriers to prevent vehicles from crashing into the plutonium storage facilities.
- ... I'm not so concerned about accidents within the facility... Those problems can be solved, but you need to protect the facility against external attacks.
- The recent escape of foot-and-mouth disease from a British research facility that was thought to be safe emphasizes the dangers of siting the NBAF in this location.
- Also there is the threat of this facility being a target by terrorist groups.
- Regardless of any precautions taken to ensure citizens' safety, I feel the installation would heighten our chances of being targeted by terrorists, either foreign or domestic.
- In September 2003, the U.S. Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) published a report detailing safety and security failures and shortcomings at the existing facility at Plum Island. A few of the many examples presented follow:
  - ... Striking workers sabotaged the water system on the first day of the strike; they could just as easily have sabotaged the steam pipes which are a key part of the decontamination process. ...
  - ... 8 scientists from other countries were found working in the biocontainment area without completed background investigations.
  - Plum Island management failed to maintain adequate control over who received copies of keys and master keys.
- What if there is a fire? What if there is a forest fire – in a prolonged drought of the sort this area is currently experiencing, the risk of fire is particularly acute.
- What if there is an ice storm, and employees can’t get there for a week, as is common in this rural area?
• During Hurricane Bob, Plum Island’s power was out for nearly a day, and it’s backup generators had been down for three months. For three days, only three workers were available to run the entire facility of hundreds of rooms and animals, trying to handle the wastes of large infected animals with a hand pump.

• While there is much discussion of the NBAF becoming a target for a spectacular sort of terrorist attack, there is a greater danger in stealth. The director of the Plum Island facility... has cautioned that pathogens are more difficult to secure than other materials that can be used as weapons, such as nuclear material. There is no existing mechanism that can detect the theft of a small amount of disease material. Once removed from the facility, that disease material can be grown and multiplied in secret. Many of the diseases which will be brought to the proposed facility can be turned into biological weapons. Just keeping an inventory list is difficult, because the diseases are as part of the research allowed to reproduce, or may be accidentally allowed to reproduce.

• North Carolina is nationally recognized for our expertise in emergency management with practical experience in both planning for and responding to emergency situations. As the former Secretary of Crime Control and Public Safety, I know that not only are North Carolinians committed to keeping our communities safe, but that our first responders are some of the best trained and prepared in this country.

• However sophisticated the proposed safety mechanisms may be, people make mistakes, natural disasters happen, and machines break. Actually, the more unique and sophisticated the machine, the greater the likelihood of it breaking down, and requiring specialized service that may take some time to bring in. There will be accidents at this facility; workers will get comfortable, people not familiar with the systems will misuse them and they will break, and/or a number of other aspects of the security design will fail.

• I heard a lot of fear of terrorist activity. Is this a reasonable terrorist target - that is, could a catastrophic event occur because of a breach in this site, and if so, what is the area of impact? A mile? 10 miles? Etc. How many people are within that range? I would think terrorists would prefer to hit a site with a big impact. I'm having trouble seeing why this site would qualify. Stealing from the site and releasing it in a heavily populated area might have the biggest impact, but that is possible where ever the site is located .... If there is a classification for potential sites of terrorists attacks, how would this facility be classified?

• The concept of a fool-proof facility has been tested with nuclear power plants. Most nuclear power plants have been safe most of the time. Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl are clear examples that no fool-proof facility exists.

• Already we have seen how vulnerable our food supply and infrastructure is to attack from those wishing to do us harm, both inside and outside of our borders

• It is disingenuous to think a Plum Island-like lab will not be a target for terrorists. When Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmud was caught red-handed in Kabul, Afghanistan, also captured was the sultan’s dossier on Plum Island.

• We don’t see any particular issues related to cataclysmic meteorological or geological events.

• Southhold is surrounded by Plum Island, Millstone, Northville Tanks, Brookhaven Labs, and potentially LNG and in the event of an attack or failure, at anyone of these facilities, we won’t stand a chance.
• What about fire safety? Who will control lab fires, the Helotes Fire Department? It was apparent that the Helotes Fire Department was overwhelmed within less than 24 hours when it attempted to fight the three-month long mulch fire that began last December 25. Will the fire safety response be like that of Plum Island, a single dedicated fireman and a bucket brigade of employees who are supposed to sprint to the firehouse at the sound of an alarm?

3.2 Air Quality

Air quality comments included both specific concerns, such as an increase in particulates, and general comments concerning degradation of air quality. One commentor had a suggestion for reducing air quality impacts. Concerns were raised about air pollutants from incineration, air pollutants from increased traffic, air quality testing and monitoring, and lowered property values and quality of life due to a reduction in air quality.

Public concerns regarding air quality will be addressed in the EIS in a section devoted to air quality issues. This section will describe the existing air quality at each of the proposed alternative locations and then describe how the proposed facility would impact air quality during both construction and operation. The public may also want to review the Waste Management section of the EIS, which will describe methods of disposing of animal carcasses. These methods could include incineration, as well as other disposal methods. Similarly, the public may want to review the Traffic and Transportation section, which will address increased traffic from construction and operation of the facility and the associated impacts.

• If the waste is burned, as I understand, we're concerned about particulate matter. Our region, Athens, is in borderline attainment for particulate matter, and we're concerned that this would further stress our area.
• ...traffic would be increased many times over and with it air pollution.
• Additional tree cover on the unused portion of the site, trees in the parking areas, and vegetated roofs could also enhance air quality by reducing the heat island effect of the site. While this is unlikely to compensate for any discharges of air toxics from the facility, it should ameliorate the impacts of vehicular traffic and normal HVAC discharges.
• The fact that you incinerate animals at 221,300 degrees or whatever temperatures that you incinerate animals, my concern is the air quality that comes as a result of that and how often is air quality testing done and where can the average citizen obtain that information. I don't know that it's readily available.
• Will monitoring include composite air samples similar to those currently being performed by DHS at other locations? Will air monitoring include DNA analysis that will allow identification of all infectious materials housed in the facility?
• This area is primarily a farming community and as such depends heavily on its soil quality, livestock, plants, clean air and water for our community well being and livelihoods.
3.3 Alternatives

Comments about alternatives fell into three broad categories:

**Category 1:** Some commentors suggested choosing one of the other proposed alternatives being considered in the EIS (e.g., the No Action Alternative or one of the alternative sites).

**Category 2:** Other commentors suggested alternative sites outside the range of the proposed alternatives considered in the EIS.

**Category 3:** Many commentors simply made a statement that they were either opposed to having the NBAF at their location or that they supported building the NBAF at their location. This was often expressed as a “vote” either for or against the facility at a particular location.

Between the first two categories, more comments fell into the second category than the first. Many commentors suggested unspecified, but remote locations, away from population centers and in hostile environments. A few people suggested specific alternate locations. In terms of the third category, sometimes such statements were introductory remarks or closing statements in a letter, e-mail, fax, voice mail, or transcript that addressed one or more other issues. Many such comments were provided by community and industry leaders in support of their site for location of the facility.

Chapter 2 of the EIS will address alternatives in detail. Included will be a discussion of reasonable alternatives, as well as alternatives that were initially considered but eliminated from further detail. The rationale for eliminating some alternatives will be described. The reasonable alternatives include siting the proposed NBAF at one of the six alternative sites under consideration and the No Action alternative. The site selection process will also be described.

**Category 1:**
- *Plum Island should continue to operate as a Bio-Safety Level 3[sic] Facility…* (i.e., No Action Alternative)
- *I like the No Action Alternative best. I think they ought to have it at Plum Island if they are going to have it at all.*
- *…please not select Athens as the location for the facility and I would vote for North Carolina. I think its proximity to the research triangle would be beneficial.*
- *Texas seems like a better possibility.*
- *A refitting of the older facility on Plum Island makes more sense to us.*

**Category 2:**
- *…really think it's important to have this lab, but I think they should have built it in some secret location where nobody would know where these pathogens are.*
- *I would urge you to accept our Governor's kind invitation to locate NBAF on the grounds of the Governor's mansion.*
- *I suggest it be put on an island somewhere where there is little human contact other than the research staff and where there is little wildlife to transmit any of the diseases being studied.*
• Put this facility either in an isolated area or in Washington DC where all the people who are worried live.
• There are many state-owned properties all over the State of Georgia that could suit such an NBAF facility. Almost all of them already have the infrastructure required for the NBAF. The closing of military bases in Georgia, includes Fort McPherson (Atlanta's seventh largest employer with 4,141 jobs, the most of any of the four bases slated for closure in Georgia). Why could not one of these bases be the site for the NBAF?
• Why not choose a geographic location that is inhospitable to the growth of lab specimens outside of their building confines?
• ...why not consider locating the site on the old Dorthea Dix land, in Raleigh.
• ...it should be in a hostile environment where toxic leaks would have trouble surviving, like arid desert or frozen ice lands.
• Build it underground in a wasteland area that is unpopulated.
• I would like to see a place like this in a more remote place, like on a island or deep in a mountain
• ...it should be located on some remote island where the germs would have a natural quarantine rather than have it in the heartland of cattle country.
• Consider location at Clay Center, Nebraska. Currently the USDA Meat Animal Research Center.

Category 3:
• ...we are opposed to this facility being in our county.
• I fully support bringing the NBAF facility to our city...
• Welcome, Welcome, Welcome, I know you may hear from people not wanting you to relocate here but let me assure you that the majority of us would welcome ya'll with open arms.
• So, I'm definitely against that and would like to vote no.

3.4 Biological Resources

Comments concerning biological resources included specific concerns about fish, bird, game, and botanical resources and their habitat. Some commentors questioned the impacts to these resources, impacts from both construction of the facility and its operation, including effects from lighting and the potential release of pathogens into the wild game populations. Other commentors provided specific information about endangered species.

The EIS will include a section detailing biological resources at each of the alternative sites, including vegetation, wetlands, aquatic resources, wildlife, and threatened and endangered species. Information provided by the public during the scoping process will be included, along with information provided by other federal, state, and local governments and other relevant sources. Concerns raised by the public about impacts to these resources will be addressed in the impact analysis, including impacts from construction as well as operation of the proposed NBAF.
• The proposed NBAF site lies directly between the two necessary components (the State Botanical Garden and Whitehall Forest - located next door to the site) of an Important Bird Area ("IBA"), designated by the National Audubon Society. Therefore, the locating of NBAF here would degrade, disrupt and otherwise diminish the continuous natural setting required for the IBA to exist. A designated IBA is a site that supports endangered or threatened bird species, including range restricted species, habitat restricted species and species vulnerable due to congeneratory behavior. How can NBAF’s intrusion with heavy construction, vehicle and human traffic and light and noise pollution not seriously degrade or even destroy this fragile and critical IBA?

• I also, as a former employee of the state Botanical Gardens, adjacent to the proposed building site, would also like to voice my disapproval of that site because of the obvious botanical affects it would have.

• I’m concerned that noise and light pollution from the facility will disrupt migration patterns.

• The Oconee River also is critical habitat for the Altamaha shiner, Cyprinella xanuina, currently classified by the state of Georgia as an endangered species. The Altamaha shiner is particularly vulnerable to habitat degradation and poor water quality. The gray bat, Myotis grisescens, is on both the federal and state endangered species lists. Threats to this species include loss of insect prey over streams degraded by siltation and pollution. Impacts on the status of these species could be exacerbated by land disturbance during the construction phase of the proposed facility adjacent to the river and by surface water withdrawals associated with the operation of the facility.

• Our stock and trade is the tall grass prairie and the natural eco-system there, and this is way too dangerous and a bad location.

• Plum Gut is a significant coastal Fish and Wildlife Habitat...Significant concentrations of many species forage in this area, including striped bass, bluefish, tautog, summer flounder, and scup. Plum Gut is one of two major migration corridors for striped bass, which move into Long Island Sound in spring en route to their breeding grounds and return to southern over wintering areas during fall. Plum Gut is also thought to be the major corridor for Atlantic salmon returning to the Connecticut and Pawtucket Rivers in the early spring.

• This area [Long Beach Bay and Orient Point Marshes] is especially significant as feeding areas for herons, egrets, and ibis, which nest on nearby Plum Island. The following at-risk bird species also utilize the habitat in this area:
  • Roseate tern – casual visitor – endangered
  • Northern harrier – threatened
  • Common tern – threatened
  • Common loon – threatened
  • Sharp-shinned hawk – special concern
  • Black skimmer – special concern
  • Northern goshawk – special concern

• DHS must consider the effect that rebuilding and/or upgrading the facility will have on the fish and wildlife on the island and in the surrounding area.

• The site is very close to the Tar River which is the home of some endangered species.

• There are several natural areas, parks, wildlife habitat and waterfowl migration areas (wetlands) immediately adjacent to the proposed site. How will they be affected?
• There is one especially dangerous feature of the Butner site which makes it an unwise choice. That is the close proximity of the Camp Butner and State Gamelands. The Gamelands have a concentration of unfenced wildlife, especially white-tailed deer. If there were such a release as has recently occurred at Pirbright, disease among the wild deer might not be discovered before widespread and regional infection. Amongst wild animals such an outbreak would be difficult to contain.

• The Research Park is located more than seven miles south of the Edwards Aquifer Recharge Zone and is not on the contributing or transitions endangered species habitat. Studies have been completed, and no golden-cheeked warbler or black-capped vireo habitat exists on the property. In addition, the Research Park lies in zone three, which is considered to be a low probability area for the nine cave invertebrates listed as endangered in Bexar County. The 100 acres being proposed for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility is located in the western section of the park. The proposed facility would be over 1/4 mile from any potential adjacent development.

3.5 Cultural Resources

Comments concerning cultural resources ranged from simply encouraging consideration of cultural resources in the NEPA process to site-specific cultural resource. Following are examples that show both the general and specific nature of the comments.

Cultural resource concerns will be addressed in the EIS, in compliance with both NEPA and Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act. Cultural resource surveys have been conducted at each alternative site and potentially affected tribes have been consulted. Information provided during public scoping will supplement these surveys and consultations. Potential impacts to cultural resources will be described as appropriate.

• How does DHS plan to deal with the environmental, ecological, as well as habitat and archeological destruction and degradation caused by NBAF?
• An archaeological survey should be performed and found historical resources should be excavated and safeguarded. Historic and cultural sites should be identified and construction in these areas avoided.
• Highway 441 (to I-20 to Atlanta) has been designated "Georgia's Heritage Highway"... Quoting a page from the Georgia Department of Economic Development's website, "In central Georgia, you'll experience seven historic communities left virtually unscathed by the Civil War along the 100-mile trek that is Georgia's Antebellum Trail (which follows Hwy. 441)...". If Highway 441 becomes known as "The Pathogen Highway" instead, the economic benefits associated with this effort as well as the labors of many people involved in preserving this important part of Georgia's culture and history will be lost.
• From 1659 to 1898, Plum Island was populated by farmers. The island is an important part of the town’s agricultural, military and maritime heritage which should be preserved. The island also has a lighthouse built in 1827...which was rebuilt in 1869...The lighthouse is now owned by DHS, which is cooperating with the East End Lighthouses and the town, which plans to acquire and restore the lighthouse.
The Town of Southold adopted a resolution on April 24th of this year encouraging the transfer of five acres to the Town for the separation of the lighthouse for addressing the preservation issues.

Fort Terry and the island’s military structures should be preserved and open to the public. According to the LWRP, “many of these structures are considered suitable for listing on the National Register of Historic Places.”

DHS must consider the effect rebuilding and/or upgrading the facility will have on the cultural heritage and historic artifacts of Southold Town that still exist on Plum Island.

My personal concern is for the stabilization and preservation of historic military buildings and artillery emplacements.

3.6 Design/Construction/Operation/Decommission

Several members of the public raised questions or concerns about the design, construction, operation, or decommission of the facility. Comments related to design and construction had to do with public involvement in the design process; expressions of confidence in the design and construction standards; quality concerns in the design and construction process; encouragement to build the facility following principles of energy efficiency, environmental sustainability, and architectural sensitivity; and interest in the construction schedule. Comments related to operation were generally quite specific and dealt with topics such as management of the facility, the nature of the work to be done at the facility, and questions about possible safety features, such as a no-fly zone. Comments related to decommissioning were generally either encouragement to plan for the decommissioning of the proposed NBAF or questions about decommissioning of the existing PIADC facility.

Preliminary design concepts applicable to all action alternative sites will be described in the EIS. General construction and operational procedures will also be described. While the NBAF will comply with all relevant design, construction, and operation regulations, many details will not be determined until the EIS has been finalized and an alternative has been selected. However, if an action alternative is selected, DHS has committed to developing a Community Involvement Plan to keep the local community informed and educated about the NBAF and its operation.

I have confidence in the design of those laboratories, the inspection by biosafety personnel and the faculty and staff who accept the responsibility of the conducting of bioresearch within those laboratories.

The bottom line is that any facility plan built, operated in accordance with current standards of operation for Biosafety Level-3 and -4 facilities should be safe in this ... site.

...NBAF be designed, constructed and operated to meet the highest level of sustainable development under the US Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED™) and that it meet or exceed all federal, state and local environmental rules and regulations.

... present a REALISTIC detailed calendar of construction plans for the community’s consideration.

Explain how quality is managed and assured during each project phase (design, permitting, contracting, construction, operation)? Will the project be independently
audited? (Perhaps by community oversight, as suggested by the Mayor.) Do the independent auditors have any real authority, or are they merely "window dressing"?

- And most importantly: neither the University of Georgia nor Athens nor its citizens will have ANY control or input over what DHS ultimately does with NBAF or how it is managed.
- Will the scientific work performed at NBAF be published or will it be classified? Since the facility falls under the purview of DHS, will research be kept from the public in the interest of national security? How transparent will NBAF be?
- Plum Island currently houses The North American Foot and Mouth Disease Bank which keeps vaccine for the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Will the Vaccine Bank be moved here?
- What kind of biological agents will be involved in this federal facility? What specific guidelines will be used when dealing with pathogens of various kinds under the direction of scientists? What is the nature of the bio-kinetics research project in this facility?
- Will there be a no-fly zone around the facility?
- The Draft EIS must assess the costs associated with decommissioning and decontaminating the facility at the end of its useful lifespan, whenever that may be. Those costs should be weighed against the alternative of abandoning the Plum Island facility after 50 years.
- What is to become of the Plum Island facility? What forethought is being given to prevent the same obsolescence as with Plum Island, 50 years from now?
- What will happen to this building in 50 years when it becomes not available for upgrades? Will we be stuck with a giant concrete hulk stuck in the ground?

3.7 Environmental Justice

Issues concerning race and lower-income and institutionalized populations were expressed by the public. General racial issues were brought up, as well as the perception that various unrepresented populations would be used as “human guinea pigs”. Income-related issues ranged from concerns that lower-income populations would not benefit from the project in terms of jobs to support for the project because it would bring jobs. Concern was expressed that institutionalized populations, as well as youth and elderly, were not being considered.

The EIS will have a section addressing environmental justice in accordance with Executive Order 12898. In addition to information provided through the public scoping process, data will be obtained from the U.S. Census of Population and Housing on racial and ethnic characteristics, percentage of minority population, and low income population. This information will be used to assess whether adverse effects, if any, will be disproportionately borne by minority or low-income populations.

- Most people here are white middle-class, upper-class Americans. What about all the other sectors involved?
- I heard from somebody at AT&T earlier that said... you're right, the poor people, they're not going to get the jobs over there. He said it. We all know it. He just sat right over there and said ... -- the jobs are not going to go to the people low down.
• The proposed site is in very close proximity to several public schools and a large population of youth and elderly, whose health and well being are at the greatest risk.

• how about the diversity of our region, we're black and white, we're Hispanic and Asian. ... So I suggest to you that the diversity of our region as a fair factor to consider.

• We don't want or need this lab! Please read this article and you will see that the black community in the Flora area does not want it either. (Some in Flora allege racial discrimination- see http://www.clarionledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070924/NEWS/709240349).

• ...I’d just like to let you people know up there doing the Scoping that Flora, Mississippi is having a big racial issue right now and 150 Blacks marched on City Hall last night. If you call the Mayor, he’s going to deny it, but if you go to wlbt.com and click on their site, I’m sure they’ve got it recorded. They showed it on TV last night. They’re going to boycott the town, and I don’t want it in Flora, and I grant you, ya’ll don’t want it in Flora with all these racial issues. So keep it out of here.

• ...somebody made the question, "Why couldn't this be in Raleigh?" My question is why can't it be in Granville County? Why -- Wake County gets all the job opportunities. We – the (audience applause) disparity between rich and poor is huge, this is now our opportunity.

• ... but the site is -- clearly is in a populated watershed and naturally raises suspicions if one of the attractions is easy access to human guinea pigs. Butner has probably the U.S. aggregate of black population largely institutionalized and not present here tonight. And our relatively poorly educated captives of one sort or another, prisoners, juvenile delinquents and mental patients unable to give truly informed consent of their own free will; captives powerless to prevent or even like the victims of the Tuskegee syphilis experiment, likely to be unaware of being infected with contagious debilitating diseases... But if using -- even if using human guinea pigs is not the intention, the temptation exists. And biological weapons research should not be conducted cheek by jowl with institutionalized populations similar to those used by Josef Mengele and his colleagues. If built here, the entire world would reasonably suspect that the U.S. military and other agencies will again be using adults and underage captives as human guinea pigs for biological warfare research.

• It has to do with environmental racism. And by that I mean we have many, many populations which are captive audiences so to speak, or captive citizens in the mental health facility, in the prisons, both state and federal and the retarded institutions (words inaudible), and I do think that this really needs to be looked at. There’s something humanely wrong about putting this facility in an area with all these captive populations, and I do mean captive populations.

3.8 Geology and Soils

Comments received concerning geology and soils included a note that steep slopes and bedrock occur near the surface at the Georgia site, therefore construction concerns were raised regarding soil erosion and blasting of bedrock. Suggestions were also made to minimize soil erosion. One commentator noted that the soils at the Georgia site are classified as prime agricultural soils. Seismic concerns were also expressed. The U.S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM) office
noted federal minerals need to be identified and managed in New York; this would be true for the other sites as well.

The EIS will include a section describing the geology and soils at each of the alternative sites, including information on earthquakes and their potential for occurrence at each proposed NBAF site, as well as soils found at each site. Additional information addressing earthquakes will be included in the Consequence Analysis section of the EIS. Information provided by the public during the scoping process will be included, along with information provided by other federal, state, and local governments and other relevant sources. Concerns raised by the public about impacts will be addressed in the impact analysis, including impacts from construction (e.g., soil erosion) as well as operation of the proposed NBAF.

- The magnitude of earth disturbance will result in a substantial amount of soil erosion and subsequent siltation and pollution of the Middle Oconee River. The slopes from the site to the river are 20 to 25 percent in some areas.
- The United States Department of Agriculture Soil Survey of Clarke County, Georgia shows that much of the proposed site is comprised of “Pacolet sandy clay loam,” ranging from 6-15 percent slope, is highly eroded and typically, the subsoil extends to a depth of only 39 inches.“ Not only would the building require blasting of bedrock, all other subsurface infrastructures would likewise.
- ...we're on an earthquake fault line, the New Madrid Fault.
- The 66-acre site proposed for the NBAF sits on land designated "Prime Agricultural Soil." That means that of all the land in the state, that site has the most suitable for producing crops. American [sic] needs food and most of it comes from crops. Rather than growing our crops on poor soil and then dumping tons of fertilizer on soil that is not fertile or arable, we should preserve and protect "Prime Agricultural Soil" for its highest and best use -- the production of agricultural crops. Such sites should not be used for non-agricultural purposes.
- The U.S. Geological Survey places the proposed site within a zone of seismic risk corresponding to $M_{\text{max}}$ of 7.5 (maximum moment magnitude). According to the USGS, “This large $M_{\text{max}}$ was motivated by the magnitude of the 1886 Charleston event (M7.3, Johnston, 1996b), since the workshop participants felt such a large event could not be ruled out in other areas of the extended crust [Note: includes the entire northeast Georgia region].” Plans for the proposed facility should consider the current USGS seismic risk calculations and anticipated increased construction costs to meet this risk.
- If Plum Island, NY is selected for the NBAF, the federal minerals needs to be identified, impacts from the proposal and cumulative impacts to the federal minerals needs to be identified, and a federal minerals management plan needs to developed with BLM's participation in the EIS.
- It is my experience and testimony that those individuals celebrate the opportunity to bring this national laboratory to San Antonio, Texas, where it will be safe from earthquakes...
3.9 Government Intentions and Capabilities

Several commentors expressed doubt about the intentions of the federal government in general and/or DHS in particular. The nature of the comments ranged from the public’s perception that “secret” work would be conducted at the NBAF, to lack of transparency, accountability, and competency.

