WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.846 --> 00:00:04.256 >> Please join me in welcoming Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly. 2 00:00:05.516 --> 00:00:11.836 [ Applause ] 3 00:00:12.336 --> 00:00:12.966 >> Thanks very much. 4 00:00:12.966 --> 00:00:16.886 I wanted to make a few comments about a new initiative that will be made public -- 5 00:00:16.886 --> 00:00:18.606 well, I guess it's going to be made public right now -- 6 00:00:18.856 --> 00:00:22.396 and then sit down and take some questions. 7 00:00:22.396 --> 00:00:23.326 But thank you, Richard. 8 00:00:23.326 --> 00:00:26.246 And the topic I want to just make a few comments on has 9 00:00:26.246 --> 00:00:27.546 to do with aviation security. 10 00:00:28.146 --> 00:00:31.036 I don't have to tell really anyone in the world that was alive then 11 00:00:31.036 --> 00:00:36.576 that since 9/11 the United States has seen a series of attempts 12 00:00:36.576 --> 00:00:41.136 on commercial aviation -- shoe bomber, liquid explosives, an underwear bomber, 13 00:00:41.136 --> 00:00:43.026 a plot to detonate explosive cargo. 14 00:00:43.026 --> 00:00:48.286 Most of these were disrupted just in time and didn't result in the tragedy 15 00:00:48.286 --> 00:00:49.646 that the terrorists were looking for. 16 00:00:50.636 --> 00:00:56.976 But in 2015, ISIS claimed responsibility for the bombing of Metrojet flight 9268, 17 00:00:56.976 --> 00:00:59.446 which called all 224 people on board 18 00:00:59.446 --> 00:01:01.856 and became the deadliest air disaster in Russian history. 19 00:01:02.496 --> 00:01:06.346 Terrorists want to bring down aircraft to instill fear, disrupt our economies, 20 00:01:06.346 --> 00:01:07.526 and undermine our way of life. 21 00:01:07.526 --> 00:01:10.996 And it works, which is why they still see aviation 22 00:01:11.036 --> 00:01:14.016 as the crown jewel target in their world. 23 00:01:14.956 --> 00:01:16.006 The threat is not diminished. 24 00:01:16.006 --> 00:01:19.036 In fact, I am concerned that we are seeing renewed interest on the part 25 00:01:19.036 --> 00:01:23.056 of terrorist groups to go after the aviation sector, from bombing aircraft 26 00:01:23.056 --> 00:01:26.956 to attacking airports on the ground as we saw in Brussels and Istanbul. 27 00:01:27.646 --> 00:01:32.196 However, we are not standing on the sidelines while fanatics hatch new plots. 28 00:01:32.196 --> 00:01:36.686 The US government is focused on deterring, detecting, and disrupting these threats. 29 00:01:37.096 --> 00:01:40.766 That is why in March I made the decision to ban electronic devices larger 30 00:01:40.766 --> 00:01:45.336 than a cell phone from the passenger cabins of US-bound commercial flights 31 00:01:45.516 --> 00:01:48.656 from the ten airports in the Middle East and North Africa. 32 00:01:49.276 --> 00:01:53.306 I made this call based on evaluated intelligence and real concerns 33 00:01:53.576 --> 00:01:55.326 that I had about terrorist plotting. 34 00:01:55.836 --> 00:02:00.436 Make no mistake: Our enemies are constantly working to find new methods 35 00:02:00.736 --> 00:02:06.846 for disguising explosives, recruiting insiders, and hijacking aircraft. 36 00:02:06.846 --> 00:02:10.156 I made a point to talk with everyone I can about securing aviation. 37 00:02:10.346 --> 00:02:13.636 I've met with our international partners, I've met with our industry leaders, 38 00:02:13.996 --> 00:02:16.406 I've met with our private sector stakeholders. 39 00:02:16.956 --> 00:02:18.766 My conclusion is this: It is time 40 00:02:18.946 --> 00:02:22.196 that we raised the global baseline of aviation security. 41 00:02:22.806 --> 00:02:26.056 We cannot play international whack-a-mole with each new threat; instead, 42 00:02:26.056 --> 00:02:29.096 we must put in place new measures across the board 43 00:02:29.496 --> 00:02:33.326 to keep the traveling public safe and make it harder for terrorists to succeed. 44 00:02:33.866 --> 00:02:36.776 Today I am announcing a first step toward this goal 45 00:02:37.226 --> 00:02:41.866 by requiring new security measures to be applied to all commercial flights coming 46 00:02:41.906 --> 00:02:43.636 into the United States from abroad. 47 00:02:44.186 --> 00:02:46.796 These measures will be both seen and unseen, 48 00:02:47.096 --> 00:02:48.976 and they will be phased in over time. 49 00:02:49.776 --> 00:02:52.376 They will include enhanced screening of electronic devices, 50 00:02:52.376 --> 00:02:55.446 more fellow passenger vetting, and new measures design 51 00:02:55.446 --> 00:02:58.806 to mitigate the potential threat of insider attacks. 52 00:02:59.406 --> 00:03:02.896 We will also lay out a clear path to encourage airlines and airports 53 00:03:02.896 --> 00:03:07.376 to adapt -- or correction, to adopt more sophisticated screening approaches, 54 00:03:07.716 --> 00:03:10.576 including better use of explosive detection K9's 55 00:03:11.086 --> 00:03:13.256 and advanced checkpoint screening technology. 56 00:03:14.016 --> 00:03:16.616 Additionally, we will encourage more airports 57 00:03:16.616 --> 00:03:18.646 to become pre-clearance locations. 58 00:03:18.946 --> 00:03:23.936 This is not only enhances security, it also increases convenience 59 00:03:23.936 --> 00:03:26.546 by allowing international travelers to go through customs 60 00:03:26.546 --> 00:03:31.576 and border security screening before boarding flights to the United States. 61 00:03:31.646 --> 00:03:35.526 With this announcement we send a clear message that inaction is not an option. 62 00:03:36.196 --> 00:03:39.326 Those who choose not to cooperate or are slow to adapt -- 63 00:03:39.856 --> 00:03:43.086 adopt these measures could be subject to other restrictions, 64 00:03:43.276 --> 00:03:47.906 including a ban on electronic devices on aircraft or even a suspension 65 00:03:48.306 --> 00:03:50.456 of their flights into the United States. 66 00:03:50.756 --> 00:03:55.146 However, in all the indication that all airlines will work with us 67 00:03:55.146 --> 00:03:58.616 to keep their aircraft, their crew, and their passengers safe. 68 00:03:59.066 --> 00:04:01.996 I've spent months engaging with our closest alleys 69 00:04:01.996 --> 00:04:04.506 and foreign partners [inaudible] and many 70 00:04:04.506 --> 00:04:07.286 of them have expressed strong support for this effort. 71 00:04:08.076 --> 00:04:11.676 While these actions we are announcing today will improve the security 72 00:04:11.676 --> 00:04:15.146 of US-bound flights, I am hopefully other nations will follow suit. 73 00:04:15.886 --> 00:04:18.216 Unless we all raise our security standards, 74 00:04:18.216 --> 00:04:21.816 terrorists who see commercial aviation as the greatest takedown, 75 00:04:22.526 --> 00:04:25.376 will find and attack the weakest link. 76 00:04:26.046 --> 00:04:28.346 Together we have the opportunity to raise the baseline 77 00:04:28.346 --> 00:04:31.406 on aviation security globally, and we can do it in a manner 78 00:04:31.406 --> 00:04:33.986 that will not unduly inconvenience the flying public. 79 00:04:33.986 --> 00:04:37.266 Let me be clear, security is my number one concern. 