WEBVTT 1 00:00:00.760 --> 00:00:03.500 Hello and welcome to today's Tech Talk 2 00:00:03.500 --> 00:00:06.700 with the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate 3 00:00:06.700 --> 00:00:08.800 Today we're going to be discussing signal 4 00:00:08.800 --> 00:00:11.020 interference as it relates to first responders. 5 00:00:11.020 --> 00:00:12.760 Sweetheart Crowley is here today 6 00:00:12.760 --> 00:00:15.420 joining us from the First Responders Group here at S&T. 7 00:00:15.420 --> 00:00:16.620 We're gonna start the discussion 8 00:00:16.620 --> 00:00:18.200 with some questions that I'm going to ask Sweetheart, 9 00:00:18.200 --> 00:00:20.060 and then we're going to open it up to the audience. 10 00:00:20.060 --> 00:00:21.360 So just to kick things off, kind of give 11 00:00:21.360 --> 00:00:23.540 us an overview of what signal interference is 12 00:00:23.540 --> 00:00:25.160 and how it impacts first responders. 13 00:00:25.160 --> 00:00:27.880 Sure, signal interference is generally 14 00:00:27.880 --> 00:00:31.020 anything that impedes a signal going from 15 00:00:31.020 --> 00:00:33.280 a transmitter to a receiver. 16 00:00:33.280 --> 00:00:35.240 Generally, in terms of what we're looking at, 17 00:00:35.240 --> 00:00:37.440 we're looking at the wireless aspect of it. 18 00:00:37.440 --> 00:00:39.060 Okay, But it doesn't need to be that. 19 00:00:39.060 --> 00:00:42.400 It could be a hard-line wire that gets interrupted. 20 00:00:42.400 --> 00:00:44.460 But generally, we're looking for interference 21 00:00:44.460 --> 00:00:46.180 between the transmitter and the receiver. 22 00:00:46.280 --> 00:00:47.620 Okay, and what are some examples of like 23 00:00:47.620 --> 00:00:50.120 the wireless versus the wired communications? 24 00:00:50.120 --> 00:00:52.660 Sure. In wireless you're primarily talking 25 00:00:52.660 --> 00:00:54.940 land, mobile, radio systems, GPS. 26 00:00:54.940 --> 00:00:58.360 We're also looking at cellular Wi-Fi, 27 00:00:58.360 --> 00:01:01.180 anything that you use to communicate wirelessly, 28 00:01:01.180 --> 00:01:04.200 as opposed to a hard fixed network. 29 00:01:04.200 --> 00:01:06.740 And most first responders now are not 30 00:01:06.740 --> 00:01:08.640 fixed to a single location, they're moving. 31 00:01:08.640 --> 00:01:11.340 Yeah. So they do their jobs through the 32 00:01:11.340 --> 00:01:13.660 wireless aspect or the mobility aspect. 33 00:01:13.660 --> 00:01:16.540 So there's a lot of different ways that they 34 00:01:16.540 --> 00:01:18.420 communicate but the signal interference 35 00:01:18.420 --> 00:01:20.220 is something that can impact all of those? 36 00:01:20.220 --> 00:01:24.060 Correct, correct the the idea is for 37 00:01:24.060 --> 00:01:25.610 first responder perspective and 38 00:01:25.610 --> 00:01:28.820 because they are key to supporting the 39 00:01:28.820 --> 00:01:33.280 public and being responsive to the public 40 00:01:33.280 --> 00:01:35.080 they need to have resilient communications. 41 00:01:35.080 --> 00:01:38.240 So ideally that's our goal, our goal is to lead towards 42 00:01:38.240 --> 00:01:40.430 resilient comms to make sure they can 43 00:01:40.430 --> 00:01:42.480 communicate when they need it and how the need it. 44 00:01:42.480 --> 00:01:43.820 Yeah, and you're raising a good point 45 00:01:43.820 --> 00:01:45.980 about, you know, the impact this has on 46 00:01:45.980 --> 00:01:47.920 you know the average member of the public. 47 00:01:47.920 --> 00:01:49.980 Can you expound more on that in terms of 48 00:01:49.980 --> 00:01:51.780 you know, why we need to have secure 49 00:01:51.780 --> 00:01:54.060 resilient communications for our first responders? 50 00:01:54.060 --> 00:01:55.840 Sure. It's everything from everything 51 00:01:55.840 --> 00:01:57.360 from you know, we're looking at the 52 00:01:57.360 --> 00:02:00.580 traditional aspect of dispatch 53 00:02:00.580 --> 00:02:04.040 reaching a mobile, mobile officer 54 00:02:04.040 --> 00:02:05.509 saying you know, go here somebody 55 00:02:05.509 --> 00:02:08.880 needs help or you have a fire brigade 56 00:02:08.880 --> 00:02:10.760 that's going out to a fire. 57 00:02:10.760 --> 00:02:13.610 They routinely get dispatched or they're 58 00:02:13.610 --> 00:02:15.080 communicating amongst themselves, 59 00:02:15.080 --> 00:02:18.160 just say, to coordinate how to specifically 60 00:02:18.160 --> 00:02:20.810 do their job, even EMS, 61 00:02:20.810 --> 00:02:22.549 And then further down the road we're 62 00:02:22.549 --> 00:02:24.260 looking at more broadband aspects of, 63 00:02:24.260 --> 00:02:26.080 how do you get comm systems 64 00:02:26.080 --> 00:02:28.700 such as, you know, send a building floor 65 00:02:28.700 --> 00:02:31.880 plan to a fire truck that's on the way to the fire 66 00:02:31.880 --> 00:02:33.829 so they have information about how to 67 00:02:33.829 --> 00:02:35.280 attack the fire once they get there. 68 00:02:35.280 --> 00:02:35.900 Yeah. 69 00:02:35.900 --> 00:02:38.180 So it's, it's sort of all aspects of it 70 00:02:38.180 --> 00:02:40.580 but generally it helps them do their job better. 71 00:02:40.580 --> 00:02:42.469 Yeah. Which obviously we need them to do, 72 00:02:42.469 --> 00:02:43.879 because they are usually protecting the 73 00:02:43.879 --> 00:02:46.900 communities and responding to something you know, serious. 74 00:02:46.900 --> 00:02:47.400 Correct. 75 00:02:47.400 --> 00:02:49.240 So there's something that often comes up 76 00:02:49.240 --> 00:02:50.810 when we talk about signal interference 77 00:02:50.810 --> 00:02:53.280 and that's jamming. Can you explain either 78 00:02:53.280 --> 00:02:54.530 the difference or how they're similar 79 00:02:54.530 --> 00:02:56.640 what is signal interference and jamming? 80 00:02:56.640 --> 00:02:59.569 So generally jamming is where you are 81 00:02:59.569 --> 00:03:04.489 creating noise or some sort of, some sort 82 00:03:04.489 --> 00:03:08.329 of signal that masks the original signal. 83 00:03:08.329 --> 00:03:09.600 That could be intentional, 84 00:03:09.600 --> 00:03:10.880 Okay. it could be unintentional. 85 00:03:10.880 --> 00:03:13.300 So the term jamming within the context, 86 00:03:13.300 --> 00:03:15.220 is if you generate another signal to 87 00:03:15.220 --> 00:03:18.640 mask the intended or desired transmission. 88 00:03:18.640 --> 00:03:22.160 Now, specifically we are kind of focused 89 00:03:22.160 --> 00:03:25.489 on looking at broadband jammers that are 90 00:03:25.489 --> 00:03:28.790 designed and developed intentionally to 91 00:03:28.790 --> 00:03:31.430 mask or interfere with communication 92 00:03:31.430 --> 00:03:34.780 systems such as, cellular, Wi-Fi, GPS or 93 00:03:34.780 --> 00:03:38.620 specifically first responder communication networks. 94 00:03:38.620 --> 00:03:40.280 And are there examples of let's say just 95 00:03:40.280 --> 00:03:41.540 natural occurrences that might 96 00:03:41.540 --> 00:03:43.069 impede communications? 97 00:03:43.069 --> 00:03:46.900 Sure, yeah. We have sun spots, microwaves, 98 00:03:46.900 --> 00:03:50.780 You could, also that's the natural aspect of it. 99 00:03:50.780 --> 00:03:52.080 You could have the human element. 