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[Music]

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Reed: Interference is a real concern

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that can affect our first responder communications.

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How do we deploy mitigation strategies

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for first responders without huge costs involvement?

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Young: If we get an emergency
call and we can't talk to each other,

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that's a big issue for us and it's a huge safety issue,

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so anything we can learn, anything we can take back to

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our agency form this exercise is a plus in my book.

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Anderson: last year it was a matter of trying to

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see on both ends if we could tell when we were being jammed.

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This year we thought about , OK, so
if you're jammed, now what do you do?

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Smith: During the Jam X '17, we're
basically using the lessons learned

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from the previous exercise to really
focus on how the jammers are being used,

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their effective range and the
impacts they have on the technology.

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One of the things that we learned was that

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if you're being jammed on one
frequency, you can go to a different frequency.

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Anderson: If you feel like you've
lost communications in one area,

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sometimes if you moved twenty feet, you might regain it.

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Kowdley: We're also looking at
using physical objects as shielding,

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specifically small cars, large cars, buildings.

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And then look at the geometries involved in terms of how

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to work against these systems that could potentially interfere

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with systems that first responders are using.

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Anderson: Survival blankets, I guess, is what they're called.

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They're like a metal blanket.

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And we thought about trying to cover a device

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that may be causing interference and
seeing if that resolved the problem.

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We've had some success with that, so
that's something we learned this year

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that if we wouldn't have been able to
come out here, we wouldn't have known.

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Kowdley: You have features on the
radio that you may not be properly using,

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such as we have automatic gain control

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and some of the other features that are built into the radio,

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but you just have to be, enable them
as part of your programming routine.

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Anderson: Also we learned the
importance of having backup communication plans

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and making sure the field units know what to do

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if something like that were to happen.

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Kowdley: We have stakeholders from
federal, state and local, industry, academia.

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Having all of us work together clearly allows us

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to learn from each other and share knowledge.

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The second piece is that having multiple
agencies bring in their multiple systems

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allows us to test what is the
impact to a whole host of systems.

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We're testing LTE and band 14.

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We're also doing a number of public safety bands and modes.

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Young: I think one of the most
important things that we can learn

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is what to look for, how to defeat that if we can

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and how to educate our employees and our
operational personnel in the field on how,

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what to do in case this does happen in the field.

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Anderson: Just because you lose communications,

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don't always think that it's going to be something technical;

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it could be something else,

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so it's important to open your mind to all possibilities.

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Don't get tunnel vision.

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Reed: Technology will come to a point

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where it's cost-effective for our first responders

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to have spectrum analyzers and early identification devices

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in their patrol cars and on their fire trucks,

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but right now what we really need to teach them is,

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is that this is a potential concern.

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This is very easy, low-cost ways that you can either say,

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yes, there may be something going on
and if there is something going on,

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this is a very easy way that we can
ensure mission critical communications

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are making it back to our dispatch,

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our command vehicles and on the incident itself.

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[Music]

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