With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values.
Connect with DHS

Social Media

DHS has multiple social media platforms that allow citizens to keep informed about homeland security issues and activities the Department is taking to make America safe.

https://www.dhs.gov/facebook
https://www.dhs.gov/twitter
https://www.dhs.gov/instagram
https://www.dhs.gov/linkedin
https://www.dhs.gov/flickr
https://www.dhs.gov/youtube
https://public.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDHS/subscriber/new

DHS Components

DHS’s Operational Components (shaded in blue) lead the Department’s operational activities to protect our Nation. The DHS Support Components (shaded in green) provide mission support and business support activities to ensure the operational organizations have what they need to accomplish the DHS mission. Click on the Component links to find out more about DHS and the Components that execute and support the mission. For the most up to date information on the Department’s structure and leadership, visit our website at http://www.dhs.gov/organization.

Operational Components

- CBP – U.S. Customs and Border Protection
- CISA – Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
- FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency
- ICE – U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
- TSA – Transportation Security Administration
- USCG – U.S. Coast Guard
- USCIS – U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
- USSS – U.S. Secret Service

Support Components

- CWMD – Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
- FLETC – Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers
- I&A – Office of Intelligence and Analysis
- MGMT - Management Directorate
- OIG – Office of Inspector General
- OPS – Office of Operations Coordination
- S&T – Science and Technology Directorate
In May 2021, DHS received its eighth consecutive Certificate of Excellence in Accountability Reporting (CEAR) from the Association of Government Accountants (AGA) for its Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Agency Financial Report. The CEAR Program was established by the AGA, in conjunction with the Chief Financial Officers Council and the Office of Management and Budget, to honor agencies demonstrating significant improvement and progress in their accountability and performance reporting.

In addition to the coveted CEAR award, DHS was presented with a Best-in-Class Award for Excellent Presentation of Performance Results in an Agency Financial Report. This is the second time DHS has been awarded this Best-in-Class Award.

AGA is an association for professionals that work in the areas of financial management, accounting, auditing, IT, budgeting, policy, grants management, performance management, and other business operations areas to help government work more efficiently and effectively.
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## Appendix A: Measure Descriptions, Data Collection Methodologies, and Verification and Validation Information

## Appendix B: Relevant GAO and OIG Reports
About this Report
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Annual Performance Report (APR) for FY 2021-2023 presents the Department’s mission programs, progress summaries, performance measure results and FY 2022 and FY 2023 targets. The report summarizes information on other key initiatives in the DHS Performance Management Framework related to the Strategic Review and our Agency Priority Goals (APG). Also included are other key management initiatives, and a summary of our performance challenges and high-risk areas identified by the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The report is consolidated to incorporate our annual performance plan and annual performance report.

For FY 2021, the Department’s Performance and Accountability Reports consist of the following three reports:

- DHS Agency Financial Report | Publication date: November 12, 2021
- DHS Annual Performance Report | Publication date: April 19, 2022
- DHS Report to our Citizens (Summary of Performance and Financial Information) | Publication date: April 22, 2022

When published, all three reports will be located on our public website at: http://www.dhs.gov/performance-accountability.

Contact Information

For more information, contact:

Department of Homeland Security
Office of the Chief Financial Officer
Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation
245 Murray Lane, SW
Mailstop 200
Washington, DC 20528
Section 1: Overview
The Overview section includes a brief review of the Department’s organizational structure followed by a description of the DHS Organizational Performance Management Framework and a brief summary of Departmental results.

Section 1: Overview

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DHS Organizational Performance Management Framework
Performance Community
Performance Measurement
Internal Controls for Verification and Validation
Quarterly Performance Reporting
Performance Public Reporting
Agency Priority Goals
Performance Reviews
Strategic Review
Departmental Summary of Results
Introduction

This report provides a representation of our performance results for FY 2021, along with those measures planned for FY 2022-2023, aligned to our organizational structure. It satisfies the requirement to publish the Department’s FY 2021 Annual Performance Report (APR) and the FY 2023 Annual Performance Plan. DHS uses our strategic set of measures contained in this report to communicate our progress and the value the Department provides to our stakeholders while providing an accountability structure for the agency. Additional performance measure information is provided in the Overview chapter of each Component’s Congressional Budget Justification, which contains both our strategic measures included here and our management measures. This APR can be found on our public web site at Performance & Financial Reports (https://www.dhs.gov/performance-financial-reports), and the Congressional Budget Justification is located at DHS Budget (https://www.dhs.gov/dhs-budget).

Organization

The Department of Homeland Security has a vital mission: to secure the nation from the many threats we face. This requires the dedication of more than 240,000 employees in jobs that range from aviation and border security to emergency response, from cybersecurity analyst to chemical facility inspector. Our duties are wide-ranging, and our goal is clear - keeping America safe. For the most up to date information on the Department’s structure, visit our web site at https://www.dhs.gov/organization. Below is a listing and description of the Components of DHS.

Operational Components

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

CBP is one of the world's largest law enforcement organizations and is charged with keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the U.S. while facilitating lawful international travel and trade.

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

CISA leads the national effort to defend critical infrastructure against the threats of today, while working with partners across all levels of government and in the private sector to secure against the evolving risks of tomorrow.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

FEMA helps people before, during, and after disasters. FEMA does this by supporting our citizens and first responders to ensure that, as a Nation, we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

TSA protects the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

USCIS administers the Nation’s lawful immigration system, safeguarding its integrity and promise by efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and honoring our values.

United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

ICE promotes homeland security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration.

United States Coast Guard (USCG)

USCG is one of the six armed forces of the United States and the only military organization within DHS. The USCG protects the maritime economy and the environment, defends our maritime borders, and saves those in peril.

United States Secret Service (USSS)

USSS has an integrated mission of protecting national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, designated sites, and National Special Security Events as well as safeguarding the Nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy.

Support Components

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD)

CWMD leads DHS efforts and coordinates with domestic and international partners to safeguard the United States against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and health security threats.

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC)

FLETC provides career-long training to law enforcement professionals to help them fulfill their responsibilities safely and proficiently.
Management Directorate (MGMT)

MGMT is responsible for budget, appropriations, expenditure of funds, accounting and finance; procurement; human resources and personnel; information technology systems; facilities, property, equipment, and other material resources; providing biometric identification services; and identification and tracking of performance measurements relating to the responsibilities of the Department.

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

I&A equips the Homeland Security Enterprise with the timely intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.

Office of Inspector General (OIG)

OIG was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) by an amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978 (92 Stat. 1101). OIG has a dual reporting responsibility to the Secretary of DHS and to Congress. OIG serves as an independent and objective audit, inspection, and investigative body to promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency in DHS programs and operations, and to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse.

Office of Operations Coordination (OPS)¹

OPS provides information daily to the Secretary of Homeland Security, senior leaders, and the Homeland Security Enterprise to enable decision-making; oversees the National Operations Center; manages the DHS Special Events Special Events Program; and leads the Department’s Continuity of Operations and Government Programs to enable continuation of primary mission essential functions in the event of a degraded or crisis operating environment.

Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)

S&T is the primary research and development arm of the Department. It provides federal, state and local officials with the technology and capabilities to protect the homeland.

¹ Office of Operations Coordination (OPS) is changing in FY22 to the Office of Homeland Security Situational Awareness (OSA) as identified in the FY23 Congressional Budget Justification.
DHS Organizational Performance Management Framework

The Department has a robust performance framework that drives performance management and enables the implementation of performance initiatives. This framework consists of core concepts and initiatives to assess program implementation progress, measure results, and drive the delivery of value to external stakeholders. The graphic shows these initiatives that come from both the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, and its companion legislation, the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA).

Figure 1: DHS Performance Management Framework

Performance Community

The DHS performance community is led by the Chief Operating Officer (a collateral duty of the Deputy Secretary of DHS), the Performance Improvement Officer (PIO) who is also the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E), and the Deputy PIO (DPIO) who is also the Assistant Director for Performance Management in PA&E. These leaders are supported by Performance Analysts in PA&E located under the DHS Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in the Management Directorate of DHS. The PIO, DPIO, and PA&E Performance Analysts are the liaison to our DHS Component performance management leaders and collaborators, along with various external stakeholders interested in performance management (shown in the graphic below).
DHS Component PIOs, Agency Priority Goal (APG) Leads, and Strategic Review Assessment Leads are the senior leaders driving performance management efforts in their respective Components. Component Performance Leads are the critical liaison between DHS PA&E and Component leadership and program managers for all performance management initiatives. They assist with communicating guidance and initiatives, provide advice on measure development concepts, collect and review measure results, and coordinate with Component leadership on performance management initiatives. Strategic Review Lead Assistants play a key role in managing Assessment Team efforts annually and refining and delivering key findings from the review process. Program Managers across DHS Components are key contributors to the Strategic Review assessment, along with generating ideas for performance measures, producing measure data, and using the information to manage and improve operations.

Performance Measurement

With the support of leadership and our Components, PA&E initiates the annual measure improvement process to enhance our set of publicly reported measures to more effectively convey the results delivered to stakeholders. Improvement ideas are derived from several sources:

- Feedback provided by senior leadership to mature our ability to describe the value delivered by DHS;
- Component leadership and program managers desire to implement measures that are meaningful to current operations and goals;
- Suggestions from PA&E Performance Analysts working to fill gaps and improve quality;
- Suggestions from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to achieve greater visibility into program performance and connections to program resources; and
- Recommendations from other external stakeholders such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congress.
While measured improvement is iterative, we use the annual process to mature the breadth and scope of our publicly reported set of measures, as shown in the figure above. The process begins in the winter after implementing the new measures in the agency performance plan, to identify gaps that were not filled along with areas where improved measures are desired. Improvement efforts continue into the spring since it can take six to nine months to develop new measure concepts depending on the complexity and scope of data collection. Summer is the Department’s review of Component proposals and discussions with OMB continue into the fall.

To support the measure change process, DHS employs a tool known as the Performance Measure Definition Form (PMDF) that provides a structured format to operationally describe measures reported in the Department’s performance deliverables. The PMDF provides instructions on completing the data fields and includes elements such as the measure name, description, scope of data collected, where the data is stored, a summary of the data collection and computation process, and what processes exist to double-check the accuracy of the data to ensure reliability. These data fields on the form reflect GAO’s recommended elements regarding data quality and to ensure data are valid for the intended purpose. The PMDF is our change management tool to propose and review new measures, make changes to existing measures, and to retire measures planned for removal from our strategic and management measure sets.

New measure proposals, or modifications to existing measures, are developed by program managers, reviewed by Component leadership and performance offices, and submitted to DHS by June 30th each year. PA&E performance analysts work in concert with leadership to review and approve changes, which are then submitted to OMB for their review, approval, and subsequent implementation. The results of this process constitute our publicly reported measures associated with our performance budget deliverables, namely our strategic and management sets of
measures. As previously mentioned, these measures are published in the Department’s APR, the Overview Chapters of the Congressional Justification, and the Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP) Report to Congress.

Internal Controls for Verification and Validation

The Department recognizes the importance of collecting complete, accurate, and reliable performance data that is shared with leadership and external stakeholders. Performance data are considered reliable if transactions and other data that support reported performance measures are properly recorded, processed, and summarized to permit the preparation of performance information in accordance with criteria stated by management. OMB Circular A-136, Financial Reporting Requirements, OMB Circular A-11, Preparation, Submission, and Execution of the Budget, and the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 (Public Law (P.L.) No. 106-531) further delineate this responsibility by requiring agencies to ensure completeness and reliability of the performance data they report by putting management assurance procedures in place.

DHS has implemented a multi-pronged approach to effectively mitigate risks and reinforce processes that enhance the Department’s ability to report complete and reliable data for performance measure reporting. This approach consists of: 1) an annual measure improvement and change control process described in the previous section using the PMDF; 2) a central information technology repository for performance measure information; 3) a Performance Measure Checklist for Completeness and Reliability used by Components to self-assess and rate their compliance with internal controls over performance information; and 4) annual assessments of the completeness and reliability of a sample of our performance measures by an independent review team.

Central Information Technology (IT) Repository for Performance Measure Information

All of DHS’s approved measures are maintained in the OneNumber tool, Performance Management (PM) System, which is a unique cube in the architecture of the OneNumber tool that also contains outyear planning and budget information. The PM System is a web-based IT system accessible to all relevant parties in DHS and was just deployed Department-wide in July of 2020. The system has specific access controls which allows for the management of the Department’s performance plan and the capturing of performance results by designated system users. The PM System stores all historical information about each measure including specific details regarding: description; scope; data source; data collection methodology; and explanation of data reliability check. The data in the system are then used as the source for quarterly and annual Performance

Note: Circular A-11, PART 6, THE FEDERAL PERFORMANCE FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING PROGRAM AND SERVICE DELIVERY, Section 240.26 Definitions. Data limitations. In order to assess the progress towards achievement of performance goals, the performance data must be appropriately valid and reliable for intended use. Significant or known data limitations should be identified to include a description of the limitations, the impact they have on goal achievement, and the actions that will be taken to correct the limitations. Performance data need not be perfect to be valid and reliable to inform management decision-making. Agencies can calibrate the accuracy of the data to the intended use of the data and the cost of improving data quality. At the same time, significant data limitations can lead to bad decisions resulting in lower performance or inaccurate performance assessments. Examples of data limitations include imprecise measurement and recordings, incomplete data, inconsistencies in data collection procedures and data that are too old and/or too infrequently collected to allow quick adjustments of agency action in a timely and cost-effective way.
and Accountability reporting. Finally, the performance data in the PM System are used to populate the Department’s business intelligence tools to provide real-time information to interested parties.

**Performance Measure Checklist for Completeness and Reliability**

The Performance Measure Checklist for Completeness and Reliability is a means for Component PIOs to attest to the quality of the information they are providing in our performance and accountability reports. Using the Checklist, Components self-evaluate key controls over strategic measure planning and reporting actions at the end of each fiscal year. Components describe their control activities and provide a rating regarding their level of compliance and actions taken for each key control. Components also factor the results of any internal or independent measure assessments into their rating. The Checklist supports the Component Head assurance statements attesting to the completeness and reliability of performance data.

**Independent Assessment of the Completeness and Reliability of Performance Measure Data**

PA&E conducts an assessment of performance measure data for completeness and reliability on a small number of its performance measures annually using an independent review team. This independent review team assesses selected strategic measures using the methodology prescribed in the *DHS Performance Measure Verification and Validation Handbook*, documents its findings, and makes recommendations for improvement. Corrective actions are required for performance measures that rate low on the scoring factors. The Handbook is made available to all Components to encourage the development and maturation of internal data verification and validation capabilities, increase transparency, and to facilitate the review process. The results obtained from the independent assessments are also used to support Component leadership assertions over the reliability of their performance information reported in the Performance Measure Checklist and Component Head Assurance Statement.

**Management Assurance Process for GPRAMA Performance Measure Information**

The Management Assurance Process requires all Component Heads in DHS to assert that performance measure data reported in the Department’s Performance and Accountability Reports are complete and reliable, namely the Agency Financial Report, the APR, and the Summary of Performance and Financial Information. If a measure is considered unreliable, the Component is directed to report the measure on the Performance Measure Checklist for Completeness and Reliability along with the corrective actions the Component is taking to correct the measure’s reliability.

The DHS Office of Risk Management and Assurance, within the Office of the CFO, oversees the management of internal controls and the compilation of many sources of information to consolidate into the Component Head and the Agency Assurance Statements. The *Agency Financial Report* contains statements in the Management Assurance section attesting to the completeness and reliability of performance measure information in our Performance and
Accountability Reports and that any unreliable measures and corrective actions are specifically reported in the APR.

Based on the process described above, all performance information is deemed complete and reliable.

**Quarterly Performance Reporting**

Quarterly reporting of the Department’s strategic and management measures is provided by Component program managers, reviewed by Component managers and performance staff, entered into the PM System, and then reviewed by PA&E performance staff. Components use the information to keep their leadership abreast of measure results and progress. PA&E also prepares a Quarterly Performance Report that has visualizations of select measure results over time, along with a trend report for all measures in the strategic and management sets. These reports are shared quarterly with the DHS PIO and DPIO, posted on a DHS intranet site, and available to all DHS senior leaders and program managers to support their on-going program management activities. Many Components have their own internal processes and products by which they review performance data for management and decision making.

**Performance Public Reporting**

The Department follows the OMB Circular A-11 and A-136 requirements to produce the following reports to communicate key financial and performance information to stakeholders:

- DHS Agency Financial Report: Publication date: November 12, 2021
- DHS Annual Performance Report: Publication date: March XX, 2022
- DHS Report to our Citizens (Summary of Performance and Financial Information): Publication date: March XX, 2022

Combined, these reports comprise our annual performance and accountability reporting requirements. When published, all three reports are located on our public website at [Performance & Financial Reports](#).

DHS also integrates performance information to present our performance budget to Congress. For each Component in DHS, the Overview Chapter of the Congressional Justification includes a section known as the Strategic Context. For our operational Components, this section contained mission program descriptions and their associated strategic and management measures. For our support Components, the measures are listed at the Component level. Lastly, we include both the strategic and management measures in the Executive Summary section of the FYHSP Report to Congress to again emphasize the connection between funding and performance. The last avenue for performance public reporting is through the Agency Priority Goals discussed below.

**Agency Priority Goals**

Agency Priority Goals (APGs) are one of the tenets of GPRAMA and provide a tool for senior leadership to drive the delivery of results on key initiatives over a two-year period. Quarterly reports of progress are provided to interested parties through the OMB web site performance.gov.
More detailed information on the DHS APGs is presented in Section 3: Other Information and is currently being updated with OMB to align with Administration and Department priorities.

Performance Reviews

DHS has implemented Performance Reviews as a means for senior leadership to be engaged in the management of efforts to deliver performance results relevant to stakeholders. Meetings are held with APG Goal Leads, senior leaders, subject matter experts, and performance leadership and staff to discuss current results, progress, and challenges being faced by these complex issues.

Strategic Review

DHS conducted its eighth annual review of progress in the spring of FY 2021 to coincide with the schedule agreed upon by OMB. The review serves multiple purposes for the Components, DHS, and OMB:

- Assess progress of our mission program implementation efforts as a means for improvement
- Facilitate best practices of a learning organization by reflecting annually on where we have been and where we are going
- Advance the use of risk, program management, and evaluation practices
- Make key findings available to Component and DHS senior leaders to inform management efforts
- Provide feedback from execution to planning, programming, and budgeting activities
- Drive a focused conversation with OMB on significant issues to inform their management and budget activities

Similar to past Strategic Reviews, Component Assessment Teams assessed progress of DHS mission programs using a variety of evidence to inform their conclusions. Senior Assessment Team leaders provided written findings for consideration by the Headquarters Review Team. The Headquarters Review Team conducted a detailed cross-cutting review of the assessment results, and progress ratings were discussed and agreed upon in concert with the PIO, DPIO, and senior mission program leadership.

The DHS Strategic Review worked to integrate information from other initiatives into the review and assessment process. First consideration was given to the impact major acquisitions may deliver to fill capability gaps and improve future program execution (associated with the Program Management Improvement Accountability Act). Second, Assessment Teams reexamined more strategic-oriented risks associated with our mission programs and updated their mitigation efforts supporting effort to implement Enterprise Risk Management. Third, DHS leveraged the Strategic Review to begin to educate a larger population on the Foundations for Evidence Based Policy Making and initiatives associated with establishing a learning agenda, and Assessment Teams brainstormed ideas for questions that informed follow-on work to shape the DHS Learning Agenda.

The summary of progress findings from this review are integrated in Section 2.
**Progress Ratings in FY 2021**

DHS used the following criteria to determine progress ratings:

- **Noteworthy Progress**
  - Mission program execution of operations are working well
  - Innovation and improvement are evident
  - Notable impact was delivered to customers and stakeholders
  - Performance measures gauge relevant activities and deliver value
  - Challenges and risks are known and managed

- **Focus Area**
  - Mission program faces challenges in execution of its operations
  - Lack of innovation and improvement
  - Strategies and actions lack impact of significant magnitude
  - Measures lack relevant value and gaps exist
  - Challenges are not well understood, and the risk environment has excessive uncertainty, and/or known risks exceed current mitigation strategies

If a program was neither a Focus Area nor a Noteworthy progress, its progress rating was Satisfactory Progress.
Departmental Summary of Results

A review of the results at the close of FY 2021 demonstrates that 54 percent of the Department’s strategic measures met their targets as shown in the table below. Additionally, 59 percent of measures sustained or improved performance from FY 2020.

The following chart shows that the measures meeting their target on an annual basis varied between 54 to 68 percent from FY 2012 through FY 2021. Likewise, the percent of measures that maintained or improved over the prior year ranged from 59 to 77 percent. These results are consistent with programs that set ambitious and challenging performance targets and reflect DHS’s ongoing effort to develop new measures to communicate the value delivered to stakeholders.

The FY 2022-2023 performance plan includes a total of 87 measures, based on 12 measures being retired or suspended from our FY 2021 – 2022 performance plan and the introduction of 7 new measures. Measures included in the FY 2022-2023 performance plan are located in the measure tables starting on page 100, and are indicated by the inclusion of FY 2022 and FY 2023 targets.

Figure 4: Percent of Measures Meeting Target and Improving over Prior Year
Section 2: Performance Report and Plan
The Performance Report and Plan section summarizes both the results delivered and those planned for each of our Components. Each Component section starts with an overview narrative. Next, for each mission program, a program description and a summary from the most recent strategic review are provided. Performance highlights showcase program activities and results. At the end of this section, a full accounting of all our strategic measures are provided by Component.

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Operational Components

Customs and Border Protection

Overview

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is one of the world’s largest law enforcement organizations and is charged with keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the U.S. while facilitating lawful international travel and trade.

For each CBP mission program, a description of the program is provided along with its most recent summary of findings. For a full listing of CBP’s performance measure results and plan, see the “Performance Measure Tables – Report and Plan” chapter in this section.

Border Security Operations

Mission Program Goal

Secure the U.S. Border between the ports of entry.

Mission Program Description

The Border Security Operations program is charged with securing America’s Southwest, Northern, and certain Coastal borders. Through the coordinated use of the Department’s operational capabilities and assets of the U.S. Border Patrol, the program improves operational effectiveness.

In May 2021, U.S. Border Patrol agents from Rio Grande Valley Sector’s Kingsville Station used a small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS) to locate a lost undocumented migrant in need of help. The agent operating the drone quickly transmitted the location to a U.S. Border Patrol paramedic, whose immediate response stabilized the patient suffering a diabetic emergency.
by working across the Department to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons, noncitizens smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from moving across the U.S. border.

Summary of Findings

Strategic Review Progress Rating: Focus Area

Program Execution and Impact

- The use of Title 42 due to COVID-19 returned most illegal crossers immediately with no consequence—resulting in an increase of repeated attempts to enter the U.S. illegally.
- Execution of operations were challenged due to the quantity of noncitizens (many repeat offenders), capacity at stations for processing, and downstream problems with transferring unaccompanied minors to Health and Human Services.
- COVID-related protocols altered interview procedures and required heightened safety and sanitization efforts for detainees under Title 8 and those processed under Title 42.
- The program navigated pandemic-related delays in technology deployments aimed to increase situational awareness, as well as construction projects to enhance impedance and denial.
- Rate of interdiction effectiveness has uneven historical trend and complexities in interpreting the meaning of the result, for the scope of what is included in the measure incorporates all apprehended/encountered migrants and does not distinguish the range of effort needed to resolve individual illegal entries.

Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>FY 2022</td>
<td>FY 2023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rate of interdiction effectiveness along the Southwest Border between ports of entry</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
<td>79.4%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>82.6%</td>
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</table>

Brief Description: The Border Patrol uses this measure as an important indicator of the ability of law enforcement response efforts to apprehend or encounter detected noncitizens and as one of several key indicators used to determine effectiveness at the U.S. border.

Explanation: Border Patrol agents interdicted 1,825,562 of 2,211,269 known illegal entries on the Southwest Border in FY21. Nearly 36 percent of those processed were members of family units or unaccompanied children. Many groups arrived in large migration events that necessitate temporary relocation of agents to assist in humanitarian efforts. Other groups are evasive and often guided by criminal organizations.

Challenges and Risks

- Border Patrol agents face demands including cumbersome COVID-19 procedures, challenging work locations, changing job requirements, and policy shifts.
- Personnel hiring issues continue due to public perception of law enforcement, job locations that often result in remote work locations or more desirable locations in expensive urban areas; and burdensome processes to vet and onboard new personnel.
- Modifying strategies to be responsive to new policy imperatives for Barrier System introduces delays and uncertainty.
• A whole-of-government approach and legislation is necessary to address border security issues.

• If efforts to recruit, hire, and retain Border Patrol Agents do not sustain requirements, then there will be degradation of efforts to maintain the security and safety of U.S. borders between ports of entry.

• If the program’s outreach efforts cannot effectively influence positive portrayal of its personnel, operations, and mission, then negative public perception is likely to decrease support for improvements to administrative and agency funding, which will hinder agent recruiting/retention efforts, and degrade the organization’s contribution to national security.

Next Steps

• Address need to implement the Border Patrol Processing Coordinator position rapidly and at large scale.

• Determine the requirements to develop a strategic communication function sized and skilled to both influence public dialogue about border enforcement and as an essential support to activities in the field.

• Combine information technology and sensor systems now available or actively under development with current physical infrastructure systems to improve situational awareness.

Air and Marine Operations

Mission Program Goal

Deny the use of air, land, and coastal waters for conducting illegal movement of people and goods across the U.S. border.

Mission Program Description

The Air and Marine Operations (AMO) program supports the deterrence and interdiction of illegal and potential terrorist activity arising from the unlawful movement of people and goods across the U.S. borders. Program personnel leverage their detection, monitoring and interdiction skills to help safeguard the nation from illegal immigration, the movement and interdiction of contraband and drugs, and terrorist threats.

Summary of Findings

Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress

Program Execution and Impact

• Maintained persistent domain awareness to enhance awareness of air and maritime traffic along U.S. borders and Puerto Rico.
• Effectively supported Joint Inter-Agency Task Force-South operations in detection of smuggling and national security threats; supported more than 100 foreign-based detachments of P-3 maritime aircraft to track drug trafficking and other national-security threats as they approach U.S. borders.

• Deployed Tethered Aerostat Radar System to enhance awareness of air and maritime traffic along U.S. borders and Puerto Rico, using a unique look-down radar capability.

• COVID-19 significantly impeded the training and bilateral operations and support demands in the maritime environment much higher than planned - playing catch-up in lack of hiring experienced mariners to fill vacancies.

• Continued trend of meeting target for air-mission launch rate measure helped to sustain trend for resolved aircraft incursions.

**Key Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
<th>FY 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of detected conventional aircraft incursions resolved along all borders of the United States</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>99.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** The measure represents the percent of conventional aircraft suspected of illegal cross border activity based on visual or sensor data available to the program which are then apprehended or turned back successfully. Detecting aircraft incursions contributes to the operational control of the U.S. border.

**Explanation:** Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) resolved 218 of 218 Border Incursions during FY21, achieving a 100 percent Border Incursion resolved rate. AMOC enhanced collaboration with internal and external partners and air domain awareness in the border environment led to successfully resolving border incursion.

A week after the U.S. Border Patrol’s Big Bend Sector installed a rescue beacon near Sierra Blanca, Texas, it generated two rescue events for noncitizens in distress. The rescue beacons are marked with bright orange rescue symbols and blue light making it visible during the day and night.
Challenges and Risks

- A significant challenge is the growing threat from small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS); this includes potential impact to crewed fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft in contingency operations.
- Need a comprehensive framework for integrating data into command-and-control practices and frameworks—Command-Control-Computers-Communications-Intelligence (C4I).
- Need better awareness of maritime threats, including vessels not using Automatic Identification Systems, to enhance contributions to DHS law enforcement.
- If the program cannot recruit and on-board skilled, experienced front-line, and support personnel, then the program will face difficulty keeping pace with partner-agency demand for support.
- If the program cannot replace a complex set of legacy capabilities with new, more effective, more affordable, well-integrated capabilities, then the program will face serious difficulties in executing key domain-awareness and mobility missions.

Next Steps

- Continue to execute a five-year program (FY23-27) to acquire and install the Minotaur Mission System aboard fixed-wing aircraft; Minotaur enables aircrews to gather, process, and share surveillance information quickly among several aircraft.
- Adapt the OpSTAR Learning Management System’s web-based portal to augment trainees’ time in aviation and maritime platforms with virtual-reality training to reduce training costs.
- Participate in FY21 Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Tech Demonstrations sponsored by the Department’s Science & Technology Directorate, which will help define the types of Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems required for future investments.

Trade Operations

Mission Program Goal

Facilitate legitimate trade, enforce trade laws, and protect the American economy to ensure consumer safety and create a level playing field for American businesses.

Mission Program Description

The Trade Operations program is committed to protecting national economic security by enforcing U.S. trade laws. The program uses its trade enforcement operational approach and its authorities to combat trade fraud by detecting high-risk activity, deterring non-compliance, and disrupting fraudulent behavior. The program includes a multilayered system of people, technology, intelligence, risk information, targeting, international cooperation, and expanded shipper vetting.
that provides greater flexibility and capacity to accomplish these functions prior to arrival at the
U.S. border. The program is also one of the largest fee collectors in the federal government based
on imported goods.

Summary of Findings

*Strategic Review Progress Rating: Noteworthy Progress*

**Program Execution and Impact**

- Optimized the clearance process for medical products with Partner Government Agencies to
  expedite imports of medical devices and Personal Protective Equipment in response to
  COVID-19, and seized fraudulent/unsafe imports linked to pandemic—primarily test kits and
  masks.
- Fully implemented requirements of the US-Mexico-Canada trade agreement.
- Continued to assess and collect duties on imports from China; implemented 43 Federal
  Register Notices and four Presidential Proclamations and coordinated 46 sets of detailed
  import instructions for trade stakeholders.
- Launched a virtual audit program with the IKEA corporation to define innovative audit
  approaches and explore the usage of virtual technology.
- Launched a pilot to accept shipment-level information directly from non-traditional E-
  commerce supply chain actors (e.g., online marketplaces) and matched it with the
  information received from traditional supply-chain actors to better segment risk.

Illegal logging is the third most profitable transnational crime in the world, yet it often
slips under the radar in many countries due to lack of regulation or corruption. CBP officers
across the country’s 328 ports of entry inspect incoming shipments to ensure compliance with
international statutes and agreements. Link: Report Trade Violation


Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of imports compliant with U.S. trade laws</td>
<td>99.38%</td>
<td>98.72%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brief Description: Ensuring all importers’ legal compliance with all trade regulations, and that their entry records contain no major discrepancies, facilitating lawful trade into the United States.

Explanation and Corrective Action: Due to COVID-19, import volumes fluctuated throughout FY21. Sampling rates were adjusted several times to get the targeted number of samples, which exceeded the planned 60,000 samples by 5,000. The FY22 sampling methodology will use the prior three years average import volumes to compute sampling rates. This reflects import fluctuations due to external factors.

Challenges and Risks

- Agriculture and passenger fee collections decreased during the pandemic with potential effects on fee-funded programs to include pay shortfalls and unfunded positions.
- Implementation of the prohibition on imports produced by companies using forced labor following the passage of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 is an ongoing challenge.
- Sustained funding is not available for continued enhancement and technology refresh of the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), which includes a backlog of capabilities needed to support all programs and growing trade volumes.
- If the program does not enhance trade enforcement capabilities and the relevant legal framework is not updated, then counterfeit, non-environmentally compliant and/or unsafe products will enter the retail chain, causing fraud, duty avoidance, the exploitation of the trade system, and illicit and potentially unsafe imports will increase.
- If the program does not adopt simplified processes, technologies, automation enhancements, and innovative policies and operations, then compliance will decrease, driving increased illicit activity and non-payment of duties and fees.

Next Steps

- Pursue several legislative proposals as part of the 21st Century Customs Framework effort, which seeks to enhance numerous aspects of the trade mission to improve the program’s operating position in the 21st century trade environment.

DID YOU KNOW?

Sports memorabilia is a lucrative business. Collectors and fans need to be aware that the market is inundated with fakes. To stop criminals, CBP is seizing imported fakes nightly. CBP officers at the Port of Indianapolis recently stopped three shipments containing counterfeit NFL and NBA championship rings. If genuine, the total value would be over $803K.
• Complete development/deployment of the Advanced Trade Analytics Platform for intelligent enforcement, modernize ACE with new trade-processing capabilities, and incorporate innovative capabilities into the Non-Intrusive Inspection System.

• Complete analysis and implement workforce-planning and training provisions of GAO-21-106 and the Department’s Strategy to Combat Human Trafficking, the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, and Child Sexual Exploitation.

**DID YOU KNOW?**

CBP announced a new formal partnership arrangement with NIKE, Inc. as part of the Donations Acceptance Program. Under this arrangement NIKE is donating proprietary technology to aid in authenticating Nike merchandise and preventing counterfeit products from entering the U.S. This tool will be trialed at select international facilities.

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**Travel Operations**

**Mission Program Goal**

Enhance the security of international travel through a variety of processes and technologies to intercept potential threats while also expediting legal travel.

**Mission Program Description**

The Travel Operations program welcomes international travelers into the U.S. through screening both foreign visitors and returning U.S. citizens. The program uses a variety of techniques to assure that global tourism remains safe and strong. It works to intercept potential threats in foreign ports prior to boarding transportation bound for the U.S. before they can cause harm. Its Trusted Traveler Programs provide expedited travel for pre-approved, low-risk travelers through dedicated lanes and kiosks. It also coordinates with the travel industry regarding specific procedures and regulations that must be followed when processing crew and passengers arriving or departing from the U.S. It is constantly seeking new ways to innovate such as the use of biometrics and facial comparison to expedite the travelers’ experience.

**Summary of Findings**

*Strategic Review Progress Rating: Noteworthy Progress*

**Program Execution and Impact**

• Leveraged the response to COVID-19 to improve operations; executed targeting rules and procedures at all ports of entry and collaborated with partners to monitor international travel rules; tracked affected travelers, denied entry to those prohibited, provided contact-tracing information as needed; expedited medical personnel and equipment through the clearance process; and increased personnel with medical training.

• Operated eBadge with TSA and commercial service providers to significantly reduce vetting processing time for badges, credentials, and regular background checks on credentialed workers at a growing number of airports.
CBP continues to leverage facial comparison technology to enhance CBP’s ability to facilitate lawful trade and travel and secure the border. Through June 2021, over 82 million travelers have participated in the biometric facial comparison process at air, land and seaports of entry.

- Implemented biometric facial comparison technology at some air, land, and seaports -- improving security and safety.
- Developed Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) Mobile application that allows Visa Waiver Program (VWP) travelers to complete, submit, and check the status of their ESTA applications and validate photo with passport chip.

**Key Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Global Entry members with no security-related violations</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure shows success of maintaining a high level of security in the Global Entry (GE) members environment through passengers’ compliance with all federal, state, and municipal laws and regulations.

**Explanation:** The GE trusted traveler program continued its effectiveness at correctly identifying low-risk travelers and quickly incorporating any changes in traveler risk-status that result in suspension or removal to ensure that all active members meet required security protocols at all times. Measure results for FY21 increased slightly over FY20. GE enrollment centers were open during all of FY21 after being closed for the last 6 months of FY20.
Challenges and Risks

- National Targeting Center faces constant pressure to expand the capacity of information systems and identify new operating resources for real-time response and analysis that incorporate multi-modal biometric and analytical tools spaces.

- Recruiting qualified people to meet staffing needs and retaining top performers through the career lifecycle is hampered due to lifestyle, location, and cost-of-living concerns.

- Visa Waiver Program travelers are experiencing longer processing times at some U.S. land borders where they must complete the paper Form I-94W in Secondary screening since an approved Electronic System for Travel Authorization travel authorization is not yet required at all land border ports of entry.

- If H-1B/L-1 Visa user-fees are not re-established, then biometric technology development and biometric program expansion will be stalled by substantial funding shortfalls.

- If the Travel program can’t expand information systems' capacity—including information exchange processes and capabilities, operational resources like multi-modal biometric tools, and access to critical intelligence—then accurate, reliable, and actionable information may not be communicated quickly enough to address shifting national security threats and concerns.

Next Steps

- Work with USCIS to address H-1B/L-1 fees to stabilize visa issuance/entrance into the United States.

- Expand current eBadge operations, through the development of the Trusted Employer Program, to more airports with improvements in vetting, while developing an eBadge App that allows direct employer completion of employee applications for access to a Travel Operations facility.

- Establish a Counter-Intelligence Watchlist, or similar process, to centralize and de-conflict data in support of a comprehensive interagency strategy to ensure a whole-of-government approach to Counter-Intelligence operations.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Overview

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) leads the national effort to defend critical infrastructure against the threats of today, while working with partners across all levels of government and in the private sector to secure against the evolving risks of tomorrow.

For each CISA mission program, a description of the mission program is provided along with its most recent summary of findings. For a full listing of CISA’s performance measure results and plan, see the “Performance Measure Tables – Report and Plan” chapter in this section.

Cybersecurity

Mission Program Goal

Defend and secure the federal enterprise network.

Mission Program Description

The Cybersecurity program advances computer security preparedness and the response to cyberattacks and incidents. The program includes activities to secure the federal network, respond to incidents, disseminate actionable information, and collaborate with private-sector partners to secure critical infrastructure. This program supports the implementation of government-wide deployment of hardware and software systems to prevent and detect incidents, respond to incidents at federal and private entities, and collaborate with the private-sector to increase the security and resiliency of critical networks. The program also coordinates cybersecurity education for the federal workforce.

Summary of Findings

Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress

Program Execution and Impact

- Lack visibility into federal executive civilian networks due to agencies use of encryption, cloud computing, and other emerging technologies.
- Lack visibility into specific cyber event information affecting the ability to adequately assess mission and strategic risks.
- Recruiting qualified cyber professionals, long onboarding times, and retention remains a significant issue.
- Advancements made to secure the federal networks, but lack strategies for managing/securing federal cloud environments and software updates.
- Federal agency responsiveness and compliance improved through the program’s use of Binding Operational and Emergency Directives to mitigate risks.
- Began efforts to conceptualize the CISA Cloud designed to enhance federal agencies defensive architecture, the program’s visibility, and enhance its governance of other agencies.
- Significant mitigation obtained by cyber hygiene scanning.
Key Measure

| Percent of critical and high vulnerabilities identified through cyber hygiene scanning mitigated within the designated timeframe |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY 2017 | FY 2018 | FY 2019 | FY 2020 | FY 2021 Target | FY 2021 Result | FY 2022 | FY 2023 |
| --- | 52% | 59% | 75% | 75% | 66% | Retired* |

**Brief Description:** DHS provides cyber hygiene scanning to Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to aid them in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based upon severity, which in turn enables FCEB agencies to make risk-based decisions regarding their network security posture.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** In FY22, 66 percent of critical and high vulnerabilities were mitigated within the designated timeframe. With Binding Operational Directive 19-02 in effect since April 2019, FCEB agencies have demonstrated improved progress in mitigating “critical” and “high” vulnerabilities within mandated timelines. Collectively, these mitigation efforts have contributed to an overall trend of improvement for the FCEB Enterprise, and DHS continues to work with agencies on achieving even higher rates of timely mitigation.

* This measure is retired. In November 2021, CISA issued Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01- Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities. The program will continue to work towards increasing the percentage of critical and high vulnerabilities identified through cyber hygiene scanning mitigated within the designated timeline and will continue to track internally by monitoring Agency adherence to this policy. The program has implemented new measures as part of their FY22-23 Agency Priority Goal.

**Challenges and Risks**

- Ability to address existing and future threats to include degradation of critical infrastructures, autonomous vehicles, and new tactics and techniques by our adversaries.
- Current mitigation strategies of issuing Binding Operational and Emergency Directives do not provide the level of authority needed to provide the oversight, access, and mitigation assistance to effectively respond to the growing risks.
- Must implement a Cloud Implementation Reference Architecture to provide guidance on how to implement a Cloud environment to operationalize the initiative.
- Completing the hiring process for new hires and retaining existing cyber staff in a highly competitive, well-paid market.
- If the Cybersecurity program cannot operationalize the information it receives, then it will not evolve from a responsive cyber posture to a proactive, defensive cyber posture.
- If the Cybersecurity program is unable to mature its technology and staff quickly, then the .gov enterprise is at risk of irrecoverable exposure to large scale threats.

**Next Steps**

- Improve the quality of new hires and the flow of the hiring process to address long-standing needs, increase analytical staffing to improve situational awareness and increase trust with state, local, tribal, and territorial governments and communities.
- Improve shared situational awareness, bi-lateral communications, and increased visibility into critical infrastructure.
**Emergency Communications**

**Mission Program Goal**

Advance federal, state, local, and tribal government interoperable emergency communications.

**Mission Program Description**

The Emergency Communications program is responsible for ensuring the Nation’s interoperable emergency communications capabilities to enable first responders and government officials to communicate during steady state and emergency operations.

**Summary of Findings**

*Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress*

**Program Execution and Impact**

- Served as advocate for state, local, territorial and tribal partners in requirements discussions with FEMA and other DHS entities.
- Leveraged a stakeholder-driven approach to address emerging technologies and cybersecurity through use of tools such as Next Generation 911 Readiness Checklist and ransomware tool for Public Safety Answering Points.
- Increased number of Emergency Communications Coordinators to provide enhanced and tailored engagement with stakeholders.
- Expanded outreach to new communities (e.g., Tribal Nations and critical infrastructure sectors) and developed new partnerships (e.g., NFL, NASCAR).
- Supported advancement of emergency communications to internet protocol based exchange with expanded voice, data, and video capabilities.
- Adapted to current events to provide strong support to stakeholders during COVID-19, natural disasters, and civil unrest.

**Key Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>99.1%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Brief Description: This measure gauges the reliability and effectiveness of the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) by assessing the completion rate of calls made through the service. The GETS call completion rate (CCR) is the percent of calls that a National Security/Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) user completes via public telephone network to communicate with the intended user/location/system/etc. GETS is accessible by authorized users at any time, most commonly to ensure call completion during times of network congestion caused by all-hazard scenarios, including terrorist attacks or natural disasters (e.g., hurricane or earthquake).*

*Explaination and Corrective Action:* In FY21 99 percent of calls were completed over the course of the fiscal year under all-hazard conditions, demonstrating strong system performance.

*Name change from: Percent of calls by National Security/Emergency Preparedness users that DHS ensured were connected*
**Challenges and Risks**

- Emergency communications stakeholders have limited resources and budgets, which impedes ability to understand challenges and determine how to invest their resources.
- Events and incidents are becoming increasingly complex, which require more planning for incident response and coordination.
- The expanding stakeholder community affected by public safety communications challenges necessitates an increased number of engagements to effectively identify interoperability and resilience gaps, and then define requirements.
- With constant evolution of technology, it is very difficult for all levels of government to keep pace, which impacts the community’s ability to address cyber risks and adapt to evolving technologies in incident communications.
- If the Next Generation Network Priority Services does not meet its acquisition milestones, the program will experience schedule delays in delivering increasingly needed priority data capabilities.

**Next Steps**

- Through a concerted effort with partners/stakeholders, define/develop priorities related to cyber risks to emergency communications.
- Assess current gaps and risks in incident communications and the role of evolving technologies to identify and validate requirements for rapidly evolving technologies to ensure well-coordinated service delivery.
- Develop strategies for reaching expanded communities and developing/tailoring support for new stakeholders and to analyze existing governance structures to determine how to support the expanded community.

**Infrastructure Security**

**Mission Program Goal**

Increase our partners’ capability and capacity to strengthen and secure the Nation’s critical infrastructure.

**Mission Program Description**

The Infrastructure Security program leads and coordinates both regulatory and voluntary national programs and policies on critical infrastructure security and resilience and develops strong partnerships across government and the private sector. The program conducts and facilitates vulnerability and consequence assessments to help critical infrastructure owners and operators and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners to understand and address risks to critical infrastructure.
infrastructure. Additionally, it sets standards, and issues guidance and best practices for federal facility security and tools that secure public gatherings and crowded places and training to help build capacity to manage risks.

**Summary of Findings**

*Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress*

**Program Execution and Impact**

- Co-chaired/co-hosted the G7 Global Partnership’s Chemical Security Working Group and first virtual Global Chemical Congress, and continued to lead an international homemade explosives precursor testing project.
- Provided national infrastructure security guidance for emerging risks for small unmanned aircraft systems, cyber-physical convergence, insider threat mitigation, vehicle ramming and Active Shooter Preparedness, and chemical security.
- Delivered 109 cyber and physical exercises to nearly 7,000 individuals to include priority areas such as COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers and elections infrastructure partners.
- Challenging to keep pace with customer demands for guidance due to shortage of expertise in the area of chemical engineering, cybersecurity, operations research, and risk/data analysis.
- New requirements defined in the National Defense Authorization Act will require coordinated planning activities.

**Key Measure**

CISA and the National Council of Statewide Interoperability Coordinators updated & refined 25 Markers that measure interoperable emergency communications system maturity in all states and territories. The Markers align to the SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum and address governance, SOPs, technology, training, & exercises. Since 2020, high-percentage gaps (Markers where 35 percent or more states/territories report the lowest maturity level) were reduced by 29 percent, resulting in notable nationwide improvements in interoperable emergency communications planning and performance.
Percent of facilities that are likely to integrate vulnerability assessment or survey information into security and resilience enhancements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
<th>FY 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>92%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure demonstrates the percent of facilities that are likely to enhance their security and resilience by integrating Infrastructure Security vulnerability assessment or survey information. Providing facilities with vulnerability information allows them to understand and reduce risk of the Nation's critical infrastructure. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, the number of Infrastructure Security Tools (IST) conducted is lower than the previous years.