100 00:03:52.080 --> 00:03:55.640 Which is, somebody incorrectly programs their radio. 101 00:03:55.640 --> 00:03:57.660 That could potentially do interference. 102 00:03:57.660 --> 00:04:00.620 Then we have the other aspect of technology. 103 00:04:00.620 --> 00:04:02.800 We could have a transmitter that goes bad. 104 00:04:02.800 --> 00:04:05.020 Oh, okay. So for example, there's been 105 00:04:05.020 --> 00:04:08.240 plenty of examples of how baby monitors, 106 00:04:08.240 --> 00:04:10.120 that operate on the wrong frequency 107 00:04:10.120 --> 00:04:12.380 and interfere with you know, 108 00:04:12.380 --> 00:04:16.100 your cordless phones and/or first responder 109 00:04:16.100 --> 00:04:18.109 communications in some cases. 110 00:04:18.109 --> 00:04:21.700 It could be anything from, it could be an 111 00:04:21.700 --> 00:04:24.560 in building system that happens to the 112 00:04:24.560 --> 00:04:29.000 transmitter could be failing and start operating on a different band. 113 00:04:29.000 --> 00:04:30.780 Those are kind of cases that, you know, 114 00:04:30.780 --> 00:04:33.330 exist today and we know of it. 115 00:04:33.330 --> 00:04:35.500 And it's not necessarily the focus of your 116 00:04:35.500 --> 00:04:38.440 program to look at you know the natural side, 117 00:04:38.440 --> 00:04:41.000 you're focused more on those intentional, the jammers? 118 00:04:41.000 --> 00:04:43.470 Correct, but specifically, if we come up with 119 00:04:43.470 --> 00:04:45.840 technologies or tactics, nothing says 120 00:04:45.840 --> 00:04:48.020 that you couldn't you couldn't ubiquitously 121 00:04:48.020 --> 00:04:49.340 apply it across the board 122 00:04:49.340 --> 00:04:51.780 So anything that that makes their comm 123 00:04:51.780 --> 00:04:54.060 systems more resilient allows the 124 00:04:54.060 --> 00:04:55.300 message to get through. 125 00:04:55.300 --> 00:04:57.200 Yeah. it's going affect, its going to help you 126 00:04:57.210 --> 00:04:59.790 regardless of what the situation is. 127 00:04:59.790 --> 00:05:04.040 But the obvious intended, intended 128 00:05:04.040 --> 00:05:05.730 objective is to get the comms through, 129 00:05:05.730 --> 00:05:09.840 allow them to communicate better and more, more reliably. 130 00:05:09.840 --> 00:05:12.020 Yeah, and I want to expand a little bit on that. 131 00:05:12.020 --> 00:05:14.920 So in you know the ideal state. What would 132 00:05:14.920 --> 00:05:17.120 First Responder Communications look like? 133 00:05:17.120 --> 00:05:21.060 So in a ideal state, if a police officer or 134 00:05:21.060 --> 00:05:24.930 a fireman, or EMS, anybody who reaches for 135 00:05:24.930 --> 00:05:27.690 their radio would would feel confident 136 00:05:27.690 --> 00:05:30.220 that they have communication links. 137 00:05:30.220 --> 00:05:32.620 know that that is not always the case. 138 00:05:32.620 --> 00:05:35.310 But in an ideal state they would have 139 00:05:35.310 --> 00:05:37.380 the kind of bandwidth if they want. 140 00:05:37.380 --> 00:05:39.660 So if they want streaming video, images, 141 00:05:39.660 --> 00:05:41.640 text, they would always get what they want. 142 00:05:41.640 --> 00:05:44.640 Yeah. But ideally that's what the target is. 143 00:05:44.640 --> 00:05:48.420 Yeah. How is S&T helping them get to that ideal state? 144 00:05:48.420 --> 00:05:50.940 So we have something called the Apex 145 00:05:50.940 --> 00:05:52.900 Next Generation First Responder Program. 146 00:05:52.900 --> 00:05:57.040 So our focus area is, is our tag line is, 147 00:05:57.040 --> 00:05:59.140 Protected, Connected and Fully Aware. 148 00:05:59.140 --> 00:06:01.920 So our idea is, is a first responder 149 00:06:01.920 --> 00:06:04.720 who is protected from everything 150 00:06:04.720 --> 00:06:07.380 from duty uniforms that are chem and bio 151 00:06:07.380 --> 00:06:09.260 resistant all the way to communication systems. 152 00:06:09.260 --> 00:06:10.140 Wow. 153 00:06:10.140 --> 00:06:12.600 So, we kind of span the entire band 154 00:06:12.600 --> 00:06:14.580 but what we're specifically talking 155 00:06:14.580 --> 00:06:16.800 today is, the spectrum piece of it, 156 00:06:16.800 --> 00:06:18.660 the wireless aspect of it, how do you make 157 00:06:18.660 --> 00:06:20.670 that more resilient, when you have 158 00:06:20.670 --> 00:06:23.920 specifically either intended or unintended targets. 159 00:06:23.920 --> 00:06:28.900 Okay, and who else, what other organizations is S&T working with on this effort? 160 00:06:28.900 --> 00:06:32.420 So actually we we had a successful test 161 00:06:32.420 --> 00:06:37.420 in 2016, and so we really got an 162 00:06:37.500 --> 00:06:40.310 amazing response with all states of 163 00:06:40.310 --> 00:06:44.340 federal state logo. We had DoD participants 164 00:06:44.340 --> 00:06:46.940 we had three-letter agencies come and support us. 165 00:06:46.940 --> 00:06:51.280 But generally we had an amazing, amazing 166 00:06:51.280 --> 00:06:54.200 event in that, and I think you're seeing 167 00:06:54.200 --> 00:06:57.480 some of the images in the backdrop from 168 00:06:57.480 --> 00:07:00.860 that event. So you know feel free to take 169 00:07:00.860 --> 00:07:04.100 a look at those as well. But we participated 170 00:07:04.100 --> 00:07:05.600 with state and local guys. 171 00:07:05.600 --> 00:07:09.040 For example, Los Angeles had their 172 00:07:09.040 --> 00:07:11.280 fire division come out, we had police 173 00:07:11.280 --> 00:07:15.640 squad, squad cars, police chiefs vehicles, 174 00:07:15.640 --> 00:07:17.740 we had their command vehicles, 175 00:07:17.740 --> 00:07:21.240 we had FEMA show up, Arizona Mesa PD showed up. 176 00:07:21.240 --> 00:07:25.700 Oh, wow. We also had a number of federal agencies. 177 00:07:25.700 --> 00:07:30.410 We had support from from DHS components ICBP, 178 00:07:30.410 --> 00:07:35.410 as well as some of the other agencies 179 00:07:36.200 --> 00:07:39.690 that support us including FCC, FCC was 180 00:07:39.690 --> 00:07:41.730 there because they are actually by 181 00:07:41.730 --> 00:07:45.870 statute required to monitor the spectrum, 182 00:07:45.870 --> 00:07:47.840 and if there's interference, they're 183 00:07:47.840 --> 00:07:48.780 supposed to help resolve it. 184 00:07:48.780 --> 00:07:49.960 Okay. 185 00:07:49.960 --> 00:07:53.500 So specifically from an enforcement point they're the people that we go to. 186 00:07:53.500 --> 00:07:56.340 Okay. So that's interesting and it's kind 187 00:07:56.340 --> 00:07:58.740 of neat to see, you know, 188 00:07:58.740 --> 00:08:00.020 not only as S&T working with other 189 00:08:00.020 --> 00:08:02.460 DHS components, another federal level 190 00:08:02.460 --> 00:08:03.760 you know, organizations but also the 191 00:08:03.760 --> 00:08:05.810 state, local, some tribal, maybe. 192 00:08:05.810 --> 00:08:08.600 you know what was it like at that exercise, 193 00:08:08.600 --> 00:08:10.320 working with so many different organizations? 