WEBVTT 1 00:00:05.516 --> 00:00:10.516 [ Music ] 2 00:00:20.266 --> 00:00:23.076 Okay. So, we've heard from S&T and we've heard from CISA 3 00:00:23.076 --> 00:00:25.066 and now the next part of this, is we also want 4 00:00:25.066 --> 00:00:26.576 to provide an industry perspective, 5 00:00:26.646 --> 00:00:27.566 just one perspective. 6 00:00:28.236 --> 00:00:31.126 But we have Demetrius Davis from the MITRE Corporation here. 7 00:00:31.486 --> 00:00:35.506 He's the Principal Systems Engineer with supporting federal 8 00:00:35.506 --> 00:00:38.406 and DOD enterprise mobility initiatives in organizations, 9 00:00:38.626 --> 00:00:41.366 specializing in mobile security, policy, 10 00:00:41.506 --> 00:00:42.696 security and acquisition. 11 00:00:43.346 --> 00:00:45.586 He's also a Department Chief Engineer 12 00:00:45.586 --> 00:00:48.236 in the MITRE Systems Engineering Technical Center, 13 00:00:48.576 --> 00:00:51.826 responsible for strategy, outreach, technical quality 14 00:00:51.826 --> 00:00:54.066 and independent research initiatives 15 00:00:54.066 --> 00:00:56.616 for a 50 percent technical staff. 16 00:00:57.316 --> 00:01:02.316 So, I'll ask Demetrius to come to the stage. 17 00:01:03.996 --> 00:01:08.536 Let me take a second to write down, "Never follow Robert Dew 18 00:01:08.646 --> 00:01:12.026 and Kevin Briggs again." 19 00:01:12.266 --> 00:01:16.296 Awesome. Before I get started, I wanted to thank Megan, and Vince 20 00:01:16.296 --> 00:01:19.516 and the rest of S&T for the invitation, a great opportunity 21 00:01:19.516 --> 00:01:21.756 to get out of D.C. for a little while, come up 22 00:01:21.756 --> 00:01:23.456 and visit our friends up at Bedford. 23 00:01:23.456 --> 00:01:27.006 We have some folks in the area, so thank you for that. 24 00:01:27.006 --> 00:01:29.406 To get started, I think I have the clicker. 25 00:01:29.496 --> 00:01:32.696 Okay. I'll jump straight into it. 26 00:01:32.696 --> 00:01:34.526 I'll try not to cover much of the ground that's been -- 27 00:01:34.526 --> 00:01:37.376 we had a master class in 5G earlier, so I don't want 28 00:01:37.466 --> 00:01:38.776 to retread a lot of that. 29 00:01:38.776 --> 00:01:41.356 So, I'll try to skate across some of the things 30 00:01:41.566 --> 00:01:43.936 that have already been touched on, get to new material. 31 00:01:43.936 --> 00:01:47.056 So, really quickly, my name is Demetrius Davis 32 00:01:47.056 --> 00:01:51.136 of MITRE Corporation, roughly about 8,500 employees, 33 00:01:51.136 --> 00:01:54.126 a not-for-profit company, for those that may not know 34 00:01:54.706 --> 00:01:58.286 that we operate FFRDC's, about seven of them, in particular. 35 00:01:58.616 --> 00:02:02.916 One of them is for DHS, so, that's one of our links, to DHS. 36 00:02:02.916 --> 00:02:06.876 I've got a whole bunch of talking points. 37 00:02:06.876 --> 00:02:09.026 I was spraying a target, because I didn't know exactly what would 38 00:02:09.026 --> 00:02:11.706 be covered before I got up, so now, I have a good idea how 39 00:02:11.706 --> 00:02:13.076 to make adjustments as we go. 40 00:02:13.076 --> 00:02:16.086 There's a little bit of everything here. 41 00:02:16.086 --> 00:02:18.006 I'll see, I have a copy here, locally. 42 00:02:18.006 --> 00:02:22.236 We'll touch on just a little background. 43 00:02:22.236 --> 00:02:24.076 Not too much, because I think we all know -- 44 00:02:24.426 --> 00:02:25.946 if we didn't know before, we know now. 45 00:02:25.946 --> 00:02:28.806 Touch on a little bit of the architectural elements 46 00:02:28.806 --> 00:02:29.956 that are a part of 5G. 47 00:02:30.046 --> 00:02:31.536 Security implications -- 48 00:02:31.696 --> 00:02:32.646 definitely want to touch on that. 49 00:02:32.646 --> 00:02:35.076 We already have heard a lot about network slicing, 50 00:02:35.076 --> 00:02:37.936 so I might skate over that one, really quickly. 51 00:02:38.696 --> 00:02:40.886 We've been introduced to some of the heterogeneous networks, 52 00:02:40.886 --> 00:02:43.026 so we'll just kind of introduce some of the use cases 53 00:02:43.026 --> 00:02:45.126 and how it applies across the different type 54 00:02:45.126 --> 00:02:47.486 of networking environments, from personal area networks, 55 00:02:47.486 --> 00:02:50.256 all the way up through a wide area limitations. 56 00:02:51.026 --> 00:02:53.756 And in one area I think we've been talking around 57 00:02:53.756 --> 00:02:55.856 but we didn't really get into a standards discussion. 58 00:02:55.856 --> 00:02:58.956 We've been touching on what's happening with 3GPP and ATIS, 59 00:02:59.006 --> 00:03:01.696 but, you know, I think we'll - we have a couple slides on that 60 00:03:01.696 --> 00:03:04.626 and to speak to specifically what are those security features 61 00:03:04.626 --> 00:03:06.656 that 3GPP is proposing and looking at, 62 00:03:07.196 --> 00:03:09.486 and see if we're mitigating some of those issues 63 00:03:09.486 --> 00:03:10.736 that we have in the 4G world. 64 00:03:10.736 --> 00:03:13.226 Some of the things we have to live with and carry forward, 65 00:03:13.436 --> 00:03:14.566 we'll solve that another day. 66 00:03:14.566 --> 00:03:16.866 But we have a lot of those issues 67 00:03:16.866 --> 00:03:20.116 that are really being addressed in the next two releases. 