To address concerns about government intentions and capabilities, DHS has developed a public participation plan, which included the scoping process, in accordance with NEPA and other applicable regulations. Through implementation of this plan, the public will be given further opportunity to ask questions and meet with officials from DHS at public meetings during the draft EIS review process, as well as have the opportunity to review and comment on the draft EIS. Furthermore, the EIS will describe in detail the work to be conducted the NBAF. Finally, if an action alternative is selected, DHS has committed to developing a Community Involvement Plan to keep the local community informed and educated about the NBAF. Through these public outreach efforts, DHS intends to build community trust and address concerns about government intentions and capabilities.

DHS must comply with treaty obligations of The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) as ratified by the United States Senate on March 26, 1995, which prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. Further, the U.S. Code Title 18, Part I, Chapter 10, Section 175 provides for fines and/or imprisonment for whoever knowingly develops, produces, stockpiles, transfers, acquires, retains, or possesses any biological agent, toxin, or delivery system for use as a weapon, or knowingly assists a foreign state or any organization to do so, or attempts, threatens, or conspires to do the same.

- I'm afraid this government has abused its citizens' trust and lied to accomplish its goals. It's imposed its will upon us and ignored our protests and broken laws and kept things secret, citing national security needs. Once this lab is built, there will be nothing to stop it from changing to work on even more dangerous viruses like Ebola, anthrax and smallpox if they want to, and we won't know about it, even if we have a citizen council.
- One thing that we have learned over the past few years is the only thing that we can trust about our Federal Government is that you can't trust it. ...the executive department in particular has shown a disdain for the rule of law. It has shown a disdain for transparency, and it's shown an avoidance of accountability.
- This administration and the Dept. of Homeland Security have, unfortunately, not earned the trust of the people of this country. Indeed, I propose that you have earned our distrust and therefore I can't believe anything you say about the safety and operation of this facility.
- I do not trust the competence of Homeland Security
- This government branch is certainly not known for being open and transparent in its business. I think there is a real trust issue with [D]HS [sic]. We were told that everything that went on in the facility would be public record but I have to say that I cannot believe
that. If [D]HS [sic] wanted to do secret research they would do so and the city of Athens would not be told.

- The development and operation of the NBAF by the Department of Homeland Security raises troubling questions of secrecy. In 2001 representatives of the Unite States blocked the development of verification protocols which were in progress under the international Biological Weapons Convention. Subsequent progress appears to have been stalled in order to conceal our biological defense program. Moreover, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 which created the Department of Homeland Security gave the agency special protections from public inquiry and free information flow.

- The Homeland Security Act created an exemption from the Freedom of Information Act for DHS which eliminates the right to obtain existing, unpublished records. ...As a result, legitimate scientific inquiry and peer-review are stifled

- I don’t trust oversight, particularly under the current administration. I feel as though many things have been lacking in accountability so it’s hard to trust anybody telling me that this will be secure and that will not be a problem and that we should trust them.

3.10 Human Health and Safety

Many commentors expressed a wide range of concerns about human health and safety in regard to the facility. A large number of these concerns had to do with public health effects in surrounding communities should an accidental (or intentional) release of pathogens occur. Other concerns related to lack of vaccines, potential contamination of the food supply (including game meat), and the impacts of a potential release of pathogens on vulnerable populations. One commentor raised questions about the possibility of a quarantine in the event of a release, and the impacts associated with quarantine. Some commentors noted that the risks to communities are low due to the latest technologies used, and still others provided information about the abilities of their local public safety responders to respond to a release incident.

A detailed Consequence Analysis is being conducted for the proposed NBAF, which will address potential adverse consequences to human health and safety that could arise from release of pathogens. This information will be included in the EIS and will be used to support the final decisions related to selecting the final site for the NBAF, as well as the determination of whether the facility will be constructed and operated.

- Release of a disease is potentially much more devastating to human health than even the mass radiation contamination from Chernobyl. One thing that is certain from the study of ecology of disease and in species: Once an unwanted disease becomes established, if it will happen, it will spread.

- The health and safety of residents in the surrounding areas of Plum Island is of primary concern. A 2003 investigation by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that a culture of lax and inadequate security, safety and environmental practices could result in potentially lethal consequences...

- The Town of Southold is above all concerned about the safety of its citizens, and the proposal to increase the Biosafety Level of Plum Island to the highest level could pose a significant threat to that safety.
• ...By changing the nature of the facility to carry a higher security level..., we will be permitting the study of zoonotic diseases – diseases transmitted from animals to humans – that could prove highly dangerous to surrounding populations. At this time, there is no other facility in the world equipped to study these dangerous diseases that could put both humans and livestock at risk.

• ...this particular community here on the east end to some of the risks that a Bio-Safety Level 4[sic] facility could pose where you’re studying diseases that have no vaccines to prevent them and no known cures is really putting us at a very, very high risk.

• The biggest issue we face is, as we’re dealing with things such as SARS pan flu and other diseases, is that piece of surveillance in being able to pick up an agent while it’s a needle in the hay stack and then be able to put the intervention and communication strategies industries forward to prevent it from becoming a public health catastrophe.

• The Health Department also works with many other agencies involved in ongoing animal surveillance. These systems detect the possibility of unusual animal death or disease trends which may be a seminal indicator of human disease. They include surveillance methods for livestock, wildlife, and aquatic species. Since the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility will be dedicated to the study of animal and zoonotic diseases, these cooperative arrangements for surveillance communication and action should provide great assurance to the San Antonio community.

• A virus or something can have our health or our kid’s health. It’s 100% is too much risk.

• we ... understand the need to protect our food supply and the public health.

• Kansas is not only the bread basket of the country but also a large producer of our meat. It makes no sense to import deadly pathogens this close to our food supply and our local residents.

• To bring diseases into this country that are not already present is inexcusable. They should be studied in facilities and locations in which they already exist. To bring foreign animal diseases into the heart of this live stock-rearing region is irresponsible. To bring zoonotic diseases to a facility built next to an elderly assisted living center such as this proposal would do, here in Manhattan, Kansas, is homicidal negligence.

• My main concern is how a release or a disaster would affect the day-to-day living of what is going on now.

• The facility proposes significant quality of life issues, including specific health and community safety issues.

• ..to think of housing so many diseases in a facility near thousands of students who travel nationally and internationally gives rise to serious concerns regarding epidemics as well.

• I would like to ask that the EIS address whether under any circumstances a quarantine would be established and what the impact of -- on the community would be if quarantine is implemented.

• I am raising my children in this community because I believe it is a good place to do so...I feel that housing the worlds deadliest diseases and developing further ways to harm innocent people is all around bad for this country.

• It is a case of the danger of the research being greater than the threat of whatever is being researched.

• The current labs have had enough safety breaches to make me very sure that this type of technology needs to be kept away from populated areas.
Section 3.0, Summary of Scoping Comments

- There are a lot of hunters in that area as well who eat the meat from the animals they catch in order to survive.
- It is extremely dangerous, and because UNC Hospitals is one of the largest transplant centers in this state, and there are many (including my daughter) who have received transplants there, this program is not an option in this state. People with transplants are immunocompromised and cannot fight off diseases.
- It will not benefit the community. Instead, it places us in severe danger, and poses severe hazards for us, and I am greatly opposed to it and do not want to see it come here.
- As a small dairy goat and horse farmer, of course I have significant concerns that the full range of disease organisms to which they and human populations could be vulnerable, and their variants would be appropriately filtered and monitored in air, stormwater and wastewater from the site.
- ...operate a containment laboratory that will do just that; contain 25 the pathogens that Homeland Security proposes to research at the NBAF. Using the latest technologies developed and proven in many countries, it is possible for people to do work safely with these micro-organisms so that they, their families and other community members do not become ill; and a surrounding environment is maintained uncontaminated.
- I feel that it could be a major health risk for the people being so close to the town. If something was to go wrong and the diseases started spreading through the town, it could result in many deaths. I feel that health is much more important than money.

3.11 Infrastructure

Some members of the public raised questions or provided comments about infrastructure. These comments included both utility and business infrastructure. Some commentors from all sites touted the infrastructure they have in place and investments that have been made to support the facility.

The EIS will include a section on infrastructure, which will describe utility infrastructure needed for operation of the NBAF, as well as existing utilities available at each alternative site to support the operation of the NBAF, including potable water supply, electrical power, natural gas, sanitary waste water treatment facilities, and storm water. Additionally, for each alternative site, the EIS will evaluate impacts to the infrastructure and note if existing facilities are adequate, or if upgrades, repairs, or new facilities would be needed.

- That work, I believe, would dovetail nicely with the research infrastructure already in place here in this great city.
- ..., this facility has the potential for a high-level consumption of natural resources, including water and energy...[sic] unless energy use is minimized and efficiency goals such as LEED Platinum standards are set and met, this facility will consume a large amount of energy, contributing to the widespread impacts from energy generation.
- I am opposed to this because I am so concerned about the energy use, the noise levels, the impact that all this has in terms of property values.
- We urge DHS to design and construct this facility to minimize energy use. The facility should be built to LEED Platinum standards. (A new CDC laboratory just received...

- ...we committed some $7 million just for the public infrastructure of the research park. Beautiful location. Proper running of that park, as well as the infrastructure that services close to that park, an ideal location for this facility.

3.12 Land Use and Visual Resources

Most comments related to land use and visual resources tended to be informative comments, notifying DHS of local land use regulations, zoning ordinances, and resolutions passed in regard to the project. Others noted conflicts with local land use regulations. Still other commentors noted adjacent land uses and their compatibility, or lack thereof, with the proposed facility. Some noted current land ownership.

Comments were received regarding visual resources, including aesthetics and impacts from lighting. Some commentors were concerned about visual impacts to the existing rural viewshed. Other commentors were concerned about lighting at the facility (necessitated by security concerns) and the associated light pollution.

The EIS will include a section on land use and visual resources. In this section, existing land uses and visual resources at each alternative site will be described. Local zoning regulations for each site will be listed in Chapter 4. Potential impacts, such as land use conflicts (if any) and changes in aesthetic quality, will be addressed.

- I see several problems with the proposed Milledge Ave. site. First of all, it is in the county ordinance Greenway Zoning area which would not allow for such a large structure.
- I would like to register my opposition to the NBAF in Athens on land-use grounds. I think the facility is not in keeping with the land-use principles Athens-Clarke County has adopted.
- I think that the change in the land use is a problem.
- In my opinion, viewed from South Milledge Avenue and Whitehall Road, the site proposed for the NBAF possesses as fine scenic qualities as I have found anywhere...
- The proposed NBAF location is one of the most beautiful, pastoral, famously well loved and very visible vistas in Athens/Clarke County. That the Georgia Consortium could offer to DHS that "the property can be fenced and a single gate and controlled access road constructed" is ABSOLUTELY ABHORRENT to many people. There is no question about this proposed NBAF site being a BLIGHT on our landscape.
- The line-of-sight view of the proposed facility could not be more prominent unless it was elevated on stilts. The facility will be sited at the crest of a prominent hill with little screening from public view. Also the rural view-shed now afforded by the site will be permanently destroyed by placement of the NBAF there.
- The proposed site is a beautiful hillside which now is used by the University as a horse enclosure. It's one of the most beautiful sites in the area and I drive by it every few days. It's a long sweeping hill curving down towards the Oconee River. It would be a shame to replace it with a huge building surrounded by parking lots and fences, not to mention the halogen lights that would remain on all night.
• *Illuminating the facility, every night all night, with high-intensity lighting appropriate for a high-security facility will create an extensive amount of light pollution.* The facility would be better suited for placement in an existing industrial park away from neighborhoods, public parks, and rural lands.

• *We don't want your light pollution...*

• *...we right now are developing a regional growth management plan, and we're addressing on a regional basis housing, schools, transportation, workforce, child care, health care. Actually every item that was on your EIS, to include the fact that we've already accomplished a regional joint land use study.***

• *City of Madison, Mississippi Resolution. WHEREAS, the Flora Industrial Park, located in Flora, Mississippi, is one of the three sites in the State of Mississippi being considered for the proposed new National Bio and Agro Defense Facility (NBAF); and WHEREAS, the Madison County Economic Development Authority, in an effort to attract the NBAF, has offered approximately 150 acres of high quality developed industrial park property...*

• *As federal land, Plum Island is not subject to New York State coastal zone controls. However, the Town of Southold has adopted a state Local Waterfront Revitalization Program (LWRP) to preserve its environmentally-sensitive land and its waterfront resources. In order to protect the fragile environment of the town and fully consider the environmental impact of rebuilding the present lab and/or upgrading it to a Bio-Level Safety-4 facility, DHS must consider and study the Town of Southold’s LWRP and its rules and regulations.***

• *Plum Island is located in the middle of a huge residential area.*

• *Although the research park is not within the city limits of the City of the San Antonio, the park is located within the city's extraterritorial jurisdiction, therefore subject to the city's code. As a result, the Research Park has a working master plan approved by the City of San Antonio...*

• *Its security lighting should be designed for maximum efficiency and to minimize light pollution.*

### 3.13 Mitigation

In regard to mitigation, a few commentors suggested mitigation measures for construction due to the potential for soil erosion on steep slopes. Other mitigation comments were general in nature, requesting mitigation plans for each type of impact.

Mitigation of potential impacts can occur in a variety of ways, such as compliance with federal, state, and local regulations (e.g., air emission controls, soil erosion controls, etc.) and incorporation of mitigation measures into project design (e.g., security measures). The EIS will identify federal, state, and local regulations applicable to construction and operation of the facility. Additionally, the description of the proposed action and alternatives will include measures that are intended to mitigate impacts and plans that are yet to be developed (such as Standard Operating Procedures).

• *This is a really large site on a steep slope very close to the river... During the construction of the facility, there's a great potential for erosion and sedimentation of the*
river, impacting habitat and downstream communities. Unless mitigated by low-impact construction techniques such as erosion and sedimentation control plans and best management practices, proper siting of buildings, minimize grading, maintenance of riparian buffers, and adherence to Athens-Clarke County's tree ordinance, the construction of this facility will negatively impact the river.

- Alternatives, mitigation and monitoring plans for each type of impact should be included. Explain how the five (or six) site finalists will be compared, and how much weight various factors will receive in choosing the final site, including what factors would contribute to a No Action option for any or all of the sites.
- A mitigation plan for impacted cultural resources should be provided.

### 3.14 Noise

Impacts from increased noise levels, both from construction and operation of the facility, were expressed as a concern by commentors. Commentors were concerned about the impacts of increased noise levels on wildlife and nearby populations.

The EIS will include a section on noise. It will address existing noise levels at each alternative site and identify noise impacts from construction and operation of the proposed facility.

- *This is an area that’s extremely sensitive to wildlife and having lights on, and noise 24/7 will completely disrupt the various populations there. Also, there’s obviously going to be the noise in an area that’s basically where people are going to be quiet.*
- *...this means massive amounts of runoff and soil erosion, noise, light, air, and water pollution at the botanical gardens.*
- *We do not want the increased noise, light, air pollution or traffic that would be part of the lab's impact.*
- *This facility is not in keeping with the rural, quiet and peaceful nature of the area. It will cause additional uncontrolled growth and development with a concurrent loss of natural resources and wildlife habitat; additional pollution to the air, water, land and noise level.*

### 3.15 Purpose and Need for the Project

Many commentors made statements about the purpose of and need for the NBAF. Commentors noted that the purpose and need for the NBAF includes protection of our agriculture sector and food supply from foreign diseases and terrorist threats, protection of human health from zoonotic diseases, scientific research, and development of countermeasures against terrorist threats. One commentor also noted technology transfer as a purpose for the facility. Some commentors stated that the facility is not needed, and increases the risk of terrorism rather than helps prevent it.

The first chapter of the EIS will address the purpose of and need for the facility. It will include background information on the aging PIADC, the responsibilities of DHS, the mission of NBAF, and the threats to U.S. agriculture from foreign diseases.
Since 1954, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center has been doing its part to protect our agricultural sector from foreign animal disease. The research and vaccine development which has taken place for more than half of a century has proven critical to the safety of American agriculture and is vital to the enduring efforts to ensure the quality of our nation’s food supply.

Those (BSL-3 and -4 facilities around the country) being built, including the proposed NBAF, may increase our risk of bio-terrorism rather than help thwart it.

There is a need for new facilities for the study of foreign animal diseases that may impact the U.S. agricultural economy with the capacity to study the zoonotic potential of those diseases for which humans are at risk as well.

... we feel strongly the facility must be constructed to protect our nation.

Both of my children have chosen science as their field of study and would welcome the opportunity to work in a facility like NBAF that will utilize their knowledge while allowing them to make a significant contribution to our nation – helping with national food security and protecting our public health.

Pests or diseases can quickly spread through stockyards, feedlots or crop fields and devastate important parts of our food supply chain within weeks or months. These pests or diseases could be brought to our country by terrorists or through international trade, which brings more foreign agricultural products to America each day. Either way, we urgently need the type of research that will take place at the NBAF.

What you're doing with Homeland Security is to save our lives, and we want to be here and help.

As I understand it, the role of the NBAF is to develop the capability to detect, prevent, protect and respond to agricultural and biological threats within the United States. One critical, but often under-represented aspect of this process is the transition of research and development efforts into viable commercial products that can be rapidly and effectively distributed to military, government and civilian users. An essential element to any government operation that develops new intellectual properties is technology transfer.

It's about basic research, diagnostic development, testing and validation. It's about developing advanced counter-measures and training for biological events, and it's about being prepared. The biological threat grows with each scientific advancement. The good guys aren't the only ones who are capable of doing this research. The enemy is well-educated, they are resourceful, and they are focused on us.

### 3.16 Recreation

A few comments were made regarding recreation, and those submitted included concerns about impacts to a proposed trail network and the State Botanical Garden of Georgia. General recreational impacts were also noted. One commenter noted available recreational opportunities as a positive statement on the quality of life in the area.

The EIS will include a section on recreation. It will identify existing recreation opportunities at each alternative site, including those brought up during public scoping. It will also address potential impacts to recreation opportunities from construction and operation of the proposed facility. Additional information on recreation can be found in the EIS in the Socioeconomics section, which will address quality of life at each alternative site.
• we are concerned that the citing of the facility in this location will disrupt our
Greenway Network Plan. Our current plans call for trails at this site along the Middle
Oconee River and a trail linking it to trails along the North Oconee River
• The proposed site abuts the State Botanical Garden of Georgia (SBGG, a STATE
institution). This site is visited by thousands of citizens every year. It encompasses 313
acres and borders the Middle Oconee River. More than five miles of nature trails
traverse the site...It is probable that the proximity of the NBAF would discourage visitors
and decrease the number of contributing members – hence the loss of operating funds to
keep the garden in the condition that the citizens of Georgia expect and deserve.
• building the NBAF at the location proposed would compromise the integrity for
recreation and wildlife habitat some of UGA's most scenic lands.
• And we choose to play here because you will not find a better spot in the State of
Mississippi for outdoor recreations, whether you enjoy riding your four wheelers on the
weekends, or you enjoy riding horses, which is my passion, or if you enjoy, you know,
hunting or fishing.

3.17 Regulatory Compliance

Comments related to regulatory compliance fell into two main categories:

Category 1: Issues related to NEPA and the NEPA process specifically.
Category 2: Issues related to laws and regulations regarding the project other than NEPA.

Most of the NEPA-related comments had to do with the scoping process and/or the scoping
meetings themselves. Some were complimentary of the process and meetings, others were
negative, with specific complaints about the process and/or meetings. Regulatory comments
outside of NEPA included questions about Congressional approval of the NBAF project and
compliance with international treaties. Others suggested the establishment of a citizens’ advisory
board.

Comments concerning the scoping process and/or the scoping meetings were reviewed by the
public participation team and suggestions for improving the future meetings were identified. The
EIS will address regulatory requirements at the federal, state, and local levels for the proposed
project in Chapter 4. Additionally, Chapter 1 will cover background information on international
treaty obligations and congressional authorizations related to the NBAF.

Category 1:

• We do not believe the community has had a fair say in deciding to host the facility.
• I thoroughly enjoyed the excellent scoping meeting that you organized at Kansas State
University.
• I was hoping to speak at the gathering but after nearly two hours of overwhelmingly
positive comments by individuals who had registered to speak ahead of time...it become
obvious I would not get my say.
• This was a highly scripted public meeting more than HEAVILY weighed in favor of those
seeking to have Manhattan as the chosen site.
• The meeting in Flora was a dog and pony show for the damn politicians. If you want to know the truth, send out questionnaires to the people within 50 miles of here and a letter telling them the truth about this facility, and what it will research.

• I do not appreciate the way these community meeting have been conducted with all the political grand standing and the smoke screens about how wonderful it will be to have some of the most dangerous diseases known to man right here in our front yards.

• this is one of the best presentations I have seen in terms of explaining how the environmental process proceeds. I just want to tip my hat to that.

• ... I already voiced my disappointment to some personnel here, with the way that this was advertised. ... I don't feel that there was adequate direct notification by the people or the persons who were responsible for advertising the hearing. I think it's really important that there be direct notification to the supervisors, police department and planning department about meetings of this sort to afford them the time to sit and gather their thoughts...I think – just as courtesy for the future and for the community, I suggest that you do that.

• The politicians knew ahead of time that you were coming, but put nothing in the paper until a week prior to the scoping meeting.

• I must object to the manner in which the September 18, 2007 scoping meeting was conducted. Those who wished to comment were required to sign in. No advance sign-in mechanism was posted on the DHS website. Nor did the public notice published in the federal register identify any mechanism for advance sign-up for commentary. The federal register notice stated that sign-up sheets would be made available at 6 p.m. on the date of the scoping meeting. NEPA provides no basis for selective hearing of those with comments – yet several dozen politicians and lobbyists supporting the proposal were called first, indeed, were called in decreasing order of political precedence with senators speaking first. This was not the order in which speakers signed up on the sign-in sheet. ... Such a practice wholly frustrated the purpose and spirit of the National Environmental Policy Act. Indeed, the vast bulk of the comments by those politicians and lobbyists who spoke fell outside the scope of the meeting’s statutory purpose: identification and proposal of issues to be addressed in the forthcoming EIS. Those conducting the meeting made no effort whatsoever to limit or channel comments to ensure compliance with NEPA.

• First, let me say that I attended the Bio-Agro Scoping Meeting held Tuesday, Sept, 18th at South Granville High School. I went to the meeting thinking that you were coming to hear the public’s comments (the people who live here) about the new facility. I was totally wrong! The meeting was a well orchestrated, pre-arranged political, business (businesses mostly not from this area), government officials, etc. - representatives with more concern about money than the well-being (health) of those who live here. In my opinion, this area is too greatly populated to put this facility.

• Since the lab is proposed for Butner, an incorporated town since last July, I could not understand why the organizers of this meeting came to Creedmoor to have the meeting. What's wrong with having our meeting in Butner? Is there a -- has Homeland Security -- are they following proper protocol.

• ...DHS must conduct a full assessment of the impacts of a possible terrorist attack on a biological weapons facility. Two recent court decisions, one on a nuclear power plant and the other on a BSL-3 laboratory, require such a thoroughgoing analysis. In the most recent case, Tri-Valley CARES v. Department of Energy, citizens living near the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory filed suit calling for the inclusion of terrorism in the environmental assessment of a laboratory similar to the proposed NBAF.

- ...we all here in the San Antonio community realize that the environmental impact statement is a very important step in ensuring the public has confidence in the suitability of building and operating a complex science campus like the NBAF.

Category 2:

- The U.S. Congress has not approved the NBAF. In order for it to be built a federal law that has protected the U.S. mainland for 60 years would have to be repealed.
- How many people know that the building of NBAF has not been approved by Congress? The bill to establish NBAF is still up for debate, as noted in the Atlanta Journal Constitution. Congress will hold hearings, as several members are concerned about whether there's enough oversight for the biolab building boom that's taking place.
- ...lack of local control: the fact that the Department of Homeland Security would have sole jurisdiction over the facility excludes the very local people whom it would affect most from having any voice in issues that arise from its development -- this is a recipe for future development problems.
- I recognize that landowners cannot legally dictate the final design, however a forum that provides me and other citizens the opportunity to share our thoughts and concerns in the process will ultimately benefit the community as a whole.
- I understand that by statute, Plum Island must be considered as the location of the new National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, a Bio-Safety Level 4[sic] facility which is needed to meet the needs of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9.
- Compliance with international law and treaty obligations must be addressed in the EIS. At issue are potential violations of the Biological Weapons Convention. The aerosolization of microbes and toxins is how biological weapons are created. So, too, is genetic modification of existing strains. Both of these techniques are proposed for the NBAF. The development of biological weapons is flatly prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention, a treaty ratified by 144 nations including the United States.

3.18 Socioeconomics

A large number of comments were submitted concerning socioeconomics. This broad category included comments concerning community impacts and impacts to other social structures, jobs, demographics, taxes and other revenue, schools and other community facilities, and economic impacts from a release of a pathogen. Comments were both positive and negative.

The EIS will address socioeconomics, including the various topics brought up during public scoping, such as employment and income, population and housing, and quality of life (which includes education and community services). Additionally, in response to public comments, a specific analysis of the agriculture and hunting industries at each proposed site will be conducted, as well as an economic analysis of a pathogen release.

