



# Implementation Status of Public Recommendations

Supplement to Annual Budget Justification for  
Fiscal Year 2025

*March 11, 2024*

Fiscal Year 2023 Report to Congress



**Homeland  
Security**



# Implementation Status of Public Recommendations Supplement to Annual Budget Justification for Fiscal Year 2025

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# I. Legislative Requirement

This report responds to the reporting requirements set forth in section 2(b) of the Good Accounting Obligation in Government Act (P.L. 115-414), which provides:

- (b) **REQUIRED REPORTS.**—In the annual budget justification submitted to Congress, as submitted with the budget of the President under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, each agency shall include—
- (1) a report listing each public recommendation of the Government Accountability Office that is designated by the Government Accountability Office as “open” or “closed, unimplemented” for a period of not less than 1 year preceding the date on which the annual budget justification is submitted;
  - (2) a report listing each public recommendation for corrective action from the Office of Inspector General of the agency that—
    - (A) was published not less than 1 year before the date on which the annual budget justification is submitted; and
    - (B) for which no final action was taken as of the date on which the annual budget justification is submitted; and
  - (3) a report on the implementation status of each public recommendation described in paragraphs (1) and (2), which shall include—
    - (A) with respect to a public recommendation that is designated by the Government Accountability Office as “open” or “closed, unimplemented”—
      - (i) that the agency has decided not to implement, a detailed justification for the decision; or
      - (ii) that the agency has decided to adopt, a timeline for full implementation, to the extent practicable, if the agency determines that the recommendation has clear budget implications;
    - (B) with respect to a public recommendation for corrective action from the Office of Inspector General of the agency for which no final action or action not recommended has been taken, an explanation of the reasons why no final action or action not recommended was taken with respect to each audit report to which the public recommendation for corrective action pertains;
    - (C) with respect to an outstanding unimplemented public recommendation from the Office of Inspector General of the agency that the agency has decided to adopt, a timeline for implementation;
    - (D) an explanation for any discrepancy between—
      - (i) the reports submitted under paragraphs (1) and (2);
      - (ii) the semiannual reports submitted by the Office of Inspector General of the agency under section 5 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.); and
      - (iii) reports submitted by the Government Accountability Office relating to public recommendations that are designated by the

Government Accountability Office as “open” or “closed, unimplemented”; and

- (E) for the first 12 months after a public recommendation is made, if the agency is determining whether to implement the public recommendation, a statement describing that the agency is doing so, which shall exempt the agency from the requirements under subparagraphs (B) and (C) with respect to that public recommendation.
- (c) COPIES OF SUBMISSIONS.—Each agency shall provide a copy of the information submitted under subsection (b) to the Government Accountability Office and the Office of Inspector General of the agency.



## II. Background

This report, submitted pursuant to Section 2(b) of P.L. 115-414, provides a description of the implementation status of each public “open” recommendation from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS or the Department) Office of Inspector General (OIG) that was more than 1 year old as of September 30, 2023 (the Department’s annual budget justification is based on the fiscal year (FY)).<sup>1</sup> This report also provides justification for the decision not to implement those recommendations, which GAO and OIG closed as “unimplemented” from October 01, 2022,<sup>2</sup> to September 30, 2023.

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-50 (Revised), “Audit Followup,” dated September 29, 1982, describes policies and procedures that the executive agencies should use when considering reports issued by an OIG, GAO, and other auditors where follow-up is necessary.

DHS Delegation #00109, “Delegation to the Under Secretary for Management to Act as the Audit Follow-up and Resolution Official for Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations,” dated May 28, 2010, designates the Under Secretary for Management (USM) as the Department’s follow-up and resolution official for OIG audit reports and recommendations.

DHS Designation #00-00901, “U.S. Department of Homeland Security Designations,” dated September 26, 2012, designates the USM as the Department’s follow-up and resolution official for GAO audit reports and recommendations.

DHS’s implementation of OMB Circular A-50 (Revised) is governed by:

- DHS Directive 077-01, “Follow-Up and Resolution for Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations,” dated October 07, 2010;
- DHS Instruction 077-01-001, “Instruction on Follow-Up and Resolution for Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations,” dated January 31, 2011;
- DHS Directive 077-02, “Relations with the U.S. Government Accountability Office (Revision # 02),” dated July 31, 2017 and;
- DHS Instruction 077-02-001, “Relations with the U.S. Government Accountability Office (Revision # 01)” dated July 02, 2010.

This report presents the status of the applicable recommendations as of, and through, September 30, 2023. In addition, recommendations that GAO or OIG agreed to close subsequent

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<sup>1</sup> DHS is also including 16 recommendations from the Treasury OIG report OIG-22-033 “Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue,” dated March 31, 2022, to provide a more complete disclosure of the OIG recommendations it tracks and monitors.

<sup>2</sup> Justification for decisions not to implement recommendations that GAO and OIG closed as “unimplemented” prior to October 01, 2022, were addressed in prior year reports.

to this date, but prior to the publication of this report, are also highlighted to let readers of this report know about recommendations that are no longer open.

### III. Implementation Status of GAO’s Public Recommendations

#### A. Recommendations “Closed, Unimplemented”

From October 01, 2022, to September 30, 2023, GAO designated four public recommendations addressed to DHS as “closed, unimplemented.” These recommendations are listed below, along with the Department’s justification for not implementing each recommendation.

DHS strictly adheres to a self-imposed practice of not closing any GAO recommendations without first reaching agreement with GAO staff to do so and has followed this practice since 2010. This provides Congress and the public added confidence that appropriate actions were taken to implement these recommendations or otherwise to resolve any disagreements.

<b>Component</b>	U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-568
<b>Report Title</b>	Facial Recognition: CBP and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) are Taking Steps to Implement Programs, but CBP Should Address Privacy and System Performance Issues
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/02/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of CBP should develop and implement a plan to ensure that the biometric air exit capability meets its established photo capture requirement.
<b>Date Closed</b>	02/01/2023
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CBP concurred with the recommendation. However, CBP subsequently determined that it would no longer require the program to meet the original photo capture requirement. CBP noted that the original requirement was included in the 2017 Operational Requirements Document (ORD) when there was the possibility of CBP owning, operating, and maintaining cameras at airport departure gates. CBP subsequently determined that it cannot require airlines to take a photo of every traveler, in part because it does not have enough staff to be present at every airport departure gate. In June 2021, CBP noted that the photo capture requirement had been removed from the latest draft of the ORD. In November 2022, DHS approved the updated ORD. Since the new ORD for the Biometric Entry-Exit Program does not include a photo capture requirement, GAO closed this recommendation as not implemented.
<b>Component</b>	Management Directorate (MGMT)-CPO (Chief Procurement Officer)
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-417
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Service Contracts: Increased Oversight Needed to Reduce the Risk Associated with Contractors Performing Certain Functions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/07/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the DHS CPO to document the factors the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) considers when waiving procurement actions from its Procurement Strategy Roadmap to ensure it is consistently considering potential acquisition risks in its planning-including those specific to services.
<b>Date Closed</b>	01/05/2023

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	GAO closed this recommendation as not implemented because the contracting activities are no longer required to submit a Procurement Strategy Roadmap (PSR) to the OCPO. As part of OCPO's continued efforts to streamline processes and strengthen collaborative partnerships, the PSR was sunset. Instead, OCPO leverages other engagements to maintain both early collaboration with OCPO stakeholders and visibility into procurement actions under the CPO's threshold.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM)
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-600
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Icebreaker Program Needs to Address Risks before Committing Resources
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/04/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The DHS Under Secretary for Management should require the Coast Guard to update the Heavy Polar Icebreaker Program's (HPIB) acquisition program baselines prior to authorizing lead ship construction, after completion of the preliminary design review, and after it has gained the requisite knowledge on its technologies, cost, and schedule, as recommended above.
<b>Date Closed</b>	01/30/2023
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) agreed to update the HPIB program's acquisition program baselines prior to authorizing lead ship construction. While the program took steps to gain the requisite knowledge on its technologies and cost by implementing recommendations in 2019, (GAO-18-600 Recommendation #s 1, 4, and 6) and 2021 (GAO-18-600 Recommendation #2), USCG was developing realistic goals for all three ships when it updated its program baselines in May 2021 for the Acquisition Decision Event (ADE) 2B, the stage in the acquisition life cycle framework when DHS formally approves the acquisition program cost, schedule, and performance baseline. As of June 2022, the delivery dates for the second and third ships were still notional. The program's next milestone is ADE 2C; authorization to start construction of the lead ship. Evaluating the program's baselines at ADE 2C, immediately before the shipbuilder is authorized to start construction, was too late because the funding required for the construction phase has already been requested and provided. As a result, the timeframe for implementation of this recommendation had passed and GAO closed it as not implemented.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-600
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Icebreaker Program Needs to Address Risks before Committing Resources
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/04/2018

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should direct the polar icebreaker program office to develop a program schedule in accordance with best practices for project schedules, including determining realistic durations of all shipbuilding activities and identifying and including a reasonable amount of margin in the schedule, to set realistic schedule goals for all three ships before the option for construction of the lead ship is awarded.
<b>Date Closed</b>	01/30/2023
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG concurred with GAO's recommendation. However, when the program awarded the contract for the design and construction of the lead ship in April 2019, a decision point in which significant resource commitments were made, USCG had not yet developed a program schedule in accordance with best practices for project schedules, particularly as it relates to setting realistic schedule goals for all three ships. While USCG continues efforts to work with the contractor to develop a realistic schedule for the lead ship, the timeframe for implementation of this recommendation passed after USCG made another significant resource decision prior to developing realistic goals for all three ships, the December 2021 award of the option for construction of the second ship. Also, since GAO recently conducted another review of this Program, GAO-23-105949, dated July 27, 2023, which addressed USCG's progress on developing a realistic schedule before additional significant resource commitments are made, GAO closed the recommendation as not implemented.



## B. Recommendations “Open”

As of September 30, 2023, 311 GAO public recommendations were designated as “open” for a period of not less than 1 year (i.e., since September 30, 2022). These recommendations are listed below along with a description of actions taken, ongoing, or planned to address them; an estimated completion date (ECD); and a brief discussion of resource and budgetary implications, as appropriate.

<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-16-514
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Detention: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen DHS Management of Short-Term Holding Facilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/26/2016
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct CBP and ICE to develop and issue guidance on how and which compliant mechanisms should be communicated to individuals in custody at holding facilities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	07/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>CBP has made significant progress in ensuring that information is posted within its holding facilities to inform individuals in CBP custody how to contact the DHS OIG Hotline to report allegations of sexual abuse and assault. As part of its Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) program, CBP launched the Keeping Detention Safe poster series, which includes posters in numerous languages providing the toll-free telephone number for the OIG Hotline. These posters were updated during 2019, and their presence is verified during routine PREA audits held at CBP holding facilities. CBP worked with the OIG to place posters within CBP holding facilities across the country. Although the “Keeping Detention Safe” poster is focused on sexual abuse and assault specifically, it does provide detainees with contact information for the OIG Hotline and encourages them to report issues directly to CBP staff for other issues, including waste, fraud, abuse, criminal activity, and allegations concerning civil rights and civil liberties. CBP’s Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) is continuing to work closely with the CBP PREA program, DHS OIG, DHS Office of the Immigration Detention Ombudsman, and DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to ensure that efforts to create new or revised notices will help provide clarity and a single point of contact (POC) for detainees to report issues of concern. Since this is now a multi-component effort, it will take longer to determine a solution that allows those in CBP holding facilities to know how to contact the right oversight office with issues. While this is a broad DHS effort, CBP expects to be completed by the end of July 2024. CBP developed and implemented the public-facing website and complaint form for reporting allegations of misconduct and other issues of concern. This website went live in June 2023 in English, and August 2023, in Spanish. To change the language, there is a drop-down in the upper right-hand of the complaint site. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.</p>
<b>Component</b>	CBP

<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-16-542
<b>Report Title</b>	Antidumping and Countervailing Duties: CBP Action Needed to Reduce Duty Processing Errors and Mitigate Nonpayment Risk
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/14/2016
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner should, consistent with U.S. law and international obligations, take steps to use its data and risk assessment strategically to mitigate Antidumping/Countervailing Duty (AD/CV) duty nonpayment, such as by using predictive risk analysis to identify entries that pose heightened risk and taking appropriate action to mitigate the risk.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	In May 2023, GAO closed this recommendation. Subsequently, GAO reopened the recommendation in the 2023 Comptroller General's Priority Recommendation Letter. CBP met with GAO in September 2023 to discuss the reason the recommendation was closed and then subsequently re-opened, to ensure CBP is able to work towards addressing GAO's expectations. To request closure, that GAO previously supported, CBP completed the following actions. In May 2021, CBP adjusted their approach for the implementation of risk-based bonding by leveraging existing authorities to develop a sustainable approach and focus on near-term deliverables. As of May 2021, the bond policy no longer permits persons suspended or debarred by CBP (or another Federal agency, as applicable) to use a continuous bond to secure customs activities. As of September 2021, CBP completed development to automate the continuous bond reviewer and analytical formulas. In October 2021, CBP published an updated internal AD/CVD Single Transaction Bond memorandum to clearly define when use of Single Transaction Bonds (using the existing formula/process) is to be considered for AD/CVD entries; and, as of September 28, 2022, CBP increased the number of CBP personnel trained on bonding authority and enforcement options by completing a 13-part Bond Educational Webinar Series for CBP personnel, which increased the understanding and enforcement of the agency's current authorities. Some of the topics covered in the series include statutory and regulatory authorities, the various activity type bonds, bond sufficiency and saturation, additional bonding for AD/CVD, superseding and substitution bonds/bond riders. CBP continues to work to complete three remaining initiatives: testing and deployment of the automated continuous bond reviewer and analytical formulas that will replace the existing manual computations; updating Customs Directive 3510-004, Monetary Guidelines for Setting Bond Amounts; and CBP clearance for a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to incorporate eBond in 19 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) 113 regulations that will update eBond functionality from a test to a requirement, eliminate the majority of paper bond

	processing, and ensure bonds are on file. Upon completion of CBP clearance, this NPRM will require further review outside of CBP prior to publication. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-17-439SU / GAO-17-618
<b>Report Title</b>	Customs and Border Protection: Improved Planning Efforts Needed to Strengthen Trade Enforcement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/27/2017
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of CBP should direct the Office of Trade and the Office of Field Operations to develop a long-term hiring plan that articulates how CBP will reach its staffing targets for trade positions set in the Homeland Security Act and the agency's resource optimization model.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) and Trade (OT), in coordination with the CBP Hiring Center, have collaborated on formal hiring plans, in order to meet the targets laid out in the Homeland Security Act of 2020 for trade enforcement positions under each office's purview. In January 2021, an OFO Import Specialist Hiring Plan was implemented. With the implementation of OFO's Import Specialist Hiring Plan: 1) Centers of Excellence and Expertise are able to expedite the filling of vacant import specialist positions; 2) CBP's Hiring Center and OFO Human Capital Division have been able to formulate a hiring schedule for FY 2022; and 3) OFO import specialist vacancies are at their lowest level since 2014. With the significant partnership success of the Recruitment and Retention Advisory Committee co-chaired by the Regulatory Audit and Advisory Services Executive Director, OT has overcome previous hiring challenges, in anticipation of meeting the 364-staffing floor for Customs Auditors. Regulatory Audit and Advisory Services remains strategically focused on potential external risk factors that may impact its goal. These focus items include potential agency budget salary shortfalls, any further hiring freeze, significant changes in U.S. economic job market, potential resolutions to any Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) implications, or derivative pandemic outbreaks. As leading indicators to these events unfold, OT will review and work to develop mitigation efforts to minimize the impact of the risk as much as possible within the flexibilities allowed by statute, regulation, and policy, and will finalize its hiring plan for the auditor positions. Trade Regulatory Audit (TRA) staffing levels for auditors is currently hovering at 344. OT continues to prioritize recruiting new auditors and have made multiple selections from the various job announcements issued during the last FY. OT expects to remain or exceed

that level of staffing going forward (funding permitting). TRA is aware that potential external risk factors may affect this, including agency budget salary shortfalls, hiring freezes, and significant changes in the U.S. economic job market. OT will monitor leading indicators and work to mitigate the impacts within the flexibilities allowed by statute, regulation, and policy. OT has developed a comprehensive strategy to address shortfalls and gaps by implementing a Strategic Hiring plan, which mirrors the creation of the Talent Acquisition Lifecycle. The cycle will afford the OT to get a head start on recruiting and allows for a 15-month window to recruit and onboard employees within the specific time frame identified within the plan. As OT is taking this proactive approach, all key stakeholders know exactly what positions are needed, expected to attrit, and the key timeframe of when recruitment needs to start and end to meet hiring levels.

<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-216
<b>Report Title</b>	Intellectual Property: Agencies Can Improve Efforts to Address Risks Posed by Changing Counterfeit Market
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/30/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of CBP should take steps to evaluate the effectiveness of CBP’s Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) enforcement efforts, such as by improving its metrics to track the overall effectiveness of its IPR enforcement efforts, evaluating selected activities to enhance IPR enforcement, and developing a process to assess and share information on port-led initiatives to enhance IPR enforcement.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/20/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CBP evaluated and updated the measures used to track and report effectiveness of IPR enforcement efforts and continues to actively monitor and assess overall metrics for the program. CBP also conducted a strategic risk assessment of the IPR Priority Trade Issue (PTI) and developed a risk register to monitor the program and adjust metrics and priorities as needed. The IPR Division Metrics Report and IPR Risk Register are living documents, that will continue to be updated to reflect the current operational environment and CBP’s overall efforts to combat the importation of counterfeit. Furthermore, CBP established an IPR PTI Coordinators working group, made up of port and field office personnel, to discuss IPR enforcement issues, share best practices and lessons learned from port-led initiatives, and inform overarching strategic planning for the IPR program. In addition to the monthly PTI Coordinators meetings, CBP holds an annual Trade Enforcement Workshop

	that provides a forum for field personnel to provide critical inputs and feedback into the enforcement priorities for the upcoming FY. CBP requested that GAO close this recommendation as implemented on September 20, 2023.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-405
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Components Could Improve Monitoring of the Employee Misconduct Process
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/30/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of CBP should monitor the duration of all cases beginning-to-end by stage and by case type.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>CBP OPR conducted a detailed analysis of the various timeliness tracking spreadsheets maintained by its Special Agent-in-Charge offices to help it adopt a reasonable and simplified timeliness standard for an administrative investigation. Effective October 1, 2020, the new timeliness standard for an administrative investigation was changed to 120 days (with no pending statuses allowed). This process change saves time, reduces complexity, and ensures a consistent standard exists for the completion of administrative investigation cases. Along with this process change, as an interim measure while the new case management system is completed, OPR also created an online dashboard, which draws data points directly from the existing case management system allowing management to monitor case duration and timeliness across the organization. OPR and CBP's Office of Human Resources Management continued to collaborate to determine the best solution to implement agreed upon changes to the respective dashboards, that will appropriately address the recommendation. OPR is also continuing to work with CBP's Office of Information and Technology (OIT) to develop a new case management system. OPR awarded the contract to develop the updated case management system on September 6, 2023, and started development that month. CBP expects the new case management system to be developed and implemented by the end of September 2024. Also, given this is a technology project, there is a potential for delays if glitches are found during user testing. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.</p>
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-405
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Components Could Improve Monitoring of the Employee Misconduct Process



<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/30/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of CBP should monitor the timeliness of misconduct cases according to established targets for management inquiries, administrative inquiries, and criminal and non-criminal investigations using case management system data.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CBP's OPR conducted a detailed analysis of the various timeliness tracking spreadsheets maintained by its Special Agent-in-Charge offices to help it adopt a reasonable and simplified timeliness standard for an administrative investigation. Effective October 1, 2020, the new timeliness standard for an administrative investigation was changed to 120 days (with no pending statuses allowed). This process change saves time, reduces complexity, and ensures a consistent standard exists for the completion of administrative investigation cases. Along with this process change, as an interim measure while the new case management system is completed, OPR also created an online dashboard which draws data points directly from the existing case management system allowing management to monitor case duration and timeliness across the organization. OPR and CBP's Office of Human Resources Management continued to collaborate to determine the best solution to implement agreed upon changes to the respective dashboards, that will appropriately address the recommendation. OPR is also continuing to work with CBP's OIT to develop a new case management system. OPR awarded the contract to develop the updated case management system on September 6, 2023, and started development that month. CBP expects the new case management system to be developed and implemented by the end of September 2024. Also, given this is a technology project, there is a potential for delays if glitches are found during user testing. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-405
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Components Could Improve Monitoring of the Employee Misconduct Process
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/30/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of CBP should define and document the case management system data fields to be used for monitoring all established performance targets and provide related guidance to staff.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	During the last half of FY 2020, CBP’s OPR conducted a detailed analysis of the various timeliness tracking spreadsheets maintained by its Special Agent-in-Charge offices to help it adopt a reasonable and simplified timeliness standard for an administrative investigation. Effective October 1, 2020, the new timeliness standard for an administrative investigation was changed to 120 days (with no pending statuses allowed). The process change saves time, reduces complexity, and ensures a consistent standard exists for the completion of administrative investigation cases. Along with the process change, as an interim measure while the new case management system is completed, OPR also created an online dashboard which draws data points directly from the existing case management system allowing management to monitor case duration and timeliness across the organization. On September 16, 2021, OPR provided GAO with a live demonstration of the system. OPR and CBP’s Office of Human Resources Management continued to collaborate to determine the best solution to implement agreed upon changes to the respective dashboards, that will appropriately address the recommendation. OPR is also continuing to work with CBP’s OIT to develop a new case management system. OPR awarded the contract to develop the required case management system on September 6, 2023, and started development that month. CBP expects the new case management system to be developed and implemented by the end of September 2024. Also, given this is a technology project, there is a potential for delays if glitches are found during user testing. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-470
<b>Report Title</b>	Northern Border Security: CBP Identified Resource Challenges but Needs Performance Measures to Assess Security Between Ports of Entry
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/28/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief of Border Patrol should develop and implement performance measures to assess its effectiveness at securing the northern border between ports of entry.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) pivoted measures-development efforts toward a comprehensive “Metrics Catalog” intended to support quantification of performance and conditions in all border environments (Southwest, Northern, and Coastal); and these efforts continue. USBP collaborated with key stakeholders to develop and test a prototype of the Metrics Catalog, which demonstrates the inter-connected relationships between existing metrics and numerous variables that can be used as search criteria. These criteria include USBP strategic objectives, master capabilities, mission-essential tasks, keywords, and key performance questions. This concept, introduced during October 2022, added context to combinations of metrics in a way that can offer an intuitive functionality and enhance understanding of performance, including public reporting in accordance with the Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act of 2010 and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2017. The initial release of the USBP Metric Catalog went live in April 2023, and work to refine functionality and populate the catalog with existing measures and metrics (and the associated relationships) continues, as does work to nominate new metrics, to include Northern Border metrics, and key performance questions.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-470
<b>Report Title</b>	Northern Border Security: CBP Identified Resource Challenges but Needs Performance Measures to Assess Security Between Ports of Entry
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/28/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Commissioner of AMO should develop and implement performance measures to assess its effectiveness at securing the northern border between ports of entry in the air and maritime environments.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	In February 2022, CBP Air and Marine Operations (AMO) implemented a universal “force-package” tracking mechanism in the Tasking, Operations, and Management Information System that identifies how AMO aircraft and vessels coordinate operations in the maritime environment. This standardized data entry will allow AMO to quantify the success of asset

coordination in the maritime environment and inform future planning of maritime patrols. On September 5, 2023, AMO provided GAO with supporting documentation on how “force-packages” are entered into the Tasking, Operations, and Management Information System and how AMO is ingesting that data in data analytic products to better understand how AMO aircraft and vessels work together in enforcement operations. In October 2023, AMO will evaluate the full-year’s dataset of “force-package” data. Preliminary findings support the expectation that AMO aircraft and vessel coordination is more prevalent in South Florida and Caribbean maritime operations, where nearly 40 percent of AMO’s enforcement outcomes are a result of AMO “force-package” coordination, but enforcement outcomes like seizures or arrests in the Northern Border maritime environments were rare in FY 2023. AMO is on track to provide a more thorough statistical evaluation of the FY 2023 force package dataset, as well as how those findings can inform future operations by the end of November 2023.

<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-658
<b>Report Title</b>	Land Ports of Entry: CBP Should Update Policies and Enhance Analysis of Inspections
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/13/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of CBP should review and update policies related to land port of entry inspections in accordance with OFO guidance.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CBP’s OFO completed the preliminary Component review of CBP Directive 3340-040B, “Primary Processing of Travelers and Vehicles at Land Ports of Entry,” and CBP Directive 3340-030C, “Secure Custody, Transport, and Escort Procedures at Ports of Entry.” Both directives are in the final phase of review and editing by the Enforcement Programs Division management team. Once a final draft is completed, the Enforcement Programs Division will submit to OFO directorates for final clearance. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-658
<b>Report Title</b>	Land Ports of Entry: CBP Should Update Policies and Enhance Analysis of Inspections

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/13/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of CBP should develop a new target for the land border interception rate for passengers in privately-owned vehicles with major violations that sets an ambitious and realistic goal based on past performance.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	During early 2020, CBP's OFO amended the targets for the Compliance Examination Cat 1 Interception Rate measure in the air and personally owned vehicle environments. OFO requested closure of the recommendation, which GAO declined, stating the targets were not raised above recent national performance results and OFO's implemented plan to raise the targets was insufficient. During March 2020, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, OFO took precautionary actions to suspend the Compliance Examination program at land ports of entry to ensure the health and safety of its workforce and the traveling public. Additionally, the pandemic's impact on international travel prevented CBP's ability to forecast travel volumes. The Compliance Examination program remains in suspension due to lower travel volumes that impact statistical sampling integrity. During November 2022, OFO began an initiative to evaluate the Compliance Examination program to determine its effectiveness in gathering compliance and risk information. During this evaluation, the Compliance Examination program will remain in suspension. The most recent estimated date for OFO to establish final land border interception rate targets was December 31, 2024, based on the requirement that OFO would need at least 2 years of reliable Compliance Examination program data to establish initial and final targets.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-182
<b>Report Title</b>	Customs and Border Protection: Risk Management for Tariff Refunds Should Be Improved
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/17/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Trade assesses the feasibility of flagging excessive export submissions across multiple claims and takes cost-effective steps, based on the assessment, to prevent over claiming.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/17/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>CBP’s OT originally developed an interim proposal that would facilitate reviews of exports between claims. OT reviewed the feasibility of repurposing the “unique identifier number” data field currently found in each export record and mandating uniform reporting requirements based upon relevant export documentation. In June 2021, OT issued a preliminary plan to the Drawback Trade Support Network and received significant feedback, including comments on the legality of requiring uniform reporting based upon the requirements in 19 USC § 1313. As a result of the Drawback Trade Support Network’s response and the lack of a common unique identifier for all exports, a policy correction would not be sufficient. OT determined tracking exports across drawback claims is not feasible. Specifically, CBP came to this conclusion due to the following reasons: (1) current law does not clearly support the initiative; (2) programming changes would require significant Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) development and funding; (3) a significant amount of exported merchandise would not be subject to this initiative; (4) electronically validating tens of millions of new data elements per day would significantly delay drawback claim acceptance rates and issuance of legitimate drawback refunds to industry, and deteriorate CBP processing efficiency; and (5) reviews would be manual and would increase the workload when CBP is experiencing delays in processing the current workload. On March 17, 2023, CBP provided supporting documentation and requested closure from GAO. In May 2023, GAO indicated that CBP’s actions addressing GAO-20-182 recommendation 3, which is to develop a plan, with time frames, to establish a reliable system of record for proof of export, are interrelated with this recommendation. CBP plans to complete corrective action to address recommendation 3 by the end of 2023. GAO wants to consider all the facts and evidence for both recommendations before deciding whether to close this recommendation.</p>
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-182
<b>Report Title</b>	Customs and Border Protection: Risk Management for Tariff Refunds Should Be Improved
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/17/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Trade develops a plan, with time frames, to establish a reliable system of record for proof of export.



<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The implementation of modernized drawback regulations enabled CBP's OT to assess the reliability of the Automated Export System (AES) as an electronic means of establishing proof of export for drawback. In 2021, OT conducted an initial assessment of the AES Electronic Export Information data set as a means of establishing proof of export for drawback and concluded that it is not a feasible solution. CBP then evaluated the AES Electronic Export Manifest data set as a means of establishing proof of export for drawback and concluded that it too is insufficient to meet the requirements for drawback electronic proof of export. OT is drafting a written analysis detailing the outcomes of its assessment of AES as a drawback proof of export requirement solution. Once the written analysis is completed, the recommendation will be submitted for closure to GAO.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-182
<b>Report Title</b>	Customs and Border Protection: Risk Management for Tariff Refunds Should Be Improved
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/17/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of CBP should ensure that the Office of Trade turns the claim selection feature in ACE back on and finalizes and implements procedures to target claims for review that were accepted into ACE during the period in which the selection feature was disabled.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On October 30, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-274

<b>Report Title</b>	Southwest Border: Actions Needed to Address Fragmentation in DHS' Processes for Apprehended Family Members
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/19/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that, at the time of apprehension, CBP collects the information that DHS components collectively need to process family members apprehended together.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/15/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On November 15, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	
	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-274
<b>Report Title</b>	Southwest Border: Actions Needed to Address Fragmentation in DHS' Processes for Apprehended Family Members
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/19/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that CBP documents the information that DHS components collectively need to process family members apprehended together on the Form I-213.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/15/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On November 15, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	
	CBP

<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-536
<b>Report Title</b>	Southwest Border: CBP Needs to Increase Oversight of Funds, Medical Care, and Reporting of Deaths
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/14/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of CBP should update the Significant Incident Reporting System to include categories that align with CBP's directive on the reporting of significant incidents.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/12/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On December 12, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-356
<b>Report Title</b>	Southwest Border Security: Actions Are Needed to Address the Cost and Readiness Implications of Continued Department of Defense (DOD) Support to U.S. Customs and Border Protection
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/02/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security, together with the Secretary of Defense, should define a common outcome for DOD's support to DHS, consistent with best practices for interagency collaboration, and articulate how that support will enable DHS to achieve its southwest border security mission in fiscal year 2021 and beyond.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense share an understanding of an outcome for DOD support to DHS on the Southwest Border (SWB). Both Secretaries desire an end to regular, yearly commitments of DOD capabilities in support of CBP’s SWB security mission. To that end, CBP has sought, and in some instances received from Congress, additional resources to apply to the SWB security mission. Those resources, coupled with internal planning and adjustment of DHS capabilities, provide a path to ending regular, yearly DOD support of the SWB security mission. However, should circumstances at the border risk overwhelming DHS and CBP capabilities, then, consistent with best practices of interagency collaboration, DHS would reach out to partners for support in meeting the mission. On August 23, 2023, CBP provided GAO with a copy of the Request for Assistance memorandum from DHS to DOD and requested closure of the recommendation. On September 6, 2023, GAO requested continued collaboration between DOD and CBP to improve the “End of Mission” section in the Request for Assistance before it will close the recommendation. GAO also suggested DHS work with DOD on this section so that it clearly states how both agencies will know when the mission has been completed. A meeting took place in October 2023, with DHS Policy, Military Advisor and CBP/USBP to discuss the next steps and actions to be taken for the GAO to close the recommendation. DHS/CBP continues to collaborate to determine how to respond to GAO’s requests for this recommendation.</p>
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-518
<b>Report Title</b>	Facial Recognition Technology: Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Should Better Assess Privacy and Other Risks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/28/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	10
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of CBP should, after implementing a mechanism to track non-federal systems, assess the risks of using such systems, including privacy and accuracy-related risks.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>CBP Directive 2120-010A, “Privacy Policy, Compliance, and Implementation,” requires all agency personnel to alert the CBP Privacy Office about any systems, technologies, regulations, rulemakings, programs, pilot projects, demonstrations, information sharing, contracts, and other activities that involve personally identifiable information (PII) or otherwise impact the privacy of individuals. The Directive places an emphasis on issues involving the development or use of facial recognition and other biometric technologies; efforts involving the collection, use, or sharing of cellular phone and location</p>

data; access to and use of social media information; the collection or disclosure of medical information; the development or application of artificial intelligence or machine learning; and surveillance or body-worn cameras. Additionally, all business owners and project managers of information technology (IT) systems, technologies, rulemakings, programs, pilot projects, demonstrations, information sharing, contracts, and other activities involving the use of PII are required to complete a Privacy Threshold Analysis (PTA), which includes a general description of the activity and describes what PII (if any) is collected (and from whom) and how that information is used or retained. The explicit linking of the PTA requirement to any activity involving the use of biometric data should increase the Privacy Office’s exposure to and awareness of potential activities that impact privacy. In addition, the CBP Privacy and Diversity Office conducted privacy training in March 2021 for more than 160 Procurement Directorate employees. The Privacy and Diversity Office also participates in the annual “Lunch & Learn” sessions, hosted by the Procurement Directorate’s Acquisition Workforce and Knowledge Management division. These trainings provide guidance from a privacy perspective to individuals who can procure access to the subject vendor types and technologies, via a government purchase card, outside of the typical IT acquisition review process. Finally, CBP Privacy and Diversity Office has completed draft Addenda to the Automated Targeting System Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) series to assess the privacy risks and describe any mitigations for the operational use of two commercial vendor facial recognition search platforms. The draft PIA addenda are under review with CBP Privacy and Diversity Office management and will then be reviewed by CBP Office of Chief Counsel (OCC) before submission for review, approval, and publication by the DHS Chief Privacy Officer.

<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104568
<b>Report Title</b>	Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Checkpoint Oversight and Data
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/06/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief of Border Patrol should ensure that sectors and the Checkpoint Program Management Office (CPMO) are overseeing that checkpoint activity data are consistently and accurately recorded. This should include (but not be limited to) overseeing data on apprehensions of smuggled people, canine assists with drug seizures, seizures of trace amounts of marijuana, non-drug property seizures, and attempted checkpoint circumventions.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<p><b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b></p>	<p>The CPMO generated a memorandum to reintroduce the CPMO to all USBP checkpoint stakeholders. The memorandum is currently pending USBP Chief review, approval, and signature. This memorandum is for all USBP sectors and Headquarters (HQ) checkpoint stakeholders and defines its vision and mission. The memorandum also designates the CPMO as the focal point for all checkpoint related activities, including checkpoint data and performance management, checkpoint policy management, checkpoint requirements and resource management, checkpoint stakeholder engagement, CPMO administration, checkpoint modernization, and checkpoint health and safety considerations. The CPMO also drafted a USBP checkpoints integrated project team (IPT) charter that will be led by the CPMO to convene all relevant checkpoint stakeholders and address all related efforts. This IPT will not only organize and assemble checkpoint stakeholders and subject matter experts, but will also facilitate commitment to a common purpose, objectives, timely delivery to specific products and requirements, and mutual accountability to the successful sustainment of checkpoints and all checkpoint related activities. Once finalized and approved by all USBP directorate leaders and the USBP Chief, the IPT charter will be distributed to USBP sectors and HQ. During November 2022, the CPMO completed the reengagement and establishment of dedicated liaisons to work with sector Data Integrity and Management Team (DIMIT) and sector management level (Supervisory Border Patrol Agents and above) subject matter experts.</p> <p>USBP’s remaining milestones include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By May 31, 2024, the CPMO will complete initial checkpoint assessments, conduct site visits to all sectors with permanent checkpoints, and complete an analysis to establish baseline requirements to gain a better understanding of sector checkpoint needs and its current footprint in the field.</li> <li>• By June 30, 2024, the CPMO will conduct an initial review of its processing system issues related to data by working with the USBP Systems Division, DIMITs, and the USBP sector Self-Inspection Program regarding the consistency and accuracy of data associated with checkpoint operations.</li> <li>• By June 30, 2024, the CPMO will develop courses of action and guidance for processing and data systems; and liaise with USBP Systems Division and DIMITs at CBP headquarters and the sector Self-Inspection Program regarding the consistency and accuracy of data associated with checkpoint operations.</li> <li>• By September 29, 2024, the CPMO will initiate line of effort meetings to integrate and maintain sector engagement, which will socialize and facilitate requirement compliance, engagement of data management, integrity teams, and development of Self-Inspection Program data field review requirements.</li> </ul> <p>By October 31, 2024, the CPMO will initiate a quarterly review of its data systems and reports, via the CPMO DIMIT liaison working with the USBP Systems Division and update automated reports based on the results of that review, as appropriate.</p>
<p><b>Component</b></p>	<p>CBP</p>



<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104568
<b>Report Title</b>	Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Checkpoint Oversight and Data
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/06/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief of Border Patrol should ensure that Border Patrol uses its data system to document information about all people for whom a checkpoint encounter leads to a subsequent enforcement action.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>CPMO drafted a USBP checkpoints IPT charter, which will be led by the CPMO, that will convene all relevant checkpoint stakeholders and address all checkpoint related efforts. This IPT will not only organize and assemble checkpoint stakeholders and subject matter experts, but will also facilitate commitment to a common purpose, objectives, timely delivery to specific products and requirements, and mutual accountability to the successful sustainment of checkpoints and all checkpoint related activities. Once finalized and approved by all USBP directorate leaders and the Chief, the IPT charter will be distributed to sectors and headquarters. During November 2022, the CPMO completed the reengagement and establishment of dedicated liaisons to work with sector DIMT and sector management level (Supervisory Border Patrol Agents and above) subject matter experts.</p> <p>USBP’s remaining milestones include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By May 31, 2024, the CPMO will complete initial checkpoint assessments, conduct site visits to all sectors with permanent checkpoints, and complete an analysis to establish baseline requirements to improve the national program.</li> <li>• By June 30, 2024, the CPMO will conduct an initial review of its processing system issues related to data by working with the USBP Systems Division, DIMTs, and the USBP sector Self-Inspection Program regarding the consistency and accuracy of data associated with checkpoint operations.</li> <li>• By June 30, 2024, the CPMO will develop courses of action and guidance for processing and data systems, continue to liaise with the Systems Division and DIMT at HQ and sector Self-Inspection Program regarding the consistency and accuracy of form I-44 quarriable fields associated with checkpoint operations.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By September 29, 2024, the CPMO will initiate line of effort meetings to integrate and maintain sector engagement, which will socialize and facilitate requirement compliance, engagement of data management, integrity teams, and development of Self-Inspection Program data field review requirements.</li> <li>• By October 31, 2024, the CPMO will initiate a quarterly review of its data systems and reports, via the CPMO DIMT liaison working with the USBP Systems Division to update automated reports based on the results of that review, as appropriate.</li> <li>• By December 29, 2024, the CPMO will implement planned courses of action for processing and data systems, to include working with USBP Systems Division and DIMTs regarding ongoing reviews of data associated with checkpoint operations and implementation of actions, as appropriate.</li> </ul>
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104568
<b>Report Title</b>	Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Checkpoint Oversight and Data
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/06/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief of Border Patrol should require checkpoints with license plate readers to document secondary inspections by using the Border Enforcement Secondary Tool as intended.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>During 2022, CPMO met with CBP's Offices of Facilities and Asset Management and OIT to discuss existing coordination and communication challenges, as well as opportunities for improved IT infrastructure. As a result of these meetings, CPMO is now included in correspondence and coordination efforts regarding the License Plate Reader program. In January 2023, USBP acquired contract support to provide program management and technical guidance related to this recommendation. Since 2022, the CPMO has conducted checkpoint assessments, which have identified consistent issues surrounding the use of the Border Enforcement Secondary Tool (BEST). CPMO is partnering with the USBP Systems Division to establish a system of record to meet this recommendation. Once the process is established, the CPMO will engage the USBP Policy team to develop compliance measures.</p> <p>USBP's remaining milestones include:</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By May 31, 2024, CPMO will complete checkpoint assessments. USBP CPMO will identify target checkpoints that have the infrastructure, technology, and communication lines to implement the use of the BEST.</li> <li>• By May 31, 2024, the CPMO will conduct infrastructure discussions with USBP’s Facilities Management and Engineering (FM&amp;E) and CBP’s OIT to identify technology, infrastructure, and communications requirements to successfully implement the BEST.</li> <li>• By June 30, 2024, CPMO will develop facilities and OIT checkpoint requirements for sectors to submit to FM&amp;E and OIT.</li> <li>• By August 31, 2024, CPMO will issue a memorandum mandating the use of the BEST at checkpoints where successful implementation can occur.</li> <li>• By September 29, 2024, CPMO will initiate line of effort meetings to integrate and maintain sector engagement, which will socialize and facilitate requirement compliance, to include implementation of the BEST.</li> <li>• By October 31, 2024, CPMO will initiate quarterly follow-up meetings with FM&amp;E and OIT regarding infrastructure improvements.</li> <li>• By October 31, 2024, CPMO will initiate quarterly notifications to newly serviced checkpoints regarding the use of the BEST.</li> </ul>
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<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104568
<b>Report Title</b>	Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Checkpoint Oversight and Data
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/06/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief of Border Patrol should provide sustained oversight of CPMO and hold it accountable for implementing its checkpoint oversight activities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Following initial checkpoint assessments, CPMO determined the need to engage additional stakeholders; and is coordinating with the USBP Policy team to make recommendations to leadership on edits to CPMO and checkpoint policies.

USBP’s remaining milestones include:

- By May 31, 2024, CPMO will complete initial checkpoint assessments. USBP CPMO will conduct site visits to all sectors with permanent checkpoints and complete an analysis to establish baseline requirements to improve the national program.
- By May 31, 2024, CPMO will develop a CPMO Doctrine, to include HQ and sector roles and responsibilities, as well as organizational structure.
- By September 29, 2024, CPMO will conduct line of effort meetings with both HQ and sector CPMO entities to identify responsibilities.
- By December 31, 2024, CPMO will develop standard operating procedures (SOP), as appropriate, for sector and program management oversight of CPMO.
- By, May 30, 2025, CPMO will initiate quarterly meetings between CPMO and sector personnel regarding activities and responsibilities.
- By December 31, 2025, CPMO will define CPMO metrics to be reported in annual sector and HQ reports, as appropriate.
- By December 31, 2026, CPMO will initiate yearly CPMO status reports to the Law Enforcement Operations Directorate Chief, to include a “rollup” of sector annual reports.