68 00:03:20.666 --> 00:03:23.626 And closing out, a couple of MITRE 5G activities 69 00:03:23.626 --> 00:03:25.576 that are going on, that's related to 5G. 70 00:03:26.406 --> 00:03:29.146 After that, if we have any more time, I have a to do list 71 00:03:29.146 --> 00:03:31.236 of things that -- within the security community, 72 00:03:31.236 --> 00:03:32.206 we really need to look at. 73 00:03:32.576 --> 00:03:34.406 More specifically, within the government community, 74 00:03:34.406 --> 00:03:37.246 because I think the government has special needs, specific DOD 75 00:03:37.246 --> 00:03:40.616 and DHS type organizations that we probably need to convene. 76 00:03:40.616 --> 00:03:42.696 We have some working groups who are standing up with the ATIS's 77 00:03:43.346 --> 00:03:46.906 and other consortiums around the beltway, as I would say. 78 00:03:47.246 --> 00:03:49.046 To be able to try to address some of those issues 79 00:03:49.046 --> 00:03:52.386 that commercial industry really doesn't care about, so we'll try 80 00:03:52.386 --> 00:03:53.576 to see if we can produce some type 81 00:03:53.576 --> 00:03:55.336 of layered, defense mechanism. 82 00:03:55.336 --> 00:03:57.336 Because we use a term called "defense in depth." 83 00:03:57.336 --> 00:03:59.906 Right? So, when we talk about things like 5G, 84 00:03:59.906 --> 00:04:01.956 we have to realize it's not just a comms layer. 85 00:04:02.366 --> 00:04:04.056 It's a lot bigger conversations. 86 00:04:04.056 --> 00:04:05.096 The ecosystem, it goes 87 00:04:05.096 --> 00:04:06.836 from devices all the way back to the Cloud. 88 00:04:06.836 --> 00:04:09.506 So, how do we -- you know, even within there, 89 00:04:09.506 --> 00:04:11.726 we have credentials, we have identity management. 90 00:04:11.726 --> 00:04:13.086 We have a lot of different services. 91 00:04:13.356 --> 00:04:14.996 And each one of those typically brings us its 92 00:04:14.996 --> 00:04:16.016 own vulnerabilities. 93 00:04:16.316 --> 00:04:17.826 So, much like we've been touching on some 94 00:04:17.826 --> 00:04:20.216 of the questions and more so on the speakers, 95 00:04:20.596 --> 00:04:23.036 we have been hearing that this is a complex system, 96 00:04:23.356 --> 00:04:25.586 that we have to kind of come up with new strategies 97 00:04:25.586 --> 00:04:26.716 and techniques for trying 98 00:04:26.716 --> 00:04:28.166 to mitigate some of these challenges. 99 00:04:28.656 --> 00:04:31.436 I promise not to spend as much time 100 00:04:31.436 --> 00:04:33.706 on the talking points slide next time. 101 00:04:35.276 --> 00:04:38.736 So, yeah, this is just a pictorial that kind 102 00:04:38.736 --> 00:04:41.066 of tells you, you know, 5G is more than just comms, 103 00:04:41.066 --> 00:04:43.426 at least the world that I come from. 104 00:04:43.426 --> 00:04:45.066 A lot of times when people say -- 105 00:04:45.386 --> 00:04:47.006 some people come at it from different angles. 106 00:04:47.006 --> 00:04:49.336 It's a very big elephant, so some of you may come 107 00:04:49.336 --> 00:04:51.916 in from layer one, so if you're talking spectral efficiency, 108 00:04:51.916 --> 00:04:53.566 if you're taking sayonara [phonetic], 109 00:04:53.566 --> 00:04:55.546 like we heard earlier on, you know, that's -- 110 00:04:55.796 --> 00:04:57.706 you come in from a RF layer. 111 00:04:57.706 --> 00:04:58.236 That's fine. 112 00:04:58.236 --> 00:05:00.246 But some people come at it from a business objective. 113 00:05:00.596 --> 00:05:02.156 What type of outcomes can I expect? 114 00:05:02.156 --> 00:05:03.886 What type of -- how would I pay for it? 115 00:05:03.886 --> 00:05:05.196 How do I buy 5G? 116 00:05:05.196 --> 00:05:06.256 Is it going to be extra? 117 00:05:06.396 --> 00:05:08.446 Is it going to be an additional service? 118 00:05:08.446 --> 00:05:09.456 I got to buy new phones? 119 00:05:09.836 --> 00:05:11.746 So, some people come in it from an acquisition. 120 00:05:11.746 --> 00:05:13.646 We have business perspectives from people looking at it 121 00:05:13.646 --> 00:05:15.906 from an application developer's perspective. 122 00:05:16.246 --> 00:05:17.796 Do I have to write my apps any different? 123 00:05:17.796 --> 00:05:20.176 What type of libraries do I've got to write, 124 00:05:20.176 --> 00:05:21.756 to be able to take advantage of low latency. 125 00:05:21.756 --> 00:05:23.866 So, everyone's looking at this really big elephant 126 00:05:23.866 --> 00:05:24.686 from different angles. 127 00:05:25.016 --> 00:05:28.356 The one thing we do know is that the user is thinking that, man, 128 00:05:28.356 --> 00:05:31.326 whenever all these wonderful technologies come together, 129 00:05:31.326 --> 00:05:32.856 it's going to be something special. 130 00:05:32.896 --> 00:05:37.026 We've been seeing it in all that sci-fi movies, and, you know, 131 00:05:37.026 --> 00:05:40.156 honestly, the way we look at it is 5G is really more 132 00:05:40.156 --> 00:05:41.216 than just the comms piece. 133 00:05:41.216 --> 00:05:44.556 It's really how all this AI stuff and machine learning 134 00:05:44.556 --> 00:05:47.426 and all the pervasive and immersive technologies -- 135 00:05:47.426 --> 00:05:50.526 how did that all come together for the public safety folks, 136 00:05:50.556 --> 00:05:52.236 for the vehicle to everything? 