- This community has diligently worked to position itself for a project of this caliber. Significant job creation is needed to meet the demands of the intellectual capacity...
• Graduating from our area schools, these bright and creative minds are hungry for opportunities to make a significant and lasting impact.

• Two years ago, the citizens of this county decided they would not be satisfied, nor would they tolerate a 20.3 percent poverty rate or median income of its citizens of roughly $17,000 dollars per year, and they developed a strategy to improve the quality of life of its citizens. Keep to our strategies of increasing the participation economy and dramatically improving our educational opportunities... no other community in America has come together just this way. The location of the National Bio[and] Agro-Defense Facility will not only bring as many as 500 direct jobs, but it would also result in the creation of other jobs in the community and would have a positive impact on healthcare and housing in this community. It would also, in my opinion, have a positive direct effect on increasing that median income for the citizens of this community.

• ...just to talk about the cost, as in the monetary cost, to our community, they make it very clear on the site that a minimum of 30 acres will become a part of this facility, that there would be – that there would need to be, at no cost, new facility provisions and upgrades provided and new roadways, all of these things to be provided by the consortium, the state government, the local government, private entities. So be sure and keep an eye on your tax dollars that way.

• Having NBAF in Athens will help our area grow and will ensure have a vibrant business environment.

• And finally, I’m interested to know when there’s all this talk of new jobs what guarantees do we have that these good and the high-paying jobs won’t go to people from Plum Island, to transfer down here and the Athens citizens will be left with security and custodial work.

• It seems to me that the community members of Athens and their needs are often overlooked for the political and financial gain of a few. This project promises to give benefits to a few, while endangering and threatening the quality of life of the many.

• We do not believe a facility of this kind is in the best long-term interests of the community.

• I would hope that you do not confuse CHEERLEADING from local stakeholders with COMMUNITY ACCEPTANCE.

• Should the state’s cattle industry, for example, go under due to disease, the potential impact on earnings alone would be nearly 1.4 billion, not to mention the roughly $312 million paid to the state's coffers in taxes. Nearly 20 percent of Kansans are employed in agriculture. Animal and plant agriculture in Kansas are economically inseparable.

• This facility is important to our national defense and would help the Kansas economy by attracting new jobs to our state. Kansas farmers would benefit from the research that would take place at the NBAF.

• My husband and myself background cattle and farm in Kansas and we know how tenuous the market is when even a threat of ag related disease is talked about.

• The NBAF project is expected to create 1,500 jobs and bring $3.5 billion to the state over the next 20 years. The NBAF will attract more businesses and create more opportunities for research by attracting private biotechnology companies and a professional workforce. We farmers will benefit from this research and economic growth and that's why we support bringing the NBAF to Kansas.
• ... Mississippi leads the nation in poverty. We’re the poorest state in the country. And looking at all these other sites that you’re showing up here, there’s no other state that this will have the impact as it will in Mississippi and for this region.

• I know the quality of life is an issue for the people who will be working at the facility, schools, opportunities for shopping, and that short of thing.

• We are a school district of approximately 11,000 students. We are the second fastest growing school district in the State Mississippi. We grow by roughly 500 students a year. Since the year 2000 we have grown from 10 campuses to 21 campuses. Our parents have supported us to the tune of $142,000,000 in construction, two bond issues that have passed overwhelming. Our composite ACT score is 23, which is two points above the national average.

• NBAF and its supporting businesses are bound to enhance the ad valorem tax structure of this area, which can only be good for all of us.

• I represent a lot of people. I represent the poor, the elderly and the mentally and physically challenged. I also represent the people who are having a hard time. They may be working and at some point in time they lose their job, so I also represent them. So I'm probably an official that has the widest variety of people and I'm not even elected. And I take my job very seriously. Many have spoken about the great benefit that NBAF has, and it's really undeniably -- I mean, it's vast. It's just there are going to be a lot of things that NBAF can bring to this community.

• I am a beef cattle producer and know the importance of this to our economy.

• We would also like addressed the economic impacts both of the complete abandonment of the island, which is a possibility that's been raised time and time again, and of the economic impacts of an investment in the island that you mentioned to a Bio 4, and particularly the economic impacts to local municipalities like mine that would have probably a huge burden in terms of the security issues.

• As you are aware, foot-and-mouth is highly contagious in livestock and could prove devastating to our economy if it were to spread. In fact, the disease is so contagious that the law states that work on it must be done on an island. Recently, England has had a possible foot-and-mouth outbreak which many are tracing to the Pirbright vaccine facility. Many in England fear this outbreak could prove as devastating as 2001 foot-and-mouth outbreak which resulted in approximately 7 million cattle being slaughtered and devastation to England’s agriculture and tourism industries.

• I also know that it would reduce the value of our land and its functions as a farm considerably.

• Local farmers are already having financial problems. If a problem DID occur, it could devastate the local chicken, pork and cattle farmers.

• The Granville area is growing rapidly, and that would put a halt to the growth that county needs.

• We've helped to prepare a skilled biotechnology work force through grants, programs, teacher training and curriculum development partnership... And tomorrow, North Carolina State University and the State will dedicate the world's largest center for training bio-manufacturing workers, evidence of investment of almost a hundred million dollars in public and private investment to support the work of about a dozen partners toward the development of a bio-manufacturing work force in North Carolina. The
Biotechnology center will help NBAF... to be integrated into North Carolina's business, scientific and education communities.

- The area, if selected, is too populated with institutions, hospitals, prisons and individuals that live close by or in the area.
- We do not need this so-called economic advantages that would be produced by such a potentially devastating operation.
- I hope the general population is not naive enough to think there will be jobs for locals after the facility is built.
- …[NBAF] will decrease the quality of life for everyone in our community. It will also decrease the value of our homes.
- We believe San Antonio has emerged as a top finalist because of its vast research capacity, diverse and well-educated work force, excellent transportation infrastructure, strong community acceptance and already existing, nationally recognized biodefense research facilities and expertise.
- What we offer in those two areas of research collaborations, research partnerships, joint academic appointments with NBAF scientists, joint research seminar programs educational programs, training opportunities for NBAF employees, and internships, new courses, and of course, a pipeline of work force for highly skilled Ph.D.s and post docs.
- We train students, including we have a master's degree in biotechnology with an emphasis on biodefense. Our student body population can provide the highly trained workforce that's necessary to run the NBAF, and we can, also, as a university, provide the teaching and training opportunities for NBAF scientists and the employees, including continuing education opportunities. We also have various opportunities to create new degrees at the university as well.
- San Antonio is a wonderful city to live in... It has a very unique cultural diversity here. We have a very low cost of living. It's a military-friendly city, and it's very supportive of the bioscience industry.

3.19 Traffic and Transportation

Issues related to traffic and transportation were expressed by commentors from all sites. In some cases, commentors were touting their existing transportation system, including roads, airports, and other transportation infrastructure, as adequate to meet the needs for the NBAF. Others expressed concerns about increased traffic due to construction and operation of the facility and the associated impacts. Still other commentors expressed concerns about the safety of transporting pathogens or noted that evacuation routes need to be considered in case of an accidental release of pathogens from the facility.

The EIS will include a section on traffic and transportation. It will identify existing transportation infrastructure and address potential impacts to traffic and transportation during both construction and operation at each alternative location, should the proposed NBAF be built.

- Highway 316 (to I-85 to Atlanta) is called one of the most dangerous roads in Georgia. It is an amalgam of congestion, speeding, and dangerous intersections. Since It is the most common route to Atlanta from Athens, ... How will DHS address the hazards inherent
intransporting deadly pathogens along such a stretch of highway clearly and in enough detail to satisfy the parents of UGA students?

- I am wondering if the NBAF will, with people traveling to and from, require lots and lots of flights and maybe require the enlargement and extension of runways at Ben Epps Airport, which is a hot topic in the community right now.
- I think the transit is a problem for having dangerous material coming back and forth from 316, basically which is already dangerous.
- These people that bring them (pathogens) to the facility back and forth, you know, is it going to be in an armored guard car? Is it just going to be somebody in a Volkswagen driving down the road, you know -- so, I mean, how are they going to transport these things back and forth? You know, it's just -- I don't think it's that safe.
- Not only is Kansas centrally located with convenient transportation...
- Although Manhattan is situated close to the geographic center of the United States, it is not an adequate transportation hub for distribution or for a facility of the magnitude of NABF. Manhattan has no major transportation or shipping company. It has no major railroad or freight distribution facility. It is not on any major highway or inter-state system. There are no major north/south traffic corridors to take goods in and out of Manhattan to other parts of the country. Its regional airport can only provide service for small to moderate size airplane. The city does not have a public transportation system.
- The commercial facility, Jackson Evers International Airport, is located just northeast of the crossroads in Mississippi where I-55 and 20 cross. We have eight commercial airlines representing non-stop service to...All of those major markets, you know, have international service. So understandably our infrastructure, your travel arrangements and your ability to move large items of commerce, as well as your animal, you know, all of your animals we can accommodate.
- What changes or enhancements to roads will be necessary to handle the increased traffic?
- Once again, to reiterate the fact that we have no evacuation plan for the north fork, for the east end, pretty much for Long Island. We were subjected recently to some flooding where our major artery, the Long Island Expressway, was closed down, and a lot of people were affected by that. A lot of people were affected by that. That's something else to keep in mind.
- I think it should take a very close and reasoned look at the transportation problem that affects the town, particularly on State Route 25 in the vicinity of the labs facility in Orient. It’s a well-known fact that biological material is transported to the site by truck in preparation for shipping to the island via the facility’s ferry boat. The security ramifications of this form of transport must be look at in the context of the continued increase in road and boat traffic associated with the population growth the east end...
- I believe that North Carolina and Creedmoor is the best location in the United States for this facility because of the following reasons:...Infrastructure and proximity to freeways, rail and international airports...
- We believe San Antonio has emerged as a finalist because of its vast research capacity, diverse and well-educated work force, excellent transportation infrastructure...
- The existing Research Park road system includes a looping road system comprised of secondary arterials with a 22,000 vehicle per day capacity. In addition, the Research
Park is located at the intersection of two state designated highways, FM 1957 and Highway 211. Bexar County has submitted and the Texas Department of Transportation is reviewing a financing proposal to provide 6- to 8 million in improvements to both of these state facilities.

- Will biological samples be transported over the mainland? Will germ samples continue to be entrusted to the U.S. Postal Service, airport limousines, and private shipping companies like FedEx...with drivers unaware of the packages’ contents without training on how to handle an accidental spill? In the 1990s, our own Southwest Research Institute used UPS to transport a dangerous simian virus. The virus packet fell out of the truck and lay along the side of Loop 410 for about 24 hours. Can you also do better than the private couriers formerly employed by the USDA? If the lab is located in San Antonio, will the DHS virus shipments arrive by armed escorts on our local roads? Will notification of each trip be given to emergency responders, such as fire and police departments, along with the nature of the samples and what to do in case of an accident, including a fatal one? What will our response time be for samples that go astray?

### 3.20 Waste Management

Issues related to waste were a commonly expressed concern. The issues ranged from questioning proposed waste management practices for the facility to hazardous wastes (including past hazardous waste issues) to impacts of waste from the facility. Of particular concern was animal waste and how it would be handled.

The EIS will include a section detailing how wastes from the facility will be handled. Existing infrastructure for waste disposal at each alternative site will be identified, along with any upgrades that may be necessary to handle wastes from the NBAF should it be located at that site. Methods for destroying pathogens will be described. Different disposal methods for animal carcasses under consideration will also be explained.

- With the EIS, I would like to know if our local landfill will be utilized in any way to dispose of waste from this facility?
- The area is very ecologically vulnerable and currently suffering from overpopulation stresses, including a severe water shortage and grossly overburdened sewage processing facilities.
- We are concerned about potential discharge of animal waste pollutants and how animal wastes will be treated and disposed of. We are also concerned about the disposal of other wastes, especially hazardous wastes, on site and the potential for contamination of surrounding areas, communities, the river, and downstream communities.
- The city has ... analyzed the dumping issues. They analyzed how to handle waste and have figured out ways to resolve the problems, I also request the EIS address the estimated quantities of ...sanitary waste produced by the facility and any post facility treatment requirements that may be necessary.
- A valid concern was expressed over the disposal of carcasses and waste materials. Can you explain in detail how that would be handled and why it is safe? Without specifics, it sounds like whitewashing. In particular, can you protect against infectious material...
getting into the ground water or above ground water sources, and if so, how? Again, please be specific. This particular point could affect far more than just Granville County.

- Generically speaking, how would disposal of hazardous material operate outside of the BSL 4 or effect a community?
- What engineering controls will be in place to address contaminated waste treatment and disposal of experimental animal or plant remains? (e.g. pretreatment, incinerator, etc.).
- Will there be solid or liquid waste streams leaving the facility? If so, what level of pretreatment will be provided, and will the Town of Butner WWTP be required to provide additional treatment? Will there be a dedicated water treatment plant and waste treatment facility on site?
- I’m a citizen of the local area, North Carolina. I am wondering if you build a plant, or build a facility in Granville County, how you are going to dispose of the hazardous waste that’s going to be created by your work? ... You will have hazardous waste from the medical work in the form of plastics and dead animals and whatever else. Are you going to have an onsite incinerator or are you going to take the waste somewhere else? If you have an onsite incinerator are you aware that there’s a lot of people that live in Granville County? That may not be a high density like Raleigh or Durham, but there are people who live around there, and I’m just concerned that the hazardous waste incineration will create air pollution.
- The Research Park has participated in the construction of outfall sewers, with a capacity of 5 million gallons per day for the park.
- Waste water disposal is being expanded for this facility, and which we think should be considered as part of your assessment for the site.
- Will DHS, as the USDA did, ignore OSHA’s and EPA’s lengthy list of workplace safety violations, including repeat infractions? Problems on Plum Island include massive landfills and bunkers filled with rusting metal drums filled with toxic materials; inoperative wastewaster treatment, effluent, and storm drains; incinerator problems; sewage spills – in short, multiple problems with the Clean Water Act and environmental laws prohibiting the storage of hazardous materials.
- The proposed site is a SuperFund site that was never cleaned up with remains of hand grenades and live ammunition shells and other left other things from WWII.

### 3.21 Water Resources

Concerns were expressed about water resources, particularly from those areas currently experiencing drought. Water availability, quantities needed by the facility, and conservation measures were of great concern. People also expressed water quality concerns. Others noted the availability of their water resources.

Public concerns about water resources will be addressed in the EIS in a section devoted to water issues. This section will describe the existing water resources at each of the proposed alternative locations and then describe how the proposed facility would impact water quality and quantity during both construction and operation.
I would ask that you closely examine water reuse and appropriate water conservation measures for this facility during your environmental analysis.

We're concerned about the consumptive use of this site, particularly in drought. We're also concerned about the impervious area of this site. It's a massive site, a lot of impervious area that's going to change the hydrology right close to the river. Impervious area causes higher highs and lower lows in your flows, and we believe that at that site in the river, we can't afford any lower lows.

...but let's be specific about water with the dwindling resource. What do we decide? Do we put it in our homes when we really get down to very little water or do we safeguard a facility like this? You know, let's get down to specifics. Maybe I should ask that you have a plan when we have -- if we have no water. Let's be specific about that.

We urge DHS to minimize the volume of stormwater runoff leaving the site by using low impact development techniques such as a vegetated roof (which not only retains stormwater but also may reduce heating and cooling costs), porous pavement for the parking areas, and the use of bioretention areas to infiltrate runoff, with a goal of achieving the same runoff volume for the site as currently exists.

We urge DHS to make every effort to minimize water use, especially consumptive use, in the operation of the site.

Athens, GA is in the (illegible) year of a major level 4 drought. We are currently unable to draw water from the Middle Oconee & Oconee rivers. Our only source, the Bear Creek Reservoir only has 6 weeks of water supply at this time. I am concerned that this project will require use of lots of water that we frankly can’t spare. Use of valuable water & avail of water need to be seriously considered before this project is considered for bldg in Athens, GA.

The location of NBAF in Athens would mean an irreversible and irretreivable commitment of these (water/water treatment/sewer) resources. Athens is experiencing an officially labeled "exceptional" drought - Level 4 water restrictions (all outdoor watering is BANNED). This is our second serious long-term drought - each over two years in duration this decade. It is a very visible problem that citizens will not forget. Drought is the top story in the newspaper, on the radio, and on the web. The Athens-Clarke County Manager told the ACC Commissioners that if it hasn't rained by early November they will need "to actually allocate water to some users and restrict it to others." By that time, ACC Public Utilities Director said that reservoir water would be severely reduced, and the "treatability" of the remaining water may affect its taste and color...What are DHS' contingency plans for NBAF during future water shortages?

I'm against it because of the huge water use.

We are extremely concerned that it would be built so close to the Oconee River, the health of which is very important to us.

100,000 gallons of water per DAY!"...We are currently in the middle of the biggest drought of this century. It has been stated that we are in a near “crisis” situation. This alone is a large enough reason to not build the facility here.

Increased restrictions are a regular occurrence in the summer months. Unless a permanent solution to Athens' recurring water shortages is implemented, the proposed NBAF laboratory will produce a negative impact on the community and our lifestyle by depleting an insufficient supply of a critical natural resource.
I also request the EIS address the estimated quantities of water needed for the program -- operation of the facility and any water quality parameters required.

And that was one of the things I looked at in terms of the plans that were submitted for this facility. And I'll just say now, I didn't see an air or a water problem that would be a threat to the county.

We are currently in the worst drought in history, and those resources are being mismanaged with no back up plans.

The Tar River flows through our farm and the proposed site is quite close to the Tar River which has a number of endangered species. It is also close to Falls lake and Lake Mickie which are water supplies for Raleigh and Durham.

The site is also near the water supplies for 2 major cities and the Tar River.

Dangerously diseased animals should be contained in an environment far away from residential areas, water supplies, institutions housing disadvantaged people, or prison populations.

The water here is already in bad condition...so why make it worse. If it is possible for it (deadly dixons) get into our waterways I wouldn’t want me or my animals to have it in my water.

You MUST take into consideration in any environmental impact statement...our dwindling water supply brought on by recurring drought and the impact of contamination of the watershed by such a facility as NBAF along with the impact on the drinking water for Raleigh and other nearby Triangle areas.

The Research Park has participated in the construction of outfall sewers, with a capacity of 5 million gallons per day for the park. Water service is provided by Bexar Metropolitan Water District. Since 1990 there has been a powerful water system available to the Research Park. Currently, Bexar Met has a 2 million gallon ground storage tank under construction at the research park, along with a 1 million gallon ground storage and 2 1/2 million gallon elevated storage tank under construction at the Stevens Ranch facility, located immediately north of Potranco Road. Both of those facilities will provide water service to the Research Park. These facilities have the 10,000 gallon per minute high service pump capacity and almost 8,000 gallons per minute of well capacity. The storage will be enough for over 15,000 equivalent connections.

We have the water plan that goes out 50 years with growth included for residential, commercial, and, of course, for military necessity and federal necessity.

3.22 Comments Outside the Scope of this EIS

A few comment submissions received by DHS were outside the scope of this EIS and will not be considered as part of the range of issues and alternatives evaluated in the NBAF EIS. They did not help to identify potential significant environmental impacts. These comments were submitted by members of the public seeking employment at NBAF.
(This page is intentionally left blank.)
4.0 CONCLUSION

This report summarizes what DHS heard from the public in regard to the proposed NBAF during the public scoping period. The next step in the NEPA process is development of the EIS, which is currently underway. All public comments received during scoping are helping to shape the scope of the NBAF EIS and define the issues that will be analyzed in depth in the EIS. Public comments have facilitated the identification and understanding of local issues. For example, in Georgia, public comments identified a proposed trail system that might not have been known from existing maps and background information. Public comments also helped identify potentially affected institutionalized populations near some of the alternative sites, and identified the need for inclusion of explanatory background information in Chapter 1, Purpose and Need, to address public comments. Additionally, ongoing local issues were underscored by a large public response. For example, many commentors in Georgia and North Carolina mentioned their current regional drought and expressed concerns about the water resources that the NBAF would require.

Members of the multi-disciplinary team preparing the EIS received all the public scoping comments applicable to their technical sections, and will consider or address the comments in their respective sections as applicable. In this way, the comments received by DHS are used to guide the development and preparation of the draft NBAF EIS.

The next opportunity for the public to comment on the NBAF will be spring 2008, when the draft NBAF EIS is expected to be available.
NBAF SCOPING REPORT

APPENDIX A

NOTICE OF INTENT (NOI)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Science and Technology Directorate; Notice of Intent To Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement

AGENCY: Science and Technology Directorate (Office of National Laboratories within the Office of Research), DHS.


SUMMARY: DHS announces its intent to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) to evaluate reasonable siting alternatives for the construction and operation of the proposed NBAF. DHS invites individuals, organizations, and agencies to present oral or written comments concerning the scope of the EIS, including the environmental issues and alternatives that the EIS should address.

DATES: The public scoping period starts with the publication of this Notice in the Federal Register and will continue until September 27, 2007. DHS will consider all comments received, postmarked or received by that date in defining the scope of the EIS. DHS also intends to hold public meetings during this comment period to provide the public with added opportunities to present comments, ask questions, and discuss concerns regarding the EIS with DHS officials.

All public meetings are listed in the SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION section. DHS will publish additional notices regarding the dates, times, and locations of the public meetings in local newspapers in advance of the scheduled meetings. Any necessary changes will be announced in the local media and on the NBAF Web site (http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf).

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by mail, online, fax, or voice mail:
1. U.S. Mail: Department of Homeland Security; Science and Technology Directorate; James V. Johnson; Mail Stop #2100; 245 Murray Lane SW.; Building 410; Washington, DC 20578. Online: http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf (click on Public Involvement); Toll-free fax: 1-866-501-NBAF (6223); or Toll-free voice mail: 1-866-501-NBAF (6223).

Updates and other information will be posted to the NBAF EIS Web page at: http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf.

In addition to providing comments at the public meetings, all interested parties are invited to record their comments, ask questions concerning the EIS, or request to be placed on the EIS mailing or document distribution list by leaving a message on the DHS Hotline at (toll free) 1-866-501-NBAF (6223). The Hotline will have instructions on how to record comments and requests.

Additional information on public participation opportunities is included in the SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION section.

All interested persons and organizations, including minority, low income, disadvantaged, and Native American groups, are urged to participate in this environmental impact review process. Assistance will be provided upon request to anyone with special needs to facilitate their participation in the process.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION:

Consultations between DHS and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) on a coordinated biosecurity strategy called for in Homeland Security Presidential Directives 9 and 10 have revealed a gap that must be filled by an integrated research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) infrastructure for combating bio and agro-terrorism threats. DHS S&T is responsible for filling this gap in a safe, secure, and environmentally sound manner. The proposed NBAF is envisioned to provide the nation with the first integrated agricultural, zoonotic disease, and public health RDT&E facility with the capability to address threats from human pathogens, high consequence zoonotic disease agents, and foreign animal diseases.

DHS intends to select a single site for the construction of the NBAF. A competitive selection process to identify and evaluate potential candidate sites, other than Plum Island, for the NBAF was recently completed. This process was initiated by issuance of a notice of request for Expressions of Interest (EOI) on January 19, 2006 (71 Federal Register 3107-3109). DHS has determined that the following “Site Alternatives” are reasonable alternative sites for the construction of the NBAF:

- Manhattan Campus Site, Manhattan, Kansas: This alternative would locate the NBAF within what is identified as the Kansas City Health Corridor on the Kansas State University Campus.
- South Millichap Avenue Site, Athens, Georgia: This alternative would locate the NBAF on the campus of the University of Georgia Whitehall Farm.
- Texas Research Park Site, San Antonio, Texas: This alternative would locate the NBAF on the land of the Texas Research Park in San Antonio.