80 00:04:37.796 --> 00:04:41.636 Our enemies are adaptive, and we have to be adaptive as well. 81 00:04:42.276 --> 00:04:45.846 A number of the measures we plan to put in place can be dialed up or down 82 00:04:45.936 --> 00:04:48.196 in a risk-based, intelligence-driven manner. 83 00:04:48.816 --> 00:04:51.756 And over the next several weeks and months we'll work with our partners 84 00:04:52.146 --> 00:04:54.456 to ensure these measures are fully implemented. 85 00:04:55.446 --> 00:04:57.356 Again, today is just a starting point. 86 00:04:57.636 --> 00:05:00.736 We are taking prudent steps to make aircraft more secure, 87 00:05:01.196 --> 00:05:04.916 to reduce insider threats, and to identify suspicious passengers. 88 00:05:05.436 --> 00:05:09.166 In the meantime we will launch a concerted effort with our foreign partners to put 89 00:05:09.166 --> 00:05:12.376 in place wider counterterrorism improvements. 90 00:05:12.646 --> 00:05:16.156 This will include better information sharing, expanded exchanges 91 00:05:16.356 --> 00:05:20.186 of terrorist watch lists, and more advanced security checks 92 00:05:20.186 --> 00:05:22.146 of travelers around the world. 93 00:05:22.876 --> 00:05:25.356 Finally, let me commend all the outstanding men 94 00:05:25.356 --> 00:05:27.106 and women throughout the department 95 00:05:27.526 --> 00:05:31.406 who make aviation security their daily mission, whether they are working 96 00:05:31.406 --> 00:05:35.756 on the front lines at the TSA checkpoint, developing better screening technology 97 00:05:35.756 --> 00:05:40.126 in the labs, or preparing the intelligence that helps us make tough decisions, 98 00:05:40.506 --> 00:05:43.736 every passengers owes them a debt of gratitude. 99 00:05:44.296 --> 00:05:47.466 I am proud to lead them and all the of the DHS employees 100 00:05:47.466 --> 00:05:49.536 who make our nation more secure. 101 00:05:50.146 --> 00:05:52.506 I also want to thank our international partners 102 00:05:52.506 --> 00:05:54.096 and airlines I have met with recently. 103 00:05:54.986 --> 00:05:59.386 We have had productive discussions about the threats we face, and I am concerned -- 104 00:05:59.516 --> 00:06:03.536 encouraged, rather, by their effort to find solutions with us 105 00:06:03.686 --> 00:06:06.566 that will help elevate global security standards. 106 00:06:07.116 --> 00:06:09.206 Thank you for the invitation to speak today, Richard. 107 00:06:09.206 --> 00:06:13.556 I look forward to my conversation with you on this issue and on a full range 108 00:06:13.556 --> 00:06:15.966 of other issues so important to the American people. 109 00:06:15.966 --> 00:06:16.866 Thank you. 110 00:06:17.516 --> 00:06:23.666 [ Applause ] 111 00:06:24.166 --> 00:06:26.586 >> Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary, for joining us today. 112 00:06:26.946 --> 00:06:32.326 I'm sure in the coming day you get plenty of questions about some of the specifics 113 00:06:32.326 --> 00:06:34.056 of what you just announced here. 114 00:06:34.056 --> 00:06:37.256 But I'd like to take the opportunity to ask you a few more questions about kind 115 00:06:37.376 --> 00:06:39.816 of the fundamental approach that you take 116 00:06:39.816 --> 00:06:42.846 to Homeland Security and to national security. 117 00:06:42.846 --> 00:06:46.916 So maybe we could start with when you make a decision like the one 118 00:06:46.916 --> 00:06:50.036 that you just announced, you mentioned that security is your top objective, but, 119 00:06:50.036 --> 00:06:54.246 of course, there are other objectives as well, and each measure has some cost 120 00:06:54.246 --> 00:06:57.536 and convenience and other things like that; how do you think 121 00:06:57.646 --> 00:07:03.216 through this balance between protecting against every conceivable threat 122 00:07:03.266 --> 00:07:07.296 that might be posed to aviation and anything else and sort 123 00:07:07.296 --> 00:07:11.436 of the regular daily life of Americans who want to sort of go about their business? 124 00:07:12.136 --> 00:07:13.046 >> Great question. 125 00:07:13.236 --> 00:07:19.396 I think -- I know -- that I spend all of my time warning about these threats. 126 00:07:19.826 --> 00:07:24.276 Most of the people in Homeland Security do that as well. 127 00:07:24.736 --> 00:07:28.256 The good news is most Americans don't have to worry very much about it. 128 00:07:28.256 --> 00:07:32.026 I think the trust and confidence that most of the people of the United States have 129 00:07:32.536 --> 00:07:35.526 in people like in law enforcement 130 00:07:35.526 --> 00:07:40.206 or in DHS is a tribute to the good work that we do. 131 00:07:40.476 --> 00:07:43.936 But on a case like this where there's aviation security or any range 132 00:07:44.646 --> 00:07:47.586 of other things that we do, obviously we collect as much intelligence; 133 00:07:48.076 --> 00:07:51.866 as much perspective; interact with as many people as possible -- 134 00:07:51.866 --> 00:07:56.266 certainly bring it to the White House level, take it to the interagency; 135 00:07:56.266 --> 00:07:57.876 and then come up with a decision. 136 00:07:57.876 --> 00:08:03.246 I have found, at least in my 45 years as a Marine, you find the person 137 00:08:03.246 --> 00:08:06.956 that has the responsibility, in this case me for this kind of security, 138 00:08:07.466 --> 00:08:11.036 that person should listen to everybody, dissenting views as well -- 139 00:08:11.036 --> 00:08:14.786 maybe more importantly dissenting views but then make the decision. 140 00:08:14.786 --> 00:08:20.206 I'm not much a believer in collective decisions because responsibility, 141 00:08:20.206 --> 00:08:21.386 I think, rests with one person. 142 00:08:21.466 --> 00:08:26.166 In the case of the aviation decision I made on the 21st of March 143 00:08:26.776 --> 00:08:31.646 to ban large electronic devices from passenger compartments was based 144 00:08:31.646 --> 00:08:36.076 on intelligence, a great deal of imput from across the interagency, 145 00:08:36.076 --> 00:08:40.176 particularly the FBI and CIA and the military, 146 00:08:40.176 --> 00:08:44.126 international intelligence partners, and then make the decision. 147 00:08:44.126 --> 00:08:47.816 And it was focused on a real threat, and the airports 148 00:08:48.006 --> 00:08:52.476 that we declared were the airports we saw most of the time in the chatter. 149 00:08:53.046 --> 00:08:58.586 And the good news is now I think we will find a way to raise the bar worldwide 150 00:08:59.366 --> 00:09:04.676 and at the same time not inconvenience the traveling public too very much 151 00:09:05.056 --> 00:09:07.606 or add much cost to aviation security. 152 00:09:07.806 --> 00:09:08.826 >> Thanks. 153 00:09:08.976 --> 00:09:13.806 And I wanted to also step back on -- this is, as you said, 154 00:09:13.806 --> 00:09:18.746 a response to a particular terrorist threat, but if you step back and look 155 00:09:18.746 --> 00:09:21.716 at the fight that the United States has been waging against terrorism 156 00:09:21.716 --> 00:09:28.926 and the way it's morphed since even before 9/11 to today, you see this every day; 157 00:09:29.186 --> 00:09:30.916 how are we doing on the war on terror? 158 00:09:30.916 --> 00:09:31.586 Are we winning it? 159 00:09:31.586 --> 00:09:32.236 Are we losing it? 160 00:09:32.236 --> 00:09:38.326 Is the terrorist threat increasing, decreasing, and how do we know? 161 00:09:38.326 --> 00:09:42.226 >> Well, I don't think you can actually, at least right now put it 162 00:09:42.226 --> 00:09:43.626 in terms of winning or losing. 