**Explanation:** Due to COVID-19 restrictions, the number of Infrastructure Survey Tools (ISTs) conducted was lower in FY21 than in previous years. However, the percentage of facilities that are likely to integrate assessment or survey information remains high. The number of ISTs is expected to increase in FY22 as restrictions are eased and Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) can travel more.

**Challenges and Risks**

- Infrastructure security data is not integrated into a common platform across mission areas, nor coordinated through a joint process of collection, stewardship, analysis and dissemination.
- Need to develop sustained architecture for managing the Sector Risk Management Agencies structure and responsibilities.
- Lack of long-term authorization for the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program inhibits the ability for facilities and the Department to engage in longer term strategic planning, make large capital investments, and retain talent.
- Difficulties hiring and onboarding staff result in an unacceptably high vacancy rate, impacting the amount of work that can be completed and the morale of existing employees.
- If infrastructure security and resilience capacity do not improve, then industry and government partners will not be prepared to take appropriate actions to prepare for and respond to evolving threats and increasing risks.
- If the interagency approach to infrastructure data collection and analysis does not improve, then the intelligence and analytic picture of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences will remain incomplete and would expose the nation to unnecessary risk of catastrophic critical infrastructure failures.

**Next Steps**

- Funding for the Interagency Security Committee Compliance System to serve the needs of federal facility stakeholders from Department/Agency level down to the individual facility.
FY 2021-2023 Annual Performance Report

- CISA Gateway should be expanded/integrated with data acquisitions as a common platform to deliver multiple services (e.g., National Asset Database required under 6 USC 664).

**DID YOU KNOW?**

CISA’s Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) training technology, Micro Training Videos, saw over 41,000 training completions during the first three quarters of FY21, surpassing the 31,082 total completions in FY20. OBP’s micro training videos provide guidance to security officials and the general public on how they should protect themselves and others from bomb incidents.

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**National Risk Management Center**

**Mission Program Goal**

Identify, analyze, prioritize, and manage high-consequence threats to critical infrastructure through a cross-cutting risk management paradigm.

**Mission Program Description**

The National Risk Management Center’s (NRMC’s) dynamic, cross-sector risk management process transforms private-public engagement into collective action by defragmenting how the government and industry develop response and security plans, risk-reduction activities, and share information. The interconnectedness of the sectors and sophistication of threats and hazards means that the consequences of an attack or imminent threat do not impact only one sector. The NRMC creates an environment where government and industry can collaborate and share expertise to enhance critical infrastructure resiliency within and across sectors.

**Summary of Findings**

*Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress*

**Program Execution and Impact**

- Supported national cybersecurity efforts during the 2020 Presidential Election (#Protect2020).
- Achieved initial development on the national 5G Strategy that details development and deployment of a secure and resilient fifth-generation telecommunications infrastructure.
- Led Information and Communications Technology Supply Chain Risk Management Task Force and developed several products to inform supply chain risk management activities across the public and private sector.
- Evaluating authorities and exemptions from other legal requirements needed for increased coordination and collaboration with risk management community.
- Working to develop and implement a comprehensive risk architecture that leverages data and serves as a standardized integration point for all types of risk.
- The program has measures to gauge efforts to secure state and local elections and the management of National Critical Function (NCF) projects.

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U.S. Department of Homeland Security

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**Key Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of state and local jurisdiction election security information products/services delivered within 30 days of request*</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure reports the delivery of election security information products/services requested by state and local jurisdictions within 30 days of receiving all information necessary to create the final version of the product, within 15 days of receiving final approval of the product from the requestor, or by the desired delivery date specified by the requestor, whichever is latest.

**Explanation:** Products were developed based on lessons learned from the 2020 election cycle. New products were socialized with previously unengaged stakeholders and products were finalized with previously engaged stakeholders helping to lay the groundwork for delivery of a large number of products in FY21. The new Election Security Safeguards product were well received and generated interest in further engaging CISA in product development. Additionally, CISA began distribution of their Election Security Training Series Postcards (Phishing, Ransomware, and Secure Practices) to accompany trainings with state and local jurisdictions. Each person who attended these trainings received a customized product. The Last Mile team prioritizes timely issuance of products upon stakeholder request in an effort to maximize their value. A total of 3,530 total products were delivered over the fiscal year with 100 percentage of products delivered within 30 days.

*This measure has performed consistently at or near 100 percent, showing that CISA is providing consistent, timely product delivery. Retiring the measure will allow CISA to focus on developing a replacement election security measure for FY23, which will align with increased election security efforts, in advance of the 2024 Presidential election year.

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In support of the Nation’s efforts to distribute COVID-19 vaccines across the country, CISA released several products that describe the four stages of vaccination distribution activity (manufacturing sites; transporters; clinics, pharmacies, and healthcare facilities; and points of distribution) to provide information regarding possible physical threats at each stage. The products propose corresponding mitigation methods to support those involved in the vaccination distribution process to strategize cost-effective measures that may preclude disruptions to the supply chain.
Challenges and Risks

- A significant challenge is having a capable NCF framework to enhance coordination and information sharing in a way that effectively addresses emerging threats and strategic risks.
- Inability to recruit, hire, and retain personnel with the right skills and expertise in a timely manner in order to meet mission requirements that are outpacing growth in resources.
- Ability to deliver enterprise-level technological solutions within the larger CISA IT systems environment where central coordination and management would create cost efficiencies and avoid duplicative capabilities.
- If the National Risk Management Center (NRMC) does not have adequate personnel and training to support long-term capability development, then the Center will be increasingly challenged to produce timely, risk-informed analysis/risk solutions to meet future demand signals.
- If the ability to collaborate with stakeholders to gather sufficient information and datasets to assess risk is limited, then the appropriate mitigations for critical infrastructure will not be developed and implemented.

Next Steps

- Clarify specific authorities that would enable the program to effectively execute operations in line with congressional intent and mission, which build on FY20 preliminary findings on engagement options for systemic cyber risk reduction ventures with the stakeholder community.
- Build consensus around a set of analytic methodologies that support supply chain risk analysis.
- Begin integration of stand-alone analytic tools into an interoperable analytic environment that enables the program to mature the risk architecture.

DID YOU KNOW?

In FY21, the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workers (ECIW) Guidance provided much-needed assistance for state, local, tribal, and territorial governments making time-sensitive decisions during the early stages of the pandemic about who could access worksites during periods of quarantine and reduced movement. The ECIW was adopted in its totality by 14 states, referenced by 20 states, and shared with 24 countries and 6 international organizations.
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Overview

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) helps people before, during, and after disasters. FEMA does this by supporting our citizens and first responders to ensure that, as a nation, we work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.

For each FEMA mission program, a description of the mission program is provided along with a key measure and success story. For a full listing of FEMA’s performance measure results and plan, see the “Performance Measure Tables – Report and Plan” chapter in this section.

Education, Training, and Exercises

Mission Program Goal

Improve the knowledge, skills, and abilities of emergency management personnel to prepare, respond, and recover from disasters of all kinds.

Mission Program Description

The Education, Training, and Exercises program comprises the National Exercise Program and the National Training and Education Division, which include the Emergency Management Institute, the Center for Domestic Preparedness, and the U.S. Fire Administration. These entities provide emergency management, response and recovery training, and exercise coordination to improve

During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2021, FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute (EMI) continually provided training to the Nation’s Emergency Managers. EMI’s Independent Study Course program witnessed more than 900,000 student completions (a record number) as emergency managers continued their training in a self-paced environment. EMI also quickly converted over 60 classroom courses to be provided by virtual delivery --- including its National Emergency Management Basic, Advanced and Executive Academies. EMI continues to embrace technology and virtual delivery to make emergency management training and education more widely available.
the knowledge, skills, and abilities of federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial emergency management personnel.

**Key Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of supervisors of students trained who believe their staff are better prepared as a result of National Fire Academy training</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure assesses the increase in the capability of students trained as reported by each individual’s first-line supervisor.

**Explanation:** During fiscal year FY21, the National Fire Academy (NFA) resumed in person training and continued online delivery of training. A total of 7,458 students were trained in 443 course offerings and 69,287 students participated in online training. The response rate of supervisors responding to the survey for this measure was just under 50 percent. The NFA will continue to build new curriculum, especially for Wildland Urban Interface training.

**Grants**

**Mission Program Goal**

Enhance the Nation's preparedness by increasing the capability of states, territories, and local jurisdictions to prepare, respond, and recover from disasters of all kinds.

**Mission Program Description**

FEMA’s Grants program leads the Federal Government’s financial assistance to state and local jurisdictions and regional authorities as they prepare, respond to, and recover from all hazards. The program provides grants to enhance jurisdictions’ resiliency to man-made and other major disasters, and to enhance their homeland security strategies.

**Key Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit to cost ratio of the hazard mitigation grants</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** The FEMA Hazard Mitigation Assistance program works with State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) stakeholders to identify natural hazards and develop mitigation plans to reduce losses. These plans are the basis for grant requests that are subsequently evaluated to determine the benefit-to-cost ratio to ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent effectively.

**Explanation:** For Fiscal Year 2021, the FEMA Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) programs obligated 598 projects for which a benefit-cost analysis (BCA) was required. The total estimated cost (federal and non-federal shared) of the projects totaled $3.62 billion with estimated benefits (avoided future damages) of $6.35 billion, which equates to a 1.75 benefit-cost ratio (BCR) for the fiscal year. FEMA will continue to fund mitigation measures in the next fiscal year that exceed project costs and reduce the impacts of future events.
The coronavirus (COVID-19) public health emergency prompted FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate National Training and Education Division (NTED) and its partners including the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, Center for Homeland Defense and Security, and Continuing Training grantees to adapt to rapidly changing conditions to safely deliver courses to communities and students across the nation. NTED and its partners expanded virtual deliveries and conducted a reduced number of in-person deliveries. All organizations documented lessons learned and refined procedures for a safe gradual increase in capacity. Since March 2020, NTED and its partners delivered more than 1,100 courses and trained more than 76,000 emergency personnel safely under COVID-19 protocols.

Mitigation

Mission Program Goal

Strengthen mitigation nationwide to reduce the Nation’s vulnerability from disasters of all kinds.

Mission Program Description

The Mitigation program works to strengthen investments in mitigation nationwide to reduce the Nation’s vulnerability to natural disasters or other emergencies, and to facilitate adoption and enforcement of up-to-date design and construction practices through state and local building codes. Developing resilient capacity in communities prior to a disaster supports the development of a culture of preparedness. The program supports activities that result in sound risk management decisions by individuals, the private-sector, and public-sector entities by conducting three core activities: risk analysis, risk reduction, and insurance against flood risk. These areas work together to reduce the loss of life and property, to enable individuals to recover more rapidly from floods and other disasters, and to lessen the financial burden on taxpayers. These investments are implemented at the Headquarters and Regional levels to support communities in mitigation efforts.
Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of U.S. population (excluding territories) covered by planned mitigation strategies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82.1%</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brief Description: Mitigation planning helps communities reduce risk through sound land-use planning principles, floodplain management practices, and financial assistance. During fiscal year (FY) 2021, the program provided technical assistance to communities effected by COVID-19.

Corrective Action: Hazard Mitigation Plan (Plan) development and updates by communities and technical assistance provided by FEMA continue to be impacted by the ongoing need for local, state, and regional jurisdictions to coordinate and support COVID-19 response, causing plan coverage to lapse for some jurisdictions. Plan approval includes the passage of adoption resolutions by local governing bodies, as well as local plan updates or development to meet requirements. In FY21, several local mitigation Plans containing significant population lapsed, impacting results. As population coverage decreases, planning effectiveness is impeded such that communities may be underprepared to respond to and recover from disasters. FEMA plans to increase technical assistance to assist communities with producing higher quality risk assessments which will be integral to increasing Plan approval and will contribute to an increase in the U.S. population covered by planned mitigation strategies.

In July 2020, FEMA leveraged a web conferencing platform to transition Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA)/Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) technical assistance (TA) from an in-person delivery into a fully virtual model. In 2021, TA expanded to become a year-round program including multiple deliveries, webinar recordings, and new materials focused on helping communities understand and complete the THIRA/SPR assessment. The new virtual model has enabled FEMA to deliver TA to 2,500 attendees to date, essentially doubling attendance from in-person deliveries.
**National Flood Insurance Fund**

**Mission Program Goal**
Reduce the Nation's vulnerability to flood hazards, accelerate recovery from floods, and mitigate future flood losses.

**Mission Program Description**
The National Flood Insurance Fund aims to reduce the impact of flooding on privately owned property by mapping areas of flood risk, providing flood insurance, and encouraging communities to adopt and enforce sound floodplain management regulations. The program also provides technical assistance and monitors communities for compliance with the minimum National Flood Insurance Plan criteria. These actions reduce risk from flooding, accelerate recovery efforts, and mitigate future flood losses.

**Key Measure**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of properties covered with flood insurance (in millions)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) fosters public understanding of flood risks while proactively encouraging homeowners to purchase private, write-your-own, insurance to reduce losses from all hazards. History has shown that insured survivors recover faster and more fully from a flood.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is managed by FEMA and is delivered to the public by a network of more than 50 insurance companies and NFIP Direct. While there has been a

FEMA’s National Preparedness Directorate partnered with the Office of Response and Recovery-Geospatial Office to create the National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Public Information Map (PIM) Application. The PIM is an open source, interactive preparedness application that connects end users to radiological preparedness resources, including information on hazards and demographics. The PIM consolidates information and data from public resources into a tool that can help strengthen community resilience.

Link: [FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) National Public Information Map (arcgis.com)](arcgis.com)
reduction in the number of properties covered by flood insurance during FY21, over 3.9M properties are covered by flood insurance. Progress was made by working alongside the Write Your Own companies and National NFIP Direct to encourage policy growth, marketing the product through both policyholder acquisition and retention campaigns, leveraging technology to transform business processes and enhance the customer experience, ensuring current policyholders were treated with care during their claims handling experience, delivering a new pricing paradigm, and redesigning the flood insurance product. NFIP continues its efforts to retain current policyholders and outreach and market to new customers. To continue to make progress, the Risk Rating 2.0: Equity in Action new pricing paradigm that enables rates that are actuarially sound, equitable, easier to understand and better reflect a property’s flood risk will continue to be implemented. As of October 2021, all new policies are rated using the pricing while the entire book of business will be subject to the new methodology after April 1, 2022.

**Preparedness and Protection**

**Mission Program Goal**

Improve the Nation’s ability to prepare for disasters of all kinds while ensuring the survival of an enduring constitutional government if a disaster were to occur.

**Mission Program Description**

The Preparedness program works to prepare the Nation for disasters of all kinds. Preparedness includes the management and administrative support functions associated with training and national exercise programs. Protection carries out a mandated mission to provide executive agent leadership to guarantee the survival of an enduring constitutional government by ensuring continuity of government, continuity of operations, and national contingency programs.

FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center was activated March 5, 2020 for COVID-19 operations. The NRCC provided Health and Human Services with synchronized support across the agency, served as a central point of information on internal activities, and provided updates to FEMA senior leadership on FEMA activities. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, FEMA has (as of January 8, 2021) managed over 57 concurrent presidential major disaster declarations for COVID-19 in all 10 FEMA regions and leveraged existing federal policies and structures in non-typical ways to effectively respond to the unprecedented nature and scope of COVID-19, all while acclimating to a new work environment. The NRCC officially deactivated on June 23, 2021, making it the longest activation in the Agency’s history at a total of 475 days.
**Key Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
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</table>

**Percent of adults that took multiple preparedness actions at their workplace, school, home, or other community location in the past year**

**Brief Description:** This measure indicates how many Americans have taken action to prepare for an emergency and provides feedback regarding the effectiveness of efforts to encourage this activity.

**Explanation:** In keeping with the Evidence Act of 2018, FEMA continued to implement a robust evaluation strategy to measure and increase the impact of the Individual and Community Preparedness Division’s work. An increase in social media promotions for products, as well as partnering in nation-wide campaigns like National Preparedness Month, have been large contributors to getting preparedness resources visibility this year. These efforts help motivate communities and individuals to take action and serves as a contributing factor to the increase in preparedness actions.

**Regional Operations**

**Mission Program Goal**

Increase the capability of states, territories, and local jurisdictions to prevent, respond to, and recover from emergencies and disasters.

**Mission Program Description**

The Regional Operations program includes the leadership, management, and mission support functions of the 10 FEMA regions across the Nation. The program works with communities to help

For more than a year, the emergency management community has operated in a pandemic environment, and FEMA has emphasized the importance of all state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) governments applying lessons learned from 2020, as they prepare for operations in 2021. To aid in that effort, the CPOG serves as a tool for governments, outlining not only guidance based on lessons learned and best practices, but also guidance related to new priorities that have arisen in recent months.
reduce the impacts of natural disasters; prepare families and individuals for all possible hazards; and support state, local, and tribal partners with technical assistance and grants for projects that aim to reduce risks, improve public safety, and protect the environment.

**Key Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual percentage of administrative costs for major disaster field operations, as compared to total program costs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure gauges program’s efficiency in providing disaster assistance by indicating what share of its disaster expenditures are administrative costs compared to the share disseminated as grants to survivors as assistance.

**Explanation:** Administrative costs results are reported with a one-year fiscal-year delay because a disaster’s administrative cost percentage typically stabilize after the one-year mark. Disasters declared with less than $50M obligated require larger investments of administrative dollars upfront to deliver high-quality services to survivors compared to program dollars obligated. FEMA quickly adapted to a COVID-19 environment by adapting standard disaster processes and procedures to a virtual environment. This included employing virtual field offices in support of jurisdictions, maximizing virtual staff deployments, and implementing virtual housing inspections in support of disaster operation financial obligations. This resulted in cost savings in some areas of administrative costs, while also allowing FEMA to financially obligate a greater amount of total actual federal dollars (including both program dollars and administrative costs) than in the past four years. FEMA also continues to prioritize ensuring a trained and qualified workforce with the required field experience to increase productivity and reduce duplication of efforts.

**Response and Recovery**

**Mission Program Goal**

Improve the response and recovery capability of communities who have been overwhelmed by a disaster.

**Mission Program Description**

The Response and Recovery program helps to ready the Nation for catastrophic disasters leveraging resources from various sources including the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). This includes efforts to coordinate the core federal response capabilities used to save lives and protect critical infrastructure in communities throughout the Nation that have been overwhelmed by the impact of a major disaster or an emergency. The program also takes the lead among federal agencies, state and local governments, and representatives of non-governmental organizations to support individuals and communities with the goal of reducing losses, improving recovery operations, and promoting resilience. This program works with residents, emergency management practitioners, organizational and community leaders, and government officials to mature the National Disaster Recovery Framework, enhance logistics and disaster communications, and improve the overall disaster survivor and grantee experience.
Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of applicants satisfied with simplicity of the Individuals and Households Program</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure gauges the simplicity of applying for individual assistance from the Individuals and Households Program, and the information is used to make procedural improvements to ensure disaster survivors have clear information and high-quality service.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** While FEMA did not meet its target, satisfaction continued to improve throughout the year. The customer experience with inspections continues to hit its target for the last four years proving that survivor’s experience with the reductions in inspections has netted a positive result. More than 95% of COVID-19 recipients rated FEMA’s customer service as satisfied or very satisfied even though the average time until award was 68.9 days. The implementation of Queue Management for Disaster Recovery Centers allowed notification to disaster survivors of estimated wait times and when a representative is available rather than requiring survivors wait at the Disaster Response Center for the next available representative. These strategies will continue to be implemented in the coming year to further increase customer satisfaction to individuals. FEMA will continue to prioritize the survivor’s experience with the Individuals and Households Program. FEMA is updating the surveys to better identify the root-causes for dissatisfaction by the end of the next fiscal year. FEMA will continue to build out the strategies implemented during FY21 such as the email delivery of surveys to collect customer experience information in a more-timely manner and increase response rates.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

**Overview**

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) promotes homeland security and public safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration.

For each ICE mission program, a description of the mission program is provided along with its most recent summary of findings. For a full listing of ICE’s performance measure results and plan, see the “Performance Measure Tables – Report and Plan” chapter in this section.

Enforcement and Removal Operations

**Mission Program Goal**

Improve the ability of the Department to arrest, detain, and remove criminals, fugitives, and other dangerous foreign nationals.

**Mission Program Description**

Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) enforces the Nation’s immigration laws by identifying and apprehending undocumented noncitizens, detaining those individuals pending final determination of removability, and removing them from the United States. ERO prioritizes the apprehension, arrest, and removal of threats to national security, border security, and public safety. ERO manages all logistical aspects of the removal process, including domestic transportation, detention, alternatives to detention programs, bond management, and supervised
release. In addition, ERO removes noncitizens from the United States to more than 170 countries around the world.

Summary of Findings

*Strategic Review Progress Rating: Focus Area*

**Program Execution and Impact**

- COVID-19 adversely impacted execution of the program operations processes—reduced arrests; limited detention capacity below projections; and made repatriation much more complicated and diminished due to port of entry closures and challenges with some S. American countries.
- Evolving CDC guidance forced periodic updating of policies and procedures and required training to comply.
- Inability to fill detention facilities to capacity due to COVID-19 social distancing restrictions.
- Negative perceptions of the program hampered its ability to get records from state and local authorities, impacting its ability to arrest noncitizens and adjudicate existing criminal cases.
- Increased litigation from court challenges diverted resources to these efforts and away from enforcement efforts.

On March 1, 2021, Enforcement and Removal Operations successfully coordinated a High Profile Removal of Iranian national, Behzad Pourghannad, 67, who was convicted of conspiracy to violate the international emergency economic powers act. Pourghannad was a conspirator in a scheme that acquired tons of carbon fiber from a U.S. broker and shipped it to Iran through third countries. Carbon fiber has aerospace and defense application and is critical to technologies related to nuclear proliferation. U.S. sanctions prohibit Iran from acquiring carbon fiber.
FY 2021-2023 Annual Performance Report

- Program execution challenges resulted in a significant drop in removals from the United States.

**Key Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of noncitizens who were returned or removed from the United States</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>256,085</td>
<td>267,258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Retired*

**Brief Description:** This measure provides a comprehensive picture of all returns and removals accomplished by the program to ensure undocumented noncitizens do not remain in the United States.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** FY21 Total Removals (excluding Title 42 expulsions) were 59,011, comprised of 27,454 border removals and 31,557 interior removals, a decrease of 126,873 (68%) from FY20's 185,884. While total removals decreased, the quality of removals measurably increased, with the percentage of convicted criminal removals increasing from 56% to 66%. The Interim Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Priorities (CIEP) issued 18 Feb 2021 refocused enforcement and removal priorities on national security, border security, and public safety. Like removals, the quality of arrests increased; ERO arrested 12,025 individuals with felony convictions, which is nearly double the 6,815 aggravated felons arrested in the previous fiscal year. This likely will increase the percentage of individuals who pose a public safety threat eligible for removal in the coming fiscal year. To maintain its capacity for removals, ICE is procuring additional COVID-19 testing capabilities, working to obtain increased levels of cooperation from foreign countries, and increasing the frequency of transport for detainees where possible. This measure was replaced by an internal measure aligned to Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities.

*This measure is being retired by the component.*

**Challenges and Risks**

- A significant challenge involves some jurisdictions not cooperating with efforts related to enforcement, detention, and information-sharing, and filing lawsuits against ICE in federal courts.
- Another challenge is the likelihood that COVID-19 will continue to constrain program operations for the next 12-24 months.
- Additionally, the current IT systems do not reflect the best solutions available from the private sector; the program is working on a fully operational T-8 system to allow the management of a single case across all mission activities from a single IT platform.

**Next Steps**

- Adopt a clear and consistent strategy to build public awareness of the importance of interior law enforcement including data highlighting the program's role in national security, border security, public safety, and promoting law-enforcement partnerships.
- Secure staff funding to handle increases in detained, non-detained, and Alternatives to Detention populations; identify opportunities for non-LE Officers (LEO) positions to assume job duties performed by LEOs; and identify new ways to support Field Operations.
- Modernize IT assets to improve data quality and access for all agencies in the immigration lifecycle; improve operational efficiencies and strengthen capabilities for data tracking and sharing—requirements include developing a system for tracking Domestic Operations statistical data and expanding access to state records to aid locating at-large removable noncitizens posing a national security, public safety, or border security threat.
**Homeland Security Investigations**

**Mission Program Goal**
Prevent the exploitation of systemic vulnerabilities in trade and immigration that allow foreign terrorists, other criminals, and their organizations to endanger the American people, property, and infrastructure.

**Mission Program Description**
The Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) program conducts criminal investigations to protect the United States against terrorism and criminal organizations that threaten public safety and national security. HSI combats transnational criminal enterprises that seek to exploit America’s legitimate trade, travel, and financial systems. This program upholds and enforces America’s customs and immigration laws at and beyond our Nation’s borders.

**DID YOU KNOW?**
In fiscal year 2020 (FY20), HSI arrested 31,915 criminal violators; seized over 1.4 million pounds of narcotics; identified and rescued 1,012 victims of child exploitation and 418 victims of human trafficking; and disrupted and dismantled countless TCOs.

Since the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, HSI has been at the forefront of efforts to combat COVID-19-related fraud and criminal activity. HSI launched Operation Stolen Promise in April 2020 to counter this threat. The operation combines HSI’s investigative expertise in intellectual property and trade violations, financial fraud, and cyber-crime, and capitalizes upon HSI’s robust international footprint, criminal analysis capabilities, and strategic private sector and government partnerships to identify, prevent, and investigate pandemic-related transnational crime. The operation has yielded significant results, both statistically and in terms of protecting the health and safety of the American public. As of June 30th, 2021, HSI and its partners have seized over $54 million in illicit proceeds, made 316 arrests; served 327 criminal search warrants; opened over 1,150 criminal investigations; and made more than 2,200 seizures of mislabeled, fraudulent, unauthorized or prohibited COVID-19 vaccines, test kits, personal protective equipment, and other medical items.
Summary of Findings

Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress

Program Execution and Impact

- Operation Stolen Promise targeted pandemic-related fraud through identification and disruption of Transnational Criminal Organization’s distributing counterfeit personal protective equipment/medical countermeasures and coordinated with the Small Business Administration to combat financial fraud under Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act.

- Established the Center for Countering Human Trafficking to combat human trafficking and forced child labor, which resulted over one thousand arrests and several hundred victims assisted.

- The Innovation Lab continued in-house development of key IT support projects for large-scale investigative analysis.

- Operations were hampered by a shortage of criminal analysts limiting analytical support to higher-profile cases.

- Increased levels of Dark Net encryption creates challenges sharing data with foreign entities and requires frequent refresh of technology and continual agent training on new techniques.

- Nearly doubled the disruptions and dismantlements related to transnational-criminal organizations.

Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of significant Homeland Security Investigation cases that resulted in a disruption or dismantlement</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure indicates the success the program has accomplished to effectively degrade high-threat transnational criminal organizations engaged in illicit trade, travel, or finance (both drug-related or non-drug-related); counterterrorism; threats to national security; violations of immigration-related employment law; or child exploitation.

**Explanation:** With the adoption of the individual "Number of" measures that identify subcategories of cases, along with Significant Case Report (SCR) Program training, HSI special agents have a better understanding of factors contributing to cases and are able to submit multiple disruptions and dismantlement toward SCR designated cases. The factors mentioned above have led to an increase in SCR submissions.

* Increased targets based on prior year results.

Challenges and Risks

- COVID-19 is likely to affect investigative efforts and the prosecution of targeted criminals for at least the coming year.

- Significant delays in the relocation of staff to critical areas, compounded by obstacles to hiring and retaining a diverse workforce of investigative and support positions.
• Virtually all the investigative work directly involves global IT networks and greater use of business-intelligence systems. ICE must continue to prioritize cutting-edge IT systems and skills in an environment of scarce resources and competing objectives.

**Next Steps**

• Start a dialog to establish a framework to address lanes of responsibility, coordination, and duplicative efforts to address the cascading effect of whole-of-government strategies.

• Develop a five-year plan for the Innovation Lab to implement new digital technology and open-source data techniques to counter TCO and counter-terrorism threats.

• ICE has requested direct-hire authority to address staffing challenges and seeks multi-year dedicated permanent-change-of-station funding to align investigative resources geographically to mission requirements and focus on training requirements, including virtual training delivery.

**Office of the Principal Legal Advisor**

**Mission Program Goal**

Provide timely and accurate legal advice and conduct litigation activities to advance the ICE mission.

**Mission Program Description**

The Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) provides a full range of legal services to ICE, including advice and counsel to ICE personnel on their law enforcement authorities and potential liabilities. The program represents ICE before multiple administrative venues and supports the Department of Justice in the prosecution of ICE cases and in the defense of civil cases against ICE. OPLA attorneys serve as the exclusive DHS representatives in removal proceedings before the U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review.

**Summary of Findings**

*Strategic Review Progress Rating: Focus Area*

**Program Execution and Impact**

• The bulk of the program’s work litigating matters before Administrative Tribunals was put on hold with the closure of the non-detained immigration courts due to COVID-19.

• The pandemic led to a dramatic increase in litigation challenging ICE detention, requiring intensive OPLA litigation support to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in defense of Agency authorities.
COVID-19 necessitated legal advice/guidance on a range of novel, complex, time-sensitive legal issues across OPLA’s practice areas.

Continued growth in civil litigation significantly increased the demand for staff and technology to address e-discovery and other litigation requirements—further straining staffing.

Strategies were modified to use video teleconferencing and electronic filing to cover the detained immigration dockets and leverage contract e-discovery vehicles.

Class action injunctive orders impaired some agency enforcement functions and authorities, requiring urgent litigation responses and legal advice.

### Key Measure

| Percent of final administrative orders that result in orders of removal from the United States |
|-----------------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| FY 2017 | FY 2018 | FY 2019 | FY 2020 | FY 2021 |
| --- | --- | 76% | 77.8% | **67%** | 56.2% | Retired* |

**Brief Description:** Attorneys in the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor play an integral role in enforcing the Nation’s immigration laws by litigating cases in immigration court and securing orders of removal against those found to be in violation of immigration laws.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** With implementation of the Interim Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Priorities (CIEP) issued 18 Feb 2021, final administrative orders issued resulting in a removal order from the U.S. may not be the best indicator of success in removal proceedings. Changing enforcement priorities, exercise of prosecutorial discretion (PD), and EOIR’s docket initiatives, due to the pandemic, impacted this performance measure falling below 67 percent. EOIR continued to operate reduced dockets and instituted programs to advance cases with pathways to relief, rather than removal. While roughly 57 percent of final orders that were obtained in FY21 were removal orders, 42 percent were reported as final orders of relief. Excluded from this metric were 10,596 cases that were dismissed or administratively closed in connection to exercises of PD. With only a record of 34,672 total final orders of any kind in FY21, OPLA believes that its exercise of PD in an additional 30 percent of cases had a significant impact on the overall percentage of final removal orders.

* This measure is being retired by the component.

**Challenges and Risks**

- Executive Office for Immigration Review’s (EOIR) unprecedented increase in immigration judges means that, absent some relief, when the non-detained immigration court dockets reopen post-COVID, the demand for OPLA attorneys will surpass available resources.

- EOIR’s evolution to electronic case files and virtual hearings will provide some flexibility and efficiency; however, the legacy 1.3 million paper A-files will require a hybrid electronic/paper system for several more years.

- The full scale and willingness of EOIR to hold virtual immigration court hearings post-COVID are unknown, requiring continued planning for facilities and staff to cover in-person hearings in regions where the program currently has no footprint.
• If the program does not expand staffing and facilities to match immigration judge increases, the program will become unable to fulfill the statutory obligation under 6 U.S.C. § 252(c) to represent DHS before EOIR.

• If the program does not have the full range of resources (skilled staff, effective collaboration with DOJ, and IT support) needed to support equities in litigation, then OPLA and DOJ cannot properly defend ICE enforcement authorities and potentially risk court-ordered sanctions.

Next Steps

• Seek appropriations for program staff to cover each immigration court, hire to its Position Management Level (both attorney and staff positions), and provide necessary facilities to cover EOIR docket and court expansion.

• Prioritize immigration court docket coverage to ensure representation in the most critical cases; expand use of video technology and electronic filing of legal pleadings, where permitted, to minimize administrative burden on understaffed locations.

• Support legislative and regulatory changes which align with enforcement priorities and baseline values established in a January 20, 2021 Executive Order (EO) 13993, Revision of Civil Immigration Enforcement Policies and Priorities.

On December 16, 2020, two weeks before the U.K. left the E.U., the U.S. and the U.K. signed a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement (CMAA) in London. “The U.S. and the U.K. work side by side to stop criminals trafficking illegal goods across the Atlantic … this CMAA means that after Brexit, our investigators can keep sharing information to stop criminals,” said U.S. Ambassador Robert Wood Johnson. Attorneys from ICE OPLA and CBP OCC speedily negotiated the CMAA to beat the Brexit deadline.
Transportation Security Administration

Overview

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) protects the Nation’s transportation systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce.

For each TSA mission program, a description of the mission program is provided along with its most recent summary of findings. For a full listing of TSA’s performance measures results and plan, see the “Performance Measure Tables – Report and Plan” chapter in this section.

Aviation Screening Operations

Mission Program Goal

Enhance aviation security by using intelligence-driven, risk-based, layered passenger and baggage screening procedures and technology to increase aviation security while managing the passenger experience.

Mission Program Description

The Aviation Screening Operations program applies intelligence-driven, risk-based, layered passenger and baggage screening procedures and technology to increase aviation security to prevent terrorism and criminal activity. The program implements processes that allow personnel at security checkpoints to focus on high-risk and unknown travelers while managing the passenger experience. The program also ensures the 100-percent screening of checked baggage for prohibited items. Other activities include training the screener workforce, vetting airline passengers, and canine operations.

Summary of Findings

Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress

Program Execution and Impact

- Resisted to COVID to improve safety for officers and travelers by increasing sanitization, distribution of Personal Protective Equipment to frontline workforce, rapidly deploying acrylic shielding at checkpoints, modifying Credential Authentication Technology (CAT) to limit document exchanges, and reducing false alarm rates to require fewer pat downs.
- Resilient and dedicated frontline workforce adapted to revised screening protocols that reduced touch without sacrificing screening standards, and continued to provide security for the traveling public during the pandemic.
- Enhanced baggage screening detection algorithms and protocols to improve homemade explosives detection and on-screen alarm resolution.
- Checked Baggage Capability Maturation Roadmap guiding long-term research, development, and acquisition strategy.
- Partnered with Science and Technology on a series of projects to improve checked baggage capability.
- Deployment of CAT will provide capability to confirm passenger flight and vetting status against the Secure Flight database.
Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of passenger data submissions that successfully undergo Secure Flight watch list matching

**Brief Description:** This measure ensures the traveling public that all domestic air passengers have undergone checking against watch lists as one means of vetting.

**Explanation:** Secure Flight’s processed every submission received. For FY21 all received submission for the vetting of passengers covered by the Securer Flight Final Rule were processed by the system. The program has met this target this quarter and every quarter previously monitored.

**Challenges and Risks**

- Ensuring enhanced technology is available to improve workforce detection capabilities, alarm resolution, and next generation On-Person Screening requirements.
- Planning for maintenance of technology requirements on legacy screening equipment.
- Keeping pace with emerging threats while maintaining reasonable false alarm rates.
- Defining capability needs associated with cybersecurity for the electronic baggage screening program.
- Ensuring industry continues to push to develop new technologies that will improve threat detection capabilities.
- If passenger screening capabilities do not keep pace with the threat environment, then aviation security may decrease.

In response to the elevated threat from Domestic Violent Extremists in the aftermath of the attack on the US Capitol, TSA worked closely with intelligence and law enforcement partners to identify individuals involved and assess any threat they pose to transportation or national security. TSA coordinated with the Threat Screening Center to execute appropriate watchlisting actions in order to extend enhanced security measures for those continuing to pose a threat.
• If insider threats are not effectively managed and mitigated, then the aviation security could significantly decrease.

**Next Steps**
• Establish a recapitalization acquisition program to address existing technologies that are near the end of their life and continue to deploy Computed Tomography, Credential Authentication Technology, and other technology to improve detection capabilities
• Hire new Transportation Security Officers to keep pace with increased travel volume (Post-COVID).
• Implement sanitization in Checked Baggage facilities and pursue solutions that decrease the need for opening bags allowing officers to resolve more alarms on screen and reduce contact with passengers’ property.

**DID YOU KNOW?**
TSA’s Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service is one of 15 State Members of the International In-Flight Security Officer Committee (IIFSOC). The Committee’s primary mission is to strengthen foreign partnerships and share best practices to enhance aviation security world-wide. Through IIFSOC, TSA has successfully identified commonalities with foreign partners leading to stronger global transportation security further protecting the U.S. homeland.

**Other Operations and Enforcement**

**Mission Program Goal**
Strengthen the security regulation and enforcement presence in the Nation’s commercial transportation sectors.

**Mission Program Description**
The Other Operations and Enforcement program encompasses security reviews, assessment, and enforcement activities in the various modes of commercial transportation. The program includes intelligence and analysis, domestic and international air carrier and airport inspections, air cargo inspections, reviews and assessments, Federal Air Marshals, deputizing airline pilots, and training crew members in self-defense. This program ensures compliance with transportation-related regulations and standards, providing credentialing services for transportation sector, and the vetting of the transportation workforce to prevent terrorism and criminal activity.

**Summary of Findings**
*Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress*

**Program Execution and Impact**
• Continued 24/7 vetting of passengers; IT and regulatory improvements have reduced redundancy in threat assessments; implemented Outcome Focused Compliance, a voluntary program that drove higher compliance rates; working closely with International Operations in reconstitution of Compliance activities.
- COVID impacted compliance implementation plan inspections for airport and air carriers; shutdown of enrollment centers for Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) and Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) credentials limited biometric information collection and reduced fees collected.

- Published Surface Security training rule requiring higher-risk passenger rail, freight rail, and bus transportation owner/operators to provide a formalized security training program for approval.

- Measures gauge inspection and compliance activity results both domestically and internationally for surface and air transportation, including those of air carriers.

- Major decline in air travel due to COVID-19 impacting both public and government related travel for validations.

**Key Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
<td>Target 90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2019</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2020</td>
<td>86.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure indicates the level of compliance including both domestic air carriers and foreign air carriers operating at domestic airports designed to enhance the safety of the Nation’s transportation systems and infrastructure.

**Explanation:** For FY21, a total of 12,077 inspections were conducted with 1,216 Findings, as COVID-19 affected overall planned inspection activity. TSA continually works with TSA-regulated entities implementing Outreach, Action Plans and Joint Testing to enhance security.

**Challenges and Risks**

- The need to increase the capacity to develop automatic vetting engine queries to identify insider threat data.

- Ensuring enrollment center capacity and adjudication resources can support security program volume for TSA PreCheck®.

- Due to the increase in shipping during the pandemic—significant challenge of increased workload on the operational environment and the need to update airline cargo security requirements for training, screening equipment, and privacy to align with industry screening changes.

- Educating surface industry stakeholders on security standards and hiring positions with special requirements needed for cyber.

- If challenges in developing risk-based policies and processes with surface transportation partners are not effectively addressed, then it may reduce the ability to oversee and partner with modal operators.
• If challenges in mitigating, detecting, and responding to an insider threat are not effectively addressed, then it may result in an attack perpetrated or enabled by transportation insiders.

TSA increased its’ surface information sharing via the Surface Information Sharing Cell (SISC). The SISC shared over 800 surface industry, TSA and other U.S. government agency products with national, state, and local stakeholders in the first 9 months of FY21 (a 90% increase from FY20). This included a 50% increase in the number of cyber security products shared between the private and public sector. This demonstrated the SISC capability to collaborate and share information on current threats to transportation infrastructure.

Next Steps

• Enhance enrollment process with online renewals so current HME and TWIC holders can renew online to reduce cost and public health exposure, and implement remote enrollment for TSA PreCheck®.

• Upgrade compliance reporting platform to improve capability and efficiency.

• Proceed with hiring for six cyber positions; revise field position descriptions to include outreach and assessments.

• Recruit, hire, and onboard cybersecurity experts possessing the technical skills and specialized experiences to fulfill cyber related functions to enhance the cyber resilience of the transportation sector, maintain threat awareness, and advance other TSA cyber related mission requirements.

• Revise field-based position descriptions to include nuance requirements that address evolving threat vectors (i.e. cybersecurity, insider threat) and modal security specialization.

• Prioritize International Civil Aviation Organization Account Consignor project along with canine screening of Priority mail.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

Overview

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) administers the Nation’s lawful immigration system, safeguarding its integrity and promise by efficiently and fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and honoring our values.

For each USCIS mission program, a description of the mission program is provided along with its most recent summary of findings. For a full listing of USCIS’ performance measure results and plan, see the “Performance Measure Tables – Report and Plan” chapter in this section.

Employment Status Verification

Mission Program Goal

Ensure lawful employment and the protection of American workers by providing efficient and accurate confirmation of employment eligibility information.

Mission Program Description

The electronic employment eligibility verification E-Verify program enables enrolled employers to confirm the work authorization of their newly hired employees quickly and easily. E-Verify is an internet-based system that compares information from an employee's Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, to records available to DHS to confirm employment eligibility within seconds.

Summary of Findings

Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress

Program Execution and Impact

- Continued to offer employment verification services seamlessly during the pandemic and adapted to the public’s needs while working closely with partners.
- New employer enrollments remained steady at roughly 1,500 per week and nearly nearly 40 million queries were run despite impacts of the pandemic on businesses and hiring.
- Enhanced Customer Relationship Management platform that improved case management, workload tracking, outreach and engagement, and Verification Information System data reporting warehouse for constant, accurate and timely reporting.
- Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, policies were adjusted in order to comply with COVID-19 restrictions.
- “myUploads” capability was added within “myE-Verify” to allow employees to upload documents and cases be automatically assigned for manual review to streamline manual case processing.
• Maintained high customer satisfaction scores, often 20 points higher than average scores for other Federal Government entities.

• Implemented auditing of electronic (1st step) cases to improve the verification process and correct data errors or discrepancies.

• In FY 21, E-Verify modified its policies and technology to increase program integrity and eliminate gaps caused by duplicate cases and hanging Tentative Non-Confirmations (TNCs) created during electronic employment verifications. These system and policy changes compel E-Verify employers to quickly address case discrepancies to prevent them from persisting. Through these changes and a massive education and compliance campaign, USCIS was able to resolve over 83 percent (192,000) of its hanging TNCs.

**Key Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior Results</td>
<td>Percent of workers determined to be Employment Authorized after an initial mismatch</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Result</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2022</td>
<td>FY 2023</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| ≤ 0.40% | 0.13% | ≤ 0.40% | ≤ 0.40% |

**Brief Description:** This measure provides a feedback mechanism to indicate the accuracy of E-Verify system reporting the number of cases in which adjudicating officials in the program find a person “employment authorized” after an initial automated mismatch decision. Ensuring the accuracy of E-Verify processing reflects the program’s intent to minimize negative impacts imposed upon those entitled to employment in the U.S. while ensuring the integrity of immigration benefits by effectively detecting and preventing unauthorized employment.

**Explanation:** E-Verify continues to be successful in matching employees to their records during the initial electronic matching phase. In cases where the check does not find a match, it is rare that the applicant will contest the case and...
be found to be employment authorized. USCIS continues to improve its processes through enhancements such as improved matching processes, better data access, and my-E-Verify, an online service that allows individuals to check their employment eligibility. E-Verify upgraded to the latest version of Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS) and connected with the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVIS), allowing for automated matching of approximately 90,000 electronic cases annually that were previously resolved manually. E-Verify implemented an audit program to review the accuracy of automated matching and improve program integrity. Finally, E-Verify improved my-E-Verify to allow employees to upload, rather than fax, documents required to resolve mismatches.

**Challenges and Risks**

- Nine states currently do not let E-Verify access its Department of Motor Vehicle data via the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System, consequently impacting E-Verify’s ability to identify fraudulent use of licenses from those states.
- Several systems used by E-Verify are outside of USCIS’ control, and outages (e.g., OneNet outages) have impacted queries.
- Lack of additional modernization which would reduce manual processing and improve response time, reliability, scalability, data matching, automated enrollment and account management, and expand case auditing to identify and correct anomalies.
- Increasing enrollment is a significant focus as the program prepares for the possibility of mandatory E-Verify.
- If key data infrastructure or data service providers that support E-Verify’s Verification Information System (VIS) experience operational or infrastructure issues, then impacts to VIS’s availability and performance may delay employment eligibility queries from employers and employees.
- If legislation is enacted that significantly affects how E-Verify performs employment verification or how quickly it needs to scale up usage, then E-Verify users could experience service disruptions as the program is expanded.

**Next Steps**

- Complete legacy retirement of E-Verify components to reduce maintenance costs and enable accelerated process modernization.
- Provide training to internal staff on updated systems and processes, enabling staff to make optimal use of system enhancements and to better collaborate to suggest new improvements.

**Fraud Prevention and Detection**

**Mission Program Goal**

Enhance the security and integrity of the legal immigration system by eliminating systemic vulnerabilities.

**Mission Program Description**

The Fraud Prevention and Detection program supports activities related to preventing and detecting immigration benefit fraud. The program leads efforts to identify threats to national
security and public safety, deter, detect, and combat immigration benefit fraud, and remove systemic and other vulnerabilities. This is part of the Fraud Prevention and Detection Fee Account.

Summary of Findings
Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress

Program Execution and Impact

- Budget impacts and COVID-19 resulted in reductions in contractor support, reduced access to physical A-files/receipt files, increased file request and case processing times, reduced interview throughput, and reduced site visit volume.
- Utilized a more data-driven and targeted approach to site visits to detect and deter fraud early in the adjudicative process.
- Conducted manual social media checks on refugee and asylum applications, including populations with known suspected gang activity or national security concerns, which were resource intensive efforts necessitating very selective application.
- Updated Department of Labor Memorandum of Agreement expanding access to labor certification information and authorized certain employees’ access to the data.
- Identified several thousand cases with potential national security concerns including cases involving individuals watchlisted in the Threat Screening Center Database seeking immigration benefits.

Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>FY 2022</td>
<td>FY 2023</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of System Generated Notifications related to national security, public safety, or fraud triaged on pending cases within 60 calendar days*</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brief Description: This measure gauges the percent of pre-adjudicative and automated System Generated Notifications related to national security, public safety, or fraud indicators that are triaged resolved by specially trained officers within 60 days. These include biographic and biometric detections of potentially significant derogatory information. Biometric notifications include derogatory information related to historical fingerprint.

On Feb. 12, 2021, the former Chief Operating Officer of Global Premier Soccer (GPS) was charged in connection with wide-ranging visa fraud conspiracy. Queries revealed that GPS had filed dozens of I-129 petitions seeking H-2B workers. Additional research uncovered that they were placing workers in unauthorized locations. As a result of this investigation, a former GPS employee pleaded guilty to destroying records in connection with this investigation.
enrollment records and other biometric type information. Continuous vetting of biometric information helps safeguard the integrity of the nation's lawful immigration system.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** Despite 149K ATLAS System Generated Notifications (SGNs) triaged, results were 5 percent under goal due to the increase in biographic and biometric SGNs and decreased number of gatekeepers to work them. USCIS systems' and DHS's IDENT harvested increased names from multiple data sources and added them to ATLAS' automated screening, plus checks occurred at multiple stages during form adjudication, resulting in more matches of potential derogatory information. Pandemic impacts, a hiring freeze, and urgent deployment needs to support the Southwest Border and Operation Allies Welcome impacted results. With the newly modernized, cloud-based ATLAS deployed in August 2021, FDNS began implementing refinements to the ATLAS SGNs to increase screening efficacy, reduce false positives, and hone in on potential significant derogatory information-related USCIS benefit requests. The hiring freeze has been lifted and ATLAS SGN refinements will be instrumental in meeting the FY22 target.

* Measure name change from: Percent of system generated notifications related to national security, public safety, or fraud triaged within 60 calendar days.

**Challenges and Risks**

- The increasing vacancy rate due to departures and retirements, coupled with the 2020 hiring freeze.
- Inability to conduct the mandatory Fraud Detection and National Security Officer Basic Training Program, courses due to ongoing COVID-19 issues generated a current backlog of approximately 100 officers in need of training.
- If the Fraud Prevention and Detection program does not maintain a fluid information exchange with its partners, then the security and integrity of the immigration system could be compromised, along with national security, leading to exploitable gaps through terrorism and targeted violence.
- If the Fraud Prevention and Detection program is unable to timely and adequately train its fraud detection and national security immigration officers, then the program's ability to maintain the lawful immigration system may become compromised.

**Next Steps**

- Creation and development of a more modernized and efficient case management system, known as FDNS-DS NexGen, which will replace FDNS-DS.
- With the creation of FDNS-DS NexGen, revise operational processes to streamline output through greater connectivity with agency data systems, creating efficiencies and data fidelity by reducing manual inputs.

**DID YOU KNOW?**

On an average day, USCIS analyzes nearly 600 tips, leads, cases, and detections for potential fraud, public safety, and national security concerns. The results provide USCIS adjudicators greater certainty that they are making fully informed decisions based on the best available information.
Mission Program Goal
Ensure immigration benefit and services are processed in a timely and accurate manner.

Mission Program Description
The Immigration Services program supports and promotes lawful immigration by processing benefit requests, so that only those eligible for immigration benefits are approved. This includes processing refugee and asylum applications as well as providing integration services for lawful immigrants. This is part of the Immigration Examinations Fee Account and the H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner Fee Account.

Summary of Findings

Program Execution and Impact
- COVID-19 temporarily closed offices to all in-person services for several months, which led to reduced capacity and adjudications until safety protocols were put in place to safely reopen.
- Incoming receipts reduced by over 30 percent, which impacted revenue and required severe cost-cutting measures across the agency.
- Personnel could not complete certain work at home during the closure which exacerbated staffing shortages, adjudication policy changes, and other technology needs, resulting in an increase backlog by more than 25 percent to over 3 million applications and doubled cycle times.
- The Contact Center experienced an increase in wait times due to limited staffing and additional demands for emergency services.
- Resource challenges slowed development of the myUSCIS front-end electronic processing, but paper files continued to be moved into electronic formats to balance workloads among Service Centers without requiring the shipment of paper files.
- Executed socially distanced interview technology to allow Asylum and Field Office adjudications to resume at reduced capacity.

Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of refugee and asylum adjudications that were appropriately decided*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brief Description: This measure assesses the program’s ability to process I-589 and I-590 to provide immigration benefit services accurately and with full traceability. Additionally, the program uses results of this quality review process to improve the training of adjudicators and the processes used in conducting adjudications.

Explanation and Corrective Action: This measure is reported annually with a two-quarter lag. The results reported are the end of fiscal year 2020 review. Due to circumstances particular to FY20, the small sample of cases reviewed only reflects the estimated volumes of I-589 adjudications expected during August and September 2020; rather than the overall volume of I-589 adjudications normally conducted during the second quarter of the fiscal year, which is
typically sampled to represent the program. The small sample was the result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the potential for an administrative furlough, which was expected to occur in FY20 Q4, severely restricting the ability to schedule I-589 interviews and complete cases beginning in March 2020. Moving forward we will be incorporating the two-quarter lag between the sampling and reporting of results, so USCIS will submit the FY 21 measure results in Q2 FY 22. As COVID travel restrictions are lifted, sampling size for the measure will improve and will more accurately reflect both I-589 and I-590 performance.

* Measure to be retired and replaced with new measure: Percent of approved refugee and asylum applications that were legally sufficient.

**Challenges and Risks**

- The ability to resource program functions is a significant challenge to meet established plans and expectations.
- The growing backlog of cases presents an ever-expanding significant challenge for the program to maintain any level of service to benefit requestors and credibility in its ability to close the time to process requests.
- Repercussions from policy changes in FY19-20 continue to reverberate in terms of resolution, along with new unknowns on what future policies related to asylum seekers travelling to the Southwest Border will be.
- Scaling up the refugee program to meet the increased annual refugee admissions ceiling.
- If new or changed immigration policies and regulations result in increased application volume and/or more complex adjudication processes, then the ability to process immigration benefits in a timely fashion will be impacted.
- If a final fee rule is not implemented in a timely manner, then the ability to timely process immigration benefit requests and related services will be impacted.

In February 2021, President Biden signed an executive order establishing the Interagency Task Force on the Reunification of Families to identify children who were unjustly separated from their parents at the U.S.-Mexico border and reunite them with their families. USCIS has been adjudicating the Applications for Travel Document, parole submissions and work authorization requests; and the Family Reunification Task Force has begun reunifying individuals whose parole applications were approved.
Next Steps

- Conduct the FY22/23 fee review and develop a Notice of Public Rule Making and final fee rule with target completion in FY22; until new fee revenue collections materialize, the program must continue to actively monitor its carryover balance, prioritize mission critical activities, and defer consideration of new unfunded activities.
- Develop a single interview scheduling system and office-to-office interviews (where a customer from one field office can be interviewed remotely by another office) and expand electronic filing and remote work capabilities.
- Expand legal pathways for protection in the Central America region.

U.S. Coast Guard

Overview

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is one of the six armed forces of the United States and the only military organization within DHS. The USCG protects the maritime economy and the environment, defends our maritime borders, and saves those in peril.

For each USCG mission program, a description of the mission program is provided along with its most recent summary of findings. For a full listing of USCG’s performance measure results and plan, see the “Performance Measure Tables – Report and Plan” chapter in this section.

Maritime Law Enforcement

Mission Program Goal

Ensure effective maritime law enforcement and border control.

Mission Program Description

The Maritime Law Enforcement program preserves America’s jurisdictional rights within our maritime borders. The USCG is the lead federal maritime law enforcement agency for enforcing national and international law on the high seas, outer continental shelf, and inward from the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to inland navigable waters, including the Great Lakes. The following statutory missions contribute to the USCG’s Maritime Law Enforcement program: Drug Interdiction; Migrant Interdiction; Living Marine Resources; and Other Law Enforcement.
Summary of Findings

Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress

Program Execution and Impact

- Use of intel to get assets in the right locations, detection capability through air assets, and interdiction supported by armed helicopters aided in drug interdictions.
- Strong partnerships in Caribbean region facilitated the quick repatriation of migrants.
- Countered predatory behavior of distant water fishing fleets through combined efforts with international partners through Operation Kuartam, Operation Southern Cross, and Operation North Pacific Guard.
- In conjunction with tribal, local, state, and federal partner agencies under the Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement (SAFE) Act, the Coast Guard continued to highlight the actions of strategic competitors who seek to impair the competitiveness and economic growth of the American seafood industry.
- Boarded thousands of domestic fishing vessels in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and interdicted record number of foreign vessels along the U.S./Mexico maritime boundary line in the Gulf of Mexico resulting in increased number of fishery violations.
- Migrant interdiction rates in the maritime environment have shown a rather unstable trend over the past four years.

Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant interdiction effectiveness in the maritime environment</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brief Description: This measure communicates the effectiveness of the maritime law enforcement program to interdict migrants attempting to enter the U.S. through maritime borders not protected by the Border Patrol.

Explanation and Corrective Action: There is currently a surge of migrant activity in the maritime environment and the continuation of this surge is unknown. The number of confirmed migrant landings (abandoned vessels, self-reporting, etc.) has increased 51% year-over-year. Coast Guard assets will need to be re-assigned from other mission sets to address this surge in migration.

Challenges and Risks

- Lack of primary control over intelligence cueing and maritime patrol aircraft support for drug interdiction reinforces the need to sustain strong relationships with interagency partners.
- Logistics and replacement parts requirements of the aging medium endurance cutter fleet.
Changes in domestic immigration policies present unique challenges to illegal migrant interdiction.

Target detection remains an ongoing challenge to domestic fisheries protection as not all fishing vessels are required to broadcast Automatic Identification System.

Lack of broad jurisdiction or authority to board IUU fishing vessels on the high seas, especially in the Atlantic.

If international partnerships and agreements are not continually developed and maintained, then maritime law enforcement loses the ability to extend our maritime border outward to target, engage, and prosecute Transnational Criminal Organizations and IUU fishing fleets.

If maritime law enforcement does not successfully leverage new and existing tools and technologies, then the risk to U.S. maritime borders and natural resource management from Transnational Criminal Organizations and IUU fishing fleets increases.

Next Steps

- Expand at-sea biometrics system capabilities and employ and field-test new tools and technologies during counter drug boarding operations.
- Synchronize aircraft and surface asset deployments with intelligence capability, surveillance, reconnaissance operations, and cyber analytics to optimize performance.
- Restore third party detainee transfers through Panama and Guatemala to the U.S., leveraging the International Maritime Interdiction Support provision of the counter drug bilateral agreement.

In April 2021, a U.S. Navy Maritime Patrol Aircraft located a low profile vessel in the central Caribbean and vectored U.S. Coast Guard Cutter TAMPA to intercept. TAMPA launched their cutter boat with boarding team to interdict and gain positive control of the suspect vessel. TAMPA seized approximately 2,501 kgs of cocaine and detained 3 suspects for prosecution. This case highlights the increased effective presence and operational response gained through DoD partnerships to leverage U.S. Navy assets.
Maritime Prevention

Mission Program Goal

Ensure marine safety and environmental protection and minimize security vulnerability of vessels and marine facilities.

Mission Program Description

The Maritime Prevention program mitigates the risk of human casualties and property losses, minimizes security risks, and protects the marine environment. The following statutory missions contribute to the USCG’s Maritime Prevention program: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Marine Safety; and Marine Environmental Protection.

Summary of Findings

Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress

Program Execution and Impact

- Implementing risk-based inspections for small passenger vessels and revamped risk-based targeting matrix for inspecting foreign vessels.
- Development of National Area Maritime Security Committees (NAMSCs) for each port zone which allowed experts to share best practices and updates from standards and regulations.
- COVID-19 reduced marine safety activities and traditional maritime traffic; program engaged in nontraditional work with partners to facilitate the safe movement of cruise ship passengers and their crew.
- Work progressed to determine how efforts to enforce compliance with the Vessel Incidental Discharge Act (VIDA) for the relevant 27 waste streams will occur as the program takes over responsibilities from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
- Some results trended downward due to COVID-related declines in marine traffic, but most were on-par with previous years’ results.

DID YOU KNOW?

Approximately 90 percent of global trade relies upon maritime conveyance. To facilitate this commerce, the Coast Guard conducted 8,417 safety and security examinations of foreign-flagged vessels for compliance with U.S. laws and international conventions, resulting in 65 detentions reportable to the International Maritime Organization.

Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three-year average number of serious marine incidents (SMI)</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brief Description: This measure assesses the impact of the program’s efforts to reduce the number of serious marine incidents through outreach, training, and inspections.
Explanation: The 12-month total (473) remains historically low compared to previous years. The resulting three-year average of SMI's (605) is a 13.2 percent improvement over FY20 Q4. These historically low SMI numbers can likely be attributed to reduced activity in the maritime domain during the height of COVID-19.

Challenges and Risks

- Ability to get personnel trained and qualified to keep pace with rapid industry changes, emerging technological innovation, and cyber threats.
- Prevention responsibilities are expanding beyond traditional boundaries of ports (offshore wind farms, space launches/recoveries offshore, etc.) which require more training, expertise, regulation, and monitoring than able to manage.
- Program is responsible for implementing Certificate of Adequacy for waste disposal process, but technical expertise resides with EPA.
- Significant time lag in regulation publication due to processing complexity and stakeholder comments to resolve.
- If the Maritime Prevention program fails to adequately maintain an effective oversight workforce, then the program and third-party oversight mechanisms will be unable to prevent unsafe vessel conditions, casualties to life, property, or the environment.
- If the Maritime Prevention program fails to maintain an effective audit and oversight workforce it will not adequately oversee the work done by third parties on its behalf, resulting in increased unsafe vessel conditions, and a greater potential for casualties to life, property, or the environment.

The program published Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 01-20, Guidelines for Addressing Cyber Risks at Marine Transportation Security Act Regulated Facilities, after a 3-year process of incorporating feedback. The first-of-its-kind product provides guidance on complying with requirements to assess, document, and address computer system and network vulnerabilities. A Facility Inspector Cyber Job Aid was created to complement this guide.
Next Steps

- Implement a more self-paced e-learning for the Marine Inspector training program, as well as embedding program personnel within industry to incorporate new content on emerging issues (cyber, alternative fuels, and new technology) to supplement traditional in-person schools and on-the-job training.
- Hire cyber subject matter experts and fill cyber billets to help port operations and Area Maritime Security Committees.
- Develop implementation plans and compliance guidance for several major regulatory projects, including VIDA implementation, updating 33 CFR Section 158 (reception facilities), and vessel electrical and mechanical systems regulations.

DID YOU KNOW?
The Coast Guard inspected over 4,800 Maritime Transportation Act regulated facilities and conducted over 660 inspection activities monitoring the transfer of hazardous cargoes. Additionally the Coast Guard inspected over 22,500 shipping containers for structural and hazardous material compliance.

Maritime Response

Mission Program Goal
Rescue persons in distress and mitigate the impacts of maritime disaster events. Ensure maritime incident response and recovery preparedness.

Mission Program Description
The Maritime Response program mitigates the consequences of marine casualties and disastrous events. The USCG preparedness efforts ensure incident response and recovery resources are fully ready and capable to minimize impact of disasters to people, the environment, and the economy. The following statutory missions contribute to the USCG’s Maritime Response program: Search and Rescue and Marine Environmental Protection.

Summary of Findings

Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress

Program Execution and Impact

- The Coast Guard’s all-threats and all-hazards preparedness efforts ensured incident response and recovery resources were fully ready and capable of scalable mobilization in coordination with, and in support of, local, state, tribal, federal, and private sector partners.
- Through strategically distributed Marine Environmental Response elements at the national, regional, and local level, the Coast Guard directed the removal and mitigation of oil and hazardous substances from spills and releases in the waters and shorelines of the U.S. coastal zone.
- As the lead agency for maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) in U.S. waters, the Coast Guard coordinated nation-wide asset response via nine U.S. Rescue and Coordination Centers and...
worked with other nations through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and other regional forums to save lives and advance the SAR system both nationally and globally.

- In support of the global and U.S. SAR system, the Coast Guard was one of four federal partners in the Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking (SARSAT) Program and participated alongside 44 partner nations in the governance and operation of the International Cospas-Sarsat Program.

**Key Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of people in imminent danger saved in the maritime environment</td>
<td>78.8%</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure reports the percent of people who were in imminent danger on the oceans and other waterways and whose lives were saved by the USCG.

**Explanation:** While the program aspires to save all lives, due to distance, weather, and other challenges the results reflect the reality of the complexities faced in meeting this goal.

**Challenges and Risks**

- Effective pollution response execution and administration requires persistent industry education and consistent regional enforcement.
- While great distances inherently complicate any SAR response, the expansion of novel maritime technologies like the offshore wind industry automated vessels may further complicate SAR cases.
- A rapidly changing climate yields significant weather events with increasing frequency and severity, requiring the Service to obligate more forces to surge events to serve the American public.
- Proposed reductions in training quotas for emergency management creates the potential for personnel to not be properly trained to do surges and carry out the mission.
- Assessing the effectiveness between different training delivery methods to determine what training looks like going forward.
- If severe storms continue to impact U.S. equities without additional readiness support, then the Maritime Response program’s ability to ensure safety and security of U.S. citizens and ports during disasters will diminish.
- If the risk of an arctic marine incident continues to increase, then the Maritime Response program's ability to effectively respond to an event will diminish.

**Next Steps**

- Continue to work through mechanisms like the Maritime Oil Spill Response Plan Advisory Group to engage with federal, state, local, and industry stakeholders and educate them on oil spill response preparation.
- Assume lead federal agency for SARSAT program from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and with it, responsibilities for overseeing the operation and
maintenance of a global network of satellites and ground stations that enables emergency beacon tracking.

- Pursue improvements to the Coast Guard Contingency Preparedness System to maintain the oversight of contingency exercise after action items and continue to drive enhancements to Service response readiness.

Maritime Security Operations

Mission Program Goal
Detect, deter, prevent, disrupt, and recover from terrorism in the maritime domain.

Mission Program Description
The Maritime Security Operations program encompasses activities to detect, deter, prevent, disrupt, and recover from terrorist attacks and other criminal acts in the maritime domain. It includes the execution of antiterrorism, response, and select recovery operations. This program conducts the operational element of the USCG’s Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission and complements the other two elements: the establishment and oversight of maritime security regimes, and maritime domain awareness.

Washington State Ferries operating in Puget Sound are vulnerable to active shooter threats. Sector Puget Sound held one of the largest full scale active shooter interagency exercises pioneering initiatives for responses to mass casualty events that may result from these emerging threats. Their efforts yielded national best practice information sharing that enhances response capability. The unit was awarded the Maritime Security and Response Operations Excellence Award.
Summary of Findings

Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress

Program Execution and Impact

- Program used a risk-based approach to manage operational deployments; after action reports served as a means to improve.
- Used risk-based methodology for targeted escorts and patrols providing maximum security and deterrence that were more difficult for adversaries to predict.
- COVID-19 impacted program operations by both affecting the availability of personnel due to exposures that required quarantining; and the development of COVID-19 policy to ensure appropriate social distancing.
- Resolved over one hundred incursions into fixed security zones to protect maritime critical infrastructure.
- Filed dozens of Field Intelligence Reports from over one thousand targeted security boardings of large commercial vessels that provided valuable information to the intelligence community about security, military, and law enforcement conditions.
- COVID-19, a busier hurricane season, and lack of resources impacted the ability to meet planned risk-reduction activities.

Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020 Target</th>
<th>FY 2020 Result</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
<th>FY 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent risk reduction of coordinated anti-terrorism activities throughout the maritime transportation system</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>40%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brief Description: This measure reflects the risk reduction impact of maritime security and response operations conducted in and around ports in the 37 Captain of the Port zones by the USCG or federal, state, and local partners.

Explanation and Corrective Action: Though progress over FY 2020 was made, the target goal was missed primarily due to competing mission demands and lack of resources. Resource issues stem from COVID-19 crew-related impacts as well as a lack of physical resources in geographic areas with high-risk profiles. Resumption of in-person training and outreach in FY22 Q2 will help field units better understand total addressable risk and how to improve risk reduction performance.

* Targets revised to 40 percent for FY22/23 based on trend analysis.

Challenges and Risks

- Advances in Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) technology are outpacing development of counter UAS (C-UAS) systems, which increases the probability of successful attacks by malicious actors using UAS.
- The emergence of domestic violent extremism has presented an episodic threat which expands the number of variables that must be considered when allocating finite resources across the Maritime Security Operations program.
- Intelligence assesses threat to Marine Transportation System as low, which could incorrectly be interpreted as no threat.
If program personnel do not maintain proper training levels to respond to an Active Shooter/Active Threat (AS/AT) then the number of casualties resulting from an AS/AT may increase.

Current C-UAS authorities under the Preventing Emerging Threats Act will sunset in 2022 creating an uncertain environment for future fielding of comprehensive C-UAS capabilities.

**Next Steps**

- Significant updates needed to Maritime Security and Response Operations policy manual which provides program direction for patrols, boardings, escorts, and fixed security zones to enhance ability of personnel to respond to AS/AT and C-UAS.
- Formalize capability for C-UAS in program of record for dedicated resources, equipment, and policy and accountability.
- Testing to identify additional resources and equipment for C-UAS.
- Beta testing the augmentation of waterborne patrols and escorts using USCG aircraft to enhance risk reduction.

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**Maritime Transportation System Management**

**Mission Program Goal**

Safeguard and expedite lawful trade and travel and mitigate hazards and vulnerabilities.

**Mission Program Description**

The Maritime Transportation System Management program ensures a safe, secure, efficient and environmentally sound waterways system. The USCG minimizes disruptions to maritime commerce by assessing and mitigating risks to safe navigation and by providing waterways restoration capabilities after extreme weather events, marine accidents, or terrorist incidents. The USCG works in concert with other Federal agencies, state and local governments, marine industries, maritime associations, and the international community to optimize balanced use of the Nation’s marine transportation system. The Aids to Navigation (ATON) and Ice Operations statutory missions contribute to this program.

**Summary of Findings**

*Strategic Review Progress Rating: Satisfactory Progress*

**Program Execution and Impact**

- The Coast Guard maintained and operated more than 45,000 buoys and beacons across the marine transportation system and ensured system compliance with international standards, such as those promulgated by the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities.
- Coast Guard icebreakers kept domestic waterways accessible; projected National sovereignty in the Arctic; and supported the global scientific community and international treaty obligations in Antarctica.
Through expeditionary asset and personnel deployments as well as continuous participation in international fora, the Coast Guard directly engaged with Arctic communities, protected U.S. and partner nation maritime rights and interests, and demonstrated responsible and effective maritime governance.

Facilitated the shipment of essential goods valued at more than $5 trillion.

Collaboration with Canada facilitated international ice patrols and domestic icebreaking to keep priority waterways open during the ice season which enabled record shipping activity in grain and wind energy industries in the Great Lakes.

Supported government and industry partners to facilitate innovation and progress in renewable energy projects (offshore wind farms, hydrokinetic energy generation, and commercial space enterprises).

### Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Availability of maritime navigation aids</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
<th>FY 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>97.1%</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
<td>96.5%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure assesses the program’s ability to manage short-range federal Aids to Navigation availability that promotes safe navigation on the waterway.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** Resource and funding constraints resulted in a funding shortfall for aid maintenance and recapitalization. Declining AAR is primarily the result of a failing fixed ATON infrastructure attributed to ongoing resource and funding constraints. To mitigate risks to the marine transportation system, the USCG is working to optimize ATON maintenance procedures and centralize ATON repair and recapitalization prioritization.

### Challenges and Risks

- The Nation’s waterways must accommodate novel, increasingly complex, and at times competing demands for usage, which the Coast Guard must balance while maintaining safety of navigation for all.
- Resource constraints have created an extensive and growing repair backlog for fixed ATON, which will continue to drive down the future overall aid availability rate.
- Changing climate and the shifting geo-political landscape in the Arctic combine to make operating environment incredibly challenging. The Coast Guard must continually adapt to serve Alaskan communities, protect National sovereignty, and reinforce international norms.
- If the ice-breaking fleet is unable to operate/cannot keep up with mission demand, then the United States cedes geo-political influence in the Polar Regions to global near-peer competitors (China, Russia).

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DID YOU KNOW?

The Coast Guard conducted over 4,555 hours of domestic icebreaking to support movement of 4.6 million tons of dry bulk cargo and 8.3 million barrels of liquid cargoes through ice-impeded waters of the Great Lakes and the Penobscot, Kennebec, and Hudson Rivers, at an economic value of $753.6 million.
• If the program cannot support the aids to navigation mission by melding legacy and new tools, then this increases risks to the safe delivery of commerce, waterway users and uses, and environmental incidents.

Next Steps

• Modernize the fleet of domestic waterways management cutters to improve service to the marine transportation system, which facilitates 5.4 trillion dollars of annual economic activity and provides employment for more than 30 million Americans.

• Explore solutions to mitigate risks to the marine transportation system including ATON maintenance optimization, novel ATON technologies, and waterways risk modeling.

• Continue to refine domestic icebreaking metrics, in consultation with waterway users, to better understand and improve major waterway availability and ensure the safety of all mariners and coastal communities.

• Continue pursuing the acquisition of a new fleet of heavy polar icebreakers, the Polar Security Cutter, to ensure continued access to both polar regions and support the country's economic, commercial, maritime and national security needs.

On March 3, 2021 Rescue Coordination Center (RCC) Boston was notified by RCC Halifax Canada, that an onboard fire disabled the fishing vessel ATLANTIC DESTINY nearly 115 miles south of Nova Scotia, Canada. RCC Boston dispatched two helicopters and one fixed wing aircraft, and coordinated support from a Canadian fixed wing aircraft, a Canadian helicopter, and Canadian Coast Guard ship. The international search and rescue team saved all 31 crewmembers in 33 foot seas and 60 mile per hour winds.
U.S. Secret Service

Overview

U.S. Secret Service (USSS) safeguards the Nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy, and protects national leaders, visiting heads of state and government, designated sites, and National Special Security Events.

For each USSS mission program, a description of the mission program is provided along with its most recent summary of findings. For a full listing of USSS’s performance measure results and plan, see the “Performance Measure Tables – Report and Plan” chapter in this section.

Field Operations

Mission Program Goal

Safeguard the nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy.

Mission Program Description

The Field Operations program supports the daily operations of the domestic and international field offices. The program is staffed by Special Agents, Uniformed Division Officers, Technical Law Enforcement, and administrative, professional, and technical personnel. Program personnel divide their time between conducting criminal investigations of financial crimes, cybercrimes, counterfeit currency, protective intelligence, and performing physical protection responsibilities. This enables the Department to protect the U.S. economy and continuity of government by investigating threats to financial payment systems, threats to leadership and locations, and events with symbolic and practical significance to U.S. citizens in physical space and cyberspace.

Summary of Findings

Strategic Review Progress Rating: Noteworthy Progress

Program Execution and Impact

- Cyber fraud forfeitures almost doubled, seizures of counterfeit currency were more than $450 million, and increase in case openings indicates that arrests are likely to increase in future.
- Returned upward to $1 billion to the CARES ACT unemployment fraud and seized approximately $9 million in fraudulent loans.
- Innovation in conducting cyber crimes partner training remotely to build investigative capacity translated into a significant increase in investigations.
- Arrested more than 1,000 criminals, averting cyber financial crime potential losses, and accomplishing nearly a 100% conviction rate.
- Merged legacy taskforces (Electronic, Financial) into one where equipment, training, and partnerships are all integrated for more effective focus on the growing world of cyber crime.
**Key Measure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>$7.10</td>
<td>FY 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>$2.57</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2019</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
<td>FY 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2020</td>
<td>$2.28</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Amount of cyber-financial crime loss prevented (in billions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$6.00</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure reflects the program’s efforts to reduce financial losses to the public attributable to cyber financial crimes.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** Since the onset of the global pandemic, significant resources were dedicated to investigating crimes targeting pandemic relief funds, to include unemployment insurance fraud and U.S. Small Business Administration loan fraud. The Secret Service, in partnership with the Department of Labor Office of Inspector General, worked directly with state unemployment benefit agencies and financial institutions on reversing fraudulent transactions and returning the funds directly to states. These investigative inquiries, also called runouts, which did not rise to the level of criminal case investigations, resulted in reversing of over $2 billion in unemployment insurance funds back to victims. The Secret Service continues to adapt to the evolving landscape of cyber-enabled financial crimes and is conducting a review of the investigative systems and metrics, which will result in technological and policy updates to more accurately capture and report loss amounts.

**Challenges and Risks**

- Field Operations continues to remain understaffed due to limited hiring over the past few years, the lengthiness of the hiring process, and the volume of retirements (2%-3% of the agent workforce over the last four fiscal years).
- Investigative equipment which continues to remain out of date and ineffective for conducting cyber investigations which is an ever changing and highly technical threat area.

**DID YOU KNOW?**

The Secret Service established its first overseas Electronic Crimes Task Force (ECTF) in Rome, Italy in 2009. This network of public-private partnerships is dedicated to fight high-tech, computer-based crimes.

In FY 2021, the Secret Service hosted a virtual Cyber Incident Response Simulation (CIRS) with business executives, federal law enforcement, and public sector officials. The simulation focused on Ransomware, Business Email Compromise, Managed Service Providers, and cryptocurrency. Trainings like these enhance planning, collaboration, and information sharing between private organizations and federal law enforcement agencies.
• The most dangerous cybercriminals continue to operate overseas with impunity, enabled by nation states.
• The expansion of Dark Web forums and privacy-enhanced cryptocurrencies make investigations of money movement far more challenging.
• If Field Operations cyber and technological capabilities do not adapt to adversaries' evolving capabilities, then its ability to detect, deter, and investigate evolving financial crimes will be degraded.
• If Field Operations cannot allocate sufficient staffing and training resources to allow time for training, then staff may be less prepared to respond to emerging financial and investigative emerging threats.

Next Steps
• Need new advanced technology in order to keep pace with new and evolving technology used in the commission of crime.
• Funding Proposal: Increased funding is needed for investigations to keep pace with growing cyber-criminal threats.
• Expand cyber fraud task forces (CFTFs) domestically and overseas to combat transnational organized crimes.
• Expand training opportunities for state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) partners, in addition to foreign law enforcement capacity building efforts.

Protective Operations

Mission Program Goal
Protect our Nation’s leaders and candidates, other designated individuals and facilities, the White House Complex, and National Special Security Events.

Mission Program Description
The Protective Operations program protects the President and Vice President and their families, former Presidents and their spouses, visiting heads of state and government, and other designated individuals. It also secures the White House Complex, Vice President's Residence, and other designated places; and designs, coordinates, and implements operational security plans for designated National Special Security Events (NSSEs). The program investigates, evaluates, disseminates, and maintains information concerning known, potential, or perceived threats to protectees, locations, and NSSEs. The program is staffed by Special Agents, Uniformed Division Officers, Technical Law Enforcement, and administrative, professional, and technical personnel that work closely with the military and with federal, state, county, local, and international law enforcement organizations to ensure mission success. This enables the Department to facilitate continuity of government and overall homeland security.
Summary of Findings

Strategic Review Progress Rating: Noteworthy Progress

Program Execution and Impact

- Delivered impact by effective protectee protection during a high tempo work environment with a busy campaign season in and into the new Administration.
- Effectively secured more than 3,500 domestic, nearly 500 foreign dignitary, and almost 200 campaign protectees visits.
- Established innovative policies and procedures to manage COVID-19 testing, tracing, work team groupings for extended periods of time, quarantine protocols, regional staffing models, and ready reserve teams.
- National Threat Assessment Center published two reports and delivered a nationwide virtual training event with over 14,000 registered audience members representing all 50 states to educate them on protecting soft targets (e.g., schools, grocery stores).
- Conducted more than 2,500 information sharing events with the law enforcement and intelligence community.

DID YOU KNOW?
The Secret Service didn’t assume full-time responsibility for protection of the President until 1902, over 35 years after it was established as a division within the Treasury Department.

In FY 2021, the Secret Service led security at one of the most public and important National Special Security Events for the United States – the 59th presidential inauguration. In response to the events of January 6, there was particular concern regarding the safety of the inauguration. Despite the heightened threat environment, the Secret Service-led security event concluded without protective incident, ensuring the safety of protectees and attendees.
Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
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<td>FY 2020</td>
<td>Performance Plan</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>FY 2022</td>
<td>FY 2023</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of protectees that arrive and depart safely</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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Brief Description: This measure reflects the effectiveness of efforts to ensure safe travels (arrive and depart safely) for protected individuals, to include the President and Vice President of the United States and their immediate families, former presidents, their spouses, and their minor children under the age of 16, major presidential and vice-presidential candidates and their spouses, and foreign heads of state.

Explanation: The Secret Service ensured safe arrival and departure for all 4,710 protective visits occurring in FY 2021. The goal was achieved by utilizing a wide variety of security measures, as well as coordinating with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.

Challenges and Risks

- Protections for Agents who work directly with senior leaders will require ongoing enhanced protocols and procedures in the COVID-19 environment.
- Establishing security details for new staff as they are confirmed and required with the change in Administration.
- The growing threat from domestic terrorism potentially aimed at domestic protectees along with facing a change in citizens’ behaviors where they physically showing up at protectee residences.
- Standing up the former President’s protective detail is always a complex challenge of activities such as identifying agents for the detail, office space, and related travel/move transactions.
- If Protective Operations countermeasures do not continue to adapt to new adversarial capabilities, then the vulnerability and threat exposure of protected persons, places, and events will increase.
- If Protective Operations does not address potential security gaps for multi-stage or multi-actor attacks, then the program will not be able to mitigate the vulnerability and threat exposure of protected persons, places, and events.

Next Steps

- Advocate for funding required to support the presidential transition, and resources associated with standing up new Former President protective detail as well as providing extended protection for Executive Branch protectees and family members.
- Promoting several legislative proposals to strengthen protective capabilities and to enhance the recruitment and retention of Uniformed Division personnel.
- Routinely assess emerging technologies for application to Office of Protective Operations missions; additionally, transitioning to two new systems related to the protective mission including Body-worn Cameras for uniformed officers.
Support Components

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office

Overview

The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) leads DHS efforts and coordinates with domestic and international partners to safeguard the United States against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and health security threats.

For a full listing of CWMD’s performance measure results and plan, see the “Performance Measure Tables – Report and Plan” chapter in this section.

Summary of Findings

Program Execution and Impact

- CWMD Research and Development (R&D) program manages efforts to identify, explore, develop, and demonstrate science and technologies that address gaps in the detection architecture, improve performance of CBRN detection and analysis, forensics capabilities, and/or reduce the operational burden of detection systems in the field. The R&D program improves detection through data analytics (advanced algorithms employing machine learning/ artificial intelligence). R&D works with operational customers to ensure transition of technologies to the field.

CWMD is home to the Department’s Chief Medical Officer (CMO). In the fight against COVID-19, the CMO led the Department’s Operation Vaccinate our Workforce (O-VOW) initiative to voluntarily vaccinate frontline and mission critical DHS employees against COVID-19, in partnership with the DHS Management Directorate, DHS Components, and the Veterans Health Administration. Through both fixed facility and field and expeditionary vaccine events, Operation VOW vaccinated approximately 75,000 DHS employees through June 2021.
- The Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks (ICLN) program held its first Joint Leadership Council (JLC) meeting since 2018, focused on chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) analytical laboratory equities.

- CWMD revitalized funding and programmatic support to the food, agriculture and veterinary (FAV) defense space. CWMD and Science & Technology (S&T) jointly published a strategic plan to guide the future of FAV defense research, development, testing, and evaluation activities.

- Over the course of COVID-19 pandemic, the National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) generated 600+ biosurveillance COVID-19 reports and developed a COVID-19 daily briefing for DHS leadership to 200+ interagency senior leaders.

- CWMD and the DHS Chief Medical Officer developed, in collaboration with CBP, ICE and FEMA, state and local entities, and the Government of Mexico, a multilayered, health security framework to test all noncitizen (migrants) for COVID-19 at the southwest border.

- BioWatch Program surged to perform COVID-19 testing at laboratories to reduce backlog and maintained sample collection/analysis in all jurisdictions 24/7/365.

- CWMD and the DHS Chief Medical Officer implemented the Regional Medical Operations Group (RMOG) in two regions, with the plan to expand to five regions in FY 2021. The RMOG is a regionalized network of CWMD federal personnel with qualifications primarily in medicine and public health that ensures the integration of public safety, law enforcement, medical, and public health partners.

- NBIC produced 735+ biosurveillance products. Increased audience for biosurveillance products by more than 30 percent, recipients across 14 Federal Partner Departments, 589 state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) agencies, and 11 common operating pictures. NBIC products enable early warning to operators and responders sharing situational awareness of acute biological events supporting decisions through rapid identification, characterization, localization, and tracking.

- Provided data integration services to support DHS initiatives, including a COVID-19 dashboard, data management for Operation Vaccinate our Workforce, and a pilot program facilitating information sharing with Veterans Affairs.

### Key Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
<th>FY 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of major metropolitan areas that have achieved Full Operational Capability to combat radiological/nuclear threats through the Securing the Cities Program</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
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</table>

#### Brief Description:
The results for this measure reflect efforts to use biodetection monitoring tools to counter attempts by terrorists and other threat actors at special security events such as the Super Bowl and United Nations. Due to the sensitivity of the information, the results are FOUO; however, the program met its goal.
**Challenges and Risks**

- Human resources challenges limit the ability to hire expertise in under-resourced areas in a timely manner.
- Competing priorities affect ability of state and local stakeholders and partners to execute CWMD mission related tasks and strategies.

**Next Steps**

- Established the CWMD Employee Engagement Team to focus on identifying barriers to and measures of success across the organization. The team will be an employee driven effort to develop an action plan for strengthening CWMD, implement changes, and monitor their effectiveness.
- Ensure alignment of funding to support the foundational activities that coordinate, strengthen, and deliver capabilities in support of DHS objectives to reduce the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction.

**Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers**

**Overview**

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) provides career-long training to law enforcement professionals to help them fulfill their responsibilities safely and proficiently.

For a full listing of FLETC’s performance measure results and plan, see the “Performance Measure Tables – Report and Plan” chapter in this section.

**Summary of Findings**

**Program Execution and Impact**

- Following a three-month pause due to the COVID-19 pandemic, FLETC successfully reconstituted training in June 2020 by implementing flexible, scalable, and sustainable procedures while simultaneously preventing, mitigating, and controlling pandemic impacts. As a result, by January 2021, FLETC had performed over 700,000 temperature and enhanced screening checks at its gates, administered nearly 30,000 COVID-19 tests to students and instructors, completed nearly 700 contact tracing inquiries, and delivered more than 4,000 newly trained law enforcement personnel to the frontlines to perform their agencies’ missions.
- FLETC leveraged its electronic delivery platform, eFLETC, to provide training that would not have otherwise been possible during the pandemic. FLETC trained 500 instructors on the fundamentals of online delivery and migrated programs in whole or part to an online format, enabling the training of over 10,000 law enforcement officers during this period.

**DID YOU KNOW?**

FLETC has more than one-hundred COVID-19 response personnel assigned to each location who have completed a contact tracing certification course from the Johns Hopkins University.
FLETC maximized telework to the extent possible to reduce the number of staff on FLETC campuses during the pandemic. FLETC managers found telework to be beneficial to many employees’ productivity and work-life balance.

FLETC’s success in overcoming COVID-19 obstacles ensured essential training occurred for federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies. FLETC trained over 46,000 students in FY20 and nearly 9,000 students in the first quarter of FY21 while increasing partner organization satisfaction with the overall FLETC experience. Continuing training through the pandemic helped reduce the operational shortfall of the 20,000 plus law enforcement officers who leave the field each year.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, FLETC expanded its virtual training delivery platform, eFLETC, to deliver advanced training online and provide virtual classroom space for student materials, surveys, and testing. Instructors and students gained online access to program materials such as streaming or on-demand videos, podcasts, PDFs, and audio books. eFLETC also extends training to FLETC graduates so they continue to have access to up-to-date law enforcement concepts, materials, and legal information.

Provided a virtual Mass Casualty Event Summit that drew nearly 1,000 participants. FLETC also conducted a virtual Cyber Conference this year with nearly 1,000 attendees at the traditionally in-person event (a 446 percent increase in attendance over previous years).

Leveraged virtual platforms for curriculum development and review processes, allowing subject matter experts and practitioners around the world to provide their critical perspectives and inputs to ensure relevance and accuracy of FLETC’s training curriculum.

FLETC completed the Virtual Firearms Ranges (VER) in April of 2021, for a total of 7 separate ranges utilizing 46 simulators across FLETC’s four training delivery points. The new VFR simulation technology is used to teach basic marksmanship skills such as weapon draw, sight alignment, trigger press, and other weapons handling skills in a safe environment prior to transitioning to live-fire training. The VFRs include virtual scenario-based training that support student performance enhancement in weapon handling, marksmanship skills, use of force decision-making, and fact-based articulation skills.
Key Measure

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<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>98%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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Percent of Partner Organizations satisfied with Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers’ training*

**Brief Description:** This measure reports customers feedback on the overall training provided to law enforcement officers and others who attend Federal Law Enforcement training along with providing on-going feedback and ideas for improvements that are incorporated into FLETC training curricula, processes, and procedures.

**Explanation:** FLETC uses the annual Partner Organization (PO) Satisfaction Survey as the means to determine PO opinions on the quality of training students receive at any of the FLETC locations in Glynco, Georgia; Artesia, New Mexico; Charleston, South Carolina; and Cheltenham, Maryland. Additionally, POs provide comments and feedback on training that is exported domestically and internationally. This measure provides a check on the POs’ satisfaction with training provided by FLETC whether at any of the sites or exported. A 94 percent satisfaction rate was reported for FY21.

*Name change from: Percent of participating organizations satisfied with the training provided by the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers

**Challenges and Risks**

- Based on training projections provided by our partner organizations, FLETC is anticipating a significant increase in training workload in the next 12-24 months.
- The three-month pause in on-site training and reduced throughput upon resumption of training, while necessary to ensure the health and safety of students and staff, has resulted in a reduced number of new law enforcement officers and agents deployed to the field.
- If FLETC’s infrastructure is not developed and maintained then FLETC’s ability to deliver training requested by POs will be impacted. FLETC is focusing its immediate resources and capacity on fulfilling the urgent training needs of agencies that must deliver new officers and agents to the field. Without the appropriate facilities, training venues, staffing, and modernized IT infrastructure in place, FLETC will not be able to cover the gap created by the COVID-19 pause in training.

**Next Steps**

- Inspired by challenges faced during the pandemic, FLETC is updating its 2018-2022 Strategic Plan. The revisions will emphasize FLETC’s role in continuing the critical pipeline of law enforcement officers to the field, and our commitment to proactively attaining our clients’ confidence in our stewardship of the mission and resources entrusted to us.
- FLETC continues to develop and deliver curriculum for state and local law enforcement to equip and empower local efforts to prevent individuals from mobilizing to violence.
- FLETC is standing up a new branch with dedicated staff to deliver in-person and online use of force training to state and local law enforcement across the United States.
Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Overview

The Office of Intelligence and Analysis equips the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) with the timely intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.

For a full listing of all performance measures with their results and plan, see the “Performance Measure Tables – Report and Plan” chapter in this section.

Summary of Findings

Program Execution and Impact

- Collected and analyzed range of unique law enforcement and intelligence information to inform threat analysis of a range of Homeland threats, to include those related to cyber and election security, terrorism, domestic violent extremism, economic security, transnational organized crime, and counterintelligence, providing timely insights into both domestic and foreign-based threats to the homeland.

- Operationalized a centralized information sharing environment, also known as the Data Management Hub, which establishes an authoritative source of unclassified DHS data on the classified network.

- Through the Intelligence Training Academy, I&A graduated 1,156 students, of whom 696 were SLTT partners, a 200+ increase from previous years. Topics included open source

I&A’s Homeland Identities, Targeting, and Exploitation Center established a joint exploitation and analysis effort that created a community of interest of analysts across the Intelligence Community and broader government. This analysis effort disseminated hundreds of intelligence and technical reports and was applied to Presidential Proclamation 10043, which resulted in the revocation of hundreds of threat actor visas, as well as multiple arrests, indictments, and investigations.
intelligence, watchlisting, data and cyber analysis, as well as a range of courses to build and enhance a ‘culture of CI’ awareness throughout the Department.

- Improved the quality and accountability of Intelligence Oversight (IO) training by instituting live, mandatory audience-tailored training, ensuring that employees received guidance regarding adherence to IO Guidelines specific to their unique responsibilities.
- Invested in the workforce by using analytics to drive efficiencies across personnel processes.
  - Greater transparency across the hiring pipeline led to the onboarding of approximately 180 federal employees, while reducing time-to-hire by almost 30 percent.
  - Developed a Diversity Equity and Inclusion (DEI) Program and Inclusive Diversity Strategic Plan designed to create an inclusive environment for the entire workforce.

### Key Measure

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<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>Performance Plan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of intelligence reports rated satisfactory and useful by customers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure gauges the extent to which finished intelligence products are satisfying customers’ needs.

**Explanation:** An intelligence report refers to a finished intelligence product—a product of analytical judgement applied to address an intelligence question produced by DHS, or through partnerships with other agencies, where the analytic conclusions have been drafted, reviewed, and disseminated to customers. Appended to each intelligence report is a customer feedback survey including a question regarding satisfaction with product usefulness. Responses of "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied" are considered to have met the criteria for "satisfactory and useful.”