<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104568
<b>Report Title</b>	Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Checkpoint Oversight and Data
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/06/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief of Border Patrol should ensure that CPMO is consistently and adequately staffed.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>Since 2021, the CPMO has been consistently staffed with two permanent Assistant Chief positions, as recommended in previous GAO audits. The current CPMO staff at USBP HQ continues to address this recommendation to determine additional staffing needs for the CPMO. However, until an initial staffing assessment is complete, CPMO cannot specify staffing needs. Once the staffing assessment is complete, CPMO will develop an appropriate staffing model, but will not make changes to the current staffing model. By May 31, 2024, CPMO will (1) complete initial checkpoint assessments, which will include site visits to all sectors with permanent checkpoints and complete an analysis to establish baseline requirements to improve the national program; and (2) develop a CPMO Doctrine, to include HQ and sector roles and responsibilities, as well as organizational structure. Next, by September 29, 2024, CPMO will conduct line of effort meetings with both HQ and sector entities to identify responsibilities. By December 31, 2024, CPMO will develop SOP's, as appropriate, for sector and program management oversight. Finally, by May 30, 2025, CPMO will initiate quarterly meetings between CPMO and sector personnel regarding activities and responsibilities.</p>
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104568
<b>Report Title</b>	Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Checkpoint Oversight and Data
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/06/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief of Border Patrol should update CPMO's roles and responsibilities and communicate them across Border Patrol, including to sectors.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>CPMO is completing its program evaluation and coordinating with Doctrine and Policy divisions to update the checkpoint policy, cement program concepts in doctrine, and develop a roll out for publication. By May 31, 2024, CPMO will (1) complete initial checkpoint assessments, which will include site visits to all sectors with permanent checkpoints and complete an analysis to establish baseline requirements to improve the national program; and (2) develop a CPMO Doctrine, to include HQ and sector roles and responsibilities, as well as organizational structure. Next, by September 29, 2024, CPMO will conduct line of effort meetings with both headquarters and sector entities to identify responsibilities. By December 31, 2024, the CPMO will develop SOP's, as appropriate, for sector and program management oversight. Finally,</p>

	by May 30, 2025, CPMO will initiate quarterly meetings between CPMO and sector personnel regarding activities and responsibilities.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104568
<b>Report Title</b>	Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Checkpoint Oversight and Data
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/06/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief of Border Patrol should develop policies and procedures for CPMO's checkpoint oversight activities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CPMO will reengage with field representatives and discuss collective issues and areas requiring further review. By May 31, 2024, CPMO will (1) complete initial checkpoint assessments at all sectors with permanent checkpoints, and an analysis to establish baseline requirements to improve the national program; and (2) develop a CPMO Doctrine, to include HQ and sector roles and responsibilities, as well as organizational structure. Next, by September 29, 2024, CPMO will conduct line of effort meetings with both headquarters and sector entities to identify responsibilities. CPMO will then develop SOP's, as appropriate, for sector and program management oversight by December 31, 2024. Finally, CPMO will initiate quarterly meetings between personnel regarding activities and responsibilities by May 30, 2025.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104626
<b>Report Title</b>	Federal Personal Property: Better Internal Guidance and More Action from General Services Administration (GSA) are Needed to Help Agencies Maximize Use of Excess
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2

<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner should ensure that internal guidance on considering excess personal property incorporates, at a minimum, when it is practicable to check for and obtain excess property and how to evaluate the suitability of excess property for meeting agency needs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>In the first quarter of FY 2023, the CBP Office of Acquisition completed its review of all CBP guidance documents on property management and purchase cards to ensure that the CBP’s guidance includes information clarifying when it is necessary or practicable to check for excess property. Specifically, the Office of Acquisition reviewed the following pertinent documents: (1) 5230-032A, “Directive Personal Property Management,” dated February 14, 2013; (2) 5200-13C, “Handbook Personal Property and Asset Management,” dated July 2012; (3) 5220-034, “Purchase Card Manual for FY 2022;” (4) 5220-041A, “Acquisition Management Policy,” dated February 7, 2019; (5) 5225-06, “Life Cycle Logistics Supportability and Sustainment Planning,” dated June 1, 2020; (6) 5225-07, “Handbook Acquisition Logistics Supportability and Sustainment Guidebook,” dated August 31 2020; (7) 5225-08, “Program Lifecycle Process Guide,” dated September 2021; and, (8) DHS102-01-009, “Donated, Seized and Forfeited, and Reuse of Interagency Technology Capability Equipment,” dated February 2017. As a result of this review, the Office of Acquisition concluded that CBP’s existing guidance covers the prioritized preference for sources of excess property when trying to acquire it. As the Office of Acquisition also found that CBP’s Purchase Card Manual, which undergoes an annual update, could benefit from a minor update in Chapter 4, “Required Sources,” to be more specific rather than providing a general reference to the Personal Property Acquisition Manual, the Office of Acquisition updated the Purchase Card Manual for FY 2023 to reflect the specific section of the Personal Property Acquisition Manual. This effort, as part of the annual update was completed on December 5, 2022, posted on the CBP SharePoint site and distributed internally on December 30, 2022. On December 16, 2022, CBP provided the documents reviewed and updated Purchase Card Manual for FY 2023 to GAO and requested closure of this recommendation. On July 7, 2023, GAO stated they believed CBP has met one part of the recommendation, but still needs to address “when it is practicable to check for and obtain excess property.” In response, CBP is revising two sections within the Personal Property Asset Management Handbook: a. (Personal Property) Section 4.6 Prioritized Sources for Acquisitions to include “practicability;” and b. (Purchase Card) Section 4.7 Purchase Requisition Review of Material Group 31XX to include suitability and “practicability.” In addition, CBP will develop and distribute semi-annual communication for Provisions on Considering Excess Personal Property starting FY 2024 until the review of the Personal Property Asset Management Handbook is completed and signed.</p>
<b>Component</b>	CBP

<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104725
<b>Report Title</b>	Border Security: CBP Could Improve How It Categorizes Drug Seizure Data and Evaluates Training
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/11/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief of Border Patrol should finalize and implement a plan to regularly evaluate the drug seizures portion of the National Field Training Program.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	During February 2022, USBP officials updated the Field Training Unit internal operating procedure (IOP), which is a post-academy graduation training program for new Border Patrol Agents. Updates to the IOP included the drug seizures module and a commitment to review the program’s curricula on a periodic basis. The IOP was fully implemented on July 1, 2022. GAO indicated that this is a positive step to fully address this recommendation. In addition, USBP will demonstrate these periodic reviews are occurring. USBP continues to update the Border Patrol Agents Field Training Unit, Supervisory Field Training Unit, and Border Patrol Processing Coordinator Field Training Unit internal operating procedures. Additionally, feedback from the field is being reviewed and updates will continue as time permits. USBP continues to update the Supervisory Field Training Unit, Border Patrol Agents Field Training Unit, and Border Patrol Processing Coordinator Field Training Unit. Additionally, USBP continues to analyze feedback from the field to make necessary adjustments, additions, and/or removals of program content. These updates continued until the end of calendar year (CY) 2023. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105053
<b>Report Title</b>	Southwest Border: CBP Should Improve Data Collection, Reporting, and Evaluation for the Missing Migrant Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/20/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief of Border Patrol should take steps to ensure that the agency collects and records available information on migrant deaths, including those identified by external entities, along the southwest border.



<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/09/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On January 09, 2024, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105053
<b>Report Title</b>	Southwest Border: CBP Should Improve Data Collection, Reporting, and Evaluation for the Missing Migrant Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/20/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief of Border Patrol should include known migrant deaths, including those reported by external entities, and any data limitations in public agency reports and those to Congress.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>USBP’s MMP reports all known migrant deaths in the BSITS; and sector MMP coordinators plan to record additional information on reported migrant deaths along the Southwest border from external partners within BSITS. MMP coordinators have participated in meetings with sector coordinators to discuss updates and best practices, including data integrity and external stakeholder engagements. The MMP engaged with medical examiners, coroners, non-governmental organizations, academia, and various law enforcement agencies along the Southwest Border to expand situational awareness and de-conflict information related to migrant deaths.</p> <p>During April 2022, USBP hosted a summit for MMP coordinators that included refresher training on the MMP doctrine, which promotes standardization in reporting. Three National Missing and Unidentified Persons System employees participated in this summit and various partners had the opportunity to engage with MMP coordinators from their area of responsibility to establish lines of communication for incident reporting and exchange information.</p>

During November 2022, USBP hosted a second MMP summit, where coordinators reviewed all MMP doctrine documents including the 2021 IOP, Border Safety Initiative Methodology, and Border Safety Initiative Tracking System Manual; and exchanged best management practices currently working for MMP. This summit allowed participants to explore all current MMP responsibilities, goals, and defined parameters of engagement with internal and external MMP stakeholders, and collection and recording of data in the dashboard.

On November 25, 2022, CBP requested that GAO consider the recommendation closed as implemented. However, GAO requested that USBP complete its planned actions to ensure that sectors are collecting and recording available information on migrant deaths. During April and September 2023, CBP sent GAO the fiscal years 2022 and 2023 MMP Reports, “Rescue Beacons and Unidentified Remains,” respectively. Furthermore, USBP conducted four regional MMP summits to further engage with external stakeholders in their immediate area, who otherwise would not be able to travel to a distant location for an MMP Summit. These events also allowed MMP personnel and its new members to continue discussing best practices and challenges to improve the program’s effectiveness. MMP Headquarters also traveled to MIP during December 2022 to begin standing up its MMP to capture what is occurring in the coastal sector. The engagement with MIP prompted the Ramey Sector in Puerto Rico to inquire about starting the MMP in that sector. Subsequently, MMP Headquarters traveled there during July 2023 to engage with sector leadership and internal and external stakeholders to begin the process of starting a pilot MMP. USBP will again request that GAO close this recommendation as implemented by November 30, 2023. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.

<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105053
<b>Report Title</b>	Southwest Border: CBP Should Improve Data Collection, Reporting, and Evaluation for the Missing Migrant Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/20/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief of Border Patrol should develop a plan with time frames to evaluate the Missing Migrant Program.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/09/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On January 09, 2024, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105321
<b>Report Title</b>	Southwest Border: CBP Oversees Short-Term Custody Standards, but Border Patrol Could Better Monitor Care of At-Risk Individuals
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief of the Border Patrol should develop and implement a mechanism to monitor the agency's compliance with welfare check requirements for certain at-risk individuals in custody.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On June 27, 2022, USBP's Law Enforcement Operations Directorate (LEOD) began issuing quarterly email guidance reminders to sectors for proper monitoring of the at-risk population as directed in the Clarification of At-Risk Population and Hold Room Monitoring Provisions in the CBP National Standards on Transport, Escort, Search and Detention, memorandum, dated May 24, 2019. Subsequently, LEOD issued quarterly reminders on September 20, 2022, December 21, 2022, March 13, 2023, and June 2, 2023, and further reminders are scheduled to be sent during October and December 2023. In addition, the At-Risk Population and Hold Room Monitoring Guidance reminder was published in SharePoint on June 6, 2023. On January 1, 2023, USBP LEOD and the Strategic Planning and Analysis Directorate created the first quarterly USBP Nationwide At-Risk Subjects by Sector report. As part of its continuous monitoring, USBP LEOD utilizes this report to notify sectors of deficiencies identified, as appropriate. On February 15, 2023, CBP provided a copy of this report to GAO. A quarterly report was sent on April 1, 2023, July 1, 2023, and the next one will be generated and distributed during October 2023. Finally, USBP provided LEOD the remaining quarterly reports during October 2023 and January 2024, to demonstrate compliance with welfare check requirements for certain at-risk individuals in custody. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	CISA

<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-211
<b>Report Title</b>	Critical Infrastructure Protection: Additional Actions Are Essential to Assessing Cybersecurity Framework Adoption
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/15/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security, in cooperation with the co-State Set Aside (SSA) as necessary, should take steps to consult with respective sector partner(s), such as the SCC, and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as appropriate, to develop methods for determining the level and type of framework adoption by entities across their respective sectors.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA sent the “Real-World Risk Reduction: Measuring Use and Impact of the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals” assessment to GAO on September 29, 2023, to complete implementation of this recommendation. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-550
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Acquisitions: Additional Practices Could Help Components Better Develop Operational Requirements
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/08/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	14
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for the National Protection and Programs Directorate conducts a workforce assessment to account for an independent requirements organization’s workforce needs
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA shared the finalized copy of its response to Section 1745 of the FY 2021 NDAA, thus completing the implementation phase for this recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-299
<b>Report Title</b>	Critical Infrastructure Protection: Additional Actions Needed to Identify Framework Adoption and Resulting Improvements
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/25/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should take steps to consult with respective sector partner(s), such as the SCC and NIST, as appropriate, to collect and report sector-wide improvements from use of the framework across its critical infrastructure sectors using existing initiatives.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA sent the “Real-World Risk Reduction: Measuring Use and Impact of the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals” assessment to GAO on September 29, 2023, to complete the first implementation phase for this recommendation. For the second implementation phase, CISA will be working on the follow-on assessment to measure the impact of the Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals over time. To gather the necessary data required for the additional follow-on assessment requested by GAO, the team will need between 6-12 months. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-453
<b>Report Title</b>	Critical Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Enhance DHS Oversight of Cybersecurity at High-Risk Chemical Facilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/14/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Assistant Director of the Infrastructure Security Division should incorporate measures to assess the contribution that its cybersecurity training is making to program goals, such as inspector- or program-specific performance improvement goals.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Despite strong support from the regulated community and bipartisan backing in both House and Senate, Congress allowed the statutory authority for CISA’s Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations to expire. With the expiration of the CFATS statutory authority on August 1, 2023, these high-risk facilities are no longer required to maintain their security measures. While CISA believes that many facilities will continue to maintain some of the security measures they have invested in, they are no longer required by law to do so and will not have access to the same CFATS-created tools. Without Congressional authority, CISA will no longer inspect high-risk sites, enforce security implementation, vet individuals who are seeking access to dangerous chemicals for terrorist ties, or identify new CFATS facilities. Final actions have been taken, from DHS’s perspective.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-453
<b>Report Title</b>	Critical Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Enhance DHS Oversight of Cybersecurity at High-Risk Chemical Facilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/14/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Assistant Director of the Infrastructure Security Division should track delivery and performance data for its cybersecurity training, such as the completion of courses, webinars, and refresher trainings.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Despite strong support from the regulated community and bipartisan backing in both House and Senate, Congress allowed the statutory authority for CISA’s Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulations to expire. With the expiration of the CFATS statutory authority on August 1, 2023, these high-risk facilities are no longer required to maintain their security measures. While CISA believes that many facilities will continue to maintain some of the security measures they have invested in, they are no longer required by law to do so and will not have access to the same CFATS-created

	tools. Without Congressional authority, CISA will no longer inspect high-risk sites, enforce security implementation, vet individuals who are seeking access to dangerous chemicals for terrorist ties, or identify new CFATS facilities. Final actions have been taken from DHS's perspective.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-453
<b>Report Title</b>	Critical Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Enhance DHS Oversight of Cybersecurity at High-Risk Chemical Facilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/14/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Assistant Director of the Infrastructure Security Division should develop a plan to evaluate the effectiveness of its cybersecurity training, such as collecting and analyzing course evaluation forms.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Despite strong support from the regulated community and bipartisan backing in both House and Senate, Congress allowed the statutory authority for CISA's CFATS regulations to expire. With the expiration of the CFATS statutory authority on August 1, 2023, these high-risk facilities are no longer required to maintain their security measures. While CISA believes that many facilities will continue to maintain some of the security measures they have invested in, they are no longer required by law to do so and will not have access to the same CFATS-created tools. Without Congressional authority, CISA will no longer inspect high-risk sites, enforce security implementation, vet individuals who are seeking access to dangerous chemicals for terrorist ties, or identify new CFATS facilities. Final actions have been taken from DHS's perspective.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-453
<b>Report Title</b>	Critical Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Enhance DHS Oversight of Cybersecurity at High-Risk Chemical Facilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/14/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Assistant Director of the Infrastructure Security Division should develop a workforce plan that addresses the program’s cybersecurity-related needs, which should include an analysis of any gaps in the program’s capacity and capability to perform its cybersecurity-related functions, and human capital strategies to address them.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Despite strong support from the regulated community and bipartisan backing in both House and Senate, Congress allowed the statutory authority for CISA’s CFATS regulations to expire. With the expiration of the CFATS statutory authority on August 1, 2023, these high-risk facilities are no longer required to maintain their security measures. While CISA believes that many facilities will continue to maintain some of the security measures they have invested in, they are no longer required by law to do so and will not have access to the same CFATS-created tools. Without Congressional authority, CISA will no longer inspect high-risk sites, enforce security implementation, vet individuals who are seeking access to dangerous chemicals for terrorist ties, or identify new CFATS facilities. Final actions have been taken from DHS’s perspective.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-453
<b>Report Title</b>	Critical Infrastructure: Actions Needed to Enhance DHS Oversight of Cybersecurity at High-Risk Chemical Facilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/14/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Assistant Director of the Infrastructure Security Division should maintain reliable, readily available information about the cyber integration levels of covered chemical facilities and inspector cybersecurity expertise. This could include updating the program’s inspection database system to better track facilities’ cyber integration levels.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Despite strong support from the regulated community and bipartisan backing in both House and Senate, Congress allowed the statutory authority for CISA’s CFATS regulations to expire. With the expiration of the CFATS statutory authority on August 1, 2023, these high-risk facilities are no longer required to maintain their security measures. While CISA believes



	that many facilities will continue to maintain some of the security measures they have invested in, they are no longer required by law to do so and will not have access to the same CFATS-created tools. Without Congressional authority, CISA will no longer inspect high-risk sites, enforce security implementation, vet individuals who are seeking access to dangerous chemicals for terrorist ties, or identify new CFATS facilities. Final actions have been taken, from DHS's perspective.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-598
<b>Report Title</b>	Cybersecurity: DHS and Selected Agencies Need to Address Shortcomings in Implementation of Network Monitoring Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/18/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that IHS's system integrator records FISMA system information in the agency's Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) tools.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The CDM Project Management Office (PMO), the System Integration (SI), and Indian Health Services (IHS) have made significant progress in the BigFix Mapping, Business Rules in Splunk, and Data Visibility in the Dashboard initiatives. Important milestones have been achieved over the past 6 months, moving closer to closing this outstanding recommendation. In the realm of BigFix Mapping, SI completed the development of BigFix fixlets in the CDM Lab, requested by the IHS BigFix subject matter experts (SME), to identify endpoints in the IHS environment. Additionally, the deployment in the IHS environment has been accomplished, with a due diligence check on the deployment scheduled for late 2023. Following these activities, the focus will be reviewing the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) coverage on Splunk. In the Business Rules (Splunk) initiative, the SI holds recurring technical working sessions with IHS. Regarding Data Visibility in the Dashboard, the SI anticipates achieving approximately 30 percent FISMA coverage within the Agency Dashboard by early October 2023. In summary, although IHS and the SI have made significant progress, an increase in FISMA coverage in the dashboard is required for the CDM Program to recommend closure. The SI and IHS are working towards that goal by the end of October 2023, representing the accomplishments of Phase II of their internal project plan.

<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-12
<b>Report Title</b>	Chemical Security: Overlapping Programs Could Better Collaborate to Share Information and Identify Potential Security Gaps
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/21/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency should collaborate with the EPA to assess the extent to which potential security gaps exist at water and wastewater facilities and, if gaps exist, develop a legislative proposal for how best to address them and submit it to the Secretary of Homeland Security and Administrator of EPA, and Congress, as appropriate.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Work on this recommendation will recommence two weeks after CFATS is reauthorized to restart CFATS work. Further actions are dependent upon the reauthorization of the CFATS' program statutory authorities and the passing of appropriations for the CFATS program. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-236
<b>Report Title</b>	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Actions Needed to Ensure Organizational Changes Result in More Effective Cybersecurity for Our Nation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/10/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Collect input to ensure that organizational changes are aligned with the needs of stakeholders, taking into account coordination challenges identified in this report.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2022
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA is still waiting for GAO to close. The request to close for all these recommendations was made on December 29, 2022, and since then, efforts have been focused on answering questions to clarify the details of the work completed. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-236
<b>Report Title</b>	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Actions Needed to Ensure Organizational Changes Result in More Effective Cybersecurity for Our Nation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/10/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	Establish processes for monitoring the effects of efforts to reduce fragmentation, overlap, and duplication including identifying potential cost savings
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2022
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA is still waiting for GAO to close. The request to close for all these recommendations was made on December 29, 2022, and since then, efforts have been focused on answering questions to clarify the details of the work completed. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-236
<b>Report Title</b>	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Actions Needed to Ensure Organizational Changes Result in More Effective Cybersecurity for Our Nation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/10/2021

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	Establish an approach, including time frames for measuring outcomes of the organizational transformation, including customer satisfaction with organizational changes.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2022
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA is still waiting for GAO to close. The request to close for all these recommendations was made on December 29, 2022, and since then, efforts have been focused on answering questions to clarify the details of the work completed. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-236
<b>Report Title</b>	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Actions Needed to Ensure Organizational Changes Result in More Effective Cybersecurity for Our Nation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/10/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	10
<b>Recommendation</b>	Take steps, with stakeholder input, to determine how critical infrastructure stakeholders should be involved with the development of guidance for their sector.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2022
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA is working with GAO to finalize their decision regarding the closeout. The request to close for all these recommendations was made on December 29, 2022, and since then, efforts have been focused on answering questions to clarify the details of the work completed.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-236

<b>Report Title</b>	Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Actions Needed to Ensure Organizational Changes Result in More Effective Cybersecurity for Our Nation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/10/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	11
<b>Recommendation</b>	Assess the agency's methods of communicating with its critical infrastructure stakeholders to ensure that appropriate parties are included in distribution lists or other communication channels.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2022
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA is working with GAO to finalize their decision on the closeout. The request to close for all these recommendations was made on December 29, 2022, and since then, efforts have been focused on answering questions to clarify the details of the work completed. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104256
<b>Report Title</b>	Cyber Insurance: Action Needed to Assess Potential Federal Response to Catastrophic Attacks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/21/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency work with the Director of the Federal Insurance Office to produce a joint assessment for Congress on the extent to which the risks to the nation's critical infrastructure from catastrophic cyberattacks, and the potential financial exposures resulting from these risks, warrant a federal insurance response.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA's Office of the Chief Economist and Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY) will continue to support Department of Treasury's Federal Insurance Office. CISA is prepared to assist the Federal Insurance Office in engaging with organizations from critical infrastructure sectors to further discuss their Request for Information submissions.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104279
<b>Report Title</b>	Critical Infrastructure Protection: CISA Should Improve Priority-Setting, Stakeholder Involvement, and Threat Information Sharing
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/01/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of CISA should ensure that CISA's process for developing a prioritized list of critical infrastructure that would cause national or regional catastrophic effects if destroyed or disrupted reflect current threats.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA National Risk Management Center has completed an initial review of other prioritization programs to work towards consistent and complementary approaches. Efforts are underway to adapt draft thresholds to better align with other prioritization methodologies but are dependent on stakeholder feedback across the different methodologies to ensure maximum participation in the prioritization programs.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104279
<b>Report Title</b>	Critical Infrastructure Protection: CISA Should Improve Priority-Setting, Stakeholder Involvement, and Threat Information Sharing
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/01/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of CISA should document, as appropriate, goals and strategies for the National Critical Functions framework.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The update of the National Plan has been delayed by the update to Presidential Policy Directive-21, thus impacting the resolution of this recommendation. CISA continues to engage with GAO to plan paths towards closure.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	CISA
<b>Report Title</b>	GAO-22-104279
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	Critical Infrastructure Protection: CISA Should Improve Priority-Setting, Stakeholder Involvement, and Threat Information Sharing
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	03/01/2022
<b>Recommendation</b>	6
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	The Director of CISA should coordinate with relevant regionally based, federal, and nonfederal partners to regularly develop and distribute regionally specific threat information to each of CISA's 10 regions.
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	10/31/2023
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Component</b>	On October 31, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Report Number</b>	CISA
<b>Report Title</b>	GAO-22-104462
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	Critical Infrastructure Protection: CISA Should Assess the Effectiveness of Its Actions to Support the Communications Sector
	11/23/2021

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Assess the effectiveness of CISA’s programs and services to support the Communications Sector, including developing and implementing metrics and analyzing feedback received from owners and operators, to determine the usefulness and relevance of its activities to support sector security and resilience.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA completed the implementation work, but GAO decided to postpone closure until they receive CISA’s final annual assessment. Currently, CISA does not have enough responses to conduct a meaningful analysis on the feedback. Integrated Operations Division will review, analyze, and create metrics with the feedback data on a quarterly basis to include an annual assessment with recommendations to improve our support to the communications sector.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104462
<b>Report Title</b>	Critical Infrastructure Protection: CISA Should Assess the Effectiveness of Its Actions to Support the Communications Sector
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/23/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Complete a capability assessment for Emergency Support Function #2, such as establishing requirements, maintaining a list of current capabilities, and conducting a capability gap analysis to identify if and where other resources may be needed.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA is still working to complete the work required to close this recommendation by end of 2023. The Primary Alternate Contingency Emergency plan initiative has promoted the development of an Emergency Support Functions (ESF)#2 Concept of Operations (CONOPS). A list of ESF #2 capabilities was updated in the ESF #2 Annex in September 2021, under the National Response Framework. The development of this CONOPS was initiated in the first quarter of FY 2023 and the formal team developing the CONOPS has been established and the work initiated. The ESF #2 CONOPS will



	establish requirements and maintain an additional list of department and agency capabilities. The goal is to complete the ESF #2 CONOPS by the end of CY 2023. An additional working group has been established to examine the role of CISA Emergency Communication Coordination (ECC) located in the CISA Regional Offices in relation to ESF #2. Foundational planning has begun on the role of the ECC's in relation to the Role of ESF#2 and the potentially mutually supportive opportunities that are available.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104462
<b>Report Title</b>	Critical Infrastructure Protection: CISA Should Assess the Effectiveness of Its Actions to Support the Communications Sector
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/23/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Produce a revised Communications Sector-Specific Plan, to include goals, objectives, and priorities that address new and emerging threats and risks to the Communications Sector and that are in alignment with sector risk management agency responsibilities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA Stakeholder Engagement Division remains committed to addressing this recommendation; however, the National Plan refresh is on hold until Presidential Policy Directive 21 is rewritten. In coordination with public and private Communications Sector stakeholders, CISA SED will develop a new, updated Communications Sector-Specific Plan following completion of updates to the National Plan, which is now expected to be complete by the end of FY 2025.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104767
<b>Report Title</b>	Ransomware: Federal Agencies Provide Useful Assistance But Can Improve Collaboration
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/14/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of CISA to (1) evaluate how to best address concerns raised by State, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT) stakeholders and facilitate collaboration with other key ransomware stakeholders taking into account its leadership of the new joint ransomware task force and (2) improve interagency coordination on ransomware assistance to SLTTs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/22/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	GAO agreed that the work done thus far responds to the recommendation’s requirement but requested that CISA shares the results of the described work to fully complete the implementation. CISA worked with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other stakeholders to gather the required data to close this recommendation. CISA has provided the information to GAO and awaits the closure decision.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105397
<b>Report Title</b>	COVID-19: Current and Future Federal Preparedness Requires Fixes to Improve Health Data and Address Improper Payments
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/26/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	11
<b>Recommendation</b>	Director of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency should assess and document lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic’s impacts on the Critical Manufacturing Sector.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/14/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CISA has worked on an after-action report, which encompasses all relevant lessons learned, including those from the Manufacturing Sector. After extensive consultation with sector-specific stakeholders, it was determined that consolidating these insights into a single comprehensive report would be the most effective approach. CISA provided this all-encompassing after-action report to GAO, and firmly believes that the work for this recommendation has been completed. CISA’s SMEs remain available for ongoing communication with GAO to resolve any remaining concerns. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.

<b>Component</b>	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-292
<b>Report Title</b>	Biodetection: DHS Exploring New Methods to Replace BioWatch and Could Benefit from Additional Guidance
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/20/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Secretary of Homeland Security ensure that the Bio-Detection 21 (BD21) program office clarifies in its acquisition documentation before the ADE 2A decision point, the intention of the situational awareness and common operating picture capability identified as a gap, including the specific functionality, sources of information, and distinction from existing common operating picture functions at DHS.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The validated Mission Needs Statement (MNS) for Bio-detection, as updated in May 2019, outlines the shared situational awareness capability gap and associated need to enable a common operating picture. The validated BD21 indoor operational requirements document aligns under the MNS to articulate the operational requirements for providing situational awareness to DHS operators and Federal, SLTT partners, including incident parameters, timeliness of notification, and user interface functions. Additionally, the BD21 program is paused in the “Analyze/Select phase” of the DHS Acquisition Lifecycle Framework while CWMD conducts a Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) that analyzes new strategic guidance for environmental bio-detection. The results of the CBA include new MNS gaps that will inform subsequent acquisition artifacts to support existing acquisitions or new programs.
<b>Component</b>	CWMD
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-292
<b>Report Title</b>	Bio-detection: DHS Exploring New Methods to Replace BioWatch and Could Benefit from Additional Guidance
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/20/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure the BD21 program conducts high-quality TRAs of all critical technologies for BD21 before the ADE 2A decision and before the ADE 2B decision (including a TRA of the overall system level interaction with the anomaly detection algorithm), in accordance with GAO's TRA best practice guide.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CWMD recommends closing this action as completed. CWMD agrees with the use of GAO's TRA best practices and notes that DHS has already incorporated them into the September 2020 DHS Technology Readiness Assessment/Manufacturing Readiness Assessment (TRA/MRA) Guide, promulgated by Science and Technology's (S&T) Office of Science and Engineering on November 4, 2020. The DHS TRA/MRA Guide incorporates lessons learned from the: (1) Department of Defense; (2) National Aeronautics and Space Administration; (3) Veterans Affairs; (4) Federal Aviation Administration; and (5) GAO to enable credible and consistent Technology and Manufacturing Readiness Assessments as a means of assessing technology and manufacturing maturity. The BD21 program commissioned the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU-APL) to conduct a formal TRA of representative system critical technology elements to assess system maturity in Q1 FY 2022. The JHU-APL completed a second TRA in Q3 FY23 using the GAO's TRA Best Practices and DHS S&T's TRA/MRA Guide to inform the system maturity as entrance criteria for the next acquisition milestone.
<b>Component</b>	CWMD
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-513
<b>Report Title</b>	Biodefense: After-Action Findings and COVID-19 Response Revealed Opportunities to Strengthen Preparedness
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/04/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security, should, with input from key nonfederal partners, work through the Biodefense Steering Committee to ensure that the Biodefense Coordination Team defines the set of capabilities needed to prepare for and respond to nationally significant biological incidents.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CWMD Policy, Strategy and Analysis Directorate, alongside other DHS Components, engaged in interagency efforts to comprehensively review the U.S. Government’s bio-preparedness policies and plans in accordance with EO 13987. This led to National Security Memorandum (NSM) NSM-15, issued on October 18, 2022, which includes the National Biodefense Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security and associated Implementation Plan that define a range of capabilities needed to prepare for and respond to national significant biological incidents. These capabilities include the ability to rapidly detect, characterize, report, forecast, and share relevant information and prevent incidents by minimizing laboratory accidents, ensuring effective biosafety and biosecurity practices, promoting responsible research, and reducing the likelihood of zoonotic spillover. In order to respond to bioincidents, the Implementation Plan calls for capabilities to limit the impacts of bioincidents through information sharing and networking; evidence-driven, coordinated response operations and investigations; and effective public messaging. CWMD requested closure on January 30, 2023, and is awaiting GAO’s decision.
<b>Component</b>	CWMD
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-513
<b>Report Title</b>	Biodefense: After-Action Findings and COVID-19 Response Revealed Opportunities to Strengthen Preparedness
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/04/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should work through the Biodefense Steering Committee to ensure that the Biodefense Coordination Team establishes a process to periodically assess and communicate exercise priorities among the capabilities they identify to support nationally significant biological incidents.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	NSM-15 requires the National Security Council (NSC) to chair a Senior Officials Exercise (SOE) on a biopreparedness health emergency in coordination with the heads of relevant departments and agencies, including DHS. Additionally, the Implementation Plan for NSM-15 contains an action to exercise operational plans for early warning capabilities to enable rapid response and annually provide biodefense and biopreparedness exercise after-action reports. National Biodefense Strategy-contributing departments and agencies will annually provide biodefense and biopreparedness exercise summary of conclusions and after-action reports to inform the review of the Implementation Plan, the National Exercise Program (NEP),

	and, more broadly, national biopreparedness efforts. CWMD requested closure on January 30, 2023, and is awaiting GAO's decision.
<b>Component</b>	CWMD
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-513
<b>Report Title</b>	Biodefense: After-Action Findings and COVID-19 Response Revealed Opportunities to Strengthen Preparedness
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/04/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	9
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should work through the Biodefense Steering Committee to ensure that the Biodefense Coordination Team provides guidance for federal and nonfederal partners for how to report on capabilities in after-action reports for exercises and real-world incidents in a consistent manner.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	NSM-15 requires the NSC to chair a SOE on a biopreparedness health emergency in coordination with the heads of relevant departments and agencies, including DHS. This exercise includes a detailed summary of conclusions. Additionally, National Biodefense Strategy-contributing departments and agencies will annually provide biodefense and biopreparedness after-action reports to inform the review of the Implementation Plan, the NEP, and broader national biopreparedness efforts. Efforts related to an exercise working group are now part of the NSC-led process for biopreparedness exercises, including exercise development and after-action report reviews expected to address, among other topics, capabilities. CWMD requested closure on January 30, 2023, and is awaiting GAO's decision.
<b>Component</b>	CWMD
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-513
<b>Report Title</b>	Biodefense: After-Action Findings and COVID-19 Response Revealed Opportunities to Strengthen Preparedness
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/04/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	13

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should work through the Biodefense Steering Committee to ensure that the Biodefense Coordination Team routinely monitors the results of interagency biological exercises and real-world incidents to identify patterns of challenges and potential root causes of identified challenges, and reports these to the Biodefense Steering Committee along with recommendations for addressing the root causes that also identify the responsible agencies.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	NSM-15 requires the NSC to chair a SOE on a biopreparedness health emergency in coordination with the heads of relevant agencies, including DHS. This exercise includes a detailed summary of conclusions. This summary of conclusions and other required after-action reports from exercises and real-world events will help identify patterns of challenges and potential root causes for these challenges that will help inform the overall review and any updates of priorities in the Implementation plan. The results of these reviews for root causes and challenges, will inform the overall review and updating of the priorities in the Implementation Plan. CWMD requested closure on January 30, 2023, and is awaiting GAO's decision.
<b>Component</b>	CWMD
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104498
<b>Report Title</b>	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: DHS Could Improve Its Acquisition of Key Technology and Coordination with Partners
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/19/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Assistant Secretary for CWMD should specify, in the new strategic plan for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, steps to reconstitute the capability gap analysis function, a strategy for outreach to key stakeholders in reconstituting this function, and time frames for the completion of the capability gap assessments.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>The draft Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) Strategy Domestic Implementation Plan identifies outreach to key stakeholders in reconstituting the gap analysis function. The specific activities include analyzing GNDA models for potential areas of improvement, collaborating with stakeholders to validate effectiveness of GNDA assessments and models, identifying Radiological/Nuclear (R/N) detection capability/capacity gaps, prioritizing R/N detection activities based on risk and capability improvements, and informing evidence-based decisions for resourcing prioritized R/N detection activities.</p> <p>CWMD's Policy, Strategy, and Analysis (PSA) directorate plans to complete simulation and modeling analysis capabilities for all hazard weapons of mass destruction capability and gap assessments by November 2024. PSA will also draft GNDA strategy tracking and implementation assessments by March 2025, and re-establish a gap analysis capability that includes gap management, prioritization of requirements, programs, and resourcing by November 2024. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.</p>
<b>Component</b>	CWMD
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104677
<b>Report Title</b>	Small Business Research Programs: Agencies Should Further Improve Award Timeliness
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/14/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	Evaluate the effectiveness of steps taken to improve SBIR award timeliness and take any necessary additional steps in order to consistently meet the Small Business Administration (SBA) award timeliness guidelines.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/22/2022
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>The DHS Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) team analyzed the current solicitation process regarding issuing awards and identified areas on how to improve award timeliness. To meet SBIR award timeliness, the solicitation process has multiple phases, milestones, deadlines, and steps to include to prepare purchase request packages for potential awards earlier in the schedule. Each phase and associated steps require communications and coordination with DHS Office of Procurement Operations (OPO), the DHS SBIR Program team, the topic managers and management/leadership to successfully make timely awards. CWMD had and continues to have weekly interactions with DHS OPO and the DHS SBIR Program Team, and monthly meetings to capture status, updates, and plan for next steps. Utilizing the DHS SBIR portal allowed for efficient coordination and communications with appropriate stakeholders, where proposals were</p>



submitted, assigned, evaluated, and selected. The portal streamlined communications and progress towards completion was tracked against the schedule milestones. After evaluating the process for FY 2022, the CWMD SBIR Team and DHS OPO concluded bi-weekly meetings with a defined agenda and the use of the portal improved the ability to track progress and meet award timelines. CWMD requested closure of this recommendation on December 22, 2022, and is awaiting GAO's decision. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.

<b>Component</b>	Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-09-455
<b>Report Title</b>	Flood Insurance: Opportunities Exist to Improve Oversight of the WYO Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/21/2009
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	To provide transparency and accountability over the payments FEMA makes to the Write Your Own (WYO) Program for expenses and profits, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Under Secretary of Homeland Security, FEMA, to determine in advance the amounts built into the payment rates for estimated expenses and profit.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2028
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA is advancing deliberation and decision making on a new WYO compensation methodology in preparation for a rulemaking action.

