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Release Date: January 9, 2007
For Immediate Release
Office of the Presss Secretary
Contact: 202-828-8010
Secretary Chertoff: Good morning, everybody. I'm joined here at the podium by Under Secretary George Foresman, who is the Under Secretary for Preparedness, Rear Admiral Brian Salerno, the Director of Inspections and Compliance at the U.S. Coast Guard, and Robert Jamison, who is the Deputy Director of the Transportation Safety Administration.
Last Friday we announced the Homeland Security grant program eligibility for the 2007 fiscal year, which includes $1.7 billion in overall grants to state and local partners for counterterrorism-related efforts.
Today we're announcing another critical grant program, the Infrastructure Protection Program. This program provides $445 million targeted to state and local partners specifically for the protection of critical infrastructure. That includes seaports, mass transit systems, chemical and nuclear facilities, passenger rail and highways.
Protecting this transportation infrastructure has been a top priority for President Bush and for our Department since our inception. Since September 11th, we've taken significant, indeed unprecedented steps to protect critical infrastructure working with state and local governments, as well as with the people who actually own and operate the vast majority of the nation's infrastructure assets -- the private sector.
Let me talk a little bit about some of the progress we've made to date as a backdrop to today's grant announcement. We've assessed risk at literally tens of thousands of critical infrastructure sites. Facilities and security plans have been analyzed in terms of threats, vulnerabilities and the potential consequences of attacks.
What that means is that we have sent Homeland Security personnel from the Coast Guard, from TSA, from our Infrastructure Protection Division, as interagency partners out into the field. And what these experts have done is they've worked with the private sector to assess the sites, worked with owners and operators to develop and review security plans, test those plans, and to recommend further action to improve protective measures.
In addition to these risk assessments and the work we've done on the security plans, we've also used some of our regulatory authority. As you know, last year, Congress for the first time gave us the authority to issue regulations in the area of chemical security, and we have seized upon that authority to issue new chemical site regulations late last year.
Similarly, we've used TSA authorities to issue rail security regulations that enhance the protection against the possibility of an attack on rail cargo that would have potentially very toxic effects on the population. We've dramatically increased air cargo security, including screening of baggage and cargo on passenger planes.
We've issued a new rule on transportation worker identification and conducted over 700,000 background checks on transportation workers. And we've also taken major steps forward regulating maritime security and other elements of aviation security.
All of this is designed to, and in fact has had the effect of, increasing protection of the American public, but without damaging our economy or impeding the movement of people and goods.
Of course, our highest priority is weapons of mass destruction. And so we focused particularly on measures that enable us to detect nuclear and radiological threats at our nation's seaports and land ports of entry. By the end of this year, 2007, we will scan almost 100 percent of arriving cargo for radiation at all of our ports of entry.
Under the Secure Freight Initiative, we've also deployed -- we've also begun deploying nuclear and radiological detection equipment to six overseas ports in order to scan cargo before it reaches our shores.
We've been working with the private sector to develop and implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. This is part of one of the 9/11 recommendations. This plan outlines our key priorities and gives us a road map for elevating security and resiliency across all of the critical sectors of our national economy.
We will soon release sector-specific security plans, developing coordination with the private sector for each of these elements of the national economy. And in addition of course to the regulation and the site assessments and the protective measures we have undertaken using federal assets, we have distributed an enormous amount of money to state and local partners.
To date, focusing only on infrastructure protection, we've awarded more than $1.5 billion in IPP grants to protect critical facilities, conduct training and exercises and purchase new equipment. This is on top of the nearly $20 billion we will have provided by the end of this fiscal year for a full range of homeland security efforts.
Now let me turn specifically to the infrastructure protection grants. This year we're going to build on the prior investments we've made through an additional $445 million in infrastructure protection grants focused at port security, transit security, buffer zone security and inner city bus and trucking security. The specific grant totals this year include $201 million for the port security grant program; $171 million for the transit security grant program; $48.5 million for the buffer zone protection program, which is focused on individual items of critical infrastructure; $11.6 million for the inner city bus security program; and $11.6 million for trucking security. I'm delighted to say that funding in each of these areas has increased over fiscal year 2006 levels, including a $33 million increase in port security funding.