Providing useful intelligence on topics of concern to the Intelligence Community and other Federal, State, Local, Tribal, Territorial and Private Sector partners equips the Homeland Security Enterprise with the intelligence and information needed to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.

### Challenges and Risks

- I&A faces challenges in ensuring information originated from other Intelligence Community agencies needed by our state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector customers can be provided, and analyzed, on a timely basis at the unclassified level.
- Failure to maintain technological proficiency, both in terms of individual collector capacity and automated applications and tools, could limit I&A’s ability to respond to potential threat related information in a timely manner.

**DID YOU KNOW?**

I&A operationalized the classified Data Management Hub, establishing an authoritative source of unclassified DHS data on the classified network and making it available to authorized Intelligence Community members having a legitimate intelligence need, consistent with pre-approved mission uses.
Next Steps

- I&A is working with DHS Intelligence Enterprise (IE) members to articulate raw intelligence requirements, while leveraging component operations to obtain information.
- I&A’s Training Optimization Initiative will build upon its successes in consolidating and streamline training program for DHS intelligence professionals as the IE matures into interchangeable intelligence workforce with common core knowledge, skills, and abilities that promotes IE workforce agility and career mobility for mission success.

Office of Operations Coordination

Overview

The Office of Operations Coordination provides information daily to the Secretary of Homeland Security, senior leaders, and the homeland security enterprise to enable decision-making; oversees the National Operations Center; and leads the Department’s Continuity of Operations and Government Programs to enable continuation of primary mission essential functions in the event of a degraded or crisis operating environment.

For a full listing of all performance measures with their results and plan, see the “Performance Measure Tables – Report and Plan” chapter in this section.

Summary of Findings

Program Execution and Impact

- Employees pivoted quickly and efficiently to remote work solutions, minimizing the impact of COVID-19 on the mission.
- OPS implemented a virtual situation room, providing partners with improved situational awareness.
- The JIAG supported DHS leadership in coordinating Departmental operations that cut across Components.
- OPS leads the Department’s mission assurance activities, including continuity of operations, continuity of government, and critical infrastructure security and resilience programs.
- The Special Events Program assessed more than 35,000 special event submissions.

Key Measure

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<th>Prior Results</th>
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<th>Performance Plan</th>
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<tr>
<td>FY 2017</td>
<td>FY 2018</td>
<td>FY 2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent of risk assessments for federal security support of large public/community special events completed within the targeted time frame</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
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</table>

3 Office of Operations Coordination (OPS) is changing in FY22 to the Office of Homeland Security Situational Awareness (OSA) as identified in the FY23 Congressional Budget Justification.
**Brief Description:** The measure indicates the timeliness of risk assessments that are used by federal agencies as criteria to determine their level of support to state and local events and is the primary federal awareness mechanism for special events occurring across the Nation.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** Quarterly analysis shows success for 3 of the 4 quarters, though the target was missed for FY21. During the first quarter there is a significant bulk of events intended for inclusion in the primary bulk submission period that were received late from external partners. Additionally, the significant increase in the number of events received late exacerbated the appearance of deficiency. This situation was not recognized when the measure was developed. The measure was revised for FY 2022 with the addition of a separate category of event submissions to account for this group of events.

**Challenges and Risks**

- In an environment of COVID-19 there are challenges in establishing trusted relationships with federal, state, and local partners.

**Next Steps**

- Work with leadership to develop a plan of action to better measure work performed.
Science and Technology Directorate

Overview

Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is the primary research and development arm of the Department. S&T provides federal, state, and local officials with the technology and capabilities to protect the homeland.

The programs that deliver performance results for S&T are: Acquisition and Operations Analysis; Laboratory Facilities; Research, Development, and Innovation; and University Programs.

For a full listing of S&T’s performance measure results and plan, see the “Performance Measure Tables – Report and Plan” chapter in this section.

Summary of Findings

Program Execution and Impact

- S&T’s engagement with DHS components and first responders led to identification of 343 near-term R&D needs during the FY 2021 Integrate Product Teams (IPT) Cycle.
- FY 2020 was the first fiscal year that S&T executed its new business process flow (BPF) and matrixed approach towards program execution.
- The BPF was automated visually to better guide how S&T works with components to understand their needs and apply scientific, engineering, analytical, and innovative approaches to deliver timely solutions and support departmental acquisitions.

S&T leaders and analysts hosted a three-day virtual workshop March 2-4, 2021, with the Military Operations Research Society (MORS) titled “Acquisition Analytics for Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” which brought together government thought leaders in analytics and acquisition. The workshop facilitated outreach and information sharing among these stakeholders to promote engagement and highlight analytical best practices on mission effectiveness, cost estimating, and risk analysis.
• S&T provided scientific support to inform global response to emerging COVID-19 pandemic by leveraging long-established collaboration with international lab partners on methods coordination, biological strain exchanges, and coordinated research studies focused on virus shedding and environmental stability.

• The federal government’s COVID-19 response is leveraging S&T National Bioforensic Analysis and Countermeasures Center’s capabilities for applied research, focusing on the survivability of the virus on commonly used surfaces, in the air, human saliva, and human respiratory fluids.

• FY 2020 was one of S&T’s most productive years, not only working COVID-19 projects but meeting other priorities during the COVID-19 pandemic environment. Using a matrixed team approach, S&T demonstrated flexibility, creativity in approaches, innovation in our solutions, and a commitment to the mission that surpassed expectations.

### Key Measure

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<tr>
<th>Prior Results</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
<th>FY 2023</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of technology or knowledge products transitioned to customers for planned improvements in the Homeland Security Enterprise</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure reflects the percent at which S&T meets its planned fiscal year transitions of technology or knowledge products for research and development funded programs/projects. A successful transition is the ownership and operation of a technology or knowledge product by a customer within the Homeland Security Enterprise.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** S&T completed 81 of 113 planned transitions including a State/Local IoT Flood Sensor testing and evaluation and a coding process of videos of encounters between officers and the public to improve officer skills, methods, and departmental policies. S&T delivered: a Master Question List for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza viruses, software to TSA for deployment at Cargo Screening facilities on existing X-Ray systems to enhance explosive detection capability, and testing and evaluation of wildland fire detection, alert and notification sensors and control systems. The target was not met due to contract delays, data collection postponements due to privacy assessment process, changing priorities, recipients’ schedules, and COVID-19 restrictions on travel and access to facilities or sites. S&T produced knowledge products and introduced innovative operational processes and technologies, not part of the original planned transitions such as models and projections for Operation Allies Welcome. S&T plans to continue collaboration with its customers and stakeholders to ensure efficient processes and regulations required to execute R&D programs and projects are in place.

### Challenges and Risks

• New and emerging technology needs appearing at an increasingly accelerated rate risks outpacing current resources for compliance oversight. A lack of compliance oversight may result in the suspension or stoppage of essential activities, fines, and Congressional and public inquiries for DHS.

• Resuming programs previously put on hold during COVID-19 pandemic due to travel restrictions in support of staff safety may slow current progress.

• Critical infrastructure improvements in S&T laboratories are needed to meet regulatory and modern technological requirements required to maintain 24x7 operations and research support capability:
  - Inadequate funding limits the ability to provide vital support in response to biological and Ag-Defense threats.
Resource limitations endanger timely execution of work, innovation expansion, and realization of current requirements.

**Next Steps**

- Properly staffing S&T to support DHS science advisory and research, development, testing, and evaluation needs to produce near-term and longer-term impacts for operational components.
- Deliver comprehensive DHS R&D financial accounting to promote visibility and transparency.
- Optimize DHS R&D investments to address near-term needs as well as future emerging threat and risk areas.
- Enhance industry outreach and engagement to effectively identify near-term technology solutions and influence the Homeland Security Industrial Base for longer-term DHS priorities.

**DID YOU KNOW?**

S&T improved IED disrupter technology by 300%; provided the Reverse Velocity Jet Tamper (ReVJeT), a revolutionary water cannon tool for safely disabling improvised explosive devices, to every bomb squad in America through the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Hazardous Device School.
Performance Measure Tables

The Department continually strives to improve our set of performance measures. As such, new measures are introduced and measures are retired each year and are identified, if applicable, in the measure tables presented in this section. A full accounting of the Department’s FY 2021 measures, their FY 2021 results and up to four additional years of historical results to allow for trend analysis is presented. For each FY 2021 measure, a short description and explanation is included to communicate the benefits each measure delivers. For those measures that did not meet their current year targets, explanations with a corrective action are provided. In addition, changes to measure names and targets from the previous year’s report are identified. DHS’s Annual Performance Plan measures are identified by the inclusion of FY 2022 and FY 2023 targets provided for measures which will be used moving forward. The following tables are provided in alphabetical order by DHS Component.

Customs and Border Protection

**Mission Program Goal:** Secure the U.S. Border between the ports of entry.

**Mission Program Description:** The Border Security Operations program is charged with securing America’s Southwest, Northern, and certain Coastal borders. Through the coordinated use of the Department’s operational capabilities and assets of the U.S. Border Patrol, the program improves operational effectiveness by working across the Department to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons, noncitizens, smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from moving across the U.S. border.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of people apprehended or encountered multiple times along the Southwest Border between ports of entry</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>≤ 17%</td>
<td>≤ 17%</td>
<td>≤ 15%</td>
<td>≤ 20%</td>
<td>≤ 20%*</td>
<td>≤ 20%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure reflects the effect the consequence delivery program is having on efforts to reduce illegal entries between ports of entry and is a feedback mechanism to inform operations at the U.S. border.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** The rate of multiple encounters among migrants entering the United States illegally on the Southwest Border increased to 26.6 percent in Fiscal Year 2021 after finishing 2020 at 25.9 percent. This result remains influenced heavily by actions taken to address the COVID-19 pandemic in accordance with the CDC’s Order Suspending Introduction of Persons from A Country Where A Communicable Disease Exists 85 Fed. Reg. 17,060 (March 26, 2020). In its pursuit of gaining operational advantage and improving performance between ports of entry, the U.S. Border Patrol continually refines its efforts to detect, track, interdict, and remove or return those entering illegally. U.S. Border Patrol leadership supports and will continue to advocate for the availability of more effective options to discourage repeated attempts at illegal entry. As appropriate, Border Patrol leaders also will continue to support enhancements to enforcement capabilities and supplemental tactical infrastructure, like access roads and improved lighting that support deterrence to illegal border crossings.

*USBP requests target change to 20 percent for FY22 and FY23. Given that Title 42 is still being applied, data from the past two years indicate that 15 percent is not attainable given the current circumstances (expulsion not being a non-factor in deterring a decision to re-enter illegally).
**Mission Program Description:** This measure gauges Border Patrol’s ability to respond and assess potential illegal activity in remote areas before the evidence vanishes to enhance situational awareness.

**Explanation:** During Fiscal Year 2021, U.S. Border Patrol agents reached the sites of indications of activity in remote, low-risk areas in 185 of 191 instances (96.9 percent) within 24 hours of the notification from CBP’s Office of Intelligence. For the second year, overall indications of cross-border activity in those northern- and southern-border locations continue to remain below the Fiscal Year 2019 level of 295 indications, coinciding with improvements in the ability to determine that some traffic is non-illicit prior to sending notifications to the stations to investigate. The ability to monitor and respond to indications of activity in remote areas preserves valuable Border Patrol resources, allowing situational awareness in low-risk areas through the National Border Geospatial Intelligence Strategy partnerships from across the U.S. intelligence community.

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<tr>
<td>Rate of interdiction effectiveness along the Southwest Border between ports of entry</td>
<td>Target 81%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result 78.9%</td>
<td>79.7%</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
<td>79.4%</td>
<td>82.6%</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Mission Program Goal:** Sustain domain awareness through command and control, coordination, information and situational awareness.

**Mission Program Description:** The Air and Marine Operations program employs aircraft and vessels in detection and interdiction roles, including support to the Border Patrol’s detection and interdiction roles, International Affairs support, intelligence and information sharing for operations and investigations; and overall operations support for systems, training, firearms, and credentialing.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of detected conventional aircraft incursions resolved along all borders of the United States</td>
<td>Target 100%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result 99.7%</td>
<td>97.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>99.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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**Brief Description:** The measure represents the percent of conventional aircraft suspected of illegal cross border activity based on visual or sensor data available to the program which are then apprehended or turned back successfully. Detecting aircraft incursions contributes to the operational control of the U.S. border.

**Explanation:** Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) resolved 218 of 218 Border Incursions during FY21, achieving a 100 percent Border Incursion resolved rate. AMOC enhanced collaboration with internal and external partners and air domain awareness in the border environment led to successfully resolving border incursion.

**Mission Program Goal:** Facilitate legitimate trade, enforce trade laws, and protect the American economy to ensure consumer safety and create a level playing field for American businesses.

**Mission Program Description:** Trade Operations is committed to protecting national economic security by enforcing U.S. trade laws. The program uses its trade enforcement operational approach and its authorities to combat trade fraud by detecting high-risk activity, deterring non-compliance, and disrupting fraudulent behavior. The program includes a multilayered system of people, technology, intelligence, risk information, targeting, international cooperation, and expanded shipper vetting that provides greater flexibility and capacity to accomplish these functions prior to arrival at the U.S. border. The program is also one of the largest fee collectors in the federal government based on imported goods.
### Performance Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of cargo by value imported to the United States by participants in CBP trade partnership programs</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
<th>FY 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>53.1%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>53.0%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** CBP works with the trade community through voluntary public-private partnership programs to expand the trade community’s adoption of tighter supply chain security measures in return for efficiencies when using these programs.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** The COVID-19 pandemic continued to compromise supply chains during FY21 with workers in factories, transportation industries, and ports. Trade partnership participants shipped less cargo than regular shippers. Plant closings, store restricted hours, bottlenecks to unload at U.S. ports all contributed to disrupting trade. CBP will work with U.S. port authorities to ensure processing of cargo as efficiently as possible in FY22.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of import revenue successfully collected</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
<th>FY 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>99.05%</td>
<td>99.44%</td>
<td>99.11%</td>
<td>99.62%</td>
<td>98.51%</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure tracks collected duties, taxes, and fees from commercial imports to the U.S. as directed by trade laws, regulations, and agreements. The enforcement of U.S. trade laws protects national economic security, facilitates fair trade, supports the health and safety of the American people, and ensures a level playing field for U.S. industry; all while providing more than $50 billion to the Treasury Department.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** Results show a shortage of 0.49 percent in meeting the 99 percent target. The reported preliminary statistics are based on 12 months (October 2020 to September 2021) of Trade Compliance Measurement (TCM) samples reviewed. CBP personnel have 120 days to complete the reviews associated with the randomly sampled transactions; most samples from September have not yet been reviewed. Final close out of these reviews will occur in January 2022. In addition, CBP received more than the projected 60K samples for the year, with an increase in the number of hits during the month of September. The higher sample size may also influence the final result. After the completion of all Trade Compliance Measurement (TCM) review are completed, CBP will be able to identify specific areas contributing to any increases in the gap (e.g., specific high-risk importers, commodities and or countries of origin). As reviews are completed, any discrepancies/enforcement action required would be completed by the appropriate CBP Center, and final results will be used to inform future risk identification efforts.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>97.50%</td>
<td>97.50%</td>
<td>97.50%</td>
<td>97.50%</td>
<td>97.50%</td>
<td>97.50%</td>
<td>97.50%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>99.38%</td>
<td>98.72%</td>
<td>98.37%</td>
<td>98.37%</td>
<td>99.96%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure ensures all imports are legally compliant with all trade regulations and that their entry records contain no major discrepancies to facilitate lawful trade into the United States.

**Explanation:** Due to COVID-19, import volumes fluctuated throughout FY21. Therefore, sampling rates were adjusted several times to get the targeted number of samples, which exceeded the planned 60,000 samples by 5,000. The FY 2022 sampling methodology will use the prior three years average import volumes to compute sampling rates. This reflects import fluctuations due to external factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of inbound cargo identified as potentially high-risk that is assessed or scanned prior to departure or at arrival at a U.S. port of entry</th>
<th>FY 2017</th>
<th>FY 2018</th>
<th>FY 2019</th>
<th>FY 2020</th>
<th>FY 2021</th>
<th>FY 2022</th>
<th>FY 2023</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>99.50%</td>
<td>97.88%</td>
<td>98.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>99.70%</td>
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</table>
Travel Operations

Mission Program Goal: Enhance the security of international travel through a variety of processes and technologies to intercept potential threats while also expediting legal travel.

Mission Program Description: The Travel Operations program welcomes international travelers into the U.S. through screening both foreign visitors and returning U.S. citizens. The program uses a variety of techniques to assure that global tourism remains safe and strong. It works to intercept potential threats in foreign ports before boarding transportation bound for the U.S. before they can cause harm. Its Trusted Traveler Programs provide expedited travel for pre-approved, low-risk travelers through dedicated lanes and kiosks. It also coordinates with the travel industry regarding specific procedures and regulations that must be followed when processing crew and passengers arriving or departing from the U.S. It is constantly seeking new ways to innovate such as the use of biometrics and facial recognition to expedite the travelers’ experience.

Performance Measure

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Global Entry members with no security-related violations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>99.8%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Brief Description: This measure shows success of maintaining a high level of security in the Global Entry (GE) members environment through passengers' compliance with all federal, state, and municipal laws and regulations.

Explanation: The GE trusted traveler program continued its effectiveness at correctly identifying low-risk travelers and quickly incorporating any changes in traveler risk-status that result in suspension or removal to ensure that all active members meet required security protocols at all times. Measure results for FY21 increased slightly over FY20. GE enrollment centers were open during all of FY21 after being closed for the last 6 months of FY20.

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office

Capability and Operations Support

Component Description: The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) leads DHS efforts and coordinates with domestic and international partners to safeguard the United States against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and health security threats.

Performance Measure

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of major metropolitan areas that have achieved Full Operational Capability to combat radiological/nuclear threats through the Securing the Cities Program</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Target</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result</td>
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<td></td>
<td>FOUO</td>
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</table>

Brief Description: The Securing the Cities program provides financial and non-financial assistance to state, local, and tribal organizations in high-risk major metropolitan areas to be better prepared against radiological and nuclear threats to help protect U.S. citizens. Due to the sensitivity of the information, the results are FOUO.

Performance Measure

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of top 25 special events integrating biodetection monitoring</td>
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<td>Target</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>Retired*</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
<td>FOUO</td>
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</table>

Brief Description: The results for this measure reflect efforts to use biodetection monitoring tools to counter attempts by terrorists and other threat actors at special security events such as the Super Bowl and United Nations. Due to the sensitivity of the information, the results are FOUO; however, the program met its goal.

*CWMD does not have control nor provide direct input into this process. Not all the Top 25 Special Events take place in BioWatch jurisdictions, thus are not counted as part of this metric, which skews the results.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

**Cybersecurity**

**Mission Program Goal:** Defend and secure the federal enterprise network.

**Mission Program Description:** The Cybersecurity program advances computer security preparedness and the response to cyber-attacks and incidents. The program includes activities to secure the federal network, respond to incidents, disseminate actionable information, and collaborate with private-sector partners to secure critical infrastructure. This program supports the implementation of government-wide deployment of hardware and software systems to prevent and detect incidents, response to incidents at federal and private entities, and collaboration with the private-sector to increase the security and resiliency of critical networks. The program also coordinates cybersecurity education for the federal workforce.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of critical</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Retired*</td>
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<tr>
<td>and high</td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>configuration-based</td>
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<td>vulnerabilities</td>
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<td>identified through</td>
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<td>high value asset</td>
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<td>mitigated within 30</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** Configuration-based vulnerabilities can be mitigated more quickly by agencies through such actions as changing security settings, software or configuration changes, patching software vulnerabilities, and adjusting user account privileges. These configuration-based vulnerabilities are identified through high value asset assessments to strengthen the defense against cyber-attacks.

**Explanation:** High Value Asset (HVA) assessments are performed across the Federal Government to identify vulnerabilities associated with the most sensitive IT systems and data. Configuration-based vulnerabilities are those that can be more quickly mitigated by agencies and departments through such actions as changing security settings, software or configuration changes, patching software vulnerabilities, and adjusting user account privileges. CISA has created Agency Support Plans for most of the CFO Act agencies based on the data CISA has access to from assessments, data collections, directives, and other technical sources. These support plans identify remediation efforts, challenges, and issues for these agencies. CISA consolidates this information into Federal Civilian Executive Branch-wide systemic risks and issues to drive CISA services, solutions, efforts, products, workshops, etc. to assist in reducing the federal risk. In Q4, there were two configuration-based vulnerabilities identified during assessments, both of which were remediated within the 30-day timeframe.

* This measure is planned for retirement, starting in FY22. It has provided useful visibility on whether agencies are remediating configuration vulnerabilities within the 30-day timelines. However, given how the High-Value Assets (HVA) assessment program has evolved, this indicator has served its useful purpose and no longer provides the same utility. CISA has developed a robust follow-up and tracking system to push agencies to provide timely mitigation and compliance. The assessment approach also changed, in part due to COVID-19, with fewer on-site assessments.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of critical</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>Retired*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and high</td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>vulnerabilities</td>
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<td>scanning</td>
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<td>mitigated within the</td>
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<td>designated timeframe</td>
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**Brief Description:** DHS provides cyber hygiene scanning to agencies to aid in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their severity for agencies to make risk-based decisions regarding their network security. Identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities on a network in a timely manner is a critical component of an effective cybersecurity program.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** In FY22, 66 percent of critical and high vulnerabilities were mitigated within the designated timeframe. With Binding Operational Directive 19-02 in effect since April 2019, FCEB agencies have demonstrated improved progress in mitigating “critical” and “high” vulnerabilities within mandated timelines. Collectively, these mitigation efforts have contributed to an overall trend of improvement for the FCEB Enterprise, and DHS continues to work with agencies on achieving even higher rates of timely mitigation.

* This measure is planned for retirement. The program will continue to work towards increasing the percentage of critical and high vulnerabilities identified through cyber hygiene scanning mitigated within the designated timeline.
FY 2021-2023 Annual Performance Report

### Percent of potential malicious cyber activity notifications where impacted agencies were alerted within the specified timeframe

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Retired*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>20%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** The measure tracks the percent of potential malicious cyber activity notifications identified as credible where the affected agency is alerted within the specified timeframe. Potential malicious cyber activity on federal networks is detected by automated tools through the National Cyber Protection System (NCPS) alert-based detection function. The system sends automated notifications to analysts within NCPS, who then manually review the notification(s), confirm if a potential credible threat exists, and if so, the affected agency is sent an email for their further exploration. The specified timeframe to notify affected agencies of potential malicious cyber activity is 12 hours for FY21.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** As of Q4, there were no E2 production alerts, therefore no agencies were notified. As a corrective action, CISA will seek to better tune E2 signatures according to the latest trends of agency needs to hone the system’s ability to identify potential malicious activity.

* This measure is planned for retirement, starting in FY22. This measure was tracked during the FY20-21 Agency Priority Goal (APG) cycle, and provided valuable data to show the utility of cyber systems and the effects that analysts have with the system. The results data demonstrated that the National Cyber Protection System (NCPS) needs substantial updates to meet changing cyber needs and threats. NCPS has started a major enhancement and update effort, and as a result, this indicator will no longer be feasible to report, given expected system changes.

### Emergency Communications

**Mission Program Goal:** Advance federal, state, local, and tribal government interoperable emergency communications.

**Mission Program Description:** The Emergency Communications program is responsible for ensuring the Nation’s interoperable emergency communications capabilities to enable first responders and government officials to communicate during steady state and emergency operations.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>55%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>68%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure identifies the current level of emergency communications interoperability maturity across 56 states and territories. Interoperable emergency communications capabilities enable first responders and government officials to continue to communicate in the event of disasters.

**Explanation:** In Q4, there was a 2.6 percent increase in all state and territory interoperability components operating at the highest levels with 492 as "defined" and 423 as "optimized" for a total of 915 out of 1,344 total. Preliminary analysis, the annual interoperability update, and increased Statewide Interoperability Coordinator (SWIC) familiarity and participation and coordination contributed to an increase in reported markers.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
<td>98.5%</td>
<td>99.0%</td>
<td>99.0%</td>
<td>99.0%</td>
<td>99.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>99.3%</td>
<td>99.1%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure gauges the reliability and effectiveness of the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) by assessing the completion rate of calls made through the service. The GETS call completion rate is the percent of calls that a National Security/Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) user completes via public telephone network to communicate with the intended user/location/system/etc. GETS is accessible by authorized users at any time, most commonly to ensure call completion during times of network congestion caused by all-hazard scenarios, including terrorist attacks or natural disasters (e.g., hurricane or earthquake).

**Explanation:** In FY21 99 percent of calls were completed over the course of the fiscal year under all-hazard conditions, demonstrating strong system performance.

*Name change from: Percent of calls by National Security/Emergency Preparedness users that DHS ensured were connected.*
## Infrastructure Security

**Mission Program Goal:** Increase our partners’ capability and capacity to strengthen and secure the Nation’s critical infrastructure.

**Mission Program Description:** The Infrastructure Security program leads and coordinates both regulatory and voluntary national programs and policies on critical infrastructure security and resilience and develops strong partnerships across government and the private sector. The program conducts and facilitates vulnerability and consequence assessments to help critical infrastructure owners and operators and state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) partners to understand and address risks to critical infrastructure. Additionally, it sets standards, and issues guidance and best practices for federal facility security and offers soft targets and crowded places tools and training to help build capacity to manage risks.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of facilities that are likely to integrate vulnerability assessment or survey information into security and resilience enhancements</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure demonstrates the percent of facilities that are likely to enhance their security and resilience by integrating Infrastructure Security vulnerability assessment or survey information. Providing facilities with vulnerability information allows them to understand and reduce risk of the Nation’s critical infrastructure. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, the number of Infrastructure Security Tools (IST) conducted is lower than the previous years.

**Explanation:** Due to COVID-19 restrictions, the number of Infrastructure Survey Tools (ISTs) conducted was lower in FY21 than in previous years. However, the percentage of facilities that are likely to integrate assessment or survey information remains high. The number of ISTs is expected to increase in FY22 as restrictions are eased and Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) can travel more.

## National Risk Management Center

**Mission Program Goal:** Identify, analyze, prioritize, and manage high-consequence threats to critical infrastructure through a cross-cutting risk management paradigm.

**Mission Program Description:** The National Risk Management Center’s (NRMC’s) dynamic, cross-sector risk management process transforms private-public engagement into collective action by defragmenting how the government and industry develop response and security plans, risk-reduction activities, and share information. The interconnectedness of the sectors and sophistication of threats and hazards means that the consequences of an attack or imminent threat do not impact only one sector. The NRMC creates an environment where government and industry can collaborate and share expertise to enhance critical infrastructure resiliency within and across sectors.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of state and local jurisdiction election security information products/services delivered within 30 days of request</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Retired+</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
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<td>100%</td>
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Brief Description: This measure reports the delivery of election security information products/services requested by state and local jurisdictions within 30 days of receiving all information necessary to create the final version of the product, within 15 days of receiving final approval of the product from the requestor, or by the desired delivery date specified by the requestor, whichever is latest.

Explanation: Products were developed based on lessons learned from the 2020 election cycle. New products were socialized with previously unengaged stakeholders and products were finalized with previously engaged stakeholders helping to lay the groundwork for delivery of a large number of products in FY21. The new Election Security Safeguards product were well received and generated interest in further engaging CISA in product development. Additionally, CISA began distribution of their Election Security Training Series Postcards (Phishing, Ransomware, and Secure Practices) to accompany trainings with state and local jurisdictions. Each person who attended these trainings received a customized product. The Last Mile team prioritizes timely issuance of products upon stakeholder request in an effort to maximize their value. A total of 3,530 total products were delivered over the fiscal year with 100 percentage of products delivered within 30 days.

* This measure has performed consistently at or near 100 percent, showing that CISA is providing consistent, timely product delivery. Retiring the measure will allow CISA to focus on developing a replacement election security measure for FY23, which will align with increased election security efforts in advance of the 2024 Presidential election year.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Education, Training, and Exercises

Mission Program Goal: Improve the knowledge, skills, and abilities of emergency management personnel to prepare, respond, and recover from disasters of all kinds.

Mission Program Description: The Education, Training, and Exercises program comprises the National Exercise Program and the National Training and Education Division, which include the Emergency Management Institute, the Center for Domestic Preparedness, and the U.S. Fire Administration. These entities provide emergency management, response and recovery training, and exercise coordination to improve the knowledge, skills, and abilities of federal and state, local, tribal, and territorial emergency management personnel.

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<tr>
<td>Percent of supervisors of students trained who believe their staff are better prepared as a result of National Fire Academy training</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>86.5%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
<td>90.9%</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
<td>92.2%</td>
<td>92.5%</td>
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Brief Description: This measure assesses the increase in the capability of students trained as reported by each individual’s first-line supervisor.

Explanation: During fiscal year FY21, the National Fire Academy (NFA) resumed in person training and continued online delivery of training. A total of 7,458 students were trained in 443 course offerings and 69,287 students participated in online training. The response rate of supervisors responding to the survey for this measure was just under 50 percent. The NFA will continue to build new curriculum, especially for Wildland Urban Interface training.

Grants

Mission Program Goal: Enhance the Nation's preparedness by increasing the capability of states, territories, and local jurisdictions to prepare, respond, and recover from disasters of all kinds.

Mission Program Description: FEMA’s Grants program leads the Federal Government’s financial assistance to state and local jurisdictions and regional authorities as they prepare, respond to, and recover from all hazards. The program provides grants to enhance jurisdictions’ resiliency to man-made and other major disasters, and to enhance their homeland security strategies.

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<tr>
<td>Benefit to cost ratio of the hazard mitigation grants</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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**Mission Program Goal:** Strengthen mitigation nationwide to reduce the Nation’s vulnerability from disasters of all kinds.

**Mission Program Description:** The Mitigation program works to strengthen investments in mitigation nationwide to reduce the Nation’s vulnerability to natural disasters or other emergencies, and to facilitate adoption and enforcement of up-to-date design and construction practices through state and local building codes. Developing resilient capacity in communities prior to a disaster supports the development of a culture of preparedness. The program supports activities that result in sound risk management decisions by individuals, the private-sector, and public-sector entities by conducting three core activities: risk analysis, risk reduction, and insurance against flood risk. These areas work together to reduce the loss of life and property, to enable individuals to recover more rapidly from floods and other disasters, and to lessen the financial burden on taxpayers. These investments are implemented at the Headquarters and Regional levels to support communities in mitigation efforts.

### Performance Measure

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of communities in high earthquake, flood, and wind-prone areas adopting disaster-resistant building codes</td>
<td>Target 63%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>43%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result 67%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>36%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure reflects actions to adopt building codes that are intended to decrease future costs and reduce the Nation’s vulnerability from natural disasters.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** This measure assesses the percent of communities adopting building codes containing provisions that adequately address earthquake, flood, and wind hazards. During fiscal year 2021 FEMA did not achieve the target of the measure. However, many successful strategies were implemented during the year. The transparency of disaster resilient building code adoption information was improved through updates to the National Building Code Adoption Portal and Regional Building Code Adoption Tracking Fact Sheets. FEMA also continued the presentation, demonstration, promotion, and updates of the National Building Code Adoption Tracking Portal.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of U.S. population (excluding territories) covered by planned mitigation strategies</td>
<td>Target 79.0%</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result 82.1%</td>
<td>87.3%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td>84.4%</td>
<td>83.2%</td>
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**Brief Description:** Mitigation planning helps communities reduce risk through sound land-use planning principles, floodplain management practices, and financial assistance.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** Hazard Mitigation Plan (Plan) development and updates by communities and technical assistance provided by FEMA continue to be impacted by the ongoing need for local, state, and regional jurisdictions to coordinate and support COVID-19 response, causing Plan coverage to lapse for some jurisdictions. Plan approval includes the passage of adoption resolutions by local governing bodies, as well as local plan updates or development to meet requirements. In FY21, several local mitigation Plans containing significant population lapse, impacting results. As population coverage decreases, planning effectiveness is impeded such that communities may be underprepared to respond to and recover from disasters. FEMA plans to increase technical assistance to assist communities with producing higher quality risk assessments which will be integral to increasing Plan approval and will contribute to an increase in the U.S. population covered by planned mitigation strategies.

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<tr>
<td>Total national investment in mitigation (in billions)</td>
<td>Target  ---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>$1.66</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
<td>$2.40</td>
<td>$3.96</td>
<td>$4.20</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Result  ---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>$1.23</td>
<td>$2.04</td>
<td>$1.55</td>
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**Preparedness and Protection**

**Mission Program Goal:** Improve the Nation’s ability to prepare for disasters of all kinds while ensuring the survival of an enduring constitutional government if a disaster were to occur.

**Mission Program Description:** The Preparedness program works to prepare the Nation for disasters of all kinds. Preparedness includes the management and administrative support functions associated with training and national exercise programs. Protection carries out a mandated mission to provide executive agent leadership to guarantee the survival of an enduring constitutional government by ensuring continuity of government, continuity of operations, and national contingency programs.
Summary of Performance Measures:

### Percent of adults that have set aside money for emergencies

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<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>44%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure gauges through a national survey whether American’s have set aside money for use in case of emergencies to be better prepared for emergencies. Research indicates that access to financial resources has proven a strong predictor of how well someone can cope in the aftermath of a disaster.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** The program was impeded from reaching its goal in the last year by the high financial drain on individuals’ emergency savings funds due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Individual and Community Preparedness Directorate (ICPD) continues to focus on a more holistic “Financial Resilience” message that is configured to retain situational relevance long beyond the end of the current pandemic situation. While emergency savings is part of this effort, emphasis is also being placed on no-cost ways to be financially resilient, such as completing the Emergency Financial First Aid Kit (EFFAK). In addition, this performance measure prioritized bolstering emergency savings as an Agency wide goal. The effects of the pandemic and climate disasters presented an opportunity to adapt and focus on a wide range of financially-related challenges faced by the American public, beyond only emergency savings. By adapting to meet these challenges, we are creating financial resilience programming that are sensitive. On December 21, 2020, Congress announced details for a full-year appropriation for FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security, as well as supplemental funding for COVID-19 response. The agreement provided funding for Financial Preparedness for FEMA to develop a plan, including how FEMA efforts will work in concert with other federal agencies with individual financial preparedness. Recommendations will be presented to Congress in fiscal year (FY) 22. In addition, as previously noted, NPD/ICPD expects to rescope or delete this measure upon the release of the new strategic plan.

### Percent of adults that took multiple preparedness actions at their workplace, school, home, or other community location in the past year

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<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>59%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure indicates how many Americans have taken actions to prepare for an emergency and provides feedback regarding the effectiveness of efforts to encourage this activity.

**Explanation:** In keeping with the Evidence Act of 2018, FEMA continued to implement a robust evaluation strategy to measure and increase the impact of the Individual and Community Preparedness Division’s work. An increase in social media promotions for products, as well as partnering in nation-wide campaigns like National Preparedness Month, have been large contributors to getting preparedness resources visibility this year. These efforts help motivate communities and individuals to take actions and serves as a contributing factor to the increase in preparedness actions.

### Percent of time the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System infrastructure is operating and available for use by federal, state, and local officials for the dissemination of emergency alerts

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>99.8%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>99.4%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure reflects the extent to which the IPAWS infrastructure provides alert and warning message collection and dissemination for federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities to send Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) to mobile phones of people in areas endangered by local hazards.

**Explanation:** Following the successful IPAWS-OPEN system modernization and migration to the AWS cloud on April 13, 2021, the IPAWS Program observed significant system availability improvements due to the resilient AWS cloud infrastructure and AWS Service Level Agreements (SLA). However, network connectivity issues outside of the IPAWS Program’s control continue to be a concern, such as when in May 2021, DHS HSIN (OneNet) experienced 1.7 hours of outage caused by an antivirus upgrade issue in the DHS network. The IPAWS Program actively monitors system availability, to include network availability; the IPAWS Program promptly reports any network related IPAWS-OPEN outages to the DHS Network Operations Center (NOC).

### Percent of U.S. population covered by FEMA-connected radio stations with electromagnetic-pulse resilience

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<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50.00%</td>
<td>62.00%</td>
<td>70.10%</td>
<td>74.00%</td>
<td>78.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>39.45%</td>
<td>47.21%</td>
<td>51.00%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure indicates the coverage achieved through supplementary equipment in voluntary partnership with private radio station owners to ensure that the President and state- and local-level authorities maintain a resilient capability to communicate with the public in all hazard conditions.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** Private sector radio stations that participate as FEMA Primary Entry Point (PEP) radio stations receive all-hazards resiliency improvements at their transmitter sites. The FEMA PEP radio stations provide the core infrastructure for the National Public Warning System mission to deliver a warning from the President and/or FEMA Administrator to at least 90 percent of the U.S. population under all conditions during a national emergency. Since 2019, FEMA has completed modernization of 13 of the original group of 36 legacy PEP stations to include modern Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) resilience. Modernization of three stations was completed in FY21 despite schedule impacts due to logistics and labor availability impacts from COVID-19. The modernized PEP stations have increased the percentage of the U.S. population covered by an EMP resilient PEP radio station to 51 percent. This 51 percent coverage did not meet the FY21 target of 57.44 percent. There have been barriers to executing PEP mode.

The program will continue to modernize legacy PEP stations constructed during the 1990’s to add EMP resilience and replace aging equipment. The program is on track to complete work at all legacy station by the end of FY24. There are currently eight PEP stations with modernization activities in progress, with an additional fifteen PEP modernizations planned. The Program will continue to monitor the PEP station modernization completion rate to complete modernization of all stations and meet a program key performance parameter in providing EMP protected broadcast coverage to 90% of the US population by the end of FY24.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of U.S. population that is covered by a local-level authority authorized and registered to send alerts and warnings to the public using the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>69.00%</td>
<td>71.00%</td>
<td>73.00%*</td>
<td>75.00%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>69.00%</td>
<td>71.00%</td>
<td>73.00%*</td>
<td>75.00%</td>
<td>77.00%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure tracks the share of the U.S. population under the jurisdiction of local authorities to which state governments have granted authorized access to the Integrated Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS) to send alerts and warnings to the public during emergencies.

**Explanation:** The IPAWS Program continues to engage with State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) authorities to inform public safety agencies about IPAWS and the benefits of using it to effectively alert local populations. The outreach efforts, in combination with increasing examples of peer agencies’ use of IPAWS to effectively deliver alerts to people’s cell phones, TVs, and radios, continue to drive local agency adoption.

* Target previously published in last year’s Annual Performance report as 82 percent. The program’s rationale for decreasing the target is based on current performance.

### Regional Operations

**Mission Program Goal:** Increase the capability of states, territories, and local jurisdictions to prevent, respond to, and recover from emergencies and disasters.

**Mission Program Description:** The Regional Operations program includes the leadership, management, and mission support functions of the 10 FEMA regions across the Nation. The program works with communities to help reduce the impacts of natural disasters; prepare families and individuals for all possible hazards; and support state, local, and tribal partners with technical assistance and grants for projects that aim to reduce risks, improve public safety, and protect the environment.

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<tr>
<td>Average annual percentage of administrative costs for major disaster field operations, as compared to total program costs</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>≤ 20.4%</td>
<td>≤ 18.4%</td>
<td>≤ 17.9%</td>
<td>≤ 17.9%</td>
<td>≤ 17.9%</td>
<td>≤ 17.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
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environment. This included employing virtual field offices in support of jurisdictions, maximizing virtual staff deployments, and implementing virtual housing inspections in support of disaster operation financial obligations. This resulted in cost savings in some areas of administrative costs, while also allowing FEMA to financially obligate a greater amount of total actual federal dollars (including both program dollars and administrative costs) than in the past four years. FEMA also continues to prioritize ensuring a trained and qualified workforce with the required field experience to increase productivity and reduce duplication of efforts.

Response and Recovery

**Mission Program Goal:** Improve the response and recovery capability of communities who have been overwhelmed by a disaster.

**Mission Program Description:** The Response and Recovery program helps to ready the Nation for catastrophic disasters leveraging resources from various sources including the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). This includes efforts to coordinate the core federal response capabilities used to save lives and protect critical infrastructure in communities throughout the Nation that have been overwhelmed by the impact of a major disaster or an emergency. The program also takes the lead among federal agencies, state and local governments, and representatives of non-governmental organizations to support individuals and communities with the goal of reducing losses, improving recovery operations, and promoting resilience. This program works with residents, emergency management practitioners, organizational and community leaders, and government officials to mature the National Disaster Recovery Framework, enhance logistics and disaster communications, and improve the overall disaster survivor and grantee experience.

**Performance Measure**

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<tr>
<td>Average number of the incident staff to support small federally-declared disasters</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>≤ 93</td>
<td>≤ 93</td>
<td>≤ 93</td>
<td>≤ 93</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>62</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure reports a five-year average number of incident staff deployed to support small federally-declared disasters. The program uses this data to develop new approaches to address and support these types of disasters.

**Explanation:** During fiscal year (FY) 2021, FEMA ended the year with an operational readiness rating of 62%. This result includes a National Incident Management (IM) force strength of 11,391 personnel with an average qualification rate of 70%. While below target, FEMA did grow the IM force strength from the beginning of the year. One cause of not meeting the target was due to a shift in priorities. Since March 2020, FEMA switched the hiring priority to focus on local hires to address the need for staff in non-incident management roles that could respond to support the COVID response at the local level.

**Performance Measure**

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<tr>
<td>Average timeliness of the individual assistance awards of the Individuals and Households program (in days)</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>≤ 11.0</td>
<td>≤ 9.0</td>
<td>≤ 8</td>
<td>≤ 7</td>
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<td>Result</td>
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<td>78.5</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>29.0</td>
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**Brief Description:** By measuring the timeliness of individual assistance awards from submission to the first receipt of an award, the program can assess the effectiveness of its critical disaster response efforts to customers.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** As FEMA's operating environment continues to increase in pace and volume, FEMA will continue to examine how business is conducted. The COVID operating environment challenged existing processes thereby making the annual target unrealistic. As a result, FEMA will be updating the metric and targets to reflect the new strategies being implemented for Individual Assistance programs. Additionally FEMA will be focusing on implementing initiatives to decrease fraud and increasing equity for survivors.

**Performance Measure**

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<tr>
<td>Percent achieved of Incident Management Workforce readiness targets</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>69%*</td>
<td>77%*</td>
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<td>Result</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>62%</td>
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</table>
**Brief Description:** Using several factors, this measure more effectively gauges the Incident Management workforce readiness from its predecessor listed above to ensure expected disaster activity across the Nation can be met.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** The FEMA Reservist force strength declined in FY 2020 as part of the biannual reappointment period. Many Reservists did not meet performance or annual availability criteria that the program requires for reappointment, and many had not deployed for years. The program seeks to strengthen the National Incident Management workforce through the establishment of more comprehensive recruitment initiatives. Several Incident Management Workforce-related initiatives were completed in FY 2020 with ongoing or pending implementation setting the stage for accelerated growth in FY 2021. These initiatives include activating new positions for which cadres have since begun hiring new staff and expanding capacity for cadre management teams to hire staff supporting Incident Management recruitment, hiring, training, and career management services. Beyond implementing and sustaining efforts completed in FY 2020, the agency will also take several steps jointly through the Office of Response and Recovery and Mission Support to build on lessons learned to reach cadre-approved targets set for FY 2021.

* Changed the target to this measure as the response to COVID-19, it has negatively affected FEMA’s ability to hire, qualify and retain our incident management workforce. Proposed new targets are: FY 22 = 69%; FY 23 = 77%.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of applicants satisfied with simplicity of the Individuals and Households Program</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>82.0%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure gauges the simplicity of applying for individual assistance from the Individuals and Households Program, and the information is used to make procedural improvements to ensure disaster survivors have clear information and high-quality service.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** While FEMA did not meet its target, satisfaction continued to improve throughout the year. The customer experience with inspections continues to hit its target for the last four years proving that survivor’s experience with the reductions in inspections has netted a positive result. More than 95% of COVID-19 recipients rated FEMA’s customer service as satisfied or very satisfied even though the average time until award was 68.9 days. The implementation of Queue Management for Disaster Recovery Centers allowed notification to disaster survivors of estimated wait times and when a representative is available rather than requiring survivors wait at the Disaster Response Center for the next available representative. These strategies will continue to be implemented in the coming year to further increase customer satisfaction to individuals. FEMA will continue to prioritize the survivor’s experience with the Individuals and Households Program. FEMA is updating the surveys to better identify the root-causes for dissatisfaction by the end of the next fiscal year. FEMA will continue to build out the strategies implemented during FY21 such as the email delivery of surveys to collect customer experience information in a more-timely manner and increase response rates.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of applicants satisfied with simplicity of the Public Assistance process</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>82.0%</td>
<td>84.0%</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td>73.8%</td>
<td>80.2%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure gauges the simplicity of applying for Public Assistance and helps to identify areas for improvement and ensure that the program provides clear information and high-quality service.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** This measure supports FEMA’s vision to streamline the disaster survivor experience by using surveys to assess customer satisfaction with the Public Assistance (PA) program process. Applicants are surveyed and their satisfaction is evaluated across five topics. At the end of fiscal year FY21, applicant satisfaction with the simplicity of the PA progress from the PA initial survey remains low with an end of year cumulative score of 67.2 percent; however, this result is seven percentage points higher than the previous year. One of the areas identified as a challenge for applicants was with the Grants Portal and program documentation requirements which applicants cited as the reason for the low score when responding to surveys. During FY21, the PA program launched a new performance framework that includes 27 customer satisfaction and simplicity metrics to better assess the program and identify areas of improvement. The results did not hinder FEMA’s mission to provide federal assistance.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of critical federal response teams supported by voice, video, and data connectivity using a fully-capable mobile emergency office vehicle</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>
**Brief Description:** On-scene availability of a mobile platform for voice, video, and data connectivity is a critical capability for federal teams managing response and recovery operations.