137 00:05:52.236 --> 00:05:55.936 I want my car to talk to my refrigerator and let my -- 138 00:05:55.936 --> 00:05:58.136 get my coffee cooking, you know, going, 139 00:05:58.136 --> 00:06:00.266 as soon as I get my garage door to open. 140 00:06:00.696 --> 00:06:01.406 And for some reason, 141 00:06:01.406 --> 00:06:04.356 we associate all this with this 5G era. 142 00:06:04.826 --> 00:06:05.746 I'm not sure why. 143 00:06:05.746 --> 00:06:07.886 We don't really need 5G to make all that happen. 144 00:06:07.886 --> 00:06:10.726 And then more specifically, within the IT conversation, 145 00:06:10.726 --> 00:06:12.846 most of IT capabilities are available today, 146 00:06:13.136 --> 00:06:15.896 but some people are still waiting for 5G to come 147 00:06:15.896 --> 00:06:17.246 to their town, so I can do IoT. 148 00:06:17.246 --> 00:06:19.926 And I'm trying to tell people, you don't have to wait. 149 00:06:20.376 --> 00:06:21.096 It's available. 150 00:06:21.096 --> 00:06:22.296 You can go build it today. 151 00:06:22.766 --> 00:06:24.206 So, but for some reason, you know, 152 00:06:24.276 --> 00:06:27.196 5G has become this catch-all buzzword, 153 00:06:27.446 --> 00:06:29.876 which sort of represents this new era in tech so, 154 00:06:29.966 --> 00:06:32.366 what you have is all your users are waiting. 155 00:06:32.366 --> 00:06:35.966 They're all dressed and ready for this big party to start. 156 00:06:35.966 --> 00:06:39.776 But not realizing behind this wall, or behind the curtain, 157 00:06:39.776 --> 00:06:42.686 there are a whole lot of administrators and cyber folks 158 00:06:42.686 --> 00:06:44.766 that are trying to figure out how do I address all 159 00:06:44.766 --> 00:06:48.556 of these complex challenges that are coming down the pike. 160 00:06:48.986 --> 00:06:51.356 So, as much as we talk about, hey, I want to be able 161 00:06:51.356 --> 00:06:53.806 to have a phone or I want to have some type of beam 162 00:06:53.806 --> 00:06:56.206 that follows me around as I walk through Central Park, 163 00:06:56.706 --> 00:06:59.816 we've got to realize that behind that comes a whole bunch of work 164 00:06:59.816 --> 00:07:01.946 and we've got to realize that threats that are coming in -- 165 00:07:01.946 --> 00:07:03.736 because a lot of this stuff is now being done 166 00:07:03.736 --> 00:07:06.286 in the software realm, and for some reason -- 167 00:07:06.286 --> 00:07:10.126 I'm a software person, so I'm biased -- but for some reason, 168 00:07:10.126 --> 00:07:12.936 there's a belief that the more software you put into a system, 169 00:07:13.076 --> 00:07:15.366 the more someone can affect it. 170 00:07:15.586 --> 00:07:17.356 As if hardware is infallible, 171 00:07:17.406 --> 00:07:19.296 but that's a conversation for another day. 172 00:07:19.956 --> 00:07:21.256 So, one of the things we're saying is, 173 00:07:21.556 --> 00:07:26.556 how do we keep those threats under some type of control. 174 00:07:26.646 --> 00:07:28.806 And I guess the last question was, what are you going to do, 175 00:07:28.806 --> 00:07:31.186 to try to stop all these different threat vectors 176 00:07:31.186 --> 00:07:33.816 and all these threat actors that are threatening all 177 00:07:33.816 --> 00:07:36.296 of these prized parts of our infrastructure. 178 00:07:36.326 --> 00:07:39.156 And the reality is, the short answer is, we have to learn how 179 00:07:39.156 --> 00:07:40.966 to do risk management. 180 00:07:41.546 --> 00:07:43.476 And that's a very nasty word. 181 00:07:43.476 --> 00:07:45.406 We talk about -- we have a risk management framework 182 00:07:45.406 --> 00:07:48.606 within the government, that we're being encouraged to apply. 183 00:07:48.966 --> 00:07:51.506 But the reality is, it's really hard to sit down and walk 184 00:07:51.506 --> 00:07:53.286 through your entire ecosystem 185 00:07:53.546 --> 00:07:55.516 and identify all the things you care about 186 00:07:55.846 --> 00:07:58.336 and prioritize what things you want to take care of 187 00:07:58.336 --> 00:08:01.956 and what things are you willing to sacrifice for a cost, 188 00:08:02.316 --> 00:08:04.296 and to be at a cost and rank everything. 189 00:08:04.296 --> 00:08:06.116 And that's a very difficult activity. 190 00:08:06.336 --> 00:08:08.686 So, it's hard to secure everything, 191 00:08:08.686 --> 00:08:11.706 and a lot of the things I do on the side is to try to figure 192 00:08:11.706 --> 00:08:14.676 out what type of soft defense mechanisms can we apply. 193 00:08:14.676 --> 00:08:16.676 Can we try trust modeling? 194 00:08:16.676 --> 00:08:17.986 Can we do some type of deception? 195 00:08:17.986 --> 00:08:22.066 What else can we do, to help with the IES's and firewalls 196 00:08:22.066 --> 00:08:24.066 and anti-viruses and all the other things we deploy 197 00:08:24.066 --> 00:08:25.706 to secure our infrastructures? 198 00:08:25.706 --> 00:08:28.606 So, those are techniques that remind me to become more versed 199 00:08:28.606 --> 00:08:30.706 and to try to figure out, how do I trick. 200 00:08:30.706 --> 00:08:31.516 How do I deter? 201 00:08:31.516 --> 00:08:34.206 How do I delay, to buy me some time, 202 00:08:34.386 --> 00:08:36.856 to figure out where the threat is really coming from? 203 00:08:37.326 --> 00:08:38.966 And so, those are some real challenges 204 00:08:38.966 --> 00:08:39.846 that we're going to have to deal with. 205 00:08:39.846 --> 00:08:41.166 And we don't have them today, 206 00:08:41.676 --> 00:08:43.256 even though the party's starting. 