163 00:09:44.166 --> 00:09:47.606 I think the best way to look at is it we're dealing with it. 164 00:09:47.976 --> 00:09:55.936 As we reacted to 9/11 and took the fight overseas to Al-Qaeda, they morphed. 165 00:09:56.766 --> 00:10:03.716 And as over time, other terrorist organizations rose up -- 166 00:10:04.156 --> 00:10:10.656 ISIS as an example they rose up to do the best they could to hurt us. 167 00:10:10.656 --> 00:10:11.886 The caliphate was created. 168 00:10:12.456 --> 00:10:14.976 Right now the caliphate is on the way out, I believe. 169 00:10:15.046 --> 00:10:21.206 I mean, the coalition that is taking the fight to the caliphate in both Iraq 170 00:10:21.206 --> 00:10:24.606 and in Turkey are shrinking it. 171 00:10:25.256 --> 00:10:29.056 The next step -- and I think I was just up in Ottawa with the five I's, 172 00:10:29.496 --> 00:10:31.846 much of the discussions we had up there revolved 173 00:10:31.846 --> 00:10:35.546 around the return of the fighters. 174 00:10:35.546 --> 00:10:41.886 And they're not in most cases with the expressed intent to bring the fight back 175 00:10:41.886 --> 00:10:44.106 to western Europe or to their homelands. 176 00:10:44.106 --> 00:10:49.346 Every one of the European nations regardless of whether they're five I's 177 00:10:49.346 --> 00:10:51.556 or not are concerned about this, something 178 00:10:51.556 --> 00:10:54.386 in the neighborhood of 5,000 perhaps fighters. 179 00:10:54.676 --> 00:10:59.686 These are overwhelmingly people who were born in Europe, hold passports. 180 00:11:00.086 --> 00:11:03.296 In our own country, United States, I think there's something on the order 181 00:11:03.296 --> 00:11:05.456 of about 300 that have gone to the fight -- 182 00:11:05.456 --> 00:11:08.336 some have been killed, some are still in the fight. 183 00:11:08.576 --> 00:11:13.626 I know in my last job I was very concerned about a couple locations in the Caribbean. 184 00:11:13.706 --> 00:11:18.276 We knew that about 110 or so mostly young men 185 00:11:18.276 --> 00:11:20.116 from those locations went to the fight. 186 00:11:20.256 --> 00:11:21.646 Some of them are already returning. 187 00:11:22.196 --> 00:11:27.236 And, again, they're returning not to, you know, buy a piece of land and settle down; 188 00:11:27.236 --> 00:11:32.916 they're returning to do -- to continue the Jihad only in another way. 189 00:11:32.916 --> 00:11:35.756 This thing is morphing all across North Africa, Central Africa, 190 00:11:35.756 --> 00:11:40.186 throughout the Middle East, as everything I just said about Europe and the West. 191 00:11:40.686 --> 00:11:42.506 This is going to be with us for a while. 192 00:11:43.096 --> 00:11:48.506 I don't think we can shoot our way out of it, but intel should be able 193 00:11:48.506 --> 00:11:53.256 to drive our responses always, of course, within the rule of law, 194 00:11:53.256 --> 00:11:57.266 always within the laws of our individual countries. 195 00:11:57.666 --> 00:11:59.326 We're going to be dealing with this for some time. 196 00:11:59.746 --> 00:12:02.156 >> Do you expect it to get worse before it gets better? 197 00:12:02.736 --> 00:12:04.286 >> Again, worse is a relative term. 198 00:12:04.286 --> 00:12:07.446 I mean, 9/11 was pretty bad. 199 00:12:07.446 --> 00:12:10.026 Luckily we have not had an event like that in our country, 200 00:12:10.626 --> 00:12:16.256 but other events overseas have been pretty horrific. 201 00:12:16.256 --> 00:12:19.546 Of course, the great perhaps least likely, I hope, 202 00:12:20.196 --> 00:12:25.526 but the biggest catastrophe would be an atomic device of some type smuggled 203 00:12:25.526 --> 00:12:30.456 into the country or a biological weapon that set off a pandemic. 204 00:12:30.976 --> 00:12:35.666 That's why, again, not to go down this road too early in the conversation, 205 00:12:35.666 --> 00:12:38.826 but that's why securing our borders is so important. 206 00:12:38.826 --> 00:12:43.216 And we are doing that already, working with our partners to the south 207 00:12:43.216 --> 00:12:47.516 and to the north, working all around the world with our partners 208 00:12:47.516 --> 00:12:49.756 that send commercial shipping to our country. 209 00:12:50.316 --> 00:12:52.976 But its vitally important to secure the borders in the homeland. 210 00:12:53.256 --> 00:12:58.346 >> And you mentioned that we can't shoot our way out of the problem of terrorism 211 00:12:58.476 --> 00:13:01.386 or at least not exclusively shoot our way out of terrorism -- 212 00:13:01.386 --> 00:13:03.036 these are the Twitter questions. 213 00:13:03.036 --> 00:13:03.446 >> Here they come. 214 00:13:03.526 --> 00:13:05.026 >> Wow, there's quite a few of these. 215 00:13:05.026 --> 00:13:05.646 People are eager. 216 00:13:05.646 --> 00:13:11.616 So, you know, DHS is involved in countering violent extremism programs 217 00:13:11.616 --> 00:13:16.236 and things like that; how do you sort of assess where we are on the war 218 00:13:16.236 --> 00:13:17.676 of ideas element of this -- 219 00:13:17.676 --> 00:13:21.036 the recruiting, the attraction of extremism to individuals? 220 00:13:21.036 --> 00:13:23.016 Because, of course, you know, if you don't stop the pipeline, 221 00:13:23.016 --> 00:13:24.176 you can't stop the problem. 222 00:13:24.416 --> 00:13:28.196 Have we gotten our arms around how we can actually do 223 00:13:28.196 --> 00:13:29.456 that effectively as a government? 224 00:13:30.806 --> 00:13:34.896 >> You know, the first thing I would say is extremism comes in many forms. 225 00:13:34.896 --> 00:13:39.946 One of the things certainly that I was very interested in, now we do it routinely 226 00:13:39.946 --> 00:13:43.126 at DHS that the press didn't do before, the chatter, 227 00:13:43.126 --> 00:13:47.626 the talk within the organization when we talked about terrorism extremism, rather, 228 00:13:47.626 --> 00:13:51.446 was all about Islamic-fueled extremism. 229 00:13:51.836 --> 00:13:55.866 But I asked the question about what about neo-Nazis, what about white supremacists, 230 00:13:56.256 --> 00:13:59.506 what about anti-Semitic organizations? 231 00:13:59.846 --> 00:14:04.396 So we track that as well because extremists, as I say, 232 00:14:04.396 --> 00:14:06.126 come in many, many variations. 233 00:14:06.556 --> 00:14:11.086 The one constant, it seems to me -- and again, most people, 234 00:14:11.086 --> 00:14:14.186 my counterparts around the world would say the one constant in all 235 00:14:14.186 --> 00:14:16.786 of this extremism is the Internet. 