**Explanation:** Throughout Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, Disaster Emergency Communications (DEC) project managers faced supply chain shortages, increased production costs, and declines in vendor capacity – specifically impacting production of our next generation mobile command center vehicles. In FY 2021, the program was determined to continue with important projects needed by MERS to keep pace with changing technologies. To reduce the threat of material inflation and supply chain shortages, staff tailored time consuming steps in the acquisition lifecycle model, sought out new sourcing activities, eliminated unnecessary features/attributes, and reallocated funds across budget categories.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Public Assistance project obligations completed within targeted timeframes</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>11%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure indicates the timeliness of the delivery of initial awards under FEMA’s Public Assistance program, which provides federal disaster relief to government organizations and certain private non-profit organizations following a Presidential disaster declaration.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** This performance measure tracks the percent of time awards for the Public Assistance (PA) program are made on time, defined as within 189 days. in fiscal year (FY) 2021, PA launched its new Performance Framework to help identify areas where PA needs to improve its score. It identified the functions of Initial Project Development, Scope and Cost Completion by Applicant and Scope and Cost Routing as the three greatest bottlenecks in the PA project process. Projects from 2017, 2018, 2019 events are still being obligated and impacting the timeliness score for the program. Regardless of an aggressive target, FEMA was not hindered in executing the mission of providing assistance for PA applicants. In FY 2021, FEMA obligated 24,880 projects for $27B. Looking forward to fiscal year (FY) 2022, the Public Assistance (PA) program will be developing a new performance metric to better reflect the nuances of the program under the new administration. Additionally, PA continues to pilot direct application and assess its effectiveness in improving the timeliness awards. Efforts to close the COVID incident period and to not allow new projects will show an improvement in the timeliness score.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of shipments for required life-sustaining commodities (meals, water, tarps, plastic sheeting, cots, blankets, and generators) and key initial response resources delivered by the agreed upon date</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
<td>99.4%</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure indicates whether life-sustaining commodities were delivered in a timely fashion to impacted communities prior to and during a disaster with the goal to save lives.

**Explanation:** This performance measure tracks the percent of shipments for required life-sustaining commodities that are delivered by the agreed upon date. At this time, 97% of shipments arrived on time. FEMA implemented a new internal system - Standard Tender of Service (STOS), which continues to improve performance over the system used in previous years.

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**Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers**

**Component Description:** The Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) provides career-long training to law enforcement professionals to help them fulfill their responsibilities safely and proficiently.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Partner Organizations satisfied with Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers’ training*</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>94%</td>
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Enforcement and Removal Operations

Mission Program Goal: Improve the ability of the Department to arrest, detain, and remove criminals, fugitives, and other dangerous foreign nationals.

Mission Program Description: Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) enforces the Nation’s immigration laws by identifying and apprehending undocumented noncitizens, detaining those individuals pending final determination of removability, and removing them from the United States. ERO prioritizes the apprehension, arrest, and removal of threats to national security, border security, and public safety. ERO manages all logistical aspects of the removal process, including domestic transportation, detention, alternatives to detention programs, bond management, and supervised release. In addition, ERO removes noncitizens from the United States to more than 170 countries around the world.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of convicted criminal noncitizens who were returned or were removed from the United States</td>
<td>Target: 140,000</td>
<td>126,000</td>
<td>151,000</td>
<td>151,000</td>
<td>97,440</td>
<td>91,500*</td>
<td>100,650*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result: 127,699</td>
<td>145,262</td>
<td>150,141</td>
<td>103,762</td>
<td>39,149</td>
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Brief Description: This measure reflects the program’s efforts to ensure convicted criminal noncitizens do not remain in the United States, contributing to public safety and national security.

Explanation and Corrective Action: FY21 total cumulative Convicted Criminal Removals ended at 39,149, a decrease of 64,613/62% from end of FY20’s 103,762. This result was driven by decreases in both Interior Criminal Removals (from 48,606 in FY20 to 26,210 in FY21, a decrease of 22,396/46.1%) and Border Criminal Removals (from 55,156 in FY20 to 12,939 in FY21, a decrease of 42,217/76.5%). Similar to Total Removals, external factors have likely impacted the count of Criminal Removals in FY21, as significant numbers of individuals have qualified for CBP border expulsions under Title 42, a proportion of which are likely to have fallen within a criminality bucket. ICE is taking every action possible to mitigate factors that detract from removal performance, including the procurement of additional COVID-19 testing capabilities, constant efforts to obtain increased levels of cooperation from foreign countries, and increasing the frequency of transport for detainees where possible. Additionally, the previously established FY21 Targets were not in alignment with the Interim CIEP guidance in effect for the last nine months of the year. In FY22, ICE will reassess targets to align with the Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law memo from DHS Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas and any anticipated impact on removal numbers.

* Target change. We used the average of the predicted value if migration rates resume pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels in FY2022. Enforcement statistics are based on conservative estimate of realistic incremental increase or decrease in enforcement counts year-over-year and do not reflect a predictive estimate.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of detention facilities found in compliance with the national detention standards by receiving a final acceptable inspection rating</td>
<td>Target: 100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result: 100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>99%</td>
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**Brief Description:** Through a robust inspections program, the program ensures facilities utilized to detain those who entered the country illegally in immigration proceedings or awaiting removal to their countries do so in accordance with the Performance Based National Detention Standards.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** The compliance rate of ICE FY21 detention inspections were 99%. There was a total of 144 reviews issued and received in FY21. Of the 144 reviews, 64 received a final rating of “Acceptable”, 71 received a final rating of “Meets Standard”, four reviews received a final rating of “Overcome by Events”, two reviews received a final rating of "N/A - No Rating Required", and three reviews received a final rating of “Does Not Meet Standards”. A Technical Assessment Review (TAR) was conducted for two of the inspections that received a final rating of “Does Not Meet Standards” (one has a TAR ongoing) and a follow-up inspection was conducted where they received a final rating of “Meets Standards”. ERO oversees a robust inspections program to ensure facilities utilized to detain aliens in immigration proceedings or awaiting removal to their countries do so in accordance with the Performance Based National Detention Standards. ERO conducts Technical Assessment Reviews (TAR) at the facilities receiving a rating of “Does Not Meet Standards” to assist in correcting deficiencies identified during each inspection. In FY 2021, ERO conducted 180-day follow-up inspections at two of these facilities, and each ultimately received a final rating of “Meets Standards.” The Follow up inspection of the one remaining facility has not yet taken place but has been scheduled. ERO is mandated by Congress to no longer use a facility if they have two consecutive inspection failures.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of noncitizens who were returned or removed from the United States</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>238,000</td>
<td>238,000</td>
<td>167,420</td>
<td>Retired*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>256,085</td>
<td>267,258</td>
<td>185,884</td>
<td>59,011</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure provides a comprehensive picture of all returns and removals accomplished by the program to ensure undocumented noncitizens do not remain in the United States.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** FY21 Cumulative Total Removals ended at 59,011, a decrease of 126,873/68% from end of FY20's 185,884. Border Removals totaled 27,454 through FY21 while interior Removals totaled 31,557. In addition to the Interim Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Priorities (CIEP) issued 18 Feb 2021 (implementing 20 Jan 2021 EO 13993), which refocused enforcement and removal priorities on national security, border security, and public safety. COVID also had a significant impact on ICE operations in FY 2021. Beginning March 2020, border removals fell from roughly 15,000 per month to approximately 3,000 per month, primarily driven by the Title 42 actions enabling CBP to conduct expulsions without transferring migrants to ICE for removal. Continued high levels of border “expulsions,” resulted in lower effectuation of potential ICE removal cases. During this same time, interior removals fell from roughly 6,500 per month to approximately 3,000 per month. To maintain its capacity for removals, ICE is procuring additional COVID-19 testing capabilities, working to obtain increased levels of cooperation from foreign countries, and increasing the frequency of transport for detainees where possible. Additionally, the previously established FY21 targets were not in alignment with the Interim CIEP guidance in effect for the last nine months of the year. This measure was replaced by an internal measure aligned to Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities.

* This measure is being retired by the component.

**Homeland Security Investigations**

**Mission Program Goal:** Prevent the exploitation of systemic vulnerabilities in trade and immigration that allow foreign terrorists, other criminals, and their organizations to endanger the American people, property, and infrastructure.

**Mission Program Description:** The Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) program conducts criminal investigations to protect the United States against terrorism and criminal organizations that threaten public safety and national security. HSI combats transnational criminal enterprises that seek to exploit America’s legitimate trade, travel, and financial systems. This program upholds and enforces America’s customs and immigration laws at and beyond our Nation’s borders.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of enforcement-related actions against employers that violate immigration-related employment laws</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>1,854</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Retired*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>1,730</td>
<td>6,398</td>
<td>6,921</td>
<td>4,415</td>
<td>736</td>
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</table>
### Office of the Principal Legal Advisor

**Mission Program Goal:** Provide timely and accurate legal advice and conduct litigation activities to advance the ICE mission.

**Mission Program Description:** The Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) provides a full-range of legal services to ICE, including advice and counsel to ICE personnel on their law enforcement authorities and potential liabilities. The program represents ICE before multiple administrative venues and supports the Department of Justice in the prosecution of ICE cases and in the defense of civil cases against ICE. OPLA attorneys serve as the exclusive DHS representatives in removal proceedings before U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review.

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<tr>
<td>Percent of final administrative orders that result in orders of removal from the United States</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>Retired*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
<td>56.2%</td>
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**Brief Description:** Attorneys in the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor play an integral role in enforcing the Nation’s immigration laws by litigating cases in immigration court and securing orders of removal against those found to be in violation of immigration laws.

---

### Significant Case Report Program

**Brief Description:** This measure demonstrates the impact of worksite enforcement operations to ensure that employers do not violate immigration-related employment laws.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** This measure is a cumulative result of enforcement-related actions against employers that hire illegal labor, including criminal arrests, audits, and final orders of fines. This measure demonstrates the impact of labor exploitation operations to ensure that employers do not violate immigration-related employment laws. The HSI labor exploitation program’s goal is to protect the public from victimization and exploitation by strategically targeting and investigating individuals, businesses and networks that engage in labor exploitation. Due to the evolution of the labor exploitation strategy and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, enforcement-related actions were lower than expected. HSI’s focus will be to work to address the current backlog of cases and continue to investigate labor exploitation cases as they arise, while continuing to be aligned with HSI’s civil and criminal enforcement priorities.

* This measure is being retired by the component.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of significant Homeland Security Investigation cases that resulted in a disruption or dismantlement</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>540*</td>
<td>545*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>698</td>
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**Brief Description:** The measure provides an understanding of the impact of investigation effort to effectively degrade high-threat transnational criminal organizations engaged in illicit trade, travel, or finance (both drug-related or non-drug-related); counter-terrorism; threats to national security; violations of immigration-related employment law; or child exploitation.

**Explanation:** With the adoption of the new “Number of” measures, along with Significant Case Report (SCR) Program training, HSI special agents have a better understanding of HSI’s Key Measure and are able to submit multiple disruptions and dismantlement toward SCR designated cases. The factors mentioned above have led to an increase in SCR submissions. Based on the above, HSI was able to meet its target for FY 2021.

* Increase targets based on prior year results.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of human trafficking and child exploitation victims rescued or assisted*</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>1,414</td>
<td>1,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>New Measure</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure reports the number of adult or minor victims rescued or assisted as a result of human trafficking and child exploitation investigations. Human trafficking includes sex trafficking and forced labor trafficking. A child exploitation victim is considered rescued once the victim has been identified, located, and physically removed by agents or a partner agency or provided information (i.e., other types of assistance) that extricates them from the exploitative situation or further abuse. A human trafficking victim is considered assisted and entered into the VAD when a Victim Assistance Specialist makes contact and provides information or resources to the victim.

* Added to continue to round out the TCO coverage of activities.

---

### Significant businesst-related employment law

**Form FY 2021-2023 Annual Performance Report**
**Explanation and Corrective Action:** With the implementation of the Interim Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Priorities (CIEP) issued 18 February 21, final administrative orders issued by EOIR resulting in a removal order from the U.S. may not be the best indicator of OPLA’s success in removal proceedings. For FY21, changing enforcement priorities, exercise of prosecutorial discretion (PD), and EOIR’s docket initiatives, due to the pandemic, likely impacted this performance measure falling below 67 percent. EOIR continued to operate reduced dockets and instituted programs to advance cases with pathways to relief, rather than removal. While roughly 57 percent of final orders that were obtained in FY21 were removal orders, 42 percent were reported as final orders of relief and, from this metric were 10,596 cases that were dismissed or administratively closed in connection to exercises of PD. With only a record of 34,672 total final orders of any kind in FY21, OPLA believes that its exercise of PD in an additional 30 percent of cases had a significant impact on the overall percentage of final removal orders.

* This measure is being retired by the component.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of stakeholder engagements related to the DHS civil immigration enforcement and removal priorities*</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>New Measure</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure captures OPLA’s stakeholder engagements regarding implementation of the Interim Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities, and any superseding guidance that may be issued related to civil immigration enforcement priorities by measuring the number of stakeholder engagements.

* Added to address activities related to civil immigration enforcement priorities.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of removal orders secured that support current enforcement priorities*</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
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<td>Result</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>New Measure</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure captures OPLA’s success in implementing the Interim Guidance to OPLA Attorneys Regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities, and any superseding guidance that may be issued related to civil immigration enforcement priorities.

* Added to align to immigration enforcement priorities.

---

**Office of Intelligence and Analysis**

**Component Description:** The Office of Intelligence and Analysis equips the Homeland Security Enterprise with the timely intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of finished intelligence products aligned to key intelligence questions</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>80%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result</td>
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<td>92%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure evaluates the extent to which I&A’s finished intelligence (FINTEL) products address Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs) aligned to customer requirements identified in the Program of Analysis (POA). The POA is organized around thematic responsibilities and ensures alignment of prioritized planned analytic efforts to customer requirements.

**Explanation:** An FY21 POA was not published, due to the COVID-19 pandemic—during which a majority of the intelligence practitioners in the DHS IE were working sporadic schedules—with the FY20 POA instead extended for prioritization and requirements purposes.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of finished intelligence products shared with the Intelligence Community</td>
<td>Target</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>95%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result</td>
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<td>80%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure reflects the percent of finished I&A intelligence products that are considered compliant with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 and which are shared with the Intelligence Community.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** I&A leverages its information sharing role to ensure that FINTEL containing unique information obtained from intelligence officers in the field reaches the IC, in order to equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with the timely.
intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient. I&A lagged its FY21 target by 15%, due in part to a focus on DHS INTERNAL ONLY FINTEL production to inform new Department leadership following the change in administration. I&A has shifted away from DHS INTERNAL ONLY production. Most production is expected to be disseminated outside the Department except in very limited cases as approved by senior leadership.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of finished intelligence products shared with state, local, tribal, and private sector partners</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>41%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure reflects the percent of I&A’s finished intelligence production that is considered compliant with Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, and which is shared with its State, Local, Tribal, Territorial, and Private Sector partners. **Explanation and Corrective Action:** I&A leverages its information sharing role to ensure that FINTEL products reach the broadest audience possible, to equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with the timely intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient. I&A lagged its FY21 target by 9%, due in part to a focus on DHS INTERNAL ONLY production to inform new Department leadership following the change in administration. In addition, a portion of I&A’s FINTEL production related to foreign malign influence and was not disseminated at the unclassified level due to oversight concerns. I&A has shifted away from DHS INTERNAL ONLY production. Most production is expected to be disseminated outside the Department except in very limited cases as approved by senior leadership. In addition, I&A is actively working with its oversight counsel to come up with a solution on broader dissemination of our foreign malign influence products to our State, Local, Tribal, Territorial, and Private Sector partners.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of intelligence reports rated satisfactory and useful by customers</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
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<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>90%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure gauges the extent to which I&A’s finished intelligence products are satisfying customers’ needs. **Explanation:** In this case, an intelligence report refers to a finished intelligence product—a product of analytical judgement applied to address an intelligence question produced by DHS, or through partnerships with other agencies, where the analytic conclusions have been drafted, reviewed, and disseminated to customers. Appended to each intelligence report is a customer feedback survey including a question regarding satisfaction with product usefulness. Responses of "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied" are considered to have met the criteria for "satisfactory and useful." Providing useful intelligence on topics of concern to the Intelligence Community and other Federal, State, Local, Tribal, Territorial and Private Sector partners equips the Homeland Security Enterprise with the intelligence and information needed to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.

---

### Office of Operations Coordination

**Component Description:** The Office of Operations Coordination provides information daily to the Secretary of Homeland Security, senior leaders, and the homeland security enterprise to enable decision-making; oversees the National Operations Center; and leads the Department’s Continuity of Operations and Government Programs to enable continuation of primary mission essential functions in the event of a degraded or crisis operating environment.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of National Operations Center incident reports and situational awareness products produced and disseminated to the homeland security enterprise within targeted timeframes</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
<td>94.6%</td>
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4 Office of Operations Coordination (OPS) is changing in FY22 to the Office of Homeland Security Situational Awareness (OSA) as identified in the FY23 Congressional Budget Justification.
**Brief Description:** The measure indicates the timeliness of the dissemination of reports and products that provide situational awareness for senior leader decision-making and across the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE).

**Explanation:** Pinehaven Fire, Washoe County, NV: Posting the report to the COP was delayed because COP was down for scheduled maintenance and upgrades; Report was posted as soon as COP restored. Shooting Incident, Sunrise, FL: COP posting delayed in part by delay in receiving detailed incident information, and in part by IT-related processing delays. Shooting and Explosion Incident, Buffalo, NM: COP posting delayed due to delay in receiving specific detailed incident information. Shooting Incident, Columbus, OH: Initial reporting lacked incident details / significance; later gleaned from press conference. Shooting Incident, San Diego, CA: Incident was not initially deemed COP viable. Shooting Incident - Dallas, TX, Pedestrian Bridge- Washington D.C., and Suspicious Incident- Houston, TX: COP postings delayed due to delay in receiving specific, detailed incident information. Assassination of Haitian President: Delayed posting to COP pending confirmation of reporting accuracy. Vehicular Incident at Washington Monument: Initial reports were a vehicular accident due to a medical emergency, later learned vehicle had attempted to run over pedestrians, meeting reporting threshold. Security Incident - JBAB, Washington, DC: Neighborhood shooting incident did not meet reporting threshold until shooter later scaled base fence line resulting in base lock down. Vehicles Blocking St. Elizabeths Gate, Washington, DC: Initially opted against posting to COP due to limited scope / impact.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of risk assessments for federal security support of large public/community special events completed within the targeted time frame</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
<td>99.0%</td>
<td>99.0%</td>
<td>90.0%*</td>
<td>90.0%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>99.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>94.4%</td>
<td>93.5%</td>
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**Brief Description:** The measure indicates the timeliness of risk assessments that are used by federal agencies as criteria to determine their level of support to state and local events and is the primary federal awareness mechanism for special events occurring across the Nation.

**Explanation:** Quarterly analysis shows success for 3 of the 4 quarters. During the first quarter there is a significant bulk of events that are intended for inclusion in the primary bulk submission period that were received late from external partners, further the significant increase in the number of events received exacerbated the appearance of deficiency. This situation was not recognized when the measure was developed. The FY 2022 Performance Measure added a separate category of event submissions to account for this group of events.

* Due to a minor change in scope (3 days vs 5 days for adhoc requests) and the current downward trend.

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**Science and Technology Directorate**

**Research, Development, and Innovation**

**Component Description:** Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is the primary research and development arm of the Department. S&T provides federal, state, and local officials with the technology and capabilities to protect the homeland.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of technology or knowledge products transitioned to customers for planned improvements in the Homeland Security Enterprise</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>72%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure reflects the percent at which S&T meets its planned fiscal year transitions of technology or knowledge products for research and development funded programs/projects. A successful transition is the ownership and operation of a technology or knowledge product by a customer within the HSE.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** In FY 2021, S&T completed 81 of 113 planned transitions. S&T completed a State/Local IoT Flood Sensor testing and evaluation and a coding process of videos obtaining encounters between officers and the public to improve officer skills, methods, and departmental polices. S&T delivered: a Master Question List regarding High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza viruses, software to TSA for deployment at Cargo Screening facilities on existing X-Ray systems to enhance their explosive detection capability, and testing and evaluation of wildland fire detection, alert and notification sensors and control systems. These transitions indicate the value that S&T provides to improve homeland security operations and assist customers to execute their mission. In FY 2021, S&T was unable to meet its target to complete 113 transitions of R&D funded programs/projects as first
identified. The original planned transitions were not completed due to contract delays, postponements in data collection due to privacy assessment process, changes in priorities, Components/recipients’ schedules, and COVID-19 restrictions on travel and access to facilities or sites. S&T produced multiple knowledge products and introduced innovative operational processes and technologies for DHS Components and the interagency, which were not part of the original planned transitions and would have exceeded the fiscal year target. One example is the delivery of models and projections to the DHS Secretary for Operation Allies Welcome. S&T plans to continue collaboration with its customers and stakeholders, including Congress as well as Office of Management and Budget, to ensure efficient processes and regulations required to execute R&D programs and projects are in place.

Transportation Security Administration

### Aviation Screening Operations

**Mission Program Goal:** Enhance aviation security by using intelligence-driven, risk-based, layered passenger and baggage screening procedures and technology to increase aviation security while managing the passenger experience.

**Mission Program Description:**

The Aviation Screening Operations program applies intelligence-driven, risk-based, layered passenger and baggage screening procedures and technology to increase aviation security to prevent terrorism and criminal activity. The program implements processes that allow personnel at security checkpoints to focus on high-risk and unknown travelers while managing the passenger experience. The program also ensures the 100-percent screening of checked baggage for prohibited items. Other activities include training the screener workforce, vetting airline passengers, and canine operations.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average number of days for DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program redress requests to be closed</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>&lt; 55</td>
<td>&lt; 55</td>
<td>&lt; 55</td>
<td>&lt; 55</td>
<td>&lt; 50*</td>
<td>&lt; 50*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure indicates how quickly the program is providing redress to individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution regarding difficulties they experienced during their travel screening at transportation hubs or crossing U.S. borders.

**Explanation:** The COVID pandemic kept the overall numbers of requests approximately 45% lower than 2019, but this allowed the team to process cases in a timely fashion throughout FY21 and meet the goal of 55 days for closing redress requests.

* Target Change. DHS TRIP would like to modify the 55 day average down to 50 based on current trends. Expect the time to increase over FY21 due to increased volume.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of canine teams that pass operational training assessments within 90 days of completing basic course at the Canine Training Center</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>85%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>91%</td>
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**Brief Description:** The measure is an indicator of the Canine Training Center training program success.

**Explanation:** During FY21, twenty-three training missions were conducted: and twenty-one teams passed within 45 days of completing the basic course at the Canine Training Center.

* Target Change. The rationale for increasing the target is to reflect a process change whereby Canine Training Center Training Instructors will now test both passenger screening and explosive detection teams.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of daily passengers receiving expedited physical screening based on assessed low risk</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>38%</td>
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</table>
**FY 2021-2023 Annual Performance Report**

**Brief Description:** This measure indicates the percent of domestic air passengers who receive expedited screening due to their being determined to be low risk so to allow Transportation Security Officers to focus on those passengers who are potentially high-risk to the aviation system.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** The FY21 target was not met due to the overall passenger throughput and PreCheck eligible passenger decrease due to COVID compared to previous years. Approximately 178.5 M passengers received expedited physical screening during FY21 out of the total passenger throughput of 473.1M. TSA continues to see the percentage of passengers eligible for expedited physical screening below pre-pandemic levels, attributed primarily to the decline in business travel, as business travelers are likely to have a PreCheck account. For FY22, Performance Management will reassess the FY target of 50%. Canine Screening contributed significantly to TSA achieving the 50% target goal. However, since Canine Screening is no longer considered a form of expedited screening, 50% may not be achievable.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of passenger data submissions that successfully undergo Secure Flight watch list matching</td>
<td>Target: 100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result: 100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure ensures the traveling public that all domestic air passengers have undergone checking against watch lists as one means of Vetting individuals against high-risk watch lists strengthens the security of the transportation system.

**Explanation:** Secure Flight’s processed every submission received. For FY21 all received submission for the vetting of passengers covered by the Securer Flight Final Rule were processed by the system. The program has met this target this quarter and every quarter previously monitored.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Transportation Security Officers that achieve a first-time pass rate on the Image Interpretation Test</td>
<td>Target: 90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>92%*</td>
<td>92%*</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Result: 95%</td>
<td>94%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure gauges the ability of Transportation Security Officers to identify prohibited items such as guns, knives, and improvised explosive devices through X-ray screening and serves as feedback for the effectiveness of training programs and experiences.

**Explanation:** The First Time Image Interpretation Test Pass Rate for FY21 was 94.0 percent based on 4,890 tests administered, of which 4,597 were First Time Passes and 293 were First-Time Failures.

* Target Change. The rationale for increasing the target is to be in line with historical results.

### Other Operations and Enforcement

**Mission Program Goal:** Strengthen the security regulation and enforcement presence in the Nation’s commercial transportation sectors.

**Mission Program Description:** The Other Operations and Enforcement program encompasses security reviews, assessment, and enforcement activities in the various modes of commercial transportation. The program includes intelligence and analysis, domestic and international inspectors, reviews and assessments, Federal Air Marshals, deputizing airline pilots, and training crew members in self-defense. This program ensures compliance with transportation-related regulations and standards, providing credentialing services for transportation sector, and the vetting of the transportation workforce to prevent terrorism and criminal activity.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of air carriers operating from domestic airports in compliance with standard security programs</td>
<td>Target: 100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result: 97.7%</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
<td>89.0%</td>
<td>86.0%</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
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</table>
### Percent of attended interchanges of rail cars containing rail security sensitive materials transiting into or through high-threat urban areas

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>97%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure indicates the extent to which TSA personnel observe the transit of freight rail containers carrying materials that could be used by terrorists or those with malicious intent to harm property and people. These observations, or attended interchanges, occur in high-threat urban areas where the impact of malicious use of these materials could be devastating.

**Explanation:** There were 1,331 Chain of Custody (COC) inspections in FY21 with only 1 record of non-compliance occurring in the 1st quarter. This is the highest annual rate of compliance for COC inspections.

### Percent of domestic cargo audits that meet screening standards

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>97.7%</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>92%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure reports the compliance of domestic air cargo carriers with cargo screening standards to indicate shortfalls to be addressed and enhance the safety and efficiency of air commerce.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** Although COVID-19 affected overall planned in-person inspection activity, 27,585 inspections were conducted with 2,134 findings in FY21. To address violations, TSA assesses civil penalties and/or works with TSA-regulated entities implementing Outreach, Action Plans and Joint Testing. TSA continually works with TSA-regulated entities to maintain a compliance posture electronically and telephonically where in-person outreach and comprehensive inspections cannot be conducted.

### Percent of identified vulnerabilities at last point of departure airports addressed through stakeholder engagement and partnerships

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>85%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure will indicate the percent of vulnerabilities identified through the program's inspection activities that have been communicated and deliberated upon through stakeholder engagement and partnerships in an effort to encourage action to close these gaps by foreign airports. By working to mitigate aviation security risks at foreign last point of departure airports the program strives to improve aviation security.

**Explanation:** A review of the 276 findings opened or updated during the reporting period of FY21 indicates that TSA took action on 100 percent of cases which were addressed through stakeholder engagement. Though COVID-19 presented unprecedented obstacles, there was continuous global coordination and assistance through active engagement with international counterparts.

### Percent of international cargo audits that meet screening standards

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>97.6%</td>
<td>88.0%</td>
<td>91.0%</td>
<td>86.0%</td>
<td>99.0%</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure indicates the level of compliance by international air carriers designed to enhance the safety of the Nation’s transportation systems and infrastructure. Compliance with international cargo screening standards enhances the safety and efficiency of air commerce and also reduces the risk of criminal and terrorist misuse of the supply chain.

**Explanation:** International inspectors travel and conduct inspections of air carriers/regulated entities and assessments of foreign airports. COVID-19 greatly affected the Foreign Airport Assessment Program as travel to these locations was impeded. For FY21, 345 inspections were conducted with 1 finding.

### Percent of overall compliance of domestic airports with established aviation security indicators

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>93.9%</td>
<td>91.0%</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>90%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure reports the extent to which domestic airports are complying with security indicators designed to assess airport vulnerabilities and provide an overall security posture of our domestic aviation system.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** The ability to conduct compliance inspections for domestic airports in FY21 was impacted by COVID-19 restrictions. Based on the myriad of airport risk, including human factors, insider threat, and the airport security posture, staying compliant with aviation security indicators is an ever-evolving challenge to the aviation industry. TSA continually works with TSA-regulated entities and partners to maintain a compliance posture virtually where in-person outreach, assessments, and comprehensive inspections cannot be conducted in person.
### U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

#### Employment Status Verification

**Mission Program Goal:** Ensure lawful employment and the protection of American workers by providing efficient and accurate confirmation of employment eligibility information.

**Mission Program Description:** The electronic employment eligibility verification E-Verify program enables enrolled employers to confirm the work authorization of their newly hired employees quickly and easily. E-Verify is an internet-based system that compares information from an employee’s Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, to records available to DHS to confirm employment eligibility within seconds.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of workers determined to be Employment Authorized after an initial mismatch</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>≤ 0.70%</td>
<td>≤ 0.60%</td>
<td>≤ 0.50%</td>
<td>≤ 0.40%</td>
<td>≤ 0.40%</td>
<td>≤ 0.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>0.21%</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure provides a feedback mechanism to indicate the accuracy of E-Verify by reporting the number of cases in which adjudicating officials in the program find a person “employment authorized” after an initial automated mismatch decision. Ensuring the accuracy of E-Verify processing reflects the program’s intent to minimize negative impacts imposed upon those entitled to employment in the U.S. while ensuring the integrity of immigration benefits by effectively detecting and preventing unauthorized employment.

**Explanation:** E-Verify continues to be successful in matching employees to their records during the initial electronic matching phase. In cases where the check does not find a match, it is rare that the applicant will contest the case and be found to be employment authorized. USCIS continues to improve its processes through enhancements such as improved matching processes, better data access, and my-E-Verify, an online service that allows individuals to check their employment eligibility. E-Verify upgraded to the latest version of Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS) and connected with the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVIS), allowing for automated matching of approximately 90,000 electronic cases annually that were previously resolved.
manually. E-Verify implemented an audit program to review the accuracy of automated matching and improve program integrity. Finally, E-Verify improved my-E-Verify to allow employees to upload, rather than fax, documents required to resolve mismatches.

### Fraud Prevention and Detection

**Mission Program Goal:** Enhance the security and integrity of the legal immigration system by eliminating systemic vulnerabilities.

**Mission Program Description:** The Fraud Prevention and Detection program supports activities related to preventing and detecting immigration benefit fraud. The program leads efforts to identify threats to national security and public safety, deter, detect, and combat immigration benefit fraud, and remove systemic and other vulnerabilities. This is part of the Fraud Prevention and Detection Fee Account.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of fraud referrals from adjudicative directorates that are closed or converted into fraud cases within 90 calendar days</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>Retired*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>86%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure indicates the program’s ability to review and adjudicate fraud referrals in a timely manner to safeguard the integrity of the nation’s lawful immigration system while fostering timely and accurate adjudication of applications.

* Measure is being retired. The Fraud Detection and National Security Data System is being replaced by NextGen to provide for consistent tracking of fraud referrals from all adjudicative directorates. Program may reintroduce this measure in a future performance cycle when data is determined to be reliable.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Immigration Services Officers, Asylum Officers, and Refugee Officers who receive advanced fraud detection or interview skills enhancement training</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>Retired*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>97%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure indicates the extent to which key personnel, who are involved in the process to assess immigration benefit applications, receive advanced training to improve their ability to detect fraudulent applications and/or to assess the completeness and truthfulness of responses from applicants. Increasing the officer’s ability to detect fraud helps mitigate the risk of applicants receiving fraudulent benefits.

* Measure is being retired. This course is now listed in DHS Performance and Learning Management System as an annual mandatory training for officers and satisfies this requirement.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of System Generated Notifications related to national security, public safety, or fraud triaged on pending cases within 60 calendar days*</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>75%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure gauges the percent of pre-adjudicative System Generated Notifications related to national security, public safety, or fraud indicators referrals received from adjudicative officers to the Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) Directorate that are triaged and resolved by specially trained officers within 60 days. Adjudication Officers may contact FDNS if they suspect fraudulent activity related to the adjudication of immigration benefits. Biometric notifications include derogatory information related to historical fingerprint enrollment records and other biometric type information. Continuous vetting of biometric information helps safeguard the integrity of the Nation’s lawful immigration system.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** USCIS gatekeepers triaged over 149K ATLAS System Generated Notifications (SGNs) in FY21, yet results were 5% under goal due to the increase in biographic and biometric SGNs, and a decrease in the number of gatekeepers. Biographic SGN increases were attributable to USCIS systems’ harvesting names from multiple sources and adding them to ATLAS’ automated screening, plus checks occurring at multiple stages during the adjudication of a form. With the increase in names checked more matches to potential derogatory information occurred. Similarly, as DHS OBIM’s IDENT biometric repository continuously expands its data holdings, more matches to potential derogatory information are being made. Staffing needs were also a factor as SGN volumes grew while the number of gatekeepers to work them decreased. The resource challenges were due to pandemic impacts, a hiring freeze, and urgent deployment needs to support the Southwest Border and Operation Allies Welcome.
With the newly modernized, cloud-based ATLAS that USCIS deployed in August 2021, FDNS began focusing on implementing refinements to the ATLAS SGNs. This effort will increase efficacy of the screening, reduce false positives, and better hone in on potential significant derogatory information that relates USCIS benefit requests. Although staffing resources will continue to be a challenge, the hiring freeze has been lifted and it is expected that the ATLAS SGN refinements will be instrumental in meeting the FY22 target.

* Measure name change from: Percent of system generated notifications related to national security, public safety, or fraud triaged within 60 calendar days

### Immigration Services

**Mission Program Goal:** Ensure immigration benefit and services are processed in a timely and accurate manner.

**Mission Program Description:** The Immigration Services program supports and promotes lawful immigration by processing benefit requests, so that only those eligible for immigration benefits are approved. This includes processing refugee and asylum applications as well as providing integration services for lawful immigrants. This is part of the Immigration Examinations Fee Account and the H-1B Nonimmigrant Petitioner Fee Account.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of approved applications for naturalization that were appropriately decided</td>
<td>Target 99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result 99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>N/A*</td>
<td>99%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure assesses the program’s ability to process the N-400 to provide immigration benefit services accurately and with full traceability. Additionally, the program uses results of this quality review process to improve the training of adjudicators and the processes used in conducting adjudications.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** The semi-annual GPRA review activity was not performed due to ongoing challenges and priority projects facing USCIS, specifically, Operation Allies Welcome, which has required USCIS to shift its personnel and resources. Based on current operating priorities, USCIS will resume semi-annual GPRA review activity for N-400 in Q2 FY22.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of approved applications for permanent residence that were appropriately decided</td>
<td>Target 99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result 99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>N/A*</td>
<td>99%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure assesses the program’s ability to process the I-485 to provide immigration benefit services accurately and with full traceability. Additionally, the program uses results of this quality review process to improve the training of adjudicators and the processes used in conducting adjudications.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** The semi-annual GPRA review activity was not performed due to ongoing challenges and priority projects facing USCIS, specifically, Operation Allies Welcome, which has required USCIS to shift its personnel and resources. Based on current operating priorities, USCIS will resume semi-annual GPRA review activity for I-485 in Q2 FY22.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of approved refugee and asylum applications that were appropriately decided</td>
<td>Target 99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>Retired*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result 86%</td>
<td>86%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure assesses the program’s ability to process applications for Asylum and Refugee status to provide immigration benefit services accurately and with full traceability.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** This measure is reported annually with a two-quarter lag. The results reported are the end of fiscal year 2020 review. Due to circumstances particular to FY20, the small sample of cases reviewed only reflects the estimated volumes of I-589 adjudications expected during August and September 2020; rather than the overall volume of I-589 adjudications normally conducted during the second quarter of the fiscal year, which is typically sampled to represent the program. The small sample was the result of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the potential for an administrative furlough, which was expected to occur in FY20 Q4, which severely restricted the ability to schedule I-589 interviews and complete cases beginning in March 2020. Moving forward we will be incorporating the two-quarter lag between the sampling and reporting of results, so USCIS will submit the FY 21 measure results in Q2 FY 22. As COVID travel restrictions are lifted, sampling size for the measure will improve and will more accurately reflect both I-589 and I-590 performance.

* Measure to be retired and replaced with new measure: Percent of approved refugee and asylum applications that were legally sufficient.
**Performance Measure** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** | **FY 2022** | **FY 2023**
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Percent of Immigration Officers who are trained to perform their duties within six months of entry on duty | Target | --- | --- | --- | --- | 90.0% | 60.0% | 70.0%
Result | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1% | --- | ---

**Additional Information:** This measure provides feedback to ensure that Immigration Officers are receiving timely training so they can have the tools to effectively accomplish their job responsibilities.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** USCIS entered the pandemic with a backlog. While the ATC was making progress by adding staff and using adjunct instructors to conduct exportable BASIC classes before the pandemic, the inability to conduct residential training from Apr-Oct 2020 due to COVID exacerbated the backlog. It took months to fully transition from residential to virtual BASIC due to identifying technology solutions, training staff on technology and virtual delivery, transitioning the 6-week course content, etc. Changes and staff acclimation were rehearsed and refined to ensure the quality of the program employees must pass as a condition of continued USCIS employment. ATC eliminated the current backlog caused by COVID-19 during Q4 with the exception of approved deferrals. New ISOs are now being scheduled immediately for the next class so ATC anticipates returning to on-target results in Q1 FY22. ATC is prepared to return to residential training at FLETC, pending operational conditions and USCIS leadership determination. Virtual BASIC will remain the fallback option until residential BASIC resumes and ATC anticipates on-target results with either option.

**Performance Measure** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** | **FY 2022** | **FY 2023**
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Percent of naturalization cases where derogatory information was identified and resolved prior to taking the oath of allegiance | Target | --- | --- | --- | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100%
Result | --- | --- | --- | 100% | 100% | --- | ---

**Brief Description:** This measure will confirm that all avenues have been pursued to resolve information that influence the decision to grant naturalization to individuals prior to their engaging in the formal process of the taking the oath of allegiance to the U.S. Information considered derogatory includes criminal activity, national security issues, or public safety concerns.

**Explanation:** USCIS employs continual vetting of naturalization applicants to ensure that applicants who are ineligible due to criminal activity, national security, or public safety concerns are not naturalized. This has been achieved for all N-400s due to the shift from paper-based to electronic (ELIS) ingestion of filings. Electronic naturalization filings allow for routine Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) and similar fraud/national security checks to occur without the need for direct human intervention—and done up until the time of final naturalization/”oathing” of the applicant. Such continuous vetting ensures the integrity of the immigration system and protects our national security.

**Performance Measure** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** | **FY 2022** | **FY 2023**
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Number of asylum determinations | Target | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | 50,000 | 50,000
Result | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---

**Brief Description:** This measure gauges the total number of asylum determinations to approve, deny, refer to an Immigration Judge, or administratively close cases related to refugee and asylum.

**Performance Measure** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** | **FY 2022** | **FY 2023**
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Percent of refugee and asylum adjudications that were legally sufficient | Target | --- | --- | --- | --- | 90.0% | 90.0% | 90.0%
Result | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---

**Brief Description:** This measure assesses the ability of officers to adjudicate asylum and refugee status determinations for Forms I-589 and Form I-590 in a legally sufficient manner.

**Performance Measure** | **FY 2017** | **FY 2018** | **FY 2019** | **FY 2020** | **FY 2021** | **FY 2022** | **FY 2023**
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Percent of respondents satisfied with the citizenship and immigration-related support received from the USCIS Contact Center | Target | --- | --- | --- | --- | 80.0% | 80.0% | 80.0%
Result | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---

**Brief Description:** This measure gauges the overall satisfaction rating of the support received from the USCIS Contact Center based on accuracy of information, responsiveness to public inquiries, and accessibility to information.
U.S. Coast Guard

Maritime Law Enforcement

Mission Program Goal: Ensure effective maritime law enforcement and border control.

Mission Program Description: The Maritime Law Enforcement program preserves America’s jurisdictional rights within our maritime borders. The USCG is the lead federal maritime law enforcement agency for enforcing national and international law on the high seas, outer continental shelf, and inward from the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone to inland navigable waters, including the Great Lakes. The following statutory missions contribute to the USCG’s Maritime Law Enforcement program: Drug Interdiction; Migrant Interdiction; Living Marine Resources; and Other Law Enforcement.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fishing regulation compliance rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>96.5%</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>97.1%</td>
<td>97.8%</td>
<td>98.0%</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>97.2%</td>
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Brief Description: This measure reflects the percent of boardings at sea by the USCG during which no significant violations of domestic fisheries regulations are detected. This effort helps ensure the health and well-being of U.S. fisheries and marine protected species.

Explanation: The USCG uses the percentage of fishing vessels observed at sea complying with domestic regulations as an indirect measure of the USCG’s deterrence effect and overall compliance of the fishing fleet. FY21 was a record year with the USCG conducting 7,531 domestic fisheries boardings and the lowest compliance rate in recent history. This lower rate suggests higher quality boardings on fleets with lower fisheries regulation compliance.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interdiction rate of foreign fishing vessels violating U.S. waters</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>40.0%*</td>
<td>40.0%*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
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Brief Description: This measure reflects efforts to prevent illegal foreign fishing vessels from encroaching on the Exclusive Economic Zone. It is a priority to protect the integrity of the Nation’s maritime borders and ensuring the health of U.S. fisheries.

Explanation: This rate is up 8.25 percent from FY20 Q4 interdiction rate. Increase is primarily related to Mexican FFVs in U.S. Gulf of Mexico EEZ. Higher interdiction numbers were a result of increased patrol assets, and better intel and targeting. Over the period of Q1 through Q3 FY21, U.S./MX maritime boundary line operations resumed pre-COVID standard procedures. Over the same period, USCG Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) devoted more Living Marine Resource patrol hours in the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in more interdictions. Additionally, CBP partners provided more air surveillance and radar detection.

* Target Change. The program’s rationale for changing the target is to make them more consistent with current results.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrant interdiction effectiveness in the maritime environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
<td>74.5%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
<td>86.1%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
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</table>

Brief Description: This measure communicates the effectiveness of the maritime law enforcement program to interdict migrants attempting to enter the U.S. through maritime borders not protected by the Border Patrol.

Explanation and Corrective Action: There is not one factor that would conclusively indicate why the result is 47 percent. It is likely due to changing maritime migration patterns to include increased Haitian flow and very large increases in the D11 AOR. A more accurate representation of Coast Guard performance would be to measure Coast Guard at sea interdictions against known flow.
Maritime Prevention

Mission Program Goal: Ensure marine safety and environmental protection and minimize security vulnerability of vessels and marine facilities.

Mission Program Description: The Maritime Prevention program mitigates the risk of human casualties and property losses, minimizes security risks, and protects the marine environment. The following statutory missions contribute to the USCG’s Maritime Prevention program: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security; Marine Safety; and Marine Environmental Protection.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of breaches at high-risk maritime facilities</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>≤ 235</td>
<td>≤ 307</td>
<td>≤ 307</td>
<td>≤ 306</td>
<td>≤ 310*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>373</td>
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Brief Description: This measure reports the number of breach of security incidents at facilities subject to MTSA where no Transportation Security Incident occurred, but established security measures have been circumvented, eluded, or violated.

Explanation and Corrective Action: The USCG is aware of the increasing trend in Breaches of Security, and research continues to determine causal factors and mitigating actions. One factor, the relatively new addition of “cyber breaches,” likely contributes to said increase, though does not wholly account for the rising trend. The USCG plans to re-forecast Breaches of Security, accounting for said cyber incidents, in order to establish more realistic goals for coming years.

*FY22-23 targets are being reviewed for potential changes. Updated targets will account for elevated results in prior years.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Three-year average number of serious marine incidents (SMI)</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>≤ 698</td>
<td>≤ 698</td>
<td>≤ 689</td>
<td>≤ 644</td>
<td>≤ 686</td>
<td>≤ 685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>605</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Brief Description: This measure assesses the impact of the program’s efforts to reduce the number of serious marine incidents through outreach, training, and inspections.

Explanation: The 12-month total (473) remains historically low compared to previous years. The resulting three-year average of SMIs (605) is a 13.2 percent improvement over FY20 Q4. These historically low SMI numbers can likely be attributed to reduced activity in the maritime domain during the height of COVID-19’s impacts.

Maritime Response

Mission Program Goal: Rescue persons in distress and mitigate the impacts of maritime disaster events. Ensure maritime incident response and recovery preparedness.

Mission Program Description: The Maritime Response program mitigates the consequences of marine casualties and disastrous events. The USCG preparedness efforts ensure incident response and recovery resources are fully ready and capable to minimize impact of disasters to people, the environment, and the economy. The following statutory missions contribute to the USCG’s Maritime Response program: Search and Rescue and Marine Environmental Protection.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of people in imminent danger saved in the maritime environment</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>78.8%</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
<td>78.0%</td>
<td>86.5%</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
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</table>

Brief Description: This measure reports the percentage of people who were in imminent danger on the oceans and other waterways under the jurisdiction of the USCG whose lives were saved by the USCG. While the program aspires to save all lives, due to distance, weather, and other challenges the results reflect the reality of the complexities faced in meeting this goal.