207 00:08:43.256 --> 00:08:44.766 We're starting to hear the music, we're starting 208 00:08:44.766 --> 00:08:47.726 to hear the hype, and people are -- the momentum is building. 209 00:08:47.726 --> 00:08:49.326 People are ready to deploy applications, 210 00:08:49.326 --> 00:08:52.576 and we haven't gotten everything quite ready for the party yet. 211 00:08:52.576 --> 00:08:55.446 So, we're going to, you know, pick up the pace in some ways 212 00:08:55.446 --> 00:08:58.356 and try to be able to come up with strategies that can be able 213 00:08:58.356 --> 00:09:02.196 to help all this wonderful future, hyper-connected era, 214 00:09:02.536 --> 00:09:06.126 activities to be able to go off without too much of a hitch. 215 00:09:06.406 --> 00:09:10.736 I'm definitely not going to spend any time on here. 216 00:09:10.736 --> 00:09:13.616 But this real quick point is to let you know, you know, 217 00:09:13.616 --> 00:09:17.516 this looks like it's -- we took a straight line from 1G to 4G 218 00:09:17.516 --> 00:09:19.656 to 5G, and it really wasn't that way. 219 00:09:19.716 --> 00:09:21.396 I just wanted to let you know, there was a bit 220 00:09:21.396 --> 00:09:23.296 of scattershot in the early years. 221 00:09:23.796 --> 00:09:26.626 But when we got around 3G, ITU really sort of stepped 222 00:09:26.626 --> 00:09:29.976 up as being the bell cow that sort of pulled all 223 00:09:29.976 --> 00:09:31.826 of our standards and our requirements together. 224 00:09:31.896 --> 00:09:34.816 And since they've sort of been escorting us through the 4G 225 00:09:34.816 --> 00:09:38.696 and into the 5G eras, so now we have one sheet of music 226 00:09:38.696 --> 00:09:40.196 that everyone's kind of working from, 227 00:09:40.196 --> 00:09:41.566 in a standards perspective. 228 00:09:41.996 --> 00:09:43.386 And so, we'll touch on some of those. 229 00:09:43.386 --> 00:09:46.766 But just in a nutshell, we had the three major use cases, 230 00:09:46.766 --> 00:09:47.956 I believe, was touched on earlier, 231 00:09:47.956 --> 00:09:50.516 so we'll just maybe allude to that lightly in the future. 232 00:09:52.146 --> 00:09:54.396 Yeah, I'm just going -- I'm just to skate through some of these, 233 00:09:54.396 --> 00:09:56.436 just because I feel like we've been -- 234 00:09:56.436 --> 00:09:57.706 as I say, we had a master class. 235 00:09:57.706 --> 00:09:59.106 I don't need to recap a lot of it. 236 00:09:59.526 --> 00:10:01.466 But one of the big challenges here is we're moving 237 00:10:01.466 --> 00:10:04.356 from a more static, you know, hardware, you know, 238 00:10:04.356 --> 00:10:06.756 centric 4G infrastructure. 239 00:10:06.756 --> 00:10:10.376 Now, we're moving towards a very virtualized software intensive 240 00:10:10.376 --> 00:10:12.686 core in the 5G era. 241 00:10:12.686 --> 00:10:14.206 We're talking more about Edge. 242 00:10:14.206 --> 00:10:16.906 We didn't talk about Edge much on the 4G side. 243 00:10:16.906 --> 00:10:18.096 We're talking about virtual relation, 244 00:10:18.096 --> 00:10:19.376 dynamic configurations -- 245 00:10:19.696 --> 00:10:22.556 all those things are things of the 5G era, and so, that's going 246 00:10:22.556 --> 00:10:23.856 to -- those things are necessary, 247 00:10:23.856 --> 00:10:26.256 to be able to create some of the wonderful scenarios 248 00:10:26.256 --> 00:10:28.246 that we're talking about doing in the next few years. 249 00:10:28.246 --> 00:10:30.556 So, I just want you to know that there was a transition. 250 00:10:30.556 --> 00:10:32.576 We were able to fix some of the issues that came 251 00:10:32.576 --> 00:10:35.226 with the 4G world, but unfortunately, you know, 252 00:10:35.226 --> 00:10:37.436 some of those things are going to carry 253 00:10:37.436 --> 00:10:39.216 on into the next generation, maybe, into 6G. 254 00:10:39.216 --> 00:10:42.176 I think we're starting 6G work improve meetings, which is scary 255 00:10:42.176 --> 00:10:44.646 and a dichotomy, like you've got to be kidding. 256 00:10:45.196 --> 00:10:47.756 And also, even a release 17 type of activity. 257 00:10:47.756 --> 00:10:49.756 It seemed like some of the stuff is more science fiction 258 00:10:49.756 --> 00:10:52.416 than reality, but we've got to get ready for it. 259 00:10:52.416 --> 00:10:53.676 It's coming over the horizon now. 260 00:10:53.936 --> 00:10:56.386 So, security implications. 261 00:10:56.386 --> 00:10:58.126 I believe we touched on a lot of these. 262 00:10:58.356 --> 00:11:01.226 So, I'm trying not to rehash a lot of that ground. 263 00:11:01.716 --> 00:11:03.916 But I'll just touch on this notion 264 00:11:03.916 --> 00:11:07.246 of 5G being this connectivity, 265 00:11:07.246 --> 00:11:09.086 this unifying connectivity fabric 266 00:11:09.086 --> 00:11:10.816 for all these other technologies. 267 00:11:11.016 --> 00:11:13.466 And so, you have, you know, as I said, 268 00:11:13.466 --> 00:11:15.036 the AI, the Cloud, the Edge. 269 00:11:15.896 --> 00:11:19.576 We have the immersive, the technologies, 270 00:11:19.576 --> 00:11:22.086 which is your virtual reality, augmented reality. 271 00:11:22.086 --> 00:11:25.196 Everyone's thinking, how can I make all this stuff go. 272 00:11:25.196 --> 00:11:29.526 I need some fuel to sort of drive all of these technologies. 