<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-09-455
<b>Report Title</b>	Flood Insurance: Opportunities Exist to Improve Oversight of the WYO Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/21/2009
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2

<b>Recommendation</b>	To provide transparency and accountability over the payments FEMA makes to WYOs for expenses and profits, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Under Secretary of Homeland Security, FEMA, to annually analyze the amounts of actual expenses and profit in relation to the estimated amounts used in setting payment rates.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	This recommendation is being addressed through the implementation of the WYO Implied Profits Desktop Procedures Manual. FEMA is currently producing the exhibits for our initial run of the process for FY 2021 data.
<b>Component</b>	
	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-09-455
<b>Report Title</b>	Flood Insurance: Opportunities Exist to Improve Oversight of the WYO Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/21/2009
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	To provide transparency and accountability over the payments FEMA makes to WYOs for expenses and profits, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Under Secretary of Homeland Security, FEMA, to consider the results of the analysis of payments, actual expenses, and profit in evaluating the methods for paying WYOs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2028
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA is advancing deliberation and decision making on a new WYO compensation methodology in preparation for a rulemaking action.
<b>Component</b>	
	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-09-455
<b>Report Title</b>	Flood Insurance: Opportunities Exist to Improve Oversight of the WYO Program

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/21/2009
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	To increase the usefulness of the data reported by WYOs to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and to institutionalize FEMA's use of such data, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Under Secretary of Homeland Security, FEMA, to take actions to obtain reasonable assurance that NAIC flood insurance expense data can be considered in setting payment rates that are appropriate, including identifying affiliated company profits in reported flood insurance expenses.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA is advancing deliberation and decision making on a new WYO compensation methodology in preparation for a rulemaking action.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-09-455
<b>Report Title</b>	Flood Insurance: Opportunities Exist to Improve Oversight of the WYO Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/21/2009
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	To increase the usefulness of the data reported by WYOs to the National Association NAIC and to institutionalize FEMA's use of such data, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Under Secretary of Homeland Security, FEMA, to develop comprehensive data analysis strategies to annually test the quality of flood insurance data that WYOs report to NAIC.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	This recommendation is being addressed through the implementation of the WYO Implied Profits Desktop Procedures Manual. FEMA is currently producing the exhibits for our initial run of the process for FY 2021 data.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-12-342SP
<b>Report Title</b>	2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/28/2012
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA should complete a national preparedness assessment of capability gaps at each level based on tiered, capability-specific performance objectives to enable prioritization of grant funding, and FEMA could identify the potential costs for establishing and maintaining those capabilities at each level and determine what capabilities federal agencies should provide.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The outline for the Investment Strategy for National Preparedness was completed in December 2022. The Investment Strategy for National Preparedness is considered a living document that will be updated and provided to key stakeholders on an annual basis. FEMA expects to complete the Investment Strategy for National Preparedness by December 29, 2023. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-12-838
<b>Report Title</b>	Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to Assess a Jurisdiction's Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/13/2012
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1

<b>Recommendation</b>	To increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the process for disaster declarations, we recommend that the FEMA Administrator develop and implement a methodology that provides a more comprehensive assessment of a jurisdiction’s capability to respond to and recover from a disaster without federal assistance. This should include one or more measures of a jurisdiction’s fiscal capacity, such as Total Taxable Resources, and consideration of the jurisdiction’s response and recovery capabilities. If FEMA continues to use the Public Assistance (PA) per capita indicator to assist in identifying a jurisdiction’s capabilities to respond to and recover from a disaster, it should adjust the indicator to accurately reflect the annual changes in the U.S. economy since 1986, when the current indicator was first adopted for use. In addition, implementing the adjustment by raising the indicator in steps over several years would give jurisdictions more time to plan for and adjust to the change.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA requested closure, but GAO will not close until FEMA fully implements a new methodology, so that the agency will have an accurate assessment of a jurisdiction’s capabilities to respond to and recover from a disaster without federal assistance and runs the risk of recommending that the President award Public Assistance to jurisdictions that have the capability to respond and recover on their own. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-17-36
<b>Report Title</b>	FLOOD INSURANCE: FEMA Needs to Address Data Quality and Consider Company Characteristics When Revising its Compensation Methodology
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/08/2016
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	To improve the transparency and accountability over the compensation paid to WYO companies and set appropriate compensation rates, the FEMA administrator should take into account WYO company characteristics that may impact companies’ expenses and profits when developing the new compensation methodology and rates.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/30/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA will begin the closure process of the recommendation once it appears in OMB's Unified Regulatory Agenda.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-297
<b>Report Title</b>	Disaster Preparedness: Additional Actions Needed to Address Gaps in the Nation's Emergency Management Capabilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/04/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Following the completion of the 2021 National Preparedness Report, determine what steps are needed to address the Nation's emergency management capability gaps across all levels of government and inform key stakeholders, such as the OMB and Congress, about what level of resources will be necessary to address the known gaps.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The outline for the Investment Strategy for National Preparedness was completed in December 2022. The Investment Strategy for National Preparedness is considered a living document that will be updated and provided to key stakeholders on an annual basis. FEMA expects to complete the Investment Strategy for National Preparedness by December 29, 2023. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-396
<b>Report Title</b>	National Flood Insurance Program: FEMA Can Improve Community Oversight and Data Sharing
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/05/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of FEMA should assess different approaches, in addition to community assistance visits, for using existing resources to ensure communities' compliance with National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) requirements. This should include analyzing alternatives to community assistance visits.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA is finalizing the internal review process for the policy and tools and has begun the process of developing and submitting the tools and guidance for Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) and PTA review.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-396
<b>Report Title</b>	National Flood Insurance Program: FEMA Can Improve Community Oversight and Data Sharing
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/05/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of FEMA should identify appropriate steps to ensure it has complete, up-to-date, and reliable records of community assistance visits, including information on why some visit records remain open for a significant period of time.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Community Information System (CIS) Modernization efforts continue to progress as the vendor develops the application. The CIS Modernization team have gathered requirements for the new CIS Modules to-be application. These requirements were converted to prototypes that the development team will use to build the final functionality. The team is working with FEMA Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO) IT to identify cloud services for the test and production environment. The team is continuing to gather information for the data migration strategy for the CIS Modernization.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-503
<b>Report Title</b>	Disaster Assistance: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen FEMA's Individuals and Households Program

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/30/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator should assess the extent to which its process for determining an applicant's eligibility for SBA-dependent other needs assistance limits or prevents survivors' access to Individuals and Households Program (IHP) assistance, and work with SBA to identify options to simplify and streamline the disaster assistance application process for survivors.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA estimates that an Interim Final Rule will be published in 2023.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-604
<b>Report Title</b>	Disaster Assistance: FEMA Should Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Fraud Risk Management for Public Assistance Emergency Work Grants
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/29/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of FEMA should plan and conduct regular fraud risk assessments of PA emergency work grants to determine a fraud risk profile that aligns with leading practices as provided in the Fraud Risk Framework. Specifically, this process should include (1) identifying inherent fraud risks to PA grant funds, (2) assessing the likelihood and impact of inherent fraud risks, (3) determining fraud risk tolerance, (4) examining the suitability of existing fraud controls, and (5) documenting the fraud risk profile.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	07/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO



<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA's Office of the Chief Security Officer has continuously worked toward satisfying the subject recommendation since the report was published in September 2020. As of June 2, 2023, the Office of the Chief Security Officer has completed two program reviews for the FEMA PA Program; Category A (completed 9/27/2022) and Category B (completed 6/2/2023). The Chief Security Officer signed and transmitted the final Category B package to the FEMA PA Program on July 14, 2023. As an ongoing endeavor, FEMA's Program Review and Inspection Branch will continuously select, review, and analyze Category B, other FEMA programs, and recommend appropriate risk controls to the program offices that further prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. The Office of the Chief Security Officer submitted for recommendation closure on July 31, 2023, and is pending GAO's response to the request.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-604
<b>Report Title</b>	Disaster Assistance: FEMA Should Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Fraud Risk Management for Public Assistance Emergency Work Grants
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/29/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of FEMA should designate one entity as the lead entity with responsibility for providing oversight of agency-wide efforts to manage fraud risks to PA emergency work grants, including managing the fraud risk assessment process, consistent with leading practices.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/04/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On August 22, 2023, FEMA met with GAO to discuss a path toward closing this recommendation. As a result of that discussion, FEMA has provided GAO documentation outlining the role of the agency's Chief Security Officer's Office as the entity responsible for managing the agency's fraud risk. FEMA requested GAO close this recommendation on August 4, 2023, and has provided GAO the updated FEMA Fraud Directive 121-6 and evidence that the agency has grown the FEMA Fraud Working Group.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-604

<b>Report Title</b>	Disaster Assistance: FEMA Should Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Fraud Risk Management for Public Assistance Emergency Work Grants
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/29/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of FEMA should update key training and guidance documents for the PA grant program to include information on where and how to report suspected fraud, and direct PA recipients to include such information in key training and guidance documents they provide to subrecipients.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA has updated and distributed all relevant PA Position Assists and the “FEMA Fact Sheet: Managing Fraud Risks,” to include how and where to report suspected fraud. Additionally, FEMA will include information on how and where to report suspected fraud in the next version of the Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide (PAPPG) and in the Program Delivery Guide. The FEMA PA Division expects to issue Version 5 of the PAPPG and the “Public Assistance Program Delivery Guide” in 2024. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-604
<b>Report Title</b>	Disaster Assistance: FEMA Should Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Fraud Risk Management for Public Assistance Emergency Work Grants
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/29/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of FEMA should update key resources, such as training and guidance documents, FEMA makes available to PA applicants to ensure these resources consistently communicate information on the highest fraud risks to PA emergency work grant funds and applicants’ responsibilities for managing those risks. The highest fraud risks may include risks related to procurement and debris removal, and other risks FEMA identifies through fraud risk assessments.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Office of Response and Recovery's PA Division and Grant Programs Directorate's Procurement Disaster Assistance Team are in receipt of the Office of the Chief Security Officer's Fraud Risk Profile Report for Category A (Debris Removal) and are currently working to update program-specific antifraud training and guidance materials that FEMA makes available to PA applicants and have established milestones to ensure progress and completion.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-604
<b>Report Title</b>	Disaster Assistance: FEMA Should Take Additional Actions to Strengthen Fraud Risk Management for Public Assistance Emergency Work Grants
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/29/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of FEMA should implement program-specific antifraud training for PA staff who work directly with PA applicants; this training should include information on the highest fraud risks to PA emergency work grants. The highest fraud risks may include risks related to procurement and debris removal, and other risk FEMA identifies through fraud risk assessments.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Office of Response and Recovery's PA Division and Grant Programs Directorate's Procurement Disaster Assistance Team are in receipt of the Office of the Chief Security Officer's Fraud Risk Profile Report for Category A (Debris Removal) and are currently working to implement program-specific antifraud training and guidance materials for PA staff who work directly with PA applicants. FEMA has established appropriate milestones to track progress and completion.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-701
<b>Report Title</b>	COVID-19: Federal Efforts Could be Strengthened by Timely and Concerted Actions

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/21/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency—who heads one of the agencies leading the COVID-19 response through the Unified Coordination Group—consistent with their roles and responsibilities, should work with relevant Federal, State, territorial, and tribal stakeholders to devise interim solutions, such as systems and guidance and dissemination of best practices, to help States enhance their ability to track the status of supply requests and plan for supply needs for the remainder of the COVID-19 pandemic response.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	To fully address this recommendation, GAO is awaiting the public release of the National Framework for Allocation of Constrained Public Health Resources. FEMA has taken its final actions for this recommendation and plans to meet with GAO to discuss paths forward in late January 2024. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-116
<b>Report Title</b>	Disaster Housing: Improved Cost Data and Guidance Would Aid FEMA Activation Decisions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/15/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of FEMA should identify and make changes to the applicable data system to capture cost data, including administrative costs for each of its housing assistance programs that will allow the agency to analyze the full cost of providing assistance under each program.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA is building relevant housing functionality and adding software programs. Logistics Management Directive, and the Recovery Technology Programs Division will coordinate to provide maintenance, inspection scheduling, and reports, in addition to capturing cost data. FEMA plans to request closure of this recommendation once systems have been updated.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-264
<b>Report Title</b>	Puerto Rico Recovery: FEMA Made Progress in Approving Projects, But Should Identify and Assess Risks to the Recovery
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/19/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA administrator should, in coordination with the Government of Puerto Rico and relevant federal agencies, identify and assess the risks to the remainder of Puerto Rico's recovery, including internal and external factors, such as Puerto Rico's capacity to carry out projects.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA Region 2 is finalizing the Caribbean Area Risk Assessment and should have it ready for publication before the end of CY 2023.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-264
<b>Report Title</b>	Puerto Rico Recovery: FEMA Made Progress in Approving Projects, But Should Identify and Assess Risks to the Recovery
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/19/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA administrator should, in coordination with the Government and Puerto Rico and relevant federal agencies, identify potential actions to manage the risks to the remainder of Puerto Rico's recovery and continuously monitor risks.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Region 2 is finalizing the Caribbean Area Risk Assessment and should have it ready for publication before the end of CY 2023.
<b>Component</b>	
	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-578
<b>Report Title</b>	National Flood Insurance Program: Congress Should Consider Updating the Mandatory Purchase Requirement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/30/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Deputy Associate Administrator of FEMA’s Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration should determine what information is available – both internally and externally – related to the mandatory purchase requirement and use it to develop strategies for increasing consumer participation in the flood insurance market.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA has completed its analyses of policy, legal, and social ramifications inherent in the mandatory purchase requirement, complicated by issues like affordability and property disclosures, and including lessons learned from past NFIP outreach. By the ECD, the NFIP will support Individual Assistance and other stakeholders to determine the nature and timing of messaging to increase the awareness of the disaster assistance program’s mandatory purchase requirement. The recommendation is on track for closure by the ECD.
<b>Component</b>	
	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-578
<b>Report Title</b>	National Flood Insurance Program: Congress Should Consider Updating the Mandatory Purchase Requirement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/30/2021

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Deputy Associate Administrator of FEMA’s Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration should evaluate and report to Congress with recommendations on how comprehensive and up-to-date flood risk information could be used to determine which properties should be subject to the mandatory purchase requirement.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA continues necessary coordination and synchronization of efforts across each recommendation. We updated Milestone 3 to reflect that the Flood Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA) is no longer an entity at FEMA, so FEMA will focus on leadership of the NFIP. More time is necessary for FEMA to brief leadership of the program, so an extension for Milestone 3 was requested of 9/15/2023. FEMA remains on track for the final milestone of 12/29/2023, which is the latest date that FEMA anticipates Congress would receive a more complete report that ensures alignment across both recommendations.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104039
<b>Report Title</b>	Disaster Recovery: Additional Actions Needed to Identify and Address Potential Recovery Barriers
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/15/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator should, in coordination with the SBA Associate Administrator of the Office of Disaster Assistance and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and Development, develop, with input from key recovery partners, and implement an interagency plan to help ensure the availability and use of quality information that includes (1) information requirements, (2) data sources and methods, and (3) strategies for overcoming information challenges – to support federal agencies involved in disaster recover in identifying access barriers or disparate outcomes.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On 08/31/2023, FEMA transmitted a corrective action plan (CAP) update to GAO. Coordination between FEMA, SBA, and HUD towards developing an interagency plan outline is ongoing. FEMA is drafting a PTA to explore options for sharing FEMA Interagency Coordination Division's community analysis tool with SBA, HUD, and other Recovery Support Function partners on a regular basis.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104039
<b>Report Title</b>	Disaster Recovery: Additional Actions Needed to Identify and Address Potential Recovery Barriers
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/15/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator should coordinate with the SBA Associate Administrator of the Office of Disaster Assistance and the HUD Assistant Secretary for Community Planning and Development to design and establish routine processes to be used within and across federal disaster recovery programs to address identified access barriers and disparate outcomes on an ongoing basis.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA Recovery Analytics Division hosted a briefing on June 6, 2023, for FEMA, HUD, and SBA working group members on FEMA's approach to equity analysis as part of an effort for each organization to share their current approaches to equity. FEMA discussed with GAO on October 18, 2023, and plans to share FEMA's correction action plan with SBA and HUD to ensure alignment.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104079
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Flood Maps: Better Planning and Analysis Needed to Address Current and Future Flood Hazards
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/25/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1



<b>Recommendation</b>	Administrator of FEMA update its multiyear plan for the Risk Mapping, Assessment, and Planning (Risk MAP) program to identify program goals, objectives, activities, performance measures, and time frames for its various efforts to address challenges in reflecting current and future flood hazards and to transition to a future program.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/24/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On October 24, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	
	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104079
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Flood Maps: Better Planning and Analysis Needed to Address Current and Future Flood Hazards
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/25/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Administrator of FEMA establish mechanisms for periodically assessing the usefulness of its Risk MAP nonregulatory products for communities in increasing their flood resilience. Such mechanisms could include tracking increases in building standards among those communities that use nonregulatory products or conducting periodic loss avoidance studies.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/12/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On January 12, 2024, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	
	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104241
<b>Report Title</b>	Alaska Native Issues: Federal Agencies Could Enhance Support for Native Village Efforts to Address Environmental Threats

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/18/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of FEMA should review FEMA’s programs identified in this report and, where the agency determines it feasible and appropriate, implement relevant changes to address program characteristics that are not established in statute that pose obstacles to Alaska Native villages’ obtaining assistance, including characteristics we identified and others that FEMA may identify. FEMA should also document its review, any related consultation with tribes, and any changes made to its programs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	This recommendation has associated milestones that correspond to a similar audit (GAO-22-104694 Recommendation 3). During the coming months, Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) will deliver webinars, as well as supporting guidance on compliance being developed. While internal milestones may shift depending on staff availability and competing priorities, the ECD is on track to be met.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104694/GAO-22-106037
<b>Report Title</b>	Flood Mitigation: Actions Needed to Improve Use of FEMA Property Acquisitions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/13/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Deputy Associate Administrator of FEMA’s Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration collect property-level data on property acquisition project milestones across FEMA’s hazard mitigation assistance grant programs, including the dates when properties are purchased and demolished. FEMA should use this information to support its efforts to reduce the overall length of the property acquisition process, such as by analyzing patterns to identify problems and promising practices and, over time, establishing metrics to encourage and track progress in shortening property acquisition time frames.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Division (HMAD) is actively collaborating with Grants Management Modernization (GMM) to ensure FEMA Grants Outcomes (FEMA GO) is on track to integrate the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) by the end of FY 2023. GMM plans to integrate live disaster declaration data in Quarter (Q)4 FY 2023 which will pave the way for full configuration of HMGP in FEMA GO, at which time the program will identify an appropriate HMGP declaration to validate the system configuration. FEMA anticipates that the onboarding of the first HMGP declaration will occur no later than Q1 FY 2024.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104694/GAO-22-106037
<b>Report Title</b>	Flood Mitigation: Actions Needed to Improve Use of FEMA Property Acquisitions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/13/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Deputy Associate Administrator of FEMA’s Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration estimate the extent of participant attrition from property acquisition projects across FEMA’s hazard mitigation assistance grant programs and use that information to help measure progress in addressing challenges that contribute to such attrition.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	HMAD is actively collaborating with GMM to ensure FEMA GO is on track to integrate HMGP by the end of FY 2023. Further inclusion of additional data points will be considered once the general workflow is built within the system. PRA and Systems of Records Notice reviews will take place once it is certain that the data points will be included.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104694/GAO-22-106037
<b>Report Title</b>	Flood Mitigation: Actions Needed to Improve Use of FEMA Property Acquisitions

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/13/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Deputy Associate Administrator of FEMA’s Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration define and report on additional measures, beyond cost-effectiveness, for assessing the outcomes and effects of using property acquisition to mitigate flood risk.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	During the coming months, HMA will deliver webinars, as well as supporting guidance on compliance being developed. FEMA is on track to submit the recommendation for closure by the February ECD.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104694/GAO-22-106037
<b>Report Title</b>	Flood Mitigation: Actions Needed to Improve Use of FEMA Property Acquisitions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/13/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Deputy Associate Administrator of FEMA’s Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration evaluate the options for improving property acquisitions identified in this report and determine whether and how to implement one or more of them. If FEMA determines that it needs authority for actions it seeks to implement, it should request that authority from Congress.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The options paper evaluation was created. The paper summarizes the existing options while also developing alternative options that would best remedy the barriers to participation noted in the report. The paper is currently under FEMA internal review.

<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105016
<b>Report Title</b>	Earthquakes: Opportunities Exist to Further Assess Risk, Build Resilience and Communicate Research
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/04/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of FEMA should develop and implement a plan to increase awareness among tribes about earthquake risk reduction initiatives.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	FEMA's National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP) is collecting responses from a survey that was sent to all Regional Earthquake Program Managers (REPM) and Regional Tribal Liaisons (RTL) focusing on three objectives: 1. Collaboratively Identifying Engagement Strategies; 2. Identifying Specific, Strategic Products, and Tools; and 3. Support in Effective Distribution. The results of this survey will assist FEMA NEHRP in developing a one/two-page Action Plan or Implementation Plan that will be shared and reviewed by FEMA's Office of Tribal Affairs, REPMs, and RTLs before being internally distributed as a live working document.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105051
<b>Report Title</b>	COVID-19: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Accountability and Program Effectiveness of Federal Response
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/27/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	11
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Federal Emergency Management Agency Administrator should require the agency's Public Assistance Program employees in the regions and at its Consolidated Resource Centers to attend training on changes to COVID-19 Public Assistance policy to help ensure it is interpreted and applied consistently nationwide.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/07/2023

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed - Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On December 07, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105397
<b>Report Title</b>	COVID-19: Current and Future Federal Preparedness Requires Fixes to Improve Health Data and Address Improper Payments
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/26/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Federal Emergency Management Agency Administrator should address deficiencies in the COVID-19 Funeral Assistance data by updating data records as data are verified, and adding data fields where necessary, to ensure that consistent and accurate data are available for monitoring of potential fraud trends and identifying control deficiencies.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/30/2022
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On July 20, 2023, FEMA and GAO met to discuss this recommendation. In September 2023, FEMA Individual Assistance Division updated multiple guidance documents to address auditor's concerns related to the accuracy of the data maintained in the National Emergency Management Information System for COVID-19 Funeral Assistance. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-343
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Detention: Opportunities Exist to Improve Cost Estimates
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/18/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE should take steps to ensure that ICE’s budget estimating process more fully addresses cost estimating best practices.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	In FY 2023, GAO evaluated again the ICE budget estimating processes to determine adherence to its 12 steps Cost Estimating process within its Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, dated March 2020. GAO determined ICE had substantially met the two of four characteristics (comprehensive and well-documented), partially met one characteristic (accurate), and minimally met the remaining characteristic (credible). ICE recognizes the limitations of the existing bed rate model, and therefore is investing in a new bed rate model to implement a more accurate and creditable bed rate projection. The ICE Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO), Office of Budget and Program Performance, and Office of Data Analytics are implementing a new bed rate model that leverages operational and financial data to forecast budgetary needs based on encounters projections. The new model will enable ICE to conduct what-if drills/scenarios/variances to forecast bed rate for the budget year and the actual bed rate for the year of execution; thereby enabling ICE to ascertain the impacts of different factors impacting funds allocated. The new model consists of data from the Office of Immigration Statistics (now the Office of Homeland Security Statistics) encounter projection, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) operational data, and historical financial data to forecast the budgetary needs for detention beds, Alternatives to Detention, and medical care. The model supports out-years budget formulation and ad-hoc analysis based on distinct operational scenarios such as surges and policy changes. In developing the new model, OCFO assessed all inputs (e.g., inflation and major cost drivers) and capabilities of the current bed rate model against the model to determine the most optimal and efficient model. As such, a key benefit of this model is the automation in determining a range of costs based on varying major assumptions, parameters, and data inputs. This scenario-based modeling capability will allow ICE to forecast cost even under uncertain environment/climate and policy changes. Running the model with different scenarios will provide cost estimates based on different types and levels of risk and sensitivity. ICE will soon provide GAO with documentation and request that GAO close the recommendation as implemented.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-405
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Components Could Improve Monitoring of the Employee Misconduct Process
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/30/2018

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	10
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE should monitor the duration of all cases beginning-to-end by stage and by case type.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE OPR has documented the investigations process and the Office of Human Capital has documented the disciplinary process in compliance with its policies. The supporting documentation was provided to GAO. In addition, GAO was provided with information on DHS's efforts to collectively evaluate, recommend and implement actions related to the policies and processes for addressing allegations of employee misconduct and effecting disciplinary actions across DHS. DHS's efforts include (1) documenting the processes by which allegations of employee misconduct are reported and handled across DHS; (2) assessing policies and procedures for receiving and investigating allegations of employee misconduct and effecting disciplinary actions and develop and implementing a DHS-wide policy; and (3) evaluating collected DHS-wide data. ICE, as a DHS Component, is participant and collaborator to these efforts.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-405
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Components Could Improve Monitoring of the Employee Misconduct Process
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/30/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	12
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE should define and document the case management system data fields and methodology to be used for monitoring all established performance targets and provide related guidance to staff.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE provided GAO with documentation on the methodology used for monitoring management inquiries. The ICE Office of Human Capital provided documentation on its performance measures and quarterly report used to monitor employee relations cases. In addition, GAO was provided with information on the DHS efforts to collectively evaluate, recommend and implement actions related to the policies and processes for addressing allegations of employee misconduct and effecting



	disciplinary actions across DHS. DHS efforts include (1) documenting the processes by which allegations of employee misconduct are reported and handled across the DHS; (2) assessing policies and procedures for receiving and investigating allegations of employee misconduct and effecting disciplinary actions and developing and implementing a DHS-wide policy; and (3) evaluating collected DHS-wide data. ICE, as a DHS Component, is participant and collaborator to these efforts.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-297
<b>Report Title</b>	Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Can Take Additional Steps to Manage Fraud Risks Related to School Recertification and Program Oversight
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/20/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	Director of ICE should implement mandatory Designated School Officials (DSO) training and verify that the training is completed.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On November 20, 2019, ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) launched the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) External Training Application (SETA) and released four courses to the academic community. The training page shows which designated school officials have completed the training, but at this time there is no mechanism for the training page to alert SEVP or restrict access to the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) for those who have not completed their training. As a workaround, SEVP runs a report in their business analytic tool to obtain a record of completed courses from SETA to allow them to determine compliance. SEVP was working towards providing additional training courses to the academic community in 2020; however, the pandemic adversely impacted the program's funding since it's a fee for service. There was an approximately 75 percent decline in SEVP's fee revenue because of COVID-19, and the SETA development was placed on hold until the resumption of fee revenue. ICE HSI SEVP continues to operate in an operational and maintenance break-fix only, due to their revenue being adversely impacted by the pandemic that resulted in funding cuts to SETA and the development of suite of courses. However, SEVP was able to award a contract, but has experienced onboarding delays. A project roadmap is due from the contractor 30 days after they are fully staffed. The baseline core requirements supporting SETA are managed and updated, as needed, from the governing regulations and

	SEVPs Final Guidance. In the meantime, during recertification time, the Principal Designated School Officials and DSO attest to familiarity with the regulations. SEVP also has the ability to run a report that provides information on whether a training course is “In Progress,” “Completed,” or “Delayed”, as well as obtain the status of the training test (in progress, completed: passed or failed and delayed and/or graded).
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-297
<b>Report Title</b>	Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Can Take Additional Steps To Manage Fraud Risks Related to School Recertification and Program Oversight
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/20/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	Director of ICE should complete the development and implementation of its plan for mandatory fraud-specific training to DSOs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The ICE HSI SEVP completed the development of five training courses in FY 2021 – SEVP Basics, 101, Exchange Visitor Program 101, Introduction to Initial SEVP Certification, and Managing a Designation. In FY 2021, SEVP also began developing three more training courses which included the fraud components until they were adversely impacted by the pandemic. There was an approximately 75 percent decline in SEVP’s fee revenue because of COVID-19, and the development of these training courses was placed on hold until the resumption of fee revenue.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-416
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Enforcement: Actions Needed to Better Handle, Identify, and Track Cases Involving Veterans
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/06/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE should take action to ensure consistent implementation of ICE’s policies for handling cases of potentially removable veterans.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/10/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On January 10, 2024, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-333
<b>Report Title</b>	Trade-Based Money Laundering: U.S. Government Has Worked with Partners to Combat the Threat, but Could Strengthen Its Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/02/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Director of ICE to develop a performance monitoring framework for the Trade Transparency Unit (TTU) program that would enable the agency to systematically track program results and how effectively it is achieving the program’s goals.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE did not concur with this recommendation. The ICE HSI TTU program has performance measures that track program results that demonstrate program activities leading to successful outcomes in domestic criminal cases related to trade-based money laundering and other financial crimes. However, ICE cannot access foreign case information or set targets regarding criminal activity and partner outcomes. No mechanism exists for the bulk sharing of information related to case management and TTUs can make target recommendations but cannot dictate targets for foreign partner case openings. The primary mission of ICE HSI’s TTU program is to establish partnerships and provide foreign law enforcement with information tools, such as the Data Analysis and Research for Trade and Transparency System (DARTTS), to facilitate the exchange of data between TTUs. During each FY, the TTU program produces statistics on the number of cases initiated,

	criminal arrests, indictments, convictions, seizure incidents, lines of trade data exchanges, conferences/outreach events, training courses, and requests for assistance from HSI field components. HSI TTU is fulfilling its mission of establishing partnerships with foreign law enforcement by providing them with access to DARTTS for trade-based money laundering (TBML) leads, outreach, and training. Although TTU systematically tracks the activities and outcomes of domestic investigations, it has limited access to track the activities of foreign partners and the outcome of their criminal investigations. ICE operates within foreign country customs and law enforcement authorities and does not share information if the political climate is not supportive to the United States presence.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-36
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Enforcement: Arrests, Detentions, and Removals, and Issues Related to Selected Populations
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/05/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE should implement a process to collect and maintain data in a readily available format on detained parents or legal guardians of U.S. citizen and legal permanent resident minors to ensure that information on this population is entered into ICE’s data system as required by policy.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE initially non-concurred with the recommendation because ICE ERO collects and maintains data on detained parents or legal guardians of U.S. citizen and legal permanent resident minors in accordance with its policy and ERO officers continue to enter and maintain data in ICE systems to facilitate appropriate actions specific to individual cases. ICE’s sole aggregate reporting requirement related to data concerning parents or legal guardians is a statutory requirement that began in FY 2016 as part of the DHS Appropriations Act, which mandates for ICE to submit semiannual reports to the House and Senate Committees on the removal of parents of U.S. Citizen minors. The data that ERO already collects and maintains is used to prepare ICE’s semiannual report titled “Deportation of Aliens Claiming U.S.-Born Children,” to satisfy this requirement, and ICE continues to do so. GAO did not accept ICE’s requests to close the recommendation.  On July 14, 2022, the ICE acting Director issued Directive 11064.3, Parental Interests of Noncitizen Parents and Legal Guardians, which revises and clarifies agency policy and procedures regarding noncitizen parental and guardianship

interests. The Directive assigns responsibilities and outlines the procedures and requirements necessary to ensure the agency’s civil immigration enforcement activities do not unnecessarily disrupt or infringe upon the parental or guardianship interests of noncitizen parents or legal guardians of minor children or incapacitated adults. It also requires ICE personnel to affirmatively inquire about parental or legal guardian status when encountering a noncitizen and record or update such information in relevant data systems. The directive further sets out updated procedures and requirements regarding the initial placement and subsequent transfer of parents and legal guardians, visitation, and access to child welfare services and programs. In addition, ICE ERO assembled a working group to identify the requirements for collecting and maintaining relevant data related to covered individuals that permits continuous monitoring and tracking of non-citizen parents/legal guardians of minor child(ren) or incapacitated adults in the United States, without regard to the dependent’s citizenship or immigration status. The working group completed the requirements gathering in FY 2023 and the requirements are undergoing review within ERO for system implementation. GAO informed ICE the policy met the spirit of the recommendation and has requested additional information related to the tracking of data. ERO is working on providing the requested documentation to achieve recommendation closure.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-596
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Detention: ICE Should Enhance Its Use of Facility Oversight Data and Management of Detainee Complaints
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/19/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE should direct Custody Management to regularly conduct analyses of contracted facility inspections oversight data over time, within and across facilities and regions, and in a manner to enable trends in inspection deficiencies to be identified and addressed.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE ERO initiated a modernization effort to migrate disparate data systems to a shared ServiceNow platform to improve overall data quality and reporting capabilities. The effort is a phased approach with the migration of facility inspection data successfully being completed in July 2023. The next phase includes system releases to add analytical capabilities to enable ERO to conduct analysis of contracted facility inspections data. The target completion date for this functionality is winter 2024, since there are milestones to migrate and deploy other systems. Once this is completed, ERO will be able to regularly

	conduct analysis of contracted facility inspections oversight data over time, within and across facilities and regions, and in a manner to require trends in inspection deficiencies. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-596
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Detention: ICE Should Enhance Its Use of Facility Oversight Data and Management of Detainee Complaints
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/19/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE should direct the Office of Detention Oversight and Custody Management to take steps to ensure that data on deficiencies identified through Office of Detention Oversight's inspections are recorded in a format that is accessible to Custody Management for analysis purposes.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/04/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed - Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On December 04, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-596
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Detention: ICE Should Enhance Its Use of Facility Oversight Data and Management of Detainee Complaints
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/19/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE should regularly conduct analyses of data on deficiencies identified through Office of Detention Oversight's inspections.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE OPR ODO conducts an annual standard review of all ICE National Detention Standards by reviewing and analyzing data from various sources to determine which detention standards have the greatest impact on the life, health, safety, and well-being of ICE detainees. New ODO Core Standards are added and/or removed for inspections each FY, due to this review. ICE OPR ODO and ERO CMD developed a data sharing process to enable CMD to track ODO inspection data. In July 2023, ERO migrated its facility inspection data to a shared ServiceNow platform to improve overall data quality and reporting capabilities. The new system has an embedded automated process that uploads ODO inspection data into the new system for CMD to review and track. The next phase in this ERO IT modernization effort includes system releases to add analytical capabilities to enable ERO to regularly conduct analysis of data on deficiencies identified through ODO inspections. The target completion date for this functionality is winter 2024 since there are milestone to migrate and deploy other ERO systems. Once this is completed, ERO will be able to regularly conduct analysis of contracted facility inspections oversight data over time, within and across facilities and regions, and in a manner to enable trends in inspection deficiencies.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-596
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Detention: ICE Should Enhance Its Use of Facility Oversight Data and Management of Detainee Complaints
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/19/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE should ensure that all Operational Review Self-Assessment results and corrective actions are recorded in a format that is conducive to tracking and analysis.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	In Q4 FY 2021, ERO CMD completed coding development of Operational Review Self-Assessment (ORSA) forms used for over-72-hour and under-72-hour facilities operating under the ICE National Detention Standards 2000 and automated the process. ERO CMD disseminated this new automated process to ERO field offices for completion ORSAs. In September 2021, ERO also awarded a contract to integrate multiple data systems, including the system used for ORSAs and corrective actions. The new system was implemented in July 2023 and ERO CMD is working with ERO field offices to complete the FY 2023 ORSAs. The system has been deployed in phases and the next phase includes system releases to add

	analytical capabilities to enable ERO to conduct analysis of ORSAs and contracted facility inspections data. The target completion date for this functionality is winter 2024 since there are milestone to migrate and deploy other systems. Once this is completed, it will enable ERO CMD to record ORSAs in a format conducive to tracking and analysis. GAO has communicated that if these efforts result in data that is conducive to tracking and analysis, ICE will meet the intent of the recommendation. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-596
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Detention: ICE Should Enhance Its Use of Facility Oversight Data and Management of Detainee Complaints
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/19/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE should regularly conduct analyses of detention-related complaint data from relevant offices, including analyses of data over time, within and across facilities and regions, and at a level necessary to identify and address potentially reoccurring complaints.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	In September 2021, ICE ERO awarded a contract to integrate multiple data systems, including the Detention Reporting and Information Line’s data system. Work planned under this contract enables ERO field office officials to enter any actions taken on, or resolutions of, detention-related complaints from the Detention Reporting and Information Line directly into the Detention Reporting and Information Line’s database, rather than documenting this information in individual mail messages or as notes in other systems. In addition to requiring ERO field offices to record resolutions and close out detention-related complaints/tasks directly in the system, the new data solution will host various legacy detention-related data systems/trackers on the same platform. Included in the solution will be a dashboard reporting capability that will help to improve ERO’s ability to analyze detention-related data over time, across facilities and areas of responsibility (AOR). Efforts are underway to include specific reporting dashboards for ERO senior leadership, such as a “Top 5 Detention Facility Concerns” report. The added reporting will allow for identifying trends with a drilldown capability to highlight specific AORs or facilities of interest. The new case management system is being deployed in phases, with added functionality being added during key milestones. The new data system was deployed in September 2023 and the final phase, which includes the analytics, is scheduled for completion in winter 2024. The completion of the final phase will



	allow ERO the capability to conduct trend analysis and slicing and dicing of detention-related complaint data from relevant offices, including analyses of data over time, within and across facilities and regions, and at a level necessary to identify and address potentially reoccurring complaints. This effort is part of an ERO IT modernization effort that includes milestones to migrate and deploy other systems. Once the analytics capability is implemented, ERO will provide GAO with sample reports to demonstrate analyses of detention-related complaint data to achieve recommendation closure.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-596
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Detention: ICE Should Enhance Its Use of Facility Oversight Data and Management of Detainee Complaints
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/19/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE should require that ERO field offices record any actions taken on, and the resolutions of, detention-related complaints referred to them from the Detention Reporting and Information Line and Administrative Inquiry Unit in a timely manner.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	In FY 2021, ICE ERO CMD drafted a performance work statement for a close-loop inquiry resolution database system in collaboration with the ICE OCIO. The contract was awarded in September 2021 and the work performed under this contract integrates multiple data systems. Included in this modernization effort was the migration of detention-related complaints to enable ERO field offices to record any action taken, and the resolution of, detention-related complaints referred from the Detention Reporting and Information line and Administrative Inquiry Unit. The data system was implemented in three phases and deployed in September 2023. ERO CMD is now working on gathering documentation to provide to GAO to demonstrate field offices are recording actions taken, including resolution, on detention-related complaints in a timely manner to obtain recommendation closure.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-149
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Detention: Actions Needed to Improve Planning, Documentation, and Oversight of Detention Facility Contracts

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/13/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure that ERO consistently uses a process that includes input from relevant stakeholders and documentation of the basis for decisions made before entering into contracts or agreements for new or expanded detention space.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE implemented a process for the review and approval of procurement actions. Under the new process, officials from the ICE ERO must submit a written justification and a request for review, and approval, to the ICE ERO Deputy Executive Associate Director (or higher) and the ICE Office of Immigration Program Evaluation (OIPE) Assistant Director prior to submitting a procurement package to ICE Office of Acquisition Management for negotiation of a contract or agreement for detention space. ERO has provided guidance, which is posted on internal site for easy access, to their Contracting Officer Representatives (COR) on the process and conducted virtual classes for the ERO field offices. ERO provided supporting documentation to corroborate the actions taken; however, GAO has requested additional documentation. ERO is working on providing documentation on its most recent detention space to demonstrate adherence to the new process. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-149
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Detention: Actions Needed to Improve Planning, Documentation, and Oversight of Detention Facility Contracts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/13/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Document and implement a strategic approach for using guaranteed minimums in detention contracts and agreements that supports ICE's strategic plans, goals, and priorities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	In August 2021, ICE conducted an assessment and reviewed 52 detention facility contracts and agreements with guaranteed minimums. The assessment results indicated that most of these contracts and agreements have a tiered bed rate structure, meaning ICE obtains cost savings if certain capacity thresholds are reached. In July 2022, ERO implemented a HQ “Field Office Cost Optimization Review Process” to enable ERO CMD and Field Operations to collaboratively provide HQ-level oversight of field office use of low cost and guaranteed minimum beds in order to optimize the least expensive facilities in each area of responsibility, where appropriate, to increase program savings and/or reduce unnecessary expenditures. The process allows HQ ERO to monitor and analyze the optimization rate of each field office and address any challenges or concern from under-utilization of low-cost facilities. To fully meet the intent of the recommendation, GAO recommended ICE demonstrate how these efforts comprise a strategic approach to using guaranteed minimum when entering into contracts and agreements (not just for those where guaranteed minimums is already in use). ERO is working on providing documentation to corroborate their efforts that comprise a strategic approach to using guaranteed minimum in detention contracts.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-149
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Detention: Actions Needed to Improve Planning, Documentation, and Oversight of Detention Facility Contracts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/13/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Revise its supervisory structure so that the CORs’ oversight functions are independent of field office management.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE ERO continues to non-concur with the recommendation. ICE ERO Field Operations evaluated the supervisory structure for CORs assigned to detention facility contracts and determined the most optimal alignment is for them to remain within the chain of command of field office management. The COR positions were established in each field office to ensure the proper oversight and administration of contracts and contractual agreements supporting each field office, as well as to provide project management support for facility related projects. The positions were intended to reduce the administrative workload of officers that were previously performing COR duties in the field; thereby, now enabling them with more time

	to engage in detention and removal activities. ERO ensures COR appointments and supervisory notification letters for each detention contract detail the responsibilities of each role. In addition, the ICE Office of Acquisition Management and the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor created a supervisor training that includes the topics of fiscal law and procurement, as well as Contracting Officer and COR roles and responsibilities. The training has been provided to ERO Field Office Directors. ICE provided supporting documentation to GAO during audit fieldwork and has continued to request that GAO consider this recommendation resolved and closed. GAO has continued to maintain that the recommendation remain open.
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<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-186
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Enforcement: ICE Can Further Enhance Its Planning and Oversight of State and Local Agreements
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/27/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Establish performance goals and related performance measures to assess and manage the performance of the 287(g) program.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	With the change in administration, ICE ERO 287(g) program was placed on hold pending issuance of DHS’s immigration enforcement priorities. ICE received immigration enforcement priorities and ERO drafted the 287(g) strategic plan to include the program goals, objectives, and performance measures in accordance with its priorities to ensure alignment. Currently, the strategic plan is undergoing internal review and ERO leadership approval. A copy of the document will be provided to GAO under separate cover once finalized.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-186
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Enforcement: ICE Can Further Enhance Its Planning and Oversight of State and Local Agreements
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/27/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2

<b>Recommendation</b>	Assess 287(g) program composition to help leverage program resources, optimize program benefits, and guide 287(g) expansion efforts.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	With the change in administration, ICE ERO 287(g) program was placed on hold pending issuance of the DHS's immigration enforcement priorities. Future expansions along with maintaining and evaluating the current partnerships remains on hold. ERO will assess the program composition and expansion efforts once guidance is provided on the way forward for the program.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-186
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Enforcement: ICE Can Further Enhance Its Planning and Oversight of State and Local Agreements
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/27/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop and implement an oversight mechanism to monitor Warrant Service Officer participants' compliance with their Memorandum of Agreement with ICE.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE ERO developed a Warrant Service Officer (WSO) oversight review process that is currently undergoing internal review. This oversight review process has been designed as a biannual process that will be conducted by ERO HQ personnel and will consist of interviews and documentation reviews to assess WSO participant compliance with the 287(g) Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). The WSO process leverages internal best practices and once implemented, will periodically be reviewed to ensure it is producing its intended outcome. ERO also developed a WSO revocation and credential destruction process, which includes instructions, templates, and destruction logs to ensure proper accountability and destruction of WSO credentials. The supporting documentation will be provided to GAO once the documentation is finalized and approved by ERO leadership.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-322
<b>Report Title</b>	Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Gun Smuggling to Mexico Would Benefit from Additional Data and Analysis
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/16/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE should ensure that HSI analyzes additional information – for example, data that ATF shares about U.S.-sourced firearms recovered in Mexico – to supplement its existing analysis identifying smuggling trends and patterns.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE HSI is responsible for export control investigations, including the investigations of firearms smuggling to Mexico, and is currently analyzing and reporting on firearms smuggling to Mexico. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) data is critical to HSI having the ability to do a complete analysis and trending of U.S sourced firearms recovered in Mexico. In May 2022, ATF detailed a resource to the National Targeting Center-Investigations to support the joint effort with HSI. An SOP has been developed and the draft SOP is currently undergoing ATF review and concurrence. The SOP will be finalized once mutual agreement is reached, and a copy of the document will be provided to the GAO for their review and recommendation closure consideration.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-322
<b>Report Title</b>	Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Disrupt Gun Smuggling to Mexico Would Benefit from Additional Data and Analysis
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/16/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE should ensure that HSI, in consultation with relevant agencies, develops performance measures to assess the results of its efforts to investigate firearms smuggling into Mexico.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE HSI collects program statistics and CBP has developed quantitative performance measures to assess the results of its efforts to investigate firearms smuggling into Mexico. HSI and CBP will provide GAO with a joint performance measures submission, since this is joint initiative focused on enhancing analytics and intelligence to identify, target, disrupt, and dismantle transnational criminal organizations responsible for exploiting otherwise illicit trade and travel in ongoing conspiracies to unlawfully procure, transport, and ultimately export firearms and related munitions from the United States into Mexico.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-487
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration Enforcement: Actions Needed to Better Track Cases Involving U.S. Citizenship Investigations
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE systematically collect and maintain electronic data on its encounters with individuals for whom there is probative evidence of U.S. citizenship.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>ICE revised its materials for the ERO officer trainings to ensure compliance with ICE’s policy that officers are to interview all individuals claiming U.S. citizenship or with potential indicia of citizenship in the presence of, or in consultation with, a supervisor. By making its training materials consistent with ICE policy, ICE has more assurance that all encounters with potential U.S. Citizens receive the appropriate supervisory review.</p> <p>ICE uses the Enforcement Integrated Database Arrest Graphical User Interface for Law Enforcement (EAGLE) as the primary booking application used by its law enforcement agents and officers to process the biometric and biographic information of individuals arrested and detained by ICE for alleged criminal violations of law and administrative violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act. U.S. Citizens may be encountered by ICE ERO, and those encounters may be logged in EAGLE. When either searching for a subject or entering a subject in the application for the first time, the user will see a biographic panel, which includes fields for “Citizenship” and “Country of Birth.” Additionally, ICE ERO has processing dispositions of “Foreign Born U.S. Citizens,” and, for legal permanent residents, “Not Amenable to Removal,”</p>

to indicate individuals with legal permanent residents and/or U.S. citizenship status. It is worth noting that not all subjects with the “Not Amenable to Removal” processing disposition are legal permanent residents. There may be other circumstances of their case which necessitates this disposition.

