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Release Date: May 15, 2007
Washington, D.C.
Secretary Chertoff: Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity and the invitation to be present here in the Parliament to address members of the [Libet] Committee and other interested observers. I also appreciate not only the remarks of Minister [Shoyblu] and Commissioner Fratini, both of whom are colleagues and friends, but also the cooperation they have demonstrated on behalf of Europe on working with the United States on a whole range of issues where we have common interests and common challenges and with which we want to continue to operate in a very close partnership to the mutual benefit of all of our people.
This is a particularly good and opportune moment to continue the ongoing discussion we've had on matters that are critical to both the United States and the European Union in terms of security. Earlier this week I had the opportunity to join the G6 Ministers in Venice to discuss some of our shared challenges with respect to preventing acts of terrorism against our countries while making sure that we continue to protect our privacy and our civil liberties. I know this is a commitment each of us shares. None of us wants to forsake our civil liberties in the name of security. On the contrary we seek security that is strong and effective but consistent with the freedoms and values we all cherish as free and democratic nations.
I also want to take the opportunity to emphasize the tremendous cooperation that we in the United States have received from our European colleagues on many fronts in dealing with this challenge of terrorism in the 21st century. We have made a lot of progress as partners and allies, united in the common purpose to defend our nations and citizens against emerging threats in the 21st Century. We have worked together to disrupt terrorist plots both in Europe and the United States. We've enhanced our security across our borders, oceans and skies. We've achieved unprecedented cooperation on a host of international initiatives. From setting standards to sharing information to boosting security at our airports and our seaports. But our work is not done. We still face many challenges.
Some of these challenges are a result of different perspectives that we have on what faces us in terms of the nature of the enemy and the appropriate response. Other challenges reflect the fact that some of the tools and legal and policy approaches that we have at our disposal are not perfectly well suited for the 21st century adversary that we now face. As my colleague and friend John Reed said a couple of days ago in Venice, we have to consider whether we need to adapt the legal tools and policy tools that have served us in the 20th century to deal with a different threat that has emerged in the 21st century.
So the question that we face is how do we move beyond our differences to achieve a new level of cooperation and understanding in areas such as information sharing, privacy and data protection? How do we achieve these goals in a way that respects our fundamental principles but also adapts so that our security goals are well served? In the end, life hangs in the balance. If we do not do our job right, we will see more innocent people perish in wanton acts of violence and terrorism as this decade continues to unfold.
So what I'd like to do is talk a little bit about what I believe are shared fundamental principles and how we approach those principles in dealing with the threat of terrorism that is before us.
I think we have to begin by asking a fundamental question, perhaps the most fundamental question. What are we fighting and why are we fighting it? In other words, what is the nature of the threat we face?
One of the unfortunate side effects of globalization in the 21st century is the globalization of terror. The same international systems that have bound our societies together – air travel, global supply, communications, and financial networks – are the same systems that terrorists seek to exploit and use against us to cause destruction on a global scale. Today's terrorists fund their operations internationally. They recruit members, they train, they plan and they carry out attacks by exploiting the gaps in the seams in our international systems. The attack of September 11th was a clear illustration of this. The plot was hatched in Central Asia, the recruits came from Saudi Arabia, the training occurred in Afghanistan, the planning occurred here in Europe, and the attack culminated, of course, in the United States with citizens from many countries including many countries represented here lost in the World Trade Center.
Our enemies are determined, they're sophisticated, and they pose a threat not only to the United States but here in Europe, in North Africa, in East Africa, in South Asia, and virtually every place around the globe.
Very recently we've seen clear and tragic evidence of the persistence of this threat in recent attacks in Algeria and Morocco, virtually on the doorstep of Europe. Earlier attacks in Madrid and London. And of course the notable failed attack this past August against transatlantic airliners departing the United Kingdom.
Just this past month a British jury convicted a number of British citizens who had plotted to use fertilizer bombs to attack a shopping mall, a night club, and other targets in London.