194 00:08:10.320 --> 00:08:12.210 It was humbling, it really was. 195 00:08:12.210 --> 00:08:15.780 I mean, you know, we were, we'd probably never 196 00:08:15.780 --> 00:08:17.760 done an event of that scope. 197 00:08:17.760 --> 00:08:22.760 We had about, I believe about 80 agencies participating. 198 00:08:23.140 --> 00:08:26.800 We had 250 people show up from all over the country. 199 00:08:26.800 --> 00:08:30.900 We had people bring their equipment to the range. 200 00:08:30.900 --> 00:08:34.940 We had actually gotten some, some commercial 201 00:08:34.940 --> 00:08:37.620 jammers that are illegal to own and operate. 202 00:08:37.620 --> 00:08:41.740 Okay. But we got them through special means, 203 00:08:41.740 --> 00:08:44.140 working with the FCC and the FAA 204 00:08:44.140 --> 00:08:46.100 to make sure that we were okay to use 205 00:08:46.100 --> 00:08:49.180 these on this particular range. We tested 206 00:08:49.180 --> 00:08:51.720 at White Sands Missile Range at a DoD facility. 207 00:08:51.720 --> 00:08:55.380 Okay. So we made sure that the spectrum was clear 208 00:08:55.380 --> 00:08:57.480 and that we wouldn't impact normal 209 00:08:57.480 --> 00:09:00.900 operations commerce or the public. 210 00:09:00.900 --> 00:09:05.900 So we set up a protected range to do this work. 211 00:09:06.140 --> 00:09:08.300 And obviously the FCC, FAA really 212 00:09:08.300 --> 00:09:09.760 helped us in doing our job. 213 00:09:09.760 --> 00:09:12.360 So it was it was really humbling that 214 00:09:12.360 --> 00:09:14.580 these people all came out and we were 215 00:09:14.580 --> 00:09:15.700 working in the middle of the night, 216 00:09:15.700 --> 00:09:18.680 so we were from eight p.m to five-six a.m. 217 00:09:18.680 --> 00:09:21.740 Oh my gosh. So it was it was a challenging environment, 218 00:09:21.740 --> 00:09:26.600 in the pitch dark and White Sands has very interesting wildlife. 219 00:09:26.610 --> 00:09:30.340 So we had a bunch of rabbits that were going amok. [Laughter] 220 00:09:30.340 --> 00:09:33.380 And so we had some really, really interesting, interesting things. 221 00:09:33.380 --> 00:09:35.700 But it was a it was a humbling event 222 00:09:35.700 --> 00:09:37.460 in that everybody supported us everybody 223 00:09:37.460 --> 00:09:40.680 was professional, and everybody was really, 224 00:09:40.680 --> 00:09:43.420 Believed in what we were doing at this point. 225 00:09:43.420 --> 00:09:45.100 And I think we learned a lot from it. 226 00:09:45.100 --> 00:09:47.220 Yeah. Can you say more about maybe what the 227 00:09:47.220 --> 00:09:48.680 results were of that exercise? 228 00:09:48.680 --> 00:09:51.120 Sure. At the end of the results, we did put 229 00:09:51.120 --> 00:09:54.060 together a report and we did, you know, 230 00:09:54.060 --> 00:09:55.860 that's being shared at different levels. 231 00:09:55.860 --> 00:10:00.860 But what we really learned is, we understood, 232 00:10:00.860 --> 00:10:02.780 I think first responders have very little 233 00:10:02.780 --> 00:10:06.160 experience with jammers or working in 234 00:10:06.160 --> 00:10:08.540 a spectrally challenged environment. 235 00:10:08.540 --> 00:10:11.840 Generally their focus is, they go do a mission 236 00:10:11.840 --> 00:10:13.220 and if the radio doesn't work, 237 00:10:13.220 --> 00:10:14.580 they still continue to do their mission 238 00:10:14.580 --> 00:10:17.540 and they are extremely adept, and flexible, 239 00:10:17.540 --> 00:10:19.040 and they carry out their mission. 240 00:10:19.040 --> 00:10:22.890 Yeah. So generally they don't get to stop, 241 00:10:22.890 --> 00:10:25.000 take a look at this, see how this reacts. 242 00:10:25.000 --> 00:10:29.180 So we actually had 70 scenarios that we ran 243 00:10:29.180 --> 00:10:32.080 all kinds of scenarios. Everything from 244 00:10:32.080 --> 00:10:33.900 from a traffic stop to a hazardous 245 00:10:33.900 --> 00:10:37.460 material, spillage. We simulated those 246 00:10:37.460 --> 00:10:39.830 simulated the traffic conditions. 247 00:10:39.830 --> 00:10:43.910 And I believe that it was one of the 248 00:10:43.910 --> 00:10:46.420 largest interoperable tests. 249 00:10:46.420 --> 00:10:49.340 So we learned a lot about, the fact that, 250 00:10:49.340 --> 00:10:51.480 you know, there are training gaps, 251 00:10:51.480 --> 00:10:55.980 Yeah. Public safety, you know, they get trained 252 00:10:55.980 --> 00:10:58.580 their guns, and they get trained on 253 00:10:58.580 --> 00:11:00.450 on their guns every year, and they have 254 00:11:00.450 --> 00:11:01.860 to go back and get recertified. 255 00:11:01.860 --> 00:11:04.920 But we don't have continuous training on radios. 256 00:11:04.920 --> 00:11:06.690 Usually they're given a radio and 257 00:11:06.690 --> 00:11:08.730 they're given a limited training and 258 00:11:08.730 --> 00:11:09.900 they're asked to go out. 259 00:11:09.900 --> 00:11:12.240 Yeah. And those radios are very capable, 260 00:11:12.240 --> 00:11:13.400 But they don't know what's in them. 261 00:11:13.400 --> 00:11:16.820 So we learned that there's a lot of training gaps. 262 00:11:16.820 --> 00:11:18.440 We also learned that there's a lot of 263 00:11:18.440 --> 00:11:22.900 things that you need to be, to be resilient. 264 00:11:22.900 --> 00:11:26.200 For example, having multiple bands, 265 00:11:26.200 --> 00:11:28.480 radios that operate in different 266 00:11:28.480 --> 00:11:30.479 communication bands allows you 267 00:11:30.479 --> 00:11:32.849 to be more resilient. Because even if one 268 00:11:32.849 --> 00:11:34.709 system isn't very reliable you can jump 269 00:11:34.709 --> 00:11:37.229 to another one. You know, and you can't, 270 00:11:37.229 --> 00:11:40.480 because you can't always rely on a single network. 271 00:11:40.480 --> 00:11:41.860 You know, especially if you're if you're 272 00:11:41.860 --> 00:11:44.180 relying on cellular, you know, you have a 273 00:11:44.180 --> 00:11:45.520 little earthquake or something, 274 00:11:45.520 --> 00:11:47.580 and you find out that all the comm links are jammed. 275 00:11:47.580 --> 00:11:49.720 Right. We've all been at a your know, an event 276 00:11:49.720 --> 00:11:49.820 where we were trying to text somebody Right. We've all been at a your know, an event 277 00:11:49.820 --> 00:11:51.120 where we were trying to text somebody 278 00:11:51.120 --> 00:11:52.880 and there's so many people that the, you know, 279 00:11:52.880 --> 00:11:54.460 communications are completely jammed, 280 00:11:54.460 --> 00:11:56.429 you can't get through. But I think you 281 00:11:56.429 --> 00:11:58.880 raised a really nice point about, communications are 282 00:11:58.880 --> 00:12:00.040 one of those things that we just expect 283 00:12:00.040 --> 00:12:02.280 to work. And sometimes we take it for 284 00:12:02.280 --> 00:12:04.160 granted that, you know, we need to stop 285 00:12:04.160 --> 00:12:06.200 and think, okay if this doesn't work, 286 00:12:06.200 --> 00:12:08.120 what do I do in that situation? Correct. 