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Release Date: 07/28/05 00:00:00
Santa Clara, California
Commonwealth Club of California
July 28, 2005
Secretary Chertoff: Well, Gloria, thank you for that very kind introduction, and Brian, I appreciate your participating with me in this program, moderating. It is wonderful weather outside. It is a tribute either to your being jaded by the weather here, or my compelling nature to speak to you in here instead of outside. I, for one, would probably choose to be outside because I'm going to go back to Washington, which, as those of you who are familiar with that part of the country, is very, very humid right now.
I'm really delighted to be here, though, seriously, to discuss our very important agenda with this Club, because it touches on something that it important to all of us, which is the future of our homeland security.
As I understand it, for more than a century, the Commonwealth Club has been the scene of many spirited debates, a place where difficult and vital issues are identified and discussed in order to generate ideas for our best course forward.
And, of course, terrorism is the issue on the forefront of many people’s minds as we speak today, and it is a subject that demands that kind of frank debate and continuous evaluation. As the recent bombings in Egypt and in London tragically reveal, terrorism has not taken a recess.
To be sure, under the President’s leadership, since 9/11 we have struck back at the terrorists and averted a successful attack here in the United States. But we cannot let ourselves be lulled into complacency, or lose focus on our long-term homeland security needs. The terrorists are constantly at work, mutating, plotting, driven by their evil ideology. And so we, too, must adapt. We must plan, we must work harder, driven by a determination to prevail.
When faced with the threat of his own era, Abraham Lincoln offered this observation: “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country."
Well, as we rise to meet the threat of terrorism, we must face each day with a similar mindset, a commitment to reject past dogmas, to "think anew" and to "act anew." And what we have been doing at the Department of Homeland Security is precisely that: thinking anew and acting anew.
Soon after I arrived, I mandated a comprehensive review of our operations, policies and structures to answer these basic questions: Are we achieving a level of security we need? How do we correct our gaps so that we meet our security objectives? How do we align our structure to best support our mission?
We launched a Second Stage Review of the Department with several core principles in mind. First, and I've said this before, DHS must base its work on priorities that are driven by risk and pursued with balance. Our goal is to optimize our security, but not security at any price. Our security strategy must promote Americans’ freedom, privacy, prosperity, and mobility.
Second, our Department must drive improvement with a sense of urgency. The clock is ticking -- as the events of the last few weeks have all too tragically shown. Terrorism will not relent, and we cannot afford to fall behind.
Third, DHS must be an effective steward of public resources -- setting priorities, meeting those priorities, and fostering innovation.
Finally, our work must be guided by the understanding that effective security is built upon a network of systems that spans all levels of government and the private sector. DHS does not, and should not, own or control all of these systems. But we must set a clear national strategy and design an architecture in which separate roles and responsibilities for security are fully integrated among public and private stakeholders.
In doing that, we must draw on the strength of our considerable network of assets, functioning as seamlessly as possible with state and local leadership, first responders, the private sector, our international partners, and, most certainly, the general public.
Capitalizing on this network and the resources our partners bring to the table is an important priority for this Department, because it’s vital to our security success. And no element of this partnership is more important than technology. Technology can provide tremendous added value in the quality of security across virtually every sector of the homeland -- border enforcement, aviation security, passenger screening, information sharing, and the list goes on. With every imperative we identified in our review, technology is a major part of our strategic plan to achieve success.
Let me give you a few examples. Technology can play a role in the detection of a threatened nuclear attack. Technology can be deployed in the form of biological sensors throughout our cities to detect the release of dangerous toxins. Technology provides the ability to screen passengers with just a simple swipe of a finger, or to screen cargo without ever opening a lid of a container.
Of course, to realize the full benefits technology has to offer, we have to look beyond the walls of DHS itself, to the private sector and to the world of high tech in places just like this, Silicon Valley. To the innovators who have made our world so much smaller, we are now looking to you to help make it that much safer.
On our end, we recognize our responsibility to support and aid these efforts in any way we can. For example, three years ago, Congress passed the SAFETY Act, which was designed to enable our private sector partners to develop innovative technology in order to protect the homeland without the fear of unduly high transaction costs imposed by the possibility of frivolous lawsuits.
Candidly, we have not done enough to take advantage of this powerful tool to spur technologies in the area of homeland security. But we are streamlining the application process, and we are working to deploy incentives under the SAFETY Act more broadly, with the hope that these changes will motivate the private sector to take full advantage of this tool.