Now how do we decide how to allocate the money? How do we assess the risk to critical infrastructure, and then how do we set priorities? Well, we use the same philosophy I discussed when we talked about our urban area security grants last Friday. We look at threat, vulnerability and consequence across the entire nation. We use hard data and analysis that is supported by the intelligence community, by information from our federal, state and local partners, and from the owners of the critical infrastructure itself.
This year we've continued to refine and strengthen our risk analysis. We have focused on the most critical assets using the tiered approach we've used in other programs that puts the most money where the most risk is. Simply put, our goal is to put our resources where the risk is the greatest, and where the funds will have the most impact.
So what does this mean in terms of this year's grants? Well, for port security, a majority of the grant funds, $120 million, will be available to eight top tier ports or port areas that we consider to be at the highest risk. These ports are Los Angeles-Long Beach, $14.7 million; San Francisco Bay, including Richmond and Oakland, which is $11.2 million; Delaware Bay, Philadelphia, Wilmington, Delaware and Southern New Jersey, $11.3 million; New Orleans, $17.3 million; New York-New Jersey, $27.1 million; Houston-Galveston, $15.7 million; Port Arthur-Beaumont, Texas, $10 million; and Puget Sound, the Seattle-Tacoma area, $12.2 million.
One thing you'll notice is, we've continued and in fact expanded upon last year's process of clustering individual ports that are part of a region into a single funding area, to reflect the geographic proximity of the assets, the shared risk and the shared waterways. Thus, the 102 ports identified as critical this year were actually clustered into 72 areas that align with the boundaries of area maritime security that have been set by the Coast Guard.
Consistent with our risk-based approach, the ports not identified in Tier I will also be able to compete for remaining grant funds which total $80 million.
In addition to allocating the money based on risk, we've asked the port security applicants to focus on a set of specific key priorities. We want to fund projects that increase situational awareness in and around the port areas, address the significant threat improvised -- I'm sorry, posed -- by improvised explosive devices such as what we call a USS Cole-style attack caused by a small boat loaded with explosives.
We want to have them focus on expanded training and exercises, implementation of the new TWIC credential and access controls, and to make sure in general that the grants that they seek to fund support our overall national preparedness priorities.
Now let me turn to transit security. As with the port security grants, we've taken a risk tiering approach for the second year in a row with respect to transit security grants, which include intracity passenger rail and bus systems, ferries and intercity rail, Amtrak. The largest portion of the grant dollars again will be awarded to the highest risk systems and to the projects that offer the maximum return on investment to reduce risk.
This year transit agencies in eight major urban areas are eligible to receive $141 million in Tier I funds to protect intracity passenger rail and bus systems. The cities are: San Francisco Bay area, $13.8 million; Greater Los Angeles, $7 million; National Capital Region, $18.2 million; Atlanta, $3.4 million; Chicago, $12.8 million; Boston, $15.3 million; the New York-Connecticut-New Jersey tristate area, $61 million; and Philadelphia, $9.7 million.
Again, consistent with last year, another 29 jurisdictions are eligible for transit security grants as Tier II applicants.
We're also doing one thing a little bit differently this year. In the past, we've allocated specific amounts for rail and specific amounts for bus. This year we're going to combine the awards, giving the grant recipients a little more flexibility to choose where to focus their resources as between transit rail and transit bus operations.
Additionally, 19 ferry systems in 14 regions will be eligible for up to $7.8 million in funding, and Amtrak is also eligible to receive $8 million to enhance inner city passenger rail security and to coordinate its efforts with the local and regional transit systems.
With respect to transit security grants, we also, as we did with the ports, have outlined a set of targeted priorities we'd like applicants to focus on in their projects. What are these priorities?
First, we want to focus on protecting high risk and high consequence areas of transit systems, including those that travel underground or underwater. We want to focus on developing countermeasures against improvised explosive devices as well as biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear attacks.