287 00:12:08.120 --> 00:12:09.160 And because it is you know, with 288 00:12:09.160 --> 00:12:11.040 first responders, these people can't 289 00:12:11.040 --> 00:12:12.460 stop, they cant stop their jobs. 290 00:12:12.460 --> 00:12:13.469 They have to keep going, and you know, 291 00:12:13.469 --> 00:12:15.360 fulfill their mission. So it's nice that 292 00:12:15.360 --> 00:12:16.739 there is an opportunity for them to test 293 00:12:16.739 --> 00:12:18.389 it out in controlled scenarios, 294 00:12:18.389 --> 00:12:19.889 controlled environments to really stop 295 00:12:19.889 --> 00:12:22.979 and hone in on, okay, what should we do? 296 00:12:22.979 --> 00:12:25.040 you know, what's going to happen next? 297 00:12:25.040 --> 00:12:26.680 And then maybe share that with the, you know, 298 00:12:26.680 --> 00:12:28.739 the rest of the population. 299 00:12:28.739 --> 00:12:30.680 So we have a question from Facebook. 300 00:12:30.899 --> 00:12:32.819 What are the possible strategies to stop the 301 00:12:32.819 --> 00:12:34.520 commercial sale of jammers? 302 00:12:34.520 --> 00:12:38.309 Well, so the first thing is that we, you know, 303 00:12:38.309 --> 00:12:41.749 we've got to acknowledge that CBP and 304 00:12:41.749 --> 00:12:44.339 FCC are doing a great job tracking down 305 00:12:44.339 --> 00:12:47.420 these people who are selling jammers and stopping them. 306 00:12:47.420 --> 00:12:50.300 But, unfortunately, some of the stuff gets in from overseas. 307 00:12:50.300 --> 00:12:52.920 Yeah. You know the interesting thing is, 308 00:12:52.920 --> 00:12:57.380 jammers are illegal in the U.S. and a lot countries. 309 00:12:57.380 --> 00:12:59.240 But they're not illegal everywhere. 310 00:12:59.240 --> 00:13:01.960 Okay. So there is a market for them. 311 00:13:01.960 --> 00:13:04.720 And, you know, if you go to a high-end resort 312 00:13:04.720 --> 00:13:07.860 in a country like Jamaica, for example. 313 00:13:07.860 --> 00:13:09.320 They may use jammers at high-end 314 00:13:09.320 --> 00:13:10.620 restaurants and theaters to prevent 315 00:13:10.620 --> 00:13:11.860 people from making phone calls, 316 00:13:11.860 --> 00:13:15.020 Gotcha. So it's it's sort of a hard thing to stop. 317 00:13:15.060 --> 00:13:18.660 But, we're stopping them at the borders, 318 00:13:18.660 --> 00:13:21.660 we're stopping them as they're being shipped. 319 00:13:21.660 --> 00:13:23.880 So we're doing our best to limit that 320 00:13:23.880 --> 00:13:26.520 and the FCC does have an enforcement bureau, 321 00:13:26.520 --> 00:13:29.240 that actually goes out and there's heavy penalties. 322 00:13:29.240 --> 00:13:32.279 as well as confiscation of the device. 323 00:13:32.279 --> 00:13:35.069 So we're doing our best to stop the 324 00:13:35.069 --> 00:13:36.989 proliferation as well as the import. 325 00:13:36.989 --> 00:13:39.940 Okay, next question from Facebook. 326 00:13:39.940 --> 00:13:42.840 Can you specify the types of jammers used? 327 00:13:42.840 --> 00:13:46.679 So generally, the the types they're just 328 00:13:46.679 --> 00:13:49.100 broad level noise trip jammers, 329 00:13:49.100 --> 00:13:53.380 kind of hard to describe in non-technical terms. 330 00:13:53.380 --> 00:13:57.540 But they basically, they sweep across a 331 00:13:57.540 --> 00:13:59.920 communication span and generate noise. 332 00:13:59.920 --> 00:14:02.240 Okay. So, and the kind that we bought, 333 00:14:02.240 --> 00:14:05.640 we bought a number of them specifically 334 00:14:05.640 --> 00:14:09.700 again through, I encourage everyone 335 00:14:09.700 --> 00:14:11.850 not to go out in order jammers because it's 336 00:14:11.850 --> 00:14:14.680 illegal and you will get penalized. 337 00:14:14.680 --> 00:14:17.309 But the thought process is that, that we 338 00:14:17.309 --> 00:14:19.980 bought GPS jammers we bought multiple 339 00:14:19.980 --> 00:14:23.400 band jammers that covered Wi-Fi or cellular. 340 00:14:23.400 --> 00:14:26.560 So the idea is that they're trying to target 341 00:14:26.560 --> 00:14:31.120 and try to interfere with different types of networks. 342 00:14:31.120 --> 00:14:33.809 And again these were purchased for 343 00:14:33.809 --> 00:14:35.380 you know, this particular exercise, 344 00:14:35.380 --> 00:14:40.300 This is through a law enforcement agency 345 00:14:40.300 --> 00:14:43.400 who we coordinated and had to get 346 00:14:43.400 --> 00:14:45.040 a significant levels of approvement, 347 00:14:45.040 --> 00:14:48.980 approvals to get them. So please don't try it. 348 00:14:48.980 --> 00:14:51.580 Next question from Facebook. 349 00:14:51.580 --> 00:14:53.600 In what ways will all of your research 350 00:14:53.600 --> 00:14:55.410 and time benefits for the volunteer fire 351 00:14:55.410 --> 00:14:56.999 departments to move into the future of 352 00:14:56.999 --> 00:14:58.980 technology and an economical price point? 353 00:14:58.980 --> 00:15:01.709 Our area is upgrading to high band in 354 00:15:01.709 --> 00:15:05.060 some areas and it's the cost that is stopping most of us. 355 00:15:05.060 --> 00:15:08.100 Costs is of paramount. But there's a lot of 356 00:15:08.100 --> 00:15:11.899 things that you can do, that in general, 357 00:15:11.899 --> 00:15:14.399 doesn't require a lot of cost, but it may 358 00:15:14.399 --> 00:15:17.320 be tactics and techniques. For example, 359 00:15:17.549 --> 00:15:19.679 we would love to educate first responders 360 00:15:19.679 --> 00:15:21.749 on what the jammers look like. So if you 361 00:15:21.749 --> 00:15:24.749 see one and you're in a position, 362 00:15:24.749 --> 00:15:26.699 you know, obviously we're not asking you to 363 00:15:26.699 --> 00:15:29.160 change your tactics or what you do on a daily basis. 364 00:15:29.160 --> 00:15:31.440 But if you can't communicate 365 00:15:31.440 --> 00:15:35.620 you know, be aware, you know, that if you, 366 00:15:35.620 --> 00:15:37.920 if you're finding that your comms are going 367 00:15:37.920 --> 00:15:41.020 in and out and in an area where you 368 00:15:41.020 --> 00:15:43.400 thought you normally communicate well. 369 00:15:43.400 --> 00:15:45.340 Or you have a pretty good idea that it's 370 00:15:45.340 --> 00:15:47.960 good communications. You know, just be aware, 371 00:15:47.960 --> 00:15:51.100 that to me that's, that's the knowledge 372 00:15:51.100 --> 00:15:52.760 that helps you. And again, it doesn't 373 00:15:52.760 --> 00:15:54.870 always have to be jamming. 374 00:15:54.870 --> 00:15:57.200 You know, you could be in a situation where, 375 00:15:57.200 --> 00:15:59.670 you know, I don't want people to default 376 00:15:59.670 --> 00:16:01.530 and say jamming is the only answer 377 00:16:01.530 --> 00:16:02.820 to why my radio doesn't work. 378 00:16:02.820 --> 00:16:05.300 Yeah. You could have a radio down, 379 00:16:05.300 --> 00:16:07.890 you could have a tower down, you could have 380 00:16:07.890 --> 00:16:10.540 maintenance going on, you could have a poor 381 00:16:10.540 --> 00:16:13.320 programming, you know, maybe your 382 00:16:13.320 --> 00:16:15.240 battery died or maybe you're on the wrong channel. 383 00:16:15.240 --> 00:16:15.840 Right. 