236 00:14:17.386 --> 00:14:21.876 The Internet is an absolutely wonderful, wonderful human invention, 237 00:14:21.876 --> 00:14:26.776 but it also can be, like any human invention, used in terrible ways. 238 00:14:27.256 --> 00:14:32.506 Our appeal to providers is to do a better job in terms of locating some 239 00:14:32.506 --> 00:14:35.026 of this extremist material that's on the net and taking it down. 240 00:14:35.706 --> 00:14:38.976 What we're really trying to do is prevent the young man 241 00:14:38.976 --> 00:14:42.826 from doing something horrific as opposed to capture him 242 00:14:42.826 --> 00:14:46.736 or to arrest him after he's done it. 243 00:14:46.736 --> 00:14:49.456 The question I ask of all my counterparts around the world -- 244 00:14:49.546 --> 00:14:52.346 Saudi Arabia, Singapore, everywhere, 245 00:14:52.346 --> 00:14:54.066 everyone I talk to is how do you prevent it? 246 00:14:54.066 --> 00:15:01.786 How do you find the individual that is getting extreme and prevent him 247 00:15:01.786 --> 00:15:04.556 from making that horrible step? 248 00:15:04.556 --> 00:15:08.616 And the answer that I found everywhere, it begins in the home -- 249 00:15:09.096 --> 00:15:14.256 parents watching what their kids are looking at on the Internet, 250 00:15:14.256 --> 00:15:19.776 what they're saying; schools, mosques, churches, synagogues, listening -- 251 00:15:19.776 --> 00:15:23.276 you know, the holy men and women, listening to what is said. 252 00:15:23.276 --> 00:15:30.886 Many times in the forensics of some of these horrific attacks, it would be a mom 253 00:15:30.886 --> 00:15:37.236 who said, "He was radical and I no longer allowed him to come to our mosque." 254 00:15:37.236 --> 00:15:41.556 Or in the case of the white supremacist that blew up the church down in Charleston 255 00:15:41.956 --> 00:15:45.006 where people had said, "Yeah, we didn't want him in our congregation 256 00:15:45.056 --> 00:15:50.366 because he would spout this white supremacist rhetoric." 257 00:15:50.366 --> 00:15:54.826 Certainly a relationship in many, many, many -- and this is good news -- 258 00:15:54.826 --> 00:15:59.416 many police departments here in the United States have community outreach programs 259 00:15:59.416 --> 00:16:04.956 so that people are not afraid to contact the police before their son 260 00:16:04.956 --> 00:16:08.486 or daughter takes that terrible last step. 261 00:16:08.996 --> 00:16:12.686 Relationships with the moms and churches so that they can call police 262 00:16:12.686 --> 00:16:17.276 and say this young man, young woman is really saying some terribly hateful, 263 00:16:17.276 --> 00:16:19.886 radical things, and I think they're going down on the wrong. 264 00:16:20.236 --> 00:16:26.376 But at the of it all, it's just a small number of people that go down this road. 265 00:16:26.926 --> 00:16:32.766 I think overwhelming number of Christians, Jews, Sikhs, Muslims are good people. 266 00:16:33.416 --> 00:16:35.346 And we should never, ever forget that. 267 00:16:35.976 --> 00:16:36.836 >> Yeah, absolutely. 268 00:16:36.836 --> 00:16:44.106 Let me ask you about the social response to the threat of terrorism as opposed 269 00:16:44.106 --> 00:16:46.296 to just the government response. 270 00:16:46.406 --> 00:16:50.406 You know, it's striking, at least to me, the way the British and their kind 271 00:16:50.406 --> 00:16:52.206 of stiff upper lip, keep calm and carry 272 00:16:52.706 --> 00:16:57.956 on way have suffered repeated horrific attacks and then, you know, 273 00:16:57.956 --> 00:17:02.796 sort of almost socially determined not to let that get in the way of them going 274 00:17:02.796 --> 00:17:05.206 about their daily lives and things like that. 275 00:17:05.506 --> 00:17:10.136 I mean, is it realistic to have zero attacks 276 00:17:10.136 --> 00:17:12.026 in the United States in the future? 277 00:17:12.026 --> 00:17:15.976 And, you know, is there a way in which society can 278 00:17:15.976 --> 00:17:21.716 or should become more resilient to inevitable attacks if, in fact, 279 00:17:21.756 --> 00:17:24.066 there will be more than zero in the future? 280 00:17:24.816 --> 00:17:28.056 >> Well, I think we certainly cannot expect zero attacks. 281 00:17:28.246 --> 00:17:32.306 I mean, we've actually done pretty well in terms of external attacks. 282 00:17:32.306 --> 00:17:38.196 Now, the home-grown San Bernardinos and Orlandos, I mean, that's the reality 283 00:17:38.196 --> 00:17:41.306 of the world we live in today. 284 00:17:41.306 --> 00:17:44.106 Good police work and as I said, good reporting by people. 285 00:17:44.446 --> 00:17:49.746 A lot of times, a number of times in some of these attacks that have happened, 286 00:17:49.746 --> 00:17:52.486 San Bernardino comes to mind but certainly Orlando, Chattanooga, 287 00:17:52.486 --> 00:17:56.356 next door neighbors have said, "You know, I saw that coming." 288 00:17:56.556 --> 00:18:00.776 Or the kid that blew up the African-American church in Charleston, 289 00:18:00.776 --> 00:18:03.336 neighbors said, "I saw that coming. 290 00:18:03.336 --> 00:18:04.706 He used to say these things." 291 00:18:04.706 --> 00:18:07.976 And you wonder why people don't report it. 292 00:18:07.976 --> 00:18:10.976 There was a neighbor, I think, in the San Bernardino case that said it, 293 00:18:10.976 --> 00:18:13.836 and when the media said, "Well, why didn't you report it 294 00:18:13.836 --> 00:18:14.976 if it was so obvious to you?" 295 00:18:14.976 --> 00:18:19.056 he said, "I didn't want to run the risk of being taken 296 00:18:19.126 --> 00:18:21.176 to court for slander or whatever." 297 00:18:21.176 --> 00:18:25.236 But I think I'd err on the side of caution if I was a neighbor. 298 00:18:25.236 --> 00:18:30.296 But I think it's something that is the reality of the time in which we live. 299 00:18:30.296 --> 00:18:33.766 If you see something, as Jeh Johnson I think started this program in DHS 300 00:18:33.766 --> 00:18:37.556 when he was the secretary, "If you see something, say something." 301 00:18:38.126 --> 00:18:41.996 Whether it's an anonymous 9-1-1 call or just a call 302 00:18:41.996 --> 00:18:43.516 to a friend who's a police officer. 303 00:18:44.076 --> 00:18:47.526 But I think that's the way we're going to get our arms around this problem. 304 00:18:47.526 --> 00:18:52.726 As far as the response of the nation -- and I was just talking to my counterpart 305 00:18:52.726 --> 00:18:55.386 in Britain up in Ottawa yesterday on this topic -- 306 00:18:55.876 --> 00:18:57.436 every time they've had it happen -- 307 00:18:57.436 --> 00:19:00.416 and it's been four times in five months they've had these attacks. 308 00:19:00.776 --> 00:19:05.986 Manchester, London, and a couple of other events they've had. 309 00:19:06.436 --> 00:19:10.916 They're very attuned to these immediate responses against, you know, 310 00:19:11.166 --> 00:19:13.916 retaliatory responses against the Muslim community. 311 00:19:14.336 --> 00:19:18.406 So one of the things they do is immediately have a kind 312 00:19:18.406 --> 00:19:23.456 of an all-faith event to where men and women 313 00:19:23.456 --> 00:19:26.506 of all faith come together and show solidarity. 314 00:19:27.026 --> 00:19:28.266 So that's the kind of thing. 315 00:19:28.266 --> 00:19:30.336 I mean, we're all Americans. 316 00:19:30.336 --> 00:19:32.876 Doesn't matter what god you worship, we're all Americans, 317 00:19:32.876 --> 00:19:36.966 we're all generally want the same thing out of life as each other. 318 00:19:36.966 --> 00:19:40.726 So we ought to kind of shoulder to shoulder take this thing on. 319 00:19:40.726 --> 00:19:45.616 And if it does happen, come together as a people and condemn it regardless 320 00:19:45.616 --> 00:19:49.936 of whether it's a white supremacist or an Islamist radical. 