Explanation: This measure assesses the percent of people who were in imminent danger on the oceans and other waterways and whose lives were saved by USCG.

Maritime Security Operations

Mission Program Goal: Detect, deter, prevent, disrupt, and recover from terrorism in the maritime domain.

Mission Program Description: The Maritime Security Operations program encompasses activities to detect, deter, prevent, disrupt, and recover from terrorist attacks and other criminal acts in the maritime domain. It includes the execution of antiterrorism, response, and select recovery operations. This program conducts the operational element of the USCG’s Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security mission and complements the other two elements: the establishment and oversight of maritime security regimes, and maritime domain awareness.
### FY 2021-2023 Annual Performance Report

#### Performance Measure

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<tr>
<td>Percent risk reduction of coordinated anti-terrorism activities throughout the maritime transportation system</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>40%*</td>
<td>40%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>32%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure reflects the risk reduction impact of maritime security and response operations conducted in and around ports in the 37 Captain of the Port zones by the USCG or federal, state, and local partners.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** The target goal was missed primarily due to competing mission demands and lack of resources. Resource issues stem from COVID-19 crew-related impacts as well as a lack of physical resources in geographic areas with high risk profiles. Resumption of in-person training and outreach in FY22 Q2 will help field units better understand total addressable risk and how to improve risk reduction performance.

* Revised to 40 percent for FY22/23 based on trend analysis.

---

### Maritime Transportation System Management

**Mission Program Goal:** Safeguard and expedite lawful trade and travel and mitigate hazards and vulnerabilities.

**Mission Program Description:** The Maritime Transportation System Management program ensures a safe, secure, efficient and environmentally sound waterways system. The USCG minimizes disruptions to maritime commerce by assessing and mitigating risks to safe navigation and by providing waterways restoration capabilities after extreme weather events, marine accidents, or terrorist incidents. The USCG works in concert with other Federal agencies, state and local governments, marine industries, maritime associations, and the international community to optimize balanced use of the Nation’s marine transportation system. The Aids to Navigation and Ice Operations statutory missions contribute to this program.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Availability of maritime navigation aids</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>97.1%</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
<td>96.5%</td>
<td>96.2%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure assesses the program’s ability to manage short-range federal Aids to Navigation availability and promote safe navigation on the waterway.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** Resource and funding constraints resulted in a funding shortfall for aid maintenance and recapitalization. 313 fixed aids have been discrepant for more than one year, and 91 for more than three years. Declining AAR is the result of a failing fixed ATON infrastructure attributed to ongoing resource and funding constraints. Unless rectified, said constraints will continue to cause AAR decline, thus increasing risk in the Marine Transportation System. USCG continues to make ATON modern and more efficient, helping mitigate said risk in the short-term.

---

### U.S. Secret Service

#### Field Operations

**Mission Program Goal:** Safeguard the nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems to preserve the integrity of the economy.

**Mission Program Description:** The Field Operations program supports the daily operations of the domestic and international field offices. The program is staffed by Special Agents, Uniformed Division Officers, Technical Law Enforcement, and administrative, professional, and technical personnel. Program personnel divide their time between conducting criminal investigations of financial crimes, cybercrimes, counterfeit currency, protective intelligence, and performing physical protection responsibilities. This enables the Department to protect the U.S. economy and continuity of government by investigating threats to financial payment systems, threats to leadership and locations, and events with symbolic and practical significance to U.S. citizens in physical space and cyberspace.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount of cyber-financial crime loss prevented (in billions)</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>$4.50</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>$7.10</td>
<td>$2.57</td>
<td>$2.28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Brief Description:** This measure reflects the program’s efforts to reduce financial losses to the public attributable to cyber financial crimes.

**Explanation and Corrective Action:** The investigative mission of the U.S. Secret Service is to protect the Nation’s financial infrastructure. Since the onset of the global pandemic, the Secret Service has dedicated significant resources to investigating crimes targeting pandemic relief funds, to include unemployment insurance fraud and U.S. Small Business Administration loan fraud. Specific to unemployment insurance fraud, the Secret Service, in partnership with the Department of Labor Office of Inspector General, worked directly with state unemployment benefit agencies and financial institutions on reversing fraudulent transactions and returning the funds directly to states. These investigative inquiries, also called runouts, which did not rise to the level of criminal case investigations, resulted in reversing of over $2 billion in unemployment insurance funds back to victims. The Secret Service continues to adapt to the evolving landscape of cyber-enabled financial crimes and will fine-tune the recording of metrics associated with emerging crimes and fraud schemes. Presently, the Secret Service is conducting a review of the investigative systems and metrics, which will result in technological and policy updates to more accurately capture and report loss amounts.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of cyber mitigation responses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>250</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result</strong></td>
<td>253</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>727</td>
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</table>

**Explanation:** The program responds to organizations that suspect a malicious network intrusion has occurred and implements mitigation responses to secure the network(s). Each cyber mitigation response involves one or more of the following activities: identifying potential victims/subjects, notifying victims/subjects, interviewing victims/subjects, confirming network intrusion, supporting mitigation of breach activity, and retrieving and analyzing forensic evidence.

**Explanation:** The number of network intrusion responses were higher than anticipated in FY21. This was due to multiple factors beginning with an increase in the number of cyber incidents/network intrusions reported to the USSS and additional program staffing and funding which allowed the Secret Service to purchase the necessary software and applications for these responses.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of financial accounts recovered (in millions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result</strong></td>
<td>27.18</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>1.10</td>
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</table>

**Explanation:** This measure represents the number of financial accounts recovered during cyber investigations including bank accounts, credit card accounts, PayPal, and other online money transfer accounts.

**Explanation:** The Criminal Investigations program recovered over 1 million financial accounts, which include bank accounts, credit card accounts, PayPal, and other online money transfer accounts.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of law enforcement individuals trained in cybercrime and cyber forensics both domestically and overseas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result</strong></td>
<td>1,968</td>
<td>2,773</td>
<td>3,375</td>
<td>4,921</td>
<td>5,400</td>
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**Explanation:** This measure communicates the number of law enforcement individuals trained by the program to facilitate investigations and resolution of financial cybercrimes.

**Explanation:** The National Computer Forensic Institute was able to transition to a virtual platform during COVID and their related facility closure. Adding this virtual environment has allowed a greater number of people to receive training than anticipated and increased overall capacity now that multiple modes of training are available (in-person training has resumed with a very limited number of students). Future targets will be adjusted to reflect this increased capability.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of currency identified as counterfeit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>&lt; 0.0088%</td>
<td>&lt; 0.0088%</td>
<td>&lt; 0.0088%</td>
<td>&lt; 0.0090%</td>
<td>&lt;0.0088%</td>
<td>&lt;0.0088%</td>
<td>&lt;0.0088%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result</strong></td>
<td>0.0093%</td>
<td>0.0064%</td>
<td>0.0060%</td>
<td>0.0051%</td>
<td>0.0036%</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Explanation:** This measure is an indicator of the proportion of counterfeit currency relative to the amount of genuine U.S. Currency in circulation and reflects the program’s efforts to reduce financial losses to the public attributable to counterfeit currency.

**Explanation:** The Criminal Investigations program met the goal of restricting the amount of counterfeit currency passed compared to genuine currency in circulation. The result shows the level of commitment the Secret Service has for deterring counterfeiting activity in the United States and abroad. Minimizing the passing of counterfeit currency is achieved through proactive investigations, developments of anti-counterfeiting initiatives, and public education.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of National Center for Missing and Exploited Children examinations requested that are conducted</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Target</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>
**Brief Description:** This measure represents the prioritized efforts of the program in conducting computer and polygraph forensic exams conducted in support of any investigation involving missing or exploited children in relation to the number of computer and polygraph forensic exams requested.

**Explanation:** The Secret Service met its goal by conducting 100% of computer and polygraph forensic exams in support of any investigation involving missing and exploited children in relation to the number of computer and polygraph forensic exams requested by NCMEC (with 108 exams conducted).

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terabytes of data forensically analyzed for criminal investigations</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>13,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>3,334</td>
<td>5,019</td>
<td>8,862</td>
<td>11,632</td>
<td>20,627</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure represents the amount of data, in terabytes, seized and forensically analyzed via investigations and those conducted by partners trained at the National Computer Forensics Institute. Training law enforcement partners substantially enhances law enforcement efforts to suppress the continually evolving and increasing number of cyber and electronic crime cases affecting communities nationwide.

**Explanation:** The number of terabytes analyzed has increased significantly since FY18 due to the trend in increased partner training at NCFI. Consequently, the terabytes that these partners analyzed has increased dramatically. Future targets were will be adjusted to reflect this new trend.

### Protective Operations

**Mission Program Goal:** Protect our Nation’s leaders and candidates, other designated individuals and facilities, the White House Complex, and National Special Security Events.

**Mission Program Description:** The Protective Operations program protects the President and Vice President and their families, former Presidents and their spouses, visiting heads of state and government, and other designated individuals. It also secures the White House Complex, Vice President's Residence, and other designated places; and designs, coordinates, and implements operational security plans for designated National Special Security Events (NSSEs). The program investigates, evaluates, disseminates, and maintains information concerning known, potential, or perceived threats to protectees, locations, and NSSEs. The program is staffed by Special Agents, Uniformed Division Officers, Technical Law Enforcement, and administrative, professional, and technical personnel that work closely with the military and with federal, state, county, local, and international law enforcement organizations to ensure mission success. This enables the Department to facilitate continuity of government and overall homeland security.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of days with incident-free protection at the White House Complex and Vice President’s Residence</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

**Brief Description:** This measure reflects the program’s effectiveness in protecting the White House Complex and Vice President’s Residence.

**Explanation:** This measure gauges the percent of days that the Secret Service provides incident-free protection to the White House Complex and Vice President’s Residence. Anything less than 100 percent incident free protection is deemed unacceptable. While there were minor protective disturbances involving the White House Complex in FY21, none of the events met the criteria for an “incident” defined in the performance measure definition form.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of National Special Security Events that were successfully completed</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>100%</td>
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**Brief Description:** This measure reflects the percent of successfully completed National Special Security Events where once the event has commenced, a security incident inside the USSS-protected venue did not preclude the event’s agenda from proceeding to its scheduled conclusion.

**Explanation:** The protection program met its target by providing 100 percent successful completion of designated National Special Security Events (NSSEs) through intense planning, communication, and training. A successfully completed NSSE is one where, once the event has commenced, no security incident(s) inside the Secret Service protected venue precluded the event’s agenda from proceeding to its scheduled conclusion.
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of protectees that arrive and depart safely</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Result</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

_Brief Description:_ This measure reflects the effectiveness of efforts to ensure safe travels (arrive and depart safely) for protected individuals, to include the President and Vice President of the United States and their immediate families, former presidents, their spouses, and their minor children under the age of 16, major presidential and vice-presidential candidates and their spouses, and foreign heads of state.

_Explanation:_ The Secret Service ensured safe arrival and departure for all 4,710 protective visits occurring in FY21. The goal was achieved by utilizing a wide variety of security measures, as well as coordinating with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
Section 3: Other Information
The Other Information section contains a presentation of our: Agency Priority Goals; a presentation of key management initiatives; and a summary of High-Risk Areas.

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Low-Priority Program Activities ............................................ 189
Acronyms ............................................................................ 190
Other Information

FY 2022-2023 Agency Priority Goals (APG)

Agency Priority Goal 1: Strengthen Federal Cyber Security

Goal Statement: Defend and secure the Federal Enterprise through a collaborative risk management effort with departments and agencies to coordinate risk response and interagency policy actions. By September 30, 2023, 90% of the agencies that have reached data preparation quality readiness, will achieve an acceptable data quality level to support reliable risk scoring reported on the Federal Dashboard to gauge the strength of the federal enterprise cybersecurity posture.

Please see https://www.performance.gov.

Customer Experience

Overview

The President’s Management Agenda includes a focus on improving the customer experience with federal services through the use of Cross Agency Priority (CAP) Goals. CAP Goals are a tool to accelerate progress on a limited number of Presidential priority areas where implementation requires active collaboration among multiple agencies. CAP Goals are updated or revised every four years with each Presidential Administration’s term.

Below are DHS’s major high impact service provider organizations efforts and successes in FY 2021 on improving the customer experience, and next steps and challenges moving forward. The Customer Experience (CX) efforts are bucketed around five major focus areas: Governance; Organization and Culture; Customer Research; Service Design; and Measurement.

CBP Information Center

Progress

Beginning in June 2020, it was decided that the CBP Information Center (CIC) would be the lead agency for CBP in reporting on the customer experiences with the agency. Prior to then, the Travelers Communications Center (TCC) under the Office of Field Operations reported on customer experience activities. The CBP Information Center (CIC) is the agency’s primary liaison with the worldwide public that enables the CBP mission of legitimate trade and travel by providing accurate and timely information about CBP regulations, procedures, policies, programs, and interactions in a professional and expedient manner. The CIC is a one-stop shop for the public to contact CBP with general inquiries that pertain to international travel, immigration, and trade issues.

The CIC has the following goals:

- Provide a positive and professional experience for our customers;
FY 2021-2023 Annual Performance Report

- Promote a valued customer experience culture that is focused on accurate and prompt action to address all customer questions and concerns; and
- Protect sensitive and personal identifiable information.

In addition to the above mission, the CIC Compliments and Complaints Branch (CCB) receives and processes compliments, complaints, and comments throughout CBP. They receive these communications from travelers, import/export businesses, members of the international trade communities, and other persons affected by CBP operations, through phone calls, emails, written correspondence, and the DHS/TRIP redress system. The CIC works primarily with the Office of Field Operations and Border Patrol for the resolution, tracking, and analysis of complaints. The CCB identifies emerging areas of concern, trends, and patterns of complaints specifically, to assist CBP personnel in effectively communicating with the public.

Throughout FY 2021, the CIC continued working with OMB to implement its action plan to improve the customer experience (CX) by providing the public with answers and information pertaining to international travel, immigration, and trade issues.

With this action plan submitted in June 2020 and updated in FY 2021, the CIC aims to reflect CX best practices across five focus areas. The action plan developed by the CIC is for customer data collection using the General Services Administration’s (GSA) Touchpoints Tool to measure progress towards its CX milestones.

**Governance**

The CIC is developing a long-term implementation strategy and impact assessment that aligns the CIC with its goals, focus areas, capabilities, governance, and operational impact.

**Organization & Culture**

The CIC continues to integrate CX skills into Public Information Officers and Customer Service Representatives (CSRs) roles and responsibilities. These responsibilities include analyzing CX data to synthesize customer insights for CX improvement. In addition, customer service training has been provided to all staff throughout year and will continue to do so in each FY as a refresher for current staff. Additionally, this type of training is now included in the new employee training for Public Information Officers and CSRs.

**Customer Research**

The CIC services a wide range of the public, including international customers. It is difficult to define a “typical” CIC customer. The CIC, through analysis of website traffic, will determine the most frequently asked questions and will tailor the information to current policies affecting the travel and trade communities.

**Service Design**

The CIC redesigned the help.cbp.gov website in October 2019 and implemented a new Customer Relationship Management system. The website improvements and new software platform allows for seamless integration between the public facing website, the phone system and the software used to track and resolve every inquiry from the public. The goal of the website is to provide the public with a self-service interaction to answer their questions without waiting in the queue to talk to a Public Information Officer and/or await an email response. The objective is to provide the
public speedy and correct answers to their questions. The CIC continues to add new self-service topics and FAQ documents to the website in both English and Spanish.

**Measurement**

In September 2021, the CIC began collecting customer data using GSA’s Touchpoints Tool via a website survey to measure progress towards its CX milestones. Later in FY2022 the same survey will be added to the telephone system the CIC uses for customer interaction. Additionally, the CIC continues to analyze which knowledge articles and topics on the website are being requested the most to make sure we are providing the correct topics and updated information to the public. Once fully implemented, the survey will provide us with actual customer feedback on their interaction with the website and/or a Public Information Officer/CSR so that customer satisfaction data can be reviewed, and adjustments made where needed.

**Challenges and Next Steps**

The CIC faces continuing challenges in the following areas:

- **Customer Research:** Absence of customer data until the Touchpoints survey is integrated.
- **Service Design:** Due to an unforeseen contractual issue, the CIC was required to change telephone hardware and software providers in a three-week period late in FY 2021. This resulted in the training and learning of a new phone system for the entire staff. Additionally, this has resulted in the delay of the telephone portion of the survey going into full production. The new phone system will not be fully integrated with the customer relationship management system for several months.
- **Measurement:** The same difficulties noted above have slowed the progress for the implementation of a CIC specific customer survey.

While the CIC will be continuing efforts across all five CX functions and it plans to focus on Governance and Measurement and accomplish the following by September 30, 2022:

- **Measurement:** Fully implement the survey instrument based on the GSA’s Touchpoints Tool to gauge the customer experience with the self-service website and also with Public Information Officer/CSR interaction via phone and emails.
  - The website and email portion of the survey went live in September 2021. The telephone portion of the survey will be available in late FY 2022.

Phone call and email volume continues to increase leading the CIC to believe that self-service materials on the website can be improved to increase the number of users that can resolve their issues without having to contact a Public Information Officer. The survey portion that is currently in production for the website and emails will provide that data.

**Emergency and Disaster Relief (FEMA)**

**Progress**

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, FEMA prioritized integrating equity and equitable outcomes in the Agency’s programs, policies, and services. This renewed focus on equity was designed to better serve historically marginalized communities and people who face unique barriers before, during, and after disasters. FEMA’s initiatives to advance equity included:
• The formation of an Equity Enterprise Steering Group (ESG);
• A robust internal and external stakeholder engagement process to develop the agency’s 2022-2026 Strategic Plan;
• Expanding the list of acceptable forms of documentation disaster survivors can use to verify ownership/occupancy for homeowners and renters;
• Providing expanded housing assistance and other needs assistance funding to disaster survivors with needs that have not historically risen to the level of eligibility;
• Expanding financial assistance for survivors with disaster-caused disabilities;
• Collaborating with the Small Business Administration (SBA) to increase the income threshold to ensure a larger pool of low-income survivors have access to disaster assistance without first applying for an SBA loan; and
• Supporting equitable outcomes during the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency by:
  • Requiring that equity and demographics data be considered when choosing the location of FEMA supported Community Vaccination Center Pilot Sites.
  • Establishing a Civil Rights Advisory Group (CRAG) in FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center to coordinate and elevate emerging equity issues.

FEMA’s work over the course of FY 2021 has also leveraged the expertise of partners across the federal government. FEMA’s multifaceted collaborations with Technology Transformation Services at the General Services Administration (GSA) included the following activities for FEMA:

• A Presidential Innovation Fellow led a human-centered design sprint to improve the Remote Inspections process;
• Program staff partnered with the Center of Excellence for Contact Centers to enhance the use of Guided Services for both customers and agents; and
• GSA’s 10x Technology Innovation team collaborated on innovation ideas to improve back-end data sharing across federal agencies for DisasterAssistance.gov and to identify new opportunities to help survivors communicate their disaster-caused losses.

Governance

To improve customer experience (CX) governance activities across the Agency, FEMA’s Individual Assistance Division hosted discussions with established CX experts at other federal agencies, including the US Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the US Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). These discussions educated FEMA leaders on how FEMA could model its CX governance and capacity building after the success of other federal agencies.

In FY 2021, FEMA also created a new formal governance body, an Equity Enterprise Steering Group, with a focus on assessing issues like survivor and community access to and receipt of FEMA programs, services, and activities. Members include representatives from each of the major offices across the agency and is co-chaired by the Office of Equal Rights (OER) and the Office of Response and Recovery (ORR). The group is designed to drive forward FEMA’s commitment to equity in every part of the agency.

Organization & Culture

Throughout FY 2021, FEMA’s Grassroots CX Community has continued to build awareness and improve the collaboration of CX interested staff from across the Agency. With FEMA’s CX activities
embedded in individual program offices throughout the agency, the Grassroots CX Community has helped identify and elevate CX opportunities and priorities to an Agency-wide audience. The primary activities of the Grassroots CX Community have included monthly discussions with CX experts from fellow DHS components, such as DHS’s US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), CISA, and as other federal agencies, such as the VA, USDA, and OMB. FEMA’s Grassroots CX Community has helped instill CX best practices within the Agency to include consulting on FEMA’s COVID-19 Funeral Assistance program, Equity Centered Community Design, and the importance of building accessible programs.

Throughout FY 2021, FEMA’s Individual Assistance Division continued to work closely with High Impact Service Provider leads at USCIS and TSA to identify collaboration opportunities and to compare best practices across DHS components. The FEMA team regularly leads these conversations, and CX experts from CISA have joined these discussions as well.

**Customer Research**

In FY 2021, FEMA continued its work supporting OMB, GSA, and the Federal Customer Experience Initiative (FCXI) team by building a cross-agency journey map from the perspective of the disaster survivor. To learn more about the survivor experience, OMB, GSA, and FCXI interviewed 21 different subject matter experts from FEMA and documented their observations.

As part of its COVID-19 response efforts, FEMA provided financial assistance for funeral expenses incurred for deaths related to COVID-19. To better understand the needs of potential beneficiaries, FEMA conducted an extensive outreach effort to funeral directors and other deathcare providers. This customer research sprint supported the successful rollout of FEMA’s COVID-19 Funeral Assistance program, which provided more than $1.2 billion dollars to over 192,000 impacted families.

**Service Design**

FEMA has expanded its adoption of innovative approaches to designing services and programs. FEMA’s Disaster Recovery Center (DRC) team partnered with the VA’s Veterans Experience Office (VEO) to pilot a new VA VEO course focused on building Human-Centered Design (HCD) capabilities and infusing an HCD mindset into the development and implementation of government programs and services. With more than 75,000 survivors visiting DRCs in calendar year 2020, DRCs are an important survivor touchpoint and are a critical opportunity to improve the survivor experience. During FY 2021, the FEMA Individual Assistance Division onboarded a staff member with expertise in HCD. This staff person joined a Presidential Innovation Fellow, FEMA’s first since 2013, in an HCD sprint that focused on the remote inspection process to verify disaster caused damage and determine habitability of survivor homes.

**Measurement**

In FY 2021 FEMA’s survivor survey capabilities were expanded to include electronic delivery and collection. This collection method allows FEMA to potentially reach respondents that may have otherwise been unable or unwilling to participate via phone collection. Phone collection continues as a complement to electronic surveys to best capture respondents using their preferred communication method.


**Challenges and Next Steps**

FEMA accomplishes its mission to serve people before, during, and after disasters, through its core values of Compassion, Fairness, Integrity, and Respect. In FY 2022, FEMA will release a 2022-2026 Strategic Plan that focuses on developing FEMA into an agency that the nation needs and deserves. In the future, FEMA will continue its strong focus to achieve equitable outcomes, improve the nation’s climate resilience, and create a prepared nation.

**Domestic Aviation Travel (TSA)**

**Progress**

TSA continues to make significant progress across all 5 focus areas below and has been deemed a model by OMB for other federal High Impact Service Providers looking to improve their customer experience. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) performs domestic security operations at the Nation’s airports, screening over two million domestic travelers each day (prior to COVID-19 impacts to travel volume).

**Governance**

The Customer Service Branch (CSB) continues to serve as the primary point of contact for TSA CX activities and has created a high-level TSA CX Strategic Plan with priority strategic initiatives. CSB has made significant progress in the implementation of these initiatives including: “Develop unified TSA-wide CX vision, strategy, metrics, and roles;” “Design and pilot employee CX training and recognition program;” and “Design and pilot improved passenger awareness of TSA communication channels” (as further detailed in the additional focus areas following). CSB designed and is actively implementing metrics to measure progress across these initiatives and incorporate lessons learned into our future CX strategic plans.

Furthermore, through CSB’s collaboration with OMB and OPM to investigate the relationship between employee experience (EX) and CX (further detailed in the “Measurement” section below), CSB has presented their EX/CX pilot and findings publicly at various CX-related conferences and summits and within the federal government at OMB, GSA, and DHS-level meetings to share this work with other agencies and departments focused on improving federal customer experience.

**Organization & Culture**

CSB supports approximately 177 Customer Support Managers (CSMs), who are the “face” of customer experience at airports across the country and are responsible for resolving customer complaints at the airport level. Given CSMs critical role in delivering high-quality customer experience, CSB conducted an in-depth Customer Support Manager (CSM) survey in the spring of 2020 to assess CSMs’ top CX-related support needs. Based on the survey results, CSB designed, launched, and maintained a CSM community of practice to foster cross-airport collaboration and best-practice sharing on CX topics. CSB designed a corresponding SharePoint site to house and share critical customer experience templates, tools, and best practices with CSMs nation-wide. Additionally, CSB conducted monthly CSM conference calls and sent out monthly newsletters, highlighting complaint/compliment trends, recognizing officers and airports for excellence in customer service, and provide guidance on new or existing policies.
Furthermore, CSB designed and launched a CX briefing for the entire TSA screening workforce to educate the screening workforce on how customer service supports TSA’s security mission and which departments are available to support staff in customer service needs. Thus far, CSB has deployed this briefing to more than 1,200 participants at airports across the country. CSB offers the briefing on a monthly basis to the entire workforce and continues to offer targeted trainings to airports in need. In addition, the briefing was piloted at the TSA Academy and is under consideration for inclusion in the new-hire basic training program. CSB is measuring initial reactions to the briefing as well as gathering qualitative feedback regarding its impact on participants one and three months after the sessions. Early responses from Customer Support Managers (CSMs) are very positive. They remarked that officers who attended the briefing “have a better understanding of the [customer service] support roles” and are “more knowledgeable of why [customer service] is our mission.”

Customer Research
Building on the April/May 2019 passenger experience survey conducted at airport checkpoints and passenger feedback from current channels, TSA conducted deep-dive assessments with TSA Executives, FSDs, CSMs, and Supervisory Transportation Security Officers throughout 2020 and 2021 to further identify customer pain points and potential solutions. TSA has designed and is now implementing a series of pilots to improve customer experience across key areas identified in these assessments. In addition, TSA conducted in-depth journey maps from booking a flight reservation through retrieving checked baggage. CSB has also created personas for multiple categories of travelers.

TSA is currently in the process of determining a timeline, plan and funding for the next passenger experience survey to gather in-person customer feedback at airport checkpoints across the country. Assuming TSA obtains funding in FY22, we will conduct a passenger experience survey in the spring of 2022.

Service Design
TSA engaged with multiple disability and multicultural coalition groups to discuss screening equipment advances and procedural changes, meeting with the coalitions quarterly and holding an annual conference. Further, based on passenger and CSM feedback, TSA designed new process flow charts for the screening workforce on how to direct passengers to TSA customer service departments, including the TSA Contact Center, Ask TSA, and TSA Cares. TSA also gathered passenger feedback on TSA’s passenger communication channels and is designing a pilot for improved passenger communications based on this feedback. TSA created a new web form on tsa.gov to allow the public to request assistance through the checkpoint via the TSA Cares program. Previously the public had to call TSA Cares and speak to an agent to coordinate assistance. This new feature provides a self-service option for the public.

Measurement
TSA conducted robust TSA-wide surveys including: TSA Contact Center and Universal Enrollment Services (UES) Help Desk phone and email surveys; in-person surveys at UES TSA PreCheck® enrollment centers; TSA.gov user surveys; and surveys following @AskTSA interactions. The CSB creates and distributes ongoing reports to leadership within the Office of Civil Rights and Liberties,
Ombudsman, and Traveler Engagement on contact center complaints, compliments, and requests for assistance regarding passengers with disabilities.

TSA also collaborated with OMB and OPM to investigate the relationship between customer experience data (gathered from the TSA Contact Center) and employee engagement-satisfaction data [gathered from Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS)]. The OMB CX Cross Agency Priority Goal team has asked the federal CX community to follow TSA’s lead and similarly investigate the relationship between their customer experience data and employee engagement-satisfaction data. TSA continues to use the CX/EX project to make data-driven decision in regards to training and support for airports across the country. TSA is continuing to work with OMB to obtain 2020 FEVS results to update the map accordingly.

Finally, TSA has drafted a TSA-wide CX Metrics dashboard to house all of TSA’s customer experience-related metrics in a central location. The metrics in the dashboard are aligned to all of the OMB A-11 Section 280 focus areas to track customer experience across: 1) Satisfaction, 2) Confidence/Trust, 3) Effectiveness/Quality, 4) Ease/Simplicity, 5) Efficiency/Speed, 6) Equity/Transparency, and 7) Employee Helpfulness.

**Challenges and Next Steps**

Following are a set of challenges TSA has experienced, organized by focus area:

- **Governance:** Due to COVID-19, TSA has been unable to hold an in-person Leadership Visioning session to align all TSA Executives to the TSA CX future vision and strategic path forward.

- **Organization & Culture:** As passenger volumes have continued to rise and recover from COVID-19, it is more difficult for airports to prioritize CX-related trainings as the TSA Officers are needed at the checkpoints.

- **Customer Research:** There is a need for funding to support timely and relevant customer research activities.

- **Service Design:** There is a need for funding to support ongoing service design activities critical to improved customer experience. In addition, our Security Policies and Procedures are not always open for discussion and feedback, as our primary function is ensuring travelers are safe and secure.

- **Metrics:** It is difficult to aggregate all TSA customer experience related data centrally in one location; however, TSA is working to centralize all TSA-wide customer experience data in a unified TSA-wide CX Performance Dashboard.

The following provide some near-term next steps TSA will be addressing.

- Incorporate pilot learnings and finalize plan for FY 22 roll-out of 3 strategic initiatives TSA-wide (2nd Quarter FY 2022):
  - #1: Conduct Ongoing Implementation of Employee CX Training and Recognition Program;
  - #2: Implement TSA-wide CX Vision, Strategy, Metrics, and Roles; and
  - #3: Implement Passenger Communication Channel Process Improvements.
• Finalize FY 2022-2023 TSA-wide CX Blueprint for organization-wide implementation across strategic focus areas (2nd Quarter FY 2022).

Finalize design and plan for Passenger Experience Survey (Version 2) to be conducted in FY 2022 (2nd Quarter FY 2022).

**Immigration Benefits (USCIS)**

**Progress**

USCIS’ External Affairs Directorate (EXA), Office of Citizenship and Applicant Information Services (CAIS), continues to work with OMB and serve as the lead in reporting on the USCIS CX for the immigration benefits mission program. EXA ensures that USCIS is communicating externally with a consistent, unified message and in doing so, leverages resources across the directorate to support the agency’s communication and engagement goals while supporting USCIS’ priority to promote expansion and adoption of user-centric online tools to manage the application and benefit request process through a secure, multifunctional online account. As part of EXA, CAIS continues to improve CX for immigration benefits by creating and refining its resources and tools through its three divisions:

- **Public Services Division** responds to questions by phone, email, live chat, and written correspondence through the USCIS Contact Center. It also provides language services to USCIS and other DHS components.

- **Digital Services Division** manages the USCIS websites and online self-help tools. It also builds digital forms and online account services.

- **Office of Citizenship** provides instruction and training on citizenship rights and responsibilities, administers the Citizenship and Integration Grant Program, and provides tools and resources to foster immigrant integration.

CAIS strives to meets all High Impact Service Provider requirements, including the completion of the capacity assessment, action plan, and submission of quarterly survey data. Several initiatives are underway throughout CAIS and are detailed in the sections that follow.

**Governance**

CAIS embraces the importance of CX, as well as its impact on the public and USCIS employees. CX remains at the core of CAIS’ strategic priorities, which include the following:

- Centralize the agency’s online services and tools to create value for applicants and create capacity within the adjudicative process;
- Unify web presence and create a digital gateway to services that allows applicants to better self-serve and create efficiency and accuracy in our adjudicative processes;
- Reduce barriers through assimilation and education initiatives that enhance awareness of citizenship rights and responsibilities; and
- Foster an engaged workforce that is highly trained, informed, and connected to the mission.

CAIS’ priorities align with the USCIS Strategic Plan, and progress is monitored on an ongoing basis. To ensure cross-collaboration across the agency, CAIS is a member of several working groups to
include the USCIS Contact Center Working Group, Information Technology Steering Committee, Online Filing Promotion Working Group, the Data Standards Working Group, and the Language Access Working Group. CAIS also participates in several external groups consisting of federal and industry partners that have the joint focus of improving public services, including the newly formed Immigrant Military Members and Veterans Initiative and interagency working group to promote naturalization under Executive Order 14012.

**Organization & Culture**
Customer Service is a core competency in all DHS employee performance plans, including USCIS. Employees must understand and anticipate the needs of those whom USCIS supports and use feedback to improve services. To enhance our capabilities, the USCIS Performance and Learning Management System has an extensive training library focused on CX.

**Customer Research**
CAIS engages applicants and employees through customer-centric research methods when developing new technologies and processes, including ethnographic research, usability testing, and focus groups. CAIS also has a team of CX experts dedicated to research and human-centered design who meet with end users to gather insights to inform development projects. Examples of research conducted in FY 2021 include:

- Focus groups with English and bilingual speakers, along with their representatives to better understand the online filing experience;
- Usability testing with applicants, petitioners, and representatives filing Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status;
- Usability testing on general and personalized processing times;
- Usability testing on forms I-821 and I-765 for Temporary Protected Status, the agency’s first forms available for concurrent online filing through the USCIS Online Account (myUSCIS);
- Usability testing with applicants on case processing notifications and inactivity alerts;
- Dedicated working group with CIS Ombudsman to collect, discuss and strategize on customer feedback;
- Research conducted on the representative account to help improve the overall representative online experience. This research was conducted to learn more about the representative user flow and how the account can be enhanced for those seeking to file large quantities of forms online. This effort focused on gathering insights as well as, recommendations and testing new designs that may be implemented to accommodate representatives with numerous clients.
- Research on organizational accounts centered on understanding employer needs to file employment benefits, understanding employer needs for account types and a corporate account structure, and documenting the model of corporate users as a basis for updates to the account structure.

**Service Design**
CAIS shapes new IT and digital investments using the human-centered design principles and best practices in service design, including delivering unified and efficient systems. When developing IT projects, CAIS seeks opportunities to integrate with other systems to create a true end-to-end
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digital experience for users and optimize efficiencies. CAIS builds front-end user interfaces for online filing that include integration of the underlying case management systems and leveraging of centralized IT services. In FY 2021, CAIS, in partnership with the Office of Information Technology and several other USCIS offices, expanded the agency’s online filing presence through the deployment of several new forms, tools, and enhancements to existing capabilities, including:

- Form I-821, Application for Temporary Protected Status, for countries eligible for both initial and re-registration;
- Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization, specifically for categories (c)(3)(A), (c)(3)(B), (c)(3)(C), (a)(12) and (c)(19) and concurrent filing with form I-821, Application for Temporary Protected Status;
- Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal, with a soft launch planned for Q1 of FY 2022;
- Form I-821D, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) package (I-765 (c)33, I-765WS), with a soft launch planned in Q1 of FY 2022; and
- Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization (c)08 (Photo Validation), with a soft launch planned for Q1 of FY 2022.

Measurement
Prior to FY 2021, CAIS successfully integrated Qualtrics with the USCIS Contact Center (phone, email, chat and written correspondence), online account, online filing and the virtual assistant Emma. In FY 2021, CAIS built on the FY 2020 progress by completing the integration of the Qualtrics survey platform across multiple external-facing channels. In FY 2021, CAIS expanded on that success by integrating Qualtrics with uscis.gov, adding additional survey capabilities to the online filing experience, and leveraging Qualtrics to assist with recruiting participants for human-centered design initiatives.

Challenges and Next Steps
- Challenge: Lack of funding causes a delay from advancing technological updates to improve customer service channels.
  - Next Step: Anticipate new funding opportunities, which will enhance deliverables. Most recently, section 4102 of the USCIS Stabilization Act, a provision of the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2021 and Other Extensions Act (Pub. L. 116-159), granted USCIS additional flexibility that will help provide support for CX initiatives moving forward. Specifically, it authorizes USCIS to utilize Premium Processing funds for the improvement of infrastructure for customer service purposes, ensuring authorization of funding for CX even in the absence of direct appropriations. Additionally, Section 4103 of the same act requires USCIS to develop and report semi-annually on a plan to digitize and improve USCIS processes, including electronic customer service.
    - Target Completion Date: Ongoing FY 2022.
- Challenge: Interactive Voice Response (IVR) System requires refinement to optimize routing between self-service and live service options.
  - Next Steps: Content changes to the IVR that resolve inquiries without transfer to live service; promotion of IVR self-help capabilities and other online resources; enhance the online account so that more applicants have personalized information about their case.
- Target Completion Date: Ongoing FY 2022.

- **Challenge:** Increase use of live chat opportunities for customers.
  - **Next Step:** Build routing algorithm to allow direct chat access to different tiers within the USCIS Contact Center.
  - **Target Completion Date:** Ongoing FY 2022.

- **Challenge:** Increase transparency with case status.
  - **Next Steps:** Provide individualized processing times for USCIS Online Account holders and provide proactive case updates to reduce inquiries.
  - **Target Completion Date:** Ongoing FY 2022.

- **Challenge:** Hiring pause and the overall staffing challenges within USCIS limit the ability of Contact Center to increase staff in order to better serve the public in a timely manner.
  - **Next Step:** Promote online tools and resources and increase public transparency about wait times for live assistance. Expand access to the USCIS Online Account to allow customers greater ability to self-manage pending cases.
  - **Target Completion Date:** Ongoing FY 2023.

- **Challenge:** Lack of a consolidated knowledge management system.
  - **Next Step:** Implement a knowledge management system to ensure consistency in publicly facing information and improve effectiveness of content across channels.
  - **Target Completion Date:** TBD.

- **Challenge:** Provide a unified website experience across uscis.gov (including the Citizenship Resource Center) and my.uscis.gov.
  - **Next Step:** Continue to build upon the July 2020 launch of the refreshed Drupal 8 website for uscis.gov and uscis.gov/es, which in addition to providing improved design and content, unifies design styles with my.uscis.gov.
  - **Target Completion Date:** Ongoing FY 2023.
Human Capital Operating Plan (HCOP)

Primary Goals of the HCOP

The Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer (OCHCO) provides thought leadership and guidance to the DHS human capital community to support the mission of the Department. Partnering with the human capital officers from each of the DHS Components through the Human Capital Leadership Council (HCLC), OCHCO articulates the DHS human capital goals and Department-wide programs and initiatives for the fiscal year in the Human Capital Operational Plan (HCOP or Plan). The plan is required in accordance with 5 Code of Federal Regulations §250.205, Strategic Human Capital Management, including the Federal Human Capital Framework and Federal Workforce Priorities. The plan further addresses skills and competency gaps in the Priority Mission Critical Occupations (PMCO), the Human Resources (HR) community, and the cybersecurity workforce.

The HCOP for fiscal years (FY) 2020 – 2024 identifies multi-year priorities that advance the human capital objectives and activities described in the DHS Strategic Plan for FY 2020 – 2024. It provides the accountable structure and performance metrics that support a unified approach to advancing these priorities and strengthening human capital service delivery Department-wide.

The Plan highlights three key HCLC priorities: HR Academy, Employee and Family Readiness (EFR), and Human Resources Information Technology (HRIT). The key priorities—in addition to the recruitment, hiring, and retention of the Department’s Mission Critical Occupations (MCOs)—represent a commitment and concerted effort shared by all DHS Components. These HCLC priorities are detailed below.

- **HR Academy** – Provides education, training, and career development opportunities to DHS HR professionals by strengthening service delivery through enhanced federal Human Capital (HC) core competencies; to shape and build a highly qualified, effective, mission-focused, and resilient HC workforce; and empower current and future HC professionals with the necessary tools to achieve their career goals. HR Academy outlines sequential and progressive training for functional specialties as well as supervisory and leadership development. The HR Academy also provides competency development in all aspects of HR management, manpower and resource management, equal employment opportunity, information management, and acquisition management.

- **Employee and Family Readiness (EFR)** – Is a Secretarial priority established to improve readiness of DHS employees—and support of their families—by increasing awareness, access to, and delivery of programs, benefits, and resources vital for resilience and health. Comprised of members from DHS Components, the Employee and Family Readiness Council (EFRC), the Resilience Health and Performance Committee, and the Workforce Readiness Committee work together to coordinate and unify programs that bolster a stronger, mission-ready workforce by promoting family, financial, and personal wellness among the Department’s employees. Of the family resilience issues being addressed by the EFRC, the top five have been continued and expanded, in light of the ongoing pandemic and its impact, to be: Social Connectedness, Strategic Messaging, Dependent Care (childcare), Total Wellness (encompassing mental health, suicide prevention, general stress, personal...
relationships, and physical well-being), and Financial Concerns.

- **HR Information Technology (HRIT)** – The mission of this initiative is to increase functionality and reduce redundancies of HR systems across the DHS by implementing and managing consolidated suites of modernized business solutions. HRIT is positioned to deliver new, more efficient, and expanded HRIT automation capabilities across the DHS. Coupled with our data analytics capabilities, HRIT will change the nature of the HC workload. The HRIT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) provides Department-wide strategic direction for the implementation of all associated HRIT services and solutions. The HRIT ESC works to strengthen the governance over the DHS HRIT portfolio initiatives to automate transactional HR functions that are being performed manually, direct investment in enterprise-wide solutions to replace legacy systems, and ensure alignment of the portfolio with the Department’s human capital objectives.

In addition to the three HCLC priorities, the HCOP also highlights two Department-wide Human Capital Initiatives: **Inclusive Diversity** and **DHS Cybersecurity Workforce**.

- **Inclusive Diversity (ID)** – This initiative aims to elevate the human experience by unleashing the power of the shared human spirit, expanding opportunities to grow and serve together while leading with the intention to make a difference. ID focuses on improving our employee culture, using demographic data analytics and innovative programs and through best practices in ID training and cultural competencies and inclusive behaviors, while also driving a better return on our investments in Strategic Recruiting (SR). ID emphasizes the importance of building inclusive workplaces, which are comprised of a set of behaviors that promote collaboration and high performance, creativity and innovation, fairness and respect, and an environment where employees believe they belong. The Department has one of the most diverse workforces in the Federal Government with notable accomplishments in veteran recruitment, employment of Individuals with Disabilities, and Diversity and Inclusion management. In FY21, DHS shifted its ID programs to align with Executive Order (EO) 14035, *Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility in the Federal Workforce*, to ensure the DHS workforce reflects the diversity of America and leverages the inward-facing employment policies & practices to ensure that DHS employees at all levels have an equal opportunity to succeed and lead.

- **DHS Cybersecurity Workforce** – Strengthening cybersecurity is one of the Department’s top priorities. The Cybersecurity Workforce initiative focuses on leveraging cybersecurity workforce planning and analysis to ensure clear understanding of current cybersecurity bench strength to meet mission needs and to be responsive to statutory reporting requirements, including those associated with the Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act (P.L. 113-246) and the Federal Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-113, tit. III). This initiative also focuses on implementing the broad authority Congress granted the Secretary in P.L.113-277 (6 U.S.C. § 658) to establish an alternative personnel system to recruit and retain cybersecurity talent in order to address cybersecurity mission needs. The Cyber Talent Management System (CTMS) will strengthen our cybersecurity workforce through new recruiting, hiring, retention, and compensation practices.
Employees hired and managed using CTMS will be part of the DHS Cybersecurity Service, and will contribute to the Nation's cybersecurity, while enhancing their cybersecurity expertise. CTMS is an example of civil service reform for cybersecurity work, providing a new way to enter public service and join the broader team of federal employees supporting the Department’s cybersecurity mission.

**Progress Update**

Despite the continuous environmental challenges as a result of the nearly two-year pandemic, there has been significant progress made by each Priority. However, amid the constantly changing environment, the DHS demand for essential human capital services has continued to grow. For example, as demands increased and the shift to a more sustainable virtual environment occurred due to the pandemic, many of the projects/initiatives experienced challenges.

EFR and Inclusive Diversity were faced with funding limitations that impacted the programs’ ability to implement consistent Department-wide dependent care and technological systems (such as SMORE and virtual ID training). Funding for these initiatives will be available in FY23 to support the implementation of EO 14035.

As the HRIT enterprise-wide solution work continues, DHS is challenged with external mandates and a Government Accountability Office (GAO) protest that has impacted the ability to implement the training solutions and assess the new systems (i.e., receive an Authorization to Operate) on schedule.

Lastly, implementing CTMS and the DHS Cybersecurity Service was delayed due to the transformative nature of the CTMS and DHS Cybersecurity Service launch, including the need for specialized human capital expertise and redesign of existing business processes involving payroll and timekeeping systems. DHS is proud to report CTMS has entered into effect as of November 2021.
Major Management and Performance Challenges and High-Risk Areas—Summary of Progress

DHS responds to reports on major management and performance challenges (MMPC), and high-risk areas from the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), respectively. Annually, OIG reports what the Inspector General (IG) considers to be the most serious challenges facing the Department and assesses DHS’ progress in addressing those issues. Every two years, GAO identifies federal programs and operations that are high risk due to their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. GAO also includes areas which GAO believes needs broad-based transformations to address major economic, efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.

OIG’s Fiscal Year (FY) 2021 MMPC report stated that DHS’s most serious management and performance challenges remain largely unchanged from FY 2020, but added one challenge—“Securing Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure.” The seven challenges the IG identified are as follows:

- Performing Fully and Effectively during COVID-19;
- Countering Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats;
- Securing Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure;
- Ensuring Proper Financial Management;
- Ensuring Technology Supports Essential Mission Operations;
- Improving FEMA’s Contracts and Grant Management, Disaster Assistance, and Fraud Prevention; and
- Strengthening Oversight and Management of Major Systems Acquisition.

The IG’s report also stated that these challenges affect a broad spectrum of the Department’s operations and may overlap. These challenges also mirror three major priorities Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas identified during a May 2021 congressional hearing, addressing: (1) immigration; (2) cybersecurity; and (3) domestic violence/terrorism. Additional details can be found in the OIG’s report “Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security” (OIG-22-05, dated November 5, 2021), available at: https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2021-11/OIG-22-05-Nov21.pdf.