In addition, we're working closely with our outstanding national labs, like Lawrence Livermore, which I visited yesterday, in order to promote and support their vital technological design and scientific work. In fact, when I was at Lawrence Livermore yesterday, I was able to see firsthand the resources that our scientists have at their disposal, as well as the resources at the disposal of their partners at Sandia and other national labs, all of this making available to us and to our efforts the tools we need to prevent and prepare for all manners of attack.
There is simply no denying the vital role of technology as we pursue our near-term security agenda. And since we're in Silicon Valley, I'd like to focus on a few of the imperatives identified in our Department Second Stage Review, where technological development, paired with a systems approach to problem solving, can help us significantly advance our efforts to secure the homeland, areas such as preparedness, border enforcement, transportation and cyber security.
Let me turn first to preparedness. In the broadest sense, preparedness addresses the full range of our capabilities to prevent, protect against, and to respond to acts of terrorists or other disasters.
And at the outset, we must candidly acknowledge this: Although we have substantial resources to provide security, these resources are not unlimited. Therefore, as a nation, we must make tough choices about how to invest finite human and financial capital to attain the optimal state of preparedness. To do this we have to focus preparedness on objective measures of risk and performance.
Our risk analysis itself is based on these three variables: threat, vulnerability, and consequence. And these variables are not equal. Some infrastructure, for example, is quite vulnerable, but the consequences of an attack are relatively small. Other infrastructures may be much less vulnerable, but the consequences of a successful attack are very high, even catastrophic.
That's why the Department’s recently released National Preparedness Goals -- and additional, risk-based planning we are undertaking -- will form our standard in allocating future DHS grants to our state and local partners so that we build the right capabilities in the right places at the right level. And just as important, all of this planning has to be focused on the long run.
Bringing greater planning discipline to all risk scenarios is another dimension of our preparedness mission. Simple common sense counsels that we begin by concentrating on events with the greatest potential negative consequences. Current events should inform our strategic planning, but should not distract or displace it.
Some of the tools we need to prevent, respond and recover from these awful terrorist scenarios are already in place, but others do need improvement. And a number of these improvements require the integration of technology into our systems of prevention, protection, response, and recovery.
For example, of all the catastrophic threats that we face, a nuclear attack on our soil would be uniquely threatening to our society. The President’s budget asks Congress to establish and fund a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to develop and deploy the next generation of systems that will allow us to intercept a nuclear threat. This means systems that cannot be defended by shielding the nuclear material; systems that reduce false positives, systems are mobile and not merely fixed.
Creating this kind of nuclear defense is a reverse Manhattan Project for the 21st century, one that will diminish the nuclear threat. And we've already begun to take the steps to make this office a reality. I again ask Congress to help us by supporting this critical resource fully.
Strengthening the protection of our valued infrastructure, of course, does not depend in the hands -- depend upon the hands of the federal government. Local government agencies have valuable resources and experience that allow them to share in the responsibility for our security. So, too, does private industry. We have to unleash these resources.
Technology also figures very prominently in our efforts to secure our borders. We have to strengthen border security and interior enforcement, as well as improve our immigration system, and we cannot have one approach with the other.
As to the first, we have to gain full control of our borders to prevent illegal immigration and security breaches. Flagrant violation of our borders undercuts respect for the rule of law, and undermines our national security. It also poses a particular burden to those who live in our border communities.
So we are developing a new approach to controlling the border, one that includes an integrated mix of additional staff, new technology, and enhanced infrastructure investment. And we're considering changes to the entire border security system, from initial detection and apprehension, through detention, all the way to eventual removal.
A strategic, comprehensive approach demands that all elements of enforcement be designed and built in a unified and integrated fashion, so that we focus on and attain the ultimate goal, which is real control of our national borders.
But gaining control of the border will require something more -- reducing the demand for illegal border migration by channeling migrants into regulated legal channels to seek work. I look forward to working with Congress, therefore, this year to improve border security significantly through the President’s proposed Temporary Worker Program.
And of course, immigration policy is about more than keeping illegal migrants out. Our heritage and our national character inspire us to create a more welcoming society for those who lawfully come to our shores to work, learn and visit, and to contribute. So we want to ensure a visa process that is secure and streamlined. In this way, those who seek to come to the United States with good intentions are not deterred by undue processing burdens.
With this and other needs in mind, Secretary Rice and I will, in the near term, announce a detailed agenda of work and innovation that the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security have already begun together, to ease the path for those who wish to come to the United States, in order to visit, study and conduct business.