We want to focus on using visible but unpredictable deterrence measures, such as K-9 teams, mobile detection and screening units, and behavioral observation, increased training for front-line personnel, emergency drills and exercises, and public awareness campaigns.
Let me touch briefly on three other programs that we also have funded this year. We've continued funding for two programs, the Intercity Bus Security and Trucking Security programs that deal with elevating the protection of our highway systems. Funds for both of these programs will be $11.6 million. The Intercity Bus Security program will be focused on an analysis of risk and the effectiveness of proposed investments by applicants.
And the Trucking Security program will fund the Highway Watch effort, a joint effort between the National Trucking Association and DHS to increase security, training and awareness across our nation's highways.
Finally, communities surrounding predesignated individual critical infrastructure sites are going to be funded under our continuation of our Buffer Zone Protection Program. These critical infrastructure sites, which number approximately 2,100 and do not include popcorn factories or petty zoos, deal with things such as chemical facilities, nuclear and electric power plants, dams, stadiums and other high risk infrastructure.
All sites have been selected prior to the grant announcements based on the risk to the individual site. A total of $48.5 million in BZPP grants for this fiscal year will be awarded through 46 states to continue protection activities for critical infrastructure.
Now let me make a little bit of a contrast between the way we do the grants under UASI and under the state programs which are broad-gauged grants that I announced on Friday, and the way we do grants for critical infrastructure, which are much more focused on either individual complexes of infrastructure like ports or transit systems, or as in the case of the buffer zone program, on individual, specific elements of critical infrastructure.
Under the infrastructure program, we do focus, as we do under all programs, on the highest risk. For the infrastructure programs, for the highest risk ports and transit systems that qualify under Tier I, we have already established a set amount of eligible funding based on risk. We can do that based on our past track record. But we're simply not going to give the money out with no accountability.
The individual port terminals and transit operators will have to submit an application for review before funds are released. Project proposals submitted will be reviewed and scored by subject matter experts to ensure grant funding is put to work in the most effective way.
And as we are doing with our other grants, because we have made the eligibility determinations early in the year, we'll have the opportunity to have a back-and-forth with the individual applicants, so that if there is a problem with a particular grant application or set of applications, we won't be treating it as a pass/fail exercise, but we'll have interaction with the applicants to allow them to revise their application to maximize the money that they can get, and apply it in the most efficient fashion possible.
The grant funds for those entities that are not in Tier I will be competitively awarded, again based on expert scoring of the submitted project proposals to make sure we are giving money to the proposals that reduce the risk to the greatest extent.
I've said from the very beginning of the process of dealing with grants that we have to be committed to risk management, and this year's infrastructure grants reflect an improved, rigorous, disciplined approach that places risk first and at the top of the list; that is supported by the judgments of the intelligence community; that is supported by strong data, by hard analysis and not just by anecdote; and that is I think to a greater degree than even last year, fair, transparent and customer-friendly.
The transit grants, intercity bus grants and port security grant submissions will be evaluated through a national review process that involves experienced subject matter experts from relevant federal agencies like the Coast Guard, TSA, and others who have real practical working knowledge of the security needs in these critical areas of infrastructure.
The port security grants, for example, will include a field review coordinated through the Coast Guard captain of the port to make sure projects are being prioritized based on local experience and expertise. The Transportation Security Administration will do the same thing for our bus and rail grants.
We expect to award the actual Tier I and Tier II grants this spring, once we've had that back-and-forth with the applicants and completed our evaluation.
The bottom line is we know that we cannot make the micromanagement type of decisions that are needed to protect individual items of infrastructure from D.C. What we have to do is set risk-based priorities, lay down clear measures of the kinds of capabilities that have to be in place, have a system for reviewing and analyzing plans to make sure they meet those capabilities, and then follow up with accountability to make sure that those who receive the money have in fact lived up to their promises. And we are committed to doing just that.
Today's grants reflect part of an overall package of support to state, local and private sector partners. We look forward to continuing to work with them over the next year during this process as we operate in a team approach to protect critical infrastructure and keep our nation safe from harm.
So with that, I will take some questions.