273 00:11:29.526 --> 00:11:32.516 And so, we're looking to 5G to sort of solve all that. 274 00:11:32.516 --> 00:11:35.126 Even though I don't believe it's really best suited 275 00:11:35.126 --> 00:11:37.986 for every use case, but for right now, we're just using it 276 00:11:37.986 --> 00:11:39.236 as a catch-all term for those 277 00:11:39.236 --> 00:11:41.236 that don't really understand the differences. 278 00:11:41.236 --> 00:11:43.226 So, we'll just keep the conversation moving forward. 279 00:11:43.226 --> 00:11:46.856 We've got to realize, with this increased connectivity, 280 00:11:46.856 --> 00:11:48.806 you're creating more of a complex system. 281 00:11:48.806 --> 00:11:53.476 So, as you get more systems, you get more, you know, threats. 282 00:11:53.476 --> 00:11:54.866 You get more cyber attacks. 283 00:11:54.866 --> 00:11:57.716 And so, we have to deal with botnets on our phones 284 00:11:57.716 --> 00:12:00.756 in the future, that deal with - how do I deal with, you know, 285 00:12:00.936 --> 00:12:02.606 devices being added to the network 286 00:12:02.606 --> 00:12:03.976 without the admin knowing about it? 287 00:12:04.316 --> 00:12:05.906 It's something we have to do on the fly. 288 00:12:05.906 --> 00:12:08.446 So, that automatic provisioning. 289 00:12:08.446 --> 00:12:09.576 How much you want to automate 290 00:12:09.866 --> 00:12:12.986 and let some software decide what is secure and not secure, 291 00:12:12.986 --> 00:12:14.346 versus having a person do it? 292 00:12:14.376 --> 00:12:16.556 So, we've got a lot of issues that we've got to address. 293 00:12:16.556 --> 00:12:19.036 And I'm not trying to pile on and let you know, 294 00:12:19.036 --> 00:12:20.536 oh my God, we should be afraid. 295 00:12:20.536 --> 00:12:22.136 We're not going to move forward. 296 00:12:22.136 --> 00:12:24.096 I just want to let you know there are some particular 297 00:12:24.096 --> 00:12:25.996 security challenges that we have to address. 298 00:12:25.996 --> 00:12:28.886 And I think we have some smart people working on this, 299 00:12:28.886 --> 00:12:31.116 so we have some good hope and belief that we're going 300 00:12:31.116 --> 00:12:33.126 to be able to beat this. 301 00:12:33.126 --> 00:12:35.906 We mentioned that the infrastructure will be heavily 302 00:12:36.046 --> 00:12:38.556 virtualized, which brings its own issues. 303 00:12:38.556 --> 00:12:41.346 But I think in some cases, there's a belief that even 304 00:12:41.346 --> 00:12:43.846 with something like a network slicing, you know, hey, 305 00:12:43.846 --> 00:12:45.186 it's basically like VPNs, right? 306 00:12:45.186 --> 00:12:47.606 We can just chop it up and pass it out 307 00:12:47.606 --> 00:12:50.336 and let people run their own little, you know, 308 00:12:50.336 --> 00:12:51.766 networks, however they want to. 309 00:12:51.766 --> 00:12:53.346 It's going to be their own ownership models. 310 00:12:53.346 --> 00:12:55.246 They've got their own KeyOS. 311 00:12:55.346 --> 00:12:57.766 It can be just like, you know, the old days. 312 00:12:58.066 --> 00:12:59.386 Nothing's different, but we've got to realize 313 00:12:59.386 --> 00:13:03.176 that there are a lot more nuances to this. 314 00:13:03.176 --> 00:13:05.616 And you just can't just automatically translate one 315 00:13:05.616 --> 00:13:06.466 technology for another. 316 00:13:06.466 --> 00:13:08.956 So, there's going to be some new software, some new terms, 317 00:13:08.956 --> 00:13:11.596 some new -- some of this stuff is going to be a little custom, 318 00:13:11.986 --> 00:13:13.706 even though we're using standards, 319 00:13:13.706 --> 00:13:17.616 and a lot of the standards are really life saving, 320 00:13:17.656 --> 00:13:21.506 because I can think a generation ago, everything was, 321 00:13:21.506 --> 00:13:23.526 you know, custom built. 322 00:13:23.736 --> 00:13:25.846 I come from doing raspberry pies, right? 323 00:13:25.846 --> 00:13:29.216 So, IoT, a few years ago, was, hey, I got three raspberry pies 324 00:13:29.216 --> 00:13:30.106 that are talking together. 325 00:13:30.106 --> 00:13:32.666 And I'm using it to feed my dog when I'm not at home. 326 00:13:32.796 --> 00:13:35.496 So, it's grown up quite a bit in a few years. 327 00:13:35.496 --> 00:13:36.296 So, now, we got to look 328 00:13:36.296 --> 00:13:41.296 at all the possible ways you can get these systems to act 329 00:13:41.846 --> 00:13:44.296 and to be able to sense and to be able to work together 330 00:13:44.296 --> 00:13:46.946 without necessarily me sitting there, pushing buttons, 331 00:13:46.946 --> 00:13:47.976 and flipping switches. 332 00:13:48.366 --> 00:13:49.956 It's a different way of thinking, so it's going 333 00:13:49.956 --> 00:13:52.506 to also trigger a different way of defending, as well. 334 00:13:53.296 --> 00:13:54.096 And supply chain. 335 00:13:54.756 --> 00:13:55.706 I know we've touched on this, 336 00:13:55.706 --> 00:13:57.996 but supply chain is a much bigger issue than -- 337 00:13:58.326 --> 00:14:00.396 let me pull the threat on the hardware to figure out, 338 00:14:00.696 --> 00:14:03.116 all the way back to where the rare earth can be pulled 339 00:14:03.116 --> 00:14:03.626 out of the ground. 340 00:14:03.726 --> 00:14:05.966 So, that lets me know that the supply chain is clean. 341 00:14:06.016 --> 00:14:08.166 And that needs to be, at least, for my opinion, 342 00:14:08.166 --> 00:14:09.596 that's what supply chain really was. 343 00:14:09.996 --> 00:14:13.776 Find out where all the pieces come from and who built them. 344 00:14:14.036 --> 00:14:15.596 Was this done in an ethical fashion? 