There is no doubt about the threat we face. There has been debate about what is an appropriate response to terrorism. Some say that terrorism is just another form of criminal activity to be dealt with in the traditional way we deal with crime. But while law enforcement techniques have some use, I cannot agree that this is the only tool that we can use in order to face this threat. I believe we are at war and that it is essential that we view the threat posed by 21st century global terrorism in the context of what it means to fight a war.
This is a different kind of war than the war we may have seen in the battlefields in the last century or in earlier centuries, and I will acknowledge it is a war that cannot be won by military might alone. It requires all of the elements of national, and dare I say international power including law enforcement, diplomacy, the use of intelligence, and soft power, the battle for ideas.
The threat that we face is not merely that of a criminal gang or conspiracy. It is an ideological threat. A threat born by ideological extremists who seek to advance a totalitarian vision through the use of terrorism. Al-Qaeda and the other groups who have affiliated with it have a world view, a world vision, one that is notably different from that of political terrorists in the past and is distinct from some of the regionally focused terrorist groups that you're familiar with here in Europe.
Again, some have said that al-Qaeda and similar ideological extremist groups are just a variation on the familiar political terrorists that we've seen in earlier places and earlier times, but I would direct you to recent comments from someone who understands well the difference. Peter Clark, who heads counter-terrorism for Scotland Yard in Britain, is a man who fought the Irish Republican Army for more than 30 years. In a speech last month he painstakingly drew a distinction between the terrorists of the IRA with specific political goals, who did not seek to destroy themselves, and who did not seek to wantonly kill innocent people, and al-Qaeda. He describes al-Qaeda as the reverse of the IRA – global in origin, reaching ambition with "networks that are large, fluid, mobile and incredibly resilient." It is his judgment, the judgment of an experienced police official, that the threat posed by al-Qaeda and similar ideological groups, is qualitatively different than that which has been faced before here and in the United States.
Of course history teaches us how corrosive ideologies can become when ideas that begin in the early stage seeming merely grandiose or fanciful graduate to having real military power on the world stage.
In the earlier part of the last century the ideologies of communism or fascism did not seem when they first were born as if they constituted a serious threat to world peace, and yet tragically we came to learn that those ideologies left unchecked, visited untold devastation and destruction upon the innocent, civilized people of the world.
Therefore, let us talk briefly about what is the goal of the Islamist extremist groups that are behind the terrorist acts that we've seen here in Europe and in the United States. They do not seek merely political revolution in their own countries. They seek the ultimate domination in many countries. Their goal is a totalitarian, theocratic empire, a religious empire, to be achieved by waging perpetual war on soldiers and civilians alike, up to and including the use of weapons of mass destruction.
Some may say this intent is grandiose, it cannot be achieved. I disagree. Extremists such as those in Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and other groups from North Africa to Iraq to South Asia to East Africa, are fighting for and now beginning to achieve control of parcels of territory in which they can train, assemble their own advanced weaponry and impose their own vision of repressive law dominating local life and exterminating local freedom.
And of course there's no doubt that the consequences that these extremists can visit upon civilized people compares with the worst we've experienced in wars. The September 11th attacks were the most devastating single blow ever visited upon the United States by foreign enemies, and the plot last summer to blow up multiple transatlantic airliners in Britain had it succeeded would have not only caused the loss of thousands of lives, but would have devastated the international aviation system and really caused a rupture in the ability to travel between this continent and the United States.
Simply put, our foes have made no secret of the fact that they intend to make war, they are building the capability to prosecute war, and they have begun to reveal to us what would be the horrific consequences should they be successful in their efforts at war.
So how do we fight this terrorist network? We fight it by developing a network of our own. It is the network of free people and civilized people who believe in the rule of law and democracy and freedom even for those who disagree with ideas. That means as such a group of partners we must build a unified set of capabilities that allows us to prevent terrorist infiltration, strengthen our borders without making them difficult for innocent people to cross, increase the level of document security, and share information and intelligence to pinpoint threats.
