WEBVTT

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[Music]

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Voice Over: Five, four, three, two, one.

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How's copy, over.

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Voice Over: Mesa copies loud and clear.

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>> Harris County Fire Commander, you copy?

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>> Harris County to Command, copy.

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>> Controller, there's no comms on V-call 10.

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You want me to do something else?

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Kowdley: Jamming is interference in the RF spectrum

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from intentional or unintentional sources.

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And we are looking specifically at first responder radio systems.

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Anderson: I'm sure that we have had problems with jamming.

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It's whether or not we realize that we're having those problems

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and that's kind of what we're here to see.

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Neese: Has it happened in the past? I don't know.

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If it has, we probably referred to it as mechanical issue or error on the operator.

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>> Carmel calling on V-call 10, how copy over.

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>> Division, Bravo's not hearing on V-call either.

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Reed: So what we were looking for was what happens when we get jammed,

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how can we identify it for our first responders

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and take that information back to them.

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And then what can we tell them, when this happens,

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these are your immediate actions to try to remedy your communication issues.

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>> Command, I need SDS information, over.

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Kowdley: We covered jamming over radio systems like VHF, UHF and HF.

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We also tested Wi-Fi, GPS, Bluetooth.

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In addition to that we tested drones

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and the capability of using other systems besides GPS for geolocation.

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Douglass: Just preparing for this event

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has actually taught us a lot more about our radio system,

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what can happen to it, some of the vulnerabilities in it

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and we've started coming up with plans on how to address those vulnerabilities.

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Kowdley: We want to be able to identify jamming, possibly locate jamming

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and then identify some possible procedures

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that you can do to work around the jamming.

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The 2017 event that we are planning on

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is going to be in Idaho, in mid to late July.

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And hopefully after the 2017 event we'll be much more prepared

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to tell you what you should do, what you should look out for,

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what are the technologies we can employ,

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not only in the infrastructure,

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but on the radio side to help you work better in jamming conditions.

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[Music]

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Voice Over: Mesa copies loud and clear.

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One, two, three, four, five.

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