Unstead Research Farm Site, Butner, North Carolina: This alternative would...
Appendix A, Notice of Intent (NOI)

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 146 / Tuesday, July 31, 2007 / Notices

locate the NBAF on the Umstead Research Farm site in Butner, North Carolina.  
Flora Industrial Park Site, Flora, Mississippi: This alternative would locate the NBAF in Flora Industrial Park in Flora, Mississippi.  
Although not included in the competitive selection process outlined above, the DHS-owned Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) will also be considered as a reasonable alternative.  
Plum Island Site, Plum Island Animal Disease Center, Plun Island, New York: This alternative would locate the new NBAF on the same federally owned property as the existing PIADC.  
None of the alternatives, a No Action Alternative will also be evaluated. Under the No Action Alternative, the NBAF would not be built and DHS would continue to use PIADC with necessary investments in facility upgrades, replacements, and repairs so that it could continue to operate at its current capability.  
Additional alternatives may be identified during the public scoping process. DHS invites comments and suggestions on alternatives that should be considered. A preferred location for the construction of the NBAF has not been identified at this time.  
DATING: The Public Meeting dates are:  
1. Wednesday, August 22, 2007, from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. Old Saybrook, CT  
Saybrook Point Inn, Two Bridge Street, Old Saybrook, CT 06475.  
2. Thursday, August 23, 2007, from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. Greenport, NY, Southold Town Hall, 53095 Main Road (Route 25), Greenport, NY 11941.  
3. Tuesday, August 28, 2007, from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. Manhattan, KS, Kansas State University, K-State Student Union, Manhattan, KS 66505.  
4. Thursday, August 30, 2007, from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. Flora, MS, First Baptist Church, Christian Life Center, 121 Center Street, Flora, MS 38840.  
5. Thursday, September 6, 2007, from 1:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. Washington, DC,  
Grand Hyatt Washington, 1000 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20001.  
6. Tuesday, September 11, 2007, from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. San Antonio, TX,  
Marriott Plaza San Antonio, 555 South Alamo Street San Antonio, TX 78205.  
7. Thursday, September 13, 2007, from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. Creedmoor, NC, South Granville High School, 701 North Crescent Drive, Creedmoor, NC 27522.  
8. Saturday, September 22, 2007, from 7 p.m. to 10 p.m. Athens, GA,  
The University of Georgia, Center for Continuing Education, 1197 South Lumpkin Street, Athens, GA 30602.  
Onsite registration and sign-up to present oral comments will be available at 6 p.m. for all meetings (12:30 p.m. for the Washington, DC meeting).  
Preliminary Identification of Environmental Issues: The following issues have been tentatively identified for analysis in the EIS. DHS invites suggestions for the addition or deletion of items on this list:  
• Land-use plans, policies, and controls;  
• Visual resources;  
• Air quality;  
• Acoustic (noise) environment;  
• Geology and soil characteristics;  
• Water resources, including surface and groundwater, floodplains and wetlands, and water use and quality;  
• Plants and animals, and their habitats, including Federally-listed threatened or endangered species and their critical habitats, wetlands and floodplains;  
• Cultural resources, including historic and prehistoric resources and traditional cultural properties encompassing Native American or culturally important sites;  
• Human health and safety (involving both members of the public and laboratory workers);  
• Socioeconomic effects that may be related to the new construction and facility operations;  
• Public infrastructure, including utilities and local transportation;  
• Waste management practices and activities including the handling, collection, treatment, and disposal of research waste; and  
• Compliance with all applicable federal, tribal, state, and local statutes and regulations and with international agreements, and required environmental permits, consultations and notifications.  
The list of issues discussed above for consideration in the NBAF EIS is preliminary and is intended to facilitate public comment. It is not intended to be all-inclusive, nor does it imply any predetermination or relative importance of potential impacts. During the process of preparing the EIS, DHS will evaluate the potential environmental and human health impacts of the alternatives, together with engineering and socioeconomic considerations. The NBAF EIS will present the results of this environmental impact evaluation process.  
DHS anticipates that certain classified or otherwise protected information will be consulted in the preparation of this EIS and used by decision-makers to decide where and how to relocate the NBAF. To the extent allowable, the EIS will summarize and present this information in a publicly releasable form.  
EIS Preparation and Public Participation Process: The process for preparing the NBAF EIS begins with the publication of this Notice of Intent in the Federal Register. After the close of the public scoping period, DHS will begin the environmental impact evaluation process. DHS expects to issue a draft NBAF EIS for public review in the spring of 2008. Public comments on the draft will be accepted during a comment period of at least 60 days following its publication. DHS will consider the public comments received on the draft EIS, perform further environmental impact evaluation if needed, and expects to publish a final NBAF EIS during fall 2008. No sooner than 30 days after publication of the Notice of Availability of the final NBAF EIS in the Federal Register, DHS will issue its Record of Decision and publish it in the Federal Register. In addition to the Federal Register, the Notice of Availability for the draft EIS, final EIS, and EIS Record of Decision will be provided through direct mail and other media.  
Jay M. Cohen,  
Under Secretary, Science & Technology  
[FR Doc. E7–14592 Filed 7–30–07; 8:45 am]  
BILLING CODE 4180–10–P  
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELESS SECURITY  
Coast Guard  
[USCG–2007–27923]  
AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS.  
ACTION: Request for Comments.  
SUMMARY: In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, this request for comments announces that the Coast Guard is forwarding four Information Collection Requests (ICRs), abstracted below, to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requesting an extension of their approval for the following collections of information: (1) 1625–0019, Alternative Compliance for International and Inland Navigation Rules—33 CFR Parts 81 and 86; (2) 1625–0052, Approval of Alterations to Marine Portable Tanks; Approval of Non-Specification Portable Tanks; (3) 1625–0052, Navigation Safety
NBAF SCOPING REPORT

APPENDIX B

SAMPLE SCOPING MEETING ANNOUNCEMENTS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
NBAF Scoping Report

BUSINESS REPLY MAIL
FIRST-CLASS MAIL PERMIT NO. 93100
WASHINGTON, DC

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE
MAIL STOP 22100
245 MURRAY LN SW BUILDING 410
WASHINGTON, DC 20077-5577

Figure B-1. Sample Scoping Meeting Mail Advertisement, fold over ½ page.

Note: This advertisement was sent via standard mail to stakeholders and interested parties.
Note: This advertisement appeared in various newspapers nationwide. See Table 1-1, *List of Meeting Sites, Meeting Dates, and Advertisements in Local Publications* on page 1-4 of this report for a full listing of NBAF Scoping meeting advertisements.
NBAF SCOPING REPORT

APPENDIX C

SCOPING MEETING FORMS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
SCOPING MEETING OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement (NBAF EIS) scoping meeting are to:

- inform stakeholders about the proposed action to build the NBAF, and
- solicit relevant, focused, input from stakeholders on the scope of the NBAF EIS.

SCOPING PROCESS

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is sponsoring public scoping meetings and encouraging meaningful public involvement in the vicinity of sites identified for proposed construction and operation of the NBAF. The department will also conduct a regional meeting in Washington, D.C. Participants will have the opportunity to meet officials from the DHS Office of National Laboratories, which is tasked with preparing the EIS, as well as officials from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service-Veterinary Services (APHIS-VS) and Agricultural Research Service (ARS), which are working cooperatively with DHS in setting priorities regarding diseases that would be researched in the NBAF. The purpose of the meetings is to collect input from the public on the NBAF EIS alternatives and issues. At the same time, the meetings provide a better understanding among members of the public concerning the proposed action and a better understanding the federal agencies involved.

A court reporter will transcribe comments provided during the formal comment period. Comments obtained at these scoping meetings, as well as oral and written comments obtained from other communication mechanisms, will be given equal consideration in defining the scope of the NBAF EIS.

SCOPING MEETING AGENDA

Registration: 6 p.m.

- Receive registration packet
- Sign-up to provide comments
- View exhibits and review information materials

Presentation: 7 p.m.

- Welcome and introductions
- Presentation and questions and answers

Formal Comment Period: 8 p.m. – 10 p.m.

- Participants provide comments
- Concluding remarks
- Comments captured by a court reporter

NOTE: Times are approximate and are subject to change based on meeting attendance levels.
OBJETIVOS DE LA REUNIÓN DE EVALUACIÓN

Los objetivos de la reunión Bio y Agro-Defensa Nacional del edificio son:

- Informar a los accionistas sobre la acción propuesta para construir el NBAF.
- Solicitar sugerencias centradas, y relevantes de accionistas de sobre el alcance de NBAF EIS.

PROCESO DE INVESTIGACIÓN

El Departamento de los EE.UU. de la Seguridad de Patria (DHS) está patrocinando reuniones públicas de evaluación y la implicación pública significativa animando en la vecindad de los sitios identificados para la construcción y la operación propuestas del NBAF. El departamento también conducirá una reunión regional en Washington. Participantes tendrán la oportunidad de encontrar a funcionarios de la oficina del ADO de laboratorios nacionales, que se encargan de elaborar el EIS, así como funcionarios del Ministerio de Agricultura de los EE.UU. (USDA) que inspeccionan la salud de los animales y las plantas en cooperación con el DHS en prioridades del ajuste con respecto a las enfermedades que serán investigadas en el NBAF. Las reuniones recogerán sugerencias del público en las alternativas y los asuntos pertinentes a EIS de NBAF. Al mismo tiempo, las reuniones proporcionan una mejor comprensión entre los miembros del público referente a la acción propuesta y una mejor comprensión de las agencias federales.

Un reportero de corte transcribirá los comentarios proporcionados durante el período del comentario formal. Los comentarios obtenidos en estas reuniones de la evaluación al igual como los comentarios orales y escritos obtenidos de otros mecanismos de la comunicación, serán dados la misma consideración en la definición del alcance del EIS de NBAF.

AGENDA DE LA REUNIÓN DE EVALUACIÓN

Registracion: 6:00 p.m.
- Recibir el paquete de registracion
- Sign-up para proporcionar comentarios
- Objetos expuestos de la visión e información de la revisión

Presentación: 7:00 p.m.
- Recepción e introducciones
- Presentación y preguntas y respuestas

Período del Comentario Formal: 8:00 p.m. — 10:00 p.m.
- Los participantes proporcionan comentarios
- Observaciones que concluyen
- Los comentarios capturaron por un reportero de corte

NOTA: Los tiempos son aproximados y están sujetos a cambio basado en niveles de asistencia a la reunión.
Scoping Meeting Registration Form

Please indicate the meeting you attended:

- [ ] August 22, 2007  
  Old Saybrook, Connecticut
- [ ] August 23, 2007  
  Southold, New York
- [ ] August 28, 2007  
  Manhattan, Kansas
- [ ] August 30, 2007  
  Flora, Mississippi
- [ ] September 6, 2007  
  Washington, D.C.
- [ ] September 11, 2007  
  San Antonio, Texas
- [ ] September 18, 2007  
  Creedmoor, North Carolina
- [ ] September 20, 2007  
  Athens, Georgia

Please provide the following information: (This information will be used to update the NBAF mailing list and to mail future project-related documents.)

Name: ___________________________________________________________________________________
Title: ____________________________________________________________________________________
Organization: _____________________________________________________________________________
Address: ________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
City:______________________________ State: ______  Zip Code: _______________________________
Day-time Phone: ________________________
E-mail Address: ___________________________________________________________________________

Please indicate which documents you are interested in receiving once they are available, and the format:

- Draft NBAF EIS Executive Summary only
- Complete Draft NBAF EIS
- Final NBAF EIS Executive Summary only
- Complete Final NBAF EIS
- Record of Decision

Hardcopy  | CD  | E-mail (PDF)
Indique por favor la reunión que assistio:

- Agosto 22, 2007
  Old Saybrook, Connecticut
- Agosto 23, 2007
  Southold, New York
- Agosto 28, 2007
  Manhattan, Kansas
- Agosto 30, 2007
  Flora, Mississippi
- Septiembre 6, 2007
  Washington, DC
- Septiembre 11, 2007
  San Antonio, Texas
- Septiembre 18, 2007
  Creedmoor, North Carolina
- Septiembre 20, 2007
  Athens, Georgia

Proporcione por favor la información siguiente: (Esta información sera utilizada para poner al día la lista de direcciones de NBAF y los documentos relacionados con el proyecto futuros de correo.)

Nombre: __________________________________________
Título: __________________________________________
Organización: _____________________________________
Dirección: _________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
Cuidad: ___________________________ Estado: ____ Código Postal: ___________________________
Teléfono Diurno: __________________________
E-mail Address: ___________________________

Indicar por favor qué documentos que estás interesados en la recepción una vez de ellos disponibles, y está el formato:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Documento de síntesis del EIS NBAF solamente</th>
<th>Hardcopy</th>
<th>CD</th>
<th>E-mail (PDF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terminar el bosquejo EIS NBAF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documento de síntesis final EIS de NBAF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resumen del EIS NBAF Final</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expediente de la decisión</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is committed to providing the public with access to pertinent information and opportunities for involvement in the environmental impact statement decisionmaking process. Accordingly, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate is soliciting written and oral comments on the proposed scope of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement (NBAF EIS).

The following communication mechanisms are available for providing comments. All comments received by close of business September 28, 2007, both written and oral, will be given equal consideration when defining the scope of the NBAF EIS. Late comments will be considered to the extent practicable.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf (click on Public Involvement)

Oral comments may be submitted by calling our 24-hour toll-free number, which is equipped with a voice mail system:
1-866-501-NBAF (6223)

Written comments may be submitted by faxing to our 24-hour toll-free number:
1-866-508-NBAF (6223)

Participants in public meetings will have access to the following tools to assist them in submitting comments:

Comment Forms: To prepare and submit written comments
Court Reporter: To record oral comments
Exhibit Area: To view exhibits and review information material
El Departamento de los E.E.U.U. de la Seguridad de Patría está confiado de proveer al público el acceso a la información pertinente y oportunidades para la implicación en el procedimiento de tomar una decisión en la declaración de consecuencias para el medio ambiente. Por consiguiente, la ciencia del DHS y la dirección de la tecnología solicitada está escribiendo y los comentarios orales de la evaluación propuesta de la declaración ambiental, National Bio-and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) (EIS), del Complejo Bio y de la Agro-Defensa Nacional.

Los mecanismos siguientes de la comunicación están disponibles para proporcionar comentarios. Todos los comentarios recibidos por el cierre de negocio el 28 de Septiembre de 2007, escrito y oral, serán dados la consideración igual al definir el alcance del EIS de NBAF. Los últimos comentarios serán considerados al grado practicables.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
Science and Technology Directorate  
James V. Johnson  
Mail Stop #2100  
245 Murray Lane, SW  
Building 410  
Washington, DC  20528

http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf (click on Public Involvement)

Los comentarios orales pueden ser sometidos llamando nuestro número gratis de 24 horas, que se equipa de un sistema de correo de voz:  
1-866-501-NBAF (6223)

El comentario escrito puede ser sometido enviando por fax a nuestro número gratis de 24 horas:  
1-866-508-NBAF (6223)

Los participantes en reuniones públicas tendrán acceso a las herramientas siguientes para asistirlos en someter comentarios:

Formas de comentario: Para preparar y someter comentarios escritos  
Reportero de corte: Para registar comentarios orales  
Area del objeto expuesto: Para ver objetos expuestos y el material informativo de la revisión
Scoping Meeting Comment Form

Please provide the following information:

Name: ____________________________________________________________________________________

Title: ____________________________________________________________________________________

Organization: ____________________________________________________________________________

Address: _________________________________________________________________________________

City: __________________________ State: _____ Zip Code: ________________________________

E-mail Address: ________________________________________________________________

Comments: ______________________________________________________________________________

(Continued on back for your convenience)
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING

Please return this form to the comment table. It may also be mailed or faxed as follows:

**U.S. MAIL**
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

**TOLL-FREE FAX**
1-866-508-NBAF (6223)
Proporcione por favor la información siguiente:

Nombre: ________________________________________________________________

Título: ________________________________________________________________

Organización: __________________________________________________________

Dirección: _____________________________________________________________

Ciudad: ___________________________ Estado: ____  Codigo Postal: __________

E-mail Address: _________________________________________________________

Comentarios: ____________________________________________________________________
Devuelva por favor este impreso a la tabla de comentario. Puede también ser enviada o ser enviada por fax como sigue:

**U.S. CORREO**
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

**FAX GRATIS**
1-866-508-NBAF (6223)
The purpose of this evaluation is to obtain your opinion on the organization and conduct of the meeting. Please assist DHS in planning future meetings by completing this evaluation.

### Meeting attended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 22, 2007</td>
<td>Old Saybrook, Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 28, 2007</td>
<td>Manhattan, Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 6, 2007</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 18, 2007</td>
<td>Creedmoor, North Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 23, 2007</td>
<td>Southold, New York</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 30, 2007</td>
<td>Flora, Mississippi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11, 2007</td>
<td>San Antonio, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 20, 2007</td>
<td>Athens, Georgia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. How did you hear about the meeting? (Check all that apply)

___ Federal Register Notice
___ Invitation Letter/Postcard
___ Print Advertisement
___ Radio/TV Advertisement
___ NBAF Web Page
___ Other: ________________________________

Suggestions for more effective advertising to reach the public: ________________________________

2. What was your primary reason for attending this meeting? ________________________________

3. Did the meeting meet your expectations?  ____ Yes  ____ No

Why: ________________________________
4. Please rate the following aspects of the meeting. (Circle your choice)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POOR</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Level of knowledge about the NBAF before the meeting</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Level of knowledge about the NBAF after the meeting</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>c. Time and date of meeting</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Location and meeting facility</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>e. Registration process</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>f. Usefulness of information materials</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>g. Usefulness of presentation</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>h. Opportunities for discussion</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>i. Knowledge/responses from meeting staff</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>j. Openness of DHS officials</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>k. Comment collection methods</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Suggestions for Improvement:

a. Format (e.g., presentation, formal comment period)

b. Information materials/displays/presentations:

c. Comment collection methods:

d. Other:

Optional:

Name: ____________________________________________

Address: __________________________________________

Please return this evaluation to the registration table. It may also be mailed or faxed as follows:

**U.S. MAIL**

Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

**FAX**

1-866-508-NBAF (6223)
Evaluación de la Reunión de Investigación

El propósito de esta evaluación es obtener su opinión sobre la organización y la conducta de la reunión. Asista por favor con el DHS en la preparación de las reuniones futuras terminando esta evaluación.

Reunión assistida:

- Agosto 22, 2007
  Old Saybrook, Connecticut
- Agosto 28, 2007
  Manhattan, Kansas
- Septiembre 6, 2007
  Washington, DC
- Septiembre 18, 2007
  Creedmoor, North Carolina
- Agosto 23, 2007
  Southold, New York
- Agosto 30, 2007
  Flora, Mississippi
- Septiembre 11, 2007
  San Antonio, Texas
- Septiembre 20, 2007
  Athens, Georgia

1. ¿Cómo escucho sobre esta reunión? (marque todo el que le aplique)
   - Aviso del registro federal
   - Letra de invitación/postal
   - Anuncio de la impresión
   - Anuncio de Radio/TV
   - Web page de NBAF
   - Otro: ____________________________

Sugerencias para que una publicidad más eficaz alcance al público: ____________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________

2. ¿Cuál es su razón primaria de asistir a esta reunión?
   ____________________________________________
   ____________________________________________

3. ¿La reunión Resolvió sus expectativas?  _____ Si  _____ No
   Porque: ____________________________________________
   ____________________________________________
4. Clasifique por favor los aspectos siguientes de la reunión. (Circular tu opción)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POBRE</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>EXELENTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Nivel de conocimiento sobre el NBAF antes de la reunión</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Nivel de conocimiento sobre el NBAF después de la reunión</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Hora y fecha de la reunión</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Facilidad de la localización y de la reunión</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Proceso de registro</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Utilidad de los materiales informativos</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Utilidad de la presentación</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Oportunidades para la discusión</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Conocimiento/respuestas del personal de la reunión</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Franqueza de los funcionarios de DHS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Métodos de colección del comentario</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Sugerencias para mejora:

a. Formato (e.g., presentación, período del comentario formal):

b. Materiales informativos/exhibiciones/presentaciones:

c. Métodos de colección del comentario:

d. Otro: ____________________________________________

Opcional:

Nombre: ________________________________________________________________________________

Dirección: _______________________________________________________________________________

Vuelva por favor esta forma de evaluacion a lamesa de registracion. Puede tambien ser enviada o ser enviada por fax como sigue:

**U.S. CORREO**
Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

**FAX**
1-866-508-NBAF (6223)
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC  20528

Question/Information Request

Name: ________________________________________________
Address: ____________________________________________

Day-time Phone: ____________________________
E-mail: _______________________________________
Question/Request: ________________________________________

For further Information access:  http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf
Mail or fax to 1-866-508-NBAF (6223)
Thank you for your interest in the NBAF program.
NBAF SCOPING REPORT

APPENDIX D

SCOPING MEETING FACT SHEETS

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
**NEED FOR A BIOSAFETY LEVEL 4 FACILITY**

The proposed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) would provide an integrated facility for studying foreign animal and zoonotic diseases (transmitted from animals to human beings).

The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) currently performs much of this research but is nearing the end of its lifecycle, is too small to accommodate necessary research, and does not have biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) capabilities. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 recognized that protection of U.S. agriculture is a critical element of homeland security and transferred ownership of PIADC from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). While DHS now has responsibility for operating PIADC, both DHS and USDA conduct scientific research, diagnostic, and training programs there as part of an integrated strategy to protect U.S. agriculture.

The missions of the DHS, USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service-Veterinary Services (APHIS-VS), and the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) are expanding to ensure protection of the nation’s livestock and, thereby, public health. The NBAF would:

- serve as a unique BSL-3 and BSL-4 livestock laboratory capable of developing countermeasures for foreign animal and zoonotic diseases;
- provide advanced test and evaluation capability for threat detection, vulnerability, diagnostics, and countermeasure assessment for agricultural and zoonotic diseases; and
- support licensing of vaccines and other countermeasures developed jointly by ARS and DHS.

The NBAF would provide a safe and secure facility in which basic research, diagnostic development and validation, diagnostic testing, advanced countermeasure development, and training for high-consequence livestock diseases can occur. Approximately 10 percent of the 520,000 square foot NBAF would be designed for BSL-4 research. This would allow directed research on diseases not previously well characterized.

**RESEARCH TO BE CONDUCTED IN THE NBAF**

Research performed at the NBAF would include basic discovery and countermeasure development, advanced countermeasure development (in collaboration with industry), and diagnostic assay development and validation. In some cases, researchers would study a disease to determine:

- the mechanism it uses to enter animals;
- the type cell the disease affects, and the effects the disease causes on the cells;
- how to develop countermeasures to help animals develop protection against the disease; and
- how quickly animals can become protected from the disease after they are vaccinated.

DHS and USDA have identified the following diseases that would potentially be studied at the NBAF. This list may change based upon continued evaluation of risks to the U.S. agricultural system.

- **Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD).** Viral disease of domestic and wild cloven-hoofed animals; acute disease characterized by fever, lameness, and vesicular lesions on the feet, tongue, mouth and teats; FMD is considered to be one of the most contagious, infectious diseases known; cost estimates of an introduction of FMD in the U.S. are more than $37 billion.

- **Classical Swine Fever (CSF).** Wild and domestic swine are the only known natural reservoir; widespread throughout the world and has the potential to cause devastating epidemics, particularly in countries free of the disease; any outbreak of CSF would have serious consequences for domestic and international trade of swine and swine products; improved countermeasures are needed.

- **African Swine Fever (ASF).** Infected animals have high mortality rates; effective countermeasures are not available for infected animals; no vaccines are available to prevent infection; no treatment exists for ASF and countermeasures need improvements.
• **Rift Valley Fever (RVF).** Virus affects human beings and cloven-hoofed animals (sheep, goats, cattle, camels, buffalo and deer); suitable countermeasures to respond in the U.S. do not exist; risk for establishment of endemic disease; ranked as a major disease of concern with USDA, DHS, and other stakeholders.

• **Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia (CBPP).** Caused by an infective microorganism (*Mycoplasma mycoides*); primarily affects cattle including European-bred cattle and Zebu; a related form can affect goats; may survive for days in the environment; no treatment available.

• **Japanese Encephalitis (JE) Virus.** Similar to St. Louis encephalitis virus; JE virus is amplified in the blood of domestic pigs and wild birds; the virus can infect humans, most domestic animals, birds, bats, snakes and frogs.

**Diseases Studied in BSL-4 Facilities**

• **Nipah Virus.** Virus was discovered in 1999; causes disease in swine and in humans through contact with infectious animals; mode of transmission between animals and from animals to humans is uncertain (appears to require close contact with infected tissues or body fluids); caused respiratory disease and encephalitis in people in Malaysia and Singapore; no drug therapies have yet been proven to be effective in treating Nipah infection; no countermeasures exist.

• **Hendra Virus.** Formerly called equine morbillivirus; first isolated in 1994; the natural reservoir for Hendra virus is still under investigation; human beings and equines seem to be predominately affected; caused respiratory and neurological disease in horses and humans in Australia.

**BIOCONTAINMENT AND SAFETY FEATURES OF THE NBAF**

The NBAF would include the latest advances in security and technology. Safety features would include Class III gloveboxes, Class I or II biological safety cabinets (BSCs) in BSL-3 labs, and Class III BSCs or Class I or II BSCs in combination with full-body, air-supplied, positive-pressure personnel suits in BSL-4 labs. There would be personnel controls to include federal background checks, biometric testing required for entry to the labs and no solitary access to BSL-4 microorganisms would be allowed.

The NBAF BSL-4 lab design would employ a box-in-box principle with a pressure-controlled buffer surrounding it. There would be air pressure differentials between zones of containment and directional airflow would be exhausted toward high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. The exhaust air would not be recirculated and all water and air that leaves the lab would be purified (i.e., no research microorganism would enter the sewage system or outside air). All critical functions would have redundant systems.

**AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES**

The NBAF would be owned by DHS with ARS and APHIS-VS as primary partners. These same agencies are currently working at PIADC. The Department of Health and Human Services and other agencies may also occupy space in the NBAF as dictated by the need for assistance.