Now, creating better systems to move people and goods more securely and efficiently into the country and around the country was a core objective in founding DHS. It remains a core objective today. Some would say that to achieve this goal, there has to be a tradeoff between security and efficiency. I reject that. With the proper security vetting, the proper technology, the proper travel documents, and the proper tracking of cargo, we can ultimately achieve a system that is both more efficient and does a better job of preserving our privacy and protecting our security.
To do so, again, we have to take advantage of technologies, technologies that can improve both our passenger and our cargo screening. Right now, in many ways we are simply undertaking the most basic primitive kind of passenger screening -- screening for names to match against names on a terrorist database. And of course, we all know names are simply not the best way to identify people. Names can be changed; identification documents can be forged. But there is a way forward. Biometric identifiers can reduce that type of fraud and can protect the identity of the visa holder by making it more difficult to impersonate somebody. Computer chips and wireless communication can allow prompt and effective screening at even remote ports of entry.
In the area of cargo, we screen all inbound containers and inspect those that merit further scrutiny. But we can do more here as well. By deploying a combination of sophisticated tracking and detection protocols -- along with the very best available equipment such as non-invasive inspection technology -- we can secure the global supply chain without slowing it down.
Ultimately, with greater use of technology, increased information sharing, and more targeted intelligence gathering, we will have a high degree of confidence and trust, so that low-risk passengers and cargo don't have to be stopped at every single point along the way to be re-vetted and rechecked.
And as these low-risk travelers and cargo move through the system more smoothly and more efficiently, our resources can then be more effectively directed, in terms of the kind of in-depth analysis and vetting that's necessary to stop a dangerous cargo shipment or a dangerous terrorist from slipping through the cracks.
Now, the events in London in the last few weeks serve as an additional reminder of the terrorist threat against innocent civilians in our mass transit systems. We've done a great deal as a nation since 9/11 and the Madrid bombings to increase protection of our transportation system, including mass transit.
State and local authorities have received more than $8 billion in Homeland Security and Urban Security grants that can be used for mass transit security and related purposes, and President Bush has proposed an additional $2.4 billion that can be used for these kinds of purposes in the 2006 budget. Already, the federal government has provided more than $255 million targeted specifically to state and local transit authorities to increase protection through hardening of assets, greater police presence during high alerts, additional detection and surveillance equipment, increased inspections, expanded use of explosives-sniffing dog teams.
We also add additional, and, by the way, often unheralded assistance in the form of research and development that benefits mass transit security. And again, technology is an area where the federal government can add real value to our mass transit efforts. For while security -- securing our subways, buses and rail systems is a critical national concern, it's never been solely or even primarily dominated by the federal government. State and local officials rightly control almost all of the law enforcement boots-on-the-ground that are used to provide security for mass transit. These highly-trained law enforcement personnel understand better than anybody else, and certainly better than the federal government, the unique design characteristics of their hometown subway, light rail, bus, and ferry systems.
So to make mass transit more secure, we need an effective partnership between federal, state, and local officials that builds on the strengths and resources that each of us has to offer, and that understands and works with the unique architecture of each individual transit system.
One element of the federal contribution to mass transit emerges from the recognition that catastrophic attacks on mass transit infrastructure have the potential to kill thousands, and preventing these kinds of attacks must be a primary focus of federal efforts. We have already placed biological and chemical sensing systems in transit systems in many different parts of the country.
We have to expedite the research and development process for the deployment of even more advanced systems to detect biological, chemical, or radiological agents so that we can stay ahead of the terrorists' intent to unleash mass casualty attacks.
We also have to apply enhanced resources to continuing to develop groundbreaking explosives detection technology, seeking systems that work with and not against the grain of our mass transit architecture. That means the kind of technology that doesn't require forcing everybody through a fixed portal, which destroys the system, but one that takes advantage of the ambient flow of the air, to help us detect in an open architecture people who might be a threat, in terms of the kinds of explosive materials they are carrying.
So, as we have been doing, we're going to continue to apply our sophisticated tools to aid localities in identifying and strengthening specific vulnerabilities in their transportation networks, and in detecting and intercepting possible catastrophic threats to those mass transit systems.
Now, we know the private sector and the high-tech world obviously have to work with us in deterring these kinds of physical attacks. But when it comes to securing our cyber systems that connect and control much of that physical infrastructure, we depend on our technology providers to take even a more direct role, and to partner with us in cyber risk assessment and mitigation, in order to achieve the measure of security that our cyber architecture demands.