384 00:16:15.840 --> 00:16:18.360 So it's just another thing in your 385 00:16:18.360 --> 00:16:21.140 toolbox that first responders need to be aware. 386 00:16:21.140 --> 00:16:22.880 And generally the boots on the ground 387 00:16:22.880 --> 00:16:25.720 aren't going to do that. But in terms of, 388 00:16:25.720 --> 00:16:27.340 you know, so if you see a jammer, 389 00:16:27.340 --> 00:16:29.190 for example, if you're, if you're taught 390 00:16:29.190 --> 00:16:30.990 that this is what it kind of looks like for example if you're if you're taught 391 00:16:30.990 --> 00:16:33.180 and you're able to, you know, shield 392 00:16:33.180 --> 00:16:36.660 yourself between the jammer and, you know, 393 00:16:36.660 --> 00:16:39.700 put yourself, put the jammer, put a large 394 00:16:39.700 --> 00:16:42.360 vehicle or a building or move around 395 00:16:42.360 --> 00:16:44.870 a little bit get to higher ground. 396 00:16:44.870 --> 00:16:48.570 Also you know that doesn't cost anything 397 00:16:48.570 --> 00:16:51.420 but to learn to do that. You know if you can. 398 00:16:51.420 --> 00:16:53.220 Obviously a lot, not a lot of cases. 399 00:16:53.220 --> 00:16:55.440 you know, you have an EMS person on the 400 00:16:55.440 --> 00:16:57.390 ground you're treating them you're not 401 00:16:57.390 --> 00:16:58.950 going to be trying to avoid and go 402 00:16:58.950 --> 00:17:00.560 behind a vehicle. You cant necessarily move. 403 00:17:00.560 --> 00:17:03.800 Right. But the is that you're smart about it 404 00:17:03.800 --> 00:17:06.380 There's another feature called automatic gain control. 405 00:17:06.380 --> 00:17:08.540 Okay. That happens to be in most radios. 406 00:17:08.540 --> 00:17:11.400 And we found out that by turning it on 407 00:17:11.400 --> 00:17:14.670 it made comm systems more reliable. 408 00:17:14.670 --> 00:17:16.920 Okay. And it's a feature that's available 409 00:17:16.920 --> 00:17:18.240 you just need to turn it on 410 00:17:18.240 --> 00:17:20.360 and program it into your radio. 411 00:17:20.360 --> 00:17:23.670 So, little things like that we're looking at. And we 412 00:17:23.670 --> 00:17:25.980 will educate first responders as much as 413 00:17:25.980 --> 00:17:27.750 possible, as well as the agencies, and 414 00:17:27.750 --> 00:17:29.670 those who are operating and maintaining 415 00:17:29.670 --> 00:17:31.920 the networks. We're teaching them. 416 00:17:31.920 --> 00:17:34.770 The other piece to this is you know signal 417 00:17:34.770 --> 00:17:36.690 interference happens. You know, it's just 418 00:17:36.690 --> 00:17:40.500 it's just an occurrence, it doesn't need to be intentional. 419 00:17:40.500 --> 00:17:44.220 Yeah. So we do need to educate our technicians 420 00:17:44.220 --> 00:17:46.520 on how to find, you know, what does a 421 00:17:46.520 --> 00:17:48.700 a jammer look like on a spectrum analyzer? 422 00:17:48.700 --> 00:17:50.850 We're trying to educate people on that as well. 423 00:17:50.850 --> 00:17:54.480 And you may not need to buy a whole lot 424 00:17:54.480 --> 00:17:56.789 of these but if you are aware of jamming. 425 00:17:56.789 --> 00:17:59.420 Yeah, and you say, you tell your network guys, 426 00:17:59.420 --> 00:18:02.120 hey, I saw some signal wasn't great can 427 00:18:02.120 --> 00:18:03.980 can you go check it out? And they're able 428 00:18:03.980 --> 00:18:06.480 to go take a spectrum analyzer and find out. 429 00:18:06.480 --> 00:18:09.920 Okay. And kind of say oh looks like its interference. 430 00:18:09.920 --> 00:18:12.800 Yeah. So that actually raises a good point 431 00:18:12.800 --> 00:18:15.330 about you know, there are some things there's some 432 00:18:15.330 --> 00:18:16.919 tactics some approaches that folks can 433 00:18:16.919 --> 00:18:19.230 take to either mitigate or try and 434 00:18:19.230 --> 00:18:20.669 address some of these, you know, the 435 00:18:20.669 --> 00:18:23.159 impacts of jamming. And I understand S&T 436 00:18:23.159 --> 00:18:25.340 has some publicly available information. 437 00:18:25.340 --> 00:18:27.150 there's an info-graphic that we can share 438 00:18:27.150 --> 00:18:29.909 with folks. And is there anything else 439 00:18:29.909 --> 00:18:31.409 that folks and let's say, you know, 440 00:18:31.409 --> 00:18:32.490 if someone's in law enforcement they can 441 00:18:32.490 --> 00:18:33.990 contact you for more information, 442 00:18:33.990 --> 00:18:35.040 they can reach out to get the diagram? 443 00:18:35.040 --> 00:18:36.180 What's available to them? 444 00:18:36.180 --> 00:18:39.520 So, there's actually a number of, a number 445 00:18:39.520 --> 00:18:41.300 of things that are available to you. 446 00:18:41.300 --> 00:18:45.180 First of all there is a, there's an 447 00:18:45.180 --> 00:18:47.400 info-graphic that basically says, you know, 448 00:18:47.400 --> 00:18:48.860 kind of gives you some indications that 449 00:18:48.860 --> 00:18:51.480 you might be jammed. For example, 450 00:18:51.480 --> 00:18:54.320 most of, most people have phones that 451 00:18:54.320 --> 00:18:57.120 that have bars on them. If you see a high, 452 00:18:57.120 --> 00:19:01.000 a very large number of bars four or five bars, 453 00:19:01.000 --> 00:19:03.980 but you can't talk. There might be signal interference. 454 00:19:03.980 --> 00:19:06.660 If you see that, you know, normally you're 455 00:19:06.660 --> 00:19:10.040 you're able to talk somewhere, but you can't, that's an indication. 456 00:19:10.040 --> 00:19:12.480 If you have multiple things that don't 457 00:19:12.480 --> 00:19:14.160 work, you know, GPS isn't working, 458 00:19:14.160 --> 00:19:16.560 something else isn't working, then maybe 459 00:19:16.560 --> 00:19:18.060 you're being jammed. So these are the 460 00:19:18.060 --> 00:19:19.470 things you kind of look for. 461 00:19:19.470 --> 00:19:23.520 So what we want to do is, so the info-graphic 462 00:19:23.520 --> 00:19:27.400 kind of talks you through that and gives you a couple of things to try. 463 00:19:27.400 --> 00:19:30.740 One is, you know, turn the radio sideways. Sometimes that helps. 464 00:19:30.740 --> 00:19:31.800 Oh, Wow. 465 00:19:31.800 --> 00:19:33.780 You know having a different polarity on 466 00:19:33.780 --> 00:19:37.200 the antenna, without getting into the technical details. 467 00:19:37.200 --> 00:19:38.800 But, you have that option. 468 00:19:38.800 --> 00:19:41.240 You also have the option of turning on 469 00:19:41.240 --> 00:19:43.740 automatic gain control. I kind of mentioned that. 470 00:19:43.740 --> 00:19:45.600 So we have the info-graphic for those in 471 00:19:45.600 --> 00:19:48.220 law enforcement and have a need to know. 472 00:19:48.220 --> 00:19:50.600 We do have a for official use only bulletin 473 00:19:50.600 --> 00:19:52.640 that we released with the FCC. 474 00:19:52.640 --> 00:19:56.620 And then as always, we at DHS S&T, are a resource. 475 00:19:56.620 --> 00:20:01.320 You can reach out to us at jamming.exercise@hq.dhs.gov. 476 00:20:01.320 --> 00:20:04.520 That's great. So that's kind of the resources. 477 00:20:04.520 --> 00:20:06.460 So there's resources available. 