The Department’s management response to the OIG’s draft MMPC report noted the many partnerships critical to maximizing the Department’s operational capabilities, including its close coordination with the intelligence community, law enforcement, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials, nonprofit organizations, social service groups, and many others. This also includes DHS’s partnership with the OIG.

The Department welcomes OIG’s format change to this year’s report which more clearly outlines: (1) each challenge and why the challenge exists; (2) the progress made to address the challenge; and (3) what remains to be done. A full copy of the Department’s response, which provides
examples of additional context regarding the progress made to address each challenge, was included in an Appendix to the OIG’s final report.

The most recent report, GAO’s “HIGH RISK SERIES: Dedicated Leadership Needed to Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk Areas” (GAO-21-119SP, dated March 2, 2021), is available at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21-119sp.pdf. The report included two areas in which DHS is the lead federal agency, and eight government-wide areas with significant DHS equities, as noted in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Area</th>
<th>Year Issue First Added to GAO’s High-Risk List</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening DHS Management Functions</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Flood Insurance Program</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation</td>
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<td>Strategic Human Capital Management</td>
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<td>Managing Federal Real Property</td>
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<td>Ensuring the Effective Protection of Technologies Critical to U.S. National Security Interests</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>Limiting the Federal Government’s Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks</td>
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<td>Improving the Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations</td>
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<td>Government-wide Personnel Security Clearance Process</td>
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<td>National Efforts to Prevent, Respond to, and Recover from Drug Misuse</td>
<td>2021</td>
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As Secretary of Homeland Security Mayorkas remarked during a speech at the National Press Club on September 9, 2021:

*I am asked often how we do it all. Do we have the resources to manage through the challenges that our nation faces in the service of the mission, to which we are dedicated to keep the American public safe and secure? And the answer is a very straightforward one. We do because of the people that comprise the Department of Homeland Security. We do because of the extraordinary talent, dedication, and efforts of the men and women of our Department.*

In the same speech, the Secretary also highlighted that during the past year the Department was making efforts to:

- Adapt systems and processes to the emerging threat of domestic violent extremism;
- Close the equity divide regarding receiving individual assistance following extreme weather events;
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- Raise awareness of ransomware attacks and communicating practices that anyone can employ to guard against it;
- Change the language used to describe migrants who arrive in the United States and seek relief and who do not yet have lawful presence;
- Close two immigration detention centers that treated individuals in a substandard manner; and
- Lead Operation Allies Welcome, the all-of-government and public-private effort to resettle vulnerable Afghan nationals in the United States.

Our Nation truly faces a complex threat landscape with enemies and adversaries who are constantly evolving. Our work with OIG and GAO helped the Department build on already-considerable progress made since DHS’ formation, as we lead homeland security initiatives across the Nation, and the globe, that meet the threats of today and the future to keep America safe. Accordingly, the Department continually strives to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of all its programs and operations. However, the areas identified above merit a higher level of focus and attention. It is important to note that overcoming challenges in these areas requires long-term strategies for ensuring stable operations, sustained management attention, and resources; all of which the Department provides.

The remainder of this section provides a brief summary of the Department’s efforts to address each GAO high-risk area.

**GAO High-Risk – Status Update**

**GAO High-Risk Area: Strengthening DHS Management Functions (DHS-specific)**

**Overview:** In 2003, GAO designated “Implementing and Transforming DHS” as high-risk due to the significant challenges associated with transforming 22 agencies into one cohesive Department. This high-risk area includes challenges related to strengthening and integrating acquisition, information technology (IT), financial, and human capital management functions. In 2013, GAO acknowledged DHS’s significant maturation and narrowed this high-risk area from “Implementing and Transforming DHS” to “Strengthening DHS Management Functions.” This refocusing by GAO is a reflection of the considerable progress DHS made in transforming original Component agencies into a single cohesive Department.

As part of efforts to address this high-risk designation, DHS developed the “Integrated Strategy for High-Risk Management” (Integrated Strategy) in 2011, and has since provided updates to GAO every six months. The Integrated Strategy includes performance information and detailed corrective action plans used by DHS leadership to monitor and assess progress. Congress codified this practice in FY 2017 in 6 U.S.C. § 341(a) (11).

In order for “Strengthening DHS Management Functions” to be removed from the High-Risk List, DHS must meet GAO’s five removal criteria, in addition to demonstrating sustainable progress toward a “Fully Addressed” rating for 30 outcomes (GAO outcomes). The GAO outcomes, agreed-upon by both GAO and DHS in 2010, reflect the level of maturity DHS management
functions must reach in order to address the underlying challenges that contributed to GAO’s high-risk designation.

**Lead Office and Official:** Management Directorate (MGMT), Immediate Office of the Under Secretary for Management (IOUSM), Linda Hahn, Director, Strategic Engagement

**Progress:** Senior leaders from GAO and DHS continue to meet regularly to review the Department’s progress and discuss the steps remaining to resolve the “Strengthening DHS Management Functions” high-risk area. In the March 2021 High-Risk Series (GAO-21-119SP), GAO once again highlighted the continued exemplary commitment and support among top DHS leadership for addressing management challenges. GAO officials also recognized the DHS Integrated Strategy as a best practice for making progress on high-risk issues and stated that, if implemented and sustained, this approach provides a path for removal from the High-Risk List. As of September 2021, GAO rated 73 percent (22 of 30) of the GAO outcomes as either Fully Addressed or Mostly Addressed.

In September 2021, DHS published its most recent Integrated Strategy update ([https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-integrated-strategy](https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-integrated-strategy)). The report provides updates to corrective action plans for the 12 GAO outcomes not currently rated as Fully Addressed. In the March 2021 High-Risk Series, GAO reiterated that DHS’s strategy and approach (i.e., the Integrated Strategy), if effectively implemented and sustained, provides a path for DHS to be removed from the High-Risk List. The September 2021 Integrated Strategy emphasizes the important progress achieved across DHS management functions that has poised the Department for removal from the High-Risk List, including:

- Continuing to meet the majority of GAO’s five criteria for High-Risk List removal and positioning “Strengthening DHS Management Functions” as one of two remaining areas on the government-wide list to have met the majority of the removal criteria;
- Expanding the IT internal control program, which is a joint effort by the DHS Chief Information Officer (CIO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), to assist in the monitoring and management of the IT internal controls for the Department and jointly support Components in efforts to strengthen IT general controls, systems security, and IT internal controls environments;
- Earning its ninth consecutive clean audit opinion for all five financial statements;
- Sustaining the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office on, and migrating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) onto, a modernized core accounting system as part of the DHS financial systems modernization (FSM) efforts. In the third quarter (Q3) of FY 2021, the solution was moved to a cloud environment;
- Fully Addressing the GAO outcome concerning the Department’s Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) scores. In September 2021, GAO upgraded this outcome to Fully Addressed, acknowledging the tremendous progress DHS has made in improving employee engagement and overall employee satisfaction, as evidenced by steady, year-over-year increases since 2015 in both the Employee Engagement Index (EEI) and the Global Satisfaction Index (GSI); and
- Continuing efforts through the Joint Requirements Council (JRC) to identify common gap areas across the DHS Components and make joint requirements and commonality recommendations, demonstrating that the JRC is fully and sustainably integrated into the Departments planning and budgeting process.

**Planned Actions and Key Milestones:** DHS will continue to implement the Integrated Strategy in conjunction with broader efforts that contribute to strong and efficient management functions. The next Integrated Strategy update is planned for March 2022. During FY 2022, DHS expects to accomplish the following:

- Sustain and build upon progress on GAO outcomes and the five criteria for High-Risk List removal;
- Implement and monitor action plans to earn a “Fully Addressed” or “Mostly Addressed” rating on additional GAO outcomes;
- Continue FSM efforts to provide Components with modern, efficient, and compliant business systems, including financial, procurement, and asset management functions. The U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard) is on track to transition, starting in October 2021, and should be in full production in the first quarter of FY 2022, after which time its legacy system will begin to sunset;
- Monitor program health through the Acquisition Program Health Assessment process and when necessary, aggressively execute DHS-approved remediation plans to rebase line and remove programs from breach status;
- Continue DHS’s program manager certification training to achieve compliance across all Level 1 and 2 programs, and perform comprehensive staffing analysis reporting with recommendations to mitigate any critical staffing gaps; and
- Continue to deploy the multi-year strategy for addressing the two remaining areas of material weakness in financial reporting and IT controls, and fully remediate any significant deficiencies.

**GAO High-Risk Area: National Flood Insurance Program (DHS-specific)**

**Overview:** The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is a key component of the Federal Government’s efforts to limit the damage, suffering, and financial impact of floods. However, it is not likely to generate sufficient revenues to repay billions of dollars borrowed from the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) to cover claims starting with the 2005 hurricanes and catastrophic losses. The lack of sufficient revenues highlights structural weaknesses in how the program was designed, and is currently funded. The GAO also found weaknesses in the NFIP management and operations, including financial reporting processes and internal controls, and oversight of contractors that place the program at risk.

In 1968, Congress created the NFIP, which offers flood insurance to homeowners, renters, and business owners in participating communities. Participating communities agree to adopt and enforce ordinances that meet or exceed FEMA requirements to reduce the risk of flooding. Private sector write-your-own (WYO) insurance company partners sell NFIP policies under their
own names, with claims and related expenses paid for by the Federal Government. FEMA also sells policies directly through a servicing agent.

Congress reauthorized NFIP for five more years in the “Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012” (BW-12) which, in order to better ensure the fiscal soundness of the program, mandated certain increases for discounted and subsidized rates to begin transitioning them to full actuarial rates. The “Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014” (HFIAA) repealed certain parts of BW-12, including a provision phasing out grandfathered rates (which maintains a subset of discounted policies); set limits on premium rate increases for certain policyholders; and applied an annual surcharge to all policyholders.

However, the NFIP is not designed to be self-sufficient, as any insurance program that takes all comers without the ability to underwrite for concentration risk will end up in the financial position that the program currently finds itself. Accordingly, the NFIP is developing a sound financial framework to enhance and bring clarity to the NFIP’s financial capability within its statutory limitations, and FEMA has begun to address these issues by implementing legislation, improving contractor oversight, initiating product and policy rating redesign, obtaining reinsurance, and implementing Pivot as the NFIP’s System of Record.

Lead Office and Official: FEMA, Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration, David Maurstad, Deputy Associate Administrator for Federal Insurance and Mitigation

Progress: FEMA continued implementing annual premium rate increases in accordance with BW-12 and HFIAA, including: (1) applying new surcharges; and (2) releasing new rates and mapping standards. Further, FEMA is transforming the NFIP to improve the experience of NFIP policyholders.

- FEMA implemented Risk Rating 2.0 – Equity in Action. Beginning October 1, 2021, new policies are subject to the new rating methodology, and existing policyholders eligible for renewal will be able to take advantage of immediate decreases in their premiums. In Phase II of implementation, all remaining policies renewing on or after April 1, 2022, will be subject to the new rating methodology.
- To support Risk Rating 2.0 and the continuation of program changes, FEMA issued bulletins to WYO insurers and NFIP Direct in April and October 2021 (https://nfipservices.floodsmart.gov/wyobull2021.html). These documents provide notices of program changes to be made impacting their operational processes and information technology.
- FEMA continues to implement the following requirements into its ongoing program and reporting processes:
  - Set 25 percent annual premium rate increases for businesses, mandated under BW-12, which took effect in April 2016;
  - Set the annual premium rate increases, as required by HFIAA, at an average rate between 5-15 percent per risk class, without exceeding the 18 percent cap on annual premium rate increases for any individual policy; and
Applied a preferred risk premium rate for the first year to policies on properties that are newly mapped into a special flood hazard area, with increases of 18 percent per year until the rate reaches full risk rate.

In addition, reinsurance and similar risk transfer mechanisms allow FEMA to diversify the tools it uses to manage the financial consequences of its catastrophic flood risk. Prior to establishing the NFIP reinsurance program, the NFIP and Treasury bore all the policyholders’ risk. Although investments made through the NFIP Reserve Fund and the purchase of reinsurance for 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021 helped improve the soundness of the NFIP’s financial framework, they do not allow the NFIP to repay borrowings or service the debt should interest rates rise or fully pay future catastrophic losses. However, the current statutory language enables the NFIP’s Reinsurance Program to explore a range of reinsurance and Insurance Linked Securities (ILS) mechanisms. FEMA continues working to expand the NFIP Reinsurance Program.

In 2017, the NFIP transferred $1.042 billion of its financial risk to the private reinsurance market for the calendar year 2017. Continuing this risk management practice, in January 2018, FEMA secured $1.46 billion in reinsurance from 28 reinsurance companies to cover qualifying flood losses starting at $4 billion per event. To complement the NFIP’s existing traditional reinsurance coverage, FEMA recently completed an additional reinsurance placement.

For the first time, in calendar year 2018, this transaction secured reinsurance coverage from capital market investors. By engaging both the traditional reinsurance market and the capital market through ILS, the NFIP can reduce risk transfer costs, access greater market capacity, and further diversify its reinsurance partners.

For calendar year 2021, FEMA has $2.343 billion in reinsurance coverage through various traditional and capital market reinsurance agreements.

**Planned Actions and Key Milestones:** FEMA is implementing rate and policy changes to support the NFIP’s goals of building a fiscally sound NFIP, reducing disaster suffering, and closing the insurance gap, including:

- Developing a sound financial framework for the NFIP including the National Flood Insurance Fund, the Reserve Fund, repayable borrowing, Reinsurance and catastrophe bonds, and appropriations;
- Updating the NFIP’s risk rating methodology through the implementation of a new pricing methodology called Risk Rating 2.0. The methodology leverages industry best practices and cutting-edge technology to enable FEMA to deliver rates that are actuarily sound, equitable, easier to understand and better reflect a property’s flood risk.
- Ensuring that, beginning October 1, 2021, new policies will be subject to the new rating methodology and that existing policyholders eligible for renewal will be able to take advantage of immediate decreases in their premiums. All remaining policies renewing on or after April 1, 2022, will be subject to the new rating methodology; and
- Continuing the Policy Forms Redesign initiative to update FEMA’s insurance forms, as current forms were last substantively revised in 2000. This initiative will create a range
of coverage options that provide greater choice and value to policyholders and will, in turn, make flood insurance easier for agents to sell. Additionally, policy forms will be simpler and more understandable with an emphasis on plain language, and will utilize property and casualty insurance industry best practices. Further, it is important to note that adoption of new policy forms is subject to a federal rulemaking process that may take several years to complete. As price remains a barrier to entry for flood insurance for low-income households, FEMA will continue to pursue legislative opportunities to address flood insurance affordability concerns. FEMA will continue to work to ensure all property owners and renters can financially recover from flood losses to reduce disaster suffering.

GAO High-Risk Area: Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation (Government-wide)

Overview: Federal agencies and our Nation’s critical infrastructure—such as power distribution, water supply, telecommunications, and emergency services—rely extensively on computerized information systems and electronic data to carry out their operations. Risks to information systems include continuing insider threats from employees and business partners, escalating and emerging threats from around the globe, the ease of obtaining and using hacking tools, the steady advance in the sophistication of attack technology, and the emergence of new and more destructive attacks. Safeguarding these systems and data is essential to protecting national and economic security, as well as public health and safety. This safeguarding of federal computer systems and the systems that support critical infrastructure—referred to as cyber–Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)—is a continuing concern. Federal information security has been on GAO’s list of high-risk areas since 1997. In 2003, GAO expanded this high-risk area to include cyber-CIP and in 2015, added protecting the privacy of personally identifiable information (PII).

The DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) continues to prioritize the security of critical infrastructure systems through: (1) Binding Operational Directives (BOD) and Emergency Directives (ED), whose application extend throughout the federal civilian executive-branch (FCEB) space; (2) services to aid entities in identification of critical vulnerabilities; (3) assessments of High-Value Asset (HVA) Systems; (4) audits of Domain Name System infrastructure; (5) intrusion detection and prevention services; and (6) the overall improvement of the federal and private sector cybersecurity postures.

Lead Office and Official: CISA, Val Cofield, Chief of Strategy, Policy and Plans

Progress: The DHS CISA continues to make progress towards ensuring the security of federal information systems and critical infrastructure, specifically to include protecting the privacy of PII. While addressing cybersecurity requires a whole-of-government approach and a robust collaboration with the private sector, DHS continues to lead the Federal Government’s efforts to improve civilian cybersecurity. DHS is also committed to advancing its ability to develop and share situational awareness of cyber threats and vulnerabilities, while providing a security baseline for federal civilian agencies. Below is a snapshot of the work that is being carried out across CISA to mitigate risks to Federal Information Systems.

Cyber Assessments Team Vulnerability Scanning
The CISA Cyber Assessments team continues to increase its Cyber Hygiene (CyHy) scanning activities. These activities ensure Federal, State, Local, Tribal, Territorial, Private sector, Critical Infrastructure, and Elections entities who sign up for the service are aware of vulnerabilities on their internet-accessible systems. Throughout FY 2021 (as of September 9, 2021), CISA detected 23,038 new instances of vulnerabilities on networks of 77 of the 102 scanned FCEB agencies required to abide by BODs, including 841 vulnerabilities rated critical or high. Details and mitigation strategies accompanied the weekly vulnerability reports sent to all stakeholders, who are then responsible for patching or otherwise remediating the vulnerabilities found.

In April 2019, DHS issued BOD 19-02, Vulnerability Remediation Requirements for Internet-Accessible Systems, which supersedes BOD 15-01. BOD 19-02 builds upon the success of BOD 15-01 by advancing Federal requirements for high and critical vulnerability remediation to further reduce the attack surface and risk to Federal agency information systems. During FY 2021 (as of September 9, 2021), Federal agencies took a median time of 11.9 days to patch critical vulnerabilities: an increase of approximately 2 days (from 9.5 days) from FY 2020. Non-critical vulnerability patching also saw an increase in the total median time to patch from FY 2020 to FY 2021.

In order to help maximize agencies' ability to meet timelines for remediation of critical and high vulnerabilities per BOD 19-02, CISA sends automated vulnerability notification emails to Federal stakeholders. If any critical or high vulnerabilities are detected on an agency's network for the first time, an email notification is sent to the affected agency within 24 hours. These alerts help bridge the gap between initial detection and agencies' weekly CyHy reports, allowing federal stakeholders required to abide by the remediation timelines set forth in BOD 19-02 to investigate the vulnerabilities sooner and address them appropriately.

**Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program**

CDM strengthened the effectiveness of its partnerships with the private sector and other Federal agencies in securing cyber critical infrastructure, as the program made significant strides in helping agencies implement CDM capabilities and strengthen understanding of their network defense strategies.

On May 12, 2021, President Biden signed Executive Order (EO) 14208, "Improving the Nation’s Cybersecurity" to support the Nation’s cybersecurity, and protect the critical infrastructure and Federal Government networks underlying the national economy and way of life. This EO bolsters agency and CISA actions to secure the Federal Government’s networks, including enabling greater visibility into cybersecurity threats, advancing incident response capabilities, and driving improvements in security practices for key information technology used by Federal agencies. Currently, all 23 CFO Act agencies, as well as 66 Non-CFO Act agencies signed new Memoranda of Agreement (MOA) to continue participation in CDM. In 2021, the CDM program began migrating to a new dashboard technology platform to deliver a solution that enables increased scalability, performance, flexibility, and innovation. To date, 10 CFO Act agencies and 27 non-CFO Act agencies transitioned to the new dashboard platform and are able to use it for
cyber risk decisions. The remainder of participating agencies are expected to complete this migration in FY 2022.

Agency-Wide Adaptive Risk Enumeration (AWARE) is CDM’s risk-scoring methodology that provides participating agencies with enhanced situational awareness of cyber risk and encourages timely remediation of threats and vulnerabilities. AWARE answers the need for a standardized risk scoring methodology across Federal civilian enterprises that considers vulnerability type, how long the vulnerability has been published, where the vulnerability occurs, and other critical factors based on data collected by CDM tools and sensors. The CDM program initiated a Data Quality Management Plan in FY 2020 to assess data quality in use at agencies to verify the reliability of AWARE scoring reported via the Federal Dashboard. Initial assessments identified several contributing factors to underlying data quality, including the performance and scalability of the previous dashboard platform. The program will continue its remediation efforts in cooperation with agencies and CDM Systems Integrators through FY 2022 as agencies transition to the new dashboard. Meanwhile, efforts are ongoing to provide AWARE with improved visual risk indicators and expanded situational awareness capabilities to provide agencies with more effective ways to manage their risk posture.

The CDM program continues to support government-wide and agency-specific efforts to provide an adequate, risk-based, consistent, and cost-effective cybersecurity solution to protect Federal civilian networks across all organizational tiers.

EINSTEIN/ National Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS)

CISA also continues to provide EINSTEIN intrusion detection and prevention services to Federal agencies. EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated (E3A), which actively blocks known malicious traffic, is deployed through the primary internet service providers serving the Federal Government. As of August 30, 2021, 256 FCEB entities were brought on to E3A services, representing approximately 2.125 million FCEB users. CISA improved public-private sector partnerships by improving information sharing so partners can block threats before their networks are penetrated and otherwise detect intrusions sooner. CISA continues its dissemination of alerts, warnings, and bulletins.

GAO previously reported that DHS was partially, but not fully, meeting its stated system objectives of detecting intrusions, preventing intrusions, analyzing malicious content, and sharing information. GAO also reported that DHS had not developed metrics for measuring the performance of NCPS, recommending that DHS take action to enhance NCPS’s capabilities, among other things. In October 2018, NCPS transitioned a non-signature-based detection capability from a pilot to an operationally ready capability. This capability enhances NCPS’s current intrusion detection capability to include functionality that can detect deviations from normal network behavior baselines. There have been instances where the capability and data supported CSD’s Threat Hunting campaigns to determine the presence of threats. The NCPS Program Management Office and the Threat Hunting team continue to work on incorporating the capability into their operational procedures to enhance analytical processing.
**HVA Systems**

CISA combined the Security Architecture Review, Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, and portion of the Federal Incident Response Evaluation into a single HVA assessment and completed 46 HVA assessments to date and expects to complete a total of 50 by the end of FY 2021. The HVA assessment includes penetration testing, network, database and web application scanning and testing, and an interview battery covering 10 cybersecurity focus areas. HVA assessments use in-depth document reviews and interviews based on analysis of strengths and weaknesses of security controls supporting network and system architectures and components based on federal requirements, specifications, and risk management strategies. This evidence-based, and subject matter expert-based analysis, allows the HVA assessment to identify gaps in the security posture of HVA systems by integrating the aspects of people, process, and technology that comprise the HVA cybersecurity controls based on federal requirements, specifications, and leading practice risk management strategies.

Significantly, DHS currently provides agencies with actionable risk mitigation information based on CyHy vulnerability scans of internet-facing network devices and HVA assessments focused on agency-identified high-value assets. Since 2016, agencies reported the mitigation of more than 420 critical, major, and high vulnerabilities on HVA systems as identified by CISA assessments.

**Information Sharing**

CISA implemented the Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) as part of the capability required in accordance with the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015. As of September 4, 2021, CISA shared approximately 24.3 million actionable indicators via AIS. As of August 2021, there are 218 entities (37 Federal and 181 Non-Federal) directly connected to the CISA AIS TAXII server. CISA is also aware of at least 380 indirect recipients of AIS data, including 277 federal entities, via CISA’s Shared Cybersecurity Services data feeds. Indirect recipients receive the AIS data as downstream customers of data aggregators, who are themselves directly connected to AIS. For example, indirect recipients may receive AIS information via Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs)/Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) and Threat Intelligence Providers. However, CISA is only able to identify a downstream (i.e., indirect) non-Federal recipient of AIS data through voluntary customer interactions, meaning that the number of indirect recipients of AIS data known to CISA is likely not reflective of the full scope of entities receiving AIS data through a data aggregator. Accordingly, CISA has made available “Other Ways to Connect: ISACs, ISAOs, Threat Providers” at [https://www.cisa.gov/ais](https://www.cisa.gov/ais). As of August 2021, 14 organizations now actively share into the AIS capability, including 7 non-federal entities.

**Cybersecurity Directives**

In FY 2021, CISA issued four EDs that supported securing over 2.3 million hosts across FCEB information systems. These EDs were issued in response to known security threats to federal
information systems, including the software supply chain attack against SolarWinds Orion. EDs are often developed and issued in less than 24 hours with aggressive timelines for the FCEB to complete required actions. CISA’s ability to swiftly respond to emergency situations is aided by collaboration with industry partners as well as tremendous efforts from the agencies. The EDs and the agencies’ work have helped the FCEB build capacity in responding to these types of exigent threats.

ED 21-01: Mitigate SolarWinds Orion Code Compromise was issued December 13, 2020, and along with Supplemental Directions Versions 1-3, directed agencies to immediately disconnect certain SolarWinds Orion platform versions from their network, conduct forensic investigation, and, for all SolarWinds Orion platforms that remained in operation, update the version, and implement hardening requirements. Supplemental Direction Version 4, issued in April 2021, provided specific instructions for incident triage and remediation for agencies with networks that used affected versions of SolarWinds Orion and have evidence of follow-on threat actor activity. CISA provided the direction in the ED and Supplemental Direction as the minimum additional required actions for FCEB agencies subject to CISA’s ED authority. As of August 2021, 99 percent of reported affected instances are confirmed as disconnected.

ED 21-02: Mitigate Microsoft Exchange On-Premise Vulnerabilities, and subsequent Supplemental Directions (Version 1 issued March 2021 and Version 2 issued April 2021), addressed an exploitation of vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange on-premise products. This ED and Supplemental Direction required agencies to identify all instances of Microsoft Exchange on-premise products in their environments, examine them for any anomalous activity, report any indicators of compromise to CISA, implement hardening requirements, and deploy Microsoft updates. As of August 2021, 100 percent of reported on-premises Exchange instances have been updated or disconnected and 84 percent of agencies that host Microsoft Exchange on-premises servers reported on their status regarding hardening requirements.

ED 21-03: Mitigate Pulse Connect Secure Product Vulnerabilities, issued April 2021, addressed an active exploitation of vulnerabilities in Pulse Connect Secure Products, a widely used Secure Sockets Layer remote access solution. The directive required agencies to account for all Pulse Connect Secure virtual and hardware appliances hosted by the agency or third party on the agency’s behalf and run an integrity tool on these appliances to detect any mismatch of hashes, which indicates a compromise of the device, if detected. As of August 2021, 87 percent of reported instances are confirmed as either patched or disconnected.

ED 21-04: Mitigate Windows Print Spooler Service Vulnerability, issued July 2021, directed agencies to stop and disable the Print Spooler Service on all Microsoft Active Directory Domain Controllers and apply updates. The Microsoft Print Spooler service was found to improperly perform privileged file operations and failed to restrict access to functionality that allows users to add printers and related drivers, which in turn allows a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges on a vulnerable system. As of August 2021, 93.3 percent of total instances have all ED 21-04 requirements implemented.
National Cyber Incident Response Plan

DHS delivered the National Cyber Incident Response Plan to the White House on January 18, 2017, as required by the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 and Presidential Policy Directive 41. During FY 2021, 7 Hunt, 41 Remote Assistance, 19 Incident Response and Recovery, 3 Advisory, and 1 Extended Hunt deployments were provided to departments, agencies, and stakeholders.

Privacy

DHS creates a culture of compliance by integrating privacy protections into its cybersecurity programs from the outset. With the DHS Privacy Office being the first statutorily mandated privacy office in the Federal Government, it serves a unique role as both an advisor and oversight body for the Department. DHS deploys a layered approach to privacy oversight for the Department’s cybersecurity activities, starting with the Chief Privacy Officer, and extending through CISA’s Privacy Officer and dedicated privacy staff across the Department. Additionally, as part of its privacy compliance responsibilities, at the beginning of and throughout programmatic activities, DHS conducts Privacy Threshold Analysis (PTAs) and Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs) as a means of identifying programs and systems that are privacy sensitive. This demonstrates the inclusion of privacy considerations during the standup review of a program or system, providing a record of the program or system and its privacy requirements at the Department’s Privacy Office and demonstrating compliance with privacy laws and regulations. PTAs and PIAs are intended to identify privacy issues early in the program or system development process and build appropriate privacy protections into programs or systems from the beginning.

The issue identification and privacy protections specifically related to the Department’s EINSTEIN, CDM, CyberSentry, and other cybersecurity programs and initiatives are discussed more fully in PIA documentation available on DHS’s website. As discussed in these PIAs, DHS has processes in place to implement data minimization, which ensures data collection is limited to information determined to be necessary to understanding cyber threats. DHS further facilitates the implementation of appropriate privacy requirements through oversight activities such as Privacy Compliance Reviews and CISA’s Privacy Oversight Reviews. These reviews provide structured opportunities to verify that PII is being handled appropriately, and that privacy oversight mechanisms are operating effectively.

Vulnerability Disclosure Policies

A key component to receiving cybersecurity help from the public is to establish a formal policy that describes the activities that can be undertaken in order to find and report vulnerabilities on agency systems in a legally authorized manner. Such policies enable federal agencies to identify and remediate vulnerabilities before they can be exploited by an adversary – to immense public benefit.
CISA issued BOD 20-01 on September 2, 2020, which enhances the resiliency of the government’s online services by requiring that agencies publish a Vulnerability Disclosure Policy (VDP) and maintain supporting handling procedures. A VDP is an essential element of an effective enterprise vulnerability management program, and is critical to the security of internet-accessible federal information systems. The BOD was issued in support of the U.S. Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) M-20-32 Improving Vulnerability Identification, Management, and Remediation.

Within 180 calendar days following the issuance of BOD 20-01, 93 of 102 agencies, including 22 of 23 CFO Act agencies, published a VDP at the "vulnerability-disclosure-policy" path of their primary .gov website. CISA uses weekly scans to monitor agency compliance with this Directive, and takes actions for non-compliance when necessary. CISA will continue tracking to ensure that the VDPs’ scope expands over time, and will continue to engage with federal agencies throughout the timeline of BOD 20-01, as appropriate, to assist with their vulnerability disclosure policy development and mitigate concerns. CISA hosted eight virtual Vulnerability Disclosure Policy Courses for federal agencies from August to September 2021 to support policy development.

**Other DHS Cybersecurity Efforts**

TSA completed the final Workforce Assessment Report in May 2021, which identified several staffing inadequacies related to the pipeline cybersecurity mission, as well as a recommended workforce plan that would help ensure that TSA is able to meet its mission of reducing pipeline systems' vulnerabilities to physical and cybersecurity risks in a dynamic and evolving threat environment. TSA is currently in the process of identifying sources of funding within current resources and appropriate parties who can help identify and/or develop relevant additional data sources for data on prior attacks, natural hazards, feedback data on pipeline system performance, physical pipeline condition, and cross-sector interdependencies.

In addition, TSA incorporated additional cybersecurity questions to the cybersecurity Security Action Item section of their Mass Transit and Passenger Rail (MTPR) Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE). MTPR BASE is a comprehensive assessment of a stakeholder’s physical and cybersecurity policies that now incorporates all five core functions of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework to strengthen cybersecurity across the nation’s public transportation and highway community. There will also be an additional cybersecurity annex to the MTPR BASE, which includes 66 cybersecurity questions in a standalone assessment for a more comprehensive review.

**Planned Actions and Key Milestones:** To further protect the Federal Government’s information systems and to collaboratively protect non-federal entities, DHS increased its E3A coverage, in accordance with the “Cybersecurity Act of 2015.” DHS also plans to continue supporting agencies through the procurement and deployment of CDM capabilities and increase the volume of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures shared via AIS, while analyzing the relative value of those indicators.
During FY 2022, DHS expects to make important progress in reinforcing DHS’s role in protecting the Federal Government’s information systems and the Nation’s cyber critical infrastructures. Progress in this arena will be tracked through the FY 2022-2023 Agency Priority Goals focused on federal cybersecurity. Noted highlights include DHS plans to continue to:

- Provide agencies with actionable risk mitigation information based on cyber hygiene scans and HVA assessments;
- Improve active agency CDM data information exchanges with the Federal Dashboard with participating federal agencies;
- Track, via scanning, that the VDPs’ scope expands over time and continue to engage with federal agencies throughout the timeline of BOD 20-01 to assist with their vulnerability disclosure policy development and mitigate concerns; and
- Share actionable indicators via the AIS capability and increase the number of organizations actively sharing into the AIS capability, including non-federal information sharing and analysis organizations or security providers.

**GAO High-Risk Area: Strategic Human Capital Management (Government-wide)**

**GAO Overview:** Addressing national challenges requires a high-performing federal workforce able to safeguard the homeland against national threats and emergencies. However, current budget and long-term fiscal pressures, declining levels of federal employee satisfaction, the changing nature of federal work, and a potential increase of employee retirements could produce gaps in leadership and institutional knowledge. Mission-critical skills gaps impede federal agencies from cost-effectively serving the public and achieving results. Additional efforts are needed to coordinate and sustain efforts to close critical skill gaps and better use workforce analytics to predict emerging skills gaps. DHS has taken significant steps during the past year to develop and demonstrate sustained progress in implementing a results-oriented, human capital plan that identifies Departmental human capital goals, objectives, and performance measures, and is also linked to the Department’s overall strategic plan.

**Lead Office and Official:** MGMT, Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer (OCHCO), Kimya Lee, Executive Director, Strategic Workforce Planning and Analysis

**Progress:** The Department continues to play an important role in the U.S. Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) efforts to address this government-wide area by identifying and formally documenting human capital requirements for high priority missions. These efforts include utilizing innovative approaches to attract and retain talent to address skills gaps in key disciplines such as those for cybersecurity professionals and border security and immigration officers. GAO continues to favorably recognize the Department's structured workforce planning for mission critical occupations, enhanced employee engagement activities, improvements in enterprise leader development, leveraging competencies and individual performance in human capital decision-making, and human capital strategic planning activities.

Other relevant progress in DHS includes:

- Results of the 2020 FEVS, which showed continued improvement in employee engagement at DHS, with increases in the EEI and GSI scores continuing an upward trend
that began in 2016. Since 2015, EEI increased thirteen percentage points to 66 percent and GSI increased fourteen percentage points to 61 percent.

- OCHCO issuing guidance in 2021 outlining more rigorous requirements for Component employee engagement action plans and shifting to a two-year cycle for action planning to allow sufficient time for implementation.
- The Leadership Bridges strategy, which is a new element under the DHS Leader Development Program connecting employees to resources and developmental opportunities to enhance their leadership capacity prior to applying for, and advancing to, increased levels of leadership responsibilities. The new Supervisory Leadership Bridges Cohort Program develops a pool of non-supervisory employees, selected for traits validated to predict leadership effectiveness, in six mission-critical occupations.
- DHS graduated 50 fellows in two iterations of the Joint Mission Fellows Program, which advances national and homeland security objectives by building a cadre of mid-level leaders with formal mission skills, qualifications, and experience.
- In response to the ongoing challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, DHS focused on employee and family readiness by promoting resources for self-care, family support, financial literacy, and health and wellness topics such as age-appropriate screenings, community engagement and social connectedness, suicide prevention, and stress management.
- To support ongoing mental health, resiliency, and suicide prevention efforts, a renewed focus was placed on promoting the development and execution of Peer Support programs, which play a critical role in reducing the stigma associated with seeking care, and aids in increased utilization of Employee Assistance Program services by making referrals when appropriate.
- DHS continuing to make progress towards identifying cross-cutting training and development data, through access to Component training and development data. Delivery of real-time data became available at the end of FY 2020, and will be evaluated to help define common problems and identify best practices, solutions, and tools for training, education, and professional development.

**Planned Actions and Key Milestones:** In FY 2022, DHS will:

- Ensure operational Components submit bi-annual Engagement Action Plans, assessed by DHS OCHCO and signed by Component leadership;
- Prioritize the Employee and Family Readiness Program as a unified approach to employee wellness and operational readiness that includes support for the families of DHS employees;
- Build the Psychological Health and Readiness program to highlight the critical importance of psychological health in comprehensive wellness and readiness for DHS employees and their families; and
- Implement the Cyber Talent Management System (CTMS). CTMS will be a new approach to federal talent management featuring flexibilities for defining jobs and critical skills, conducting hiring, and will provide market-sensitive compensation.
GAO High-Risk Area: Managing Federal Real Property (Government-wide)

GAO Overview: Real property is a major cost driver for DHS. The allocated resources for leased rental payments, operation and maintenance, and purchase or improvement to land and structures is approximately $5 billion per year. About $2 billion per year goes toward leased rental payments. DHS-owned assets have an estimated functional replacement value of about $30 billion.

The DHS real property portfolio consists of more than 55,000 individual property records, and is comprised of buildings, structures, and land assets. The portfolio has a variety of mission use types to support the diverse missions of the Department, to include office, warehouse, family housing, laboratory, shore facilities, hangers, and structures, such as navigational aids and utility systems.

Within the DHS building portfolio, leases through the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) account for almost half of the Department’s building square footage, direct-leased building space accounts for a little over one-tenth of building space, and DHS-owned space accounts for the remaining building square footage.

The responsibilities of DHS’s Senior Real Property Officer are designated to DHS’s Chief Readiness Support Officer (CRSO). As part of the Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer (OCRSO), the Department’s Office of Real Property is responsible for providing Departmental strategy, policy, oversight, and coordination for DHS Components with delegated real property operating authority. There are 12 DHS Components with delegated real property operating authority, all of which have their own Senior Real Property Officer, funding structures, maturities, means, and strategies to deliver their real property programs in line with Departmental policies.

During the last two decades, real estate management practices, both in the public and private sectors, have shifted and DHS is working to leverage industry best practices. Best practices in industry and government are centered around three concepts:

- Centralized oversight with a real estate champion at the senior leadership level to set corporate objectives and emphasize the portfolio strategy;
- Analytics to drive decision making and decisions in terms of the best long-term interests of organizations; and
- Governance to ensure there is transparency and to facilitate enterprise decision-making.

DHS embraces these concepts and employed several strategies to improve real property management, reduce leasing costs, and reduce excess and underused property that are outlined below.

Lead Office and Official: MGMT, OCRSO, Tom Chaleki, CRSO

Progress: DHS continued its real property portfolio efficiency and reduction efforts, which aim to achieve the right facility, at the right location, at the right cost. DHS also continued efforts to
reduce the real property footprint by focusing on square foot (SF) reduction and cost savings to reduce dependency on leased locations and improve space utilization in both leased and owned locations. Further, the Department’s Federal Protective Service (FPS) provided integrated security and law enforcement services to federally owned, leased, or operated buildings, facilities, property, and other assets.

Federal Real Property Management

GAO designated federal real property as a high-risk government operation in 2003, citing numerous reasons, including the retention of excess and underutilized properties, an over-reliance on costly leasing to meet long-term space needs, and the use of unreliable data to support decision-making. Though the government-wide high-risk designation remains in effect, OCRSO is addressing risks to DHS through continued improvements to Departmental capabilities in policy, oversight, and coordination and by executing regional planning that looks to achieve consolidations, co-locations, and rightsizing.

Departmental Real Property Asset Management

Limited up-front funding to replace expiring leases, construct new facilities, and improve existing facilities makes it a challenge to acquire more efficient, less costly leased space or optimize government-owned space. In such a fiscally constrained environment, implementing, maintaining, and leveraging DHS policies that are based on best asset management practices that meet DHS strategic plan objectives is critical for effective asset and portfolio management.

Departmental policies seek to institutionalize strategic real property planning and management. OCRSO focuses on optimizing the Department’s portfolio through policies that deliver affordable readiness by standardizing the real property portfolio planning processes, improving space utilization, managing condition, and advancing cross-Component portfolio planning. These policies are driven by various strategic DHS goals and objectives, which are then supported by DHS’s real property asset management objectives. The DHS real property asset management objectives are: (1) Optimize Inventory; (2) Recapitalize Assets; (3) Maintain Condition; (4) Improve Utilization; (5) Deliver Affordable Readiness; and (6) Implement Effective Asset Management. These objectives largely align with the ten objectives issued by the Federal Real Property Council.

Policies such as the DHS Workspace Standard and the DHS Integrated Planning and Capital Investment Strategy are examples of how DHS leverages policies to deliver affordable readiness. DHS was one of the first federal agencies to adopt a Workspace Standard for office space in 2014. This standard is consistent with the DHS Real Property Efficiency Plan, which requires meeting the standard for major reconfigurations and new requirements, subject to available funding. In 2020, DHS began to review this workspace policy to consider revisions to increase focus on actual utilization by measuring occupancy rates, rather than by assigned personnel rates, and also to integrate the DHS Mission Space Standards Guide that was developed in 2020. In 2021, DHS updated the Workspace Standard for office and related administrative spaces to
set the DHS standard utilization ceiling at 150 SF/per Average Occupant. This was a change from the previous policy requirement of an office and related administrative spaces ceiling of 150 SF/per Assigned Occupant. In 2022, DHS will also launch the DHS National Workspace Strategy initiative, which will further mature the DHS Workspace Standard policy and require the delivery of DHS’s workspace of the future.

DHS’s Integrated Planning and Capital Investment Strategy is also a key OCRSO policy, as OCRSO is positioned to take an active role in the management and oversight of Component real property financial resources, with an emphasis on budgeting and funding to meet the Department’s operational mission requirements effectively and efficiently. Within the context of this policy, OCRSO formally partnered with the Office of the CFO (OCFO) to oversee the portfolio’s funding, as required by OMB M-18-21, “Designation and Responsibilities of Agency Senior Real Property Officers,” dated July 12, 2018. This process began in FY 2017, when DHS sought to improve the visibility into resource management and required DHS Components to complete an annual Real Property Financial Assessment.

DHS also made significant progress since 2017 by completing multiple assessments, and by requiring Components to provide their real property capital plan to DHS annually beginning in FY 2020. DHS used Component plans and other sources to deliver the inaugural DHS Real Property Capital Plan in 2020, meeting requirements in OMB’s M-20-03, “Implementation of Agency-wide Real Property Capital Planning.” Also, in 2020, DHS drafted a revision of the subject policy, and drafted an associated DHS Real Property Asset Management System Manual.

In 2021, DHS successfully integrated Component real property capital plans into the DHS FY 2023 budgeting cycle, resulting in an alignment and transparency of the program’s resources. DHS continues to improve its understanding of the costs related to the program at a high level and at a much more granular project by project level. This shift has allowed DHS to demonstrate that real property is one of the largest single expenses for the Department, which has supported increased recognition for real property as a major program area for the Department.

OCRSO’s future goal is to mature this new process within the Department’s existing Program Budget Review process and connect real property financial data within the Department’s new OneNumber system, an OCFO financial IT system. In addition, OCRSO is moving actively toward leveraging the data on the portfolio to develop risk models that identify resourcing challenges and efficiency opportunities.

**Regional Planning - National Capital Region**

In FY 2020, DHS focused attention on the largest major market in the country by producing the DHS National Capital Region (NCR) Real Property Strategy. DHS has the largest federal real estate footprint in the NCR, with a portfolio consisting of 266 owned and leased locations and approximately 12 million SF, costing an estimated $1 billion annually, supporting approximately 34,000 employees. DHS NCR Real Property performed a real estate portfolio diagnostic to
identify all the real property in the NCR to establish a baseline. Working with DHS Components and GSA, the Department established a consolidation plan that improves operational and cultural synergies while reducing the overall footprint and efficiently using the Department’s resources. The outcome is a DHS Headquarters (HQ)-approved plan that centralizes leadership in and around the St. Elizabeths campus providing high-quality and efficiently planned space. Even though the Department has developed a new NCR Consolidation Plan, the lack of consistent funding has greatly impacted consolidation projects around the NCR and specifically at St. Elizabeths throughout its development.

The Deputy Under Secretary for Management (DUSM) will chair the newly forming NCR Executive Committee of the NCR Real Property Governance Council to add transparency and accountability to real property management and become the C-suite sponsor for emphasizing portfolio strategy objectives across the enterprise. Initial presentation to Components around the purpose of the Executive Committee was held on August 19, 2021, and Component meetings to prepare for the kick-off Executive Committee meeting have begun. The first NCR Executive Committee meeting to be chaired by the DUSM is anticipated to occur in February 2022. An organizational diagnostic was also completed that recommends how to incorporate industry best practices to centralize oversight, and utilize analytics to support prudent real property decision-making across the Department. Further, NCR Real Property reorganized its office to incorporate the organizational diagnostic recommendations. DHS is examining headquarters staffing levels to incorporate industry best practices to align all real property activities. NCR Real Property transitioned funding from the working capital fund program to OCRSO direct appropriations which streamlined the financial requirements. NCR Real Property is also adding a Real Property Management System to manage and maintain real property portfolio records.

Regional Planning - Cross-Component Coordination

To foster better integration of the Department’s planning and operations process outside the NCR, DHS established the Field Efficiencies Program Management Office, which transitioned to the Regional Mission Support Division at the beginning of FY 2020. Through this long-term approach to planning, the Department began integrating mission support planning across Components to foster opportunities, share best practices, and overcome common mission support challenges.

OCRSO is responsible for implementing a unified cross-Component planning process to identify efficiency and effectiveness opportunities for common or similar mission functions with compatible mission support requirements, co-locations, or future mission needs. OCRSO developed a regional planning process that was piloted in Boston and expanded nationally to all regions. The regional planning process consists of five tailorable phases, with an additional “Phase 0” that marks the research and pre-planning that must occur prior to and including kickoff for a regional planning effort. While the regional planning process is consistent and scalable, alternatives proposed during the process vary based on regional variables and
Component requirements. The DHS regional approach to real property planning relies heavily on partnership with GSA and Components to be successful.