DHS and USDA work cooperatively to set priorities regarding diseases to be researched. Interagency working groups utilize a variety of agricultural risk assessments and gap analyses to prioritize research and diagnostic capabilities. ARS performs basic research in discovery in mechanisms of disease and countermeasure development and works to transition prospective candidates for advanced countermeasure development to DHS. DHS further develops these candidates and transitions them to commercial partners for complete development and hand off to APHIS-VS for deposition in the National Veterinary Stockpile. DHS, ARS, and APHIS-VS work to develop diagnostic tools to be utilized in the reference and state laboratories.

Once developed, APHIS-VS is responsible for validating the new assays/tools and deploying them to the National Animal Health Laboratory Network. APHIS-VS is also responsible for operating the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory for diagnosis of FMD and other high-consequence foreign animal diseases (FADs), as well as training veterinarians (as part of the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician's school) in the recognition and diagnosis of FADs.

**CONSORTIUM ROLE**

The site consortium would assist in the NBAF’s mission but would not have a direct role in overall operations. The consortium would provide access to:

• a vibrant research area for collaboration between NBAF researchers and others such as veterinary diagnostic laboratories, the state veterinary office, students and faculty;

• a trained workforce with graduate and post doctoral degrees; and

• continuing education and sabbatical opportunities for NBAF researchers.
**NECESIDAD DE UNA FACILIDAD DEL NIVEL 4 DE BIO-SEGURIDAD**

El complejo Bio y de la Agro-Defensa Nacional propuesta (NBAF) proporcionará un complejo integrado para estudiar el animal extranjero y las enfermedades zoonóticas (enfermedades transmitidas por animales hacia los seres humanos).

El Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), Centro de la Enfermedad de Animales de la Isla del Ciruelo realiza mucha investigación pero se está acercando al final de su ciclo vital, es demasiado pequeño para acomodar la investigación necesaria, y no tiene actualmente un nivel 4 (capacidad de la seguridad biológica de BSL-4). El acto de la seguridad de patria de 2002 reconoció que la protección de la agricultura de los EE.UU. es un elemento crítico de la seguridad de patria y de la propiedad transferida de PIADC del U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Ministerio de Agricultura de los EE.UU. al U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Depaliamento de los EE.UU. de la Seguridad de Patria. Mientras que el DHS ahora tiene responsabilidad de operar PIADC, el DHS y el USDA conducen la investigación científica, el diagnóstico, y programas de entrenamiento acomo parte de una estrategia integrada para proteger la agricultura de los EE.UU.

Las misiones del DHS, del USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service-Veterinary Services (APHIS-VS), Servicio-Veterinarios de la Inspección de la Salud de los Animales y las Plantas y del Agricultural Research Service, (ARS) Servicio de Investigación Agrícola se están ampliando para asegurar la protección del ganado y, de tal modo, de la salud pública de la nación. El NBAF:

- servirá como laboratorio para un ganado único BSL-3 y BSL-4 capaz de desarrollar las contramedidas para el animal extranjero y las enfermedades zoonóticas;
- proporcionará la capacidad avanzada de la prueba y de la evaluación para la detección de la amenaza, la vulnerabilidad, los diagnósticos, y las contramedidas para las enfermedades agrícolas y zoonóticas. 
- ayudara en la autorización de vacunas y de otras contramedidas.

El NBAF proporciona un complejo seguro en la cual la investigación básica, el desarrollo, la validación de diagnóstico, la prueba de diagnóstico, el desarrollo avanzado de las contramedidas, y el entrenamiento para las enfermedades del ganado del altoconsecuencia pueden ocurrir. El aproximadamente 10 por ciento de los 520.000 pies cuadrados NBAF sería diseñado para la investigación BSL-4. Esto permitirá investigación sobre las enfermedades no previamente caracterizadas.

**INVESTIGACIÓN QUE SE CONDUCIRÁ EN EL NBAF**

La investigación realizada en el NBAF incluirá el descubrimiento y desarrollo básico de las contramedidas, desarrollo avanzado de las contramedidas (en colaboración con la industria), desarrollo y validación de diagnóstico del análisis. En algunos casos, los investigadores estudiaron una enfermedad para determinar:

- el mecanismo que utiliza para inscribir animales;
- el tipo de célula y los efectos de la enfermedad, y de de la causa de la enfermedad en las células;
- cómo desarrollar contramedidas para ayudar a animales a desarrollar la protección contra la enfermedad
- cómo los animales pueden rápidamente protegerse contra la enfermedad después de que se vacunen.

El DHS y el USDA han identificado las enfermedades siguientes que potencialmente serían estudiadas en el NBAF. Esta lista puede cambiar basándose sobre la evaluación continua de riesgos al sistema agrícola de los EE.UU.:

- **Fiebre Aftosa (FMD)**. Enfermedad viral de animales domésticos y salvajes; enfermedad aguda caracterizada por la fiebre, el cojera, y lesiones vesiculares en los pies, la lengua, la boca y los pezones; FMD se considera ser una de las enfermedades más contagiosas, más infecciosas conocidas; el costo de una introducción de FMD en los EE.UU. son más de $37 mil millones.
- **Peste Porcina Clásica (CFS)**. Los cerdos salvajes y domésticos son el único depósito natural conocido; extenso en el mundo entero y tiene el potencial para causar epidemias devastadoras, particularmente en países libres de esta enfermedad; cualquier brote de CFS tendría consecuencias serias para el comercio doméstico e internacional de cerdos y de productos de los cerdos; las contramedidas mejoradas son necesarias.
- **Peste Porcina Africana (ASF)**. Los animales infectados tienen altas posibilidades de mortalidad; las contramedidas eficaces no están disponibles para los animales infectados; no hay vacunas disponibles para prevenir la infección; ningún tratamiento existe para el ASF y las contramedidas necesitan mejoras.
- **Fiebre del Valle Rift (RVF)**. El virus afecta a los seres humanos y a los animales (ovejas, cabras, ganado, camellos, búfalo y ciervos); las contramedidas convenientes a responder en los EE.UU. no existen; riesgo para el...
• **Pleuranumonia Bovina Contagiosa** (CBPP). Causado por un microorganismo contagioso (mycoides del micoplasma); afecta sobre todo el ganado incluyendo el ganado cebú Europeo; una forma relacionada puede afectar a cabras; puede sobrevivir por días en el ambiente; ningún tratamiento disponible.

• **Virus Japones de la Encefalitis** (JE). Similar al virus de la encefalitis de St. Louis; el virus de JE se amplifica en la sangre de cerdos domésticos y de pájaros salvajes; el virus puede infectar a seres humanos, la mayoría de los animales domésticos, pájaros, serpientes y ranas.

**Enfermedades Estudiadas en las Instalaciones BSL-4**

• **Virus de Nipah**. El virus fue descubierto en 1999; enfermedad causada en cerdos y en seres humanos a través del contacto con los animales infectados; el modo de transmisión entre los mímiles y de animales a los seres humanos es incierto (aparece requerir entrar en contacto cerca con los tejidos o los fluidos corporales infectados); enfermedad respiratoria y encefalitis causadas en gente en Malasia y Singapur; no se ha demostrado ninguna terapia de droga todavía que sean eficaces en tratar la infección de Nipah;ningunas contramedidas existen.

• **Virus de Hendra**. Antes llamado Morbillivirus; primero aislado en 1994; el depósito natural para el virus de Hendra todavía está bajo investigación; los seres humanos y los equinos parecen ser afectados predominantemente; enfermedad respiratoria y neurológica causada en caballos y seres humanos en Australia.

**BIOCONTAINMENT Y CARACTERÍSTICAS DE LA SEGURIDAD DEL NBAF**

El NBAF incluiría los últimos avances en seguridad y tecnología. Las características de la seguridad incluirían las guanteras de la clase III, la clase I o II de los gabinetes de Seguridad Biológicas (BSCs) en los laboratorios BSL-3, y la clase III BSCs o la clase I o II BSCs conjuntamente con el cuerpo-entero, trajes de presión positiva para el personal en los laboratorios BSL-4. Habría control del personal para incluir las comprobaciones de antecedentes federales, prueba biométrica requerida para la entrada a los laboratorios y no se permitiría ningún acceso solitario a los microorganismos BSL-4.

El diseño del laboratorio de NBAF BSL-4 emplearía el principio de la caja-en-caja con un almacenado intermediario presión-controlado que lo rodea. Habría diferencias de presión de aire entre las zonas de la contención y la circulación de aire direccional sería agotada hacia los filtros de partículas de gran eficacia del aire (HEPA). El aire de extractor no sería recirculado y toda la agua y aire que sale del laboratorio serían purificados (es decir, ningún microorganismo de la investigación entraría en el aire del sistema o del exterior de las aguas residuales). Todas las funciones críticas tendrían sistemas redundantes.

**RESPONSABILIDADES DE LA AGENCIA**

El NBAF sería poseído por el DHS con el ARS y APHIS-VS como socios primarios. Estas mismas agencias están trabajando actualmente en PIADC. El departamento de servicios de salud y humanos y de otras agencias puede también ocupar el espacio en el NBAF según lo dictado por la necesidad de la ayuda.

El DHS y el USDA trabajan cooperativamente para establecer prioridades con respecto a las enfermedades que se investigarán. Los grupos de trabajo del organismo común utilizan una variedad de riesgo y de análisis agrícolas del boquete para dar prioridad a capacidades de la investigación y del diagnóstico. El ARS realiza la investigación básica en descubrimiento en mecanismos de la enfermedad y de las contramedidas desarrollo y trabaja los candidatos anticipados de la transición al desarrollo avanzado de las contramedidas al DHS. El DHS desarrolla estos candidatos y los transición a los socios comerciales para el desarrollo y darlos completos APHIS-VS para la deposición en la reserva veterinaria nacional. El trabajo del DHS, del ARS, y de APHIS-VS es desarrollar las herramientas de diagnóstico que se utilizarán en los laboratorios de la referencia y del estado.

Una vez que está desarrollado, APHIS-VS es responsable de validar los nuevos análisis/herramientas y de desplegarlas a la red nacional del laboratorio de la salud de los animales. APHIS-VS es también responsable de operar el laboratorio de diagnóstico extranjero de la enfermedad de animales para la diagnosis de FMD y de otras enfermedades de animales extranjeras de la alta-consecuencia, así como veterinarios del entrenamiento (como parte de la escuela de animales del médico extranjero de la enfermedad) en el reconocimiento y la diagnosis de FADs.

**PAPEL DEL CONSORCIO**

El consorcio del sitio asistiría en la misión del NBAF pero no tendría un papel directo en operaciones totales. El consorcio proporcionaría el acceso a:

• un área de investigación vibrante para la colaboración entre los investigadores de NBAF y otros como laboratorios de diagnóstico veterinarios, la oficina veterinaria del estado, estudiantes y facultad;

• una mano de obra entrenada con grados doctorales del graduado; y oportunidades de la formación permanente

• educación para los investigadores de NBAF.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) for major federal actions that may significantly affect the quality of the environment. Under NEPA, the term “environment” encompasses the natural and physical environment (i.e., air, water, geography, and geology), as well as the relationship of people with that environment (i.e., health and safety, socioeconomic conditions, cultural resources, noise, and aesthetics). NEPA requires federal agencies to use all practicable means within their authority and consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to create and maintain conditions under which people and nature can exist in productive harmony. Congress enacted NEPA to ensure that, before any action is taken, federal agencies consider the potential environmental impacts of their proposed actions and alternatives that would avoid or minimize adverse effects upon the quality of the environment.

The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) established regulations for implementing NEPA applicable to all federal agencies, including procedures for preparing an EIS. Individual agencies, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have established their own implementing regulations to meet or exceed these requirements. The major steps in the NEPA process for preparing an EIS are illustrated in Figure 1. Issuing a Notice of Intent (NOI) begins the EIS process, followed by gathering input on the issues and alternatives to be considered in the EIS (scoping process) from federal agencies, state and local governments, Native American tribes, and other interested individuals and organizations. This information is analyzed to determine the potential for significant impacts to the environment. The environmental impact analysis is presented in the draft EIS, which is released to the public for comment. Public comments on the draft EIS are analyzed, responded to, and any resulting changes to the analyses are documented in the final EIS. Decisions are not made in the EIS, but are issued in a Record of Decision (ROD) published after the final EIS.

### NOTICE OF INTENT AND SCOPING PROCESS

A federal agency first issues a NOI to prepare an EIS. The NOI is issued in the Federal Register to inform the public that an EIS will be prepared, and to formally announce the beginning of the scoping process. The NOI describes the proposed action and alternatives the agency is considering; provides information on issues and potential impacts; and invites comments, questions, and suggestions (both written and oral) on the scope of the EIS. This scoping process provides opportunities for the public to give their comments directly to the federal agency on the scope of the EIS. This aids the federal agency in determining the alternatives, issues, and potential environmental impacts to be analyzed in the EIS. While not a specific requirement, but in keeping with the spirit of NEPA and agency policy, DHS is holding scoping meetings to inform the public and facilitate the collection of public input.
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

The draft EIS is the next step in the NEPA process. It describes, analyzes, and compares the potential environmental impacts of the alternatives to accomplish the purpose and need to which the agency is responding. It also provides information on the methodologies and assumptions used for the analyses. If one or more preferred alternatives exist at this stage of the NEPA process, they are identified in the draft EIS.

PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE DRAFT EIS

Once the EIS is issued, a minimum of 45 days is provided for federal agencies, state and local governments, Native American tribes, and stakeholders to provide comments. The public comment period begins with the publication of a Notice of Availability (NOA) of the draft EIS in the Federal Register. At least one public meeting is held to solicit public input on the draft EIS. As with scoping, DHS is planning to hold meetings in the communities potentially affected by the proposed action to keep the public informed and to augment other communication mechanisms that include toll-free telephone and fax lines, internet, and U.S. mail. All comments received, whether oral or written, will be equally considered in the preparation of the final EIS.

FINAL EIS

Following the public comment period, a final EIS is published and distributed. The final EIS reflects consideration of comments, includes DHS responses to comments, and provides any necessary revisions to the EIS. In addition, the final EIS will identify DHS’ preferred alternative, if it wasn’t identified in the draft EIS. The release of the final EIS is announced by publishing a NOA in the Federal Register.

RECORD OF DECISION

Once the final EIS is published, a minimum 30-day waiting period is required by NEPA before a Record of Decision (ROD) can be issued in the Federal Register. The ROD notifies the public of decisions on the proposed action and the reasons for them. The ROD may also include consideration of other decision factors such as costs, technical feasibility, agency statutory mission, and/or national objectives.

The NEPA process does not dictate that an agency select the most environmentally beneficial alternative. The purpose of the NEPA process is to ensure that accurate environmental studies are performed; that they are done with public involvement; and that public officials make decisions based on an understanding of environmental consequences.

YOU ARE VITAL TO THE PROCESS

DHS is committed to open communication and providing public access to pertinent information and opportunities for involvement throughout the NEPA process. Accordingly, DHS encourages your participation because it helps shape the scope and issues addressed in the NBAF EIS.

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El National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Acto Nacional de la Política Ambiental, de 1969 requiere la preparación de una declaración de consecuencias medioambiental (EIS) para las acciones federales importantes que pueden afectar perceptiblemente a la calidad del ambiente. Debajo NEPA, el término: "medio-ambiente" abarca el ambiente natural y físico (es decir, aire, agua, geografía, y geología), así como la relación de la gente con ese ambiente (es decir, salud y seguridad, las condiciones socioeconómicas, los recursos culturales, ruido, y estética). El NEPA requiere que las agencias federales utilicen todos los medios practicables dentro de su autoridad y constante con otras consideraciones esenciales de la política nacional, para crear y de mantener las condiciones bajo las cuales la gente y la naturaleza pueden existir en armonía productiva. El congreso pensó en el EIS para asegurarse de que, antes de que se tome cualquier acción, las agencias federales consideran las consecuencias potenciales para el medio ambiente de sus acciones y alternativas que evitarían o reducirían al mínimo efectos nocivos a la calidad del ambiente.

El Council on Environment Quality (CEQ), Consejo sobre la Calidad Ambiental estableció las regulaciones para implementar el NEPA aplicarlo a todas las agencias federales, incluyendo los procedimientos para elaborar un EIS. Las agencias individuales, incluyendo Department of Homeland Security (DHS), la Seguridad de la Patria han establecido sus propios reglamentos de aplicación para cumplir o exceder estos requisitos. Los pasos principales en la NEPA para elaborar un EIS se ilustra en el cuadro 1. El publicar un Notice of Intent (NOI), Aviso de Intento comienza el proceso del EIS, seguido por la recolección de sugerencias en las ediciones y las alternativas que se considerarán en el EIS (proceso de la evaluación) de las agencias federales, estado y los gobiernos locales, las tribus del Nativo Americano, y otros individuos y organizaciones interesados. Esta información se analiza para determinar el potencial para los impactos significativos al ambiente. El análisis de consecuencias para el medio ambiente se presenta en el bosquejo del EIS, que se lanza al público para comentario. Los comentarios públicos sobre el EIS son analizados, respondidos y se documentan en el EIS final. Las decisiones no se toman en el EIS, sino se publican en un Record of Decision (ROD), Expediente de Decisión publicado después del EIS final.

**AVISO DEL INTENTO Y PROCESO DE EVALUACIÓN**

Una agencia federal primero publica un NOI para elaborar un EIS. El NOI se publica en el Registro Federal para informar al público que un EIS será elaborado, y para anunciar formalmente el principio del proceso de la evaluación. El NOI describe la acción propuesta y las alternativas que la agencia está considerando; proporciona la información sobre asuntos e impactos potenciales; e invita a comentarios, preguntas, y sugerencias (escrito y oral) en el alcance del EIS. Este proceso de la evaluación proporciona las oportunidades para que el público dé sus comentarios directo a la agencia federal en el alcance del EIS. Esto ayuda a la agencia federal en la determinación de la alternativa, asuntos y el potencial de consecuencias medioambientales para ser analizada en el EIS. Mientras que no un requisito específico, pero para estar en armonía con el espíritu de NEPA y de la política de la agencia, DHS está llevando a cabo reuniones de evaluación para informar al público y para facilitar la colección de sugerencias pública.
BOSQUEJO DE DECLARACIÓN PARA EL MEDIO AMBIENTE

El bosquejo EIS es el paso siguiente en el proceso del NEPA. Describe, analiza, y compara el potencial de las consecuencias medio ambientales de las alternativas para lograr el propósito y necesidad de la cual está respondiendo la agencia. También proporciona la información en las metodologías y las suposiciones utilizadas para el análisis. Si existen uno o más alternativas preferidas a esta etapa del proceso del NEPA, se identifican en el bosquejo del EIS.

COMENTARIO PÚBLICO BOSQUEJO DEL EIS

Una vez que se publica el EIS, un mínimo de 45 días se proporciona para que las agencias federales, el estado y el gobierno, las tribus Americanas Nativas, y los accionistas proporcionen comentarios. El periodo del comentario público comienza con la publicación de una disponibilidad del aviso (NOA) del EIS del bosquejo en el Registro Federal. Por lo menos una reunión pública se celebra para solicitar las sugerencias públicas en el bosquejo de EIS. Como con la evaluación, el DHS está planeando celebrar reuniones en las comunidades potencialmente afectadas por la acción propuesta para mantener al público informado y para aumentar otros mecanismos de comunicación que incluyan líneas gratis del teléfono y de fax, Internet, y el correo de los EE.UU. Todos los comentarios recibidos bien sean, orales o escritos, serán considerados igualmente en la preparación del EIS final.

EIS FINAL

Después del período del comentario público, se publica y se distribuye un EIS final. El EIS final refleja la consideración de comentarios, incluye respuestas del DHS a los comentarios, y proporciona cualquier revisión necesaria al EIS. Además, el EIS final identificará la alternativa preferida del DHS, si no fue identificado en el bosquejo de EIS del bosquejo. El lanzamiento del EIS final es anunciado publicando un NOA en el Registro Federal.

EXPEDIENTE DE LA DECISIÓN

Una vez que se publica el EIS final, un período mínimo de espera compuesto de 30 días es requerido por NEPA antes de que un Expediente de la Decisión (ROD) se pueda publicar en el Registro Federal. ROD notifica el público de decisiones sobre la acción propuesta y de las razones de ellas. ROD puede también incluir la consideración de otros factores de decisión tales como costes, viabilidad técnica, misión estatutaria de la agencia, y/o objetivos nacionales.

El proceso del NEPA no dicta que una agencia debe seleccionar la alternativa lo más ambientalmente beneficiosa. El propósito del proceso del NEPA es asegurarse de que los estudios ambientales exactos están realizados; que están hechos con la implicación pública; y que los funcionarios toman las decisiones basadas en una comprensión de consecuencias ambientales.

USTED ES VITAL AL PROCESO

DHS está resuelto a abrir a la comunicación abierta y a proporcionar el acceso público a la información pertinente y las oportunidades para la implicación a través del proceso del NEPA. Por consiguiente, el DHS lo anima a participar porque ayuda a darle forma a las ediciones que se trataron en el EIS de NBAF.

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Glossary of Technical Terms

Biological Safety Cabinets (BSCs): The most effective and the most commonly used primary containment devices in laboratories working with infectious agents. There are three general types available (Class I, II, III). Properly maintained Class I and II BSCs, when used in conjunction with good microbiological techniques, provide an effective containment system for safe manipulation of moderate and high-risk microorganisms (biosafety level 2 and 3 microorganisms). Class II BSCs also protect the research material itself through high-efficiency particulate air filtration (HEPA filtration) of the air flow down across the work surface. Class III cabinets offer the maximum protection to laboratory personnel because all hazardous materials are contained in a totally enclosed cabinet.

Biosafety Levels (BSLs): There are four levels of biosafety used to designate and regulate lab work with microorganisms. The range is BSL-1 in which the microorganisms are not known to cause disease in healthy adult human beings to BSL-4 in which the microorganisms pose a risk of life-threatening disease and for which there is no known vaccine or therapy. BSL-3Ag refers to research involving large agricultural animals. There are guidelines in place to ensure safe work sites through a combination of engineering controls, management policies, work practices, and procedures. Increasing levels of personnel and environmental protection are provided for by the different biosafety levels used in microbiological/biomedical laboratories. The higher the level of the biosafety lab, the more stringent the level of protection.

Countermeasures: A collective term used in bioccontainment laboratories to include vaccines, biotherapeutics, diagnostic assays, therapies, and vector control.

Diagnostic Assay: A test to determine presence or absence of infectious agents or antibodies to determine if an animal has or has been exposed to an agent.

Environmental Impact Statement: A document required of federal agencies by the National Environmental Policy Act for major federal actions that may significantly affect the quality of the environment. A tool for decisionmaking, it describes, analyzes, and compares the potential environmental impacts of the alternatives to accomplish the purpose and need to which the agency is responding.

Glovebox: A sealed container designed to allow a trained scientist to manipulate microorganisms while being in a different containment level than that of the agent they are manipulating. Built into the sides of the glovebox are two glove ports arranged in such a way that one can place their hands into the ports, into gloves and perform tasks inside the box without breaking the seal. There are three general types available (Class I, II, III) based on the material the box and gloves are made of.

High-Consequence Foreign Animal Diseases (FADs): Diseases not present in the United States that are capable of rapidly spreading and causing high numbers of deaths and/or devastating economic consequences (e.g., foot and mouth disease).

Homeland Security Presidential Directives 9 and 10: These directives established a national goal to protect agricultural infrastructure to ensure our livestock and food safety and security.

Host: In biology, a host is an organism that harbors a virus or parasite, typically providing nourishment and shelter.

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF): Proposed facility that would address both current and future requirements in research, diagnostics, and training for combating high-consequence agricultural threats. Research would focus on early development and discovery of vaccines and diagnostic tests for these important agricultural diseases.
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA): Requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) for major federal actions that may significantly affect the quality of the environment. In NEPA, the term “environment” encompasses the natural and physical environment (i.e., air, water, geography, and geology), as well as the relationship of people with that environment (i.e., health and safety, socioeconomic conditions, cultural resources, noise, and aesthetics).

Natural Reservoir: Refers to the long-term host of the pathogen of an infectious disease. It is often the case that hosts do not get severely ill.

Pathogen or Infectious Agent: A biological agent that causes disease or illness to its host. The term is most often used for agents that disrupt the normal physiology of an animal or person.

Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC): U.S. laboratory for the diagnosis, research, and training for foreign animal diseases. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory is located at PIADC. This laboratory has the capability of diagnosing over 30 foreign animal diseases and is responsible for educating veterinarians in the recognition and diagnosis of these diseases. The USDA Agricultural Research Service (ARS) operates a program focused on basic discovery and research of foreign animal diseases. The DHS scientific program focuses primarily on the advanced development of vaccines and other countermeasures.