In some ways intelligence is what I would describe as the 21st century version of radar. In the last century when we feared an attack with bombs we used radar to detect enemy aircraft that might be coming into the United States or into Europe. But that is of no avail in dealing with terrorists. Terrorists come in under the cover of innocence. They cannot be detected by mechanical radar. They can only be detected by the use, analysis and sharing of intelligence that allows us to separate those who are a threat from those who are innocent.
Now let me speak specifically about one way in which we have used intelligence, which I know is of concern to the members of this committee and to this parliament. That is the use of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) system.
We have built the system to analyze air traveler information combined with other intelligence as part of our method of building a layer of defenses for the United States. This, of course, has been the subject of much serious discussion with the European Union. I think as we go forward to continue and complete these discussions we have the opportunity to take a fresh look at the issue of sharing this information which in many ways reflects a larger issue – how are we going to develop a long-term framework to share information that allows us to protect all of our citizens against these very dangerous threats?
It is my belief that we have fundamental principles in common which will give us a firm edifice on which we can build sharing arrangements – one that respects some differences in the institutional arrangements in our various countries, but that ultimately reflects the shared values we all have in liberty and privacy.
As you know, Passenger Name Record information is that which is collected by the travel industry or the airlines when a person makes an airline reservation. It's basic information. It's nothing that's particularly confidential by its very nature. It's things like your name, passport number, frequent flyer number, credit card information and contact information like telephone and address.
What we do is we take this information and we run it against lists of known and suspected terrorists. We use it to analyze links that may arise or connections that may arise between travelers and others who are known to be terrorists so that we can identify those of the 80 million air passengers who come to the United States every year who we need to take a closer look at.
It is the ability to use this information to identify hidden connections that makes it so valuable as a tool to keep out dangerous people.
What I thought I would do in my opportunity to speak to you today is to talk very concretely about how it is we have benefited from the use of this information. We are not merely collecting this for the idle purpose of having a large database of personal data. We are collecting it because time and again it is proving to us that it will enable us to keep dangerous people outside the United States.
We will be furnishing you with a letter at the close of this session that will lay out in greater detail some of our successes using this kind of information, but let me mention just a couple.
In June 2003 using this kind of passenger data and other information one of our inspectors at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport identified an individual traveler coming in not from Europe but from the Middle East. Based on the information shown through this analysis, the inspector pulled aside this individual and conducted an interview. At the close of the interview the inspector concluded that this individual should not be admitted into the United States.
We encountered this individual two years later, or rather we encountered his fingerprints, because in 2005 we found his fingerprints on the steering wheel of a truck which had been used as a vehicle-born improvised explosive device, had been detonated in Iraq and had killed 132 people.
Quite simply, we kept a man out of the United States who later proved to be a suicide bomber. And while I cannot tell you he would have detonated a bomb in Chicago or elsewhere in the United States, I can tell you I would not like to take that chance.
In September 2006 our inspectors at Minneapolis-St. Paul airport used this kind of information – Passenger Name Record information – to select a high risk passenger for further examination. When we did so, we asked him questions and we began to examine his baggage. What did we find? We found video clips of improvised explosive devices used against U.S. soldiers and vehicles; we found a video on martyrdom; and a manual on how to construct improvised explosive devices.
After we took him into federal custody additional searches revealed that he had used the internet to gather information on a special weapons facility in Iraq as well as the England-France Tunnel. In December this individual plead guilty to visa fraud. Again, can I guarantee that this person would have detonated a bomb in the United States? No. Would I want to take that chance? No.
Finally, let me talk about a bit of history, or rather what might have been. Some have gone back and looked at the hijackers who came in on September 11th, or before September 11th to carry out the attacks on September 11th. They've asked the question whether the kind of analysis we are now doing would have allowed us to prevent that plot from being carried out. So let me tell you what would have happened had we had this tool back in 2001.