478 00:20:06.460 --> 00:20:08.900 We have another question we're gonna ask from Facebook. 479 00:20:08.900 --> 00:20:11.000 How closely is S&T working with firstnet 480 00:20:11.000 --> 00:20:13.300 on stopping jammers, and how often do 481 00:20:13.300 --> 00:20:16.260 first responders in the field encounter these jammers? 482 00:20:16.260 --> 00:20:19.900 So, that's a great question by the way. 483 00:20:19.900 --> 00:20:23.070 We are working with firstnet. We shared our 484 00:20:23.070 --> 00:20:24.920 data with them. They actually came down 485 00:20:24.920 --> 00:20:27.880 to the first event. We're having a follow-on event. 486 00:20:27.880 --> 00:20:30.280 and we can probably get into that more later. 487 00:20:30.280 --> 00:20:33.680 But they're coming out. We've shared our data with them. 488 00:20:33.680 --> 00:20:36.100 So they kind of know, what's going on. 489 00:20:36.100 --> 00:20:40.100 And in terms of actually quantizing how many 490 00:20:40.100 --> 00:20:42.630 jammers actually are in the field, 491 00:20:42.630 --> 00:20:45.040 it's kind of hard, a lot of times, you know, 492 00:20:45.040 --> 00:20:47.130 our first responders, as I mentioned 493 00:20:47.130 --> 00:20:49.260 before are very resilient, they're flexible. 494 00:20:49.260 --> 00:20:50.380 Hey my radio doesn't work, 495 00:20:50.380 --> 00:20:53.700 they're not gonna stop doing their jobs, they're gonna, go do their jobs. 496 00:20:53.700 --> 00:20:56.910 But the idea is, so they don't always record it, 497 00:20:56.910 --> 00:21:01.080 but, we're trying to actually help quantify, 498 00:21:01.080 --> 00:21:03.220 you know, how big is this problem? 499 00:21:03.220 --> 00:21:07.520 How much more incidences are there? 500 00:21:07.520 --> 00:21:10.460 So we're trying to work across multiple 501 00:21:10.460 --> 00:21:12.380 jurisdictions and multiple agencies 502 00:21:12.380 --> 00:21:13.890 agencies at all levels to understand 503 00:21:13.890 --> 00:21:15.600 that we're working with the FCC, 504 00:21:15.600 --> 00:21:17.790 we're working with the fusion centers, and NCC. 505 00:21:17.790 --> 00:21:22.020 we're also working with NTIA and FCC to 506 00:21:22.020 --> 00:21:24.420 kind of quantize and figure out, 507 00:21:24.420 --> 00:21:27.390 well, how broadly are these things happening? 508 00:21:27.390 --> 00:21:29.820 Yeah. We expect, I mean even if you don't look 509 00:21:29.820 --> 00:21:33.980 at jammers, prospectively, as as years go by, 510 00:21:33.980 --> 00:21:37.080 that the the growth of wireless technologies 511 00:21:37.080 --> 00:21:40.040 and wireless devices and wireless things, 512 00:21:40.040 --> 00:21:42.140 are so much more prevalent. 513 00:21:42.140 --> 00:21:44.120 that the likelihood that you're gonna 514 00:21:44.120 --> 00:21:47.120 have signal interference becomes much greater. 515 00:21:47.120 --> 00:21:49.180 Because everything's radiating. 516 00:21:49.180 --> 00:21:52.170 So, I think it's gonna become more prevalent, 517 00:21:52.170 --> 00:21:54.060 more pervasive. But I don't have a way 518 00:21:54.060 --> 00:21:56.540 to quantize that right now. Yeah, and it sounds like, 519 00:21:56.540 --> 00:21:57.400 getting back to that point about, 520 00:21:57.400 --> 00:21:58.820 sometimes it's hard to recognize 521 00:21:58.820 --> 00:22:00.880 if this is intentional jamming or if this 522 00:22:00.880 --> 00:22:02.280 is just signal interference that's 523 00:22:02.280 --> 00:22:03.660 happening for other reasons. 524 00:22:03.660 --> 00:22:05.220 Correct. So that may be something that impacts our 525 00:22:05.220 --> 00:22:07.110 ability to say you know there's X amount 526 00:22:07.110 --> 00:22:08.880 of jammers out there, we know where they are. 527 00:22:08.880 --> 00:22:10.960 You know. if they're so hard to necessarily 528 00:22:10.960 --> 00:22:14.100 pinpoint. This is jamming. It can hinder 529 00:22:14.100 --> 00:22:16.380 those abilities to say, okay, we know what's going on 530 00:22:16.380 --> 00:22:18.240 as far as like who the jammers are. 531 00:22:18.240 --> 00:22:20.360 Correct. But I mean, I mean, I think that there's enough 532 00:22:20.360 --> 00:22:22.370 incidences in the newspaper as well as. 533 00:22:22.370 --> 00:22:24.650 You know there was a guy in Chicago who 534 00:22:24.650 --> 00:22:26.720 didn't want to be bothered on his, 535 00:22:26.720 --> 00:22:29.510 on this particular rail car, and he had 536 00:22:29.510 --> 00:22:31.460 a jammer in his briefcase and nobody 537 00:22:31.460 --> 00:22:34.070 could use their phone, nearby. So you know, 538 00:22:34.070 --> 00:22:37.160 the intent is, he just wanted quiet time to get to work. 539 00:22:37.160 --> 00:22:39.040 He made a quiet car. He made a quiet car. [Laughter] 540 00:22:39.040 --> 00:22:42.000 So, the idea is that those kind of things happen. 541 00:22:42.000 --> 00:22:43.340 You know, we had another person who didn't 542 00:22:43.340 --> 00:22:46.190 want to be tracked and he was using his 543 00:22:46.190 --> 00:22:50.180 commercial companies vehicle to go off 544 00:22:50.180 --> 00:22:52.490 at lunch and do something. And so he was 545 00:22:52.490 --> 00:22:54.470 using a jammer. But he was inadvertently 546 00:22:54.470 --> 00:22:58.250 affecting you know other people 547 00:22:58.250 --> 00:23:01.850 as well as you know, knocking out GPS 548 00:23:01.850 --> 00:23:04.080 in certain areas. And that affects, you know, 549 00:23:04.080 --> 00:23:06.940 we all use our GPS for navigation. 550 00:23:06.940 --> 00:23:09.600 and you can only see that use of GPS is 551 00:23:09.600 --> 00:23:11.000 becoming more pervasive as well. 552 00:23:11.000 --> 00:23:14.300 Yeah. So alright another question from Facebook. 553 00:23:14.300 --> 00:23:16.220 Will S&T provide opportunities 554 00:23:16.220 --> 00:23:18.580 to work on a challenge in this area? 555 00:23:18.580 --> 00:23:22.140 What other areas are upcoming for companies to work together on? 556 00:23:22.140 --> 00:23:24.060 So again, another great question. 557 00:23:24.060 --> 00:23:27.730 We did have an RFI out, that we put out 558 00:23:27.730 --> 00:23:30.920 for the 2017 event and invited companies 559 00:23:30.920 --> 00:23:33.020 to participate. And the thought process 560 00:23:33.020 --> 00:23:36.380 there is, so it's kind of leading us into, 561 00:23:36.380 --> 00:23:40.220 into the what's up next? But we did offer 562 00:23:40.220 --> 00:23:41.960 companies to come up and tell us how 563 00:23:41.960 --> 00:23:45.160 they can identify, locate, and mitigate, 564 00:23:45.160 --> 00:23:48.790 mitigate jamming or signal interference. 565 00:23:48.790 --> 00:23:51.520 We will have other opportunities to 566 00:23:51.520 --> 00:23:54.900 provide companies to work with us. 567 00:23:54.900 --> 00:23:58.320 But again, you know, we're happy to entertain 568 00:23:58.320 --> 00:24:01.580 questions and help industry as well. 569 00:24:01.580 --> 00:24:04.670 Because the end goal in comms is resiliency. 