These data points are all maintained in a common database repository owned and operated by ICE that supports law enforcement activities of certain DHS components. It is the repository for all data created, updated, and accessed by several software applications, including EAGLE. The applications that capture and use data maintained in this repository capture information related to the investigation, arrest, booking, detention, and removal of persons encountered during immigration and law enforcement investigations and operations conducted by ICE, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and CBP. ICE is working with GAO to identify the documentation needed to achieve recommendation closure.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104470
<b>Report Title</b>	Law Enforcement: Federal Agencies Should Improve Reporting and Review of Less-Lethal Force
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/15/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	9
<b>Recommendation</b>	Modify policies and procedures to ensure that relevant officials document their determination on whether less-lethal force was used in accordance with agency policy.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On May 26, 2023, ICE updated its policy on Firearms and Use of Force (ICE Directive 19009.3). GAO received the updated policy but stated that they needed further information from ICE to fully close the recommendation. ICE’s Office of Regulatory Affairs and Policy is currently working on updating the ICE Use of Force handbook to fully address the recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104529
<b>Report Title</b>	Alternatives To Detention: ICE Needs to Better Assess Program Performance and Improve Contract Oversight



<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE develop a mechanism for ERO to record the completion of Alternatives to Detention (ATD) supervision reviews.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE OIPE has undertaken an effort to develop standards, such as for program oversight, supervisions, language assistance, disability accommodations and/or modifications, legal access, and religious accommodation, for the ATD program. ICE OIPE is working on finalizing and obtaining ICE leadership approval in Q2 of FY 2024. Once these standards are approved, ERO will assume the responsibility of implementing the standards to ensure program compliance. ERO will provide GAO will the supporting documentation of the mechanism used to record the completion of ATD supervision reviews.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104529
<b>Report Title</b>	Alternatives To Detention: ICE Needs to Better Assess Program Performance and Improve Contract Oversight
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE regularly monitor the information on ATD supervision reviews to ensure that the reviews occur according to policy.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE OIPE has undertaken an effort to develop standards, such as for program oversight, supervisions, language assistance, disability accommodations and/or modifications, legal access, and religious accommodation, for the ATD program. ICE OIPE is working on finalizing and obtaining ICE leadership approval in Q2 of FY 2024. Once these standards are

	approved, ERO will assume the responsibility of implementing the standards to ensure program compliance. ERO will provide GAO supporting documentation of the mechanism used to record the completion of ATD supervision reviews.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104529
<b>Report Title</b>	Alternatives To Detention: ICE Needs to Better Assess Program Performance and Improve Contract Oversight
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE establish performance goals with measurable targets for the ATD program that cover core program activities and participant outcomes.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE OIPE has undertaken an effort to develop standards, such as for program oversight, supervisions, language assistance, disability accommodations and/or modifications, legal access, and religious accommodation, for the ATD program. ICE OIPE is working on finalizing and obtaining ICE leadership approval in Q2 of FY 2024. Once these standards are approved, ERO will assume the responsibility of implementing the standards to ensure program compliance. ERO will provide GAO supporting documentation of the mechanism used to record the completion of ATD supervision reviews.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104529
<b>Report Title</b>	Alternatives To Detention: ICE Needs to Better Assess Program Performance and Improve Contract Oversight
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE include information on absconsions relative to the population of both active and unenrolled participants when externally reporting absconsion information for the ATD program.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE ERO updated its absconsion methodology as recommended by GAO. ERO is now including the active participant count in compliance metrics when it is reported for the program. The updated methodology better standardizes the absconder rate to match methods in other ERO Units and ICE programs. ERO is currently working on providing GAO with documentation for its updated absconsion methodology to achieve recommendation closure.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104529
<b>Report Title</b>	Alternatives To Detention: ICE Needs to Better Assess Program Performance and Improve Contract Oversight
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE consistently explain ICE's methodology for calculating absconsion statistics when externally reporting absconsion information for the ATD program.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE ERO updated its absconsion methodology as recommended by GAO. ERO is now including the active participant count in compliance metrics when it is reported for the program. The updated methodology better standardizes the absconder rate to match methods in other ERO Units and ICE programs. ERO is currently working on providing GAO with documentation for its updated absconsion methodology to achieve recommendation closure.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104529
<b>Report Title</b>	Alternatives To Detention: ICE Needs to Better Assess Program Performance and Improve Contract Oversight
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE ensure that its oversight activities collect the information needed to assess all performance standards in the contract.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE ERO HQ officials will begin to conduct random case file audits to assess the performance standards in the contract. ERO is also developing Quality Assurance audits for site and program review inspections that will be scored, tracked, and provided to the contractor when completed for resolution. In addition, all ERO field offices have dedicated Alternatives to Detention Monitoring Officers (ADMO) and task managers that randomly audit cases to ensure services assigned by ICE are rendered and billed accordingly by the contractor. The ADMO works closely with contractor to ensure compliance with performance standards during their daily interactions. Any deficiencies identified are immediately addressed and reconciled with the contractor. ADMOs also reconcile monthly billing statement to ensure government requirements are met and billing is accurate. ERO is also developing Quality Assurance audits for site and program review inspections. These inspections will be conducted at random locations to cover the site and case file audits to ensure contract compliance. Once completed, ERO will provide GAO with the supporting documentation to achieve recommendation closure.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104529
<b>Report Title</b>	Alternatives To Detention: ICE Needs to Better Assess Program Performance and Improve Contract Oversight
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE ensure the results of its oversight activities are recorded in a manner that allows for analysis of the contractor's overall performance against each standard.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE ERO HQ officials will begin to conduct random case file audits to assess the performance standards in the contract. ERO is also developing Quality Assurance audits for site and program review inspections that will be scored, tracked and provided to the contractor when completed for resolution. In addition, all ERO field offices have dedicated ADMOs and task managers that randomly audit cases to ensure services assigned by ICE are rendered and billed accordingly by the contractor. The ADMO works closely with contractors to ensure compliance with performance standards during their daily interactions. Any deficiencies identified are immediately addressed and reconciled with the contractor. ADMOs also reconcile monthly billing statement to ensure government requirements are met and billing is accurate. ERO is also developing Quality Assurance audits for site and program review inspections. These inspections will be conducted at random locations to cover the site and case file audits to ensure contract compliance. ERO will ensure the results of its oversight activities are recorded in a manner that allows for analysis and provide to GAO to achieve recommendation closure.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104529
<b>Report Title</b>	Alternatives To Detention: ICE Needs to Better Assess Program Performance and Improve Contract Oversight
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE use the oversight findings to assess whether the contractor is meeting the acceptable quality levels for all performance standards and document the results.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE ERO HQ officials will leverage the finding from the random case file audits to assess the performance standards in the contract. ERO is also developing Quality Assurance audits for site and program review inspections that will be scored, tracked, and provided to the contractor when completed for resolution. ERO will ensure the results of its oversight activities are recorded in a manner that allows for analysis and provide to GAO to achieve recommendation closure.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104529
<b>Report Title</b>	Alternatives To Detention: ICE Needs to Better Assess Program Performance and Improve Contract Oversight

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	9
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE take steps to ensure that the ATD program contractor addresses findings identified through case file audits and that ICE documents their resolution.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE ERO HQ officials will begin to conduct random case file audits to assess the performance standards in the contract. ERO is also developing Quality Assurance audits for site and program review inspections that will be scored, tracked, and provided to the contractor when completed for resolution. In addition, all ERO field offices have dedicated ADMOs and task managers that randomly audit cases to ensure services assigned by ICE are rendered and billed accordingly by the contractor. The ADMO works closely with contractor to ensure compliance with performance standards during their daily interactions. ERO will ensure the results of its oversight activities are recorded in a manner that allows for analysis and provide to GAO to achieve recommendation closure.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104529
<b>Report Title</b>	Alternatives To Detention: ICE Needs to Better Assess Program Performance and Improve Contract Oversight
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	10
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE monitor whether the ATD contractor is providing participants with access to legal orientation presentations as required by the contract.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE ERO improved its oversight mechanism of ensuring the contractor’s obligation to make the legal orientation presentations available to ATD program participants. ERO currently relies upon its ability to request ad hoc reporting of the contractor. The contractor performs this obligation through various means in Contractor Sites and provides reports to ERO demonstrating that every individual with an e-mail address is provided with a direct access link to an open-source presentation. However, ERO ATD continues to acknowledge that program participants are not required to attend, and the only measurable action on behalf of the agency is to gauge the contractor’s requirement to make the presentation available to the participant. ERO ATD is actively pursuing a contract modification to secure a standard and agreed-upon cadence of data elements and delivery.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-447
<b>Report Title</b>	Countering Illicit Finance and Trade: Better Information Sharing and Collaboration Needed to Combat Trade-Based Money Laundering
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/30/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement takes steps to enable and implement sharing of the Trade Transparency Unit’s trade data – including for the purposes of trade data analysis about patterns or trends of illicit activity related to trade-based money laundering and similar schemes – with U.S. agencies with roles and responsibilities related to enforcing trade laws and combating illicit financial activity, as appropriate.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE HIS’s TTU is a key entity responsible for combatting TBML in the United States. HSI TTU identifies global TBML trends and conducts ongoing analysis of trade data provided through partnerships and agreements with other countries’ trade transparency unit. The data-sharing agreements with foreign countries prohibit the sharing of their information, and data sharing agreements among U.S. law enforcement agencies provide a mechanism to request access and authorization if an agency needs access. These measures were established to protect the data and comply with federal statutes, regulations, and standards. In addition, these measures protect government information, operations, and assets against threats by ensuring that access to this data is at the least privilege and on a need-to-know basis. ICE non-concurred with the recommendation

and requested GAO consider the recommendation resolved and closed. GAO did not agree and maintained the recommendation open. ICE HSI met with GAO in March 2023 to discuss the recommendation, risks, and challenges. During the meeting, ICE HSI relayed that the tool for accomplishing the analysis is the DARTTS application, which has been under redevelopment within HSI’s Repository for Analytics in a Virtualized Environment while transitioning away from the legacy vendor-owned FALCON system. FALCON was retired in November 2022. HSI prioritized replicating the most needed features from the previous legacy system while concurrently developing the underlying framework of the Repository for Analytics in a Virtualized Environment to enable automated identification of TBML activity in the future. Development is planned for advanced analytics, including automated identification of TBML activity, scheduled to be completed in Q2 of FY 2024 contingent upon HSI receiving the necessary funding. HSI also informed GAO that in addition to funding, the timeline may be impacted by feature re-prioritization, resource allocation, additional requirements, upgrades, and other agency priorities. If the project is properly funded, HSI estimates completing development in FY 2025. Based on this information, GAO agreed that it would satisfy the spirit of their recommendation if implemented.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-23-106114
<b>Report Title</b>	China: Efforts Underway to Address Technology Transfer Risk at U.S. Universities, but ICE Could Improve Related Data
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/02/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE establish milestones for completing the assessment required by NSMP-33 section 4(d)(ii).
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On February 7, 2023, ICE HSI, SEVP met with officials from the Department of State to discuss National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33). With regard to the requirements of NSPM-33, HSI SEVP has completed its assessment of regulatory and technical updates necessary to require educational institutions report information on the seven data points specified in NSPM-33 in section 4(d)(i) which include: (1) employment and employment history; (2) sources of financial support; (3) education history including academic institutes, degree(s), and research advisor(s); (4) current and prior research and development (R&D) affiliations and projects; (5) current and pending participation in foreign-sponsored talent requirement programs; (6) program of study and/or research; and (7) facility/facilities and location(s) of expected work. Currently, educational institutions and nonimmigrant students are required to report and update the information in



five of the seven categories in the SEVIS. Specifically, DSOs and students are required to report employment in SEVIS including “any change of name, address, or interruption of such employment” (8 C.F.R. 214.2(f)(12)(i)). Students are also currently required to provide documentary evidence of financial support “in the amount indicated on the SEVIS Form I-20” (8 C.F.R. 214.2(f)(1)(i)(B)). In addition, DSOs must report each institution that a student attends while in the United States, as well as the program of study and degree earned (8 C.F.R. 214.3(g)(1) & (2)). Students and schools are also required to report the location and address of any employment (8 C.F.R. 214.2(f)(12)).

Currently, two of the seven data points are not collected in SEVIS. These two data points are “current and prior R&D affiliations and projects” and “current and pending participation in foreign government-sponsored talent recruitment programs.” For ICE to be able to collect this information, new regulations would have to be drafted and implemented to authorize the collection of this data and permitting its maintenance in SEVIS. HSI SEVP is working on providing GAO assessment documentation to achieve closure of the recommendation.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-23-106114
<b>Report Title</b>	China: Efforts Underway to Address Technology Transfer Risk at U.S. Universities, but ICE Could Improve Related Data
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/02/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of ICE take steps to improve employer information in SEVIS or otherwise update the records of foreign students approved for OPT as appropriate.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	ICE HSI SEVP has taken steps to improve the employer information in SEVIS, which is used to track and monitor schools, exchange visitor programs, and F, M, and J nonimmigrants while they visit the United States and participate in the United States education system. In February 2023, SEVP sent out 1,291 letters to employed students participating in Optional Practical Training who did not report employer information. Following receipt of the letters, 593 students submitted updates and another 188 have inquired about how to update their records. Through this process, which SEVP will continue to do, the employer information in SEVIS will be updated regularly and significantly improved. In addition, SEVP is taking steps to make reporting easier by providing a drop-down option for the top 200 employers in SEVIS. This will facilitate

	reporting for students, DSOs, as well as standardize employer names, thereby eliminating variations. Standardizing the top 200 employers via a dropdown menu will significantly improve SEVIS employment records. HSI SEVP is working with GAO to reach agreement on the documentation needed to reach recommendation closure.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CFO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-417
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Service Contracts: Increased Oversight Needed to Reduce the Risk Associated with Contractors Performing Certain Functions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/07/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the DHS Chief Financial Officer to work with Congress to identify information to include in its annual congressional budget justifications to provide greater transparency into requested and actual service requirement costs, particularly for those services requiring heightened management attention.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/05/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Based on examples from the Army's Congressional Budget Justification provided by GAO, DHS Budget met with GAO on June 26, 2023 to explain how the DHS Congressional Budget Justification is similar to Army's Congressional Budget Justification. Per OMB Circular A-11, DHS uses budget object class information to display costs associated with services to include those services requiring heightened management attention. GAO asked for a list of changes to service contract information since 2020 and to request input from Congressional staff for any additional service contract information required in the Congressional Budget Justification. On September 5, 2023, DHS provided GAO with the requested information and asked that this recommendation be considered implemented and closed.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CFO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-9
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Risk for the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/28/2020

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The DHS Secretary should ensure the DHS Under Secretary for Management directs the Coast Guard, as it develops the next life cycle cost estimate for the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program, to update its cost estimate for stage 1 in accordance with best practices for cost estimation, including: (1) conducting a sensitivity analysis, (2) conducting a risk and uncertainty analysis, (3) reflecting information from the program's most recent technical baseline, and (4) conducting an independent cost assessment of the estimate.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The USCG OPC Program Office is updating the Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) for the OPC program to support ADE-2B. The updated LCCE will include cost risk and sensitivity analysis and will reflect the program's most recent technical baseline. The USCG is finalizing the LCCE since the OPC Stage two protest was withdrawn, and the DHS Cost Analysis Division will independently assess the cost estimate.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CHCO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-204
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Employee Morale: Some Improvements Made, but Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Employee Engagement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/12/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	DHS OCHCO should, through its planned written guidance to components on the employee engagement action planning process, require the approval of OCHCO and the heads of the components to finalize the employee engagement action plans.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	MGMT's Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer (OCHCO) Office of Strategic Talent Recruitment, Inclusive Diversity and Engagement (STRIDE) issued action planning guidance and implemented a monitoring framework for Component engagement action plans in March 2021 and requested closure, but GAO decided to keep this recommendation open for

	<p>monitoring purposes. Throughout a 2-year action planning cycle, Components have taken substantive steps to align with the guidance, improve action plans, and address OCHCO’s feedback. The new monitoring framework includes in-depth reviews and assessments of Component employee engagement action plans, as well as training and technical support. On September 9, 2023, all Component action plans were sent to GAO as evidence and DHS requested that GAO close the recommendation as implemented. GAO informed DHS that they will continue to keep this recommendation open due to one Component (ICE) not meeting expectations. GAO requested another cycle of actions plans that demonstrate all Components’ alignment with the expectations OCHCO outlined for full approval, including review and assessment of results of previous plans to adjust/reprioritize/identify actions to improve employee engagement. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.</p>
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CHCO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-204
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Employee Morale: Some Improvements Made, but Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Employee Engagement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/12/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	DHS OCHCO should monitor components’ implementation of the OPM action planning cycle to ensure the components review and assess the results of their actions to adjust, reprioritize, and identify new actions needed to improve employee engagement.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	MGMT-OCHCO-STRIDE issued action planning guidance and implemented a monitoring framework for Component engagement action plans in March 2021 and requested closure, but GAO decided to keep this recommendation open for monitoring purposes. Throughout a 2-year action planning cycle, Components have taken substantive steps to align with the guidance, improve action plans, and address OCHCO’s feedback. The new monitoring framework includes in-depth reviews and assessments of Component employee engagement action plans, as well as training and technical support. On September 9, 2023, all Component action plans were sent to GAO as evidence and DHS requested that GAO close the recommendation as implemented. GAO informed DHS that they will continue to keep this recommendation open, pending all Components’ alignment with the expectations OCHCO outlined for full approval, including review and assessment of results of previous plans to adjust/reprioritize/identify actions to improve employee engagement. MGMT-OCHCO-

	STRIDE will provide another cycle of action plans and additional documents as requested by GAO. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-129
<b>Report Title</b>	Information Technology: Agencies Need to Fully Implement Key Workforce Planning Activities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/30/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the agency fully implements each of the eight key IT workforce planning activities it did not fully implement.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/26/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	DHS submitted a closure request memorandum and supporting documentation to GAO on September 26, 2023. OCIO prepared a response memo on the status of addressing the remaining three of eight IT Workforce initiatives under this recommendation that were not fully addressed. GAO will meet with OCIO on November 8, 2023 to follow up on the overall approach of how OCIO is addressing the workforce planning efforts. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-213
<b>Report Title</b>	Agile Software Development: DHS has Made Significant Progress in Implementing Leading Practices, but Needs to Take Additional Actions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/01/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary should ensure that the CIO, in collaboration with the Chief Procurement Officer, through the Homeland Security Acquisition Institute, establish Agile training requirements for senior stakeholders.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The Chief Technology Officer Directorate (CTOD) has drafted a response detailing the new approach to fulfilling the remaining recommendations for GAO, which is currently pending CTOD leadership review. This comprehensive approach details DHS's relevant use of working groups, policies and procedures, and the DHS IT Academy to respond to recommendations 5 & 7. Once cleared by CTOD and OCIO leadership, CTOD will submit the response to GAO as discussed during the August 2023 meeting with GAO. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-213
<b>Report Title</b>	Agile Software Development: DHS has Made Significant Progress in Implementing Leading Practices, but Needs to Take Additional Actions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/01/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary should ensure that the CIO, in collaboration with the Chief Procurement Officer, through the Homeland Security Acquisition Institute, establish Agile training requirements for staff outside of the acquisition workforce but assigned to Agile programs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CTOD has drafted a response detailing the new approach to fulfilling the remaining recommendations for GAO, which is currently pending CTOD leadership review. This comprehensive approach details DHS's relevant use of working groups, policies and procedures, and the DHS IT Academy to respond to recommendations 5 & 7. Once cleared by CTOD and OCIO leadership, CTOD will submit the response to GAO as discussed during the August 2023 meeting with GAO. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-171

<b>Report Title</b>	Information and Communications Technology: Federal Agencies Need to Take Urgent Action to Manage Supply Chain Risks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/27/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	31
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop a department-wide Information and Communications Technology (ICT) SCRM strategy that makes explicit the department's risk tolerance and identifies how the department intends to assess, respond to, and monitor ICT supply chain risks across the life cycle of ICT products and services.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/28/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	DHS updated and finalized multiple C-SCRM documents to include the strategy document. There is now a U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) Strategy (Version 2.0) document, a separate U.S. Department of Homeland Security Implementation Plan of the DHS Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Strategy (Version 2.0) document, and a Manufacturer Due Diligence Assessment SOP document. DHS requested closure.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-171
<b>Report Title</b>	Information and Communications Technology: Federal Agencies Need to Take Urgent Action to Manage Supply Chain Risks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/27/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	33
<b>Recommendation</b>	Establish a process to conduct department-wide assessments of ICT supply chain risks.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	DHS is developing department-wide risk assessment processes that take into consideration the criticality and interconnected nature of ICT products and services. At this point, DHS has conducted department-wide data calls for determination of critical software across Components in which critical suppliers for the Department were identified. The DHS C-SCRM Program Management Office also issued a prioritization memo to ensure critical ICT receives prioritization in being evaluated as part of DHS Technical Reference Model reviews. DHS is also in the process of establishing a C-SCRM Governing Council. This Council will develop the DHS processes that determine and prioritize aggregated supply chain risks present across the organization.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-171
<b>Report Title</b>	Information and Communications Technology: Federal Agencies Need to Take Urgent Action to Manage Supply Chain Risks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/27/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	34
<b>Recommendation</b>	Establish a process to conduct a SCRM review of a potential supplier prior to awarding a contract or issuing an order to that supplier for ICT products and services.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/28/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	DHS has established an assessment methodology to have a means of ensuring that a contractor has key cybersecurity and cyber hygiene practices in place as a consideration for contract award and while performing services for the Department. This methodology consisted of the identification of common cybersecurity weaknesses in a select pool of vendors that perform services for the Department. The data elements found within those vendor contracts helped the Department determine contract impact levels and perform risk analysis. DHS requests closure.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-171
<b>Report Title</b>	Information and Communications Technology: Federal Agencies Need to Take Urgent Action to Manage Supply Chain Risks



<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/27/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	35
<b>Recommendation</b>	Fully develop organizational ICT SCRM requirements for inclusion in contracts that are tailored to the type of contract and business needs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/28/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	DHS HQ completed and finalized proposed draft general C-SCRM contract language in Q2 FY22 for consideration by the broader acquisition community. DHS requests closure.
<b>Component</b>	
	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	
	GAO-21-171
<b>Report Title</b>	
	Information and Communications Technology: Federal Agencies Need to Take Urgent Action to Manage Supply Chain Risks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/27/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	36
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop organizational procedures to detect counterfeit and compromised ICT products prior to their deployment.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/28/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	DHS continues to work with departments and Agencies (D/A) agencies from the Federal Executive Branch to establish federal-wide guidance on the detection for counterfeit and compromised ICT. This coordination is occurring through the establishment and implementation of Executive Orders (ex. E.O. 14028, Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity), follow on guidance from OMB memoranda that establishes vendor secure software development attestations for identified critical software, and pending Federal Acquisition Regulation cases (to include Software Bill of Materials).

<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-507
<b>Report Title</b>	Countering Violent Extremism: DHS Can Further Enhance Its Strategic Planning and Data Governance Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security ensure that the Chief Data Officer – in consultation with other affected offices and components – incorporates the governance of data needed to support DHS’ targeted violence and terrorism prevention mission into its departmental data governance framework, including determining how targeted violence and terrorism prevention will be represented on the data governance body, conducting a data maturity assessment, and identifying opportunities to increase staff data skills that includes targeted violence and terrorism prevention data.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	After discussing with the DHS Office of the General Counsel (OGC), Chief Data Officer (CDO) will re-engage with GAO in late October 2023. This gives CDO time to review the additional materials with components. Specifically, GAO is requesting DHS identify data-specific training opportunities for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention. The additional information DHS provides should include learning agenda and intended training outcomes.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CPO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-417
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Service Contracts: Increased Oversight Needed to Reduce the Risk Associated with Contractors Performing Certain Functions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/07/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the DHS Chief Procurement Officer to, in coordination with the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management, develop a risk-based approach for reviewing service requirements-through the Procurement Strategy Roadmap or other means-to ensure proposed service requirements are clearly defined and reviewed before planning how they are to be procured.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	DHS OCPO did not concur with this recommendation and maintains that sufficient policies and processes, as acknowledged in the draft report, exist to ensure that service requirements are clearly defined and reviewed before they are procured. As part of OCPO's continued efforts to streamline processes and strengthen collaborative partnerships, the Procurement Strategy Roadmap was sunset. Also, OCPO reiterates that DHS's services requirements are largely recurring requirements, and commercial in nature. Consequently, these types of requirements are routinely clearly defined. For new or unique requirements, DHS utilizes early acquisition planning, such as effective market research strategies, as a critical part of clearly defining these requirements. IT service requirements undergo additional reviews by both Component and HQ to ensure the services meet Component needs and are consistent with DHS priorities. OCPO's Strategic Solutions Office, before individual requirements are developed, collaborates with stakeholders to identify strategic sourcing opportunities, and develop sourcing strategies that leverage efficiencies for similar service requirements to avoid duplication in services across DHS. Also, IPTs facilitate comprehensive reviews of service requirements; specific guidance, tools, templates, and checklists are available to help guide program officials through the requirements development process. These various policies and processes provide adequate assurance that DHS is allocating service requirements the attention to safeguard against duplicative or poorly defined requirements. OCPO upholds its position that establishing the recommended review process is unnecessary, duplicative, and is unlikely to yield any significant benefits. OCPO leadership will re-engage with GAO in November or December 2023 to discuss a path to closure.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CPO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-417
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Service Contracts: Increased Oversight Needed to Reduce the Risk Associated with Contractors Performing Certain Functions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/07/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the DHS Chief Procurement Officer to update the Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions Analysis to provide guidance for analyzing, documenting, and updating the federal workforce needed to perform or oversee service contracts requiring heightened management attention.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	DHS OCPO did not concur with this recommendation and maintains disagreement with the need to update the Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions Analysis to provide guidance for analyzing and documenting the federal workforce needed to perform or oversee service contracts requiring heightened management attention. OCPO reiterates that Components are required to certify that they have sufficient internal capacity to oversee and manage contractor activities and maintain control of its mission and operations when the requirement involves a function closely associated with inherently government functions. Additionally, if the requirement involves critical functions, Component must certify that they have sufficient internal capacity to maintain control over their missions and operations; and that an adequate number of positions exist that are filled by federal employees with the appropriate training, experience, and expertise to understand the Components' requirements, formulate alternatives, manage work products, and monitor any contractors used to support the federal workforce. These certifications require the Program Offices to conduct an analysis that is best suited for their requirement. While OCPO non-concurred with the specific request in the recommendation, OCPO updated the job aid instructions to require that analyses be updated when there is a change to the requirement that impacts the inherently governmental functions, closely associated with inherently governmental functions, special interest functions, or critical functions determination in Section I, II, or III of the Job Aid. OCPO leadership will re-engage with GAO in November or December 2023 to discuss a path to closure.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CPO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-491
<b>Report Title</b>	Federal Contracting: Senior Leaders Should Use Leading Companies' Key Practices to Improve Performance
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/27/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure the DHS Chief Procurement Officer collaborates with end users to develop performance metrics for procurement organizations.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	DHS OCPO did not concur with this recommendation. OCPO maintains that collaboration with end users, as defined by GAO, is not a requirement when developing appropriate and quality performance metrics for procurement organizations. Notwithstanding OCPO’s disagreement with this recommendation, OCPO believes that its planned actions to address the second recommendation under this report may be able to satisfy the intent of this recommendation. To supplement the Acquisition 360 and Head of the Contracting Activities’ internal customer satisfaction surveys, OCPO will add an additional requirement, related to end-user satisfaction, in the FY 2024 Head of the Contracting Activities Goal Letters.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CPO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-491
<b>Report Title</b>	Federal Contracting: Senior Leaders Should Use Leading Companies’ Key Practices to Improve Performance
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/27/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	9
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure the DHS Chief Procurement Officer uses a balanced set of performance metrics to manage the Department’s procurement organizations, including outcome-oriented metrics to measure (a) cost savings/avoidance, (b) timeliness of deliveries, (c) quality of deliverables, and (d) end-user satisfaction.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	OCPO maintains that cost savings/avoidance, timeliness of deliveries, quality of deliverables, and end-user satisfaction do not capture the most relevant aspects of performance of the DHS procurement organization. OCPO will implement some actions that should meet the intent of the recommendation. On June 1, 2023, OCPO met with GAO representatives to discuss planned actions. Specifically, in FY 2024, OCPO will conduct a root cause analysis of the schedule and timeliness data points in the Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System. The review will target contracts with “marginal” or “satisfactory” ratings. Based on the results of the analysis, OCPO will determine next steps. Additionally, to supplement the Acquisition 360, OCPO will consider adding an additional requirement related to end-user satisfaction in the FY 2024 Head of the Contracting Activity Goal Letters. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CPO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-528
<b>Report Title</b>	COVID-19 Contracting: Opportunities to Improve Practices to Assess Prospective Vendors and Capture Lessons Learned

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/29/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	10
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Health and Human Services, should ensure that input from contracting officials on interagency contracting lessons learned in response to COVID-19 is collected and shared as part of government-wide efforts to collect, analyze, and report on lessons learned.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	DHS OCPO concurred with this recommendation and worked with FEMA to determine what interagency contracting lessons learned, in response to COVID-19, could be shared. In December 2021, OCPO shared these lessons learned with DOD and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). DOD, in turn, provided their collection of lessons learned. On May 5, 2023, OCPO, DOD, and HHS representatives met to discuss this recommendation and a path to closure. As of September 2023, DHS and DOD are awaiting HHS' lessons learned. OCPO will initiate another discussion with HHS in October or November 2023. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CRSO
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-14-648
<b>Report Title</b>	Federal Real Property: DHS and GSA Need to Strengthen the Management of DHS Headquarters Consolidation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/19/2014
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	In order to improve transparency and allow for more informed decision making by congressional leaders and DHS and GSA decision-makers, before requesting additional funding for the DHS headquarters consolidation project, after revising the DHS headquarters consolidation plans, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the General Services Administration should work jointly to develop revised cost and schedule estimates for the remaining portions of the consolidation project that conform to GSA guidance and leading practices for cost and schedule estimation, including an independent evaluation of the estimates.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	In support of the July 21, 2023, GSA Cost and Schedule Report submission, DHS is coordinating with GAO to discuss DHS cost estimates for the various projects on the St Elizabeths Campus. GAO requested follow-up to evaluate current cost and schedule estimates. MGMT-CRSO is gathering the requested information and will send to GAO as soon as it is available. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	
	MGMT-Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM)
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-386
<b>Report Title</b>	Homeland Security: DHS Needs to Fully Implement Key Practices in Acquiring Biometric Identity Management System
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/08/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure that the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART) program office fully reviews and approves or rejects contractor deliverables prior to working on the next system release.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	As part of contract transition out activities, OBIM has reviewed and dispositioned all contract deliverables that were required during the HART development contract. Deliverables have either received final acceptance or were of sufficient completion to be picked up by follow-on contracts for completion as the government finishes HART development and test, and the system approaches initial operational capability. OBIM is working on documentation to provide to GAO to request closure.
<b>Component</b>	
	MGMT-OBIM
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-386
<b>Report Title</b>	Homeland Security: DHS Needs to Fully Implement Key Practices in Acquiring Biometric Identity Management System
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/08/2021

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure that, moving forward, the HART program tracks and monitors all of its costs, including government labor costs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/02/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	OBIM provided GAO the 2023 LCCE on May 26, 2023 and additional information at GAO's request on August 2, 2023. OBIM requested closure of the recommendation on August 2, 2023, and is awaiting GAO's response. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	
	MGMT-OBIM
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-386
<b>Report Title</b>	Homeland Security: DHS Needs to Fully Implement Key Practices in Acquiring Biometric Identity Management System
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/08/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure that the HART program defines the extent to which it should be interacting with each of its stakeholders throughout the acquisition process, and, once established, monitors stakeholder involvement against that defined level of involvement.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The Executive Steering Committee (ESC) was modified from the OBIM ESC to the HART ESC to provide more effective governance of the HART program. The ESC charter was updated, and the first HART ESC meeting was held on August 29, 2023. OBIM is in the process of updating the Executive Stakeholder Board (ESB) charter now that the ESC charter update is completed. OBIM expects to complete the ESB update by Q2 of FY 2024. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	
	MGMT-PARM
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-77
<b>Report Title</b>	Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Opportunities to Improve Its Component Acquisition Oversight



<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/20/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Under Secretary for Management should ensure that the Component Acquisition Executives that are responsible for oversight of acquisition programs comply with Department of Homeland Security direction to complete Component Acquisition Executive support staffing plans.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	07/27/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	DHS PARM submitted supporting FY 2023 Component Acquisition Executives (CAE) Staffing Plans to GAO on July 27, 2023 to satisfy discussed steps towards closure. PARM requested closure with that submission and is awaiting GAO's decision. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-PARM
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-77
<b>Report Title</b>	Homeland Security Acquisitions: DHS Has Opportunities to Improve Its Component Acquisition Oversight
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/20/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Under Secretary for Management should identify, in policy or guidance, the expertise that constitutes critical acquisition positions for effective Component Acquisition Executive oversight.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	PARM provided GAO with updated Instruction 102-01-006, Rev 01, 5/27/2022 "Acquisition Program Management Staffing" and new Annual Staffing Plans, which include both a Staffing Plan Questionnaire and a Staffing Plan Worksheet to address GAO's expectations that the guidance offers more direction to CAE functions as to what/how those functions have critical expertise, such as those pertaining to oversight of cost, schedule, and performance. On June 14, 2023, PARM requested closure of this recommendation with that submission; and on June 29, 2023, GAO notified PARM that the

	documentation and information provided was sufficient to close the recommendation. PARM is awaiting GAO's official closure.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-PARM
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-9
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Risk for the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/28/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The DHS Secretary should ensure the DHS Under Secretary for Management directs the Coast Guard to revise OPC's acquisition program baseline for stage 1 to include OPC's delivery dates.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	PARM confirmed that the program will be updating their Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) to include the OPC 4 delivery schedule milestone for stage 1 at the same time they update the APB for Stage 2 [in support of ADE-2B). Because USCG has received an Over Target Baseline/Over Target Schedule request from the prime contractor for OPC 4, the projected date for establishing the OPC 4 delivery timeline has been adjusted, along with the ADE-2B decision for OPC 11-16. The ADE-2B is anticipated to occur no earlier than March 2024.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-PARM
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-9
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Risk for the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/28/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The DHS Secretary should ensure the DHS Under Secretary for Management directs the Coast Guard to include in OPC's acquisition program baseline for stage 2 OPC's delivery dates when the stage 2 acquisition program baseline is established and approved at ADE 2B.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	DHS awarded the OPC Phase 2 to Austal USA on June 30, 2022. DHS will update the program's APB as approved at ADE-2B. This is projected to occur no earlier than March 2024. The APB would be updated in advance and support the ADE-2B decision.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-PARM
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104513
<b>Report Title</b>	Leading Practices: Agency Acquisition Policies Could Better Implement Key Product Development Principles
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/10/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the DHS Undersecretary for Management update DHS acquisition policies to fully implement the following principles throughout development; attaining a sound business case
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/03/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On October 3, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-PARM
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104513
<b>Report Title</b>	Leading Practices: Agency Acquisition Policies Could Better Implement Key Product Development Principles
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/10/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the DHS Undersecretary for Management update DHS acquisition policies to fully implement the following principles throughout development; applying iterative design approaches
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	PARM is updating the Instruction Manual 102-01-003, Acquisition Management Lexicon, Appendix A, to clearly identify that the use of the term “incremental” is interchangeable with the term “iterative” in the context of the Instruction 102-01-001, Acquisition Management, and the PARM APB Template. PARM will request closure with the submission of this documentation. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	
	MGMT-PARM
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104513
<b>Report Title</b>	Leading Practices: Agency Acquisition Policies Could Better Implement Key Product Development Principles
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/10/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the DHS Undersecretary for Management update DHS acquisition policies to fully implement the following principles throughout development; off-ramping capabilities when needed to maintain schedule.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/03/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On October 03, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	
	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-590
<b>Report Title</b>	Homeland Security: Clearer Roles and Responsibilities for the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans and Workforce Planning Would Enhance Its Effectiveness

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/19/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should create corresponding processes and procedures to help implement the mission, roles, and responsibilities defined in the delegation of authority or similar document to help ensure predictability, repeatability, and accountability in department-wide and crosscutting strategy and policy efforts.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	GAO has at least five follow up questions to documentation provided to address Recommendation 2. PLCY will follow up with SMEs to address.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-590
<b>Report Title</b>	Homeland Security: Clearer Roles and Responsibilities for the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans and Workforce Planning Would Enhance Its Effectiveness
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/19/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans should use the “DHS Workforce Planning Guide” to help identify and analyze any gaps in PLCY’s workforce, design strategies to address any gaps, and communicate this information to DHS leadership.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	PLCY is working to address the recommendation.

<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-305
<b>Report Title</b>	Border Security: DHS Should Improve the Quality of Unlawful Border Entry Information and Other Metric Reporting
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/21/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should develop and implement a process to systematically review the reliability of the data used in its Border Security Metrics Report and comprehensively identify any limitations with the data and methodologies that underlie its metrics.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	GAO started another related Border Security Metrics engagement (job code 106277) on October 24, 2022 and will not close any previous recommendations while the new engagement is ongoing. 106277 is expected to be published in November 2023.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-305
<b>Report Title</b>	Border Security: DHS Should Improve the Quality of Unlawful Border Entry Information and Other Metric Reporting
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/21/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure the communication of the limitations of the metrics identified through the systematic review in the Department's annual Border Security Metrics Report.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	GAO started another related Border Security Metrics engagement (job code 106277) on October 24, 2022 and will not close any previous recommendations while the new engagement is ongoing. 106277 is expected to be published in November 2023.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-441
<b>Report Title</b>	Drug Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces (JTF) Should Enhance Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug Activities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/09/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should develop outcome-based performance measures for the DHS JTFs that are consistent.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	PLCY will follow up with coordinating with MIL, as that office is currently responsible for JTF matters. per PL 117-263: SEC. 7111. JOINT TASK FORCES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY. (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the ‘‘DHS Joint Task Forces Reauthorization Act of 2022’’. (b) DHS JOINT TASK FORCES.— Subsection (b) of section 708 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 348) is amended— (1) by amending paragraph (8) to read as follows: ‘‘(8) JOINT TASK FORCE STAFF.— ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Each Joint Task Force shall have a staff, composed of personnel from relevant components and offices of the Department, to assist the Director of such Joint Task Force in carrying out the mission and responsibilities of such Joint Task Force.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-245
<b>Report Title</b>	Southwest Border: Actions Needed to Improve DHS Processing of Families and Coordination between DHS and HHS
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/19/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security, jointly with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, should collaborate to address information sharing gaps identified in this report to ensure that ORR receives information needed to make decisions for UAC, including those apprehended with an adult.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	PLCY contacted DHS OHSS for updates on status working towards closure of recommendation. OHSS stated they will confer with Border Security and Immigration Policy and the operational components on this and provide update. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-274
<b>Report Title</b>	Southwest Border: Actions Needed to Address Fragmentation in DHS' Processes for Apprehended Family Members
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/19/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should evaluate options for developing a unique identifier shared across DHS components' data systems to link family members apprehended together.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/15/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On November 15, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-507
<b>Report Title</b>	Countering Violent Extremism: DHS Can Further Enhance Its Strategic Planning and Data Governance Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2021



<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security ensure that the Office of Counterterrorism and Threat Prevention Policy and affected components and offices revise or supplement DHS's Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence strategy to include all key elements of a comprehensive strategy.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	PLCY Audits provided documentation and a summary of actions taken to GAO in September 2023 and requested that GAO consider the recommendation closed as implemented. Note: PLCY has requested that this recommendation be reassigned to the Counterterrorism Coordinator's Office (CT) in the Office of the Secretary.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104470
<b>Report Title</b>	Law Enforcement: Federal Agencies Should Improve Reporting and Review of Less-Lethal Force
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/15/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop standards for its component agencies on the types of information that must be reported on each use of force incident.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/26/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	PLCY provided supporting documentation on September 26, 2023 and requested that GAO consider the recommendation closed as implemented. However, GAO is delaying closure and reaching out to Components to gather additional information on steps they have taken to ensure that officers develop use of force reports with all of the needed basic information to evaluate the use of force incident.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104470

<b>Report Title</b>	Law Enforcement: Federal Agencies Should Improve Reporting and Review of Less-Lethal Force
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/15/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	Oversee the quality, consistency, and completeness of use of force reporting across all DHS components, such as through a department-wide use of force oversight body or regular evaluations of use of force reporting.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	PLCY updated GAO on June 21, 2023, about the steps it is taking to address this recommendation. On September 21, 2023, PLCY followed up with the GAO audit team that confirmed GAO had received the information and GAO was gathering additional information from Components. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	DHS's Privacy Office (PRIV)
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104144
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Privacy: Selected Component Agencies Generally Provided Oversight of Contractors, but Further Actions Needed to Address Gaps
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/16/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security should direct its Privacy Office to provide targeted role-based privacy training to contractors who are responsible for protecting PII.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	PRIV recently welcomed a new Oversight Director, who will play a role in training initiatives. Presently, PRIV is assessing current training programs that may be available and identifying whether the programs will be able modified to meet the goal of this recommendation or potentially create new ones. PRIV will then address any shortcomings discovered during this evaluation.

<b>Component</b>	PRIV
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104144
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Privacy: Selected Component Agencies Generally Provided Oversight of Contractors, but Further Actions Needed to Address Gaps
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/16/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection should direct the CBP Privacy Office to ensure that risk assessments are fully documented in the incident database.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The draft update to the Privacy Incident Handling Guidance is currently under PRIV senior leadership and Department Component review. PRIV is on target to update the Privacy Incident Handling Guidance incorporating GAO recommendations by the ECD.
<b>Component</b>	PRIV
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104144
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS PRIVACY: Selected Component Agencies Generally Provided Oversight of Contractors, but Further Actions Needed to Address Gaps
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/16/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection should direct the CBP Privacy Office to ensure that recommendations to notify affected individuals of privacy incidents are fully documented in the incident database.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The draft update to the Privacy Incident Handling Guidance is currently under PRIV senior leadership and Department Component review. PRIV is on target to update the Privacy Incident Handling Guidance incorporating GAO recommendations by the ECD.
<b>Component</b>	PRIV
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105040
<b>Report Title</b>	Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): Selected Agencies Adapted to the COVID-19 Pandemic but Face Ongoing Challenges and Backlogs
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/26/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Chief Privacy Officer of the Department of Homeland Security, as the Department's Chief FOIA Officer, should work with agency components to develop backlog reduction plans that specify goals and measures for reducing the FOIA backlog, provide specific milestones for backlog reduction efforts, and identify planned actions to reduce backlog.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	PRIV provided excerpts from some of the available working draft backlog reduction plans to GAO. These drafts include details on staffing, funding, metric monitoring dashboards, and other measures and goals aimed at reducing the FOIA backlog. Additionally, various milestones were provided. PRIV submitted responses to GAO's additional questions on October 04, 2023.
<b>Component</b>	PRIV
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105065
<b>Report Title</b>	Privacy: Dedicated Leadership Can Improve Programs and Address Challenges
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	20
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should incorporate privacy into an organization-wide risk management strategy that includes a determination of risk tolerance.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	PRIV provided documentation of the risk assessment tool including the risk categories and guidance on how users are to determine, categorize and select the appropriate risk category in DHS policy or guidance to GAO. PRIV will formally document the risk management strategy as described in the PRIV Compliance Handbook and provide GAO with the requested information on October 13, 2023, and request that GAO consider the recommendation closed as implemented.
<b>Component</b>	PRIV
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105065
<b>Report Title</b>	Privacy: Dedicated Leadership Can Improve Programs and Address Challenges
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	21
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should fully define and document the role of the senior agency official for privacy or other designated privacy official in reviewing and approving system categorizations, overseeing privacy control assessments, and reviewing authorization packages.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The DHS Compliance Handbook provides a description of the Chief Privacy Officer's responsibilities to review all privacy risks, agency actions and policies that involve PII, and that all system categorizations, privacy control assessments, and authorization packages for privacy and data security are documented. PRIV provide GAO with the requested information on October 13, 2023, and request that GAO consider the recommendation closed as implemented.
<b>Component</b>	PRIV
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105065
<b>Report Title</b>	Privacy: Dedicated Leadership Can Improve Programs and Address Challenges
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/22/2022

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	22
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should fully develop and document a privacy continuous monitoring strategy.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The privacy risks and compliance artifacts monitoring process is inclusive of all privacy controls risk management tiers and the process is documented in an SOP. PRIV provide GAO with the requested information on October 13, 2023, and request that GAO consider the recommendation closed as implemented.
<b>Component</b>	S&T
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-81
<b>Report Title</b>	Federal Research: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Public Access to Research Results
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/21/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should take steps to ensure appropriate agency-funded research data are readily findable and accessible to the public.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	As of September 30, 2023, S&T has established repositories for both publications, via agreement with the National Institute of Health and their associated data sets, via Figshare. S&T has experienced complications with the population of the data repository for a variety of factors. The research being conducted and funded by DHS is largely not owned by DHS but rather, by the authors who frequently arrange publication of the research on their own and often grant copyright to the publisher. S&T is working to provide links and citations to those works, in addition to the DHS published works, via a publicly accessible website. Additionally, there remains a strong security concern, culturally, within DHS that also slows their ability to share data sets. S&T is working on addressing that with the development of the DHS-wide Data Management Plan requirements and associated workflow/process planning. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.