345 00:14:15.596 --> 00:14:17.246 Did we have 12-year-olds in mines? 346 00:14:17.586 --> 00:14:18.396 Is that a problem? 347 00:14:18.476 --> 00:14:20.256 From a business point of view, you probably don't care, 348 00:14:20.256 --> 00:14:22.806 but it does trigger some other issues. 349 00:14:22.806 --> 00:14:26.006 So, that's a technical or a technology supply chain. 350 00:14:26.006 --> 00:14:28.326 Well, there's also a service supply chain. 351 00:14:28.376 --> 00:14:30.136 So, one of the things we're seeing overseas, 352 00:14:30.516 --> 00:14:31.876 and I think it was touched on lightly 353 00:14:31.876 --> 00:14:36.156 in the last presentation, and that is, if I go overseas 354 00:14:36.156 --> 00:14:37.676 and I use a foreign carrier network, 355 00:14:38.016 --> 00:14:42.236 and I'm buying a service from the provider, who is not banned 356 00:14:42.236 --> 00:14:46.216 or considered non-compliant, but they have a contract 357 00:14:46.216 --> 00:14:49.836 with someone who has a contract with someone who has a contract, 358 00:14:49.836 --> 00:14:51.896 who uses non-compliant software. 359 00:14:52.376 --> 00:14:54.936 So, now, we have a service supply chain. 360 00:14:54.936 --> 00:14:56.836 We're now going to say, every service I buy, 361 00:14:57.196 --> 00:15:00.006 I've got to follow that little thread of, you know, 362 00:15:00.196 --> 00:15:02.446 to figure out who all they get their supplies from. 363 00:15:02.446 --> 00:15:04.676 Not just the hardware, not just the software, 364 00:15:04.676 --> 00:15:06.466 but it's also service contracts. 365 00:15:06.866 --> 00:15:08.476 And so, now, the question is, 366 00:15:08.476 --> 00:15:09.596 this isn't something the Department 367 00:15:09.596 --> 00:15:12.166 of Commerce is dealing with every day, to say, okay, 368 00:15:12.166 --> 00:15:14.736 this guidance went out, but now, how far does it go? 369 00:15:14.876 --> 00:15:17.646 You know, how many hops into the network do I have 370 00:15:17.646 --> 00:15:20.876 to go before I can sleep at night, knowing that I'm secure, 371 00:15:21.016 --> 00:15:22.366 whatever secure really means? 372 00:15:22.756 --> 00:15:25.186 So, supply chain gonna open up some second 373 00:15:25.186 --> 00:15:27.496 and third order effects that we now have to look 374 00:15:27.496 --> 00:15:29.086 at it a little differently than just knowing 375 00:15:29.086 --> 00:15:31.576 that it's a clean technology supply chain. 376 00:15:31.576 --> 00:15:34.226 There's a little bit more to it. 377 00:15:35.296 --> 00:15:38.566 This -- I think we've touched on this, even, a little bit. 378 00:15:38.566 --> 00:15:41.816 But this is -- sort of shows some of the challenges we see 379 00:15:41.816 --> 00:15:44.076 in the RAN side of the equation. 380 00:15:44.076 --> 00:15:46.406 So, in some cases, you can have a rogue base station. 381 00:15:46.406 --> 00:15:48.556 I think someone even had a question on that, saying, 382 00:15:48.556 --> 00:15:51.166 you know, if you have a IMSI catcher and how will you deal 383 00:15:51.166 --> 00:15:53.956 with that today, versus how we envision doing it in the future. 384 00:15:53.956 --> 00:15:55.866 So, you can have an unsecure phone 385 00:15:56.446 --> 00:15:59.416 or end user device at a base station. 386 00:15:59.416 --> 00:16:01.776 And, so, right now, there are ways that you can say, hey, 387 00:16:01.776 --> 00:16:03.326 the person sticks a base station there. 388 00:16:03.326 --> 00:16:04.956 You don't know who you're connected to exactly. 389 00:16:05.386 --> 00:16:08.336 And so, there's some changes we can make, here, whether it's, 390 00:16:08.816 --> 00:16:10.486 you know, adding some type of -- 391 00:16:10.486 --> 00:16:15.446 a key type of key management construct or creating some type 392 00:16:15.696 --> 00:16:18.486 of enhanced base station technology, so you can be able 393 00:16:18.486 --> 00:16:20.796 to verify that I am you, you are me, 394 00:16:20.796 --> 00:16:24.016 before we make a hard connection and start passing information. 395 00:16:24.526 --> 00:16:26.676 So this just shows one way of doing it. 396 00:16:26.826 --> 00:16:27.726 There's different ways. 397 00:16:27.726 --> 00:16:30.736 There's -- 3GPP is also looking at that. 398 00:16:31.346 --> 00:16:35.056 This was actually part of the -- one of the minor contributions 399 00:16:35.056 --> 00:16:36.896 to the last 3GPP, SA3 session. 400 00:16:36.896 --> 00:16:41.896 I think I have a slide on that, somewhere -- 401 00:16:42.766 --> 00:16:44.206 I might get to it in a second. 402 00:16:44.676 --> 00:16:46.866 This is a recap of the network slicing. 403 00:16:46.866 --> 00:16:48.626 I feel like I'm skating through a lot of this, because I feel 404 00:16:48.626 --> 00:16:50.946 like we've already, you know, been, you know, 405 00:16:50.946 --> 00:16:52.106 schooled on it very well. 406 00:16:52.106 --> 00:16:54.806 So, don't want to go into it very deeply. 407 00:16:54.806 --> 00:16:56.526 Anything I want to touch on? 408 00:16:56.526 --> 00:16:58.476 No, I think we've been -- 409 00:16:58.476 --> 00:17:01.136 actually, that slide looks almost just 410 00:17:01.136 --> 00:17:02.126 like the slide from earlier. 411 00:17:02.476 --> 00:17:04.006 So, I'll keep moving. 