570 00:24:04.670 --> 00:24:06.950 Yeah, and we'll have some contact 571 00:24:06.950 --> 00:24:08.760 information that we'll share at the end of this, 572 00:24:08.760 --> 00:24:10.240 so you can get in touch with the folks 573 00:24:10.240 --> 00:24:12.660 who are working on this. And I want to ask 574 00:24:12.660 --> 00:24:14.040 about this upcoming exercise, 575 00:24:14.040 --> 00:24:15.800 the Jam Accident. Can you tell me more about 576 00:24:15.800 --> 00:24:16.560 what's going to happen there? 577 00:24:16.560 --> 00:24:18.580 Sure we're having another event in July. 578 00:24:18.580 --> 00:24:23.340 Unfortunately, by the time this Facebook Live 579 00:24:23.340 --> 00:24:26.500 was was set up, we've closed the window, 580 00:24:26.500 --> 00:24:29.900 but we already have about three hundred and fifty people coming 581 00:24:29.900 --> 00:24:31.720 and about hundred and eight organizations 582 00:24:31.720 --> 00:24:33.380 who have signed up to support us 583 00:24:33.380 --> 00:24:36.040 to do the work. So we're gonna be in Idaho 584 00:24:36.040 --> 00:24:37.480 and we're going to be doing some, 585 00:24:37.480 --> 00:24:41.300 some spectrum interference and setting 586 00:24:41.300 --> 00:24:42.900 up situations where we can actually 587 00:24:42.900 --> 00:24:44.420 test comm systems, to really 588 00:24:44.420 --> 00:24:47.120 understand what the impact is. 589 00:24:47.120 --> 00:24:49.590 We've got a little bit of it in 2016, this time 590 00:24:49.590 --> 00:24:51.299 we're gonna look at that as well as look 591 00:24:51.299 --> 00:24:53.100 at technologies that it's gonna make it 592 00:24:53.100 --> 00:24:56.850 more resilient, as to not only identify, 593 00:24:56.850 --> 00:24:59.820 locate and mitigate jamming, but also to 594 00:24:59.820 --> 00:25:03.480 look at techniques. You know how good is it 595 00:25:03.480 --> 00:25:06.660 it to hide behind a car or hide behind a 596 00:25:06.660 --> 00:25:09.179 building or get to higher ground? 597 00:25:09.179 --> 00:25:12.520 And really quantify you know how much better 598 00:25:12.520 --> 00:25:14.260 is it to use the automatic gain control? 599 00:25:14.260 --> 00:25:16.290 So we're trying to quantify that the 600 00:25:16.290 --> 00:25:19.460 actual performance metrics, during the 2017 event. 601 00:25:19.460 --> 00:25:21.760 So moving more into, do some of these solutions 602 00:25:21.760 --> 00:25:24.360 mitigation tactics, how effective are they? 603 00:25:24.360 --> 00:25:26.200 You know, how would we replicate these other places? 604 00:25:26.200 --> 00:25:28.780 Correct. More into, I guess solution space 605 00:25:28.780 --> 00:25:31.400 rather than discovery of, okay what exactly is the problem? 606 00:25:31.400 --> 00:25:33.100 Maybe that was the 2016 focus? 607 00:25:33.100 --> 00:25:35.120 Right, but I mean, we are, we will be 608 00:25:35.120 --> 00:25:36.860 going back and revisiting a little bit. 609 00:25:36.860 --> 00:25:41.480 Okay. Exactly, exactly, quantizing 610 00:25:41.480 --> 00:25:43.700 exactly what the impact is. 611 00:25:43.700 --> 00:25:46.620 You know, we don't want to necessarily 612 00:25:46.620 --> 00:25:48.720 speak to any, just saying, you know, this 613 00:25:48.720 --> 00:25:51.760 jammer did, What did this jammer exactly do? 614 00:25:51.760 --> 00:25:54.330 What kind of things can it do? 615 00:25:54.330 --> 00:25:56.340 And just sort of understand what the 616 00:25:56.340 --> 00:25:59.140 impacts are. Understand ranges, 617 00:25:59.140 --> 00:26:01.140 offset distances those kind of things. 618 00:26:01.500 --> 00:26:04.140 Okay, great. Another question from Facebook. 619 00:26:04.140 --> 00:26:05.970 What type of bandwidth and power do you 620 00:26:05.970 --> 00:26:07.560 typically see from jammers? 621 00:26:07.560 --> 00:26:08.920 Do you have any white papers on what 622 00:26:08.920 --> 00:26:11.020 you typically see on spectrum analyzers? 623 00:26:11.020 --> 00:26:15.600 So great question. I'm not really going to get 624 00:26:15.600 --> 00:26:18.090 into the details about the bandwidth, but 625 00:26:18.090 --> 00:26:20.360 generally they span a number of bands 626 00:26:20.360 --> 00:26:23.700 and most of the jammers are designed and 627 00:26:23.700 --> 00:26:27.660 optimized for cellular and GPS type. 628 00:26:27.660 --> 00:26:30.179 So in general they those are the bands that 629 00:26:30.179 --> 00:26:33.160 they work in. Less so in public safety 630 00:26:33.160 --> 00:26:35.880 bands, but there are jammers that 631 00:26:35.880 --> 00:26:38.070 work in four hundred and fifty, and some of the other bands 632 00:26:38.070 --> 00:26:40.860 that first responders tend to use. 633 00:26:40.860 --> 00:26:44.880 But again, their target is overseas, 634 00:26:44.880 --> 00:26:47.310 you know, Japan for example uses four hundred and fifty 635 00:26:47.310 --> 00:26:48.840 megahertz, and so those jammers are 636 00:26:48.840 --> 00:26:51.090 ideally targeted towards cellular 637 00:26:51.090 --> 00:26:54.080 systems in Japan. So, I don't to get into a lot 638 00:26:54.080 --> 00:26:55.640 of detail about but there's all kinds. 639 00:26:55.640 --> 00:26:57.600 There are small ones, there are big ones. 640 00:26:57.600 --> 00:26:59.130 There are big ones that are, 641 00:26:59.130 --> 00:27:01.470 you know, man portable or vehicle portable. 642 00:27:01.470 --> 00:27:04.620 Some are huge and they have to be stationary. 643 00:27:04.620 --> 00:27:06.280 And some are as tiny as key fob. 644 00:27:06.280 --> 00:27:09.680 Okay, wow. There are all different kinds. 645 00:27:09.680 --> 00:27:12.570 Next question. Are there local or state 646 00:27:12.570 --> 00:27:14.160 laws that combat jamming or 647 00:27:14.160 --> 00:27:17.040 international signals interference? 648 00:27:17.040 --> 00:27:19.200 That's another great question. 649 00:27:19.200 --> 00:27:23.550 I appreciate the questions. The only 650 00:27:23.550 --> 00:27:26.440 statute that we really have is the FCC primarily. 651 00:27:26.440 --> 00:27:29.520 Because they'd, they literally are the 652 00:27:29.520 --> 00:27:31.200 are the ones who allocate spectrum to 653 00:27:31.200 --> 00:27:33.000 different agencies and different. 654 00:27:33.000 --> 00:27:37.770 So for example, Verizon paid for the licenses 655 00:27:37.770 --> 00:27:40.060 and they own a bunch of licenses and 656 00:27:40.060 --> 00:27:43.980 spectrum that they operate in. So FCC is 657 00:27:43.980 --> 00:27:46.020 the one that enforces it and 658 00:27:46.020 --> 00:27:50.880 and operates. From a state and local, we, 659 00:27:50.880 --> 00:27:54.150 it varies on a policy perspective, but a lot 660 00:27:54.150 --> 00:27:56.100 of times state locals the only options 661 00:27:56.100 --> 00:27:58.080 they have or to look at it from a 662 00:27:58.080 --> 00:28:01.060 perspective of interfering with police 663 00:28:01.060 --> 00:28:05.660 or interfering with law enforcement activities. 664 00:28:05.660 --> 00:28:07.780 So, but, I, we encourage you 665 00:28:07.780 --> 00:28:09.240 to identify, and talk to your, 666 00:28:09.240 --> 00:28:10.790 your local and state folks. 667 00:28:10.790 --> 00:28:13.320 Understand what legislation is there. 