<b>Component</b>	S&T
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-81
<b>Report Title</b>	Federal Research: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Public Access to Research Results
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/21/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	10
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should complete development of data management plan requirements.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	<p>As of September 30, 2023, S&amp;T has created a cross-Component Data Management Plan Working Group, which has revised previous work and is presenting the current draft to the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) for review/comment in early October; following that, the Working Group will:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develop a Data Management Plan workflow that includes quality evaluation and compliance checking;</li> <li>• Consult with OGC on a template prior to moving through an official approval process;</li> <li>• Create directive 026-08 on Data Management; and</li> <li>• Create directive 026-08-001 on Data Management instructions. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.</li> </ul>
<b>Component</b>	S&T
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-81
<b>Report Title</b>	Federal Research: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Public Access to Research Results
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/21/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	15
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should evaluate training needs for agency officials or others involved in reviewing the merits of researchers' data management plans and, if additional training is found to be warranted, develop and provide such training.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	S&T created a draft Research Data Management Template that will be shared with the White House OSTP in early October 2023. Also in collaboration, a draft Data Management Plan Research Guide has been created but not published. S&T is waiting to publish until the template is accepted as part of a new Directive and Policy and Procedures of S&T-based workflow. Formal training is planned once the template is officially adopted and the workflow is complete. That workflow is one of the next steps for the Data Management Plan Working Group following the completion of the Data Management Plan Template.
<b>Component</b>	
	S&T
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-81
<b>Report Title</b>	Federal Research: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Public Access to Research Results
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/21/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	26
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should develop and implement a mechanism to ensure researcher compliance with the public access plan and associated requirements.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	S&T continues its work on updates to DHS's Public Access Plan. The most recent draft revisions are under review by OSTP. Previous feedback from OSTP in June 2023 was very positive. Once the Data Management Plan Working Group has finished their work, the data management specifics can be added to update the Public Access Plan for final approval. The issue of compliance will naturally follow that process.
<b>Component</b>	
	Office of the Secretary (SEC)
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-507
<b>Report Title</b>	Countering Violent Extremism: DHS Can Further Enhance Its Strategic Planning and Data Governance Efforts



<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security – in consultation with affected offices and components – should establish common terminology for targeted violence.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	SEC ‘s Office of Counter Terrorism continues to delineate roles and responsibilities.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-405
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Components Could Improve Monitoring of the Employee Misconduct Process
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/30/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	16
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of TSA should monitor the duration of all cases beginning-to-end by stage and case type.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA is finalizing the updates to the new database and the Employee Relations dashboard and will soon be able to request that GAO consider the recommendation closed as implemented. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-405
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Components Could Improve Monitoring of the Employee Misconduct Process

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/30/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	17
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of TSA should monitor the timeliness of misconduct cases according to established targets for management inquiries (fact finding) and administrative inquiries, and the proposal and decision stages, using case information system data.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA is finalizing the updates to the new database and the Employee Relations dashboard and will soon be able to request that GAO consider the recommendation closed as implemented. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	
	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-405
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Components Could Improve Monitoring of the Employee Misconduct Process
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/30/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	18
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of TSA should define and document the case management system data fields and methodology to be used for monitoring all established performance targets and provide related guidance to staff
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA is working on completion of the updated User Guide for the Employee Relations Database and will soon be able to request that GAO consider the recommendation closed as implemented. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	
	TSA

<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-426
<b>Report Title</b>	Critical Infrastructure Protection: Key Pipeline Security Documents Need to Reflect Current Operating Environment
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/05/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The TSA Administrator should periodically review, and as appropriate, update the 2010 Pipeline Security and Incident Recovery Protocol Plan to ensure the plan reflects relevant changes in pipeline security threats, technology, federal law and policy, and any other factors relevant to the security of the nation's pipeline systems.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA is working to complete its review and update to the Pipeline Security Incident Protocol Plan, to address changes in the threat landscape—particularly in terms of cybersecurity. Additionally, the plan is being revised to bring it into conformity with several national level policy documents, such as the National Response Framework, the National Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan, and the National Terrorism Advisory System. Revisions are being completed and will be coordinated with both internal and external partners. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-48
<b>Report Title</b>	Critical Infrastructure Protection: Actions Needed to Address Significant Weaknesses in TSA's Pipeline Security Program Management
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/18/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement's Surface Division to identify or develop other data sources relevant to threat, vulnerability, and consequence consistent with the NIPP and DHS critical infrastructure risk mitigation priorities and incorporate that data into the Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool to assess relative risk of critical pipeline systems, which could include data on prior attacks, natural hazards, feedback data on pipeline system performance, physical pipeline condition, and cross-sector interdependencies.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/05/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On January 05, 2024, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	TSA
<b>Report Title</b>	GAO-19-48
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	Critical Infrastructure Protection: Actions Needed to Address Significant Weaknesses in TSA’s Pipeline Security Program Management
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	12/18/2018
<b>Recommendation</b>	7
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	The TSA Administrator should direct the Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division to take steps to coordinate an independent, external peer review of its Pipeline Relative Risk Ranking Tool, after the Pipeline Security Branch completes enhancements to its risk assessment approach.
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	01/05/2024
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Component</b>	On January 05, 2024, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Report Number</b>	TSA
<b>Report Title</b>	GAO-20-125
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Has Taken Steps to Address Workforce Issues, but Additional Actions Needed
	02/12/2020

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Administrator / Director of FAMS should identify and utilize a suitable system that provides information about air marshals' medical qualification status.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA's Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (LE/FAMS) updated GAO in early Summer 2023 on TSA's ongoing efforts to close the recommendation. LE/FAMS continues to work with Salesforce to develop a new system, which is an important element to fully implement the recommendation. The target completion date of the employee Health Records system is late 2023.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-125
<b>Report Title</b>	Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Has Taken Steps to Address Workforce Issues, but Additional Actions Needed
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/12/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Administrator / Director of FAMS should develop and implement a plan to assess the health and fitness of the FAMS workforce as a whole, including trends over time.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA's LE/FAMS updated GAO in early Summer 2023 on TSA's ongoing efforts to close this recommendation. The second installment of the workforce survey has been drafted and is currently under review before disseminating to the workforce. Once the second survey is completed and evaluated in late 2023, LE/FAMS will provide the survey outcomes to GAO.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	TSA

<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-125
<b>Report Title</b>	Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Has Taken Steps to Address Workforce Issues, but Additional Actions Needed
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/12/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Administrator / Director of FAMS should identify and implement a means to monitor the extent to which air marshals' actual shifts and rest hours are consistent with scheduling guidelines.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA's LE/FAMS updated GAO in early Summer 2023 on TSA's ongoing efforts to close the recommendation. LE/FAMS developed a report to evaluate and monitor actual operations hours. The report is currently being reviewed to ensure it captures the necessary information to meet the intent of the recommendation. LE/FAMS expects to finalize the report in late 2023.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-125
<b>Report Title</b>	Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Has Taken Steps to Address Workforce Issues, but Additional Actions Needed
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/12/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Administrator / Director of FAMS should take steps to reaffirm and strengthen efforts to prevent discrimination by, for example, updating and following through on its 2012 action plan and renewing leadership commitment to the plan's goals
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/10/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On January 10, 2024, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-56
<b>Report Title</b>	Aviation Security: TSA Should Ensure Screening Technologies Continue to Meet Detection Requirements after Deployment
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/05/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The TSA Administrator should require and ensure that TSA officials document their assessments of risk and the rationale-including the assumptions, methodology, and uncertainty considered-behind decisions to deploy screening technologies.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/24/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA updated GAO on May 24, 2023, outlining TSA’s regular approach to consider operational risk when developing deployment plans for checkpoint and checked baggage screening capabilities, and requested that GAO consider this recommendation closed as implemented.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-56
<b>Report Title</b>	Aviation Security: TSA Should Ensure Screening Technologies Continue to Meet Detection Requirements after Deployment
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/05/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The TSA Administrator should develop a process to ensure that screening technologies continue to meet detection requirements after deployment to commercial airports.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA continues to adjust Periodic Review policy, including the general timeframes for conducting reviews, which allow management to assess system performance requirements relative to effectiveness and suitability. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-56
<b>Report Title</b>	Aviation Security: TSA Should Ensure Screening Technologies Continue to Meet Detection Requirements after Deployment
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/05/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The TSA Administrator should implement the process it develops to ensure that screening technologies continue to meet detection requirements after deployment to commercial airports.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/02/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA continues to plan and execute reviews in accordance with policy and as resources and risk dictate. TSA requested GAO consider closing this recommendation based upon the implementation of reviews completed, which is consistent with the intent of the recommendation. TSA provided GAO two completed reviews and additional supporting documentation on August 2, 2023, and requested that GAO consider the recommendation closed as implemented.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-72
<b>Report Title</b>	Aviation Security: TSA Coordinates with Stakeholders on Changes to Screening Rules but Could Clarify Its Review Processes and Better Measure Effectiveness
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/20/2019



<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of TSA should explore additional data sources measuring the effectiveness of Silent Partner and Quiet Skies rules.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/02/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On January 02, 2024, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-105192
<b>Report Title</b>	Air Cargo Security: TSA Field Testing Should Ensure Screening Systems Meet Detection Standards
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/13/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	GAO recommended that the Secretary of DHS should ensure that the Administrator of TSA and the Commissioner of CBP: Establish a documented process to ensure that relevant officials from both agencies are aware of and have access to applicable data to inform their inbound air cargo risk assessment efforts.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/15/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA’s Office of Requirements and Capabilities Analysis (RCA) provided an update to GAO on February 15, 2023, describing actions taken to implement this recommendation and requested that GAO close the recommendation as implemented. GAO indicated that they are reviewing the information and have not yet made a closure decision or if additional information is needed.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-105192

<b>Report Title</b>	Air Cargo Security: TSA Field Testing Should Ensure Screening Systems Meet Detection Standards
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/13/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of TSA, prior to designating the explosives detection system for air cargo screening currently under evaluation as “qualified” on the air cargo screening technology list, should, to the extent practicable, verify through additional data collection or analysis that the system’s probability of detection in the field matches the performance measured in laboratory testing.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/15/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA’s RCA provided an update to GAO on February 15, 2023, describing actions taken to implement this recommendation and requested that GAO close the recommendation as implemented. GAO indicated that they are reviewing the information and have not yet made a closure decision or if additional information is needed.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-105192
<b>Report Title</b>	Air Cargo Security: TSA Field Testing Should Ensure Screening Systems Meet Detection Standards
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/13/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of TSA should ensure that necessary data are collected during field assessments to independently verify that the probability of detection of explosives detection systems for air cargo screening in the field matches the performance measured in laboratory testing, prior to designating systems as “qualified” on the air cargo screening technology list. TSA could provide this verification either through live explosives testing or, when operational considerations limit TSA’s ability to use live threat materials, TSA should use an independently validated, fully documented alternative testing strategy.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/15/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA’s RCA provided an update to GAO on February 15, 2023, describing actions taken to implement this recommendation and requested that GAO close the recommendation as implemented. GAO indicated that they are reviewing the information and have not yet made a closure decision or if additional information is needed.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-105192
<b>Report Title</b>	Air Cargo Security: TSA Field Testing Should Ensure Screening Systems Meet Detection Standards
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/13/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of TSA should ensure statistical techniques are used to analyze data from TSA field assessments, including data from the current field assessment, of explosives detection systems for air cargo screening, prior to designating systems as “qualified” on the air cargo screening technology list. This statistical analysis should include the following elements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-calculating error values for each quantitative measurement,</li> <li>-identifying all necessary performance thresholds, and</li> <li>-comparing the measured values and errors against each threshold to determine the statistical confidence of the results.</li> </ul>
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/15/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA’s RCA provided an update to GAO on February 15, 2023, describing actions taken to implement this recommendation and requested that GAO close the recommendation as implemented. GAO indicated that they are reviewing the information and have not yet made a closure decision or if additional information is needed.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-50
<b>Report Title</b>	Transportation Security Acquisitions: TSA Needs to Establish Metrics and Evaluate Third Party Testing Outcomes for Screening Technologies
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/29/2020

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	When performance metrics have been established, the Administrator of TSA should assess gains in efficiency resulting from third party testing.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	There has been no change in status to the recommendation. GAO chose to leave the recommendation open for an additional year, in hopes that a company will elect to use the third-party testing program. TSA will request closure again at the start of 2024. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-50
<b>Report Title</b>	Transportation Security Acquisitions: TSA Needs to Establish Metrics and Evaluate Third Party Testing Outcomes for Screening Technologies
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/29/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of TSA should assess whether third party testing contributes to its goals of increasing supplier diversity and innovation.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	There has been no change in status to the recommendation. GAO chose to leave the recommendation open for an additional year, in hopes that a company will elect to use the third-party testing program. TSA will request closure again at the start of 2024. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-595
<b>Report Title</b>	COVID-19: Federal Air Marshal Service Should Document Its Response to Cases and Facilitate Access to Testing

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/05/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Executive Assistant Administrator/Director of FAMS: Ensure that FAMS officials consistently document steps taken to implement agency protocols following identification of employees with COVID-19.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA's LE/FAMS updated GAO in early Summer 2023 on TSA's ongoing efforts to close the recommendation. LE/FAMS has developed a document to address the required steps to meet the intent of the recommendation. The document is currently being finalized. LE/FAMS expects to provide the document to GAO and request that GAO close the recommendation as implemented in November 2023.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104144
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Privacy: Selected Component Agencies Generally Provided Oversight of Contractors, but Further Actions Needed to Address Gaps
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/16/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration should direct the TSA Privacy Office to ensure the evaluation of proposed new instances of sharing personally identifiable information with third parties are fully documented.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/13/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed - Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On December 13, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.

<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105063
<b>Report Title</b>	Aviation Security Programs: TSA Should Clarify Compliance Program Guidance and Address Stakeholder Concerns with Its Data Systems
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/27/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	TSA Administrator ensure the Information Technology and Compliance offices conduct an assessment to identify and address user concerns as PARIS transitions to the new platform.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA's Security Operations and Information Technology Offices are jointly working with internal stakeholders to identify and address user concerns regarding the PARIS transition to the new platform. A milestone plan will be developed to address user concerns regarding collecting, analyzing, and sharing information in the new platform.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105063
<b>Report Title</b>	Aviation Security Programs: TSA Should Clarify Compliance Program Guidance and Address Stakeholder Concerns with Its Data Systems
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/27/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of TSA should ensure the Information Technology office identify, document, and share lessons learned from the agency's experiences transitioning the PARIS, LinKS, and GRADS data systems to a new platform in advance of future transitions.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/16/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed - Implemented

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On November 16, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-16-226
<b>Report Title</b>	DOD and Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Increase Oversight and Management Information on Hazing Incidents Involving Servicemembers
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/09/2016
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	GAO recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard evaluate the prevalence of hazing in the Coast Guard.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Since publication of this recommendation in 2016, USCG has updated policy and training requirements related to the prevention of hazing. USCG reviewed the reported hazing incidents and determined not to conduct a formal assessment of the prevalence of hazing. This decision was based on a comparison of reported hazing incidents (a total of 3 during 2020) with other types of prohibited behaviors, showing that; hazing in USCG is minimal, both comparatively and on an absolute basis. GAO has decided to keep the recommendation open due to changes happening at DOD with regard to hazing, which could eventually affect USCG. USCG is awaiting additional feedback from GAO on the way forward to reach closure.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-16-453
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy is Underway, but Agency Could Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/15/2016
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1

<b>Recommendation</b>	That the Commandant of the Coast Guard develop measures, as appropriate, for gauging how the agency's actions have helped to mitigate the Arctic capability gaps.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Promulgation of USCG's Arctic Strategic Outlook Implementation Plan (ASIP) is pending. USCG is monitoring current geopolitical events to understand how they may affect security and coordination in the Arctic and, consequently, the ASIP. USCG does not have an estimated release date for the ASIP but intends to reevaluate its status frequently. USCG has developed a draft framework tool, but the prototype cannot be accurately evaluated until the ASIP is approved and then implemented over the course of at least 1 year. Therefore, the completion date is dependent on finalizing the ASIP, which is uncertain at this time.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-16-453
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Arctic Strategy is Underway, but Agency Could Better Assess How Its Actions Mitigate Known Arctic Capability Gaps
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/15/2016
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	That the Commandant of the Coast Guard design and implement a process to systematically assess the extent to which actions taken agency-wide have helped mitigate the Arctic capability gaps for which it has responsibility
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Promulgation of the Coast Guard's ASIP is pending. The Coast Guard is monitoring current geopolitical events to understand how they may affect security and coordination in the Arctic and, consequently, our ASIP. The Coast Guard does not have an estimated release date for the ASIP but intends to reevaluate its status frequently. The Coast Guard has developed a draft framework tool, but the prototype cannot be accurately evaluated until the ASIP is approved and then implemented over the course of at least 1 year.



<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-135
<b>Report Title</b>	Transitioning Veterans: The Coast Guard Needs to Improve Data Quality and Monitoring of its Transition Assistance Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/19/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	Once reliable data are available by installation or unit, enable unit commanders and the higher-level commanders to whom they report to access TAP performance information specifically for the units they oversee so that they can monitor compliance with all TAP requirements.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	As a follow-up to discussions with GAO, USCG has determined additional actions that need to be taken before this recommendation will be closed. Those actions/milestones are: (1) In 2023, USCG provided training to field transition managers on identifying separating and transitioning members through DOD Transition Assistance Program-IT. Training will be completed by September 30, 2024; and (2) In FY 2024, USCG plans to fully implement member tracking. USCG is developing training for transition managers regarding the requirements in the updated Commandant Instruction and use of the DOD tracking system, to include CAPSTONE.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-16
<b>Report Title</b>	Commercial Fishing Vessels: More Information Needed to Improve Classification Implementation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/14/2017
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Coast Guard should issue regulations or guidance to clarify and implement the alternative-to-class approach.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2026

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG worked closely with industry to provide the necessary guidance on the alternative to class approach. USCG is currently conducting an analysis of adequacy of the alternative to class approach as required per 46 U.S.C. §4503©.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-9
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Close Stations Identified as Overlapping and Unnecessarily Duplicative
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/02/2017
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish and follow a sound air station optimization process similar to its process for analyzing boat stations to allow it to comprehensively analyze its need for air stations and air facilities and determine what changes may be needed
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG has identified the need for further analysis and estimates, and the projected completion time for these analyses is several years. In addition, USCG plans to consider additional air station optimization as part of its efforts to recapitalize its rotary wing aircraft fleet, which is in the initial planning stage.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-9
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Close Stations Identified as Overlapping and Unnecessarily Duplicative
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/02/2017
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should take action to close the stations identified according to its plan and target dates.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Since this recommendation was issued, USCG has closed six stations. At the beginning of each FY, USCG's Office of Boat Forces conducts a front-end assessment and, along with input from Coast Guard District staff offices and operational commanders, determines potential units for closure or a change in response posture. USCG's FY 2023 budget included a reduction of three additional stations (small): Block Island, Ocracoke, and Sackets Harbor. In April 2023, USCG notified Congress and posted Federal Register Notice (88 FR 66, pages 20546-20547, agency/docket number USCG-2023-0100, document number 2023-07148) to obtain public input regarding its proposal to consolidate these three seasonal stations with their respective parent units. No station reductions were included in the FY 2024 budget. USCG will continue to evaluate for future budgets. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-281
<b>Report Title</b>	2017 Disaster Contracting: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Post-Disaster Contracts to Support Response and Recovery
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/24/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish a formal process to solicit input from officials directly involved in the agency's response and recovery following a disaster and to share that input with the Emergency Support Function Leadership Group.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The Emergency Support Function Leadership Group (ESFLG) and its non-USCG members do not have access to USCG's internal Contingency Preparedness System (CPS). However, Coast Guard representatives to the ESFLG have access to CPS, and provide pertinent information from CPS (e.g., lessons learned, best practices, corrective actions) as required or requested by the ESFLG. To memorialize these regular engagements, USCG's Office of Emergency Management and Disaster Response intends to promulgate a Policy Letter instituting a formal process for identifying significant

	feedback/lessons learned from major disaster responses which would be appropriate for sharing with the ESFLG. The Policy Letter will detail the process through which USCG will share input with the Emergency Support Function Leadership Group (ESFLG). The Policy Letter process will be incorporated into the next update of (Commandant Instruction Manual (COMDTINST) 3010.19 (series), the USCG After Action Program and Corrective Action Program policy instruction. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-82
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of at Least \$2.6 Billion
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/21/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should direct program managers to establish shore infrastructure performance goals, measures, and baselines to track the effectiveness of maintenance and repair investments and provide feedback on progress made.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Maintenance and repair investments are prioritized at the annual Centralized and Regional Planned Obligation Prioritization Boards. An annual Centralized Planned Obligation Prioritization Precept Memorandum describes how projects should be prioritized and additional prioritization details are found in the Centralized Planned Obligation Prioritization and Regional Planned Obligation Prioritization Process Guide Technical Orders. Metrics such as Facility Condition Index, which measures the material condition of a shore asset, and Mission Dependency Index, which measures the dependency of Coast Guard operations on a shore asset, are both used to prioritize maintenance and repair projects. USCG has also implemented BUILDER, a web-based software application which helps determine when, where, and how to prioritize maintenance and repair investments. Additional metrics in BUILDER describe the health of a vertical asset when maintenance and repair investments are deferred and allow for the evaluation and tracking of investment decisions. Data is currently being entered and validated in BUILDER to support the prioritization process. By continually assessing facility condition and updating the condition index, USCG can see the results of maintenance and repair investments. USCG is collecting the needed documentation to request closure and will have this to GAO by December 15, 2023.

<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-82
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of at Least \$2.6 Billion
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/21/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should work with Congress to develop and implement a process to routinely align Coast Guard's shore infrastructure portfolio with mission needs, including by disposing of all unneeded assets.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG continues working to establish the formal policy and process to assess unneeded land, buildings, and structures; and anticipates releasing this policy and process with the next update of the Coast Guard Real Property Management Manual.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-82
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of at Least \$2.6 Billion
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/21/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should employ models for its asset lines for predicting the outcome of investments, analyzing trade-offs, and optimizing decisions among competing investments.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2028
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<p><b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b></p>	<p>USCG has completed implementation of the preferred maintenance modeling solution, BUILDER Sustainment Management System platform, through four primary phases of work: Phase 1 (completed): Develop business rules and processes for utilization of BUILDER; develop plan for piloting and implementation; Phase 2 (completed): Pilot BUILDER to establish proof of concept established under Phase 1; Phase 3 (completed): Develop Job Guides and Training and Finalize Implementation Plan; and Phase 4 (completed): USCG-wide implementation. All facility condition assessments have been conducted using the BUILDER Sustainment Management System since March 30, 2023.</p> <p>On July 12, 2023, USCG provided GAO with supporting documentation of the actions taken and requested this recommendation be closed as implemented. However, GAO has not agreed to close the recommendation until all facility condition assessments have been completed and analyzed. GAO said they will be tracking this for at least 10 years, for the outcome of investments, trade-offs, decision optimizations, and potential cost savings as part of their annual overlap, duplication, and fragmentation reporting requirements. To get to considering this recommendation as “partially addressed,” GAO is looking for USCG subject matter experts to explain how BUILDER predicts outcomes and how that information is subsequently used to analyze tradeoffs and optimize decisions among competing investments. The explanation and supporting documentation were provided to GAO on September 20, 2023. Additionally, during the next 5 years, USCG will be completing and analyzing facility condition assessments on every USCG facility.</p>
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<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-82
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of at Least \$2.6 Billion
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/21/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should include supporting details about competing project alternatives and report trade-offs in Congressional budget requests and related reports.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG concurs with the intent of GAO’s recommendation; however, USCG develops and submits its congressional budget requests and Unfunded Priority List in accordance with DHS guidance, and OMB Circular A-11, which mandates the confidentiality of budget deliberations. USCG is going to provide additional information regarding the public availability of the Shore Infrastructure Logistics Center report. USCG provided GAO with the 2021 Shore Infrastructure Logistics Center Annual Report and is working to publish the report to a public facing website.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-223
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Organizational Changes and Determine Workforce Needs
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/26/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish a systematic mechanism to track implementation and measure the Coast Guard's progress in achieving organizational change goals.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Promulgation of the revision to the Coast Guard Organizational Manual, COMDTINST M5400.7, is expected to be completed before the end of CY 2023.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-223
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Organizational Changes and Determine Workforce Needs
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/26/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish a mechanism to periodically seek and monitor employee satisfaction with organizational change efforts.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/09/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed - Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On November 09, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	
	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-223
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Evaluate the Effectiveness of Organizational Changes and Determine Workforce Needs
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/26/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should update its April 2018 Manpower Requirements Plan to include time frames and milestones for completing manpower requirements analyses and determinations for all positions and units.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/27/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	In March 2023, USCG provided GAO with the Manpower Requirement Manual, COMDTIST 5310.6A; the Manpower Requirements Determination Tactics, Techniques and Procedures; and the report to Congress, as required by Section 5104 of Title 14 U.S.C., the Manpower Requirements Plan. In May 2023, USCG and GAO staff met to discuss this recommendation and USCG followed up the meeting by providing GAO with additional documentation, as the recurring report to Congress did not include specific timeframes and milestones for USCG to complete manpower requirements analysis and determinations for all positions and units. USCG recently provided GAO with the list of planned studies to be completed over the next 5 years. To reach full closure, USCG will need to update the recurring report to Congress, the Manpower Requirement Plan, which is not due again to Congress until February 2026. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	
	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-33



<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap or Gaps in Capabilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/21/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Coast Guard should conduct a comprehensive analysis of its Deployable Specialized Forces' workforce needs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Using FY 2021 funding, USCG entered into a contract with RAND to conduct a Mission Analysis Report (MAR) of the Maritime Safety and Security Team and Maritime Security Response Team contributions to the Maritime Security Response mission, reviewing capabilities and potential overlaps. USCG's data analysis of the MAR is still in progress. Once complete, an addendum that discusses the data analysis will be submitted, along with the MAR, from RAND.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-33
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap or Gaps in Capabilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/21/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Coast Guard should assess the extent to which unnecessary overlap or duplication exists among Deployable Specialized Forces' capabilities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Using FY 2021 funding, USCG entered into a contract with RAND to conduct a MAR of the Maritime Safety and Security Team and Maritime Security Response Team contributions to the Maritime Security Response mission, reviewing

	capabilities and potential overlaps. USCG's data analysis of the MAR is still in progress. Once complete, an addendum that discusses the data analysis will be submitted, along with the MAR, from RAND.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-416
<b>Report Title</b>	Military and Veteran Support: Performance Goals Could Strengthen Programs that Help Servicemembers Obtain Civilian Employment
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/09/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should develop formal performance goals and measures for its Spouse Employment Assistance Program.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The Coast Guard Office of Work-Life Programs is coordinating with the Health, Safety, and Work-Life Service Center to develop the new instruction for Spouse Employment and to establish metrics and goals for the program.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-554
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Improved Analysis of Vessel Response Plan Use Could Help Mitigate Marine Pollution Risk
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/29/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Program Manager of the Vessel Response Plan (VRP) Program establishes a process to analyze incidents where VRPs have been activated to determine whether or how the Coast Guard should improve its VRP review processes—including its approach to verifying plan information, contracts, and the quality of data used in review process--- to assure VRP effectiveness.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	07/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The Marine Environmental Response and Preparedness Manual is in the final phases of review by USCG's publication office before entering clearance. The Service extended its timeline to ensure all initial concerns and comments from field users could be incorporated or addressed within the current version.
<b>Component</b>	
	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-562
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Ensure Investments in Key Data System Meet Mission and User Needs
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/16/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Deputy Commandant for Mission Support assesses and addresses the causes of data errors and inconsistent entries in MISLE as identified by program offices and MISLE users, including reviewing MISLE training and data validation processes.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) MERGE initiative, which was delayed in FY 2022 due to competing priorities and resource constraints, began in FY 2023. USCG continues to address data quality through continued training provided to MISLE users responsible for entering and validating activity and case information in the MISLE database. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	
	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-562
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Ensure Investments in Key Data System Meet Mission and User Needs
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/16/2020

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Deputy Commandant for Mission Support uses the results of its 2019 Standardization Team assessment of command centers to develop a plan for improving the consistency and accuracy of MISLE data identified in its report.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The MISLE MERGE project kick-off was held on April 3, 2023. The MISLE MERGE functionality will be implemented in three major parts: Vessel MERGE functionality, Facility MERGE functionality, and Party (People and Organizations) MERGE functionality. USCG continues to peruse the Coast Guard Case Management (CGCM) enterprise solution as the MISLE system replacement. On February 21, 2023, the Coast Guard Enterprise Architecture Board conducted an enterprise architecture assessment of the CGCM acquisition program, and this assessment demonstrated that CGCM is on track for a successful Acquisition Decision Event One by the end of CY 2023.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-562
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Ensure Investments in Key Data System Meet Mission and User Needs
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/16/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Deputy Commandant for Mission Support and the Deputy Commandant for Operations use the processes outlined in the SELC to identify needed enhancements across the MISLE system by developing an updated mission needs statement.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	07/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The capabilities-based analysis is complete, and the final report was signed on March 19, 2021. The Joint Requirements Integration Management System process has been initiated and the capability assessment study plan was signed on June 15, 2021. The capabilities analysis report was completed on May 2, 2023. Pending documentation include: (1) Case

	Management Mission Needs Statement, estimated to be completed by November 30, 2023; (2) CONOPS is being developed, estimated to be completed by April 30, 2024, and (3) the operational requirements document is being developed, estimated to be completed by of July 31, 2024.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-562
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Ensure Investments in Key Data System Meet Mission and User Needs
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/16/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Deputy Commandant for Mission Support and the Deputy Commandant for Operations use the processes outlined in the SELC to identify and analyze alternatives, and objectively select the preferred solution for MISLE to meet approved mission needs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	07/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	CGCM preliminary-CONOPS draft was completed by the IPT on March 1, 2023, and awaits inclusion of Analysis of Alternatives/Alternative Analysis (AoA/AA) data to route for sequential clearance. The remaining deliverable required to reach ADE-1 is a signed Mission Need Statement document. The CGCM Mission Need Statement document was reviewed by the Joint Requirements Council (JRC) and returned in May 2023 for adjudication. CGCM is estimated to reach ADE-1 in fall 2023. Upon reaching ADE-1, the Program Manager (PM) plans to conduct an AoA/AA that is estimated to take 6 to 8 months to complete. The final CONOPS is estimated to be ready to route for clearance by May or June 2024, following the completion of the AoA/AA assessment and incorporation of data. The Operational Requirement Document IPT started May 15, 2023, and will run through April 14, 2024.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-619
<b>Report Title</b>	Natural Gas Exports: Updated Guidance and Regulations Could Improve Facility Permitting Processes
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/06/2020

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should conduct a standards-specific review of the Coast Guard's regulations that incorporate standards and, if necessary, update the regulations or document its decision for not updating them.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG conducted a standards specific review of 33 C.F.R. part 149 and found 1 standard in need of updating – National Fire Protection Association 10: 2010. USCG plans to update 33 C.F.R. 149 to reflect the updated National Fire Protection Association 10 standard in a future rulemaking. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	
	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-619
<b>Report Title</b>	Natural Gas Exports: Updated Guidance and Regulations Could Improve Facility Permitting Processes
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/06/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	9
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should develop and implement workforce planning for the Office of Operating and Environmental Standards that addresses the four remaining key principles for strategic workforce planning.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	In March 2023, USCG first requested that GAO close this recommendation as implemented. Since then, USCG has met with GAO and responded to a series of questions. The latest set of deliverables will be provided by December 15, 2023.
<b>Component</b>	
	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-100
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve National Vessel Documentation Center Operations

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/16/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Deputy Commandant for Operations documents decisions in future years in which it elects not to conduct operational analyses for VDS and its replacement.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/16/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On August 16, 2023, the Coast Guard requested that GAO close this recommendation as implemented and is awaiting closure or feedback from GAO.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-100
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve National Vessel Documentation Center Operations
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/16/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should direct the Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy to ensure that the National Vessel Documentation Center (NVDC) conducts a full cost study of NVDC's commercial and recreational user fees.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG will conduct a full cost study of its commercial and recreational user fees. The cost study will be conducted following the implementation of NVDC new IT system, Vessel Documentation System 3.0 (VDS 3.0), and associated new automated processes. This will allow NVDC to accurately assess the costs of providing services to the public, including new IT support costs. Due to technical issues, the launch of VDS 3.0 has been delayed. No timeframe for deployment is

	currently available. Once VDS 3.0 is online and fully operational, NVDC will undertake the full cost study, which is expected to take approximately 12 months.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-100
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve National Vessel Documentation Center Operations
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/16/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Assistant Commandant for Resources, in coordination with the Deputy Commandant for Operations, establishes a mechanism to track NVDC implementation of recommendations from its user fee reviews.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/23/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On May 23, 2023, USCG requested that GAO close this recommendation as implemented. USCG is awaiting feedback from the GAO. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-100
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Improve National Vessel Documentation Center Operations
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/16/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Assistant Commandant for Resources, in coordination with the Deputy Commandant for Operations, documents the decision if NVDC elects not to implement a recommendation from its user fee reviews.



<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The SharePoint tracking website is operational. USCG has not received expected feedback and recommendations from DHS on the last round of Biennial Fee Reviews that were submitted in January 2022. These specific recommendations are needed to populate the tracking tool. However, at this point, it does not appear that DHS will provide specific input on the 2021 Biennial Fee Reviews. As such, USCG is working with the relevant programs to prepare for the next round of Biennial Fee Reviews due to DHS in December 2023.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-247
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: More Information Needed to Assess Efficacy and Costs of Vessel Survival Craft Requirements
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Director of Inspections and Compliance revises its vessel accident investigations guidance to require Coast Guard investigators to collect date of birth, known disability, and use of lifesaving equipment of people in vessel accidents who were casualties due to water immersion, or who used lifesaving equipment.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG non-concurred with this recommendation and has not been able to reach a way forward with GAO. As a follow-up to USCG's request for GAO to close the recommendation as not implemented, GAO responded with: "At this time, GAO is leaving the recommendation open in light of the recency of the report and importance of the recommendation."
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-247
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: More Information Needed to Assess Efficacy and Costs of Vessel Survival Craft Requirements

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Director of Commercial Regulations and Standards fully implements OMB and GAO cost and benefit estimate best practices in developing future estimates of the implementation costs for out-of-water survival craft requirements, including relying on the most current inflation information and discounting future costs and benefits for cost effectiveness projections, and documenting its methods for calculating acquisition costs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	GAO has partially closed the recommendation. To close the recommendation, GAO has requested USCG use the most current inflation information available at the time of drafting the report to Congress titled “Non-immersion Survival Craft.” The next submission of the “Non-immersion Survival Craft” report is not due to Congress until December 2026. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-247
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: More Information Needed to Assess Efficacy and Costs of Vessel Survival Craft Requirements
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure that the Director of Inspections and Compliance establishes a process to routinely review and update, if appropriate, its cold water areas determination guidance for certain lifesaving equipment requirements on commercial vessels using the best available temperature data.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/02/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On January 02, 2024, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-42
<b>Report Title</b>	Disaster Response: Agencies Should Assess Contracting Workforce Needs and Purchase Card Fraud Risk
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/24/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard should update its fraud risk profile for the purchase card program to include an assessment of how, if at all, the risk profile differs for purchase card use in support of disaster response.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/16/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On August 16, 2023, USCG requested that GAO close this recommendation as implemented and is awaiting feedback from GAO. The Coast Guard's existing controls within the Purchase Card program are robust, regardless of the funding source. Further, the DHS OIG Improper Payments Program requires dedicated assessments of any payments, to include purchase payments, that are at high risk of fraud, waste, abuse, and misuse. The Improper Payments Program already considers Disaster Supplemental funded payments as high risk, requiring greater scrutiny.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-42
<b>Report Title</b>	Disaster Response: Agencies Should Assess Contracting Workforce Needs and Purchase Card Fraud Risk
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/24/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	11
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard should ensure that the agency has adequate data to allow it to conduct analysis of purchase card use in support of disaster response, including both the disaster event supported and sufficient vendor information to allow fraud risk analysis.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG's data migration to the Financial Systems Modernization Solution is complete. However, USCG continues to refine how the Financial Systems Modernization Solution captures and displays the required data. Enhancement of the DHS compliance report will allow cardholders and approving officials to add details in the description field about what was purchased or if it was COVID 19/natural disaster related at the transaction level and this detail will be passed to the DHS compliance report for access by the Program Office. The system enhancement is currently still under development.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-584
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: A More Systematic Process to Resolve Recommended Actions Could Enhance Future Surge Operations
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/21/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Establish a more systematic process for ensuring that assigned recommended actions are tracked, updated, and resolved in line with the Coast Guard's resolution rate and timeliness goals.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG is taking the following actions: (1) Create and institute a metric to track compliance with the recommendation; (2) Change the CPS to allow for the identification of lead and support offices for recommended actions; (3) Update the Commandant Instruction; (4) Review outstanding recommended actions and identify action officers for each, and provide outreach and instruction for utilizing the CPS to update progress and resolve recommended actions; and (5) Within 2 years after funding is made available, create CPS dashboards showing progress toward resolution of outstanding recommended actions.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-9
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Risk for the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/28/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure the Coast Guard Component Acquisition Executive revises Coast Guard's acquisition policy to include criteria and a methodology for demonstrating design maturity for shipbuilding programs that are aligned with shipbuilding best practices, including specifying the completion of basic and functional designs and maturing critical technologies to a Technology Readiness Level of 7.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/15/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On September 15, 2023, USCG provided GAO with the most recent version of SOP #932-23, signed in August 2023. This version incorporates an additional stipulation for functional design completion to include major portions of distributive systems. USCG requested that GAO close the recommendation as implemented. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-9
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Reduce Risk for the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/28/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure the OPC program updates its shipbuilder and government schedules for OPCs 1 through 4 to (1) fully address deficiencies identified in the shipbuilder's schedule, and (2) fully incorporate schedule risk analysis in accordance with schedule best practices.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG directed Eastern Shipbuilding Group to develop a new performance measurement baseline and provide an updated schedule, which will include OPC #4. USCG projects the re-baselining process to take up to 6 months.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-103973
<b>Report Title</b>	Sexual Assault: DOD and Coast Guard Should Ensure Laws Are Implemented to Improve Oversight of Key Prevention and Response Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	20
<b>Recommendation</b>	GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security ensure that the Commandant of the Coast Guard, in collaboration with the Director of Health, Safety & Work Life Directorate, review and update or establish policy, and set a timeframe for completion, to ensure alignment with sexual assault prevention and response statutory requirements, specifically, sections 1712 and 1745(a)-(c) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG first requested that GAO close the recommendation as implemented on February 15, 2023, and since then USCG has been responding to a series of questions from GAO. USCG's Office of Health, Safety & Work-Life Directorate is updating Military Assignments and Authorized Absences Instruction to address this latest feedback.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-103973
<b>Report Title</b>	Sexual Assault: DOD and Coast Guard Should Ensure Laws Are Implemented to Improve Oversight of Key Prevention and Response Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	21

<b>Recommendation</b>	GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security ensure that the Commandant of the Coast Guard in collaboration with the Director of Health, Safety & Work Life Directorate, implement the education and training on sexual assault prevention and response for individuals enlisted under a delayed entry program by-for example-documenting such training in policy or other relevant guidance to ensure compliance with section 535(a)-(b) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2018.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/20/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Beginning in FY 2024, Delayed Entry Program recruits will be directed to complete Coast Guard Sexual Assault Prevention, Response, and Recovery training online and sign a Form CG-3307 acknowledging training completion. Recruiters will ensure this form is submitted to Personnel Service Center and CG-1K4 for records management and completion compliance. On September 20, 2023, USCG requested that GAO close this recommendation as implemented, and is awaiting feedback from GAO.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-103973
<b>Report Title</b>	Sexual Assault: DOD and Coast Guard Should Ensure Laws Are Implemented to Improve Oversight of Key Prevention and Response Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	22
<b>Recommendation</b>	GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security ensure that the Commandant of the Coast Guard publish quarterly reports related to the processing and outcomes of claims reviewed by the Discharge Review Boards to ensure compliance with section 521(b) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2018.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG's Office of Military Personnel Policy has reconstituted the Discharge Review Board program and has brought on four additional temporary staff to assist in backlog reduction. Tracking of requested data has been incorporated into the data management system and USCG is still on track to begin quarterly reporting in winter 2023.

<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-103973
<b>Report Title</b>	Sexual Assault: DOD and Coast Guard Should Ensure Laws Are Implemented to Improve Oversight of Key Prevention and Response Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	23
<b>Recommendation</b>	GAO recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security ensure that the Commandant of the Coast Guard in collaboration with the Director of Health, Safety & Work Life Directorate, establish an oversight structure that includes mechanisms to consistently track and document implementation of ongoing and future NDAA statutory requirements related to sexual assault prevention to ensure compliance with applicable laws and improve oversight of its SAPR [Sexual Assault Prevention and Response] program.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/02/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On January 02, 2024, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104144
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Privacy: Selected Component Agencies Generally Provided Oversight of Contractors, but Further Actions Needed to Address Gaps
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/16/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard should direct the USCG Privacy Office to establish a time frame to complete the development of a process that can be used to identify and assess the gaps in contractor compliance with privacy requirements.