Question: Mr. Secretary, can you explain how it is that you're able to decide in advance which of the top tier cities get what money, when you don't do it for the Urban Area Security program. Your answer was "based on our past experience." Well, you had past experience in the Urban Area Security program, too. Why can you do it here and you can't do it there?
Secretary Chertoff: The Urban Area program covers a wide range of potential types of grants that communities might want to get. It's a very broad gauged program and therefore we can't really make a specific determination until we see which of the kinds of programs individual high risk communities want to pursue.
The infrastructure programs are much more focused. They're focused on particular types of infrastructure. Therefore, based on our past experience, it's a little bit easier for us to make a determination about what the presumptive award is going to be.
Now obviously it's based on the premise that the actual applications will be good applications, will have in fact plans for applying the money in a way that is consistent with our national preparedness goal and our priorities. But based on past experience and because we're dealing with a much more narrowly focused grant type of award, it is possible for us to make these presumptive determinations of what the right allocation of money is.
Question: Before you know how they're going to spend it?
Secretary Chertoff: Well, it's contingent upon a plan being presented that we're going to approve that indicates to us the money is being spent in the right way. Now one of the reasons we're doing this early this year, in fact I think six months earlier than we did last fiscal year, is because that's going to give us an opportunity to go back to them if there are issues that we have about what they propose to do and give them an opportunity to revise their plans so they can come in with something that we think is sound and that they agree with.
And we're confident that the earlier eligibility determinations and this back-and-forth process is going to deliver to these communities what they've been asking for, which is predictability but also some opportunity to have interaction as we sign off on the final grant awards.
Question: Well, just to follow up, is this another way of saying that you're sort of saying where the need is greatest to do more?
Secretary Chertoff: Where the need is greatest and where the risk is the greatest, but also always underscoring the fact that there has to be a plan to use the money in a way that actually reduces the risk and that advances the kind of capabilities that we need in order to protect Americans.
If you go back to some of the early grant awards three or four years ago, a lot of money was pushed out almost in what I would call a block-grant kind of mentality: You put the money out there, very little guidance.
Predictably, we had a rash of stories, which I still read occasionally, about communities that spent money on leather jackets or gym equipment or things of that sort. And so to move away from that kind of willy-nilly approach, we have put in place -- and I think this year really effects the maturation of that process -- a risk driven allocation of eligibility but a capabilities drive determination of what the actual grants are, so that we really make sure that the money goes for the kinds of things I think the public expects, things like situational awareness, cameras to show you where the risks are, or the tools you need in order to respond if there is an attack on a ship in a port, or what you need to do to strengthen the most vulnerable areas of your transit system against an improvised explosive devise.
And I think the combination of risk driven eligibility but a disciplined approach to making sure the grants are spent on the appropriate risk-reduction efforts delivers exactly what the American public expects.
Yes.
Question: Mr. Secretary, on another matter, if I may, Democrats currently have a bill on the House floor which, among other things, would require 100 percent scanning of sea cargo and 100 percent screening of cargo on passenger plans. Is that practical and what's your opinion of those provisions?
Secretary Chertoff: Well, let me tell you what we do. First of all, of course, we welcome Congress' continued commitment to putting into effect the 9/11 Commission recommendations. We've made a lot of progress in doing that. And to the extent we institutionalize those, that's a good thing.
We also though have to balance with reality, and we have to make sure that the approach we take not only addresses high risk but does it in a cost-effective and sensible manner. So let me talk for just a couple minutes about what we're doing with ports and with air cargo.
As I said earlier, by the end of this year, we will scan virtually 100 percent of all the containers that come through our land and sea ports for radioactive devices. We are also, following on Congress' Safe Port Act of last year, beginning to evaluate pushing this scanning activity overseas with respect to at least six ports.
The challenge is going to be though to make sure that whatever we do is workable in real life. And as the Washington Post editorial page observed today, we have to make sure that we don't mandate a system that is unworkable either because it requires us to insist that foreign ports do things that foreign countries are unwilling to do or because the physical architecture of the foreign port doesn't permit this kind of scanning.