Our cyber systems have linked us together -- nationally, even globally -- in dramatic and remarkable ways. It’s particularly amazing for those of us who remember what it was like in the dark ages, back when you actually mailed letters, snail mail, you went to the movie theater to watch movies -- I still do that occasionally -- and you waited for the newspaper to be delivered in hard copies, opposed to online. That's a time some people call "prehistoric." But securing our cyber systems is critical not only to ensure a way of life to which we’ve grown accustomed and, indeed, upon which we now depend, but to protect the vast infrastructure that these systems support and operate.
During our Second Stage Review, cyber security was one of the issues we evaluated to determine what we needed to do to improve protective measures already in place, and to elevate our preparedness in this essential area.
There are a number of things we have to do. These include maintaining and enhancing a robust cyber space response system, furthering information sharing and supporting working partnerships between government and industry, operationally, and on more strategic issues, such as software assurance and corporate governance. We must work to integrate cyber priorities into our infrastructure protection plans and prepare ourselves to respond to new technology threats.
Currently, we are working to finalize a National Infrastructure Protection Plan that will offer baseline preparedness plans and response protocols for seventeen critical infrastructure sectors and resources, including Information Technology, Agriculture, Water, and Energy.
And we’re working with stakeholders to develop our plan for the IT portion of this overall strategy, and looking at the kind of impact IT has on the physical infrastructures as well.
For example, power grids, water treatment facilities, financial institutions, all use computer systems and software to operate, so we have to coordinate closely to ensure the systems that are making our infrastructure assets more efficient do not also expose them to vulnerabilities that a terrorist could exploit.
As such, we're looking at all aspects of cyber in our risk management approach to identify threats, reduce vulnerabilities, and provide protective measures to mitigate against and respond to the possible consequences of an attack.
From standing up a 24/7 cyber threat watch and analysis center, to establishing a cyber alert system, to providing resources to counter the latest virus or worm or other intrusion, there is a lot government has done and more that we can do to increase cyber security. But the reality is that a vast majority of our cyber assets are privately owned and operated, and also that's where a vast majority of our private ingenuity and creativity reposes.
It follows, therefore, that security, even cyber security, cannot take the form of government dictates, but must be the product of strong partnership work and disciplined collaboration.
So we have to ask ourselves, how can we facilitate the collaboration? What are the barriers to private/public partnership? What can we do as government to help industry implement enhanced security measures? More incentives? More Resources? These are the kinds of questions we are currently working with industry to answer and act upon as partners.
In fact, during our review of the Department, one thing that emerged was that in order to address these issues more effectively, we needed to elevate the role of cyber security in our management and organizational structure. So to accomplish that, as well as to enhance the coordination of all of our efforts to protect our technological infrastructure, we have asked to create a new Assistant Secretary for Cyber and Telecommunications Security.
This position will serve to support the security of the resources that are so critical to our nation and so fundamental to the work that many of you do here in Silicon Valley. It's a position that the tech community has long recommended and asked for, and we listened to that and we acted upon it. And we'll continue to be open to your suggestions so that we can better work together in order to find solutions to our shared challenges.
Going forward, the new Assistant Secretary for Cyber and Telecom will play an integral role, working with you, as we implement our information technology infrastructure protection plans, and as we prepare for a large scale cyber security exercise this November to test the level of our preparedness.
The bottom line is this: In protecting the homeland, we will always seek a reasonable balance. Security is an overriding necessity, but we must also fight the urge to clamp down in fear and bring our society to a standstill.
Our anti-terrorism efforts must be based on assessments of risk, not simply reaction to attacks. In the face of terror, there will always be some temptation to panic, to react. We must be steady, unwavering, dedicated to the task at hand, and always committed to "think anew," as Lincoln suggested.
Indeed, if anything, we can draw great wisdom and strength from Lincoln's example, even though it goes back more than 150 years. He remained a common reassuring presence, even when civil war threatened to tear our nation apart.
And so we, too, have that in our DNA. We, too, will remain calm, yet resolved, resolved to make difficult decisions, to adapt when necessary, and never to relinquish our commitment to the values of hope, freedom and democracy, values that have defined our character through many past storms, and will surely sustain us through the storms to come.
Thank you very much.
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This page was last reviewed/modified on 07/28/05 00:00:00.