The resulting regional plans focus on increasing space effectiveness and utilization of DHS assets with the objective of reducing administrative office space and increasing utilization rates while improving support for the mission. Regional planning efforts underway include Boston, Charleston, Miami, New York City, Philadelphia, Seattle, and San Juan.

Resilience

In 2018, Department developed the DHS Resilience Framework to provide a roadmap for the Department in operational resilience and readiness. The framework formalized a Department-wide systematic process for assessing climate and manmade vulnerabilities and integrating resilience into mission critical infrastructure. This effort provides a holistic framework to ensure sustained resilience of mission essential functions and assets and related supporting critical infrastructure assets during all phases of mission operations (normal operations, disruptive event, response, and recovery/reconstitution). This effort is led by OCRSO in partnership with the Office of Operations Coordination (OPS) and coordinated across all DHS HQ offices and Operational Components. DHS Components provided their first Plans for Resilience in 2019 and per instruction provide updates on a bi-annual basis to integrate Resilience Strategies across the enterprise. The latest revisions were due on August 31, 2021, and are currently under review with OCRSO and OPS.

Per the recently issued EO 14008, Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad, DHS submitted a Climate Action Plan in September 2021 that was approved and signed by the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Climate Action Plan integrates climate adaptation goals and principles into the Department to strengthen mission operations and infrastructure, therefore building upon the principles of the DHS Resilience Framework. The Climate Action Plan identifies a priority adaptation action to ensure constant emphasis on climate resilient facilities and infrastructure, to further drive urgent action throughout DHS to address the climate crisis. The Department's policy is to integrate climate change into DHS missions, assets, and personnel; by adapting our operations to account for climate change and mitigate any additional harm; by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, promoting resilience, and reducing the multiple risks posed by the climate crisis.

Protection of Facilities (FPS)

FPS is charged with the mission of protecting and delivering integrated law enforcement and protective security services to the buildings, grounds, and property that are owned, occupied, or secured by the Federal Government (including any agency, instrumentality, or wholly owned or mixed-ownership corporation thereof) and the persons on the property, including employees and visitors. FPS has oversight of more than 13,000 contract Protective Security Officers (PSOs), who provide the most visible day-to-day component of FPS’s facility security protection.
FPS leads efforts within a complex operating environment to protect and secure federal facilities, employees, and visitors from increasingly dangerous and unpredictable physical and cyber threats. FPS continues to develop national-level policies, operational initiatives, capabilities, and programs that are grounded in the seamless integration of law enforcement, security, and intelligence activities. These efforts are instrumental for threat detection and deterrence while enhancing security and promoting facility and infrastructure resilience. For example:

- In FY 2021, DHS’s FPS and CISA, in coordination with GSA, established an MOA that outlines how each organization will strengthen the cybersecurity of control systems at Federal facilities through a coordinated and holistic risk management process.
- In FY 2020, FPS implemented changes to its basic security fee structure to better tailor how it allocates basic security fee charges to tenant agencies. The changes are projected to decrease the annual basic security fee charged to over two thirds of the agencies that pay one, while simultaneously ensuring no change in the level of services. This achievement was recognized by GAO in its March 2021 report, “FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: Projected Outcomes of the New Fee Structure on Tenant Agencies’ Costs” (GAO-21-311R).
- With GSA, FPS is the Co-Chair of the Sector Risk Management Agency for the Government Facilities Sector (GFS). In this capacity, FPS uses institutional knowledge and specialized expertise about federal facility security and infrastructure resilience to issue briefings, notifications, and alerts to members of the GFS.
- FPS and the United States Marshal Service, in consultation with the Administrative Office United States Courts and GSA, finalized updates to the MOA on courthouse security in July 2019 that is still used today.
- FPS established training guidelines to ensure that PSOs are providing high quality protective security services at federal facilities nationwide. As an example, FPS developed an Active Threat Awareness certification to reinforce training and information outlined in the National PSO Training Program, which all active PSOs are required to re-certify annually.
- In FY 2019, FPS received the Authority to Operate for the Post Tracking System, an oversight tool that FPS will use to comprehensively manage the contract guard workforce nation-wide. Full implementation is scheduled for FY 2023.

FPS has established a clearly defined standard for engaging PSOs throughout the portfolio, which enables an FPS Inspector to proactively interact with PSOs, involving them as key team players within the FPS operational environment and encouraging positive working relationships to improve operational readiness.

**Planned Actions and Key Milestones:** DHS continues to improve the management, oversight, and physical security of its real property inventory. Specific initiatives include:

- During FY 2022, OCRSO will continue to partner with OCFO to optimize real property financial resources through the Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution process for the 2024-2028 cycle.
• During FY 2022, OCRSO will partner with Components, other DHS MGMT lines of business and GSA to deliver the DHS Workplace Strategy initiative that will define DHS’s workspace of the future, document the Department’s plan to optimize its portfolio and outline the policy changes required to deliver the strategy.
• OCRSO is committed to conducting regional planning for each city identified in the Field Efficiencies Strategic Review and Recommendations Report by the end of FY 2025. The regional plans will focus on increased utilization of DHS assets in support of improved efficiency.
• DHS worked with GSA to develop and implement the DHS NCR Real Property Strategy that will consolidate DHS HQ tenancies in the NCR over a ten-year timeframe. DHS’s goal remains to improve mission effectiveness, cultural synergies and increase the efficiency of its NCR portfolio by optimizing use of federal property, using long-term commercial leases (when necessary), and supporting the Unity of Effort initiative.
• Work will continue on the Post Tracking System, an oversight tool that FPS will use to comprehensively manage the contract guard workforce nation-wide, aiming to reach full implementation in FY 2023.

GAO High-Risk Area: Ensuring the Effective Protection of Technologies Critical to U.S. National Security Interests (Government-wide)

Overview: In 2007, GAO designated ensuring the effective protection of technologies critical to U.S. national security interests as a high-risk area because these weapons and technologies are often targets for espionage, theft, reverse engineering, and illegal export. Although the government has taken significant steps to address this issue area, it remains high risk because of the ongoing challenges of balancing national security concerns and economic interests in the area of emerging technologies that are multiform and shifting.

GAO notes the role of the Export Enforcement Coordination Center (E2C2) as a platform for improving coordination and de-confliction for U.S. export control efforts. The E2C2 is managed by a Director from DHS U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and two Deputy Directors from the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC). The E2C2 serves as a conduit among the Federal export enforcement agencies, licensing agencies, and the Intelligence Community (IC) for the exchange of information related to potential U.S. export control violations. The E2C2’s primary function is to de-conflict potential enforcement actions and intelligence among the participating U.S. government agencies.

GAO also noted the importance of improving security cooperation and disclosure for this issue area, particularly with regard to Foreign Military Sales (FMS). U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is responsible for controlling the export of articles related to these sales.

Lead Office and Official: DHS Office of Strategy, Policy and Plans (PLCY), Amy Strauss, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Security

Progress:

E2C2
To improve the coordination of intelligence among the various agencies involved in export controls, HSI has made efforts to improve the operation of the E2C2 by establishing the Export Enforcement Intelligence Cell Working Group. This working group serves as a conduit for federal law enforcement, export licensing agencies, the IC, and defense department agencies to exchange information related to potential U.S. export control violations. In addition, the E2C2 Intelligence Cell established a process to exchange information for coordination and deconfliction purposes. The cell’s efforts have expanded export enforcement investigations; enhanced opportunities for joint operations; and contributed to the greater coordination of efforts at U.S. borders and ports of entry on export enforcement matters.

The E2C2 Intelligence Working Group convenes monthly and includes representatives from DHS, DOJ, Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), DOC, U.S. Department of State (DOS), U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Treasury, and other government agencies. Staffing, specifically of key external positions at the E2C2 for ongoing coordination and for the development of standard operating procedures, remains an issue. Two key positions remain vacant, the: (1) Deputy Director position filled by the FBI; and (2) Intelligence Community Liaison (ICL) designated by the Director of National Intelligence. The FBI position has been vacant since November 2017 and ICL position since April 2016. These vacancies, other staffing shortages, limited resources, and competing priorities have all contributed to the E2C2’s inability to finalize internal policy and administrative requirements such as standard operating procedures for certain functions.

Most importantly, the E2C2 lacks the resources to develop an automated deconfliction and case coordination system with the ability to track, analyze, and report on enforcement actions (deconflictions, case coordination, information inquiries, etc.). The current manual deconfliction process is being automated, but only at the most basic level to facilitate the time intensive process of distributing, reviewing, and responding to deconfliction requests. Although this automated deconfliction system will provide a limited statistical reporting capability, it will not include the strategic capability needed to track export transactions, mine relevant databases, and use predictive analytics. This limitation prevents the E2C2 from fulfilling its mandated function to report government-wide statistics on export enforcement actions. It also hampers the E2C2’s ability to identify and share critical information such as threat-based procurement trends within the IC.

These resource limitations have prevented E2C2 from establishing procedures to facilitate data sharing and developing measures for illicit transshipment activity; and developing qualitative and quantitative measures of effectiveness for the entire enforcement community to baseline and trend data. DHS will continue to work with partner agencies to fully staff the E2C2, obtain the necessary resources, and expand the center’s capacity to exchange relevant export enforcement data with the IC.

FMS
As of May 1, 2018, CBP and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency completed the integration of the electronic sharing of the Letter of Offer and Acceptance data for FMS cases, allowing for a centralized process for tracking FMS shipments and enhancing the FMS export data validation and decrementation process. Any associated amendments or modifications for FMS cases issued after 2004 may be returned to the entity that provided the documentation. However, CBP will retain all information regarding any import or export shipments against the FMS cases including the decrementation of the cases.

**Foreign Investment Screening**

On August 13, 2018, the President signed the “Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act” (FIRRMA), a significant statutory reform of the authorities of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). FIRRMA and its implementing regulations expanded CFIUS authority to cover a range of foreign investments not previously within its jurisdiction, and singled out critical technology as an area of focus.

FIRRMA defines “critical technology” to include any items controlled under existing export control regimes, such as the United States Munitions List and Commerce Control List; various nuclear-related technologies; select agents and toxins; and any “emerging and foundational technologies” that the export control agencies (DOD, DOS, DOC, and DOE) determine should receive additional protection pursuant to the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, which establishes a process for the heads of those agencies to identify those technologies. Candidate technologies in the Advance Notice of Public Rulemaking include cutting-edge, dual-use technologies in the areas of biotechnology, quantum computing, robotics, additive manufacturing, advanced materials, hyper sonics, and artificial intelligence. (PLCY defers to DOC, as the lead for this matter, on the ultimate determinations and timing.)

Under the prior statutory regime, CFIUS could review only those foreign investments that conferred control over an existing U.S. business to a foreign person, and most filings were made on a voluntary basis by parties seeking safe harbor for their transactions. FIRRMA expands CFIUS jurisdiction to include certain non-passive, non-controlling investments in U.S. businesses, and covered investments to include investments in a TID U.S. business (a U.S. business that “Produces, designs, tests, manufactures, fabricates, or develops one or more critical technologies,” as defined in Title 31 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), section 800.248) when the use, development, acquisition, or release of the TID U.S. business’s critical technology would require a license to export to the foreign party’s country. This includes joint ventures.

Pursuant to regulations that went into effect October 2020, a filing with the Committee is mandatory in certain circumstances, such as when there is a covered investment and a license would be needed for the export, reexport, transfer (in-country), or retransfer of a critical technology by the TID U.S. business. See Title 31 CFR section 800.401(c)(1). Most relevant for DHS are investments in encryption and wireless technology, about 10 percent of the docket.

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5 U.S. businesses with critical technologies, critical infrastructure, and personal data.
DHS carefully assessed each investment for risks arising from the transaction; of the declarations for which DHS co-led the assessment, about 30 percent received safe harbor.

**Planned Actions and Key Milestones:** As the Department’s primary point of contact for CFIUS at the staff level, PLCY ensures the Department works closely with Treasury as the Committee staff chair to draft the regulations to implement FIRRMA, including regulations pertaining to critical technology, and coordinates with other CFIUS member agencies to evaluate the risk arising from foreign investments, including declarations and other filings pertaining to critical technology. PLCY will:

- Continue to receive declarations pertaining to critical technologies in industries for which DHS is the co-lead and sector risk management agency under [Presidential Policy Directive 21](https://www.whitehouse.gov/policy-directory/Presidential-Policy-Directive-21), as amended by the FY 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 116-283 at Section 9002(a)(7), coordinating the Department’s assessment of risks to national security arising from each transaction;
- Continue to work with DHS’s Components, including the Office of the General Counsel and MGMT, to revise the Department’s delegation, directive, and instruction governing its CFIUS functions, expected to be signed in 2022;
- Work with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to continue to provide expertise to inform internal DHS export compliance actions, as well as international exports policy formation bodies to which DHS contributes;
- Continue to attend National Security Council-led Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) and sub-PCCs on relevant emerging technology and export controls topics; and
- Establish a Technology Protection Working Group with DHS Components to increase the U.S. Government’s ability to protect U.S. early-stage research in emerging technologies by bringing together DHS authorities and capabilities in immigration, export controls, and foreign investment.

**GAO High-Risk Area: Limiting the Federal Government’s Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks (Government-wide)**

**Overview:** In February 2013, GAO designated “Limiting the Federal Government’s Fiscal Exposure by Better Managing Climate Change Risks” as a government-wide high-risk area. In addition to creating significant financial risks for the Federal Government, the effects of climate change could: (1) threaten coastal areas with rising sea levels; (2) alter agricultural productivity; (3) affect water supplies; (4) increase the intensity and frequency of severe weather events; and (5) increase the frequency and volume of population movement and consequent goods movement. GAO found that the Federal Government is not well organized to address the fiscal exposure presented by the effects of climate change and needs a government-wide strategic approach with strong leadership to manage related risks. GAO also found that climate change may increase the Federal Government’s fiscal exposure related to federal facilities, federal insurance programs—such as FEMA’s NFIP (discussed in greater detail in a prior section), and federal disaster aid—such as FEMA’s Disaster Relief Fund.
The projected impacts of climate change intersect with DHS in several areas. Notably, DHS facilities may be exposed to greater risks and an increase in the cost of aid provided following a disaster.

**Lead Office and Official:** MGMT, IOUSM, Randolph D. “Tex” Alles, DUSM and Chief Sustainability Officer

**Progress:** In FY 2021, DHS continued to make significant advancements in addressing mission-related climate resilience efforts. The Secretary issued a memorandum to the Department launching the Climate Change Action Group (CCAG) to align with Executive Order 14008, Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad. The CCAG is driving action across DHS missions, assets, and personnel to account for the climate crisis via risk-based strategies, to mitigate additional harm, reduce greenhouse gases, and promote resilience and adaptation. Directive 023-03, “Climate Resilience” will be updated in the first quarter of FY 2022 to include the CCAG, mission resilience efforts, and the priority adaptation areas.

The natural disasters – ongoing flooding, fires, and hurricanes, and the current COVID-19 pandemic – further highlight the urgency to focus on mission resilience and underscore the need to reduce the impact on the Department’s mission-capability. The Department’s resilience effort is broadening to now include the human and health impacts to our mission-capability due to the pandemic as well as the intense focus on the climate crisis. Operational resilience to support internal and external critical infrastructure dependencies continues to be a cornerstone of many of the Department’s programs, policies, and activities. OCRSO sustainability and environmental programs continue to lead the Department’s resilience efforts. In FY 2021:

- The DHS Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (CISR) Working Group, jointly led by OCRSO and DHS’s Office of Operations Coordination, continued to work with DHS operational Components and MGMT Lines of Business to advance the integration of operational resilience into DHS continuity planning efforts and the execution.
- The DHS Resilience Framework, signed by the DUSM on August 13, 2018, defines a systematic approach to measure and plan for resilience and incorporates it into our critical infrastructure in the areas of energy and water, facilities, information and communication technology, and transportation. This framework ensures sustained resilience and readiness to perform our mission essential functions supported by critical infrastructure assets during all phases of mission operations (normal operation, disruptive event, response, and recovery and reconstitution).
- The CISR Working Group led the development of the Climate Action Plan (CAP), a requirement of EO14008. In September 2021, the Secretary of Homeland Security approved, and issued, the CAP to the White House Council on Environmental Quality. The CAP identifies five priority adaptation areas:
  1. Incorporate Climate Adaptation Planning and Processes into Homeland Security Mission Areas;
  2. Ensure Climate Resilient Facilities and Infrastructure;
  3. Incorporate Climate Adaptation into National Preparedness and Community Grants Projects;
4. Ensure Climate-Ready Services and Supplies; and
5. Increase Climate Literacy

- DHS continued its partnership with the DOE through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to share information, advance resilience research, and jointly develop tools to support resilience efforts.
- The CISR Working Group continued to assist Components in updating their Plans for Resilience, conducting resilience assessments using the Resilience Baseline Assessment Scoring Tool and the dependency analysis model to identify external vulnerabilities on DHS critical infrastructure, prioritizing mission assets based on greatest vulnerabilities, and using these assessments as examples for best practices in resilience implementation. In August 2021, each Operational Component submitted its updated Plan for Resilience, which outlined critical assets and timelines for conducting climate-related vulnerability assessments.
- The CISR Working Group continues to collaborate with General Services Administration Sustainability and Facility teams to develop an MOU to support the DHS CAP, resilience framework, and aggressive goals, such as the conversion of 50 percent of our mobile fleet to electric vehicles by 2030. This MOU is anticipated to be signed in FY 2022.

Planned Actions and Key Milestones: During FY 2022, DHS plans to advance the following initiatives:
- Update the Resilience Framework to integrate the CAP Mitigation Activities;
- Develop a regional vulnerabilities report based on climate change and mission critical assets;
- Develop a charter for governance and oversight of the resilience program through the CISR Working Group; and
- Update the Climate Resilience Directive to reflect current CAP and resilience processes.

GAO High-Risk Area: Improving the Management of IT Acquisitions and Operations (Government-wide)

Overview: More than $80 billion is invested annually in IT across the Federal Government. GAO has determined agencies continue to struggle with IT projects due to overly broad scopes, delivering functionality several years after initiation, and ineffective executive-level governance and oversight, as CIOs do not have authority to review and approve their agency’s entire IT portfolios, and overall authority is limited. Congress passed the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) to strengthen CIO authority and oversight for IT projects. To improve the management of IT acquisitions and IT systems, DHS launched key improvement efforts on multiple fronts, positioned itself as a leader in various efficiency initiatives, and established the JRC to evaluate high priority and cross-departmental opportunities.

Lead Office and Official: MGMT, Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO), Robert Dorr, Executive Director, Business Management Directorate

Progress: The Department’s implementation of FITARA has resulted in multiple successes:
- Updated IT management processes and established additional elements to support a compatible, cohesive infrastructure;
- Standardized operating procedures related to improving the transparency and management of IT acquisitions and operations; and
- Strengthened OCIO authority to provide needed direction and oversight.

The Department is continually improving its implementation of FITARA. In FY 2021, OCIO implemented and/or refined the following initiatives:

- To continue to integrate data sources to enhance IT Acquisition Review (ITAR) decision-making, DHS enhanced its ITAR tool to include an application programming interface (API) between the Capital Planning and Investment Control (CPIC) Investment, Evaluation, Submission and Tracking and ITAR platforms. This resulted in a more integrated view of how the proposed procurement supports specific Future Years Homeland Security Program investments to enhance ITAR review and decision-making.
- To implement process improvements beyond alignment to OMB TechStat requirements, DHS implemented a comprehensive, continuous review throughout impacted programs’ Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. These reviews are more rigorous and frequent than the standard TechStat Accountability Session. In addition, these continuous engagements and program reviews are performed against the entirety of DHS Major Investments, rather than just high-risk programs.
- In conjunction with DHS human capital leadership, OCIO implemented the CTMS, which is a new approach to federal talent management featuring flexibilities for defining jobs and critical skills, conducting hiring, and providing market-sensitive compensation.
- To continue to socialize the DHS Strategic Workforce Plan, OCIO posted all IT Career Paths and Training Plans to an intranet site and formed an IT Workforce Planning Integrated Project Team (IPT) to implement strategies across the Department.
- To update and align the DHS Systems Engineering Life Cycle (SELC) Instruction and Guidebook with the DHS Acquisition Management Instruction, DHS revised its Acquisition Management Instruction in January 2021 to include requirements for SELC tailoring plans to be developed at acquisition decision event 2A, with revisions at subsequent acquisition decision events as needed. DHS also published a revised version of its SELC Instruction and Guidebook in February and July 2021, respectively. The requirements for establishing key acquisition documentation, including the requirements for the SELC tailoring plans, align between policies and guidance.
- OCIO continued to consolidate and optimize enterprise data centers Data Center 1 (DC1) and Data Center 2 (DC2). Over 93 percent of the 151 systems have exited DC2, with 60 systems migrated out of DC2 during FY 2021.
- To leverage Technology Modernization Fund (TMF) American Rescue Plan Act (ARP) guidelines to advance cross-component modernization, requested transformational investments in DHS traveler experience, information sharing, and southwest border humanitarian and border control operations to enhance services to the public.

**Planned Actions and Key Milestones:** OCIO will focus on the following initiatives:
- Continue to consolidate and optimize the two DHS enterprise data centers. All Component applications will exit DC2 by December 2021. Remaining general support systems and task orders will be executed via an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract by June 2022. The end result will be that all DC2 systems will have migrated to the cloud or an alternative systems provider, or be retired. DHS will improve management and services for the remaining enterprise data center, DC1 by awarding and transitioning support to its new “Data Center and Cloud Optimization” contract.

- Recruit and retain a cadre of critical cyber talent via CTMS. DHS will use an innovative hiring authority to recruit and retain top cyber talent. CTMS offers more competitive compensation via salaries that are market-sensitive and based on demonstrated skills and expertise, with access to higher salaries and incentives based on impact to the DHS cybersecurity mission; and a meaningful opportunity for employees to develop their skills while also contributing to the Department’s mission.

- Continue DHS Workforce Planning IPT sessions to promote use of competency requirements for IT staff. DHS will include IT leadership positions in these sessions, and use the sessions to develop and maintain current workforce planning processes, and provide standardized workforce documents to all DHS employees.

- Continue to expand CIO visibility into all IT expenditures. DHS is using the Technology Business Management (TBM) taxonomy as a mechanism to enhance visibility via its CPIC submissions. The Department has aligned its IT investments to the TBM taxonomy to provide more transparency into IT planned spending for FY 2022.

- Continue to refine the DHS ITAR process by simplifying customer intake. DHS is improving its customer intake form, and integrating additional APIs to integrate ITAR with Component acquisition management platforms.

- Establish the DHS IT Technology Modernization Fund (IT TMF) Investment Fund to manage TMF ARP awards. The DHS IT TMF is being established under the joint chairmanship of the CIO and CFO to oversee investments in modernization efforts ranging from customer experience-focused technology solutions such as end-to-end electronic immigration and border enforcement processing, to remote and mobile access to DHS information sharing platforms, to biometrically supported contactless DHS trusted traveler processing.

- Continue the IT Acquisitions Career Path Profile effort. This effort will continue through FY 2021 Q1, incorporating further detail and alignment with IT reporting, governance, and oversight of DHS Homeland Security Acquisition Institute course curricula and the DHS career certification requirements.


**Overview:** In January 2018, GAO added the government-wide personnel security clearance process to the High-Risk List. GAO’s explanation for the high-risk designation was that the process faces significant challenges related to: (1) the timely processing of clearances; (2) measuring investigation quality; and (3) ensuring IT security, among other things. A high-quality
and timely government-wide personnel security clearance process is essential to minimize the risks of unauthorized disclosures of classified information, and to help ensure information about individuals with a criminal history, or other questionable behaviors, is identified and assessed. GAO asserts the “government-wide personnel security process continues to face challenges in the timely processing of clearances, measuring the quality of investigations, and ensuring the security of related information technology systems.”

DHS has been aggressive with its efforts to mitigate impediments to the current clearance process. DHS has issued internal guidance through policy memoranda in order to streamline the personnel security process, and to instill consistency across the Department. DHS is an active member in government-wide personnel security reform efforts, with representation and input on numerous inter-governmental working groups. This includes the Trusted Workforce (TW) 2.0 Executive Steering Group and Action Group, which are interagency-level management working groups dedicated to re-thinking the personnel vetting processes across the Federal Government. DHS also participates in committees led by the Performance Accountability Council (PAC) Program Management Office (PMO), which is the arm of the PAC mandated to create governmental enterprise technical solutions for the personnel security process, and the ODNI’s Continuous Evaluation (CE) working group.

DHS does not have a backlog in background investigations. The OPM approved DHS for updated and expanded Delegated Investigative Authority in 2021, allowing DHS to act as its own Investigative Service Provider. DHS awarded its own Enterprise Blanket Purchase Agreement to contract for background investigations, which mitigates certain high-risk concerns of timeliness and quality of background investigations, and supports reform initiatives.

DHS is an active participant in reform initiatives and efforts regarding the use of IT shared services across the Federal Government and efforts to move from the traditional periodic reinvestigation cycle to a continuous vetting model. For example, DHS uses the ODNI Continuous Evaluation System (CES) for the purposes of continuous vetting.

The DHS Chief Security Officer (CSO) established the Personnel Security Operations Task Force (PSOTF) to support reform efforts across the Department. The PSOTF identified potential improvements to the Department’s personnel security posture by evaluating enterprise-wide personnel security processes, procedures, best practices, and organizational structures, and issued 23 recommendations in 2018. Since then, 15 of those recommendations were completed, and the other 8 are in the process of implementation. Additionally, to reinforce that DHS is committed to improving processes, the Office of the Chief Security Officer (OCSO) provides quarterly update briefings to staff from the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

**Lead Office and Official:** MGMT, OCSO, Richard D. McComb, CSO

**Progress:** DHS is actively working to reduce the length of time to onboard federal and contractor personnel. DHS is collaborating both internally and externally with its federal partners to transform the personnel security process. Initiatives include:
• Since 2017, DHS has issued multiple policy memoranda to clarify reciprocity guidance, and further streamline and standardize personnel security procedures across the Department. Examples include Departmental guidance on expediting entry on duty for contractors with active security clearances; polygraph reciprocity; guidance on streamlining personnel security procedures for internal and external transfers; and DHS-specific mitigation strategies to address an investigative backlog. The impact of these efforts is evident in the DHS-tracked metrics, which are routinely provided to senior leadership, showing that the Department is meeting ODNI timeliness standards. As of September 2021, DHS onboarded 82 percent of contractors, who were cleared at preliminary determination, in an average of four days. Contractors who required a full determination (required issue resolution or expansion), onboarded in an average of 71 days. For federal applicants, 75 percent were cleared at preliminary determination in an average of three days, and those who required a full determination were onboarded in an average of 44 days.

• DHS established an Executive Steering Committee with senior leaders from DHS Headquarters to develop an enterprise approach to establishing policies for implementing TW 2.0 across DHS. In July 2021, DHS became the first department or agency to issue its own department-specific TW 2.0 Implementation Plan. The DHS-specific plan was signed by the DUSM to ensure DHS stakeholders involved in the transitional states of personnel vetting reform have baseline guidance as well as milestones to implement in support of the larger government-wide effort.

• OCSO is working with OCIO and other partners across the DHS Management Lines of Business to implement the Access Lifecycle Management (ALM) system. ALM is a program designed to automate the onboarding and offboarding of federal and contractor employees. ALM is currently being utilized across DHS Headquarters and FEMA. ALM is being integrated at ICE and CISA. The remainder of the DHS Operational Components have comparable systems that manage onboarding and offboarding their federal and contractor employees.

• DHS remains closely engaged with industry through organizations such as the Industrial Security Working Group, and NCMS: The Society of Industrial Security Professionals. Engagements with these organizations provide a venue for DHS to socialize the latest personnel security policies, procedures, and initiatives.

• DHS implemented Human Resources Information Technology (HRIT), which streamlines and eliminates manual and redundant processes surrounding the hand-off between security and human resources for onboarding. DHS OCSO integrated the Integrated Security Management System with HRIT to gain efficiencies between security and human resources IT systems for onboarding by eliminating duplicative and manual data processes.

• DHS is pursuing an initiative to develop web-based forms for contractors that will streamline and modernize the personnel security process, similar to the efforts implemented for federal applicants. This modernization effort will enhance oversight and transparency by tracking the precise status of a contract applicant from the time the contract is awarded to the time the contractor is onboarded.
The updated DHS Personnel Security Instruction is in the final stages of the Department’s formal policy review process.

DHS developed and maintains a secure Community of Interest on the Homeland Security Information Network where personnel security professionals across the Department can access and review shared resources (e.g., regulations, instructional guidance, policy memoranda, etc.).

**Planned Actions and Key Milestones:** DHS has documented the estimated completion times for the various efforts it is currently undertaking. It should be noted that some of these efforts depend on future funding. Initiatives include:

- DHS is continuing to enhance a more effective communication mechanism through the ALM initiative, which will also provide systematic and more expeditious notifications to industry when their staff clear the personnel security process, enabling industry partners to commence work on DHS contracts.
- DHS is continuing to focus on developing relationships with industry partners through Acquisition Innovation Roundtables (AIRs) and other industry engagements, which will continue in FY 2022. To date, AIR working groups have resulted in an open dialogue between federal staff and industry partners. To further aid communication, DHS implemented standardized language for unclassified contracts to ensure clear and consistent language is used across the Department.
- DHS will continue implementing recommendations stemming from the PSOTF during FY 2022 with completion expected at the end of FY 2024. One example is reconciling personnel security metrics and reporting to improve and monitor performance across the Enterprise; identifying gaps of missing but required data; and updating reports to align with data calls reported to ODNI and OPM.
- DHS has a signed MOU and Interconnection Security Agreement with ODNI to leverage its CES by having a direct system-to-system connectivity for automatic CE enrollment, replacing manual uploads, and processing. DHS plans to complete this connection in December 2021, while also implementing an analytical tool that will assist personnel security adjudicators in triaging “hits” received from CES alerts. DHS will remain engaged with the PAC PMO and DOD regarding IT shared services for personnel security processing, and any recommendations coming from TW 2.0 efforts.

**GAO High-Risk Area: National Efforts to Prevent, Respond to, and Recover from Drug Misuse (Government-wide)**

**Overview:** Drug misuse—the use of illicit drugs and the misuse of prescription drugs—is a persistent and long-standing public health issue in the United States. Ongoing Departmental efforts seek to address drug misuse through education and prevention, substance use disorder treatment, and law enforcement and drug interdiction, and through programs that serve populations affected by drug misuse. These efforts involve Federal, state, local, and tribal governments, as well as community groups and the private sector.
National rates of drug misuse have increased over the past two decades, and represent a serious risk to public health, resulting in significant loss of life and harmful effects to society and the economy, including billions of dollars in costs. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that there were more than 93,300 overdose deaths in the United States in 2020. In recent years, the Federal government has spent billions of dollars and has enlisted more than a dozen agencies to address drug misuse and its effects.

**Lead Office and Official:** DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY), Border Security and Transnational Organized Crime, Meghann O’Rourke, Director, Counternarcotics Policy

**Progress:** During 2020, DHS joined a newly-formed Interagency GAO High-Risk List Consortium (Consortium), organized and led by representatives from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and which formed a Subcommittee on Drug Misuse, led by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), to begin thinking through what needs to happen for there to be a coordinated government-wide response to the opioid crisis in particular and rising drug abuse in general. DHS joined the Subcommittee, and our involvement is led by PLCY with CBP and the Coast Guard supporting.

DHS initially identified 10 open recommendations related to this GAO high-risk area, of which GAO has already formally closed three:

  - Recommendation 2: The Commissioner of CBP should analyze the results of the Self-Inspection Program over time and at a level necessary to identify and address potentially reoccurring inspection deficiencies at individual ports of entry (closed as implemented on May 28, 2021).

  On September 30, 2020, Office of Field Operation (OFO) completed its Annual Self-inspection Program (SIP) Cycle 2020 Report, which includes reporting of SIP results from all OFO reporting units, to include analysis of reoccurring inspection deficiencies over time at individual reporting units. The Self-Inspection Reporting System (webSIRS) enhancements and reports created for Cycle 2020 enabled OFO field offices to track and analyze repeat corrective actions generated due to non-compliance over a range of years, rather than just one year at a time. The analysis of reoccurring inspection deficiencies was included in the FY 2020 OFO SIP Annual Report. As a result, OFO was able to incorporate the deliverables indicated in the Corrective Action Plan for 2021 in 2020, one year ahead of schedule. A request for closure was sent to GAO on April 2, 2021, along with

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7 ICE is not participating as part of Subcommittee at this time because the ICE Homeland Security Investigations Contraband Smuggling Unit is already participating on ONDCP drug interdiction working groups related to the drug misuse issue. ICE and other DHS Components will participate on the Subcommittee in the future once the work of the committee is more fully identified, as appropriate.
supportive documentation which included 2019/2020 Annual SIP reports, resulting in the closure of this recommendation four months ahead of schedule.

- GAO-17-474, “BORDER SECURITY: Additional Actions Could Strengthen DHS Efforts to Address Subterranean, Aerial, and Maritime Smuggling”
  - Recommendation 4: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of CBP and the Director of ICE to jointly establish and monitor performance measures and targets related to cross-border tunnels (closed as not implemented on August 26, 2021).

ICE HSI investigates a wide range of domestic and international activities arising from the illegal movement of people and goods into, within, and out of the United States. HSI partners with CBP and other federal, state, and local law enforcement to respond to, and investigate, transnational organized crime at, and between, U.S. ports of entry. HSI’s performance management framework has the capability to identify cases and link them to cross-border tunnel related investigations, as necessary. GAO’s recommendation to establish and monitor performance measures and targets related to cross-border tunnels does not operationally enhance agency efforts necessary to address in the disruption or dismantlement of transnational criminal organizations. As ICE does not have unlimited resources to dedicate to efforts that do not further support the agency in accomplishing its mission and priorities, ICE requested GAO close the recommendation.

- Recommendation 5: The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Commissioner of CBP to establish and monitor performance targets related to ultralight aircraft (closed as not implemented on August 17, 2021).

CBP Air and Marine Operations (AMO) and U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) were developing a joint performance measure and targets for interdicting ultralight aircraft. However, in December 2019, CBP determined that it would no longer pursue establishing a performance measure because it found that the ultralight aircraft interdiction rate fluctuated year to year, and that the number of ultralight aircraft incidents had been trending downward. Subsequently, in September 2020, CBP reinitiated efforts to develop a performance measure and target in response to GAO’s continued belief that performance measures would help CBP monitor performance to ensure that technology investments and operational responses to address ultralight aircraft are effective. However, CBP determined that it could not collect reliable performance data at the time, and requested closure of the recommendation accordingly.

In addition, it is appropriate to note that on November 17, 2021, the OIG published its final report titled: “‘DHS’ Implementation of OIG Recommendations Related to Drug Interdiction” (OIG-22-09), which found that DHS took timely corrective actions to address all eight of the closed drug interdiction-related recommendations OIG reviewed from four prior reports issued between fiscal years 2011 and 2019. More specifically, OIG found that DHS’ actions improved drug interdiction operations, personnel safety, administration of staffing resources, drug
storage and destruction policies, and visibility of drug control activity outcomes through enhanced internal controls.

**Planned Actions and Key Milestones:** DHS has taken and/or plans the following actions to address the remaining seven open recommendations:

- **GAO-19-441, “DRUG CONTROL: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces Should Enhance Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug Activities”**
  - Recommendation 3: The Secretary of Homeland Security should develop outcome-based performance measures for the DHS Joint Task Forces (JTF) that are consistent.
    
    In early 2021, DHS HQ restricted the JTFs, with JTF-East alone remaining. For that reason, there is no need for a “headquarters” coordination function, as JTF-East is coordinated through the Coast Guard. PLCY plans to inform GAO of this and request closure, since the recommendation is overcome by events.

  - Recommendation 1: The Commissioner of CBP should review and update policies related to land port of entry inspections in accordance with OFO guidance.
    
    CBP OFO continues to review and update policies related to land port of entry inspections. For example, the OFO Admissibility and Passenger Programs and Operations Directorate initiated a process to modernize handbooks, policy memoranda, and directives in accordance with OFO Policy Management Handbook, dated January 2016. In January 2020, an OFO policy working group was created to assist with the process of reviewing and updating handbooks, policy memoranda and directives. The working group continues to meet to compile/coordinate updates, and the revised Personal Search Handbook was published on the CBP intranet on May 10, 2021. Further, the revised Personal Search Handbook training course was uploaded into the DHS Performance and Learning Management System, and as of September 2021, the course has been completed by over 12,000 CBP Officers and Agriculture Specialists.
  
    Recommendation 3: The Commissioner of CBP should implement a policy to conduct periodic comprehensive analyses of covert test findings.
    
    CBP’s Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) transitioned from the Operations Support/Office of Intelligence to the Operations Support/Planning, Analysis, Requirement Evaluation Directorate (OS-PARE) on August 18, 2021. Guidance documents, to include the Standard Operating Procedures, Directive, Process Map and Guide, and messaging materials are in the review and approval process. Additionally, as the only statutorily-designated office for CBP’s covert testing, OFTD is in the process of developing performance measures and standard operating procedures to assess the effectiveness of the program in collaboration with other CBP offices. On September 27, 2021, OFTD implemented, and went
live with, a system of record to document operations, assessment reports, recommendations, and track corrective actions.

- Recommendation 4: The Commissioner of CBP should develop a new target for the land border interception rate for passengers in privately-owned vehicles with major violations that sets an ambitious and realistic goal based on past performance.

In January 2020, CBP’s OFO amended the targets for the Compliance Examination Cat 1 Interception Rate measure in the air and personally owned vehicle environments. These changes include increasing the national target by 5.0 percent per year until the target is within 5.0 percent of the national average, and the 0.5 percent per year thereafter, and having separate targets for field offices that is incrementally increased by 2.0 percent per year to no greater than 10.0 percent below the national target, once the national target is within 5.0 percent of the national average. Following these changes, CBP submitted supporting documentation to GAO and requested closure, and held a conference call with GAO on June 2, 2020, in GAO noted that, while OFO raised the targets, they were not raised above recent national performance results and OFO’s implemented plan to raise the targets is insufficient. The targets must be raised above recent performance results to close the recommendation. OFO is currently reconsidering the plan.

COVID-19 travel restrictions, and national and local guidance for people to limit travel, have resulted in substantial reduction of traveler volume in both the land and air travel environments. In March 2020, OFO took precautionary actions and temporarily suspended the COMPEX Program at land ports of entry, and reduced COMPEX examinations in the air environment based on lower air travel volume. In January 2021, OFO suspended COMPEX in both land and air ports of entry, to ensure the health and safety of the DHS workforce and the traveling public. CBP is conferring with international partners and OFO is continuing to assess the downstream impact that the current decrease in travel has on future travel volumes before setting performance targets for FY 2022 and onward.

OFO will be requesting an extension of the estimated completion date through December 2021, due to international travel restrictions and low travel volumes. OFO cannot definitively set future targets for the COMPEX Program until it can reliably forecast start dates and schedule for the resumption of international travel in the land border and air environments. This is to ensure that targets are not just realistic and ambitious, but also reliable and fair. OFO continues to analyze current trends in travel volume to determine ambitious and realistic targets for FY 2022 and beyond.

- GAO-20-33, “COAST GUARD: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces’ Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap or Gaps in Capabilities”
Recommendation 1: The Coast Guard should conduct a comprehensive analysis of its Deployable Specialized Forces' [DSF] workforce needs.

Due to the varying missions of each unit type, the Coast Guard Office of Specialized Capabilities, working with the Manpower Requirements staff, will conduct individual DSF unit type analyses. The Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST) manpower analysis is underway and should be completed in early FY 2022. The National Strike Force (NSF) program manual was promulgated in March of 2021, and the NSF MRA is slated for FY 2022. A comprehensive analysis of all five DSF unit types is subject to available funding, but the Manpower Requirements Staff estimates completing a DSF unit type analysis each fiscal year, among competing requests from all Coast Guard offices.

Recommendation 2: The Coast Guard should assess the extent to which unnecessary overlap or duplication exists among DSF's capabilities.

Funding for a DSF-specific Mission Analysis Report (MAR) was requested, which the Coast Guard uses to analyze how well the Coast Guard is organized, trained, and equipped to perform current and future missions, to identify gaps and redundancies which will impact the Coast Guard's effectiveness and efficiency in performing a future mission or function, and to inform program management and major systems acquisition decisions. Completion pends availability of funding.

- GAO-21-296, “TRANSPORTATION SAFETY: DOT Has Taken Steps to Verify and Publicize Drug and Alcohol Testing Data but Could Do More”

Recommendation 2: The Commandant of the Coast Guard should direct the Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy to: (1) evaluate the different processes used by the Coast Guard to verify drug and alcohol testing data—including comparing data to records during inspections, checking data for errors manually or with software, and contacting employers that do not submit a report or submit an incomplete report—and (2) determine what, if any, additional steps should be taken to improve the reliability of the information.

The Coast Guard reviewed the different processes used to verify drug and alcohol testing data with the following findings: (1) The Management Information System (MIS) requires substantial time and effort from employers, sponsoring organizations, and the Coast Guard to coordinate, collate, report, analyze, and assess the effectiveness of drug testing as a preventative effort in the maritime industry; and (2) The value of the MIS data is dependent upon the integrity and good will of the reporting parties to accurately collect and report chemical testing data to the Coast Guard. Self-reporting presents challenges as it requires significant agency effort to detect data inconsistencies and identify entities that fail to comply with the requirement to file an annual MIS report.

In order to address these challenges, the Coast Guard initiated discussions with representatives of the chemical testing and commercial maritime industry to explore improved methods for accessing, processing, and publishing MIS data.
specific to the maritime transportation industry. As the Coast Guard is not subject to the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act of 1991, utilization of the MIS is not required by law. The Coast Guard could access alternative, credible data sets independent of employers or sponsoring organizations. Potential alternate sources of MIS data records include testing laboratories and Medical Review Officers. Utilizing these data sets would significantly reduce the burden on the current MIS stakeholders and offer a simplified and accurate process to evaluate the effectiveness of maritime drug testing. Further, it is important to note that Coast Guard marine inspectors and investigators need improved access to past MIS reports to support compliance activities in the field, as inspectors and investigators currently need to request a copy of an MIS report either from the marine employer who made the submission or the Coast Guard Headquarters Drug and Alcohol Prevention and Investigation Office. The Coast Guard is evaluating process requirements that would make MIS data available in a centralized system accessible to all marine inspectors and investigations. The Coast Guard will soon ask GAO to close this recommendation.
Low-Priority Program Activities

The President’s Budget identifies the lower-priority program activities, as required under the *GPRA Modernization Act*, 31 U.S.C. 1115(b)(10). The public can access the volume at: [http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget](http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget)
### Acronyms

- **AIS** – Automated Indicator Sharing  
- **ALOS** – Average Length of Stay  
- **APG** – Agency Priority Goal  
- **AQI** – Agricultural Quarantine Inspection  
- **ARB** – Acquisition Review Board  
- **ARM** – Agriculture Risk Management  
- **ATS** – Automated Targeting System  
- **BOD** – Binding Operational Directive  
- **CBP** – U.S. Customs and Border Protection  
- **CDM** – Continuous Diagnosis Mitigation  
- **CFATS** – Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards  
- **CFO** – Chief Financial Officer  
- **CHCO** – Chief Human Capital Office  
- **CIO** – Chief Information Officer  
- **CIP** – Critical Infrastructure Protection  
- **CISA** – Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
- **CISR** – Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience  
- **COO** – Chief Operating Officer  
- **CWMD** – Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office  
- **CX** – Customer Experience  
- **DHS** – U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
- **DMO** – Departmental Management and Operations  
- **DOS** – Department of State  
- **DPIO** – Deputy Performance Improvement Officer  
- **E2C2** – Export Enforcement Coordination Center  
- **EEI** – Employee Engagement Index  
- **EO** – Executive Order  
- **ERO** – Enforcement and Removal Operations  
- **EXA** – External Affairs Directorate  
- **FEMA** – Federal Emergency Management Agency  
- **FEVS** – Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey  
- **FIMA** – Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration  
- **FIRRMA** – Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act  
- **FIT** – FEMA Integration Team  
- **FITARA** – Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act  
- **FLETC** – Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers  
- **FMS** – Foreign Military Sales  
- **FPS** – Federal Protective Service  
- **FSA** – Facility Security Assessment  
- **FY** – Fiscal Year  
- **GAO** – Government Accountability Office  
- **GCC** – Government Coordinating Council  
- **GMM** – Grants Management Modernization  
- **GPRA** – Government Performance and Results Act  
- **GPRAMA** – GPRA Modernization Act  
- **HCLC** – Human Capital Leadership Council  
- **HCOP** – Human Capital Operating Plan  
- **HOMECORT** – Homeland Criminal Organization Target  
- **HQ** – Headquarters  
- **HRIT** – Human Resource Information Technology  
- **HSAI** – DHS Homeland Security Acquisition Institute  
- **HSE** – Homeland Security Enterprise  
- **HSI** – Homeland Security Investigations  
- **HSPD** – Homeland Security Presidential Directive  
- **HVA** – High Value Assets  
- **I&A** – Office of Intelligence and Analysis  
- **IC** – Intelligence Community  
- **ICE** – U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement  
- **IPAWS** – Integrated Public Alert Warning System  
- **ISC** – Interagency Security Committee  
- **ISP** – Internet Service Provider  
- **IT** – Information Technology  
- **ITDS** – International Trade Data System  
- **IVR** – Interactive Voice Response System  
- **JRC** – Joint Requirements Council  
- **LEO** – Law Enforcement Officer  
- **LPD** – Last Point of Departure  
- **LS** – Leadership Survey  
- **LSCMS** – Logistics Supply Chain Management System  
- **MEOV** – Mobile Emergency Office Vehicle  
- **MMPC** – Major Management and Performance Challenges