<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The Overarching Medical Program PIA is still in the draft phase as the USCG Privacy Office ensures that it encompasses all aspects of the agency's use of medical, government, and contract systems. Ensuring that the PIA provides transparency and discusses the risks and mitigations of use of these systems is paramount for compliance with law and policy.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104144
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Privacy: Selected Component Agencies Generally Provided Oversight of Contractors, but Further Actions Needed to Address Gaps
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/16/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard should direct the USCG Privacy Office to ensure, in conjunction with the acquisition office, that contractors certify their acceptance of their privacy requirement responsibilities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Within the context of contractual relationships and proposed new instances of information sharing, the USCG Privacy Office is required by the Appendix G process to review all instances of information sharing. Any changes to previously reviewed and approved information sharing agreements are assessed through the Appendix G review process and DHS Instruction 047-01-001, Privacy Policy and Compliance, Section VI.D. The USCG Privacy Office will update the Privacy Incident Response, Notification, and Reporting Procedures for Personally Identifiable Information instruction, COMDTINST 5260.5, to align Service policy with existing DHS requirements.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104144
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Privacy: Selected Component Agencies Generally Provided Oversight of Contractors, but Further Actions Needed to Address Gaps

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/16/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard should direct the USCG Privacy Office to ensure the evaluation of proposed new instances of sharing personally identifiable information with third parties are fully documented.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Within the context of contractual relationships and proposed new instances of information sharing, the USCG Privacy Office is required by the Appendix G process to review all instances of information sharing. Any changes to previously reviewed and approved information sharing agreements are assessed through the Appendix G review process and DHS Instruction 047-01-001, Privacy Policy and Compliance, Section VI.D. The USCG Privacy Office will update the Privacy Incident Response, Notification, and Reporting Procedures for Personally Identifiable Information instruction, COMDTINST 5260.5, to align Service policy with existing DHS requirements.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104153
<b>Report Title</b>	Offshore Oil Spills: Additional Information Is Needed to Better Understand the Environmental Tradeoffs of Using Chemical Dispersants
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/15/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should work with the Environmental Protection Agency and other agencies to conduct assessments-such as biological assessments or ecological risk assessments-examining the potential effects of the subsurface use of dispersants on ocean ecosystems in regions where this is considered a viable response option.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research convened a working group to address recommendations #3, and #4 in August 2022. Since then, the working group has convened three additional times. Outcomes of recommendation #1 will be informed by the results of this working group as it examines the potential effects of the subsurface use of dispersants on ocean ecosystems in regions where the use of dispersants is viable.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104153
<b>Report Title</b>	Offshore Oil Spills: Additional Information Is Needed to Better Understand the Environmental Tradeoffs of Using Chemical Dispersants
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/15/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure that the chair of the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research, in coordination with member agencies, convene a working group of the appropriate government, academic, and industry stakeholders, to identify ways to improve the quality of information about the effectiveness of the subsurface use of dispersants.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research convened a working group to address recommendations #3 and #4 in August 2022. Since then, the working group has convened three additional times. The working group is developing interim milestones to identify ways to improve the quality of information about the effectiveness of the subsurface use of dispersants.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104153
<b>Report Title</b>	Offshore Oil Spills: Additional Information Is Needed to Better Understand the Environmental Tradeoffs of Using Chemical Dispersants
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/15/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4

<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure that the chair of the Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research, in coordination with member agencies, convene a working group of the appropriate government, academic, and industry stakeholders, to identify ways to better ensure that experiments about chemically dispersed oil toxicity and biodegradation result in quality information.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The Interagency Coordinating Committee on Oil Pollution Research convened a working group to address recommendations #3 and #4 in August 2022. Since then, the working group has convened three additional times. The working group is developing interim milestones to identify ways to better ensure that experiments about chemically dispersed oil toxicity and biodegradation result in quality information.
<b>Component</b>	
	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104465
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Enhancements Needed To Strengthen Marine Inspection Workforce Planning Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/12/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Deputy Commandant for Operations should collect additional data on the marine inspection workforce and maritime industry to forecast future workforce needs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/29/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The Research and Development Center (RDC) commenced the project “Persistent Simulation for the CG Workforce” in October 2022. The RDC, in coordination with the Offices of Strategic Workforce Planning and Human Resource Analytics and Shore Forces, researched available Commercial/Government Off the Shelf technologies and identified a key modeling/simulation application. The application is currently being evaluated on its association with the project’s key objectives prior to testing and further implementation efforts.
<b>Component</b>	
	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104465

<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Enhancements Needed To Strengthen Marine Inspection Workforce Planning Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/12/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Deputy Commandant for Operations should update time frames and milestones for the marine inspection workforce pyramid initiative through full implementation.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/29/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The RDC commenced the project “Persistent Simulation for the CG Workforce” in October 2022. The RDC, in coordination with the Offices of Strategic Workforce Planning and Human Resource Analytics and Shore Forces, researched available Commercial/Government Off the Shelf technologies and identified a key modeling/simulation application. The application is currently being evaluated on its association with the project’s key objectives prior to testing and further implementation efforts.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104465
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Enhancements Needed To Strengthen Marine Inspection Workforce Planning Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/12/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Deputy Commandant for Operations should develop performance measures with targets for the marine inspection workforce improvement plan and associated initiatives.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/29/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The Prevention Readiness Initiative is intended to present a concise, cogent narrative on the challenges facing the Prevention Workforce and the high-level lines of effort. The Action Plan is the next step in the process for addressing the gaps. However, it is important to recognize that certain items in the Action Plan are pre-decisional from a budgetary

	perspective. The overall purpose is to provide a path forward (actionable guidance) for the Prevention program. Additionally, USCG senior leadership conducts semi-annual assessments of the progress, which includes updating and/or changing items. The nuance is important to highlight because while the strategic direction remains intact, the potential to update/change the documents is critical as it provides senior leadership the agility to adjust to changing realities – including budget realities.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104465
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Enhancements Needed To Strengthen Marine Inspection Workforce Planning Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/12/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Deputy Commandant for Operations should assess the outcomes of the marine inspection workforce improvement plan and associated initiatives.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/29/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The Prevention Readiness Initiative is intended to present a concise, cogent narrative on the challenges facing the Prevention Workforce and the high-level lines of effort. The Action Plan is the next step in the process for addressing the gaps. However, it is important to recognize that certain items in the Action Plan are pre-decisional from a budgetary perspective. The overall purpose is to provide a path forward (actionable guidance) for the Prevention program. Additionally, USCG senior leadership conducts semi-annual assessments of the progress, which includes updating and/or changing items. The nuance is important to highlight because while the strategic direction remains intact, the potential to update/change the documentation is critical as it provides senior leaders the agility to adjust to changing realities – including budget realities.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104707
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard IT: Actions Needed to Improve Processes for Overseeing Non-Major Acquisition Programs
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/26/2022

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure the Coast Guard Component Acquisition Executive takes action, such as clearly communicating how non-major acquisition programs should: (1) establish and revise baseline cost and schedule goals, including specifying the dollar type and required schedule events, pursuant to DHS policy, and (2) communicate accurate and consistent baseline information in annual briefings.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/02/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed - Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On October 02, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	
	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104707
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard IT: Actions Needed to Improve Processes for Overseeing Non-Major Acquisition Programs
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/26/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure the Coast Guard Component Acquisition Executive, in coordination with DHS's Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management revises the Coast Guard's non-major breach policy to specify that programs that fail to meet their cost, schedule, or performance goals are considered to be in breach status.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/02/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed- Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On October 02, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	
	USCG

<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105021
<b>Report Title</b>	Military Naturalizations: Federal Agencies Assist with Naturalizations, but Additional Monitoring and Assessment Are Needed
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/14/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should develop a policy documenting the N-426 certification process.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The N-426 Certification Process and policy was promulgated via general message and is in effect. The Military Civil and Dependent Affairs, COMDTINST M1700.1, remains under review with an anticipated promulgation date of November 2023. This delay is a result of non-subject related changes to this comprehensive document, including schooling for dependent children and additional review pertaining to the naturalization process.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105021
<b>Report Title</b>	Military Naturalizations: Federal Agencies Assist with Naturalizations, but Additional Monitoring and Assessment Are Needed
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/14/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should develop a procedure to collect information on the timeliness of certifying officials' return of N-426 forms to servicemembers applying for naturalization.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS



<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The N-426 Certification Process and policy was promulgated via general message and is in effect. The Military Civil and Dependent Affairs, COMDTINST M1700.1, remains under review with an anticipated promulgation date of November 2023. This delay is a result of non-subject related changes to this comprehensive document, including schooling for dependent children and additional review pertaining to the naturalization process.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105092
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Enhance IT Program Implementation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop network capacity planning policies and procedures that address the leading practices we identified, including (1) compiling a complete and accurate inventory of hardware, software, and configurations; (2) identifying traffic growth predictions; (3) prioritizing network traffic; (4) performing simulations and what-if-analyses; and (5) continually monitoring the health of the infrastructure to ensure it is meeting demand and mission needs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG's Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Cyber, and Intelligence (C5I) Infrastructure Program remains on track to complete the Enterprise Infrastructure Services transition by March 2024. USCG will continue to transition to GSA provided the Enterprise Infrastructure Services contract, along with additional network services that will be undertaken, upon completion of the transition. Within this effort, USCG intends to address the policies and procedures described within this recommendation, due to the dependency of the transition and the vendor unique service options.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105092
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Enhance IT Program Implementation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2

<b>Recommendation</b>	Implement the leading practices for network capacity planning that we identified, including (1) compiling a complete and accurate inventory of hardware, software, and configurations; (2) identifying traffic growth predictions; (3) prioritizing network traffic; (4) performing simulations and what-if-analyses; and (5) continually monitoring the health of the infrastructure to ensure it is meeting demand and mission needs
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG's C5I Infrastructure Program remains on track to complete the Enterprise Infrastructure Services transition by March 2024, to include working toward network capacity planning as outlined in the original response to this recommendation. Upon completion and coordination of the prior defined policies and procedures, USCG intends to work toward network capacity planning. USCG procured a new inventory system called Alphabet and is in the process of updating system data prior to reaching full operational capability. Inventories of USCG's operational technology (i.e., programmable systems or devices that interact with the physical environment) are already tracked under separate divisions including the Command, Control, & Navigation Program (e.g., navigation and radar systems), the Surface Forces Logistics Center (e.g., Engineering Command and Control), and Coast Guard Office of Naval Engineering (e.g., fire control and weapons systems).
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105092
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Enhance IT Program Implementation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Establish a comprehensive and accurate inventory of all operational technology, including ICS and Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Inventories of USCG's operational technology (i.e., devices that interact with the physical environment) are already tracked under the separate divisions who hold responsibility for the systems such as: the Surface Forces Logistics Center for Engineering Command and Control, the Office of Naval Engineering for fire control/weapons systems, or the Aviation

	Logistics Command for aviation control systems. USCG’s Office of C5I Program Management will coordinate with stakeholders to establish a single consolidated inventory of all operational technology, including Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and SCADA systems.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105092
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Enhance IT Program Implementation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop a plan or strategy for aligning all operational technology to the DOD risk management framework, including time frames for completing the alignment.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG’s Office of Information Management will develop a standard to ensure that operational technology is securely configured in accordance with applicable DOD policies and security controls. This standard will set expectations for operational technology to undergo special assessment of their functional and security-related capabilities and deficiencies. The NIST Special Purpose 800-82r3 expands the scope of guidance on industrial control systems to include operational technology, as well as updates to guidance on operational technology threats and vulnerabilities, risk management, recommended practices, and architectures. NIST’s document is currently undergoing initial public comment. USCG will review the policy once approved by NIST and determine how to best align a future operational technology Cybersecurity Risk Management Implementation Standard to this guidance and measure the effectiveness of the implementation. However, USCG cannot estimate an approximate timeline until NIST approves its document.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105092
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Enhance IT Program Implementation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/28/2022

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure that the plan or strategy for aligning all operational technology to the DOD risk management framework is effectively implemented.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG's Office of Cybersecurity Program Management will update the Cybersecurity Policy, COMDTINST M5500.13, to require that all operational technology comply with the DOD risk management framework. The estimated completion date for the update the next revision of the Cybersecurity Policy is December 29, 2023. NIST Special Purpose 800-82r3 would expand the scope of guidance from industrial control systems to include operational technology, as well as updates operational technology threats and vulnerabilities, risk management, recommended practices, and architectures. NIST's document is currently undergoing initial public comment. USCG will review the policy once approved by NIST and determine how to best align a future operational technology Cybersecurity Risk Management Implementation Standard to this guidance and measure the effectiveness of the implementation. However, USCG cannot estimate an approximate timeline until NIST approves its document.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105092
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Enhance IT Program Implementation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	Update existing policies and procedures to explicitly describe a cybersecurity risk management process for ICS and SCADA systems.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG will ensure that the next update to the Cybersecurity Policy, COMDTINST M5500.13, includes requirements for and supports implementation of cybersecurity risk management for ICS and SCADA. The estimated completion date for the policy update remains December 29, 2023. NIST Special Purpose 800-82r3 would expand the scope of guidance from industrial control systems to include operational technology, as well as updates operational technology threats and vulnerabilities, risk management, recommended practices, and architectures. NIST’s document is currently undergoing Initial Public Comment. USCG will review the policy once approved by NIST and determine how to best align a future operational technology Cybersecurity Risk Management Implementation Standard to this guidance and measure the effectiveness of the implementation. However, USCG cannot estimate an approximate timeline until NIST approves its document.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105092
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Enhance IT Program Implementation
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	Send its list of cloud services that do not meet FedRAMP requirements to the appropriate agency head for submission to the Federal CIO.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG’s Cloud Implementation IPT developed DOD Security Requirements Group compliant contract language which requires each cloud service to meet the minimum requirements for DOD cloud service providers. During ITARs, if a cloud service is requested, the ITAR team reviews the proposed contract language and if the required language is not included, the acquisition request will be denied until DOD Security Requirements Group contract language is included. A list of cloud services that do not meet FedRAMP requirements is estimated to be completed approximately December 31, 2024.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105092
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Enhance IT Program Implementation

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	Update the Service’s cloud strategy and other relevant documentation to include a crosswalk of new and old skills and occupational categories, and to conduct a skills gap analysis.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Technology established a Cloud IPT in September 2022 to examine the Service’s Cloud Strategy, as well as to review and analyze the skills of the current workforce. Currently, USCG is on track with other efforts described in the original response to this recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105152
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Health Care: Improvements Needed for Determining Staffing Needs and Monitoring Access to Care
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/04/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure the Assistant Commandant for Human Resources implements health care staffing standards for its health services program that account for health care staff deployments, including surge deployments.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/31/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	As required by Section 8260(c) of the of the Elijah E. Cummings Coast Guard Authorization Act (CGAA) of 2020 (P.L. 116-283), USCG is drafting a report to Congress that provides recommendations for medical staffing standards based on each finding and conclusion contained in GAO-22-105152, including recommendations for health service technicians, flight surgeons, physician assistants, dentists, dental hygienists, pharmacists, and other recommendations, as appropriate. The foundation for this report will be the ongoing Health Services Manpower Requirements Determination, along with the

	development of the Healthcare System Review and Strategic Plan as required by Section 11407 of the James M. Inhofe NDAA for FY 2023 (Pub. L. No. 117-263).
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105152
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Health Care: Improvements Needed for Determining Staffing Needs and Monitoring Access to Care
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/04/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should ensure the Assistant Commandant for Human Resources improves its process to collect more reliable data on access-to-care at clinics and sickbays to monitor whether access-to-care standards are being met while the service works with the Defense Health Agency to better understand the capabilities of the new electronic health record system for monitoring access-to-care.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	07/12/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On July 12, 2023, USCG requested that GAO close this recommendation as implemented, and is awaiting feedback from GAO. USCG provided GAO with the manpower requirements model, dated May 17, 2023. Additionally, the Access to Care for Beneficiaries Instruction was published in June 2023 and outlines requirements for reporting access to care data. It was directed by the CGAA, Section 11408. This instruction is USCG's first ever Access to Care policy.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105208
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Workforce Planning Actions Needed to Address Growing Cyberspace Mission Demands
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/27/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should assess and determine the staffing levels needed to meet its cyberspace mission demands.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG's Cyber Command Manpower Requirement Analysis and is finalizing the Manpower Requirement Determination.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105208
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Workforce Planning Actions Needed to Address Growing Cyberspace Mission Demands
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/27/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish a strategic workforce plan for its cyberspace workforce, to include strategies and implementing activities to address all competency and staffing needs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG's Office of Cyberspace Forces and the Cyberspace Workforce IPT are developing the workforce management plan.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105208
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Workforce Planning Actions Needed to Address Growing Cyberspace Mission Demands
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/27/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3



<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should incorporate data from the Cyber Mission Specialist rating to inform its strategic workforce planning for the enlisted cyberspace workforce.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The implementation of USCG's Cyber Mission Specialist (CMS) rating began in FY 2023. USCG is actively working to finalize the CMS rating implementation. Once fully implemented, USCG will gather and analyze the workforce data to inform planning for the enlisted cyberspace workforce.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	USCG
<b>Report Title</b>	GAO-22-105208
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	Coast Guard: Workforce Planning Actions Needed to Address Growing Cyberspace Mission Demands
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	09/27/2022
<b>Recommendation</b>	4
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should develop metrics for recruitment of enlisted and all civilian cyberspace personnel and use these metrics to assess the effectiveness of its recruitment and hiring efforts.
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	09/30/2026
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	DHS
<b>Component</b>	The implementation of USCG's CMS rating began in FY 2023. USCG is actively working to finalize the CMS rating implementation. Once fully implemented, USCG will gather and analyze the workforce data to inform planning for the enlisted cyberspace workforce.
<b>Report Number</b>	USCG
<b>Report Title</b>	GAO-22-105208
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	Coast Guard: Workforce Planning Actions Needed to Address Growing Cyberspace Mission Demands
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/27/2022

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should set and quantify retention goals and objectives for its cyberspace workforce.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The implementation of USCG's CMS rating began in FY 2023. USCG is actively working to finalize the CMS rating implementation. Once fully implemented, USCG will gather and analyze the workforce data to inform planning for the enlisted cyberspace workforce.
<b>Component</b>	
	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105208
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Workforce Planning Actions Needed to Address Growing Cyberspace Mission Demands
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/27/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish and track metrics of success for improving cyberspace personnel morale and report its progress to Coast Guard leadership.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	To address this recommendation, USCG added new questions to the 2023 Organizational Assessment Survey. The results from the survey will be available in September 2024. At that time, USCG will use the survey questions as a measurement tool to track progress on improving cyberspace personnel morale.
<b>Component</b>	
	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105220
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Tsunami Emergency Planning in the Pacific Northwest
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/07/2022

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard should ensure that coastal units in the Pacific Northwest develop location-specific evacuation plans.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The 13 <sup>th</sup> Coast Guard District has chartered a workgroup to develop a Tsunami Evacuation Template for coastal units to use when building evacuation, contingency, and other plans, as appropriate. Further, the 13 <sup>th</sup> Coast Guard District will lead a seminar titled, “Natural Disaster Contingency,” planned to be held before December 2023, that will contribute the development of this template, as the seminar will bring together SMEs for three planning meetings, as well as the actual seminar to develop overall objectives centered on the risk to human life from a tsunami impact on the coastal zone. In addition, to ensure location-specific plans, the workgroup will be composed of SMEs from the 13 <sup>th</sup> Coast Guard District, as well as Coast Guard Sector and coastal units. USCG believes that these efforts will effectively develop a template that allows flexibility to be used across all units along the Washington and Oregon coasts. However, it is important to note that the current USCG cycle for plan development is a lengthy process, and addressing this recommendation using the seminar approach will take approximately 1.5 to 2 years, especially as seminars have three meetings (initial, mid-term, and final) plus the actual seminar, followed by a period of time to complete the final product. This length of time is predicated on identifying SMEs from across the District, Sector, and coastal units to ensure the template aligns with guidance, command structure, and local community evacuation plans already in place. Additionally, the estimated time reflects that sectors and coastal units are primarily first responders for lifesaving and port waterways and coastal safety and security, which may require directing resources away from this effort periodically.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105220
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Tsunami Emergency Planning in the Pacific Northwest
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/07/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard should ensure that coastal units in the Pacific Northwest are provided with tsunami evacuation planning guidance that includes protocols for personnel and dependents.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	The 13 <sup>th</sup> Coast Guard District's Preparedness Branch is developing contingency plans and policies for all hazards responses, the previously described seminar. Design and objectives shall address that the template and subsequent plans include protocols that both active duty personnel and their dependents are evacuated to safety. Further, the workgroup will ensure that the guidance aligns with State and local evacuation plans already in place, and adheres to established civil evacuation corridors and muster sites at any disaster shelter/structure that may already exist for evacuees. The completion of these efforts is impacted by the current USCG cycle for plan development using a seminar, as well as the competing priorities faced by sectors and coastal units, which are primarily first responders for lifesavings and port waterways and coastal safety and security.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105220
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Additional Actions Needed to Improve Tsunami Emergency Planning in the Pacific Northwest
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/07/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard should ensure that coastal units in the Pacific Northwest assess the feasibility of their tsunami evacuation plans through regular exercises that provide participation opportunities for Coast Guard personnel and dependents.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Evacuation plans shall be exercised periodically for their feasibility and adjusted as prescribed in COMDTINST M3010.11E. Coast Guard currently anticipates completing these plans by June 2026, and scheduled exercises shall include participants, both members and dependents.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105432

<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard: Assessment of a Risk-Based Approach for Conducting Gas Carrier Exams Is Needed
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/12/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Commandant of the Coast Guard should conduct an assessment of adopting a risk-based approach for conducting gas carrier compliance exams and take actions to address the results, as appropriate and feasible.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	07/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCG incorporated this recommendation into the Statement of Objectives for the National Academies of Science (NAS) study, mandated by the Elijah E. Cummings CGAA of 2020, Section 8254, subsection (b). USCG contracted with the NAS in July 2022 to begin this study. The NAS expects the study will take 18 months to complete. Upon completion of the NAS study, the Office of Commercial Vessel Compliance will evaluate the findings and recommendations and take action on the results as appropriate and feasible. The estimated completion date to address GAO's recommendation is expected no later than 6 months after the date on which the final report from NAS is received.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105676
<b>Report Title</b>	Military Personnel: Armed Forces Should Clarify Tattoo Policies' Waiver Guidance
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/17/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the Commandant of the Coast Guard updates the Coast Guard's tattoo policy, as appropriate, to better ensure that it clearly documents whether waivers to the tattoo policy are available for both recruits and service members; and provides clear guidance on tattoos eligible for waivers, the waiver approval authority, requirements for requesting a waiver, and on any other conditions required for waiver consideration or approval.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	COMDTINST 1001.1 is under final USCG review.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-17-706
<b>Report Title</b>	Refugees: Actions Needed by State Department and DHS to Further Strengthen Applicant Screening Process and Assess Fraud Risks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/30/2017
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	Conduct regular joint assessments of applicant fraud risk across USRAP.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCIS' Refugee, Asylum, and International Affairs Directorate (RAIO), International and Refugee Affairs Division, finalized its first fraud risk profile in September 2022. USCIS submitted this documentation to GAO at that time and requested that GAO close the recommendation as implemented. USCIS also informed GAO that RAIO would not conduct another fraud risk profile because of a more recent GAO recommendation for USCIS's to adopt an enterprise-wide approach to fraud risks (GAO-22-105328, issued September 19, 2022). However, GAO said it will not close the recommendation for a fraud risk assessment of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program until there is evidence that the fraud risk associated with this program is considered in USCIS's new enterprise-wide approach to fraud risk. Therefore, USCIS plans no additional work specific to this recommendation while it works on its enterprise-wide fraud risk profiles, which are expected to be completed in January 2024. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-18-550
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS ACQUISITIONS: Additional Practices Could Help Components Better Develop Operational Requirements
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/08/2018

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	21
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services establishes the planned independent requirements development organization within U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	After considering multiple options for separating the functions of the Component Requirements Executive and the CAE, in September 2023 the USCIS Director's Office approved moving the Component Requirements Executive functions from the USCIS Management Directorate to the USCIS OCFO. The USCIS OCFO is separate from the Management Directorate and reports directly to the USCIS Director's Office. The change, which is effective October 1, 2023, includes the transfer of the necessary resources. On September 29, 2023, USCIS submitted a request to GAO to close this recommendation as implemented and is currently awaiting GAO's decision.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-529
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Actions Needed to Address Pending Caseload
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/18/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	Director of USCIS should develop a long-term workforce plan that includes strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCIS did not concur with this recommendation, noting that its current workforce planning activities meet its needs to acquire, develop, and retain staff. USCIS also provided GAO with information related to its short- and mid-term plans and strategies for acquiring, developing, and retaining staff. USCIS requested that GAO close this recommendation on December 12, 2022. On April 13, 2023, GAO responded that they currently plan to keep this recommendation open in the

	event that USCIS decides to take the recommended actions. At this time, USCIS has no further plans to take action on this recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105021
<b>Report Title</b>	Military Naturalizations: Federal Agencies Assist with Naturalizations, but Additional Monitoring and Assessment Are Needed
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/14/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of USCIS should track time frames from their receipt of the last background check to the final adjudication date for applications filed by servicemembers stationed on active duty abroad and use this information to help improve efforts to adjudicate these cases within 180 days.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCIS created a flag on military applications for naturalization in its database to identify foreign addresses. USCIS staff are currently reviewing data to determine if this flag is operating as intended and identifying those individuals who enter naturalization processing when they are overseas. Once the analysis is completed, USCIS's Field Operations Directorate will determine if this is a viable solution to identify these cases in an effective manner and track them through the entirety of the military naturalization process.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105021
<b>Report Title</b>	Military Naturalizations: Federal Agencies Assist with Naturalizations, but Additional Monitoring and Assessment Are Needed
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/14/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	11



<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of USCIS, in coordination with DOD and Veteran Affairs (VA), should develop and implement a plan to regularly assess its military naturalization assistance efforts.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/02/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCIS’s multiple directorates work regularly with DOD and the VA to provide outreach to military members and their family members regarding naturalization and other immigration benefits. These efforts include outreach by the USCIS community relations specialists, conducting engagements with various outside entities on the services available to military members, and monthly meetings between USCIS and DOD to coordinate efforts to reach military members. On February 17, 2023, USCIS requested that GAO close this recommendation as implemented. GAO requested additional information which USCIS provided on May 12, 2023 and again USCIS requested GAO close this recommendation. On June 02, 2023, GAO stated that they would take no further action on USCIS’s request to close the recommendation until they receive updates from both DOD and VA for their respective recommendations in this report. USCIS awaits GAO’s decision. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105328
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Additional Actions Needed to Manage Fraud Risks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/19/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of USCIS should identify the factors that affect Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate’s (FDNS) workload to ensure the staffing model’s assumptions reflect operating conditions.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCIS FDNS successfully launched FDNS-DS NexGen on June 06, 2023. This improved case management system will collect information to help identify the factors that affect FDNS’ workload. As more data is collected in the new system, FDNS will analyze data to ensure the staffing model’s assumptions reflect operating condition.

<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105328
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Additional Actions Needed to Manage Fraud Risks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/19/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of USCIS should develop and implement additional guidance on FDNS data entry practices for fields used as staffing model inputs to ensure consistency and produce quality and reliable data.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/19/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed - Implemented
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On October 19, 2023, GAO closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105328
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Additional Actions Needed to Manage Fraud Risks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/19/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of USCIS should develop and implement a process-including clearly defining roles and responsibilities-for regularly conducting fraud risk assessments and documenting fraud risk profiles for the immigration benefits USCIS is responsible for adjudicating.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCIS FDNS has completed draft documentation outlining an SOP for how USCIS will conduct fraud risk assessments and develop fraud risk profiles. In addition, USCIS has compiled specific information about existing antifraud strategies, which is a key component for conducting fraud risk assessments and creating fraud risk profiles. FDNS plans to lead a working group that will review, edit, and validate the SOP language and then develop a fraud risk assessment and fraud risk profile, building from the information gathered through previous data calls.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105328
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Additional Actions Needed to Manage Fraud Risks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/19/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of USCIS should develop and implement a process for developing and regularly updating an antifraud strategy that is aligned to the agency's fraud risk assessments.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCIS is leveraging the work of an intra-agency working group charged with developing documentation for a USCIS Fraud Risk Framework. A section of the USCIS Fraud Risk Framework will outline the general "process" USCIS will employ for developing and regularly updating an antifraud strategy. The working group began meeting regularly in August 2023 and includes USCIS' FDNS, Office of Policy and Strategy and Office of Performance and Quality. As USCIS has moved forward with these efforts, it recognized that more time and resources will be required to develop a thorough response for an enterprise-wide fraud risk framework and has adjusted the ECD accordingly.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105328
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Additional Actions Needed to Manage Fraud Risks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/19/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of USCIS should develop and implement a process-including clearly defining roles and responsibilities-for risk-based evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of antifraud activities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCIS FDNS and the USCIS OCFO are working with the DHS Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) to produce a final report containing a variety of evaluation options and consideration for the evaluation activities. HSOAC provided its draft report to USCIS on September 26, 2023, and USCIS is currently reviewing the document.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-105328
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Additional Actions Needed to Manage Fraud Risks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/19/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of USCIS should develop outcome-oriented performance metrics, including baselines and targets as appropriate, to monitor the effectiveness of its antifraud activities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USCIS FDNS and the USCIS OCFO are working with the DHS HSOAC to produce a final report containing a variety of evaluation options, evaluation activities, and outcome-oriented performance metrics, including baselines and targets as appropriate, to monitor the effectiveness of its antifraud activities. HSOAC provided its draft report to USCIS on September 26, 2023, and USCIS is currently reviewing the document.
<b>Component</b>	United States Secret Service (USSS)
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-415
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Secret Service: Further Actions Needed to Fully Address Protective Mission Panel Recommendations
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/22/2019

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of the Secret Service should develop and implement a plan to ensure that special agents assigned to PPD and VPD reach annual training targets given current and planned staffing levels.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/20/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USSS contacted GAO on April 20, 2023, for a status update regarding closing the recommendation. GAO informed USSS that the agency will review all documentation internally and advise when it has made a final determination. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	USSS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-415
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Secret Service: Further Actions Needed to Fully Address Protective Mission Panel Recommendations
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/22/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of the Secret Service should develop and implement a policy that documents the process for collecting complete Uniformed Division officer training data and establishes the types of information that should be collected.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/20/23
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USSS contacted GAO on April 20, 2023, for a status update regarding closing the recommendation. GAO informed USSS that the agency will review all documentation internally and advise when it has made a final determination.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	USSS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-60
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Secret Service: Action Needed to Address Significant Gaps in IT Workforce Planning and Management Practices

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/16/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director should ensure that the Office of Human Resources (1) develops and tracks metrics to monitor the effectiveness of the Secret Service's recruitment activities for the IT workforce, including their effectiveness at addressing skill and staffing gaps; and (2) reports to component leadership on those metrics.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/14/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USSS submitted its corrective actions to GAO on August 14, 2023, which included an update on the agency's decision to implement a new end-to-end hiring strategy that will include the use of a new hiring tool that can track metrics related to the results of its recruitment activities for the agency's information technology workforce.
<b>Component</b>	USSS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-60
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Secret Service: Action Needed to Address Significant Gaps in IT Workforce Planning and Management Practices
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/16/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	9
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director should ensure that the Office of Human Resources and OCIO adjust their recruitment and hiring plans and activities, as necessary, after establishing and tracking metrics for assessing the effectiveness of these activities for the IT workforce
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	GAO provided its assessment of USSS's corrective actions in February 2023 and advised that the agency's implementation of this recommendation is dependent on the corrective actions to address recommendation #8. GAO will consider this recommendation addressed once USSS submits documentation of the recruiting-related metrics that the agency uses to track its information technology workforce. USSS has coordinated internally to address this recommendation.

<b>Component</b>	USSS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-60
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Secret Service: Action Needed to Address Significant Gaps in IT Workforce Planning and Management Practices
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/16/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	10
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director should ensure that the CIO (1) defines the required training for each IT workforce group, (2) determines the activities that OCIO will include in its IT workforce training and development program based on its available training budget, and (3) implements those activities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	GAO provided its assessment of USSS's corrective actions in February 2023 and advised that the agency has not addressed the recommendation. In response to GAO's recommendation, USSS's OCIO established an SOP that identifies, among other things, recommended training and certifications for each OCIO division (e.g., network management, cyber security). However, GAO advised that the SOP does not identify required training for each of the OCIO divisions. USSS advised GAO in April 2022 that OCIO would not implement a training and development program specific to the agency's IT workforce. Instead, OCIO believes that the responsibility to train and develop all members of the IT workforce would be better suited at the enterprise level.
<b>Component</b>	USSS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-60
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Secret Service: Action Needed to Address Significant Gaps in IT Workforce Planning and Management Practices
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/16/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	11
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director should ensure that the CIO ensures that the IT workforce completes training specific to their positions (after defining the training required for each workforce group).

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	GAO provided its assessment of USSS's corrective actions in February 2023 and advised that the agency has not addressed the recommendation. USSS's OCIO has identified the recommended training and certifications for each OCIO division (e.g., network management, cyber security).
<b>Component</b>	USSS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-19-60
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Secret Service: Action Needed to Address Significant Gaps in IT Workforce Planning and Management Practices
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/16/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	12
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director should ensure that the CIO collects and assesses performance data (including qualitative or quantitative measures, as appropriate) to determine how the IT training program contributes to improved performance and results (once the training program is implemented).
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	GAO provided its assessment of USSS's corrective actions in February 2023 and advised that the agency has not addressed the recommendation. USSS's OCIO advised GAO that the agency would not implement a training and development program that is specific to its IT workforce. Instead OCIO established an SOP document that identifies, among other things, recommended training and certifications for each OCIO division (e.g., network management, cyber security).
<b>Component</b>	USSS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-239
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Secret Service: Investigative Operations Confer Benefits, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Prioritize Resources
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/26/2019



<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of the Secret Service should establish a documented process to ensure that Office of Investigations resources are aligned with priority criminal threats. The process should outline key information to be included in plans for addressing priority threats.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	On April 21, 2023, GAO provided its assessment of USSS's corrective actions and advised that the agency partially addressed the recommendation. To close the recommendation, GAO requested that USSS provide evidence of a documented process to ensure that the agency aligns investigative resources with priority threats, including key information to be included in plans for addressing these threats. USSS has coordinated with GAO to visit the agency to further discuss the recommendation and the role of the agency's Global Investigative Operations Center as it relates to the recommendation. USSS will coordinate with GAO in early FY 2024 to schedule a visit. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	USSS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-20-239
<b>Report Title</b>	U.S. Secret Service: Investigative Operations Confer Benefits, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Prioritize Resources
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/26/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of the Secret Service should identify investigations that address priority criminal threats agency-wide and collect data on the resources expended to investigate the threats.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	GAO advised USSS in April 2023 that the agency partially addressed the recommendation. As such, GAO has requested that USSS submit metrics detailing the results of the agency's re-categorization of its investigative priorities throughout

	2023. GAO advised that if USSS can confirm that the agency's actions met the intent of the recommendation, GAO will aim to close the recommendation as implemented. GAO considers this recommendation as partially addressed.
<b>Component</b>	USSS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-105255
<b>Report Title</b>	Capitol Attack: Special Event Designations Could Have Been Requested for January 6, 2021, but Not All DHS Guidance is Clear
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/09/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should consider whether additional factors, such as the context of the events and surrounding circumstances in light of the current environment of emerging threats, are needed for designating National Special Security Event (NSSE) events.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USSS continues to non-concur with GAO's recommendation. While senior DHS leadership, program officials, and subject matter experts value GAO's perspective concerning the NSSE process, DHS continues to believe the process already is dynamic, responsive to change, and understood by relevant stakeholders. Local, State, and federal law enforcement and public safety officials respond to emerging factors and adapt security postures without the need to designate an event as an NSSE. This occurs regularly throughout the National Capital Region. As such, DHS's position on the recommendation remains the same – that GAO should consider it resolved and closed, as DHS requested in both the management response letter included in the final report and the Deputy Secretary's letter to GAO on November 12, 2021.
<b>Component</b>	USSS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-105255
<b>Report Title</b>	Capitol Attack: Special Event Designations Could Have Been Requested for January 6, 2021, but Not All DHS Guidance is Clear
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/09/2021

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security should update the Department of Homeland Security policy to clarify and communicate the process for requesting an NSSE designation for an event held on federal property in Washington, D.C. to all relevant stakeholders, including relevant federal, state, and local entities
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USSS continues to non-concur with GAO's recommendation. While senior DHS leadership, program officials, and subject matter experts value GAO's perspective concerning the NSSE designation process, DHS continues to believe the process already is dynamic, responsive to change, and understood by relevant stakeholders in the National Capitol Region. Additionally, DHS Office of Partnership and Engagement (OPE) advocates for and represents the interests of SLTT governments, including the D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency. OPE also serves as a conduit for the Secretary of Homeland Security to engage with stakeholders or share information on a variety of topics. This can include partnering with USSS and/or others through OPE's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs to respond to SLTT questions regarding the NSSE request and designation process, as needed. Furthermore, DHS's Office of Homeland Security Situational Awareness (formerly the DHS Office of Operations Coordination) fulfills a unique response and facilitation role within DHS by serving as the bridge for sharing critical information between DHS Components, across the interagency community, and among homeland security partners. As such, DHS's position on the recommendation remains the same – that GAO should consider it resolved and closed, as DHS requested in both the management response letter included in the final report and the Deputy Secretary's letter to GAO on November 12, 2021.
<b>Component</b>	USSS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-21-518
<b>Report Title</b>	Facial Recognition Technology: Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Should Better Assess Privacy and Other Risks
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/28/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	12
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of the Secret Service should, after implementing a mechanism to track non-federal systems, assess the risks of using such systems, including privacy and accuracy-related risks.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	USSS advised GAO in June 2023 that DHS PRIV is currently reviewing the agency's facial recognition technology privacy impact assessment.
<b>Component</b>	USSS
<b>Report Number</b>	GAO-22-104767
<b>Report Title</b>	Ransomware: Federal Agencies Provide Useful Assistance But Can Improve Collaboration
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/14/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Director of Secret Service to (1) evaluate how to best address concerns raised by SLTTs and facilitate collaboration with other key ransomware stakeholders and (2) improve interagency coordination on ransomware assistance to SLTTs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/12/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	GAO
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	GAO reviewed documentation USSS initially submitted in response to the recommendation and identified a few areas that needed additional support. Overall, GAO acknowledged USSS's intent to address its recommendation by being a participating member of the Joint Ransomware Task Force (JRTF) and its various working groups. However, GAO requested additional documentation that demonstrates USSS's actions through these mechanisms to assess the agency's implementation. On May 12, 2023, USSS submitted additional supporting documentation to GAO to include the JRTF Charter, JRTF CONOPS, and the Secret Service Office of Investigation's Significant Cyber Coordination policy.

## IV. Implementation Status of OIG's Public Recommendations

### A. Recommendations "Closed, Unimplemented"

From October 01, 2022, to September 30, 2023, OIG designated three public recommendations addressed to DHS as "closed, unimplemented." These recommendations are listed below, along with the Department's justification for not implementing each recommendation.

DHS strictly adheres to a self-imposed practice of not closing any OIG recommendations without first reaching agreement with OIG staff to do so and has followed this practice since 2010. This practice provides Congress and the public added confidence that appropriate actions were taken to implement these recommendations or otherwise to resolve any disagreements.

<b>Component</b>	MGMT-USM
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-66
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA)
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/27/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	<p>The Under Secretary for Management should develop and implement a department-wide structure and designate an office to manage and oversee forfeiture activities across DHS including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reviewing component policies and procedures to ensure alignment with CAFRA;</li> <li>• Developing performance objectives, measures, and plans; and</li> <li>• Periodically requesting and reviewing component administrative forfeiture data for alignment with department and component goals.</li> </ul>
<b>Date Closed</b>	07/13/2023
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	Since the implementation of asset forfeiture activities occurs at the operational Component level, it would not be a good use of limited resources to establish an HQ-level office for such activities. On December 15, 2022, DHS published a directive and instruction to help ensure better alignment of CAFRA forfeiture activities which OIG acknowledged; however, OIG closed the recommendation as not implemented.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-59
<b>Report Title</b>	Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/14/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Management, coordinate with DOJ and State to develop an agreement that facilitates the direct sharing of passport information within the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) environment through State's formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) process.
<b>Date Closed</b>	06/23/2023

<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	PLCY held several conversations with the OIG audit team informing them only one Joint Terrorism Task Force (East) remained in existence, and that the recommendation was overcome by events since it no longer described the current structure. OIG agreed to close the recommendation as not implemented.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-59
<b>Report Title</b>	HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/14/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Under Secretary of Management coordinate with the Information Sharing and Safeguarding Governance Board to ensure: (a) ICE and TSA develop an agreement for TSA to directly process Secure Flight data requested for use by the JTTF or HSI JTTF agents investigating terrorism activities or performing task force specific missions; and (b) DHS JTTF contributors mitigate data restrictions or delays pertaining to law enforcement and intelligence investigations.
<b>Date Closed</b>	06/23/2023
<b>Narrative of Implementation Status</b>	TSA non-concurred with this recommendation and has maintained its position against establishing an agreement for directly processing Secure Flight data requested by JTTF or Homeland Security JTTF agents investigating terrorism activities or performing task force specific missions. TSA noted that there is already an established process in place to perform the tasks included in the recommendation. TSA provided OIG with supporting documentation on May 5, 2023, and OIG agreed to close the recommendation as not implemented.

## B. Recommendations “Open”

As of September 30, 2023, 246 OIG public recommendations were designated as “open” for a period of not less than 1 year (i.e., since September 30, 2022). These recommendations are listed below, along with a description of the actions taken, ongoing, or planned to address the recommendations; an ECD; and a brief discussion of resource and budgetary implications, as appropriate.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> DHS is also including 16 recommendations from the Treasury OIG report OIG-22-033 “Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue,” dated March 31, 2022, to provide more complete disclosure of the OIG recommendations it tracks and monitored.