412 00:17:04.046 --> 00:17:06.396 So, here, this is just one depiction 413 00:17:06.396 --> 00:17:09.316 of how the world might look, right, from, you know, 414 00:17:09.316 --> 00:17:10.616 which side of the world you're on. 415 00:17:11.066 --> 00:17:12.196 On one side, we looked at -- 416 00:17:12.466 --> 00:17:14.206 okay, I'm an application developer 417 00:17:14.346 --> 00:17:16.356 or I have a use case I want to address. 418 00:17:16.656 --> 00:17:20.046 I've got to figure out, okay, for what I want to do, 419 00:17:20.046 --> 00:17:22.236 I got to map that to what type 420 00:17:22.236 --> 00:17:23.526 of environment I'm going to be working in. 421 00:17:23.666 --> 00:17:24.476 So, am I in the building? 422 00:17:24.476 --> 00:17:25.476 Am I outside the building? 423 00:17:25.476 --> 00:17:29.316 Am I in a personal area network or am I doing something 424 00:17:29.316 --> 00:17:30.456 that very specialized? 425 00:17:30.456 --> 00:17:33.086 So, something like telesurgery, that's going to say, Oh, 426 00:17:33.086 --> 00:17:35.846 my gosh, I need to make sure I have low latency. 427 00:17:35.846 --> 00:17:37.236 So, that tells you, boom, 428 00:17:37.236 --> 00:17:39.846 I need to be considering something like a 5G. 429 00:17:39.996 --> 00:17:43.206 So, this sort of tells you 5G has enrollment 430 00:17:43.206 --> 00:17:44.286 in a lot of different places. 431 00:17:44.286 --> 00:17:45.716 I think there's some battlegrounds we're going 432 00:17:45.716 --> 00:17:47.326 to see somewhere, especially in the building. 433 00:17:47.786 --> 00:17:50.576 I personally don't believe Wi-Fi is totally dead yet. 434 00:17:50.836 --> 00:17:51.946 I think there's going to be -- 435 00:17:51.946 --> 00:17:55.176 especially Wi-Fi 6 and WP3 coming out. 436 00:17:55.226 --> 00:17:58.386 I think it's going to be an interesting battle here 437 00:17:58.386 --> 00:18:00.846 on the end building sector. 438 00:18:00.846 --> 00:18:02.546 But once you get into the wide area environment, 439 00:18:02.546 --> 00:18:06.336 so I think it's pretty much going to be a 5G, even though, 440 00:18:06.816 --> 00:18:09.186 when we talk about IoT, we also got to realize 441 00:18:09.186 --> 00:18:11.326 that IoT is not just one thing either. 442 00:18:11.716 --> 00:18:14.046 So, there's massive IoT, which may be dealing with a lot 443 00:18:14.046 --> 00:18:16.906 of low power, you know, a lot of, you know, 444 00:18:16.906 --> 00:18:19.206 we may run narrow band IoT solution may work for you. 445 00:18:19.286 --> 00:18:21.846 If you don't need to have wireless webcams, 446 00:18:21.846 --> 00:18:24.556 sitting somewhere, collecting high res video, 447 00:18:24.556 --> 00:18:28.036 then you might be able to get by with a narrow band IoT solution. 448 00:18:28.306 --> 00:18:31.146 But they can still tie into the 5G fabric. 449 00:18:31.376 --> 00:18:32.606 They can still move forward. 450 00:18:32.676 --> 00:18:33.716 So, just letting you know, 451 00:18:33.716 --> 00:18:35.916 there's different ways of slicing this. 452 00:18:36.116 --> 00:18:37.606 So, this is one way of slicing it. 453 00:18:38.096 --> 00:18:40.776 I believe that on the personal area network piece, 454 00:18:40.776 --> 00:18:43.906 I think there's going to be some interesting activity there, too. 455 00:18:43.906 --> 00:18:46.926 I mean, we always bring this up in 802's category, right? 456 00:18:46.926 --> 00:18:48.526 802.11 and .15. 457 00:18:48.716 --> 00:18:51.396 So, I think this is just one way of looking at it 458 00:18:51.396 --> 00:18:54.386 from a use case point of view and slice the pie according 459 00:18:54.386 --> 00:18:56.976 to where is the failed technology best applied. 460 00:18:57.516 --> 00:19:02.516 [ Silence ] 461 00:19:06.046 --> 00:19:08.146 Okay. Maybe I'm pushing it wrong. 462 00:19:09.316 --> 00:19:10.406 Oh, okay, next. 463 00:19:12.126 --> 00:19:16.216 This one, I definitely don't have to touch on, 464 00:19:16.216 --> 00:19:17.976 because I think we've analyzed -- 465 00:19:18.076 --> 00:19:20.106 I mean, as you look at the three different use cases, 466 00:19:20.106 --> 00:19:23.246 we kind of drew it on a spider chart a bit, to kind of show you 467 00:19:23.246 --> 00:19:24.636 where they're best used. 468 00:19:24.636 --> 00:19:27.716 So, as we did in the last case, on the last slide, we looked at, 469 00:19:27.716 --> 00:19:31.106 okay, for a given cellular solution, if they work well 470 00:19:31.106 --> 00:19:33.746 in a wide area environment, well, so, here in the case, 471 00:19:33.746 --> 00:19:36.106 you may look at it and say, for whatever I may need 472 00:19:36.106 --> 00:19:39.676 from all these different illities and attributes, 473 00:19:40.066 --> 00:19:42.406 you know, depending on what I want out of it, 474 00:19:42.646 --> 00:19:44.976 will you tell me what type of use case I want to apply? 475 00:19:45.456 --> 00:19:48.226 So, when we step into 5G, at least the first generation, 476 00:19:48.226 --> 00:19:51.566 we're going to see mostly a broad band type of approach. 477 00:19:51.566 --> 00:19:56.566 We won't get really into the low latency stuff until maybe the -- 478 00:19:57.666 --> 00:20:00.076 at least that's the stuff in early 16 479 00:20:00.076 --> 00:20:02.046 that will probably spill over in release 17. 480 00:20:02.096 --> 00:20:04.486 Oh wow. Time moves quick up here. 481 00:20:05.076 --> 00:20:05.916 Maybe it's Boston. 