So of course we aspire to do as much of the scanning overseas as we can. I think, though, that we want to make sure that we proceed in a way that is expeditious but measured and sensible and passes the real life test. You know, at some point rhetoric has to meet reality, and that usually happens in my department. We've got to make sure that we've met reality.
Likewise, with air cargo we issued a regulation this past year that dramatically elevated the amount of screening for air cargo. It requires all checked air cargo and passenger lines to go through baggage screening just the way passenger baggage does. It increases the requirements for consolidators who deal with shipping from manufacturers to have increased screening for explosives.
But again, we need to make sure that, as we proceed to continually elevate the level of security, we do it in a way that doesn't destroy the system itself or doesn't put requirements there that are simply not capable of being met with current technology. I mean the worst thing in the world would be a system that placed a requirement in effect that essentially resulted in ending the use of passenger planes for shipping, which I think would probably have a very, very negative impact on the airline industry.
So we're going to continue to look forward to working with Congress as they develop legislation on following up on all the recommendations of the Commission that relate to DHS, but doing it in a way that is realistic, sound and cost effective.
Question: The provisions in the bill, as they are now, are they unrealistic?
Secretary Chertoff: You know, as I said, I mean we've -- the bill was dropped yesterday. We are looking at the bill. We are working with Congress. I think I've expressed in general, not only today but in the past, my sense of the need to balance increased security with real world constraints and cost benefit. Now that's going to be our template as we work with Congress moving forward with this legislation.
Yes.
Question: Mr. Secretary, as you -- that detection at ports is of great importance to you, and part of the money should be used for that, some recent developments overseas have suggested that some agents may avoid detection because of the kind of systems that are used to detect that when it comes to chemicals of certain types. Is that a priority, and is that something you expect jurisdictions, localities, to do or is this something that your internal science people are working on or would work on?
Secretary Chertoff: Obviously, one of the critical things we worry about certainly with respect to containers is nuclear or radioactive material, and we're always working. And as I think I announced last year, we've got a contract out for the next generation in detection equipment that will allow somewhat more specific and precise detection of radioactive and nuclear materials.
When you come to chemicals, again unfortunately, a lot of the chemicals which can be used to make IEDs are garden variety chemicals that no one is going to have to ship in by container because you can buy them down at your local garden store.
There, I think we're working actually some of those who sell these chemicals as we've done traditionally in a lot of areas with respect to explosive material to make sure that we have put into place know-your-customer rules or people are alert for oddly large purchases that don't make a lot of sense. We've seen traditionally that that kind of alertness, when someone lives in an apartment in New York and buys a ton of ammonium nitrate, he'd have to have a pretty large terrace garden to use a ton of ammonium nitrate, so that's a tip off that we've got something to worry about.
So, as with anything else, there are different approaches that make sense with different kinds of threats. One size does not fit all, and a cookie cutter doesn't fit everything we have to deal with.
Question: A follow up real quick. What about the big -- chemicals that may come from states, state sponsors?
Secretary Chertoff: Well, again, depending on what the nature of the chemical is. Unfortunately many of the chemicals that are components of the most dangerous kinds of devices are readily available in the United States. So it's -- detection for example of chlorine, which is easily available here, is not something that we're spending a lot of time on with respect to containers although we do in general have a screening system for containers that is focused on all kinds of hazardous materials plus narcotics, plus other kinds of matter that we want to keep out of the country.
But precisely because of the danger about things like chlorine, we put into effect last year a much more robust system for protecting hazardous inhalation materials when they travel by rail. And we put into effect chemical security regulations to protect those kinds of chemicals when they're in the U.S.
Bottom line is different kinds of threats are presented in different ways. Sometimes the high threat is something imported from overseas. Sometimes it's something that may be available here at home. We have to tailor our approach to what the greatest risk is based on a particular type of material we're concerned about.
Yes.
Question: You mentioned earlier I think that some grant money was spent on leather jackets and gym equipment, and I'm curious to know if any of the grant money that was issued under previous IPPs was determined to be fraudulent or wasteful, and if so what was done as a result of that.