<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-18-83
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/24/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Information and Technology (OIT) and Executive Assistant Commissioners for Field Operations and Operations Support jointly establish a process to inventory arriving international air mail received from USPS, scanned by CBP, and returned to USPS.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP completed a \$45 million expenditure in FY 2021 allocated for critical infrastructure and technology investments to modernize CBP's inspection areas at international mail facilities across the United States. This mail sorting and singulation technology will be linked to state of-the-art non-intrusive inspection equipment that will increase the volume and speed of mail inspected as well as improve the rate at which CBP is able to detect, hold, and seize suspicious mail. This effort will support new enforcement capabilities that will increase mail processing efficiency and security.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-18-83
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/24/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Commissioners for Field Operations and Operations Support update CBP's International Mail Operations and Enforcement Handbook to reflect all types of arriving international mail.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP has revised the International Mail Operations and Enforcement Handbook, which includes an update to Section 5, Classes of Mail, to clearly reflect the types of arriving international mail. CBP is in the final review stage of the Handbook.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-18-83
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/24/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Commissioners for Field Operations and Operations Support jointly update the Seized Asset Management and Enforcement Procedure Handbook and the International Mail Operations and Enforcement Handbook to outline all of the precautions necessary to safeguard suspicious mail prior to formal seizure.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP, OFO is in the process of updating the Seized Asset Management and Enforcement Procedures Handbook (SAMEPH) with the International Mail Operations and Enforcement Handbook, which includes an update to classes of mail, to clearly reflect the types of arriving international mail. CBP plans to finalize updates to the SAMEPH by December 2024.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-19-23
<b>Report Title</b>	Border Patrol Needs a Staffing Model to Better Plan for Hiring More Agents
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/28/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Under Secretary for Management of DHS ensure CBP and Border Patrol expedite development and implementation of a workforce staffing model for U.S. Border Patrol as required by Congress to better inform staffing and resource deployment decisions.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	<p>During 2022 and 2023, USBP worked with the DHS Program Analysis and Evaluation Division, which oversees the Verification, Validation, and Accreditation (VV&amp;A) process for staffing models, as well as OMB. All four sub-models (Sector Intelligence Unit (SIU), Patrol Border Group (PBG), Special Operations, and Operational Support Group (OSG)) have been completed; and the PBG, SIU, and OSG sub-models have been granted limited accreditation from VV&amp;A. These three sub-models account for 96.2 percent of the total output from the USBP workforce staffing model. OMB has already cleared the PBG sub-model, which accounts for 85.7 percent of the total number of required agents.</p> <p>USBP estimates that by December 29, 2023, all four sub-models will be completed and accredited. USBP will update the Congressional report, “USBP Staffing Model (22-40725),” with current outputs from the PBG sub-model; and coordinate efforts to brief Congress. Once the Special Operations sub-model is accredited, the Congressional report will be updated and resubmitted to OMB. USBP estimates that OMB will clear all four staffing sub-models by March 31, 2025, at which time USBP will brief the House Appropriations Committee on its workforce staffing model.</p>
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-27
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP Faced Challenges in its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/15/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Acting Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Information Technology, and the Executive Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations and Acting Executive Assistant Commissioner for Operations Support provide the support staff and equipment necessary at the JFK IM to adequately inspect mail in a timely manner.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	This recommendation has two distinctly separate components. Regarding equipment, in FY 2020, CBP procured computerized tomography scanners for deployment to the International Mail Facility (IMF). The scanners will be deployed as new conveyor construction meets necessary parameters. CBP has awarded a contract to procure new and advanced mail sorting technology for the IMF. CBP has received and approved final system design. This equipment is expected to be fully integrated with third party non-intrusive inspection equipment. CBP has reviewed and approved final system designs for the new and advanced letter sorting technology to be deployed to the IMF. Once completed, the vendor will provide training materials on the new system. A contract has been requested through GSA for required support for the installation of the already purchased Mail Sorting and Singulation Technologies (MSST). As of July 2023, the MSST contract has been met and equipment delivered. Based on FY 2023 funding, the project is currently able to move forward into the next phase in design and has been submitted to Port Authority for review. At this time, it is not known if the Port Authority will require additional changes necessitating FY 2024 funding. CBP does not anticipate further information on the MSST until Q4 of CY 2023 when CBP will receive comments, possible permits, and the contract from the Port Authority and GSA. As this is in design phase, the estimate for completion is September 2024.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-27
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP Faced Challenges in its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/15/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations and Acting Executive Assistant Commissioner for Operations Support establish a process for JFK IMG to identify and reconcile targeted mail that is not provided by USPS.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	MSST installation has been contracted with GSA and a timeline has been established. The final design of MSST was presented to CBP in April 2023. MSST will be installed by October 31, 2023, and operational by March 29, 2024.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-27
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP Faced Challenges in its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/15/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations and Acting Executive Assistant Commissioner for Operations Support implement the necessary controls to secure mail in CBP's possession at the JFK IMF.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The CBP OFO continues to implement security measures to secure mail in its possession at the John F. Kennedy (JFK) IMF by taking the following steps: CBP employee access control system records continue to be reviewed monthly to ensure employees only have access to areas with an official need to perform work; the draft interim Physical Security Controls SOPs have been finalized and are currently being implemented; and recommendations for upgraded Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) and the Intrusion Detection System Physical Access Control System (PACS) have been included in the Statements of Work (SOW) for the ongoing IMF office space and operational floor modernization projects. Final design of the CCTV/PACS system will be done in coordination with the (OPR, Security Management Division (SMD), Physical Security Branch. SMD completed a facility assessment of the JFK IMF on August 4, 2021. Further upgrades will be part of the current operational floor renovation construction project currently being designed with GSA. The design for that project is ongoing and is currently with the GSA to come to a final design which will allow CBP to determine which upgrades can be made in order based on availability of funding. As GSA is working on completing 65 percent of the design documents, the estimate for completion is October 31, 2023. Ongoing efforts with GSA, USPS, and the Port Authority on the operational floor project will fully address all these concerns. Recently, GSA has noted that the current approach for the operational floor, which involved other sub tenants, may have to be entirely rethought due to design and cost issues. CBP is seeking clarification on these concerns and their impact on our overall design. OFO does not anticipate firm information on this until November 2023.

<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-27
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP Faced Challenges in its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/15/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations develop a plan to improve the controls and reliability of the local database used to monitor targeted international mail.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP, OFO New York Field Office (NYFO) and OIT continue to integrate processes for identifying and reconciling targeted mail into CBP's enterprise targeting system and expanding this capability to additional IMFs. The local database has been taken offline due to the shared drive being shut down as of January 30, 2023. The NYFO and the JFK IMF are currently testing the use of Automated Targeting Systems (ATS) worklists to replicate the process for the tracking of held packages. The JFK IMF has confirmed that they are using two "worklists" within ATS "JFK Mail" and "JFK IMF Holds" in combination with the deployed manual input function to address onsite tracking of mail examined, held, or acted on by CBP at the IMF. When Officers complete inspections, they can either transfer a specific parcel to a worklist based upon the disposition or individually track their exams and closeout their inspections. The new system is functioning by noting targeted mail and mail presented for inspection have been transferred to a worklist with an ability to add additional shipments manually.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-48
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP Needs to Strengthen Its Oversight and Policy to Better Care for Migrants Needing Medical Attention
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection periodically assess and document requirements to review and update related policies and procedures to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• clearly define at-risk populations;</li> <li>• establish set times for frequency of welfare checks;</li> <li>• ensure completion of medical assessments for all juveniles; and</li> <li>• ensure rescreening of migrants after detainment exceeds guidelines.</li> </ul>
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP, Operations Support (OS), Office of the Chief Medical Officer (OCMO) determined the National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search policy sufficiently describes at-risk population considerations, as well as the timing and frequency of welfare checks. Any further determination detailing the frequency and timing of welfare checks are operational decisions best decided by local management who are apprised of operational requirements, capabilities, and constraints. CBP OCMO worked with the Medical Support Contract vendor and operational leadership to finalize supplemental guidance for implementation of the Enhanced Medical Directive to clarify medical support processes and practices. OCMO is working to complete an updated Enhanced Medical Directive (versus providing supplemental guidance as previously planned). It is anticipated the directive will be completed and distributed to the field by the end of March 2024.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-62
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP Targeted Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Migrant Caravan
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/20/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP update Customs Directive No. 4320-003, July 1990 (TECS Directive) to clarify the appropriate bases for placing lookouts and providing training to all CBP officials who have the authority to place lookouts.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	During March 2023, CBP's OFO met with the OIG to discuss a discrepancy between CBP OFO's TECS directive and the corresponding training module. OFO confirmed that the training module is correct and is updating the TECS directive accordingly. The revised guidance will be drafted by the end of November 2023. It will then go through the review and approval process. CBP plans to complete the corrective actions by March 2024.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-62
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP Targeted Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Migrant Caravan
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/20/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP develop and issue a policy regarding asking, advising, or otherwise communicating with foreign governments about denying entry to U.S. citizens. At a minimum, the policy should specify the appropriate circumstances for such communications, who is authorized to approve such communications, and the procedures to follow when making such communications.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/06/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	As of September 30, 2023, DHS reiterated that, as previously noted in the original response to this recommendation, all individuals were screened, vetted, and inspected, to include information regarding those without documentation. DHS believes this recommendation is based on a misunderstanding of the information the CBP OFO provided to OIG during this review. Although the OIG points to a lack of travel documents as evidence that CBP did not have appropriate information to conduct vetting, it is important to clarify that parolees often do not have official travel documents. When official travel documents are not available, CBP uses an alternative process to check identifying documents and vet individuals. Additionally, the OIG's report erroneously points to two individuals for whom the OIG contends vetting was not conducted.



	Previous corrective actions by CBP include that in March 2022, DHS provided the OIG with clarifying information demonstrating that, contrary to OIG’s claims, these two individuals were cleared by the interagency vetting process at the time of travel, and no derogatory information was reported prior to parole. CBP OFO provided documentation and evidence to OIG of these actions multiple times, corroborating that recurrent vetting processes established for all paroled Afghan nationals are carried out for the duration of their parole period. CBP submitted a request for closure to the OIG on September 6, 2023, and is awaiting the OIG’s response.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-62
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP Targeted Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Migrant Caravan
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/20/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP conduct a review of all instances in which CBP, as part of its response to the migrant caravan, disclosed U.S. citizens' Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information to Mexican officials, between October 2018 and March 2019, to identify any instances that did not comply with foreign disclosure requirements and take remedial actions. Remedial actions may include rescinding request to deny entry to U.S. citizens, retroactively instructing foreign authorities to hold CBP information in confidence, and use CBP information only for the purpose for which CBP provided it, ensuring disclosures are properly documented in CBP's system of records, and any other steps necessary to ensure that all foreign disclosures comply with CBP Directive No. 4320-025A, Disclosure of Official Information to Foreign Authorities, DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, DHS Handbook for Safeguarding Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information, and all other applicable policies and procedures.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	In April 2023, CBP Privacy and Diversity Office completed a review and found no disclosures of U.S. citizens’ Sensitive PII to Mexican officials, between October 2018 and March 2019, that did not comply with foreign disclosure requirements. However, despite finding no evidence of improper disclosures, CBP has published an updated foreign disclosure policy, CBP Directive Number 4320-025B, Disclosure of CBP Information to Foreign Authorities, dated April 20, 2023, to ensure clear policy guidance. Pursuant to section 6.1.2 of the new Disclosure of CBP Information to Foreign Authorities, all CBP

	employees are responsible for ensuring that any disclosure of PII belonging to individuals covered by the Privacy Act (U.S. Citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents) and the Judicial Redress Act are: (1) made from a CBP System of Records to a foreign authority in accordance with a Routine Use that has been established and described in the relevant System of Record Notices for the system from which the records originated and (2) provided only to a party with a need-to-know in the performance of their official duties.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-62
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP Targeted Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Migrant Caravan
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/20/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP provide training to all CBP personnel on the process for sharing information with foreign nations, covering all applicable policies and procedures, including which CBP personnel are authorized to make foreign disclosures.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP Directive Number 4320-025B, Disclosure of CBP Information to Foreign Authorities, was signed on April 20, 2023, to ensure clear policy guidance. As of August 2023, the CBP Privacy Office has generated a training presentation that will accurately describe the information sharing process outlined in the updated directive. The training presentation is currently under review. Once the presentation is finalized, the Privacy Office will work with the Office of Training Development to have it posted to DHS's Learning Management System. The Privacy Office is also working to merge this new training with a presentation outlining the requirements for Domestic Disclosures of Information to create a single course that outlines all requirements and processes for information sharing at CBP. Upon completion, the Privacy Office will also coordinate with relevant personnel in the operational components to determine which personnel should receive the training, so that it can be appropriately assigned.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-62

<b>Report Title</b>	CBP Targeted Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Migrant Caravan
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/20/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Commissioner of CBP take immediate action to end the use of WhatsApp for operational purposes or to ensure that WhatsApp messages are retained in compliance with legal and policy requirements including records retention schedules.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	In September 2023, CBP OIT completed implementation of the Short Message Service/Multimedia Messaging Service archiving and retention tool. In August 2023, OIT obtained funding for the TELE Message Archiver for WhatsApp and is projecting deployment of the tool by the end of Q1 FY 2024.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure Cargo Security and Control Division (CSC) officials develop and disseminate performance measures specific to the In-Bond Program so that CSC, field offices, and port personnel are aware of program expectations. These measures should be used to regularly assess port performance and hold ports accountable.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO CSC received feedback from the field offices on new In-Bond enforcement policy and guidance for the examination and auditing of In-Bonds, In-Bond Self Inspection Worksheet (SIW) compliance, and Port Export In-Bond auditing. As of September 29, 2023, CSC is currently revising the in-bond enforcement protocol. Due to delays with development of the in-bond audit tool programming, the In-Bond SIW could not be implemented. The new enforcement protocol will perform post export enforcement of overdue in bond entries, which cannot be completed without the update to the system.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure CSC officials develop written procedures for CSC’s oversight of port performance relating to the In-Bond Program to include, but not be limited to, regular data analytics and review of ACE reports.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO CSC initially planned to develop the new in-bond audit reporting tool in SharePoint, to provide via Power BI technology real-time analytics to field offices and management. Due to technical limitations, in June 2023, CSC decided to redevelop the tool in Dataverse, which is a much more robust platform. The new tool, along with updated and new ACE In-Bond Reports, will allow CSC to effectively monitor port in-bond enforcement performance. Once the new tool and ACE In-Bond Reports are available for use, CSC will create written SOPs for staff to rely on to assist in their ongoing in-bond oversight activity.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure CSC officials work with TTO officials to implement a central repository to store ACE reports, compliance examination documentation, and other in-bond related information, including training materials, maintained by the ports so that CSC can oversee in-bond activity. Additionally, CSC should regularly notify field offices and ports that these documents are available in this repository.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO CSC continues to work with the ACE Business Office in the Trade Transformation Office (TTO) within OT to provide system functionality requirements for future enhancements, subject to competing priorities and annual appropriation funding allocations. This is an on-going process based on available funding. OFO's In Bond Audit Tool is currently being developed with revisions in the Dataverse Platform. This project was formerly developed in SharePoint, but due to technical limitations, in June 2023 CSC decided to redevelop the Tool in Dataverse, which is a much more robust platform.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure CSC officials expand the SIP in-bond SIW questions to cover key program areas, such as the ports' use of ACE reporting to oversee overdue in-bond shipments and training for CBP officers on in-bond compliance examinations and audits.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO CSC will incorporate more detailed SIW Guidance for responding to all questions on its updated SIW, assigned during even years. CSC will have the ability to add a question to the SIW during the next In-Bond cycle which will be in FY 2024. CSC is collaborating with OFO's Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate (PPAE) to determine how best to provide guidance to the ports on responding to In-Bond SIW questions, which will include scenarios and the appropriate responses.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure CSC officials provide guidance to the ports on how to respond to in-bond SIW questions to include scenarios and the appropriate response given those scenarios.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO CSC will incorporate more detailed SIW Guidance for responding to all questions on its updated SIW, assigned during even years. CSC will have the ability to add a question to the SIW during the next In-Bond cycle which is not until FY 2024. CSC is collaborating with OFO's PPAAE to determine how best to provide guidance to the ports on responding to In-Bond SIW questions, which will include scenarios and the appropriate responses.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure OIT officials assess and address each port's need for infrastructure and equipment upgrades to effectively operate and meet information system requirements.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OIT conducted end-user equipment assessments at the five ports included in the report. Only three of the five sites required hardware refresh. OIT worked with CBP OFO to obtain funding for the equipment at these reimbursable facilities. All funding requests for the three ports have been signed, approved, and procurement requests completed. On June 11, 2023, the end-user equipment was delivered and installed at one location. Once equipment is received at the final two sites, the Field Support Directorate will request scripts from the local Field Technology Officers.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure CSC officials issue policies and procedures for ports on ACE reports they are expected to run regularly to oversee inbound shipments and ensure in-bonds are closed out. This should include guidance necessary to monitor shipments in ACE as well as review proof of exports.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO CSC received feedback from the field offices that entailed a re-examination and course correction regarding CBP's protocol for auditing of overdue in-bonds and how to better record and store in-bond audit results on new In-Bond enforcement policy and guidance for the examination and auditing of In-Bonds, In-Bond SIW compliance, and Port Export In-Bond auditing. CSC has created a new working group, OFO In-Bond Work Group, comprised of the OFO in-bond SMEs, which will specifically create new training and oversight SOPs that direct CBP Officers how to properly monitor in-bond shipments and to effectively enforce carriers' compliance with 19 C.F.R. Part 18 (In-Bond). CSC plans to provide training and update guidance on how to run ACE In-Bond Reports to identify open in-bond entries to be audited and examined. Further, an ACE report has been created and is currently functional to identify in-bond entries that will be in overdue status within 10 days of the report.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure CSC officials issue policies and procedures for CSC to regularly review the monitoring and tracking of in-bond shipments conducted by the ports.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO CSC initially planned to develop the new in-bond audit reporting tool in SharePoint, to provide via Power BI technology real time analytics to field offices and management. Due to technical limitations, in June 2023, CSC decided to redevelop the tool in Dataverse, which is a much more robust platform. The new tool, along with updated and new ACE In-Bond Reports, will allow CSC to effectively monitor port in-bond enforcement performance. Once the new tool and ACE In-Bond Reports are available for use, CSC will create written SOPs for staff to rely on to assist in their ongoing in-bond oversight activity.
<b>Component</b>	CBP



<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	9
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure CSC officials update in-bond regulations to require a standardized proof of export to be uploaded to ACE for all cargo exported.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO CSC continues to collaborate with OT, Office of Regulations and Rulings to obtain legal guidance pursuant to the possibility of changing current policy and procedures pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 190.72, Proof of exportation.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	10
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure CSC officials provide TTO officials business requirements after regulations are updated so that TTO can update ACE to require proof of export for closure of in-bonds that are exported.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CSC will provide business requirements to CBP's TTO officials if regulations are updated based upon feedback from the NPRM. Subsequently, TTO will update ACE accordingly.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	11
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure OT officials, with input from CSC officials, update regulations to support ACE functionality and data quality to modernize the in-bond process. This includes improving the report processing time, improving the quality of reports, and addressing Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee (COAC) concerns regarding the system.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO CSC is working with CBP's TTO ACE Business Office to provide system functionality requirements for future enhancements, as appropriate. CSC officials are coordinating with OT officials to discuss the request for development, level of effort, funding, and updating the regulations to support ACE functionality and data quality to modernize the in-Bond process. Once complete, these improvements will include report processing time, quality of reports, and address COAC concerns regarding the system. CSC continues to collaborate/participate in the COAC Secure Trade Lanes In-Bond working group. The working group will continue to engage in the development of proposed regulatory language intended to incorporate technical and policy efforts in the next quarter. Additional efforts will involve determining economic and operational benefits associated with the delivered solutions. CSC also requested improvements and technical enhancements on the Manifest Trade In-Bond User Interface, which was originally launched in January 2023. These enhancements will provide for easier management of in-bond entries filers/brokers/carriers.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033

<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue <i>(Treasury OIG)</i>
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	12
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure CSC officials provide TTO officials with business requirements after regulations are updated so that TTO can implement changes in ACE to modernize in-bond tracking and automation processes and enhance data quality to meet user needs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO CSC will provide business requirements to CBP’s TTO officials if regulations are updated based upon feedback from the NPRM. Subsequently, TTO will update ACE accordingly.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue <i>(Treasury OIG)</i>
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	13
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner direct CSC officials to consider updating guidance on compliance examinations to require ports to examine a statistically valid sample of in-bond shipments so that cargo reviewed is more representative of all in-bond shipments. Additionally, the guidance should contain instructions on waivers of examination including documenting the justification for these waivers.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO CSC will issue a new memorandum to the field and ports that will update ACE in-bond report oversight process. Further, CSC will enhance the in-bond post audit oversight area of responsibility, in coordination with CBP's OIT, by providing requirements within the ACE Report Module and disseminating associated Field Office guidance related to enforcement measures. CSC and OFO, Operations, Planning and Evaluation created and deployed a new In-Bond Compliance Measurement (IBCM) program that functions as CSC's core in-bond shipment examination protocol. The IBCM employs a statistically valid survey methodology and operates specific User Defined Rules to target certain in-bond shipments by issuing enforcement holds requiring the shipments to be physically examined. As a final step, CSC will conduct testing of the in-bond audit tool.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	14
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure CSC officials provide the ports with written policies and procedures to ensure compliance examinations are adequate and consistent. These procedures should include selecting cargo for review, conducting examinations, documenting the process used for the review and the results, and storing the records.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO CSC distributed a memorandum and muster on February 27, 2023, to CBP's field offices that provided new in-bond enforcement policy and guidance for the examination and auditing of In-Bonds and Port Export In-Bond Auditing. The guidance included instructions on how to conduct in-bond cargo examinations and how to document the results in ATS Import Cargo Exam Findings Module. OFO continues to complete testing of the in-bond audit tool.
<b>Component</b>	CBP

<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	17
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure CSC and TTO officials require ACE training related to the oversight of in-bond cargo for all CBP officers.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO CSC, in coordination with CBP's TTO, will co-produce webinars addressing in-bond compliance report oversight and training for CBP Field Office personnel. CSC worked with the Trade and Cargo Academy at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers to develop a stand-alone In-Bond Instructional Training Course for CBP officers responsible for cargo operations, which the most recent course was held September 26-28, 2023, with full enrollment. This course will continue to be offered twice per FY. In addition, CSC is working with the ACE Reports Team to develop ACE In-Bond report training webinars.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-033
<b>Report Title</b>	Revenue Collection: The U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Oversight of the Merchandise Transported In-Bond Program Needs Improvement to Better Ensure the Protection of Revenue ( <i>Treasury OIG</i> )
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	19
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP Commissioner ensure the CORE Division coordinates with the Revenue Division and CSC officials to improve custodial bonding to address the risks of merchandise transported in-bond and update CBP's bonding policy. The policy should improve the connectivity between in-bond shipments and respective duties, taxes, and fees by considering estimated duties when determining the appropriate bond coverage.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OT OFO and Office of Finance - Revenue Division will continue to leverage existing authorities pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 113 to enforce the requirements for custodial bonds to protect revenue, by: (1) collaborating to ensure policies and procedures are updated; and (2) exploring efforts to improve appropriate bond coverage. CBP developed several policy and training initiatives to address the risks of merchandise transported in-bond and update CBP's bonding policy. One initiative, a 13-part Bond Educational Webinar series on bonding authority and enforcement for CBP personnel, was completed on September 28, 2022. The remaining initiatives are: (1) Finalization of CBP clearance for a NPRM to incorporate eBond into 19 C.F.R. § 113 Regulations to update eBond functionality from a test to a requirement. This will eliminate the majority of paper bond processing and ensure bonds are on file. The NPRM is currently under internal review within OT. Publication in the Federal Register is dependent on full clearance by CBP, followed by clearance by the Department of the Treasury and OMB. (2) Updating the Monetary Guidelines for Setting Bond Amounts directive. This Directive provides guidelines for CBP personnel when setting bond amounts, determining bond sufficiency, and considering whether to require additional security. The Directive is in the final stage of the formal clearance process.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-34
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP Needs Improved Oversight for Its Centers of Excellence and Expertise
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Commissioners of CBP's Offices of Trade and Field Operations coordinate to establish and implement enforcement procedures that include Center officials in the decision-making process and assist with corrective actions to promptly resolve importer violations.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP has transitioned into the final phase of completing the Commercial Enforcement Analysis and Response (CEAR 2.0) enhancements. The CEAR 2.0 will improve communications from all stakeholders to support trade enforcement decision-making and the allocation of resources for prompt violation determinations. OT OFO Centers of Excellence and Expertise (CEE) and ICE HSI collaborated to (1) update the CEAR 2.0, (2) reorganize the enforcement program by providing a means to respond to trade and customs violations more efficiently once a violation is discovered, and (3) execute a consequence delivery of appropriate enforcement actions in a timelier manner. As of September 30, 2023, the Base Metals Machinery, and Agriculture and Prepared Products CEAs are incorporating CEAR 2.0 enhancements, in addition to the new violation case referral tool (Raven) from HSI that gives visibility throughout the trade criminal enforcement process. CEAR 2.0 agency wide deployment is on schedule for the Q3 of FY 2024.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-34
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP Needs Improved Oversight for Its Centers of Excellence and Expertise
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/31/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Commissioners of CBP’s Offices of Trade and Field Operations coordinate to update appropriate SOPs for initiation, analysis, monitoring, and management of trade penalty cases that clearly delineate the Center’s role and define ways to measure improvements.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO and OT are updating existing SOPs that delineate the appropriate methodologies for managing trade penalty cases from the initiation of a case to the final disposition to ensure clarity in the roles and responsibilities of the Centers and provide uniformity and consistency. OFO, in coordination with OT, is finalizing the Trade Enforcement Roadmap program to replace the CEAR process. This will enhance communication and collaboration during the development of trade enforcement cases. In addition, procedures for action when the parties involved fail to provide a waiver of the statute of limitations (SOL) are identified. OFO is still working with OT and other stakeholders to restructure the CEAR program. Once the SOP is completed, OFO will update the SAMEPH Section 12.1.5, CEAR to include any updates to the current section based on the SOP and a link to the SOP document within the SAMEPH.

<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-39
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP and CWMD Need to Improve Monitoring and Maintenance of Radiation Portal Monitor Systems
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/27/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The CBP and CWMD key stakeholders develop an agreed to support plan to monitor and sustain RPM systems that includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An assessment of RPM panel condition; and</li> <li>• Operational Analysis to assess RPM system performance and operations to identify evolving requirements and future capability needs, and changes to sustainment approach.</li> </ul>
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OFO and CWMD engaged in joint discussions in Q3 and Q4 of CY 2022 and developed a draft of a comprehensive joint monitoring plan. During 2023, CBP and CWMD continue to engage in discussions to further develop the comprehensive joint monitoring plan.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-52
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS and CBP Should Improve Intellectual Property Rights Management and Enforcement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/18/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Commissioner for CBP Office of Trade: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. develop and implement standard operating procedures for the IPR Division’s official responsibilities and activities, including procedures for developing strategic planning documents and evaluating IPR seizure statistics to measure its strategic planning goals;</li> </ol>



	<p>b. quarterly monitor and document CBP’s progress toward key IPR activities and strategies reported to Congress;</p> <p>c. develop and define and implement a repeatable process for documenting changes to IPR seizure data;</p> <p>d. establish a standard operating procedure for reconciling and reporting IPR seizure data; and</p> <p>e. assign responsibility to trade officials for coordinating the correction of inaccurate IPR seizure data when identified.</p>
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	<p>During (FY 2022, CBP OT IPR and E-Commerce Division, completed the IPR Operations Strategic Planning SOP, which documents the process for annual FY reviews and updates to the IPR Priority Trade Issue overarching strategy and planning documents; and IPR Operations Seizure Data Process SOP that documents the process for running queries and reviews to reconcile and report IPR seizure data. The SOP is supplemented by the IPR Operations Seizure Data Process Quick Reference Guide and the IPR Seizure Data Process Flow Diagrams. Since June 2022, the CBP OT IPR and E-Commerce Division has produced a quarterly report that tracks progress of IPR activities and strategies, as well as a set of Key Performance Indicators that are reported to OT leadership monthly. On January 31, 2023, CBP provided OIG with supporting evidence, to include the FY 2022 Q3 and Q4 IPR activities and strategy reports, and both SOPs. CBP informed OIG that it was phasing out the use of the standalone database for the tracking and reporting of IPR statistics, and instead using dashboards that pull directly from the Seized Assets and Case Tracking System. The updated SOP resolves concerns with developing, defining, and implementing a repeatable process for documenting changes to IPR seizure data; reconciling and reporting IPR seizure data; and assigning responsibility to trade officials for coordinating the correction of inaccurate IPR seizure data when identified. CBP is working to provide OIG with supporting evidence that the responsibility for coordinating the correction of inaccurate IPR seizure data has been assigned to the IPR/E-Commerce Division Director.</p>
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-52
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS and CBP Should Improve Intellectual Property Rights Management and Enforcement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/18/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Deputy Commissioner for CBP assign responsibility to an office to develop a strategic risk assessment for it IPR Priority Trade Issue.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	In October 2022, CBP Office of Trade’s Planning, Accountability, and Evaluation Division led a formal IPR risk assessment during Q1 of FY 2023. CBP completed a formal risk assessment for the IPR PTI, which resulted in the creation of an IPR risk register that will be regularly evaluated and updated as part of the PTI strategic planning process. CBP is working to provide additional supporting evidence to OIG that the OT IPR Division is responsible for monitoring and conducting annual risk assessments.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-52
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS and CBP Should Improve Intellectual Property Rights Management and Enforcement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/18/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Commissioner for CBP Office of Field Operations: a. establish criteria for when to convert informal targeting efforts to formal targeting rules, and b. develop and implement a process to increase monitoring and oversight of IPR targeting.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The updated version of the User Defined Rules (UDR) SOP (v. 5.0) will be released in October 2023. The UDR SOP will include best practices regarding the use of manual targeting (User Defined Queries), as well as recommendations for when automated targeting (UDR) would be a more beneficial approach. UDR testing and evaluation will need to be completed. CBP OFO National Targeting Center met with OT to discuss the monthly trend analysis product that OT will produce and disseminate by the 15 <sup>th</sup> of each month. OT will send the first report by October 15, 2023, including trends through the entirety of FY 2023. Regarding the UDR SOP, the final version of the appendix will be disseminated CBP-wide by October 20, 2023.

<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-52
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS and CBP Should Improve Intellectual Property Rights Management and Enforcement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/18/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Field Operations and the Executive Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Trade consult with the CBP OCC to interpret the intellectual property rights seizure statutes and establish parameters and oversight procedures for ports to determine their own seizure thresholds or alternatives to seizure, as appropriate.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/28/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP determined that establishing overarching thresholds is not operationally feasible, since thresholds would hinder a Port Director's ability to determine the appropriate action for violative shipments based on the totality of the circumstances associated with that shipment and the parties involved. In lieu of such thresholds for each port, OT incorporated information regarding seizure alternatives into the ongoing IPR instructor-led training and is working to establish a mechanism to effectively capture those actions within CBP's enforcement systems. Additionally, CBP is pursuing broader statutory changes that will provide a greater framework for the use of seizure alternatives for low-value, IPR-infringing shipments. On August 28, 2023, CBP provided OIG with supporting documentation, to include copies of the IPR Instructor-Led Training, the CBP Alternatives to Seizure Tool Kit, and Issue Paper documenting analysis of establishing thresholds for alternatives to seizure.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-52
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS and CBP Should Improve Intellectual Property Rights Management and Enforcement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/18/2022

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Assistant Commissioners for CBP Office of Field Operations and Office of Trade establish a tracking mechanism for IPR investigative referrals to ICE.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	OT is currently updating the CEAR referral process, CEAR 2.0, and is coordinating with internal CBP offices, as well as HSI. In coordination with CEAR 2.0, OT and HSI are collaborating on a tool, Raven, to track case referrals from CBP to HSI, which would include the referrals made to ICE. All IPR referrals will follow this process and be recorded and tracked by the tool once implemented. CBP is targeting an implementation date of mid-year, FY 2024.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-64
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/06/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner: a. Immediately identify evacuees from Afghanistan who are in the United States and provide evidence of full screening and vetting based on confirmed identification - especially for those who did not have documentation; and b. Ensure recurrent vetting processes established for all paroled evacuees are carried out for the duration of their parole period.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	DHS reiterates that, as previously noted in the original response to this recommendation, all individuals were screened, vetted, and inspected, to include information regarding those without documentation. DHS believes this recommendation is based on a misunderstanding of the information the CBP OFO provided to OIG during this review. Although OIG points to a lack of travel documents as evidence that CBP did not have appropriate information to conduct vetting, it is important to clarify that parolees often do not have official travel documents. When official travel documents are not available, CBP uses an alternative process to check identifying documents and vet individuals. Additionally, OIG’s report erroneously points to two individuals for whom OIG contends vetting was not conducted. Previous corrective actions by CBP include that in March 2022, DHS provided OIG with clarifying information demonstrating that, contrary to OIG’s claims, these two individuals were cleared by the interagency vetting process at the time of travel, and no derogatory information was reported prior to parole. CBP OFO provided documentation and evidence to OIG of these actions’ multiple times, corroborating that recurrent vetting processes established for all paroled Afghan nationals are carried out for the duration of their parole period. CBP is analyzing OIG’s response to CBP’s request for closure in July 2023, and is developing a path forward that will address OIG’s feedback.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-66
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/09/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Assistant Commissioner, Office of Information and Technology [OIT] and [CBP] Commissioner continue to analyze and prioritize funding needs to make integration improvements to DHS IT systems ensuring timely and accurate information sharing internally within DHS and externally with the [DOJ] and [HHS].
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CBP OIT received the \$5.023 million Procurement, Construction, and Improvements Congressional Appropriation Funding for Unified Immigration Portal (UIP) in July 2023. In September 2023, a meeting was held between the OIT UIP Team and Assistant Commissioner of OIT to discuss recent program progress, challenges, and review upcoming priorities. The

	activities necessary for UIP to achieve full operating capability (FOC) are dependent on this funding. Due to that dependency, UIP is scheduled to reach FOC by the end of December 2023.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-66
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/09/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Assistant Commissioner, [OIT] and [CBP] Chief Information Officer further promote the [UIP] to more DHS and external users.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	<p>Since March 2023, CBP OIT has continued the goal of expanding the UIP to more users within DHS and external users from DOJ and HHS. UIP has worked with the Executive Office for Immigration Review OIT and established a connection for data sharing between DHS and DOJ to provide a more complete view of immigration processing between Department's (Court Scheduler application programming interface). UIP also expanded access to data from its partners including USCIS Global, begun ingesting a subset of Credible Fear (CF) data to be shared via UIP dashboards, and increased access to/visibility of decision data in the UIP Timeline view for automated referral cases to USCIS. UIP is receiving CF referral data from ICE through Databricks (Delta Sharing) enabling referral data (from both USBP and ICE) into the timeline view to display when a subject's CF case has been referred to USCIS for an initial decision. The program plans to receive additional CF data to be incorporated into the platform and provide users with a better understanding of processing between CBP, ICE, and USCIS. As of September 2023, there are over 27,000 CBP UIP users; approximately 2,200 ICE UIP users; over 100 HHS UIP users; over 100 DHS HQ UIP users; and approximately 100 USCIS UIP users. The electronic Notice to Appear (NTA) Service was developed and deployed, establishing that a connection for sharing NTAs between DHS and DOJ has been implemented to production. Following the implementation of this service into production, CBP OFO and ICE ERO completed their integration with the service. In FY 2023, UIP exceeded 30,000 users and are capable to onboard DOJ EOIR upon their request. The remaining action is the onboarding of DOJ that will be trained in UIP.</p>

<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-66
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/09/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Commissioner of CBP evaluate adherence to current immigration policies and memorandums of agreement for internal and external collaboration and working groups and update them as needed.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On September 15, 2022, CBP's Policy Directorate (PD) established an internal working group with the relevant CBP offices to address this recommendation. PD continues to work closely with SMEs from CBP's USBP, OFO, Privacy Diversity Office, OCC, and OIT, along with partners at ICE and HHS to evaluate information-sharing practices related to unaccompanied children (UC) as recommended in OIG's report. In January 2023, PD and HHS met weekly to establish a plan to identify specific information-sharing improvements, coordinate feedback, and implement new requirements within both departments, to better support UC encounters and custody transfers. In May 2023 CBP provided HHS with a draft MOA, which is under review. CBP aims to have a finalized MOA to circulate by December 2023.
<b>Component</b>	CBP
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-66
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/09/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Assistant Commissioner, OIT and CBP Chief Information Officer coordinate with U.S. Border Patrol and evaluate, develop, and implement strategies to address Form I-213 errors.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On September 14, 2023, CBP OIT demonstrated the e3 functionality of populating Family Unit (FMU) into I-213 Narrative section to the OIG. The e3 OIT Team completed development of the solution in e3 to auto-populate the name of the FMU to resolve the previously identified errors within I-213. This technical solution will auto-populate the name of the FMU into I-213. Prior to full implementation, the final remediation will include testing of effectiveness to ensure resolution of the identified I-213 errors.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-37
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Can Enhance Efforts to Protect Commercial Facilities from Terrorism and Physical Threats
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/11/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Director, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency work with the Acting Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, to develop comprehensive policies and procedures to support its role as the commercial facilities' Sector-Specific Agency. Specifically: a) provide convening authority and clear expectations to ensure the agency can fulfill its responsibility as the designated Sector-Specific Agency; b) develop methods to share best practices; c) ensure effective coordination across the Department's components and update all critical resource documents-including the Private Sector Resource Catalog-as required; and d) develop procedures to ensure comprehensive analysis of data.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The Homeland and Critical Infrastructure Resilience Interagency Policy Committee is in the process of updating the Presidential PD 21 (PPD-21). This process will refine the statutory roles of Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMA), clarify how SRMAs coordinate with CISA, and will identify the process to be used to reevaluate the Sector structure and associated SRMAs. The Sector-Specific Plans (SSP) serve as the strategic documents organizing sector activity and



priorities in support of the Joint National Priorities for critical infrastructure security and resilience. Following the publication of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (National Plan), CISA will work closely with all SRMAs to coordinate efforts and assist with updates to their SSPs, which will reflect updates and incorporate concepts and ideas from several products and initiatives completed since the previous SSPs for each sector were developed. The updated SSPs will tailor strategic guidance in the refreshed National Plan to each sector’s unique operating conditions and risk landscape. CISA expects that updated SSPs will include guidance addressing a wide range of all-hazards threats. However, CISA expects to SSPs will be developed within 6-9 months of the National Plan update.

<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-01
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Has Secured the Nation’s Election Systems, but Work Remains to Protect the Infrastructure
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/22/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Coordinate with the Office of the Secretary to revise the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and other planning documents to incorporate current and evolving risks as well as mitigation strategies needed to secure the Nation’s election infrastructure.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CISA remains committed to addressing this recommendation; however, the National Plan refresh is on hold until the rewrite of the Presidential PD 21. CISA will start working on all required corrective actions following completion of updates to the National Plan, which is now expected to be complete by the end of FY 2025.

<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-59
<b>Report Title</b>	CISA Can Improve Efforts to Ensure Dam Security and Resilience
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/09/2021

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Update the Dams Sector-Specific Plan as required, ensuring alignment with the updated National Infrastructure Protection Plan currently under development.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	As previously indicated, SSPs serve as the strategic documents organizing sector activity and priorities in support of the Joint National Priorities for critical infrastructure security and resilience. Following the publication of the National Plan, CISA will work closely with all SRMAs to coordinate efforts and assist with updates to their SSPs, which will reflect updates and incorporate concepts and ideas from several products and initiatives completed since the previous SSPs for each sector were developed. The updated SSPs will tailor strategic guidance in the refreshed National Plan to each sector's unique operating conditions and risk landscape. CISA expects that updated SSPs will include guidance addressing a wide range of all-hazards threats. However, CISA expects to SSPs will be developed within 6-9 months of the National Plan update.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-59
<b>Report Title</b>	CISA Can Improve Efforts to Ensure Dam Security and Resilience
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/09/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Formalize CISA's organizational structure to clarify roles, responsibilities, coordination processes, and reporting procedures across all divisions performing activities relating to CISA's role as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Dams Sector.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/01/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CISA met with OIG and provided the Decision Memo for the Establishment and Implementation of the National Coordinator and CISA SRMA, which OIG accepted in support of the closeout for the recommendation on August 01, 2023. CISA awaits the final approval.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-59
<b>Report Title</b>	CISA Can Improve Efforts to Ensure Dam Security and Resilience
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/09/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Establish policies, procedures, and performance metrics to help ensure CISA divisions consistently assess the impact of all programs and activities relating to CISA’s role as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Dams Sector, and that CISA assess their effectiveness in the role of Sector-Specific Agency for the Dams Sector.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CISA will prepare the guidelines and metrics for the implementation of the SRMA roles and responsibilities upon the completion of the Presidential PD-21 update. As the roles and responsibilities are outlined in the FY 2021 NDAA, the Presidential PD-21 rewrite will provide clarity to the duties entrusted to federal agencies to help manage risk to critical infrastructure.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-59
<b>Report Title</b>	CISA Can Improve Efforts to Ensure Dam Security and Resilience
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/09/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Strengthen coordination with FEMA by establishing Memorandums of Understanding, Interagency Agreements, or other documented strategies to formally define CISA’s and FEMA’s roles and responsibilities for information sharing and

	analytical collaboration for grant decision-making related to safety, security, and resilience of dams, as well as the use and applicability of numerical simulation models, flood inundation tools, and supporting geospatial mapping capabilities to support emergency preparedness and incident response.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CISA is still waiting for OIG to close. CISA provided the closeout memo on August 30, 2023. OIG reached out in September to ask questions regarding the agreement signed between CISA and FEMA. CISA provided those answers shortly thereafter and now awaits OIG's closure decision.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-06
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Needs Additional Oversight and Documentation to Ensure Progress in Joint Cybersecurity Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/08/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop an implementation plan to conduct periodic assessments for monitoring the progress of goals and activities and complete annual updates on action items, as required by the Cyber Action Plan and associated 2015 and 2018 memorandums.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CISA is still waiting for the signature of the 2018 MOU; it is presently with DHS Policy for review and adjudication. Once the close out memo is signed, CISA will submit the 2018 MOU close out memo to OIG to close. The overall ECD has been pushed to account for the DOD review process.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-06

<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Needs Additional Oversight and Documentation to Ensure Progress in Joint Cybersecurity Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/08/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Conduct centralized tracking and completion of signed closeout summaries to reconcile the ongoing, outstanding, and open tasks and activities, as required by the Cyber Action Plan and associated 2015 and 2018 memorandums.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CISA is still waiting for the signature of the 2018 MOU; it is presently with DHS Policy for review and adjudication. Once the close out memo is signed, CISA will submit the 2018 MOU close out memo to OIG to close. The overall ECD has been pushed to account for the DOD review process.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-06
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Needs Additional Oversight and Documentation to Ensure Progress in Joint Cybersecurity Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/08/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Establish performance measures to ensure the effectiveness and completion of the Cyber Action Plan and associated 2015 and 2018 memorandum activities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CISA is still waiting for the signature of the 2018 MOU; it is presently with DHS Policy for review and adjudication. Once the close out memo is signed, CISA will submit the 2018 MOU close out memo to OIG to close. The overall ECD has been pushed to account for the DOD review process.