Wildlife Reservoir: Wildlife, normally defined as wild, free-roaming animals (e.g., mammals, birds, fish, reptiles, and amphibians), therefore, this refers to a wild animal as long-term host of the pathogen of an infectious disease. It is often the case that hosts do not get the disease carried by the pathogen or it does not show symptoms of the disease and is non-lethal.

Zoonotic: A term for diseases transmitted by animals to humans.
Biological Safety Cabinets (BSCs)
Gabinetes de seguridad biológica (BSCs): Los dispositivos más eficaces y con más uso general para la contención primaria de los laboratorios que trabajan con los agentes infecciosos. Hay tres tipos generales disponibles (clase I, II, III). La clase correctamente mantenida I y II cuando están siendo utilizados en conjunto con buenas técnicas microbiológicas, proveen un sistema de contención eficaz por la manipulación segura de los microorganismos moderados y de riesgo elevado (los microorganismos del nivel 2 y 3 de la seguridad biológica). La clase III BSC también protege el material en sí mismo de la investigación con la filtración de partículas de gran eficacia del aire (filtración de HEPA) del flujo de aire abajo a través de la superficie de trabajo. Los gabinetes de la clase III ofrecen la protección máxima al personal del laboratorio porque todos los materiales peligrosos se contienen en un, gabinete del laboratorio que esta cerrado.

Biosafety Levels (BSLs)
Seguridad biológica llana (BSLs): Hay cuatro niveles de seguridad biológica usados para señalar y para regular el trabajo de laboratorio con los microorganismos. La gama es BSL-I en el cual los microorganismos no se les conoce para causar enfermedad en seres humanos adultos sanos a BSL-4 en el cual los microorganismos planteen un riesgo de enfermedad peligrosa para la vida la cual no hay ninguna vacuna o terapia conocida. BSL-3 AG se refiere a la investigación que implica animales agrícolas grandes. Hay pautas en el lugar para asegurar sitios de trabajo seguros con controles de combinaciones de ingeniería de la, política, gerencia, práctica del trabajo, y procedimientos. Los niveles cada vez mayores de personal y de protección del medio ambiente son proporcionados para diversos niveles de la seguridad biológica usados en laboratorios microbiológicos/biomédicos. Cuanto más alto es el nivel de seguridad biológica del laboratorio, más riguroso el nivel de protección.

Diagnostic Assay
Análisis de diagnóstico: Una prueba para determinar presencia o la ausencia de agentes infecciosos o de anticuerpos para determinar si un animal tiene o se ha expuesto a un agente.

Environmental Impact Statement
Declaración de Consecuencias para el Medio Ambiente: Un documento requerido de agencias federales por el acto nacional de la política medioambiental para las acciones federales importantes que pueden afectar perceptiblemente a la calidad del ambiente. Una herramienta para la toma de decisión, describe, analiza, y compara las consecuencias para el medio ambiente potenciales de las alternativas para lograr el propósito y necesidades en la cual esta respondiendo la agencia.

Glovebox
Guantera: Un envase sellado diseñado para permitir que un científico entrenado manipule microorganismos mientras que estando en un diverso nivel de la contención que el del agente que ellos están manipulando. Se incorporan a los lados de la guantera dos portes del guante arreglados de tal manera que uno pueda poner sus manos en los puertos, en los guantes y realizar tareas dentro de la caja sin la fractura del sello. Hay tres tipos generailes disponibles (la clase I, II, III) basado en el material de la caja y los guantes.

High-Consequence Foreign Animal Diseases (FADs)
Enfermedades de animales extranjeras de la Alto-Consecuencia (FADs): Enfermedades no presentes en los Estados Unidos que son capaces de desparramarse rápidamente y causar números elevados de muertes y/o de devastar las consecuencias económicas (e.g. la fiebre aftosa)

Homeland Security Presidential Directives 9 and 10
Directorios presidenciales 9 y 10 de la seguridad de patria: Estos directivos establecieron una meta nacional para proteger la infraestructura agrícola para asegurar nuestro ganado y seguridad alimentaria y seguridad.
Host
Anfitrion: En biología, un anfitrión es un organismo que abriga un virus o un parásito, típicamente proporcionando el alimento y el abrigo.

National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF)
Facilidad Bio y de la Agro-Defensa nacional (NBAF): Facilidad o Complejo propuesta que trataría requisitos actuales y futuros en la investigación, diagnósticos, y el entrenamiento para combatir amenazas agrícolas de la alta consecuencia. La investigación se centraría en el desarrollo y el descubrimiento tempranos de vacunas y de pruebas de diagnóstico para estas enfermedades agrícolas importantes.

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
Acto nacional de la política medioambiental (NEPA): Requiere la preparación de una declaración de consecuencias para el medio ambiente (EIS) para las acciones federales importantes que pueden afectar perceptiblemente a la calidad del ambiente. En NEPA, el término "ambiente" abarca el ambiente natural y físico (es decir, aire, agua, geografía, y geología), así como la relación de la gente con ese ambiente (es decir, salud y seguridad, las condiciones socioeconómicas, los recursos culturales, ruido, y estética).

Natural Reservoir
Depósito natural: Se refiere al anfitrión de largo plazo del patógeno de una enfermedad infecciosa. A menudo este es la causa por la cual los anfitriones no se enferman severamente.

Pathogen or Infectious Agent
Patógeno o agente infeccioso: Un agente biológico que causa enfermedad o enfermedad a su anfitrión. El término es el uso más frecuente para los agentes que interrumpen la fisiología normal de un animal o de una persona.

Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)
Centro de Enfermedad Animal de la Isla del Ciruelo: Laboratorio de los EE.UU. para la diagnosis, la investigación, y el entrenamiento para las enfermedades de animales extranjeras. El Ministerio de Agricultura de los EE.UU. (USDA) laboratorio de diagnóstico extranjero de enfermedad de animales del servicio de la inspección de la salud de los animales y las plantas (APHIS) está situado en PIADC. Este laboratorio tiene la capacidad del diagnóstico sobre 30 enfermedades de animals extranjeros y es responsable de educar a veterinarios en el reconocimiento y la diagnosis de estas enfermedades. El servicio de investigación agrícola del USDA (ARS) opera un programa centrado en el descubrimiento y la investigación básicas de las enfermedades de animales extranjeros. El programa científico del DHS se centra sobre todo en el desarrollo avanzado de vacunas y de otras contramedidas.

Wildlife Reservoir
Depósito de la fauna: La fauna, definida normalmente como animales salvajes, de libre-itinerancias (e.g., mamíferos, pájaros, pescados, reptiles, y anfibios), por lo tanto, esto se refiere a un animal salvaje como anfitrión de largo plazo del patógeno de una enfermedad infecciosa. Es a menudo el caso que los anfitriones no consiguen la enfermedad llevada por el patógeno o no demuestra los síntomas de la enfermedad y es inocuo.

Zoonotic
Zoonótico: Un término para las enfermedades transmitidas por los animales a los seres humanos.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is leading a requirements analysis process to identify a next-generation biological and agricultural defense facility to replace the important but aging facility at Plum Island, NY. The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) is an essential component of the national strategy for protecting U.S. agriculture from a bioterrorist attack involving the intentional introduction of foreign animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease, as described in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive, “Biodefense for the 21st Century.” DHS is working closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service-Veterinary Services (APHIS-VS) and Agriculture Research Service (ARS) to evaluate current and future needs for agricultural biosecurity.

**PROPOSED ACTION**

A Notice of Intent (NOI) was published in the Federal Register on July 31, 2007, announcing DHS’s intention of preparing an environmental impact statement (EIS) to evaluate siting alternatives for the construction and operation by DHS of a proposed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). A gap in the nation’s coordinated biodefense strategy has been identified that must be filled by an integrated research, development, test and evaluation infrastructure for combating biological and agricultural threats from natural and manmade sources. The proposed action is to build the NBAF that would fill this gap and help DHS fulfill its mission of detecting, preventing, protecting against and responding to incidents within the United States.

**RANGE OF REASONABLE ALTERNATIVES**

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires that federal agencies consider a range of reasonable alternatives for implementing a proposed action. The NBAF EIS will analyze the following preliminary alternatives; however, public input during the scoping period may result in the addition of other alternatives.

- No action alternative (i.e., maintain current research capability at PIADC and do not proceed with the proposed NBAF). NEPA requires agencies to consider a no action alternative.
- Build and operate the proposed NBAF at one of the following sites:
  - South Milledge Avenue Site; Athens, Georgia
  - Manhattan Campus Site; Manhattan Kansas
  - Flora Industrial Park Site; Flora, Mississippi
  - Plum Island Site; Plum Island, New York
  - Umstead Research Farm Site; Butner, North Carolina
  - Texas Research Park Site; San Antonio, Texas

**ISSUES TO BE ANALYZED IN THE NBAF EIS**

The following issues have been identified for analysis in the NBAF EIS; the list is preliminary and is intended to facilitate public comment on the scope of the EIS. Other issues will be identified through public involvement and interagency coordination.

- Land-use plans, policies, and controls
- Visual resources
- Air quality
• Acoustic (noise) environment
• Geology and soil characteristics
• Water resources, including surface and groundwater, floodplains and wetlands, and water use and quality;
• Plants and animals, and their habitats, including federally listed threatened or endangered species and their critical habitats, wetlands and floodplains
• Cultural resources, including historic and prehistoric resources and traditional cultural properties encompassing Native American or culturally important sites
• Human health and safety (involving both members of the public and laboratory workers)
• Socioeconomic effects that may be related to the new construction and facility operations
• Public infrastructure, including utilities and local transportation
• Waste management practices and activities including the handling, collection, treatment, and disposal of research wastes
• Compliance with all applicable federal, tribal, state, and local statutes and regulations and with international agreements, and required environmental permits, consultations and notifications

**DECISIONS TO BE MADE**

Environmental consequences are of great importance to the federal departments involved in this endeavor and will be an integral part of the decisionmaking process. No decisions will be made in the EIS itself; however, the decisions whether to build the NBAF and where will be made based on the EIS analyses, as well as a combination of environmental, economic, engineering and other technical factors, policy considerations, and public comment. Decisions will be announced in a Record of Decision after the final NBAF EIS has been completed and released to the public.

**PUBLIC PARTICIPATION**

DHS is currently soliciting public input on the scope of the draft NBAF EIS and holding public meetings in communities that may host the facility, as well as a regional meeting. In addition to providing oral comments or submitting written comments at the meetings, the following communication mechanisms are available. All comments, both oral and written, received during the scoping period (July 31 through September 28, 2007), will be given equal consideration.

**U.S. MAIL:**
U.S. Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate James V. Johnson Mail Stop #2100 245 Murray Lane, SW Building 410 Washington, DC 20528

**ONLINE:** [http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf](http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf) (click on Public Involvement)

**TOLL-FREE FAX:** 1-866-508-NBAF (6223)

**TOLL-FREE VOICE MAIL:** 1-866-501-NBAF (6223)

**NBAF EIS SCHEDULE**

Scoping Period: July 31 through September 28, 2007
Draft NBAF EIS and public meetings: Spring 2008
Final NBAF EIS: Fall 2008
Record of Decision: At least 30 days after publishing the final NBAF EIS
PROPÓSITO Y NECESIDAD

El U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Departamento de los EE.UU. de la Seguridad de Patria está llevando un proceso del análisis de requisitos para identificar un complejo de defensa biológica y agrícola de próxima-generación de la defensa para sustituir el complejo de defensa envejecido pero importante en la Isla del Ciruelo, NY. El Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), Centro de la Enfermedad de Animales de la Isla del Ciruelo es un componente esencial de la estrategia nacional para proteger agricultura de los EE.UU. contra un ataque del bioterrorista que implica la introducción intencional de enfermedades de animales extranjeras tales como fiebre aftosa, según lo descrito en el Directorio Presidencial de la Seguridad de Patria, "Biodefensa para el siglo XXI". El DHS está trabajando de cerca con el U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Ministerio de Agricultura de los EE.UU. los servicios de Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service-Veterinary Services (APHIS-VS), Servicio-Veterinarios de la Inspección de la Salud de los Animales y las Plantas y el Agriculture Research Service (ARS), Servicio de Investigación de la Agricultura para evaluar las necesidades corrientes y futuras para la bioseguridad agrícola.

ACCIÓN PROPUESTA

A Notice of Intent (NOI), un Anuncio del Intento fue publicado en el Registro Federal el 31 de julio de 2007, anunciando la intención del DHS de elaborar una declaración de consecuencias medio ambiental (EIS) para evaluar las alternativas de localización para la construcción y la operación por el DHS de un complejo Bio y de la Agro-Defensa Nacional propuesta (NBAF). Un boquete en la estrategia coordinada del biodefensa de la nación se ha identificado que se debe llenar por una investigación, un desarrollo, una prueba y una infraestructura integrada de la evaluación para combatir amenazas biológicas y agrícolas de fuentes naturales y artificiales. La acción propuesta es construir el NBAF que llenaría este boquete y DHS ayudara a satisfacer su misión de detectar, de prevenir, y proteger contra incidentes dentro de los Estados Unidos.

GAMA DE ALTERNATIVAS RAZONABLES

El National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Acto Nacional de la Política Medioambiental requiere que las agencias federales consideren una gama de alternativas razonables para ejecutar una acción propuesta. El EIS de NBAF analizará las alternativas preliminares siguientes; sin embargo, la entrada pública durante el período de investigación puede dar lugar a la adición de otras alternativas.

- Ninguna alternativa de acción (es decir, mantener la capacidad actual de la investigación en PIADC y no proceder con el NBAF propuesto). El NEPA requiere las agencias considerar una alternativa sin acción de no.
- Construir y operar el NBAF propuesto en uno de los sitios siguientes:
  - Sitio South Milledge Avenue Site; Athens, Georgia
  - Sitio Manhattan Campus Site; Manhattan Kansas
  - Sitio Flora Industrial Park Site; Flora, Mississippi
  - Sitio Plum Island, New York
  - Sitio Umstead Research Farm; Butner, North Carolina
  - Sitio Texas Research Park, San Antonio, Texas

EDICIONES QUE SE ANALIZARÁN EN EL EIS DE NBAF

Los asuntos siguientes se han identificado para el análisis en el EIS de NBAF; la lista es preliminar y su intención es facilitar el comentario público sobre el alcance del EIS. Otros asuntos serán identificados con la coordinación pública y del organismo común.
• Planes, políticas, y controles de la ocupación del terreno del
• Recursos Visuales
• Calidad del aire
• Ambiente Acústico (ruído)
• Características de la geología y del suelo
• Recursos hídricos incluyendo agua y superficial y subterránea, terrenos de aluvión y humedales, y uso y calidad del agua
• Plantas y animales y su hábitat, incluyendo especies amenazadas o en peligro de extinción y sus hábitat, humedales y terrenos de aluvión críticos
• Recursos culturales incluyendo recursos históricos y prehistóricos y características culturales tradicionales que abarcan el Nativo Americano o sitios culturales importantes
• Salud humana y seguridad de (que implican a ambos miembros del público y de los técnicos de laboratorio)
• Efectos socioeconómicos que se pueden relacionar con nueva construcción y operaciones de la facilidad
• Infraestructura pública incluyendo utilidades y el transporte local
• Prácticas de gestión y actividades incluyendo la dirección, la colección, el tratamiento, y la disposición de las basuras de la investigación
• Conformidad con regulaciones federales, tribal todo aplicables, estado, y estatutos locales y regulaciones y con acuerdos internacionales, y permisos, consultas y notificaciones ambientales requeridos

**DECISIONES QUE SE HARÁN**

Las consecuencias ambientales son de gran importancia a los departamentos federales implicados en este esfuerzo y serán una parte integrante del procedimiento de toma de decisión. No se tomará ninguna decisión en el EIS en sí mismo; sin embargo, las decisiones si construir el NBAF, y donde será hecho será basado en los análisis del EIS, así como una combinación de factores ambientales, económicos, y factores técnicos, de la política, y commentario público. Las decisiones serán anunciadas en un expediente de la decisión después del EIS final de NBAF después que haya terminado y se ha lanzado al público.

**PARTICIPACIÓN PÚBLICA**

El DHS está solicitando las sugerencias públicas en el alcance del EIS del bosquejo NBAF y está celebrando actualmente reuniones públicas en las comunidades que pueden recibir la facilidad, así como una reunión regional. Además de proporcionar comentarios orales o de someter comentarios escritos en las reuniones, los mecanismos siguientes de la comunicación están disponibles. Todos comentarios, oral y escritos, recibidos durante el periodo de investigación (el 31 de julio hasta el 28 de septiembre de 2007), serán dados la misma consideración.

**CORREO DE EE.UU.:**
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Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC  20528

**CORREO ELECTRONICO:**  http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf (Entre en la pagina Participación del Público)

**FAX GRATIS:**  1-866-508-NBAF (6223)

**GRATIS CORREO DE VOZ:**  1-866-501-NBAF (6223)

**HORARIO DEL NBAF EIS**

Periodo de Evaluación  
el 31 de julio hasta el 28 de septiembre de 2007

Draft NBAF EIS y reuniones públicas  
Primavera 2008

Final del NBAF EIS  
Otoño 2008

Expediente de la Decisión  
Por lo menos 30 días después de publicar el final del NBAF EIS
KEY CONTENT AREAS OF THE EIS DOCUMENT

➢ **Purpose of and Need for the Proposed Action**
  o Description of scoping activities conducted and summary of scoping comments.
    ▪ Identification of how and where scoping comments were addressed in the draft EIS.

➢ **Description of the Proposed Action and Alternatives Considered**
  o Definition of the **proposed action**—construct and operate the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) at a single site.
  o Description of facility design and construction activities and requirements.
  o Description of the proposed NBAF, including, but not limited to:
    ▪ research to be conducted,
    ▪ laboratory operations,
    ▪ animal care and use,
    ▪ special engineering considerations and safeguards,
    ▪ access control and physical security, and
    ▪ biosurety (biosafety).
  o Description of alternatives considered, including:
    ▪ no action alternative (i.e., maintain current research at the Plum Island Animal Disease Center and do not proceed with the proposed NBAF),
    ▪ six site alternatives for constructing and operating the NBAF, and
    ▪ alternatives considered but dismissed (will not be analyzed in the EIS).

➢ **Affected Environment**
  o Description of the **existing** natural and human environment that could be impacted by the proposed action and the six site alternatives considered.
  o Discipline (topical) areas include, but are not necessarily limited to:
    ▪ land use, including planning and zoning considerations;
    ▪ visual resources (viewshed/vistas);
    ▪ site infrastructure, including utilities and transportation;
    ▪ meteorology and climate;
    ▪ air quality and acoustic (noise) environment;
    ▪ geology and soils, including site/regional geologic hazards;
    ▪ water resources, including surface and groundwater;
    ▪ ecological resources (terrestrial and aquatic), including wetlands and threatened and endangered species;
    ▪ cultural resources, including American Indian, historic, archaeological, and paleontological resources;
    ▪ socioeconomic conditions, including demographics, employment, housing, and community services; and
    ▪ waste management and hazardous materials, including available waste management infrastructure and existing contamination.
➤ **Environmental Consequences**

- Description of the potential impacts on the environment and human health that could result from implementation of the proposed action and the six site alternatives, as well as the no action alternative.
- Potential for impacts assessed for each of the disciplines identified in the affected environment, as well as those unique to the NBAF; analysis focused on significant environmental issues and alternatives with issues analyzed and potential impacts discussed at a level of detail commensurate with their importance ("sliding scale" approach).
- Examples of areas of potential impacts that would be evaluated include, but are not necessarily limited to:
  - change in land use character;
  - utility consumption and capacity limitations;
  - consumption of rock and mineral resources;
  - facility constraints and design considerations due to geologic hazards;
  - air emissions and compliance with applicable standards;
  - disturbance of ecological resources, including wildlife habitat and/or sensitive species;
  - disturbance of cultural resources, including American Indian, historic or archaeological sites;
  - liquid effluents, disposal, and compliance with applicable standards;
  - public and worker health and safety, including potential effects from facility accidents and intentional acts;
  - change in socioeconomic conditions, including local employment, traffic, need for community services, housing, etc.; and
  - waste generation, transportation, and disposal.

➤ **Applicable Laws, Regulations, and Other Requirements**

- Description of the applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements that apply to the proposed action and alternatives, including:
  - laws, regulations, and other requirements that form the basis for or govern DHS actions;
  - governing federal, state, and local environmental, safety, and health laws and regulations that could apply; and
  - consultation requirements between the DHS and other federal, state, and local agencies and federally-recognized American Indian Nations.
Puntos Principales del Documento EIS de NBAF y Asuntos Potenciales

PUNTOS PRINCIPALES DEL DOCUMENTO EIS

➢ Necesidad y Propuesta de la Acción

- Descripción del U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Departamento de Seguridad de la Patria de los EE.UU. para la misión y la infraestructura según lo escrito en el Directorio Presidencial de la Seguridad de Patria, “Biodefensa para el siglo XXI”.

- Descripción de las actividades de la evaluación que se condujeron y el resumen de los comentarios de la reunión de la investigación.
  - Identificación de cómo y de donde fueron los comentarios tratados en el bosquejo del EIS.

➢ La Descripción de la Acción Propuesta y las Alternativas Consideradas

- Descripción de la acción propuesta - construir y operar el complejo Bio y de la Agro-Defensa Nacional (NBAF) en un solo sitio.

- Descripción de diseño del complejo y las actividades constructivas y requisitos

- Descripción del sitio propuesto del NBAF, incluyendo pero no limitándose a:
  - investigación conducida
  - operaciones de laboratorios
  - cuidado y uso de animales
  - consideración de ingeniería especial
  - control de acceso y seguridad física
  - seguridad biológica

- Descripción de las alternativas consideradas, incluyendo:
  - alternativa sin acción (e.g., mantener investigación al día en Plum Island Animal Disease Center, Centro de Enfermedad Animal de la Isla del Ciruelo)
  - seis alternativas del sitio para construir y operar el NBAF
  - alternativas consideradas pero no incluidas (no serán consideradas en el bosquejo EIS)

➢ Ambiente Afectado

- Descripción del ambiente natural y humano existente que podría ser afectado por la acción propuesta y las seis alternativas del sitio consideradas.

- Areas disciplinadas topicales incluyen, pero no se limitan a:
  - utilizacion del suelo, incluyendo preparación y consideraciones de la división
  - recursos visuales (panoramas)
  - infraestructura del sitio, incluyendo utilidades y transportación
  - clima y meteriologia
  - calidad del aire y el ambiente acústico (ruído)
  - peligros geológicos regionales del sitio
  - recursos de agua, iiincluyendo agua subterrannea
  - recursos terrestres y de agua, incluyendo especies en peligro de extinción
  - recursos culturales, incluyendo Indo-Americano, arqueólogos, paleontólogos
  - condiciones socioeconómicas, incluyendo la gestión de desechos y la contaminación existente
  - gestión de desechos y materiales peligrosos, incluyendo la infraestructura disponible de la gestión de desechos y la contaminación existente.
**Consecuencias Medio Ambientales**

- Descripción del **potencial** efecto en el medio ambiente y la salud humana que puede resultar de implementación de la acción propuesta y los seis sitios alternativos, así como las alternativas sin acción.
- Potencial efecto para cada disciplina identificada in el medio ambiental afectado, al igual que esos únicos al NBAF; análisis enfocado en asunto medio ambientales y alternativas con asunto analizados y efectos potenciales discutidos en un nivel de detalle con importancia.
- Ejemplos de áreas con efecto potencial serian evaluadas incluyendo, pero no necesariamente limitadas a:
  - cambio en el carácter de la tierra
  - limitaciones para uso general de la consumación
  - consumición de recursos de minerales y de roca
  - emisiones de aire compatibles con las normas aplicadas
  - disturbio de recursos ecológicos, incluyendo hábitat de la fauna y especie sensible
  - disturbio de recursos culturales, incluyendo Indio-Americano, sitios históricos o arqueológicos
  - disturbio de líquidos, disposición, conformidad de la salud y seguridad del trabajador, incluyendo efectos potenciales
  - seguridad de salud para el publico y del trabajador, incluyendo efectos potenciales de accidentes de la facilidad y de actos intencionales
  - cambios en las condiciones socioeconómicas, incluyendo el empleo, trafico, necesidad de servicio comunitario
  - transportacion y desgaste

**Leyes Aplicables, Regulaciones y Otros Requisitos**

- Descripción de leyes aplicables des estados, locales y federales y requisitos que aplican a la acción propuesta y alternativas incluyendo:
  - leyes, regulaciones, y otros requisitos que forman la base de las acciones del DHS
  - seguridad del estado, federal y medio ambiental local y leyes de la salud y regulaciones que puedan aplicar
  - requisitos de consulta entre DHS y otras agencias federales, del estado y localmente. reconocidas federalmente como Naciones Indio-Americanos.
Biosafety Levels

BIOSAFETY LEVELS (BSL)

- There are four levels of biosafety used to designate and regulate lab work with microorganisms.
- Each level is designed to prevent lab-acquired infections and to protect the environment from potentially hazardous agents.
- The higher the level of the biosafety lab, the more stringent the level of protection required to work in these areas.