First of all, two of the hijackers who appeared on a U.S. watch list would have been identified when they bought their tickets. Three of the other hijackers used the same addresses as the two who we had on the watch list, so we would have been able to identify three additional hijackers. One of them, by the way, was Mohammed Attah. A sixth hijacker used the same frequent flyer number as one of the other hijackers, so we would have identified him as well. Finally, five other hijackers used the same phone number as Mohammed Attah, so we would have identified those five. With three simple analytic moves using this kind of data we would have identified 11 of the 19 hijackers and stopped them from coming into the United States.
It is difficult in the face of that clear tragic lesson of history to abandon a tool which at minimal cost of civil liberty has the tremendous potential to save lives, because after all, life is the primary liberty on which all other liberties depend.
Now let me tell you a little bit about what Passenger Name Record information is not, because there's also a certain amount of misconception about this. We do not use Passenger Name Record data to profile based on race or ethnicity. To the contrary, this information allows us to focus on relevant behavioral criteria developed from our investigative or intelligence work. PNR data doesn't guarantee that a person who comes in can be identified as a terrorist or not a terrorist, but it does allow our officers to make a more informed assessment to determine who should be questioned further at the border.
Finally, we don't use PNR to label people or create a risk score that stays with the person for the rest of their life. It simply gives us a way of analyzing their behavior in conjunction with other things we know so we can pursue further inquiry when they appear at our airports.
The benefits of this analytic technique are clear, but we also have very strong privacy protections. Our Federal Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act, among other laws, as well as oversight by Congress, American courts, and the Inspector General, provide a very strong guarantee against misuse of this information. In fact the Privacy Act has criminal and civil penalties against its violation. Under our mixed use policy the Privacy Act guarantees extend to foreign nationals.
Finally, we recognize that every human system, no matter how valuable, has its imperfections. Therefore we want to continue to build our capacity to grant redress to people who claim they are unfairly being treated at our borders. We recently established a program called a Traveler Redress Inquiry Program that allows travelers of any nationality to seek redress if they feel they've been inappropriately selected by our targeting systems. In short, while there are some differences in the way organize ourselves than the system here, I believe in all fundamentals this valuable tool is being used in a way that is consistent with the fundamental values that underlie both of our civilizations.
Finally, let me speak for a moment about the Visa Waiver Program which I know is a matter of great interest. The President announced last year that he would ask Congress to pass legislation that would enable us to admit additional countries to the Visa Waiver Program by creating some greater flexibility in the standards that we now apply. That legislation is before Congress. We're hopeful Congress will act this session to inaugurate it. And if Congress gives us the authority, we look forward to being more flexible in welcoming additional European countries into the Visa Waiver Program while continuing to work to elevate security standards in a way that is consistently applied to all countries for our mutual benefit.
As we consider these issues, Passenger Name Record issues, or visa waiver issues, I would suggest that there are some philosophical approaches that ought to govern what we do. Instead of beginning with very specific rigid, legalistic rules, we ought to begin with shared principles along the lines that we're developing now with the High Level Contact Group. Open democracies should be able to respect each other's privacy frameworks, especially when we share the same fair information principles. We want to work constructively, we want to be transparent, and of course we don't want to sit in judgment of each other.
I believe a clear and compelling case can be made that sharing PNR and other identity information will be a net gain for privacy and civil liberties. It will help us better understand who actually poses a risk and should receive more targeted scrutiny. It will avoid the need for a blanket approach that either sweeps everybody into the net or descends into crude profiling which is something that we do not want to engage in. By being able to positively confirm a person's identity, by leveraging the tools we are currently constructing, we will be able to create a safer world not only for Americans but for those who come from Europe to travel in the United States and vice versa.
With that spirit I'm confident that with my friends here and others here at the European Union we will be able to negotiate a new arrangement that demonstrates our joint commitment to protecting privacy while meeting security.
The United States and Europe do share the same basic values when it comes to protecting our citizens and upholding our freedoms. We have defended enemies in the past working together; we can confront today's enemies if we continue in the same spirit.
Thank you for hearing me and I look forward to continuing this dialogue.
This page was last reviewed/modified on May 15, 2007.