321 00:19:49.936 --> 00:19:52.786 It's the only way to get through this. 322 00:19:52.886 --> 00:19:53.106 >> All right. 323 00:19:53.106 --> 00:19:54.506 Well, we can switch gears a little bit. 324 00:19:54.506 --> 00:19:55.996 I have a Twitter question here. 325 00:19:55.996 --> 00:19:59.296 So as I would say, almost everyone 326 00:19:59.296 --> 00:20:03.086 in this room knows a few years ago OPM had a major cyberbreach, 327 00:20:03.086 --> 00:20:05.296 and they took probably most 328 00:20:05.296 --> 00:20:10.216 of the people's security clearance information -- mine, too; yours, too. 329 00:20:10.216 --> 00:20:12.556 You know? So we're all in this same boat together. 330 00:20:13.296 --> 00:20:18.656 What's the federal government doing to try to prevent another such thing 331 00:20:18.656 --> 00:20:19.976 of these kinds of losses more broadly speaking? 332 00:20:20.046 --> 00:20:23.116 >> Well, the federal government's doing everything it can. 333 00:20:23.416 --> 00:20:27.216 Until I took this job I didn't realize the capacity, 334 00:20:27.216 --> 00:20:33.326 the capability that DHS has in terms of cybersecurity. 335 00:20:33.326 --> 00:20:36.936 Of course, we're responsible for protecting the dot gov nets, 336 00:20:36.936 --> 00:20:39.756 which hasn't always been perfect. 337 00:20:40.326 --> 00:20:44.076 But I think my experts, the people that really know this business 338 00:20:44.076 --> 00:20:47.416 in my organization, tell me the difference today than even just a couple 339 00:20:47.416 --> 00:20:54.986 of years ago is that we've partnered with the commercial cybersector, like, 340 00:20:55.386 --> 00:20:59.286 seamlessly almost and look to them for the innovations 341 00:20:59.456 --> 00:21:02.426 and for the changes and to leverage that. 342 00:21:02.426 --> 00:21:07.036 Of course, we offer our defensive help to anyone that wants it. 343 00:21:07.036 --> 00:21:11.586 And, you know, Jeh Johnson, in fact, just last week appeared at a hearing 344 00:21:11.586 --> 00:21:16.906 as to whether -- I mean, during his time at the end of his time 345 00:21:16.906 --> 00:21:21.646 at DHS they offered help from DHS to the DNC and to the Clinton campaign 346 00:21:22.136 --> 00:21:25.946 because they saw -- had a sense for what was going on there. 347 00:21:26.536 --> 00:21:34.506 I think going forward, we are already offering our help and certainly plugging 348 00:21:34.506 --> 00:21:40.416 into every single other entity in the US government, in the US economy, 349 00:21:40.416 --> 00:21:45.756 overseas to really create a team that works together. 350 00:21:46.386 --> 00:21:49.656 But, you know, we saw one a couple of weeks ago. 351 00:21:49.656 --> 00:21:51.826 The WannaCry, we have one going on right now. 352 00:21:52.436 --> 00:21:56.016 The good news is it hasn't hurt this country nearly as bad 353 00:21:56.016 --> 00:21:57.296 as it hurt the other countries. 354 00:21:57.916 --> 00:22:01.946 But it is eye-watering to me when I first saw it happen, 355 00:22:01.946 --> 00:22:07.216 when WannaCry first started, how fast DHS brought together the team -- 356 00:22:07.216 --> 00:22:12.046 the team in NSA, FBI, the commercial providers -- 357 00:22:12.046 --> 00:22:16.806 and, you know, partnered with international partners 358 00:22:16.806 --> 00:22:21.436 to protect the United States and assist in reducing the damage overseas. 359 00:22:22.166 --> 00:22:26.766 >> Okay. You mentioned the importance of secure borders, which is, you know, 360 00:22:26.766 --> 00:22:28.666 obviously a topic of active discussion. 361 00:22:29.086 --> 00:22:32.626 How porous are our borders, would you say? 362 00:22:32.626 --> 00:22:35.126 And I mean, do we have terrorists coming over the southern border, 363 00:22:35.126 --> 00:22:36.926 or is this just something that could happen? 364 00:22:37.306 --> 00:22:40.616 And do you think we need to secure it? 365 00:22:40.616 --> 00:22:44.836 Is it an actual wall or is it a mix of sensors, and barriers, 366 00:22:44.836 --> 00:22:46.866 and responders, and all these things? 367 00:22:47.896 --> 00:22:51.526 >> I mean, let me go back to when I was in South Comm, I got very, very, 368 00:22:52.576 --> 00:22:57.276 very intense into this network that moves up through -- 369 00:22:57.306 --> 00:23:00.176 well, the world and it moves up through Central America, 370 00:23:00.176 --> 00:23:01.456 Mexico, into the United States. 371 00:23:01.456 --> 00:23:07.226 And I would say then frequently in open hearings and the press that anything 372 00:23:07.226 --> 00:23:09.276 that wants to get into the United States can 373 00:23:09.276 --> 00:23:12.206 through that network -- drugs, hundreds of tons. 374 00:23:12.206 --> 00:23:18.146 And here I'm talking hard drugs, but hundreds of tons of methamphetamine, 375 00:23:18.146 --> 00:23:20.916 heroin, and cocaine ride that network 376 00:23:20.916 --> 00:23:24.936 into the United States in a nearly unstoppable way. 377 00:23:25.346 --> 00:23:29.566 Tens of thousands of illegal persons crossing, millions and billions 378 00:23:29.566 --> 00:23:32.776 of dollars' worth of elicit commercial goods. 379 00:23:32.776 --> 00:23:38.876 Terrorists, I'm fairly confident right now they're not riding that network. 380 00:23:38.876 --> 00:23:42.966 We do pick up, we -- the United States, our Mexican partners, 381 00:23:42.966 --> 00:23:46.386 Central American partners -- are picking up an increasing number 382 00:23:46.386 --> 00:23:51.106 of individuals here, special interest aliens that travel from other parts 383 00:23:51.106 --> 00:23:55.536 of the world at great expense to come into the country. 384 00:23:55.646 --> 00:24:00.156 Typically people that spend that kind of money are not coming here to drive a taxi 385 00:24:00.156 --> 00:24:04.826 in Washington D.C., to wash dishes, they are coming here for another reason. 386 00:24:04.826 --> 00:24:08.906 But right now we are actually very, very good at locating them 387 00:24:08.906 --> 00:24:11.996 and sending them back before they ever get into the United States. 388 00:24:12.286 --> 00:24:15.436 But as I say, the network is very, very, very efficient. 389 00:24:15.966 --> 00:24:17.546 How do we stop it? 390 00:24:17.616 --> 00:24:22.796 We stop it with technology, we stop it with physical barriers -- they work. 391 00:24:23.486 --> 00:24:25.556 And we're working towards that. 392 00:24:25.556 --> 00:24:29.026 But we also stop it with working very, 393 00:24:29.026 --> 00:24:31.336 very closely with our partners' information, 394 00:24:31.336 --> 00:24:35.246 passenger information exchange, and just being shoulder to shoulder with them. 395 00:24:35.536 --> 00:24:36.476 And it does work. 396 00:24:36.836 --> 00:24:41.766 So it's not one single thing that does it, it's not one wall, or just technology, 397 00:24:41.766 --> 00:24:44.996 or just CVP, it's all of that. 398 00:24:45.026 --> 00:24:47.876 To include, again, the great partners, the Mexicans, 399 00:24:47.876 --> 00:24:49.866 the Central Americans that we work with. 400 00:24:50.616 --> 00:24:55.696 >> And on the travel ban or the executive order with the Supreme Court's decision, 401 00:24:56.106 --> 00:25:01.316 I know before you were saying that it didn't -- because of the injunction, 402 00:25:01.316 --> 00:25:03.596 it didn't allow you to conduct the review of procedures 403 00:25:03.596 --> 00:25:06.856 that you thought was critical to sort of moving forward. 