482 00:20:06.256 --> 00:20:08.126 So, I'm just showing you that, you know, 483 00:20:08.126 --> 00:20:10.146 depending on what you're looking for, it may tell you what type 484 00:20:10.146 --> 00:20:13.406 of use case you may want to consider. 485 00:20:13.686 --> 00:20:14.496 Standards, really quick. 486 00:20:14.546 --> 00:20:16.376 We have to touch on this really quickly. 487 00:20:16.376 --> 00:20:19.846 One of the things about network splicing I think we think that's 488 00:20:19.896 --> 00:20:22.646 going to be the - that and beam forming are two 489 00:20:22.646 --> 00:20:24.926 of the most popular features that we typically hear 490 00:20:24.926 --> 00:20:26.306 about when we talk about 5G. 491 00:20:26.856 --> 00:20:29.446 But one of the keys to that is you probably have to realize, 492 00:20:29.446 --> 00:20:31.616 you have to have a true 5G core to make that happen. 493 00:20:32.186 --> 00:20:33.426 And so, one of the things we learned 494 00:20:33.466 --> 00:20:36.396 about in Release 15 is there's two different architectures 495 00:20:36.396 --> 00:20:38.026 that we're going to probably promote, 496 00:20:38.026 --> 00:20:40.056 which is a standalone and non-standalone. 497 00:20:40.106 --> 00:20:43.606 So, you've got to really have a 5G standalone architecture, 498 00:20:43.606 --> 00:20:45.336 to really make the network splicing happen. 499 00:20:45.766 --> 00:20:47.416 And, so, that's some of the things that's being bandied 500 00:20:47.416 --> 00:20:49.906 about and believe me, it's not a pretty place to be. 501 00:20:49.906 --> 00:20:52.856 I went out to Reno, back, I guess, in the spring. 502 00:20:53.386 --> 00:20:56.106 I like to take advantage of anytime something is happening 503 00:20:56.106 --> 00:20:58.066 in the country, so I don't travel all around the world 504 00:20:58.066 --> 00:21:00.036 and attend all these working group sessions -- 505 00:21:00.036 --> 00:21:04.416 but there's a pretty good body of work -- there's SA3 work, 506 00:21:04.416 --> 00:21:05.976 which is mostly security center. 507 00:21:06.546 --> 00:21:08.086 And there's also a separate, you know, 508 00:21:08.206 --> 00:21:10.046 five or six different RAN working groups. 509 00:21:10.456 --> 00:21:13.436 So, we're working through ATIS to try, you know, 510 00:21:13.436 --> 00:21:16.426 make sure we stay engaged with some of those 3GPP activities. 511 00:21:17.136 --> 00:21:18.306 Anything else? 512 00:21:18.786 --> 00:21:20.036 One of the things we also notice is 513 00:21:20.036 --> 00:21:21.726 within the security working group, 514 00:21:21.726 --> 00:21:23.946 they don't really spend a lot of time on supply chains. 515 00:21:23.946 --> 00:21:26.316 We realize that may be a second activity we have 516 00:21:26.316 --> 00:21:27.266 to do outside of that. 517 00:21:27.266 --> 00:21:30.036 So, we're setting up individual supply chain working groups, 518 00:21:30.036 --> 00:21:31.956 with that as hopefully, get those started 519 00:21:31.956 --> 00:21:32.846 in the next few weeks. 520 00:21:33.616 --> 00:21:35.706 Here are a few of the security features, 521 00:21:35.706 --> 00:21:37.336 as you move from 4G to 5G. 522 00:21:37.456 --> 00:21:38.786 Some are considered optional. 523 00:21:39.266 --> 00:21:41.306 We've been trying to make contributions, 524 00:21:41.306 --> 00:21:42.276 to be able to say, hey, some 525 00:21:42.276 --> 00:21:44.716 of these optional features should be considered mandatory. 526 00:21:45.516 --> 00:21:49.336 Most of them got rebutted, so, we're going to try to see 527 00:21:49.406 --> 00:21:52.516 if we can do that at the ATIS level, which is more 528 00:21:52.516 --> 00:21:54.296 or less focused on United States 529 00:21:54.296 --> 00:21:55.906 and North America type employment. 530 00:21:56.526 --> 00:21:59.456 So, as you see here, if we had our choice, be king for a day, 531 00:21:59.456 --> 00:22:02.336 we would really want to push getting the MC encryption, 532 00:22:02.526 --> 00:22:04.176 you know, new generation, we're calling it [inaudible], 533 00:22:04.176 --> 00:22:09.176 some new terms you've got to be able to adapt to. 534 00:22:09.646 --> 00:22:12.476 These are contributions. 535 00:22:12.756 --> 00:22:17.436 And the working -- we have a secure profile working group, 536 00:22:17.436 --> 00:22:20.146 actually our next meeting is, I think, the first of August. 537 00:22:20.616 --> 00:22:22.926 So, if anyone's interested, this is an industry 538 00:22:22.926 --> 00:22:25.096 and government consortium, environment where we'll be able 539 00:22:25.096 --> 00:22:27.506 to work through some of these 5G security issues together. 540 00:22:28.806 --> 00:22:31.796 To do list, which I'll skip, because we're out of time. 541 00:22:32.516 --> 00:22:34.646 So I'll just jump to any questions. 542 00:22:34.646 --> 00:22:38.066 I'll leave this up, just in case it reminds me of something. 543 00:22:38.286 --> 00:22:39.426 Yes? Any questions? 544 00:22:40.606 --> 00:22:44.666 That means I can talk longer. 545 00:22:45.506 --> 00:22:46.526 I was just kidding. 546 00:22:49.896 --> 00:22:51.586 Awesome. We're up against a break, right? 547 00:22:51.726 --> 00:22:54.026 Well thank you very much. 548 00:22:54.026 --> 00:22:54.536 Thank you. 549 00:22:55.516 --> 00:22:57.516 [ Applause ] 550 00:22:58.516 --> 00:23:03.516 [ Music ] 551 00:23:06.188 --> 00:23:11.188 [ Silence ]