BSL-1: Microorganisms not known to cause disease in healthy adult human beings.

- Potential hazards to laboratory personnel and the environment are minimal.
- Work is conducted on open bench tops using standard microbiological practices (lab coats, safety glasses and gloves).
- Lab personnel have specific training in the procedures conducted in the lab and are supervised by a scientist with general training in microbiology or a related science.
- BSL-1 labs are located in high school and college-level biology and chemistry classrooms and research institutions.

BSL-2: Microorganisms of moderate potential hazard to personnel and the environment.

- Lab personnel have specific training in handling pathogenic agents and are supervised by scientists competent in handling infectious agents and associated procedures.
- Access to the lab is limited when work is being conducted.
- All procedures in which infectious aerosols or splashes may be created are conducted in biological safety cabinets or other physical containment equipment.
- BSL-2 labs are located in research institutions, essentially all hospitals, and medical and veterinary schools.
- An example of a microorganism that would be studied in a NBAF BSL-2 lab is the inactivated virus that causes foot and mouth disease.

BSL-3: Microorganisms present in the United States, and foreign and emerging agents that may cause serious consequences in livestock but are not harmful to human beings because of available protective measures.

- Lab personnel have specific training in handling pathogenic microbes potentially lethal to animals and are supervised by trained scientists who are experienced in working with these agents and associated procedures.
- Access to the lab is controlled (i.e., card reader for entry; self-sealing, double door access, etc.)
- All procedures involving the manipulation of infectious materials are conducted within biological safety cabinets or other physical containment devices, or by personnel wearing appropriate personal protective clothing and equipment.
- BSL-3 labs have special engineering and design features to enhance safety.
- BSL-3 labs are located in research institutions, hospitals, and medical and veterinary schools.
- An example of a microorganism that would be studied in a NBAF BSL-3 lab is the live virus that causes foot and mouth disease in cloven-hoofed animals.
BSL-4: Microorganisms that pose a high risk of life-threatening disease and for which there is no known vaccine or therapy.

- Lab personnel have specific and thorough training in handling extremely hazardous infectious agents and fully understand all containment functions, practices, equipment and lab design characteristics.
- Lab personnel are supervised by trained scientists who are experienced in working with the microorganisms and with associated procedures.
- Access to the lab is strictly controlled. The facility is in a controlled area within a building, which is completely isolated from all other areas.
- There are four BSL-4 facilities currently operating in the United States in populated urban areas: Atlanta, Georgia; Fort Detrick, Maryland; Galveston, Texas; and San Antonio, Texas. There has never been a public exposure at a BSL-4 lab in the United States.
- **Examples of microorganisms that could possibly be studied in a NBAF BSL-4 lab include Nipah and Hendra viruses, both of which are emerging zoonotic diseases that can spread from their natural reservoir to human beings, and are often fatal.**
El Nivel de la Seguridad Biológica (BSL)

- Hay cuatro niveles de seguridad biológica usados para señalar y para regular el trabajo de laboratorio con los microorganismos.
- Cada nivel se diseña para prevenir infecciones adquiridas por laboratorios y para proteger el ambiente contra agentes potencialmente peligrosos.
- Cuanto más alto es el nivel del laboratorio de la seguridad biológica, más riguroso el nivel de protección requerido para trabajar en estas áreas.

BSL-1: Microorganismos que no son reconocidos para causar enfermedades en seres adultos sanos.

- Los peligros potenciales al personal del laboratorio y al ambiente son mínimos.
- El trabajo se conduce en tapas abiertas usando las prácticas microbiológicas que son neutrales (capas del laboratorio, gafas de seguridad y guantes).
- El personal del laboratorio de tienen entrenamiento específico en los procedimientos conducidos en el laboratorio y son supervisados por un científico con el entrenamiento general en microbiología o una ciencia relacionada.
- Los laboratorios del BSL-1 están situados en salas de clase de la secundaria y de biología y de la química del nivel universitario e instituciones de investigación.

BSL-2: Microorganismos de peligro potencial moderado al personal y al ambiente.

- El personal del laboratorio tienen entrenamiento específico en la manipulación de agentes patógenos y son supervisados por los científicos competentes en la manipulación de agentes infecciosos y de procedimientos asociados.
- El acceso al laboratorio es limitado cuando se está conduciendo el trabajo.
- Todos los procedimientos en los cuales los aerosoles infecciosos salpican se conduce en los gabinetes de seguridad biológicos o el otro equipo físico de la contención.
- Los laboratorios del BSL-2 están situados en las instituciones de investigación, esencialmente todos los hospitales, y las escuelas médicas y veterinarias.
- Un ejemplo de un microorganismo que sería estudiado en un laboratorio de NBAF BSL-2 es el virus hecho inactivo que causa fiebre aftosa.

BSL-3: Los microorganismos presentes en los Estados Unidos, y los agents extranjeros y emergentes que pueden causar consecuencias serias en ganado pero no son dañosos a los seres humanos debido a medidas protectoras disponibles.

- El personal del laboratorio tiene entrenamiento específico en la manipulación de los microbios patógenos potencialmente mortales a los animales y son supervisados por los científicos entrenados que experimentan en el trabajo con estos agentes y procedimientos asociados.
- El acceso al laboratorio se controla con (un lector de tarjetas para la entrada; acceso doble de puerta, autoadhesivos, etc.)
Todos los procedimientos que implican la manipulación de materiales infecciosos son conducidos dentro de los gabinetes de seguridad biológicos y de otros dispositivos físicos de la contención, o por el personal que usa la ropa protectora y el equipo apropiado.

Los laboratorios con BSL-3 tienen características especiales de la ingeniería y diseño para realzar la seguridad.

Los laboratorios con BSL-3 están situados en instituciones de investigación, hospitales, y escuelas médicas y veterinarias.

Un ejemplo de un microorganismo que sería estudiado en un laboratorio de NBAF BSL-3 es el virus vivo que causa fiebre aftosa en animales.

BSL-4: Microorganismos que presentan un riesgo elevado de la enfermedad para la vida y para cuáles no hay ninguna vacuna o terapia conocida.

- El personal del laboratorio tiene entrenamiento específico y cuidadoso en la manipulación de agentes infecciosos extremadamente peligrosos y entienden completamente todas las funciones de la contención, prácticas, equipo y características del diseño del laboratorio.
- Los científicos entrenados supervisan al personal del laboratorio que experimentan en el trabajo con los microorganismos y con procedimientos asociados.
- El acceso al laboratorio se controla de manera estricta. El complejo está en un área controlada dentro de un edificio, que se aísla totalmente del resto de las áreas.
- En el edificio se encuentra cuatro instalaciones BSL-4 que funcionan actualmente en los Estados Unidos en zonas urbanas pobladas: Atlanta, Georgia; Fort Detrick, Maryland; Galveston, Tejas; y San Antonio, Tejas. Nunca ha habido una exposición pública en un laboratorio BSL-4 en los Estados Unidos.
- Los ejemplos de los microorganismos que podrían ser estudiados posiblemente en un laboratorio de NBAF BSL-4 incluyen los virus de Nipah y de Hendra, que son las enfermedades zoonóticas emergentes que pueden separarse de su depósito natural a los seres humanos, y son a menudo fatales.
Plum Island Animal Disease Center

Protecting America's Livestock For More Than 50 Years

The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) became part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (PL 107-296, Section 310), on June 1, 2003.

PIADC is an important national asset in which scientists conduct basic and applied research and diagnostic activities to protect the health of livestock on farms across America from foreign disease agents. DHS has the mission to protect America from terrorist threats including those directed against agriculture. The transfer of PIADC operations facilitates the Department's ability to lead a focused research and development program to prevent, respond to and recover from the intentional introduction of animal diseases.

Facts about the Plum Island Animal Disease Center

- Since 1954, Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) has been protecting America's livestock from foreign animal diseases (diseases not present in the U.S.).

- PIADC is located on Plum Island, 840 acres that lie 1.5 miles from Orient Point, New York and 9 miles from Old Saybrook, Connecticut.

- PIADC has more than 300 employees.

- Plum Island derives its name from the profusion of native plum trees on its beaches. The Island has a storied place in America's colonial, Revolutionary, and military history. Plum Island buttressed the nation's coastal and harbor defenses during the Spanish-American War through World War II.

- Plum Island's contribution to animal disease research dates to 1951, under auspices of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. By mid-decade, the U.S. Congress appropriated funds for a new laboratory in response to outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease in Mexico (1946) and Canada (1952); the facilities were transferred to the U.S. Department of Agriculture and a new Plum Island Animal Disease Laboratory was dedicated at the site.

- PIADC operates BSL3 Ag and BSL 2 laboratory facilities.
DHS and USDA Safeguarding Livestock

- At PIADC, DHS and USDA work together in a crucial shared mission.

- DHS' Targeted Advanced Development Unit partners with USDA; academia and industry scientists to deliver promising vaccines and antivirals to the USDA for licensure and inclusion in the USDA National Veterinary Stockpile.

- USDA Agricultural Research Service (ARS) scientists perform basic and applied research to formulate better countermeasures against foreign animal diseases including strategies for prevention, control and recovery. ARS focuses on developing faster acting vaccines and antivirals to be used during outbreaks to stop or limit transmission. Antivirals prevent infection while vaccine immunity develops. The principal diseases studied are foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever and vesicular stomatitis virus.

- USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS) scientists operate the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, an internationally recognized facility performing diagnostic testing of samples collected from U.S. livestock. APHIS also tests animals and animal products being imported into the U.S. APHIS maintains the North American Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank at PIADC.

Foreign Animal Disease Education

- PIADC hosts several Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic schools each year to train federal and state veterinarians and laboratory diagnostic staff, military veterinarians and veterinary school faculty. These hands-on courses allow students to observe signs of foreign animal diseases. They also instruct students on sample collection and submission in the event of a suspected foreign animal disease outbreak. By 2006, PIADC had run its 116th FADD School and had educated more than 3,000 participants.

- FADD Schools have been operated at PIADC since 1971.

About Foot-and-Mouth Disease

- Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) is extremely contagious among cloven-hoofed animals. Accidental outbreaks of the virus have caused catastrophic livestock and economic losses in many countries throughout the world. FMD was eradicated from the U.S. in 1929 but is currently endemic to many parts of the world. FMD does not affect humans.
CONSORTIUM

The Gulf States Bio and Agro-Defense Consortium is a coalition of public and private entities working collectively to attract the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) to Mississippi. The Consortium is comprised of the State of Mississippi, the University of Mississippi (UM), the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC), Mississippi State University (MSU), Jackson State University (JSU), Tulane University, the Tulane National Primate Research Center, the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), Tougaloo College, and Battelle Memorial Institute. Except for UTMB, all members of the Consortium are within a two-hour drive of the proposed site. The Consortium has committed to providing regular shuttle services to and from the NBAF for all university participants.

PROPOSED NBAF SITE LOCATION

The proposed site is located in the Flora Industrial Park in Madison County, Mississippi. A mixed-use commercial park, the Flora site offers a gentle rolling terrain with nearby access to interstates, railways, and the Jackson-Evers International Airport. The Madison County Economic Development Agency maintains the park’s more than 150 acres. The portion under consideration for the NBAF currently has no tenants or physical structures and is approximately 150 acres. The only tenant in the Flora Industrial Park is Primus, a manufacturing company.

COMPLEMENTARY RESEARCH AND WORKFORCE

The Consortium partners bring a diverse set of capabilities and significant biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) and BSL-4 experience to NBAF operations. MSU has a veterinary school, maintains significant research programs in animal sciences, and operates a BSL-3 facility on its main campus. MSU also operates the state diagnostic veterinary laboratory in Pearl, Mississippi, a 40,000 square foot facility that will have an active BSL-3 within two years. The university also has collaborations with the U.S. Department of Agriculture Agricultural Research Services (ARS), a facility that has the distinction of possessing the greatest number of agricultural doctorate degrees in the nation. The UM has a world-renowned program in pharmaceutical sciences that would be crucial to NBAF’s countermeasure development and licensing activities. The National Center for Natural Products located at UM currently screens more than 30,000 samples and houses more than 18,000 natural products with proven medicinal/agricultural properties. UMMC and Tulane University have programs in medical research and in clinical trial development and execution.

Currently, UMMC has over 350,000 square feet of research space, with an additional 178,000 square feet of new construction to be completed within two years. UMMC researchers have recently been recognized at the national level for research involving anthrax and potential treatments. Both institutions have infectious diseases doctoral and medical training and operate BSL-3 facilities certified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Federal Drug Administration. TNPRC has a free-standing 3,000-square foot facility dedicated to BSL-3 animal research. UTMB has an established research program in infectious diseases directly relevant to bioterrorism and operates one of the few BSL-4 facilities in the nation. Battelle has a long history of successfully managing national laboratories, including West Jefferson BSL-3 laboratory, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center. Battelle is responsible for the operation of over 50,000 square feet of research facilities with research and development totaling over $4 billion. JSU has a National Center for Environmental Health and the National Center for Biodefense Communications.

The Consortium also provides a strong workforce for the NBAF in Mississippi. JSU and Tougaloo College are Historically Black Colleges and Universities that produce significant numbers of African-Americans in the sciences. Collectively, the Consortium graduates approximately 40 doctorate-, 100 masters- and 370
baccalaureate-level students in relevant life sciences each year (average over the past five years). Their fields of study include biology, chemistry, biochemistry, animal sciences and physiology, bioengineering, and pharmaceutical sciences. Annually, approximately 100 medical doctors, 50 doctors of veterinary medicine, and 75 professional pharmacists graduate from the Consortium academic partners. Currently, approximately 60 percent of bachelor-level and above-degree professionals leave the area because life sciences opportunities cluster elsewhere in the nation.

AVAILABLE SITE INFRASTRUCTURE

The proposed site is adjacent to U.S. Route 49, a major four-lane divided highway. It is connected via major highways Interstate 55 (approximately 17 miles), which supports north/south interstate traffic, and to Interstate 20 (approximately 20 miles), which supports east/west interstate traffic. The State of Mississippi will commit to providing any needed utility improvements for the NBAF. The utilities for the site are supplied by Entergy Corporation, which has a three-phase power onsite. Natural gas is available onsite (6-inch main). Water is supplied by the Town of Flora. Currently, the site is supplied by a 10-inch pipe adjacent to the site, with 100,000- and 200,000-gallon storage tanks located within 0.75 miles. Sewer services (treatment plant) are also provided by the Town of Flora; there is currently an 8-inch main adjacent to the site.
CONSORTIUM

The Heartland Bio Agro Consortium (HBAC) is led by Kansas State University and the Midwest Research Institute, with the Kansas City Area Life Sciences Institute providing the cohesive leadership that unites the diverse membership. HBAC partners include a number of research universities within the Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska region, and several research universities outside the region chosen to complement strategic research foci. HBAC partners include private research institutes and research hospitals. The greater Kansas City area is a major hub of the veterinary pharmaceutical industry, having companies in the vaccine development, production, and distribution arenas. HBAC partners include a number of these organizations.

PROPOSED NBAF SITE LOCATION

The proposed site for locating the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) is on the Manhattan, Kansas, campus of Kansas State University, immediately adjacent to the Biosecurity Research Institute (BRI). The BRI is a $54 million research/education facility having biosafety level 3 (BSL-3), BSL-3 Enhanced (BSL-3E), and BSL-3 Agriculture (BSL-3Ag) state-of-the-art research space. The site borders on the research laboratories and teaching hospital of the Kansas State University College of Veterinary Medicine. Adjacent land is available for pasturing animals.

The Kansas legislature has passed a bill authorizing the transfer of all or part of a tract of land located in township ten (10) south, range eight (8) east of the sixth (6th) Principal Meridian in Riley County, Kansas. The total acreage is just less than 45 acres when the land containing the BRI is subtracted.

COMPLEMENTARY RESEARCH AND WORKFORCE

HBAC is a unique combination of research universities, research institutes and hospitals, subject-matter experts, and leading firms in the bioscience industry – all capable of providing a collaborative, enriched, and valuable environment for the NBAF. A spectrum of activities comprises the lifecycle of bioscience/biomedical innovation, including basic research, discovery, validation, Good Labor Practices (GLP) manufacturing, government regulatory issues, clinical trials, in-hospital diagnostic support, and defined outcomes. HBAC and the Kansas City region have adopted a one-medicine/one-health approach which links the animal health and the human health communities in a joint search for answers to intriguing health and bioscience questions. This approach is particularly relevant to biodefense and emerging infectious disease research for several important
reasons. First, many of the emerging diseases are zoonotic in nature, and these diseases pose real threats not only in the food animal and wildlife arenas, but on the human health side as well. Second, solutions to the problems in both animal health and human health require a fundamental understanding of the same basic principles of disease physiology and require the same tools and technology to bring the solutions from concepts to reality.

HBAC is in a region rich in animal infectious disease research, pharmaceutical production, and workforce availability. The Kansas City bioscience industry is an internationally-recognized leader in the animal health arena. Its strength is in its numbers: the region is home to 165 life science companies, with 37 focused on protecting and securing animal health. Within the $14.5 billion animal health industry, more than 40 percent of the U.S. sales and 26 percent of worldwide sales are those of companies having a presence in the Kansas City area. There is a major focus on research and development, GLP/Good Manufacturing Practices(GMP) manufacturing, and translation into the marketplace. More than 5,000 animal health workers provide a uniquely skilled workforce.

AVAILABLE SITE INFRASTRUCTURE

Utilities available to the site include water, electricity, sewer, telecommunications, and natural gas. The site is within 1,000 feet of a fire station and within 1 mile of a hospital having emergency room service. Adjacent to the site is the Kansas State University Research Park, allowing co-location of industrial research facilities as the NBAF matures. The Biosecurity Research Institute and the College of Veterinary Medicine ensure a critical neighboring mass of infectious disease research.
The Texas Biological and Agro-Defense Consortium (TBAC) is a collection of stakeholders formed to bring the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) to San Antonio. Members of the TBAC include the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research (SFBR), the University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA), the University of Texas Health Science Center, San Antonio (UTHSCSA), Brooks Development Authority (BDA), and the Texas Research & Technology Foundation (TRTF).

SFBR is a leading independent biomedical research institution, home to the Southwest National Primate Research Center, which includes the capacity for non-human primate studies in biosafety level 4 (BSL-4), and a veterinary technical staff experienced in the management and use of nonhuman primates ranging from chimpanzees to marmosets.

UTSA has created several research centers and institutes which have formed collaborative programs with institutions and private research entities. A number of research programs are focused on parasitic and fungal disease, biotechnology problems of national strategic need, including detection and analysis of influenza, genomic sequencing of biothreat agents and novel vaccine development.

UTHSCSA is home to numerous research programs focused on established and emerging infectious diseases caused by parasitic, fungal, viral, and bacterial pathogens. A significant number of these programs in the Department of Microbiology and Immunology focus on potential bioterror threats related to the NBAF mission.

TRTF owns and operates the 1,236-acre Texas Research Park (TRP). TRTF is a 501(c)(3) non-profit innovation-based economic developer for San Antonio and South Texas.

The San Antonio site alternative is located on 100 acres within the TRP, Bexar and Medina Counties. The TRP site is part of a former working ranch that was donated to TRTF in 1986. The TRP is approximately four miles west of the City of San Antonio; it is in its extra-territorial jurisdiction, and it is a Designated Industrial District of the City.

San Antonio is home to a comprehensive research community with ongoing research programs related to the NBAF mission. The bioscience and healthcare industry sector is the largest economic generator in the community. The TRP site is within proximity of skilled research and technical staff with expertise in design, construction, and operations conducted at biological and agricultural research facilities.

Available site utilities are adjacent to the TRP site with capacities that meet or exceed NBAF requirements. Facilities to increase water capacity are currently under construction, as is a 200-megawatt electrical substation in the TRP. Natural gas capacity is more than adequate for the NBAF and future resident tenant needs. Existing wastewater lines are adequate, and planned upgrades would service the NBAF and future tenant needs.

Transportation arteries are adjacent and nearby the TRP and the alternative site. The TRP fronts on State Highway 211 (Texas Research Parkway). To the south, State Highway 211 connects to U.S. Highway 90 approximately two miles from the TRP. To the north, State Highway 211 intersects with State Highway 1957.
(Potranco Road) and will be extended northward within four years to connect to the northwest segment of State Highway 211.
**CONSORCIO**

*Texas Biological and Agro-Defense Consortium* (TBAC), Consorcio Biológico y de Agro-Defensa, esta compuesta para traer la facilidad Biológica y de Agro-Defensa Nacional (NBAF) a San Antonio. Los Miembros del TBAC incluyen: *Southwest Foundation for Biological Research* (SFBR), la Fundación Southwest para la Investigación Biomédica, *University of Texas at San Antonio* (UTSA), La Universidad de Texas en San Antonio, *University of Texas Health Science Center, San Antonio* (UTHSCSA), El Centro de la Ciencia de la Salud de la Universidad de Texas en San Antonio, *Brooks Development Authority* (BDA), la Autoridad del Desarrollo de Brooks, y *Texas Research and Technology Foundation* (TRTF), La Investigación y Fundación de Tecnología de Texas.

SFBR es una institución de investigación Biomédica independiente, hogar al Centro de Investigación Nacional Southwest, que incluye la capacidad para los estudios sin primates humanos en el nivel de la seguridad biológica 4 (BSL-4), y un personal técnico veterinario experimentado en la gerencia y el uso de primates no humanos que se extienden de chimpancés a los marmosetes.

UTSA ha creado a varios centros e institutos de investigación que han formado programas de colaboración con las instituciones y las entidades privadas de la investigación. Un numero de programas de investigación están enfocadas en parásitos y fungicida, problemas en biotecnología de la necesidad estratégica nacional, incluyendo la detección y el análisis de la gripe, secuencia de agentes amenazadores y el desarrollo vaccíneo.

UTHSCSA es reconocido por los programas de investigación centrados en las enfermedades infecciosas establecidas como las que se pueden desarrollar por causa de parásitos, fungicidas, virales, y bacterias. Un numero significativo de estos programas en el departamento de microbiología y la inmunología se centran en amenazas potenciales terroristas, esto esta relacionado con la misión de NBAF.

TRTF posee y opera 1,236 acres. TRTF es 501(c)(3) organización sin fines de lucro en San Antonio y el Sur de Texas.

**PROPUESTA DE UBICACIÓN DEL SITIO DE NBAF**

El sitio alternativo de San Antonio está situado en 100 acres dentro del *Texas Research Park* (TRP), Parque de Investigación de Texas, y dentro de los condados de Bexar y Medina. Este sitio anteriormente fue un rancho de trabajo que fue donado a TRTF en 1986. TRP, está aproximadamente 4 millas al oeste de la ciudad de San Antonio. Este es un distrito industrial señalado de la ciudad.

**INVESTIGACIÓN Y MANO DE OBRA**

San Antonio es reconocido por una comunidad de investigación comprensiva con programas de investigación en cursos relacionados con la misión de NBAF. El sector industrial de la ciencia biológica y del cuidado medico es el generador económico más grande de la comunidad. El sitio de TRP esta dentro de proximidad de la investigación expelia y del personal técnico con maestría en diseño, construcción, y operaciones conducidas en las instalaciones de investigación biológica y agrícola.

**INFRAESTRUCTURA DISPONIBLE DEL SITIO**

Las utilidades disponibles del sitio están adyacente al sitio de TRP con las capacidades que cumplen o exceden los requisitos de NBAF. Las instalaciones para aumentar la capacidad del agua están actualmente bajo construcción, al igual que una subestación electrica de 200 megavatios en el TRP. La capacidad del gas natural es más que adecuada para el NBAF y las necesidades de futuros residentes.
Las arterias del transporte están adyacentes y cerca de TRP. El sitio alternativo se encuentra en la carretera del estado 211 o Texas Research Parkway. Con el Sur, la carretera de estado 211, conecta con la carretera 90 de EE. UU., aproximadamente 2 millas del TRP. Al Norte se encuentra una intersección de la calle Potranco. Esta será extendida hacia el Norte en el plazo de cuatro años para conectar el segmento del Noroeste de la carretera 211.
CONSORTIUM

The North Carolina Consortium for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) is a statewide public-private partnership. Academic members include two land-grant agriculture universities, a veterinary college, three medical institutions (two with public health components), and the North Carolina (NC) Community College Bionetwork. Government participants include federal, state and local officials, in addition to the North Carolina Departments of Agriculture, Health, Commerce, Environment, and Crime Control. Agriculture is represented by our major livestock associations (beef, dairy, poultry, and swine), the NC Farm Bureau, and the NC Agribusiness Council. Biotechnology is represented by non-profit groups promoting biotechnology statewide, and by private sector members in biological research and development, vaccine manufacturing, diagnostics, and similar fields.