404 00:25:07.316 --> 00:25:11.176 Do you have that space now with the Supreme Court's decision, 405 00:25:11.176 --> 00:25:13.446 or does that actually have to wait 406 00:25:13.446 --> 00:25:16.096 until they make a ruling on the underlying thing? 407 00:25:16.096 --> 00:25:18.656 So will this be a moot point by the time the Supreme Court gets to that? 408 00:25:18.656 --> 00:25:19.426 >> I think we do. 409 00:25:19.426 --> 00:25:25.596 One of the things -- I mean, I'm a law enforcer, but I'm also a law follower. 410 00:25:25.776 --> 00:25:31.436 I told my folks that I didn't want to come anywhere near close 411 00:25:31.756 --> 00:25:34.396 to getting cross-wise with the Court. 412 00:25:35.096 --> 00:25:37.626 I think that's the right way to be a public servant. 413 00:25:37.886 --> 00:25:45.456 Now we're allowed to take a hard look at what we could use going forward. 414 00:25:45.706 --> 00:25:50.916 And by the time, I believe, we win this, the government wins this case 415 00:25:51.306 --> 00:25:55.336 in the Supreme Court, we'll be able to move forward, not focusing on people 416 00:25:55.336 --> 00:26:02.666 from one religion or one culture but focusing on, you know, every airport, 417 00:26:02.666 --> 00:26:06.276 every country around the world and do a better job at determining 418 00:26:06.276 --> 00:26:09.626 who the person is that wants to come and why they want to come here. 419 00:26:09.626 --> 00:26:15.856 We have very, very, very complicated immigration system. 420 00:26:16.356 --> 00:26:17.986 I think it needs to be simplified. 421 00:26:18.056 --> 00:26:19.446 It certainly needs to be updated. 422 00:26:19.896 --> 00:26:24.886 But we have an absolute right to have a pretty good idea -- a very good idea -- 423 00:26:24.886 --> 00:26:26.176 of who's coming and why they're coming. 424 00:26:27.696 --> 00:26:33.036 >> And you talked about the obvious importance of international partnerships, 425 00:26:33.036 --> 00:26:36.356 whether it's with the Canadians, the Mexicans, or with our allies and friends 426 00:26:36.356 --> 00:26:39.886 in Europe on the whole basket of issues that you have to deal with. 427 00:26:40.376 --> 00:26:44.446 But, of course, there's a private sector component no matter almost any 428 00:26:44.446 --> 00:26:47.226 of the issues you're talking about, certainly cyber but some 429 00:26:47.226 --> 00:26:51.186 of the other things as well; how much of partnership 430 00:26:51.186 --> 00:26:54.596 with the private sector is a part of what you're doing these days? 431 00:26:54.596 --> 00:27:00.876 And how tough is it to work with the private sector in order to, you know, 432 00:27:01.116 --> 00:27:02.656 sort of come around common approaches? 433 00:27:02.656 --> 00:27:06.726 >> Yeah. We have a very, very solid outreach and relationship 434 00:27:06.726 --> 00:27:12.146 with the private sector across all the areas of responsibility at DHS. 435 00:27:12.146 --> 00:27:16.196 Certainly, they see it in their interest to tap into any source 436 00:27:16.196 --> 00:27:18.916 of solutions that might be out there. 437 00:27:19.066 --> 00:27:21.736 And certainly that's where I come down. 438 00:27:21.736 --> 00:27:25.756 I mean, they're, generally speaking -- the private, and cyber, 439 00:27:25.756 --> 00:27:29.286 and other threat streams like that, they're faster than us, 440 00:27:29.676 --> 00:27:31.386 they invest more money than we do. 441 00:27:32.526 --> 00:27:35.026 We should take advantage of that, and they're always willing to share. 442 00:27:35.576 --> 00:27:39.956 >> And how about, you know, state and local when it comes to, you know, 443 00:27:40.266 --> 00:27:44.616 for example, protecting the integrity of our election system? 444 00:27:44.696 --> 00:27:47.966 So, you know, according at least to the media reports 445 00:27:47.966 --> 00:27:52.536 when the Obama administration reached out and, I think, 446 00:27:52.586 --> 00:27:56.576 I believe your predecessor sort of reached out and sort of offered DHS's support 447 00:27:56.576 --> 00:28:01.856 for those who might come under threat of cyberattack on voting machines 448 00:28:01.856 --> 00:28:05.906 or communications between voting officials and so forth, there was a kind 449 00:28:05.976 --> 00:28:09.356 of a thanks but, you know, no thanks kind of thing from a number of people. 450 00:28:10.086 --> 00:28:15.006 Is this something that you're starting to think through in terms of the interface 451 00:28:15.006 --> 00:28:19.186 between what DHS does in order to help protect our election systems 452 00:28:19.186 --> 00:28:22.686 against the obvious threats to them and what the state and local folks are doing? 453 00:28:22.686 --> 00:28:25.186 >> Well, the first thing I'd say to make a little bit of joke here, 454 00:28:25.186 --> 00:28:28.886 but generally speaking, if someone from Washington shows up and says, 455 00:28:28.886 --> 00:28:30.866 "I want to help," you should run for the exits. 456 00:28:31.736 --> 00:28:34.836 But if someone comes and says, "I'm from Washington, 457 00:28:34.836 --> 00:28:37.626 I want to partner with you on your terms." 458 00:28:38.176 --> 00:28:44.646 Jeh Johnson declared the electoral system, the election system 459 00:28:44.646 --> 00:28:47.186 as critical infrastructure just before he stepped down based 460 00:28:47.186 --> 00:28:51.706 on what we know now he knew from August through the election period. 461 00:28:52.246 --> 00:28:57.856 And but the offer is on a voluntary basis. 462 00:28:58.286 --> 00:29:02.096 If you don't want to plug in, if you don't want us to help, 463 00:29:02.446 --> 00:29:04.206 try to help, then that's fine. 464 00:29:04.726 --> 00:29:06.426 So it's purely voluntary. 465 00:29:06.426 --> 00:29:09.456 I fully understand the sensitivities of the states. 466 00:29:10.016 --> 00:29:15.656 I've had discussions with states attorneys general and other election officials. 467 00:29:16.096 --> 00:29:21.696 Some welcomed the possibility, the opportunity; others are much more wary, 468 00:29:22.256 --> 00:29:24.486 but we'll do it on their terms. 469 00:29:24.486 --> 00:29:26.086 I would not force this on them. 470 00:29:26.486 --> 00:29:30.276 But I would say that if they don't want our help, 471 00:29:30.426 --> 00:29:36.506 and even if they do want our help, they'd be well advised to hire some very, very, 472 00:29:36.506 --> 00:29:39.986 very good hired cyberguns, if you will, to help protect. 473 00:29:39.986 --> 00:29:43.416 Because this is the way of the future. 474 00:29:43.416 --> 00:29:45.236 We have an election coming up in 18 months. 475 00:29:45.776 --> 00:29:48.156 We'll be back at this with a vengeance at that point. 476 00:29:48.286 --> 00:29:50.676 You know, Western Europe just experienced it. 477 00:29:51.896 --> 00:29:57.606 We have to protect this or we're not a real democracy anymore 478 00:29:57.606 --> 00:30:00.566 if we don't watch out, if someone can manipulate vote counts. 