668 00:28:13.320 --> 00:28:16.110 What tools and, and because, it is a tool 669 00:28:16.110 --> 00:28:19.540 in your box that you can use, 670 00:28:19.540 --> 00:28:20.960 and say, you know, you're not supposed 671 00:28:20.960 --> 00:28:22.590 to have a jammer, and so take it away 672 00:28:22.590 --> 00:28:25.520 from somebody, as opposed to waiting for the FCC. 673 00:28:25.520 --> 00:28:28.100 So I encourage you to find out what 674 00:28:28.100 --> 00:28:31.100 what your local and state 675 00:28:31.100 --> 00:28:33.870 regulations and rules are. But in general 676 00:28:33.870 --> 00:28:36.140 most of it, it goes towards the FCC. 677 00:28:36.140 --> 00:28:39.270 Okay. We have another question coming in, but 678 00:28:39.270 --> 00:28:41.980 just so folks know. Who can they contact, 679 00:28:41.980 --> 00:28:44.820 or what email can they contact for more 680 00:28:44.820 --> 00:28:46.170 information on this or if they have 681 00:28:46.170 --> 00:28:49.640 questions or they need resources. Who can they reach out to? 682 00:28:49.640 --> 00:28:51.600 So that's a good question. 683 00:28:51.600 --> 00:28:56.600 We are definitely jamming.exercises is 684 00:28:56.610 --> 00:28:59.920 again, a resource, jamming.exercises.hq.dhs.gov. 685 00:28:59.920 --> 00:29:02.440 But we have actually, from the 2016 event, 686 00:29:02.440 --> 00:29:05.350 we actually briefed the law enforcement folks. 687 00:29:05.350 --> 00:29:08.200 And we gave them not only the info-graphic, 688 00:29:08.200 --> 00:29:12.400 but we also gave them the "for official use only" bulletin. 689 00:29:12.400 --> 00:29:14.780 So they have, they have knowledge. 690 00:29:14.780 --> 00:29:17.260 They just need to be able to go to their, 691 00:29:17.260 --> 00:29:20.160 within their own agencies and find the right folks that have it. 692 00:29:20.740 --> 00:29:23.080 So we are doing our best to communicate 693 00:29:23.080 --> 00:29:24.700 we're targeting the fusion centers, 694 00:29:24.700 --> 00:29:28.660 we reached out to, through the state 695 00:29:28.660 --> 00:29:31.340 emergency folks, we're coordinating with them. 696 00:29:31.340 --> 00:29:32.920 We're also coordinating well with 697 00:29:32.920 --> 00:29:36.500 law enforcement. We're educating them to the best that we can 698 00:29:36.500 --> 00:29:39.300 Yeah. in terms of what we've learned and so, 699 00:29:39.300 --> 00:29:41.200 The information is being sent out. 700 00:29:41.200 --> 00:29:43.800 In fact, I think the bulletin, both bulletins 701 00:29:43.800 --> 00:29:46.540 and some of our deck information was 702 00:29:46.540 --> 00:29:50.900 sent to I think, eighty thousand law enforcement contacts that we have. 703 00:29:50.900 --> 00:29:52.800 So, we're reaching out and doing the 704 00:29:52.800 --> 00:29:54.920 best to communicate outwardly. 705 00:29:54.920 --> 00:29:57.360 And making sure that people get the message. 706 00:29:57.360 --> 00:29:59.280 Good. I think this question is related. 707 00:29:59.280 --> 00:30:01.120 So my son is a police officer, 708 00:30:01.120 --> 00:30:03.760 what information can DHS provide to him 709 00:30:03.760 --> 00:30:05.650 and other individuals like him, to 710 00:30:05.650 --> 00:30:07.780 identify and work around jamming? 711 00:30:07.780 --> 00:30:12.780 So again, our communication boxes is always identify and work around jamming so 712 00:30:13.630 --> 00:30:15.850 available, but I highly recommend they 713 00:30:15.850 --> 00:30:17.860 talk to their watch commander or 714 00:30:17.860 --> 00:30:19.420 they're on scene, because we have been 715 00:30:19.420 --> 00:30:21.420 sharing that information with them. 716 00:30:21.420 --> 00:30:24.020 And so they are getting the information. 717 00:30:24.020 --> 00:30:25.929 Again I want to, I want to, I can't, 718 00:30:25.929 --> 00:30:28.420 emphasize this enough. Jamming is not the 719 00:30:28.420 --> 00:30:31.580 go-to solution. It's one of these solutions. 720 00:30:31.580 --> 00:30:32.780 Maybe it's the fifth or sixth thing 721 00:30:32.780 --> 00:30:35.400 that I try, but I verify that I have comms. 722 00:30:35.400 --> 00:30:37.400 I verify my settings aren't wrong. 723 00:30:37.400 --> 00:30:39.580 I verify that I'm on the right channel. 724 00:30:39.580 --> 00:30:41.320 You know, I'm doing a check all 725 00:30:41.320 --> 00:30:43.030 the other things, if you need to before 726 00:30:43.030 --> 00:30:45.490 you think that it's jamming. But it's 727 00:30:45.490 --> 00:30:47.800 just an idea of put your, you know, 728 00:30:47.800 --> 00:30:50.240 make sure your spidey senses tingling. 729 00:30:50.240 --> 00:30:52.330 In terms of understanding that there might 730 00:30:52.330 --> 00:30:54.260 be something going on and be aware of it. 731 00:30:54.260 --> 00:30:57.620 So back to this upcoming jam X. 732 00:30:57.620 --> 00:31:00.520 What kind of results or what, what's the 733 00:31:00.520 --> 00:31:02.710 time frame for sharing the results from that exercise? 734 00:31:02.710 --> 00:31:07.710 So we are, going to be doing it in July time frame. 735 00:31:08.060 --> 00:31:12.210 So the information is I believe it's on our website, 736 00:31:12.210 --> 00:31:14.280 as well as some of the other areas. 737 00:31:14.280 --> 00:31:16.320 But we're thinking that we may have some 738 00:31:16.320 --> 00:31:18.180 initial results and we will share those 739 00:31:18.180 --> 00:31:22.240 that app go in 2017. And I think it's the, 740 00:31:22.240 --> 00:31:23.940 what is the date? It was in August I think. 741 00:31:23.940 --> 00:31:25.770 I think it's August. But I think we have 742 00:31:25.770 --> 00:31:28.500 a date. I think it's the, I want to say 14th, 743 00:31:28.500 --> 00:31:30.420 I want to say the 14th of August. 744 00:31:30.420 --> 00:31:33.000 We will actually share some of the results 745 00:31:33.000 --> 00:31:34.530 at the level that we can, 746 00:31:34.530 --> 00:31:39.240 given the audience. So we are being careful 747 00:31:39.240 --> 00:31:41.420 on you know, how much data we share. 748 00:31:41.420 --> 00:31:42.260 Absolutely. 749 00:31:42.260 --> 00:31:46.680 specifically. But our focus is to share what we learned. 750 00:31:46.680 --> 00:31:49.110 Good, all right. Thank you all so much for 751 00:31:49.110 --> 00:31:50.340 attending and thank you Sweetheart for 752 00:31:50.340 --> 00:31:52.200 participating in this Tech Talk. 753 00:31:52.200 --> 00:31:54.000 If have any questions, we'll put contact 754 00:31:54.000 --> 00:31:56.260 information in the post and you can reach out. 755 00:31:56.260 --> 00:31:57.620 Thank you again. 756 00:31:57.620 --> 00:32:00.600 Before you go. Did you tell them about the FCC number? 757 00:32:00.600 --> 00:32:03.870 We'll post it. Okay so everyone there is 758 00:32:03.870 --> 00:32:07.100 a FCC number, that if you think you have 759 00:32:07.100 --> 00:32:09.060 jamming, and you identify it, you know 760 00:32:09.060 --> 00:32:11.040 you have a place to report it. 761 00:32:11.040 --> 00:32:13.710 So, we have an FCC contact information that we will put up. 762 00:32:13.710 --> 00:32:15.340 Perfect. Thank you. 763 00:32:15.340 --> 00:32:18.170 Alright, thanks again.