Secretary Chertoff: Well, the leather and gym equipment goes back years. This is back in the early part of -- the immediate period of time after September 11th. And I think the problem, looking back on that, was not that there was fraud; it's that the requirements were defined so broadly and so generally that anything that could be tied to homeland security in theory was eligible.
That's why we went through this fairly intense and disciplined process of defining what we call National Preparedness Goals. We'd set forth the kinds of things we want to have Homeland Security money spent on.
That's why we have this review system. I know there's sometimes a little bit of complaining about the fact that we require the grant applications to be reviewed by experts, but it's precisely for this reason. It's to make sure that we don't get a grant that says, "I'm going to get leather jackets because this really helps with homeland security," but rather it gives us an opportunity to evaluate whether the particular expenditure has been well thought out, whether it's capable in fact of being completed, and whether it really ties in a direct way to the kinds of very, very important capabilities that lie at the cornerstone of what our grant program is all about.
Question: Mr. Secretary, are you fairly well satisfied now with the mix of money here comparing transit to port to inner city, to trucking, to buffer zone? Are those areas getting about the right mix of money or should -- do you still believe there is some further work to be done here in terms of increasing, for example, transit?
Secretary Chertoff: Let me answer that in two ways. First of all, I think this is the best we've ever done. That's not to say that we can't refine it further, but I think in terms of a process that was sensible, that was risk-based, it really reflects not only a great deal of thought but some of the lessons we've learned over the last few years as well.
On the other hand, I want to step back and make a larger point, Pete. These are not entitlement programs, in the sense that when you get your social security annuity check it's the same every month and you expect to have the same. These are designed to build capabilities.
If I say I'm going to put an alarm system in my house, and I get, let's say, a grant to put that system in my house, once I've built the system, I don't expect to get the same money for the same system over and over and over again. So it's perfectly predictable that over time there's going to be some change.
As transit systems and port systems put into place these basic capabilities, we should expect that they may be getting less money in future years and some money may be going to ports that may be slightly lesser risk to give them an opportunity to raise their security higher.
The purpose of the grants is risk reduction. If we're doing our job right, we are actually giving ports and communities and transit systems the money that will begin to lower the risk of the system. And if we're doing the job right, what that should lead over the long term to is less money because there's less risk because we've driven the risk down.
So although there's a tendency I think to try to reduce this into, "how did we do this year compared to last year" and "how are we doing this year compared to next year," the point I've been trying to drive is the needs are not static. They're going to change, and one of the ways we actually reduce the need is by investing a lot up front.
So I would expect that you would continue to see some changes over time, maybe not on a year-to-year basis, but over a number of years, as we succeed in reducing some of the risk in the higher level recipients.
Question: Well, to use your house analogy, in terms of rail, for example, have we decided that a home alarm is about all we need and that we don't need to bulletproof the windows and dig a mote around the house and have a 24-hour armed guard and better lighting, you know? In other words, are we, in terms of rail security, about where we need to be?
Secretary Chertoff: Oh, no. And I'm far from saying "we're done this year, the job is done." What I am saying is this, though -- there will come a point in time, when we'll have decided that we have put enough in a particular system and perhaps nothing in another system, that we will want to say, "Well, perhaps we ought to somewhat reduce the amount in the system that has gotten the maximum amount of funding because they've got the bulletproofing, and they've got the locks, and they've got the alarm system, and we ought to put a little bit into a system that doesn't have any of that."
This is a process which will presumably go on for the foreseeable future. And what I'm simply suggesting is over time there will be probably some adjustments on a risk-based theory because the essence of the program is to reduce risk. And once we've given the highest risk systems the alarm, and the bulletproofing, and the armed guards, and all of that, it's not clear to me they'll need a second round of bulletproofing and a second round of alarm systems.
But again, this is not to suggest this work is going to be done in a year, nor that I would expect enormous fluctuations year to year. It's rather to suggest that over time one shouldn't be surprised to see some adjustments because, if we're doing it right, and we're actually improving security, that should reflect reduced vulnerability, which means reduced risk.
Thank you.
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This page was last reviewed/modified on January 9, 2007.