479 00:30:00.566 --> 00:30:03.316 They didn't last time, but if we ever get to that point 480 00:30:03.316 --> 00:30:05.476 where people are actually manipulating vote counts, 481 00:30:06.106 --> 00:30:09.916 I would say they'd be well advised to take all the help they can get. 482 00:30:10.076 --> 00:30:12.726 Because I certainly will. 483 00:30:14.086 --> 00:30:19.626 >> Let me ask you, too, about Congress, which I'm sure is your favorite topic 484 00:30:19.626 --> 00:30:25.016 of all in part because of the unbelievably fragmented nature 485 00:30:25.016 --> 00:30:27.876 of Congressional oversight over the Department of Homeland Security. 486 00:30:29.926 --> 00:30:33.076 You know, last count there's, you know -- 487 00:30:33.076 --> 00:30:35.746 I mean, there are literally dozens of committees and subcommittees 488 00:30:35.746 --> 00:30:36.956 that are overseeing different portions. 489 00:30:36.956 --> 00:30:37.496 >> 119. 490 00:30:37.496 --> 00:30:43.176 >> 119. So, you know, even if you testified before one a day, 491 00:30:43.176 --> 00:30:45.446 it would take you until a pretty significant portion 492 00:30:45.446 --> 00:30:46.146 of the year before you -- 493 00:30:46.146 --> 00:30:46.996 >> And I won't. 494 00:30:46.996 --> 00:30:52.596 >> Well, in that case -- but can Congress become a more effective sort 495 00:30:52.596 --> 00:30:56.686 of partner with DHS in what it's doing? 496 00:30:57.046 --> 00:31:02.196 I mean, are there sort of practical things that the Congress can do other 497 00:31:02.196 --> 00:31:05.556 than consolidating all those into one committee, which they had the opportunity 498 00:31:05.556 --> 00:31:08.466 to do back when I was working on the Hill and they decided not 499 00:31:08.466 --> 00:31:11.526 to because everybody had their little areas that they wanted to hold onto? 500 00:31:11.816 --> 00:31:16.316 So what can Congress do on any of these issues that we're talking 501 00:31:16.316 --> 00:31:21.326 about to sort of, you know, be a better partner in the Homeland Security effort? 502 00:31:21.516 --> 00:31:23.196 >> Well, I would never criticize the Congress -- 503 00:31:23.196 --> 00:31:24.596 they're the elected representatives. 504 00:31:24.596 --> 00:31:25.246 >> I'll do that for you. 505 00:31:25.246 --> 00:31:25.886 >> Yeah, please. 506 00:31:26.056 --> 00:31:26.866 Do it some more. 507 00:31:27.301 --> 00:31:29.301 [ Laughter ] 508 00:31:29.586 --> 00:31:32.706 But the fact is that they don't want to give up jurisdiction. 509 00:31:32.706 --> 00:31:36.966 You know? The department was created 15 or so years ago from all 510 00:31:36.966 --> 00:31:39.806 over the federal government, put into DHS. 511 00:31:40.236 --> 00:31:44.316 At the time then and it still is a need, they should have done much what 512 00:31:44.406 --> 00:31:49.816 like the Department of Defense deals with, you know, four committees and maybe 20 513 00:31:49.816 --> 00:31:52.386 or 25 subcommittees at the most. 514 00:31:52.826 --> 00:31:53.716 They could do that. 515 00:31:53.716 --> 00:31:58.256 Chairman McCaul and others in the House and Senate see that as a way forward. 516 00:31:58.256 --> 00:32:02.726 You know, the complication for us is, just as you might imagine, 517 00:32:02.726 --> 00:32:04.656 119 committees and subcommittees. 518 00:32:05.346 --> 00:32:09.726 Some of the elements of DHS are actually have two committees of jurisdiction 519 00:32:09.726 --> 00:32:13.996 and will go to one, and the witness will be warned about some topic -- 520 00:32:14.086 --> 00:32:17.456 do this or don't do that -- and they'll go to their other committee 521 00:32:17.796 --> 00:32:20.216 and the other committee will have the opposite view. 522 00:32:21.096 --> 00:32:22.906 So something ought to be done. 523 00:32:22.906 --> 00:32:26.876 As I say, Chairman McCaul and others like him are doing the best they can, 524 00:32:26.876 --> 00:32:29.106 but we've got to pare it down. 525 00:32:29.666 --> 00:32:33.116 It is a very complicated organization, but so is the Department 526 00:32:33.116 --> 00:32:34.766 of Defense if you look at it. 527 00:32:34.856 --> 00:32:37.116 And I know the Department of Defense very well. 528 00:32:37.116 --> 00:32:40.446 And I'm dangerous enough to say about DHS that sure, there's a lot of -- 529 00:32:40.656 --> 00:32:44.476 quarter of a million people -- there's a lot of variations, 530 00:32:44.476 --> 00:32:50.626 there's a lot of different missions, but it's really no different than, say, DOD. 531 00:32:50.756 --> 00:32:56.336 One of the things Jeh Johnson brought in about halfway 532 00:32:56.336 --> 00:33:01.386 through his tenure was this topic or this idea of unity of effort to where we look 533 00:33:01.386 --> 00:33:04.386 at the department and say, "Okay, what are those things that we can combine?" 534 00:33:04.796 --> 00:33:07.356 Acquisition, perhaps, and that kind of thing. 535 00:33:07.796 --> 00:33:11.266 But we have a long way to go. 536 00:33:11.736 --> 00:33:15.466 I wished they had started it 15 years ago when the department was first created. 537 00:33:16.566 --> 00:33:20.196 >> And another question I can't resist asking you because I'm originally 538 00:33:20.196 --> 00:33:24.446 from New Orleans is the lessons of Katrina all these years later. 539 00:33:25.716 --> 00:33:31.936 You know, if there are some extreme weather event that happens on your watch, 540 00:33:32.306 --> 00:33:38.436 are there -- how advanced is DHS now compared to -- 541 00:33:38.806 --> 00:33:43.736 in its emergency response compared to where it was all these years ago 542 00:33:43.736 --> 00:33:48.506 in your assessment to respond effectively to those kinds of real tragedies 543 00:33:48.506 --> 00:33:49.926 that affect, you know, so many people? 544 00:33:49.926 --> 00:33:50.716 >> Great question. 545 00:33:50.716 --> 00:33:52.526 I mean, I think it's way ahead now. 546 00:33:53.006 --> 00:33:57.676 When I first got to the job, there was -- into the job in January -- 547 00:33:57.676 --> 00:34:00.226 there was a couple of tornadoes did some damage 548 00:34:00.226 --> 00:34:02.016 down in the Mississippi-Georgia line. 549 00:34:02.476 --> 00:34:05.706 I called FEMA, just how does this work? 550 00:34:05.706 --> 00:34:10.336 And they said, "Sir, we already have people on the ground there." 551 00:34:10.336 --> 00:34:12.086 And the governors hadn't asked. 552 00:34:12.086 --> 00:34:15.226 Now, they weren't doing anything other than on the ground, ready to go. 553 00:34:15.226 --> 00:34:18.666 So as soon as the governor asked for help, they were there already. 554 00:34:18.666 --> 00:34:22.626 You know, I'd call a governor, the next phone call I had was from President Trump, 555 00:34:23.126 --> 00:34:26.886 who said, "Hey, should I go down there into that region?" 556 00:34:26.886 --> 00:34:29.216 I said, "No, sir, that's probably the last thing they want right now is for you 557 00:34:29.216 --> 00:34:32.186 to show up relative to what the package that goes with you." 558 00:34:32.186 --> 00:34:35.736 But the point is for several of these kind of tornado events, 559 00:34:36.226 --> 00:34:40.626 a snow event up in the north, Pennsylvania, I think, 560 00:34:40.626 --> 00:34:47.466 he would call me very interested in how FEMA adjusted to that. 561 00:34:47.466 --> 00:34:52.206 Now he's more as I am, much more comfortable because the men and women 562 00:34:52.206 --> 00:34:55.676 of FEMA -- I mean, they lean so far forward, again, 563 00:34:55.676 --> 00:34:58.926 always respecting the states and the authorities of the governor. 