PROPOSED NBAF SITE LOCATION

The proposed site comprises 195 acres in the Granville County portion of the 4,035-acre NC Department of Agriculture Umstead Research Farm (URF). The parcel is unimproved land that was partially logged in 2000. There is a 54-acre area on the northeast side available for expansion, although there are other expansion options available within the farm. URF neighbors include the NC Department of Health and Human Services, a National Guard facility, NC State University, and federal, county, and state entities.

Four large universities, the Research Triangle Park, the Eastern Regional Offices of U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service-Veterinary Services (APHIS-VS), and state agencies, are within a 25- to 45-minute drive. The site’s proximity to nationally ranked research universities, the Triangle area’s private sector, our agriculture resources, and government facilities, offers opportunities for synergies, communications, collaborations, and efficiencies that make it highly attractive.

COMPLEMENTARY RESEARCH AND WORKFORCE

The Triangle region, and the state, have garnered multiple awards and continuous recognition for its depth in science and engineering. This strength is generated by its research universities and community college training programs, and is enhanced by its extensive science and technology-based private sector, supported by science- and engineering-friendly communities. The Research Triangle region of North Carolina, within which the URF is centrally located, is a national resource in health, engineering, general science, and technology research. In the past few years, North Carolina ranked 7th and 15th nationally for total National Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation research funding. The Consortium also excels at moving research into the
Resources are plentiful. Based on a quick survey, it is estimated that in the Research Triangle Park and immediate vicinity, private sector companies with at least 20-percent research laboratory space have nearly 8.6 million square feet of research laboratory space dedicated to addressing NBAF relevant issues. Note this does not include the large federal (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences), state (NC Agriculture, Environment, and Public Health), or university facilities.

The availability of highly trained workers extends across NBAF workforce needs, starting with construction and design workforce availability. From 2003 to 2006, the Research Triangle Regional Partnership projected a Triangle area three-year track of $800 million in biotechnology construction projects employing over 15,000 workers. North Carolina has approximately 30 architecture/engineering companies, and as many contractor companies, with a total of more than 1,500 employees with expertise in laboratory planning. At least five national architecture/engineering firms with experience in high biocontainment facilities have offices and employees in the area, with yet another moving to the Triangle this year. The workforce availability also includes those in the technical life science disciplines. Nearly half of North Carolina’s 48,000 bioscience-related business employees work in the Triangle area. Approximately 10,000 employees work for pharmaceutical companies statewide carrying out aseptic manufacturing operations at the highest standards.

The workforce pipeline in North Carolina is also formidable. Central to this is the NC Community College System’s (NCCCS) BioNetwork, a statewide program offering training from short courses and certificates through associate degree programs in biomanufacturing, biotechnology, and facility validation for life science technical, design, and construction workers. Statewide, during past three years nearly 2,850 students were enrolled in NCCCS biotechnology programs. For the academic year ending in 2005, over 1,200 more enrolled in relevant continuing education courses. In addition, the University of North Carolina system provides advanced training and facilities in these areas throughout the state. During the 2005-2006 academic year, NC institutions conferred nearly 8,000 bachelor’s and graduate degrees in NBAF relevant areas.

**AVAILABLE SITE INFRASTRUCTURE**

A major interstate highway (Interstate 85) is within three miles of the site, and connects with Interstates 40 and 95. Service spurs for the Norfolk-Southern Railroad exist in Butner, approximately three miles south. The Raleigh-Durham International airport is less than 25 miles away, and the Piedmont-Triad International airport is just over an hour drive from the proposed site. Public safety is managed by the NC Department of Crime Control & Public Safety, which offers the formidable resources of state-level security and protection to the NBAF site.

Power is supplied by Duke Energy Corporation (also supplies power to the Research Triangle Park), and would be able to provide any load demand to the NBAF. Natural gas is supplied by Public Service Company of North Carolina, a regulated public utility serving over 400,000 customers throughout a 28-county area.

Telephone and telecommunications is supplied locally by the town of Butner and/or the NC Department of Health and Human Services. Business telephone service is offered by Sprint/Embarq, and multiple cellular companies cover the area. Telecommunications availability includes the T1 service at the John Umstead Hospital in Butner, as well as regular commercial services via several private companies.

Water and sewer service is supplied by the South Granville Water and Sewer Authority. It has an operating water and sewer capacity of three million gallons per day (MGD) and five MGD, respectively, and is operating at approximately 50 percent capacity. Power, water, and communications are currently supplied throughout and around the URF, allowing several options for bringing service to the proposed site.
CONSORTIUM

The Georgia Consortium for Health and Agro-Security is headed by Governor Sonny Perdue, a veterinarian who appreciates the threats to Georgia’s citizenry and economy posed by zoonotic diseases, along with Senators Saxby Chambliss and Johnny Isakson. The consortium includes our Congressional delegation, Department of Economic Development, the Board of Regents and Chancellor of the University System of Georgia (USG), the state’s research universities and Georgia Research Alliance (GRA); Mayor Heidi Davison and other state and regional government leaders and agencies; Georgia Department of Agriculture and a coalition of Georgia’s agricultural associations and stakeholder groups formed to attract the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF); Georgia Power, Merial and other companies; private/non-profit biomedical and health agencies; local and state economic development foundations and chambers of commerce; Georgia’s Department of Technical and Adult Education (DTAE) and Athens Technical College; the Office of Homeland Security/Georgia Emergency Management Agency; local health officials, including the CEOs of Athens Regional and St. Mary’s hospitals. The University of Georgia (UGA) has provided leadership and will have close ties to the NBAF and serve as its local host.

PROPOSED NBAF SITE LOCATION

The proposed site is a 67-acre parcel owned by UGA located southwest of the intersection of South Milledge Avenue and Whitehall Road in Athens-Clarke County, Georgia. It is located behind the UGA Livestock Instructional Arena and is used as horse pasture. The site, currently known as a portion of Tax Map Parcel No. 18-3-010, is surrounded by a large tract of UGA property. There are no adjacent neighborhoods. The title to the property is vested in the USG Board of Regents, which will deed the property to the federal government if the site is selected for construction of the NBAF.

COMPLEMENTARY RESEARCH AND WORKFORCE

UGA excels in research relevant to the NBAF, with prominent programs in livestock and wildlife health and disease surveillance, global emerging infectious diseases, microbiological food safety and agro-security. UGA has new initiatives in public health, and with the Medical College of Georgia is planning a new Athens’ medical campus to open in 2009. It has made major investments in relevant research infrastructure, including the Paul Coverdell Biomedical and Health Sciences Center and the Animal Health Research Center, and has a history of productive interactions with university, federal and industrial partners. Also in Athens, Merial – a world-leading producer of animal health care products – has expertise in vaccine production that would greatly assist the NBAF, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Agricultural Research Service (ARS) Southeast Poultry Research Lab is a principal repository of national expertise in avian influenza. A major pharmaceutical company is considering Athens as one of two sites for construction of a major pandemic vaccine production facility, which would dovetail perfectly with the mission of the NBAF.

The Athens site would locate the NBAF an hour away from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the world’s health sentinel, which responds to emerging infectious diseases and thus would naturally interact with the NBAF. Also in Atlanta, Emory’s School of Medicine and School of Public Health are world class and offer vaccine and infectious disease research programs that are among the nation’s best. Additionally, Georgia Tech is increasing its biomedical programs and offers state-of-the-art engineering solutions to diagnostic and therapeutic problems, and Georgia State has a National Resource Center for Viral Immunology. Collectively, these Athens-Atlanta assets offer the NBAF the best potential to respond to natural pandemic or bioterror threats in a robust, well-coordinated fashion.

Other features distinguish the research environment offered by an Athens location. Building on strengths identified by outside consultants, the Georgia Research Alliance recently received the first $10 million
installment on a major, multi-year state investment in vaccine and anti-viral research infrastructure. The Georgia life science industry is booming and now ranks 7th in the United States for number of companies. And, Georgia has invested statewide in specialized containment facilities for infectious disease research – from biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) facilities at the CDC and Georgia State in Atlanta to the BSL-3-Ag facilities at the USDA, and the near-completed UGA Animal Health Research Center in Athens. Thus, Georgia has ample high-containment design, building and operations expertise, and it also offers relatively low building costs in a national comparison.

Athens provides an attractive location in which to recruit scientific staff, and the state provides a robust and customizable pipeline for workforce recruitment and training. The USG graduates over 7,000 bio-/health science majors per year and Georgia offers state-of-the-art programs for tailored workforce recruitment. DTAE and Athens Technical College, in particular, provide a range of biotechnology workforce training, and DTAE’s nationally recognized Quickstart program allow for customization of workforce training to meet specific NBAF needs. This commitment and array of unique programs ensures the availability of a well-trained and sustainable NBAF workforce.

**AVAILABLE SITE INFRASTRUCTURE**

Athens-Clarke County (ACC) has ample water and sewer capacity to serve the NBAF. ACC can withdraw 35 million gallons per day (MGD) from Bear Creek reservoir and another 28 MGD from the North and Middle Oconee Rivers. The ACC water treatment facility can treat 28 MGD but will be upgraded and expanded to 32 MGD by 2008. ACC’s existing peak-day water demand is 26 MGD. An 8-inch water line is accessible on South Milledge Avenue, but will be upgraded to a 12-inch line to better serve the NBAF. There are no sewer lines close to the proposed site, hence a force main will be installed along South Milledge Avenue and waste pumped via an onsite lift station to the ACC’s Middle Oconee Wastewater Treatment Facility (about three miles away). Currently, the facility has a capacity of 6 MGD with an existing demand of 3.5 MGD. The facility will be upgraded and expanded to 10 MGD by 2012. Georgia Power will provide electrical service from two separate substations through existing electrical distribution infrastructure, mitigating transient power loss.

The site is located 1.5 miles from the Athens Perimeter (Loop 10), a four-lane bypass that quickly connects to Atlanta and Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport via Georgia Route 316, or to Interstate 20 or 85 via U.S. Route 441.
The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) has been protecting America’s livestock from foreign (not present in the United States) animal diseases for more than 50 years.

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has operational oversight of PIADC. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Agricultural Research Service (ARS) conducts basic and applied research to formulate better countermeasures against foreign animal diseases. The USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) conducts diagnostic testing and maintains the North American Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank. The DHS Targeted Advanced Development (TAD) group is focused on expediting the development of promising countermeasures such as vaccines and antivirals.

PIADC began in 1954 when the island, which was owned by the Army, was turned over to the Agriculture Department to establish a research center dedicated to the study of foot and mouth disease in response to outbreaks of the disease in Canada and Mexico.

PIADC is currently the only place in the United States where research work can be performed with live foot and mouth disease virus. PIADC operates biosafety level 3 agriculture (BSL-3 Ag), BSL-3 and BSL-2 laboratory facilities.

**PROPOSED NBAF SITE LOCATION**

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires that federal agencies consider a no action alternative in addition to a range of reasonable alternatives for implementing a proposed action in an environmental impact statement (EIS). The proposed action is to build the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) to fill an identified gap in the nation’s coordinated biodefense strategy. The NBAF would provide a safe and secure BSL-4 facility in which basic research, diagnostic development and validation, diagnostic testing, advanced countermeasure development, and training for high-consequence livestock disease can occur. PIADC is the no action alternative (i.e., maintain current research capability at BSL-3 and do not proceed with the proposed NBAF). PIADC is also considered a reasonable alternative and will be evaluated in the NBAF EIS based on the fact that Plum Island currently performs much of the research with an existing workforce that assesses potential threats to animals from foreign animal diseases. In addition, the federal government already owns and controls the property on which PIADC is located.

The existing facility on Plum Island is more than 50 years old, is too small to accommodate the expanded USDA and DHS mission research, and does not have BSL-4 capabilities. The proposed NBAF would be constructed and operated on approximately 30 acres in the vicinity of the existing facility. Plum Island is an 840-acre island that lies 1.5 miles from Orient Point, New York, and 9 miles from Old Saybrook, Connecticut.

**COMPLEMENTARY RESEARCH AND WORKFORCE**

More than 300 employees from DHS, USDA and contracting companies work together at PIADC to support the crucial shared mission of providing the nation’s first defense against foreign animal diseases.
DHS’s TAD unit partners with the USDA ARS, academia, and industry scientists to deliver promising vaccines and antivirals to USDA for licensing and inclusion in the USDA APHIS National Veterinary Stockpile.

USDA ARS performs basic and applied research to formulate better countermeasures against foreign animal diseases, including strategies for prevention, control and recovery. ARS focuses on developing faster-acting vaccines and antivirals to be used during outbreaks to stop or limit transmission. Antivirals prevent infection while vaccine immunity develops. Primary research is conducted on foot and mouth disease, classical swine fever and vesicular stomatitis virus.

USDA APHIS operates the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, an internationally recognized facility performing diagnostic testing of samples collected from U.S. livestock. APHIS also tests animals and animal products being imported into the United States. APHIS maintains the North American Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank at PIADC.

Since 1971, APHIS has hosted the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic (FADD) schools to train federal, state and foreign national veterinarians and laboratory diagnostic staff, military veterinarians and veterinary school faculty on foreign animal diseases. These hands-on courses allow students the unique opportunity to observe first-hand the signs of foreign animal diseases. They also instruct students on sample collection and submission in the event of a suspected foreign animal disease outbreak. By 2006, PIADC had run its 116th FADD school and had educated more than 3,000 participants.

Operations and support staff include personnel in administration, engineering, environmental protection, security, safety and occupational health, information technology, emergency services (fire and emergency medical technicians), transportation management, grounds maintenance, finance, purchasing, hospitality, maintenance, and public affairs.

**AVAILABLE SITE INFRASTRUCTURE**

As the sole occupant of Plum Island, the center operates what could be considered a small city to support the facility’s infrastructure and operations. In addition to the biocontainment research facility, PIADC infrastructure facilities include a power plant, back-up generators, fire house, waste water treatment plant, and a freshwater supply system. Transportation to the island is provided by government ferries running from Orient Point, New York, and Old Saybrook, Connecticut. Transportation on the island is provided by a motor pool of government-supplied vehicles including buses, vans and security vehicles.

Relationships and mutual aid agreements exist with local police, fire and emergency services. Federal Protective Services staff stationed at PIADC augment the security forces staffing and provides additional capabilities (e.g., arrest authority).

Airports within proximity of Plum Island include Bradley International near Hartford, Connecticut, and McArthur Airport in Islip, New York.
NOTE: The posters have been scaled to print on standard-size (8½ x 11) paper, making some of the text illegible when printed.
An environmental impact statement (EIS) is a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) document that analyzes the environmental impacts that could result from implementation of a proposed action and alternatives.

Why Is an EIS Being Prepared?
NEPA requires federal agencies to conduct an EIS for major federal actions that could have significant impacts on the environment. Under NEPA, “environment” includes the natural and physical environment (such as air, water, geography, geology), as well as people’s relationship with the environment (such as health, safety, jobs, schools, housing, and aesthetics). An EIS looks at both short-term and long-term effects and considers possible mitigation measures, if applicable.

The EIS Process
An EIS is prepared in a series of steps: gathering government and public comments to define the issues that should be analyzed in the EIS (known as “scoping”); preparing the draft EIS; receiving and responding to public comments on the draft EIS; and preparing the final EIS. Decisions are not made in an EIS; rather, the EIS analysis is one of several factors decisionmakers consider. The decisions are announced in the Record of Decision (ROD) after the final EIS has been published.

Scoping (Public Input)
A federal agency begins the scoping period for an EIS by publishing a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the Federal Register to let the public know that it is considering an action and will prepare an EIS. The NOI describes the proposed action and may provide background information on issues and potential impacts. During the scoping period, the public can provide comments on the proposed action, alternatives, issues, and potential environmental impacts to be analyzed in the EIS. Scoping may involve public meetings and other means to obtain public comments on the EIS.

The NOI for the NBAF EIS was published on July 31, 2007.

Draft EIS (Public Input)
Preparation of the draft EIS is the next step in the process. The draft EIS presents, analyzes, and compares the potential environmental impacts for the proposed action and alternatives and their implementation, and provides additional information on the methodologies and assumptions used for the analyses. The draft EIS is made available for public review and comment. Public comments on the draft EIS are considered in the preparation of the final EIS.

The draft NBAF EIS is scheduled for spring 2008.

Final EIS
Following the public comment period on the draft EIS, a final EIS is prepared and distributed. Responses to public comments are included in this document.

Record of Decision (ROD)
After the final EIS is published, a minimum 30-day waiting period is required before a ROD can be issued. The ROD notifies the public of the decisions made on the proposed action and the reasons for those decisions. The decisionmaking process may include consideration of factors such as cost, technical feasibility, agency statutory missions, and national objectives, as well as the potential environmental impacts of an action. No action can be taken until the decision has been made public and the ROD is published in the Federal Register.
Biosafety Levels (BSL)

- There are four levels of biosafety used to designate and regulate lab work with microorganisms.
- Each level is designed to prevent lab-acquired infections and to protect the environment from potentially hazardous agents.
- The higher the level of the biosafety lab, the more stringent the level of protection required to work in these areas.

Research in BSL-2, BSL-3 and BSL-3Ag Laboratories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Biosafety Level</th>
<th>Agents</th>
<th>Practices</th>
<th>Safety Equipment</th>
<th>Facilities</th>
<th>Locations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSL-1</td>
<td>These agents are not generally associated with disease in healthy people.</td>
<td>- Good microbiological practice</td>
<td>- Pipetting devices and lab coats</td>
<td>- High school and collegiate-level teaching and training of scientists and staff</td>
<td>- Research institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSL-2</td>
<td>NBAF would study animal diseases and the agents that cause them. These agents are associated with human diseases (i.e., research at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC]).</td>
<td>- BSL-3 practices plus:</td>
<td>- Class I or II Biological Safety Cabinets (BSCs) or other physical containment devices</td>
<td>- Open-handhold</td>
<td>- Medical and veterinary schools, research institutions, essentially all hospitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSL-3</td>
<td>NBAF would study animal diseases and the agents that cause them. These agents are associated with human diseases and cause illness by spreading through the air (aerosol) (i.e., research at the CDC/National Institutes of Health [NIH]).</td>
<td>- BSL-3 practices plus:</td>
<td>- Class I or II Biological Safety Cabinets (BSCs) or other physical containment devices</td>
<td>- Open-handhold</td>
<td>- Medical and veterinary schools, research institutions, essentially all hospitals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSL-4</td>
<td>NBAF would study animal diseases and the agents that cause them. These agents are associated with human diseases and cause illness by spreading through the air (aerosol) or have unknown mode of transmission (i.e., research at the CDC/NIH).</td>
<td>- BSL-3 practices plus:</td>
<td>- All procedures conducted in Class I, II, III, or IV Biological Safety Cabinets (BSCs) or other physical containment devices</td>
<td>- Open-handhold</td>
<td>- Medical and veterinary schools, research institutions, essentially all hospitals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


BSL-4 Laboratory and Animal Suites

Approximately 10 percent of the NBAF would be designed for BSL-4 research.
Mission
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service-Veterinary Services (APHIS-VS), and the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) are expanding their missions to ensure protection of the nation’s livestock and, thereby, public health.

Goal
The proposed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) would meet the requirements identified in Homeland Security Presidential Directives 9 and 10 and would provide an integrated facility for studying foreign animal and zoonotic diseases (transmitted from animals to human beings).

Design
The NBAF would provide a safe and secure facility in which basic research, diagnostic development and validation, diagnostic testing, advanced countermeasure development, and training for high-consequence livestock diseases can occur. Approximately 10 percent of the 520,000 square foot NBAF would be designed for biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) research. This would allow directed research on diseases not previously well characterized.

The NBAF would:
Research high-consequence biological threats involving foreign animal and zoonotic diseases. The new and unique government biocontainment infrastructure would:
• integrate those aspects of public and animal health research that have been determined to be central to national security;
• assess and research evolving bioterrorism threats over the next five decades; and
• enable DHS and USDA to fulfill their integrated homeland defense research, development, testing, and evaluation responsibilities.

Research
DHS and USDA have identified the following diseases that would potentially be studied at the NBAF. This list may change based upon continued evaluation of risks to the U.S. agriculture system.

• Foot and Mouth Disease
• Classical Swine Fever
• African Swine Fever
• Rift Valley Fever
• Japanese Encephalitis Virus
• Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia

Diseases Studied in BSL-4 Facilities
• Nipah Virus
• Hendra Virus

Research Focus
Research performed at the NBAF would include basic discovery and countermeasure development, advanced countermeasure development (in collaboration with industry), and diagnostic assay development and validation. In some cases, researchers would study a disease to determine:
• the mechanism it uses to enter animals,
• the type cell the disease affects, and the effects the disease causes on the cell;
• how to develop countermeasures to help animals develop protection against the disease, and
• how quickly animals can become protected from the disease after they are vaccinated.
In a joint activity with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed the requirements for a next-generation biological and agricultural defense facility to enhance and protect the nation’s agriculture and public health. The work planned for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) would address biological and agricultural national security risks by co-locating scientists from several federal agencies in a state-of-the-art biocontainment facility.

DHS held a competitive process by soliciting Expressions of Interest (EOI) to select a potential site for the NBAF. A multi-agency (DHS, USDA, HHS and the Department of Defense), multi-disciplinary (engineers, scientists, lawyers, academics and communicators) team was formed to review submissions.

- EOI was published January 19, 2006, in the Federal Register.
- 29 EOI submissions were received recommending potential sites for the NBAF.
- EOI submissions were evaluated against four criteria:
  - proximity to research capabilities,
  - proximity to workforce,
  - acquisition/construction/operations, and
  - community acceptance.
- Evaluation resulted in 18 potential sites in 11 states announced in August 2006.
- Additional information was requested before DHS conducted sites visits in April and May 2007.

The final site alternatives selected for evaluation in the NBAF Environmental Impact Statement are:

- South Milledge Avenue Site; Athens, Georgia
- Manhattan Campus Site; Manhattan, Kansas
- Flora Industrial Park Site; Flora, Mississippi
- Plum Island Site; Plum Island, New York
- Umstead Research Farm Site; Butner, North Carolina
- Texas Research Park Site; San Antonio, Texas
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has identified six reasonable alternative sites to evaluate in the environmental impact statement (EIS) for the construction and operation of the proposed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF):

**South Milledge Avenue Site; Athens, Georgia**
This alternative would locate the NBAF on the campus of the University of Georgia Whitehall Farm.

**Manhattan Campus Site; Manhattan, Kansas**
This alternative would locate the NBAF within the Kansas City Animal Health Corridor on the Kansas State University Campus.

**Flora Industrial Park Site; Flora, Mississippi**
This alternative would locate the NBAF in the Flora Industrial Park in Madison County, Mississippi.

**Plum Island Site; Plum Island, New York**
This alternative would locate the NBAF on the same federally owned property as the existing Plum Island Animal Disease Facility (PIADC) off the northeastern tip of Long Island.

**Umstead Research Farm Site; Butner, North Carolina**
This alternative would locate the NBAF on the Umstead Research Farm site, which is owned by the State of North Carolina and managed by the North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Research Stations Division.

**Texas Research Park Site; San Antonio, Texas**
This alternative would locate the NBAF in the Texas Research Park in San Antonio, Texas, on land owned by the Texas Research and Technology Foundation.

Public input during the scoping period may result in the identification of other alternatives to be evaluated in the NBAF EIS.
The nation’s first defense against foreign animal disease

Since 1954, Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) has been protecting America’s livestock from foreign animal diseases.

DHS and USDA Safeguarding Livestock

At PIADC, DHS and USDA work together in a crucial shared mission.

USDA Agricultural Research Service performs basic and applied research to formulate better countermeasures against foreign animal diseases, including strategies for prevention, control and recovery.

DHS’s Targeted Advanced Development unit partners with USDA Agricultural Research Service, academia and industry to deliver promising vaccines and antiviral biotherapeutics to the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services for licensure and inclusion in the USDA National Veterinary Stockpile.

USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services operate the Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory, an internationally recognized facility performing diagnostic testing of samples collected from U.S. livestock.

Our Mission

Research and Development. PIADC’s research program includes developing diagnostic surveillance tools and vaccines, as well as antiviral biotherapeutics for foot and mouth disease and other high-threat foreign diseases of livestock.

Diagnostics. Laboratory staff conduct more than 20,000 diagnostic tests a year on suspect foreign animal disease samples.

Education. Since 1971, PIADC has educated more than 3,500 veterinarians and pathologists in foreign animal diseases.
I. Program Overview (7:00 - 7:30 p.m.)

• Presentation by the NBAF Program Manager.

II. Informal Questions and Answers (7:30 - 8:00 p.m.)

• Clarifying questions on the presentation, NBAF EIS, and NEPA process.

• Questions and answers will not be recorded and will not be part of the official record.

III. Formal Comments (8:00 - 10:00 p.m.)

• The moderator will call on commentors in the order they signed up (pre-registration takes precedence).

• Commentors will come to the microphone, state their name and organization, if so desired, for the record.

• Time permitting, others may provide comment.

• Comments will be recorded by the court reporter.

NOTE: Times are approximate and are subject to change based on meeting attendance levels.