564 00:34:58.926 --> 00:35:00.376 And that's who's really in charge. 565 00:35:00.376 --> 00:35:01.226 We support them. 566 00:35:01.356 --> 00:35:04.846 But they lean so far forward that they almost fall forward. 567 00:35:05.216 --> 00:35:08.436 But so I think we're in a much better place. 568 00:35:08.436 --> 00:35:13.796 Some of these events -- Katrina, Sandy -- are so big that it takes, you know, 569 00:35:13.796 --> 00:35:16.816 literally the entire state and federal government. 570 00:35:17.166 --> 00:35:20.066 But these men and women really know what they're doing. 571 00:35:20.066 --> 00:35:22.356 We just got a new administrator, Brock Long. 572 00:35:22.826 --> 00:35:25.406 He comes with a great deal of experience. 573 00:35:25.406 --> 00:35:26.626 He's our FEMA administrator. 574 00:35:27.046 --> 00:35:32.076 He was the Alabama -- the administrator in Alabama. 575 00:35:32.336 --> 00:35:34.156 He's got federal time, he's got state time. 576 00:35:34.636 --> 00:35:37.486 He's just a superb pick; I picked him. 577 00:35:38.016 --> 00:35:39.456 [ Laughter ] 578 00:35:39.456 --> 00:35:40.666 >> How could he better any better, then? 579 00:35:40.666 --> 00:35:41.256 >> That's right. 580 00:35:41.386 --> 00:35:45.596 He is a phenomenally talented guy in this regard. 581 00:35:45.596 --> 00:35:48.936 And so -- I mean, these things can get big, as you know. 582 00:35:49.336 --> 00:35:51.886 But I think we're in good hands with FEMA. 583 00:35:51.886 --> 00:35:55.996 >> Another Twitter question before we wrap up here in just a minute: 584 00:35:56.276 --> 00:35:59.896 Can you talk about the administration proposal to move the refugee bureau 585 00:35:59.896 --> 00:36:01.656 from the State Department to DHS? 586 00:36:02.216 --> 00:36:02.896 >> I can't. 587 00:36:03.436 --> 00:36:06.046 >> Okay. Well, then that means we can move 588 00:36:06.046 --> 00:36:09.806 on to another question in an expeditious manner. 589 00:36:11.576 --> 00:36:14.966 I'll do another Twitter question: Can you talk about the decision 590 00:36:14.966 --> 00:36:22.626 to change DHS CVE grants, such as cutting off those aimed at neo-Nazi groups? 591 00:36:22.866 --> 00:36:27.736 >> On the grants, when I first got to the job -- 592 00:36:27.906 --> 00:36:30.366 and I've got a lot of understanding 593 00:36:30.366 --> 00:36:35.196 of how federal programs are managed by other federal agencies. 594 00:36:35.596 --> 00:36:41.986 In my past life, whether it was in Iraq, or in Central America, South America, 595 00:36:42.526 --> 00:36:46.836 and the one question I always ask is -- 596 00:36:47.216 --> 00:36:50.246 the example I would give is the conversation I had about gangs 597 00:36:50.246 --> 00:36:53.456 in Central America: Is this a good program? 598 00:36:53.456 --> 00:36:54.416 And they said, "Oh my gosh, yeah, 599 00:36:54.416 --> 00:36:56.466 we're trying to keep kids from going into the gangs." 600 00:36:56.466 --> 00:36:57.966 I said, "Okay, what we're trying 601 00:36:57.966 --> 00:37:00.816 to accomplish is really good, but is it effective? 602 00:37:01.446 --> 00:37:03.386 You know? What are the metrics?" 603 00:37:03.386 --> 00:37:07.276 How do we know that -- we're spending on this program $10 million a year 604 00:37:07.576 --> 00:37:11.876 for ten years; are there more kids in the gangs, the same number of kids -- 605 00:37:11.876 --> 00:37:15.556 I would argue in both those cases that's failure -- or is there a lot fewer kids? 606 00:37:16.076 --> 00:37:19.786 And the person that I was talking to said, "No, it's exponentially worse." 607 00:37:20.836 --> 00:37:26.886 So maybe we should look at the program and either certainly try to adjust it 608 00:37:26.886 --> 00:37:30.206 so it's more effective or effective or just do away with it. 609 00:37:30.206 --> 00:37:33.526 So as I came in, decisions had been made, 610 00:37:33.526 --> 00:37:35.666 recommendations had been made before I took over. 611 00:37:36.276 --> 00:37:42.626 And so I asked my staff, "Let's look at those programs and ask those questions -- 612 00:37:42.626 --> 00:37:44.296 what is the metric of success? 613 00:37:44.556 --> 00:37:45.956 First of all, is it even possible 614 00:37:46.406 --> 00:37:49.856 to prevent someone from becoming an extremist?" 615 00:37:50.536 --> 00:37:55.256 But let's ask that question, but also say, "Has the local community -- 616 00:37:55.256 --> 00:37:58.666 whatever city it is -- have they put their own money against this?" 617 00:37:59.366 --> 00:38:05.376 Because that tells me there's buy-in, that they think we can help with our money. 618 00:38:05.416 --> 00:38:09.776 So as you ask those question, in many, many cases, the answer was, 619 00:38:09.776 --> 00:38:13.356 "What we're trying to accomplish is certainly honorable and decent 620 00:38:13.356 --> 00:38:19.776 and wonderful, but there really is no way that we can determine whether these kind 621 00:38:19.776 --> 00:38:21.826 of programs in the past have been successful." 622 00:38:22.136 --> 00:38:27.096 So we found other -- what I consider to be other programs that would be, 623 00:38:27.096 --> 00:38:32.466 you know, possibly more successful. 624 00:38:33.266 --> 00:38:36.926 Back to my comments when I first mentioned before, though, I mean, 625 00:38:37.316 --> 00:38:40.696 I might be the first Homeland Security person because of the surprise -- 626 00:38:40.696 --> 00:38:43.986 I think I am -- because of the surprise I received when I said, 627 00:38:43.986 --> 00:38:45.236 "What about white supremacists? 628 00:38:45.236 --> 00:38:46.576 What about neo-Nazis? 629 00:38:46.996 --> 00:38:51.906 What about people who are attacking small African-American churches 630 00:38:51.906 --> 00:38:55.126 in the South or anywhere or mosques? 631 00:38:55.196 --> 00:38:56.896 Do we know about those kind of things?" 632 00:38:57.536 --> 00:39:00.706 And the answer was, "No, but we will find out." 633 00:39:00.706 --> 00:39:07.406 So I'm very attuned to other forms of extremism. 634 00:39:07.796 --> 00:39:11.496 But with a finite amount of money, I wanted to at least start down the road 635 00:39:11.496 --> 00:39:16.006 of let's find organizations that we think might be able to deliver -- 636 00:39:16.216 --> 00:39:17.836 not organizations but programs. 637 00:39:18.306 --> 00:39:21.756 But, you know, these things are always in change. 638 00:39:21.756 --> 00:39:23.296 We'll see how those programs do. 639 00:39:23.766 --> 00:39:26.846 If they don't seem to work out -- again, if the local community's not willing 640 00:39:27.216 --> 00:39:30.866 to put their own money in, then we'll look for other programs 641 00:39:30.866 --> 00:39:31.936 that might prove more effective. 642 00:39:32.146 --> 00:39:34.086 >> Mr. Secretary, thank you for your time. 643 00:39:34.086 --> 00:39:34.216 >> Sure. 644 00:39:34.216 --> 00:39:35.496 >> I really appreciate you being here with us. 645 00:39:35.496 --> 00:39:35.886 >> Thank you, Richard. 646 00:39:35.886 --> 00:39:37.976 >> And please join me in thanking the Secretary. 647 00:39:38.016 --> 00:39:39.156 [ Applause ] 648 00:39:39.156 --> 00:39:39.596 >> Thank you. 649 00:39:39.596 --> 00:39:39.806 >> Thanks. 650 00:39:40.168 --> 00:39:42.168 [ Applause ]