<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-06
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Needs Additional Oversight and Documentation to Ensure Progress in Joint Cybersecurity Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/08/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Establish the DHS governance structure and ensure it consists of an Executive Committee that meets at least semi-annually and a Steering Committee that meets at least quarterly, as required.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CISA is still waiting for the signature of the 2018 MOU; it is presently with DHS Policy for review and adjudication. Once the close out memo is signed, CISA will submit the 2018 MOU close out memo to OIG to close. The overall ECD has been pushed to account for the DOD review process.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-33
<b>Report Title</b>	The Office of Bombing Prevention Needs to Improve its Management and Assessment of Capabilities to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/29/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Issue policy that clearly delineates the Office for Bombing Prevention’s day-to-day responsibilities in leading Presidential Policy Directive 17 coordination and implementation efforts across DHS, including a process for identifying, tracking, and elevating participation issues, as well as tracking milestones quarterly.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/31/2024

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CISA's Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) continues to work with CISA's Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (OSPP) to review and edit the CISA directive manual. CISA/OSPP currently maintains the latest revision and are conducting reviews and making edits to ensure the policy meets CISA policy standards and OBP is in regular communications with the OSPP team. The draft directive will be reviewed for adjustments to the language, then circulated through the appropriate agency processes for review and approval.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-33
<b>Report Title</b>	The Office of Bombing Prevention Needs to Improve its Management and Assessment of Capabilities to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/29/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Integrate its C-IED data sources and modernize its National Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Capabilities Analysis Database (NCCAD) reporting system to generate automated reports at the national, regional, and state level.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CISA OBP has obtained additional funding and is currently on track to award a recompete contract required to continue iterative development of the Data. CISA OBP has transitioned NCCAD Modernization system development to include the Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operational Data and Analytics (CODA) tool and the recently developed Data Entry Tool (DET) to CISA OCIO. Training, point of sale outreach, and unit assessment data have been integrated into a common operational picture and are being managed through CODA and DET. Additionally, CODA is in full time use with OBP's Threat Analysis Team to log daily IED incidents. This update allows for a near real-time visualization of IED incidents as they are reported. OBP will continue to work with OCIO on development of remaining key data integration, visualization, and reporting features to reach Indicators of Compromise.
<b>Component</b>	CISA

<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-59
<b>Report Title</b>	Additional Progress Needed to Improve Information Sharing Under the Cybersecurity Act of 2015
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/16/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Director of CISA develop and implement a formal process to verify the number of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures shared through CISA’s Automated Indicator Sharing capabilities to enable accurate reporting and oversight.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CISA submitted closure documentation on June 30, 2023, and is still waiting for OIG’s decision on closure.
<b>Component</b>	CISA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-63
<b>Report Title</b>	CISA and FEMA Can Improve Coordination Efforts to Ensure Energy Sector Resilience
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/02/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	CISA Director and FEMA Administrator develop and document a comprehensive and adaptive framework ensuring collaboration between DHS components in support of Energy Sector activities, including procedures to: a. Periodically monitor and update DHS Energy Sector activities to ensure progress toward achieving common goals and outcomes, such as those in the National Preparedness Goal and the Energy Sector-Specific Plan; and b. Identify relevant participants and eliminate challenges to data sharing (e.g., developing a method for regularly updating the list of Federal offices with a “need to know” status and sharing risk assessment information with each other, DHS components, and key stakeholders, as permitted by law).
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2025



<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CISA expects to complete the National Plan refresh within 6-9 months of the Presidential PD-21 update, with SSPs subsequently developed and finalized within 6-9 months of the completed National Plan. Accordingly, CISA now anticipates completion of these activities by September 2025.
<b>Component</b>	CWMD
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-22
<b>Report Title</b>	Biological Threat Detection and Response Challenges Remain for BioWatch
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/02/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Conduct risk assessments of BioWatch’s posture and align its capabilities with the program’s mission.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CWMD has engaged and provided input to OIG to address this recommendation. The BioWatch program initiated a re-evaluation of the collector network to ensure optimal coverage was provided for each of the jurisdictions. Additionally, the BioWatch program initiated an IPT to evaluate opportunities to enhance program operations, which included development of a risk assessment to assist jurisdictions in identifying gaps in preparedness. The IPT also identified opportunities to improve capacity and coverage of high visibility events and venues, which are currently being pursued. The CWMD Audit Liaison and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Operational Support Division communicated these items to OIG during a meeting on September 22, 2023. At that time, OIG indicated that the use of the term “nationwide” was inconsistent with the true operational capability of the program. BioWatch had previously recognized the potential misinterpretation associated with the term and had begun to remove it from all program documents. During the meeting, the BioWatch Program Director acknowledged that the program would do another round of review to ensure use of the term “nationwide” was removed from all program documents to avoid any future confusion. That review and process will be completed by October 31, 2023.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA

<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-18-71
<b>Report Title</b>	Special Review: FEMA Paid Employees Over the Annual Premium Pay Cap
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/31/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Adhere to the responsibilities defined in FEMA's Premium Pay Policy and/or update the policy as needed to enact workable steps to enforce the annual premium pay cap.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA has finalized the updated draft of FEMA's policy on Premium Pay. However, the policy requires a change in personnel pay structure that will impact more than 100 FEMA employees, which requires Congressional notification regarding structural pay reform as outlined in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. No. 116-260, div. F, § 525). Congress was notified on May 11, 2023, however the Congressional staff requested additional information which FEMA is compiling for submission.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-19-66
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Did Not Sufficiently Safeguard Use of Transportation Assistance Funds
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/30/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery strengthen FEMA's transportation assistance policies and procedures and coordinate with FEMA Assistant Administrator for Mission Support to: a) require the collection and retention of eligibility documentation or where applicable, document the steps taken to validate applicant statements in FEMA's system of record, and b) ensure future information technology updates support the collection, use, and retention of unique Vehicle Identification Numbers to enable FEMA to cross-reference national databases to confirm insurance coverage and identify applicant's second vehicles.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA continues to strongly non-concur with this recommendation and has outlined its perspective in various communications with DHS OIG including, but not limited to, FEMA's Management Response Letter and 90-Day Letter. To date, OIG has declined to close this recommendation and has opted not to elevate it to the DHS Under Secretary for Management for resolution.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Title</b>	OIG-19-66
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	FEMA Did Not Sufficiently Safeguard Use of Transportation Assistance Funds
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	09/30/2019
<b>Recommendation</b>	3
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	We recommend the FEMA Assistant Administrator for Recovery, in accordance with the Stafford and Improper Payments Acts; develop controls to identify payments not used for critical transportation needs.
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	TBD
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	OIG
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Title</b>	OIG-20-15
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	FEMA Purchased More Manufactured Housing Units Than It Needed in Texas After Hurricane Harvey
	02/27/2020

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Office of Response and Recovery, Associate Administrator take steps to maintain a complete set of supporting documentation, including invoices and bills of lading to support all of its MHU and TPS assets. FEMA should also align its recordkeeping with Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123 and the Federal Acquisition Regulation by establishing documentation processes that include audit trails and specific document retention periods.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On September 30, 2023, FEMA Logistics Management Directorate (LMD) completed software configuration for the Lifecycle Process Management System (LPMS)'s minimal viable product. The next milestone is the configuration of LPMS to provide reporting on Transportable Temporary Housing Units (TTHU) installations. The reporting will include maintenance and inspection scheduling and capturing costs associated with site inspections and haul/install of TTHU units. The ECD for this configuration is December 31, 2024. By an ECD of December 31, 2026, LMD will complete updates to LPMS to attain FOC. At this point, LPMS will be capable of maintaining a complete set of supporting documentation associated with the TTHU program, including invoices and bills of lading.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-23
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Has Made More than \$3 Billion in Improper and Potentially Fraudulent Payments for Home Repair Assistance since 2003
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/06/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Federal Emergency Management Agency Administrator, due to the questioned costs exceeding \$3 billion, implement a process to collect documentation and verify eligibility for applicants claiming no homeowner's insurance prior to providing IHP home repair assistance payouts.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA continues to strongly non-concur with this recommendation and has outlined its perspective in various communications with OIG including, but not limited to, FEMA's Management Response Letter and 90-Day Letter. To date, OIG has declined to close this recommendation and has opted not to elevate it to the DHS Under Secretary for Management for resolution.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-23
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Has Made More than \$3 Billion in Improper and Potentially Fraudulent Payments for Home Repair Assistance since 2003
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/06/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Federal Emergency Management Agency Administrator include the IHP as susceptible to significant improper payments subject to annual improper payments estimation and reporting.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA continues to strongly non-concur with this recommendation and has outlined its perspective in various communications with OIG including, but not limited to, FEMA's Management Response Letter and 90-Day Letter. To date, OIG has declined to close this recommendation and has opted not to elevate it to the DHS Under Secretary for Management for resolution.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-48
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Lee County, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/15/2020

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, work with the State of Florida to ensure that the County's funding and/or reimbursements for the above projects is properly reduced by \$899,450 for unsupported force account costs and \$61,109 for unallocable contract costs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/26/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Region 4 submitted documentation for closure consideration to OIG on September 26, 2023. FEMA provided the OIG determination memos that were sent to the State regarding disallowed costs. If the State elects to appeal FEMA's decision, the process may take up to a year.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-48
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Lee County, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/15/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, work with the State of Florida to determine the allowability of the unsupported costs of \$16,210 for Project 6683 and collect any amounts that are determined to be unallowable.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/26/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Region 4 submitted documentation for closure consideration to OIG on September 26, 2023. FEMA provided the OIG determination memos that were sent to the State regarding disallowed costs. If the State elects to appeal FEMA's decision, the process may take up to a year, and may impact the final disallowed costs depending on the outcome of an appeal.

<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-48
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Lee County, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/15/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, work with the State of Florida to adequately review costs and ensure that the request for funding includes sufficient supporting documentation before approving the costs for FEMA reimbursement.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/26/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Region 4 submitted documentation for closure consideration to OIG on September 26, 2023. FEMA provided the OIG determination memos that were sent to the State regarding disallowed costs. If the State elects to appeal FEMA's decision, the process may take up to a year, and may impact the final disallowed costs depending on the outcome of an appeal.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-48
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Lee County, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/15/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, work with the State of Florida to determine the eligibility of the contract costs and disallow these costs if the contractors did not bill the costs in accordance with contract terms and did not adequately support the billings.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/26/2023

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Region 4 has submitted documentation for closure consideration to OIG on September 26, 2023. FEMA provided the OIG determination memorandums that were sent to the State regarding disallowed costs. If the State elects to appeal FEMA's decision, the process may take up to a year, and may impact the final disallowed costs depending on the outcome of an appeal.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-48
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Lee County, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/15/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, provide additional technical assistance and monitoring for the County's projects, to provide FEMA with reasonable assurance that the County properly accounts for contract costs, including obtaining and retaining supporting documentation.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/26/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Region 4 submitted documentation for closure consideration to OIG on September 26, 2023. FEMA provided the OIG determination memorandums that were sent to the State regarding disallowed costs. If the State elects to appeal FEMA's decision, the process may take up to a year, and may impact the final disallowed costs depending on the outcome of an appeal.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-48
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Lee County, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/15/2020



<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, work with the State of Florida to educate the County representatives on including the required C.F.R. provisions in their contracts and to increase monitoring to ensure compliance with related Federal provisions.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/26/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Region 4 submitted documentation for closure consideration to OIG on September 26, 2023. FEMA provided the OIG with documentation indicating that training with the State has taken place.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-50
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Polk County School Board, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, determine the allowability of the \$46,168 in unsupported spoilage costs and collect any amount that is determined to be unallowable from PCSB.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA Region 4 will meet with OIG on October 30, 2023, to discuss follow up questions on the request for closure and the recouping of some of the funding provided to the State. FEMA submitted documentation for closure consideration on September 29, 2023.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-50

<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Polk County School Board, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, ensure that the State of Florida does not reimburse PCSB for the \$26,911 in ineligible costs
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA Region 4 will meet with OIG on October 30, 2023, to discuss follow up questions on the request for closure and the recouping of some of the funding provided to the State. FEMA submitted documentation for closure consideration on September 29, 2023.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-50
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Polk County School Board, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, ensure that the State of Florida does not reimburse PCSB for the \$897 in unallowable costs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA Region 4 will meet with OIG on October 30, 2023, to discuss follow up questions on the request for closure and the recouping of some of the funding provided to the State. FEMA submitted documentation for closure consideration on September 29, 2023.

<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-50
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Polk County School Board, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, ensure that the State of Florida does not reimburse PCSB for the \$329 in unallowable costs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA Region 4 will meet with OIG on October 30, 2023, to discuss follow up questions on the request for closure and the recouping of some of the funding provided to the State. FEMA submitted documentation for closure consideration on September 29, 2023.

<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-50
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Polk County School Board, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV, work with the State of Florida to request that PCSB review the hourly wage amounts for all employees and adjust the RFR accordingly.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA Region 4 will meet with OIG on October 30, 2023, to discuss follow up questions on the request for closure and the recouping of some of the funding provided to the State. FEMA submitted documentation for closure consideration on September 29, 2023.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-51
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Monroe County, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV direct the State of Florida to recover the \$265,928 in ineligible costs from the County.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Region 4 submitted documentation for closure consideration on September 29, 2023. FEMA provided the OIG determination memorandums that were sent to the State regarding disallowed costs. If the State elects to appeal FEMA's decision, the process may take up to a year, and may impact the final disallowed costs depending on the outcome of an appeal.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-51
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Monroe County, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV direct the State of Florida to recover the \$30,237 in unreasonable force account labor costs from the County.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Region 4 submitted documentation for closure consideration on September 29, 2023. FEMA provided the OIG determination memorandums that were sent to the State regarding disallowed costs. If the State elects to appeal FEMA's decision, the process may take up to a year, and may impact the final disallowed costs depending on the outcome of an appeal.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-51
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Monroe County, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	12
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV direct the State of Florida to recover the \$2,403 in ineligible costs from the County.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Region 4 submitted documentation for closure consideration on September 29, 2023. A Notice of Potential Debt Collection was provided to OIG on September 29, 2023, to address FEMA's action to recoup the funding. The notification that FEMA is moving forward with recouping the funding should be sufficient for addressing the recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-51
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Monroe County, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2020

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	15
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV direct the State of Florida to monitor the County's procedures and ensure the County establishes and maintains internal controls over the retention of supporting documentation.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On September 29, 2023, documentation was forwarded to OIG with a request for closure. A Notice of Potential Debt Collection was provided to OIG on September 29, 2023, to address FEMA's action to recoup the funding. The notification that FEMA is moving forward with recouping the funding should be sufficient for addressing the recommendation. The response from OIG is pending.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-51
<b>Report Title</b>	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Monroe County, Florida
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/20/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	16
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend that the Regional Administrator, FEMA Region IV direct the State of Florida to require the County to provide additional technical assistance and monitoring of the County's contracts to ensure that the County only awards time-and-materials contracts when necessary and that all contracts comply with Federal Uniform Guidance (2 C.F.R. 200) requirements.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Region 4 submitted documentation for closure consideration on September 29, 2023. FEMA provided evidence to OIG that technical assistance was provided to that State and County regarding the recommendation.

<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-60
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Has Paid Billions in Improper Payments for SBA Dependent Other Needs Assistance since 2003
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/12/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator, due to the more than \$3.3 billion in questioned costs throughout a 16-year period, implement a process to collect income and dependent documentation on SBA Dependent ONA applicants to ensure payments are proper.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On June 26, 2023, FEMA transmitted a letter to OIG noting FEMA's continued non-concurrence as expressed on the June 26, 2020 letter with the recommendations in this audit. FEMA is awaiting the OIG's response.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-60
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Has Paid Billions in Improper Payments for SBA Dependent Other Needs Assistance since 2003
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/12/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator, due to the questioned costs in recommendation 1, implement a verification process to ensure accuracy of income and dependent information provided by SBA Dependent ONA applicants.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On June 26, 2023, FEMA transmitted a letter to OIG noting FEMA’s continued non-concurrence as expressed on the June 26, 2020 letter with the recommendations in this audit. FEMA is awaiting the OIG’s response.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-60
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Has Paid Billions in Improper Payments for SBA Dependent Other Needs Assistance since 2003
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/12/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator, include SBA Dependent ONA as susceptible to significant improper payments subject to annual improper payments estimation and reporting.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On June 26, 2023, FEMA transmitted a letter to OIG noting FEMA’s continued non-concurrence as expressed on the June 26, 2020 letter with the recommendations in this audit. FEMA is awaiting the OIG’s response.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-68
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Is Not Effectively Administering a Program to Reduce or Eliminate Damage to Severe Repetitive Loss Properties
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/08/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Administrator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency devise a plan to strengthen its management of SRL properties and ensure the accuracy of the SRL list. The plan should: (1) assign specific roles and responsibilities to ensure cross-division integration, implementation, and monitoring of FEMA's SRL strategy; (2) improve its workflow tracking system to monitor all requested changes to the SRL list and capture resulting outcomes; and (3) evaluate alternatives for updating the SRL list apart from Form AW-501, such as permitting updates to a property’s mitigation status based on submission of a proper elevation certificate.



<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Manual mitigation efforts are ongoing with Texas and Louisiana. However, there have been delays in Q3 FY 2023 because the States are revamping their mitigation progress forms and are including the NFIP required fields for FEMA input. Federal Insurance Division is looking forward to Region 4 starting their manual mitigation submissions.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-68
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Is Not Effectively Administering a Program to Reduce or Eliminate Damage to Severe Repetitive Loss Properties
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/08/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Administrator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency revise FEMA's approach to ensure equitable and timely distribution of mitigation funding. At a minimum, FEMA should: (1) devise a plan and conduct outreach to communities with a large number of SRL properties to identify and address barriers to their participation in the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) grant program; (2) update regional, state, and community training to address inconsistent practices and requirements that hinder NFIP-insured participation in the FMA grant program; and (3) develop and implement policies and procedures to monitor and enforce grant requirements.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	HMA grant program staff continues to attend weekly FEMA GO meetings to support the integration of FEMA GO and the insurance system of record to have a functioning property inventory used to identify completed, mitigated properties for post closeout monitoring. HMA grant program staff have drafted the enforcement document (with recommended enforcement options), received leadership and FEMA's Office of Chief Counsel comments for adjudication, and are currently ensuring compliance with the recently released 2023 HMA Program and Policy Guide.

<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-76
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Mismanaged the Commodity Distribution Process in Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/25/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the FEMA Administrator develop a comprehensive strategy and implementation plans for improving asset tracking and in-transit visibility across all modes of transportation. These plans should also include specific goals and corrective actions to address the agency’s commodity distribution challenges in managing the end-to-end distribution process, ensure the accuracy of underlying data, and strengthen and integrate distribution policies and the governance structure.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA LMD is working to develop a CONOPS document explaining how FEMA plans to improve asset tracking and in-transit visibility across all modes of transportation in support of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The CONOPS ECD is January 31, 2024.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-76
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Mismanaged the Commodity Distribution Process in Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/25/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the FEMA Administrator develop and improve management reporting and data gathering business processes to address the data reporting challenges, resulting in more accurate and near-real-time information that enables quality decision making in assessing disaster survivor support needs.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	LMD is working to address the data reporting challenges, resulting in more accurate and near real-time information that enables quality decision making in assessing disaster survivor support needs. Specifically, LMD will develop a Logistics Manual Processes in a Degraded Environment SOP document by December 29, 2023, and develop guidance for reviewing the quality of data/information reported in the Logistics Supply Chain Management System by August 30, 2024.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Title</b>	OIG-21-26
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	FEMA's Procurement and Cost Reimbursement Review Process Needs Improvement
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	03/04/2021
<b>Recommendation</b>	3
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	Ensure the Regional Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV, review debris removal procurements and projects and either disallow or acquire support documentation for \$25,594,524 (\$23,282,276 Federal share) in questionable debris costs.
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	DHS
<b>Recommendation</b>	OIG indicated this recommendation will remain open until they have received a Final Inspection Report for each Project Worksheet from FEMA, which will allow OIG to review the basis for the agency's determinations. FEMA is working to provide those Inspection Reports to OIG by mid-December 2023.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Title</b>	OIG-21-28
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Needs Revised Policies and Procedures to Better Manage Recovery of Disallowed Grant Funds

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/11/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator should review and update, as necessary, all applicable policies to reflect the changes to the statute of limitations created by the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 for Section 705(a) of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/16/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On November 16, 2023, OIG closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	
	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-28
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Needs Revised Policies and Procedures to Better Manage Recovery of Disallowed Grant Funds
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/11/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator should revise FEMA’s process to routinely review all internal policies and procedures when Federal laws and regulations affecting FEMA change to ensure internal policies and procedures remain compliant and required changes are timely.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/16/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On November 16, 2023, OIG closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.

<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-42
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Initiated the Hurricane Harvey Direct Housing Assistance Agreement without Necessary Processes and Controls
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/06/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure its direct housing information system provides flexibility implementing alternative direct housing options; provides support to states, territories, and tribal governments administering direct housing assistance; and facilitates data exchange and sharing with non-FEMA information systems.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA Recovery Technology Program Division (RTPD) continuously works to document security controls and attain a formal Authority to Operate (ATO) is ongoing. The target date for ATO completion has shifted to February 29, 2024, to allow the OCIO's contractor sufficient time to develop the FEMA Enterprise Cloud/ Recovery Cloud Environment networking architecture for the Accessible Communication for Survivor Support Helpline system. RTPD hosted additional meetings with Deputy Directors with the Individual Assistance Division. Also, RTPD has hosted monthly meetings with Recovery Cloud Environment. Collaborative planning, analysis, and development will continue for the next few years.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-43
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Has Not Prioritized Compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Hindering Its Ability to Reduce Repetitive Damages to Roads and Bridges
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/06/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Address unresolved implementation issues, publish proposed regulations for notice and comment within 1 year, and issue final regulations within 3 years of issuance of this report for implementation of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 5172(b)(2).

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	In July 2021, OIG recommended the FEMA Administrator address unresolved implementation issues, publish proposed regulations for notice and comment within 1 year, and issue final regulations within 3 years of issuance of this report for implementation of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 5172(b)(2). On October 2, 2023, FEMA will transmit to OIG a CAP Update, including a Request for Closure of Recommendation 1. FEMA continues to request closure of this recommendation while continuing to assess how best to move forward with implementation of section 205(b) of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 and determining appropriate next steps for the Public Assistance (PA) Repetitive Damage rulemaking, Regulation Identification Number 1660-AA47.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-43
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Has Not Prioritized Compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Hindering Its Ability to Reduce Repetitive Damages to Roads and Bridges
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/06/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Review and resolve hazard mitigation challenges, such as: -ensuring education and training of states and applicants on migration programs and availability of funding at the state and applicant levels; -revising criteria and instructions for completing benefit-cost analysis to clarify and streamlines the process and assist applicants with meeting the required benefit-cost threshold; -streamlining the processes from application submission to approval to decrease applicants’ wait time for mitigation; and -considering existing flexibilities to adjust the cost share for applicants experiencing financial hardships.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/17/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On October 17, 2023, OIG closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-64
<b>Report Title</b>	Lessons Learned from FEMA’s Initial Response to COVID-19
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/21/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Assistant Administrator for Response in the Office of Response and Recovery at FEMA improve the reliability of WebEOC data by: a. Developing internal controls for WebEOC to prevent incomplete and inaccurate information from being entered into the system; and b. Ensuring all new users receive formal training on completing, submitting, processing, and tracking of resource requests in WebEOC.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/16/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed – Implemented
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On October 16, 2023, OIG closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-64
<b>Report Title</b>	Lessons Learned from FEMA’s Initial Response to COVID-19
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/21/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Associate Administrator for Response and Recovery at FEMA strengthen FEMA’s coordination during the COVID-19 response and future pandemics by formally documenting the policies and procedures for making informed and consistent resource allocation decisions for critical lifesaving supplies and equipment.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	OIG has stated this recommendation will remain open until FEMA and its partners publish the updated Pandemic Crisis Action Plan.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Title</b>	OIG-21-64
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	Lessons Learned from FEMA's Initial Response to COVID-19
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	09/21/2021
<b>Recommendation</b>	3
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	We recommend the Administrator of FEMA, working with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, issue clarifying guidance defining agencies' pandemic response roles and responsibilities under Stafford Act declarations.
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	08/10/2023
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	OIG
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	The revised Biological Incident Annex (BIA) was submitted, disseminated, and published to the National Security Council and interagency stakeholders on May 16, 2023. On August 10, 2023, FEMA requested that OIG close the recommendation as implemented.
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	OIG-21-71
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Better Address Employee Allegations of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct
	09/29/2021
	3



<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator should develop and implement formal processes and procedures to ensure allegations of egregious harassment raised in EEO complaints can be referred to the Office of Professional Responsibility for separate, potential misconduct review at the discretion of the Office of Equal Rights director.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The Office of Equal Rights expects the SOP to be completed by the end of November 2023. FEMA will then submit documentation to OIG for closure consideration.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-11
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Continues to Phase Out Its Use of Alternative Contracting Methods to Administer the National Flood Insurance Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/04/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA's Deputy Associate Administrator for Insurance and Mitigation strengthen oversight of the National Flood Insurance Program cash management process to ensure Write Your Own insurance providers' and NFIP Direct and Bureau and Statistical Agent contractors' accounts receivable and accounts payable aging reports and bank reconciliations are reviewed.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Federal Insurance Division (FID) created a bulletin to inform WYO companies of new requirements and instructions for submitting documentation for accounts receivable and accounts payable aging reports and monthly bank reconciliations. It has been approved and has been disseminated to the companies. During the next few months, FID will provide guidance, answer questions, and address feedback on the new requirements.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	FEMA

<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-25
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Should Apply Lessons Learned from the STEP Pilot Program Implementation in Puerto Rico to Future Programs
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/07/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Assistant Administrator for FEMA's Recovery Directorate establish program- or award-specific performance goals to measure the progress of recipients in implementing activities under state-administered sheltering assistance grant awards.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/13/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On August 09, 2022, FEMA requested closure of this recommendation. On January 12, 2023, FEMA met with OIG to discuss additional documentation needed for closure. On January 13, 2023, FEMA submitted the requested documentation to OIG. On September 14, 2023, OIG informed FEMA that OIG anticipates providing a response in October 2023.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-25
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Should Apply Lessons Learned from the STEP Pilot Program Implementation in Puerto Rico to Future Programs
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/07/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Assistant Administrator for FEMA's Recovery Directorate establish coordinated program- or award-specific oversight activities to monitor, assess, and provide guidance to sheltering assistance grant recipients on performance and corrective actions to address shortfalls. In addition: (a) ensure proper documentation of oversight activities; and (b) validate accuracy of progress-related data provided by the award recipient.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/13/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On August 09, 2022, FEMA requested closure of this recommendation. On January 12, 2023, FEMA met with OIG to discuss additional documentation needed for closure. On January 13, 2023, FEMA submitted the requested documentation to OIG. On September 14, 2023, OIG informed FEMA that OIG anticipates providing a response in October 2023.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-46
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Needs to Improve Oversight and Management of Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Property Acquisitions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for Resilience implement financial management procedures to ensure FEMA regional officials monitor and close HMGP property acquisition projects in a timely manner, and that they conduct Strategic Funds Management reviews, document review decisions, and implement such decisions where appropriate. These actions will help minimize as much as \$134,911,248 in funds that FEMA could put to better use.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA reviewed and updated existing materials to incorporate language required by the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 legislation to substantially change the management cost procedures and create a separate subrecipient management cost allowance, while assuring compliance with 2023 Hazard Mitigation Assistance Program and Policy Guide.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-46
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Needs to Improve Oversight and Management of Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Property Acquisitions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for Resilience implement management procedures to ensure HMGP property acquisition project applications and project information are complete and accurate when submitted, reviewed, closed, and maintained by FEMA.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	GMM is on track to fully import legacy data for HMGP into FEMA GO by September 30, 2026. The onboarding of the data migration vendor has been delayed by 9 months. This has caused the ECD for data migration work to shift to September 30, 2026.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-46
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Needs to Improve Oversight and Management of Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Property Acquisitions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for Resilience direct FEMA regions to ensure states monitor, inspect, and report to FEMA on acquired HMGP properties in accordance with grant requirements to confirm the properties are maintained as open space.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The Open Space team has published the Region 6 dataset to the online portal and has provided training to the Region 6 team on using the platform to oversee and ensure the acquired properties are maintained as open space as stipulated in 44 C.F.R. 80.11.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-46

<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Needs to Improve Oversight and Management of Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Property Acquisitions
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator for Resilience and FEMA’s Office of Equal Rights continue initiatives to reduce barriers and increase opportunities pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for applying for and receiving FEMA HMGP property acquisition grants. Additionally, we recommend that FEMA develop guidance and implement equity considerations in program delivery, including the states’ use of demographic, economic, and other required data when selecting projects for HMGP property acquisition.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Mitigation Directorate HMA is extending the ECD to bring the ECD in alignment with a corresponding recommendation in a similar GAO audit (GAO-22-104694 recommendation 3). Throughout the coming months, HMA will deliver webinars, as well as supporting guidance on compliance being developed; however, internal milestones may shift depending on staff availability and competing priorities.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-51
<b>Report Title</b>	Assessment of FEMA's Public Assistance Alternative Procedures Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/13/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Associate Administrator of the Office of Response and Recovery assess issues pertaining to the use of Public Assistance Alternative Procedures for projects in Puerto Rico resulting from Hurricanes Irma and Maria and incorporate lessons learned into Section 428 procedures for future disasters.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On October 16, 2023, FEMA will transmit a CAP update outlining the steps FEMA has taken to address this recommendation. FEMA's ECD for the completion Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide version 5 is May 31, 2024. On October 2, 2023, FEMA will submit the draft content to DHS and OMB for review. FEMA anticipates DHS and OMB's clearance by December 29, 2023. The overall public comment period of the PAPPG version 5 draft is anticipated to last until March 10, 2024.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-51
<b>Report Title</b>	Assessment of FEMA's Public Assistance Alternative Procedures Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/13/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Associate Administrator of the Office of Response and Recovery assess whether it can or should change aspects of the PAAP program in response to suggestions raised by applicants.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On October 16, 2023, FEMA will transmit a CAP update outlining the steps FEMA has taken to address this recommendation. FEMA's ECD for the completion Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide version 5 is May 31, 2024. On October 2, 2023, FEMA will submit the draft content to DHS and OMB for review. FEMA anticipates DHS and OMB's clearance by December 29, 2023. The overall public comment period of the PAPPG version 5 draft is anticipated to last until March 10, 2024.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-54
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Did not Adequately or Efficiently Deploy Its Employees in Support of Operation Allies Welcome
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/27/2022

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop a framework for directing DHS components to deploy staff to support missions, including non-centrally funded, unplanned, or emergency operations, for which DHS resources are needed
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On October 24, 2023, a meeting will take place between FEMA’s Field Operations Directorate (FOD)-ORR-ALO regarding a plan of action for this open-resolved recommendation due to a reassigned audit from DHS MGMT-PARM. The program SME will meet internally in preparation of the next steps.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Title</b>	OIG-22-54
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	DHS Did not Adequately or Efficiently Deploy Its Employees in Support of Operation Allies Welcome
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	07/27/2022
<b>Recommendation</b>	2
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	Develop a volunteer deployment strategy that includes provisions for supporting volunteers, regardless of funding source.
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	01/31/2024
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	DHS
<b>Component</b>	On October 24, 2023, a meeting will take place between FOD-ORR-ALO regarding a plan of action for this open-resolved recommendation due to a reassigned audit from DHS MGMT-PARM. The program SMEs will meet internally in preparation of the next steps.
<b>Report Number</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Title</b>	OIG-22-56
<b>Component</b>	FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/10/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Administrator collaborate with the National Board to reallocate all unclaimed and unpaid funds for all phases with closed spending periods to the earliest possible phase.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA requested that OIG close this recommendation on July 1, 2022, and again on November 9, 2022. FEMA continues to strongly non-concur with this recommendation and has outlined its perspective in various communications with OIG including, but not limited to, FEMA’s Management Response Letter and 90-Day Letter. To date, OIG has declined to close this recommendation and has opted not to elevate it to the DHS Under Secretary for Management for resolution.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-56
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/10/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Administrator collaborate with the National Board to develop a more proactive approach to determine, as early in the process as possible, whether Local Boards and State Set-Aside Committees are willing to accept funds, so that funds can be reallocated from jurisdictions unwilling or unable to participate in the Emergency Food and Shelter Program.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA requested closure on July 1, 2022, and again on November 9, 2022. FEMA continues to strongly non-concur with this recommendation and has outlined its perspective in various communications with OIG including, but not limited to,



	FEMA's Management Response Letter and 90-Day Letter. To date, OIG has declined to close this recommendation and has opted not to elevate it to the DHS Under Secretary for Management for resolution.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-56
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/10/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator collaborate with the National Board to ensure United Way Worldwide performs a periodic analysis of Local Boards and State Set-Aside Committees that have routinely not accepted funds and determine whether Local Boards or State Set-Aside Committees can be reestablished.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA is collaborating with the National Board to ensure the National Board establishes a procedure and timeline for 1) contacting Local Boards (LB) and SSA Committees that have not submitted plans by the deadline and 2) reallocating funds from non-responsive LBs and SSAs or reclaiming funds not used. The National Board accepted the Term on March 3, 2023, and will complete the activities under it by December 29, 2023.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-56
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/10/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator Collaborate with the National Board to ensure United Way Worldwide develops and implements policies and guidance to Local Boards to follow when Local Recipient Organizations with outstanding compliance issues apply for Emergency Food and Shelter Program funding.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA continues to collaborate with the National Board to ensure United Way Worldwide (UWW), on behalf of the National Board, establishes written policies and guidance for LBs to follow when Local Recipient Organizations with outstanding compliance issues apply for Emergency Food and Shelter Program funding (EFSP).
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-56
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/10/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator develop and implement written policies on FEMA's roles, responsibilities, and procedures for operating the Emergency Food and Shelter Program.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA's EFSP-Humanitarian Relief awarded the task order with a contractor. The task order period of performance end date is 12 months from the date of award, which will be April 30, 2024. FEMA will then work to review and finalize the policies.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-56
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/10/2022

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator collaborate with the National Board to increase analysis of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program's performance and ability to deliver funds and assess program participation during each phase.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA provided documentation to support this request in the form of a copy of the UWW email sent to potential vendors to solicit bids for the EFSP IT redesign project, as well as a copy of the Request for Proposal and requested closure of this recommendation on August 28, 2023. The OIG stated FEMA's plan and proposed actions are responsive to this recommendation. However, to close the recommendation, the OIG requested adequate supporting documentation showing the redesigned system is, in fact, enabling better data tracking, availability, reporting, and analyses.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-56
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/10/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator collaborate with the National Board to establish a contract, memorandum of understanding, or other written agreement mechanism with the Emergency Food and Shelter Program's fiscal agent and secretariat to establish requirements and expectations.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On June 2023, the EFSP National Board approved hiring of contract support to draft an MOU to establish requirements and expectations between the National Board and its Secretariat and Fiscal Agent, UWW. The contractor delivered a draft MOU to UWW on June 28, 2023, which is under review by UWW and its legal counsel. On August 28, 2023, FEMA

requested closure of this recommendation after providing documentation to support this request in the form of a copy of an UWW email to the EFSP National Board confirming development of the MOU. OIG stated that to close the recommendation, FEMA would need to provide supporting documentation showing an approved and signed MOU with clear requirements and expectations of the EFSP’s Fiscal and Secretariat – UWW.

<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-56
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/10/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	9
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator collaborate with the National Board to establish a formal board charter and develop and implement written policies and procedures including, but not limited to, periodically reviewing the direct allocation formula and a risk assessment of Local Boards and Local Recipient Organizations for the compliance review process.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The National Board agreed to create a board charter to include a description of policies and procedures needed and to then establish written policies and procedures for periodically reviewing the direct allocation formula and assessing the risk of LBs and Local Recipient Organizations in the compliance review process. In July 2023, the National Board approved the hiring of contract support to develop the charter. FEMA’s EFSP is acquiring guidance on developing these written policies to address compliance issues fairly and effectively, taking into consideration how the Board currently manages compliance concerns, and advise UWW accordingly.

<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-56
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/10/2022

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	10
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator collaborate with the National Board to implement a plan to enforce already established guidance including Local Boards' deadlines for board plan submission and the disbursement of funds to Local Recipient Organizations within the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act's 3-month required timeframe.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA requested that OIG close this recommendation on July 1, 2022, and again on November 9, 2022. FEMA continues to strongly non-concur with this recommendation and has outlined its perspective in various communications with OIG including, but not limited to, FEMA's Management Response Letter and 90-Day Letter. To date, OIG has declined to close this recommendation and has opted not to elevate it to the DHS Under Secretary for Management for resolution.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-63
<b>Report Title</b>	CISA and FEMA Can Improve Coordination Efforts to Ensure Energy Sector Resilience
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/02/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	CISA Director and FEMA Administrator each review and update key guidance in support of Energy Sector and disaster response activities to ensure it is current, relevant, and consistent. Additionally, re recommend CISA and FEMA work with the Sector Risk Management Agency to ensure DHS Energy Sector policies, procedures, and guidance are compatible and do not contain conflicting terminology.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	In June 2023, FEMA initiated a revision to the Power Outage Incident Annex (POIA) in coordination with CISA and Department and Agency partners. The POIA revision completed the third step of the six-step planning process in October 2023 via an Information Analysis Brief provided to the interagency Emergency Support Function Leadership Group.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-69
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than \$3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/16/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator develop and implement a standard risk assessment process before initiating new Federal grant programs. This risk assessment should focus on identifying and evaluating program risks that may affect FEMA’s ability to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse in its programs and mitigating those external risks to the extent practical.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	For this recommendation, OIG would like to gain an understanding of the risk environment prior to developing and executing new Federal grant programs. This recommendation is currently unresolved. FEMA is analyzing the “recommendation follow-up” requests and evaluating a path forward to provide OIG a response for this recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-69
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than \$3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/16/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2

<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Administrator, when mandated to rely on eligibility determinations of non-FEMA programs, develop a process to assess the program controls and identify risk to the extent practical.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	In a document dated February 22, 2023, the OIG provided discussion points to address the OIG's identified internal control weaknesses within the LWA. For this recommendation, OIG would like to gain an understanding of the risk environment prior to developing and executing new Federal grant programs. This recommendation is currently unresolved. FEMA is analyzing the “recommendation follow-up” requests and is scheduling meetings to evaluate a path forward to provide OIG a response for this recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-69
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than \$3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/16/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Administrator update the State Administrative Plan template to incorporate a requirement for grantees to include a description of the steps to prevent improper payments.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	For this recommendation, OIG would like FEMA to create processes to update and adapt agreements when new or improved strategies, methods, and processes to mitigate weaknesses are identified; for example, the National Association of State Workforce Agency’s Integrity Data Hub. FEMA is analyzing the “recommendation follow-up” requests and evaluating a path forward to provide OIG a response for this recommendation.

<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-69
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than \$3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/16/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FEMA Administrator Develop and implement a process to monitor whether grantees implement and use the controls attested in FEMA-approved State Administrative Plans.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	For this recommendation, OIG would like FEMA to develop a mechanism that fosters open communication and collaboration with grantees to ensure best practices are shared and utilized. FEMA is analyzing the “recommendation follow-up” requests and evaluating a path forward to provide OIG a response for this recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-69
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than \$3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/16/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Administrator work with state workforce agencies to evaluate the Lost Wages Assistance program payments and verify that all recipients who received payment have a self-certification on file, as required; to determine whether the claimant meets eligibility requirements if no self-certification is on file; and, if not, to recover the payment.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD



<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	For this recommendation, OIG would like FEMA to develop and field a process to provide reasonable assurance that only eligible recipients receive program benefits. FEMA is analyzing the “recommendation follow-up” requests and evaluating a path forward to provide OIG a response for this recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-69
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than \$3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/16/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Administrator conduct an after-action study of the Lost Wages Assistance program and update FEMA's Individuals and Households Program based on the lessons learned from the study.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	For this recommendation, OIG would like FEMA to utilize their audit reports as a base for lessons learned and apply those lessons to future grant programs. FEMA is analyzing the “recommendation follow-up” requests and evaluating a path forward to provide OIG a response for this recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-69
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than \$3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/16/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7

<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Administrator de-obligate and recover any monies determined to have been obtained fraudulently or other improper payments through Lost Wages Assistance from the state workforce agencies.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	For this recommendation, OIG would like FEMA to develop and field a process to provide reasonable assurance that only eligible recipients receive program benefits. FEMA is analyzing the “recommendation follow-up” requests and evaluating a path forward to provide OIG a response for this recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-73
<b>Report Title</b>	More than \$2.6 Million in Potentially Fraudulent LWA Payments Were Linked to DHS Employees' Identities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/27/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Administrator develop and implement a process to review state administrative plans for consistency and ensure they include fraud prevention and mitigation strategies.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	For this recommendation, OIG would like FEMA to create a process requiring grantees to codify mitigation strategies and compensating controls to reduce fraud and improper payment. FEMA should be included in the development and approval processes. This recommendation is currently unresolved. FEMA is analyzing the “recommendation follow-up” requests and evaluating a path forward to provide OIG a response for this recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-76
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA's Management of Mission Assignments to Other Federal Agencies Needs Improvement

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/29/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Associate Administrator for Response and Recovery develop a process to ensure FEMA components comply with FEMA’s Mission Assignment Guide, requiring the formulation of comprehensive cost estimates during initiation and throughout the performance period for mission assignments.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The collection and coordination with all relevant FEMA stakeholders was conducted and concluded in July 2023. The revisions include updated language within the SOW and Total Cost Estimate replacing “comprehensive” and “detailed” cost estimates with “a breakdown outlining eligible costs” as identified in 44C.F.R. 206.8 (c).
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-76
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA’s Management of Mission Assignments to Other Federal Agencies Needs Improvement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/29/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Deputy Administrator develop a risk-based process for reviewing documentation that supports mission assignment expenditures and apply this process to COVID-19 mission assignments to ensure eligibility of claimed costs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA developed and initiated Mission Assignment (MA) Project Management (PM) SOP brown bag training sessions for targeted mission assignment specialists, managers, unit leads, and MA Project Manager personnel. The MA PM SOP is

	being consistently socialized with the Operations Cadre. The MA program advocated for all MA PM personnel to attend the MA 0349 training for a better understanding of MA and PM roles and responsibilities.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-76
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA's Management of Mission Assignments to Other Federal Agencies Needs Improvement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/29/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	FEMA Associate Administrator for Response and Recovery obtain documentation supporting the more than \$103 million for COVID-19 mission assignments and conduct a review to determine whether the costs comply with Federal and FEMA guidance.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The six mission assignments from the OIG report will be reviewed, in sequence with the MA PM SOP socialization and training (recommendation 3), since the team conducting the PM training will also be reviewing these missions.
<b>Component</b>	FEMA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-77
<b>Report Title</b>	FEMA did not Effectively Manage a Disaster Case Management Grant in Support of Hurricane Maria
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/29/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Federal Emergency Management Agency Administrator establish policies and procedures for the Disaster Case Management Program when the program is not awarded to the State or Territory. The policies should address how FEMA will perform oversight and monitoring and how FEMA will ensure that standards for financial management systems and compliance with the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (2 C.F.R. Pt. 200) are met.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA Individual Assistance plans to include updated language in the forthcoming Individual Assistance Program and Policy Guidance (IAPPG) v2.0. As described in the administration’s Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions published on www.reginfo.gov, Individual Assistance is also planning an update to regulations governing the Individual Assistance program. To ensure that FEMA Individual Assistance policy guidance is in accordance with FEMA regulations, Individual Assistance has updated the forecasted publication of IAPPG 2.0 from March 29, 2024, to no later than December 31, 2025. The IAPPG will include OIG’s suggested updates to oversight, monitoring, and ensuring compliance for financial management systems and the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principle, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards.
<b>Component</b>	Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-17-49
<b>Report Title</b>	Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/30/2017
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Formalize agreements that enable I&A field officials to develop intelligence reporting with DHS components in the field, based on pilot program results.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	As of September 30, 2023, a CAP update has been provided to OIG. DHS continues to revise Instruction 264-01-006, DHS Intelligence Information Report (IIR) Program. The internal review time was extended due to IA's internal realignment announced on May 4, 2023. After submission to MGMT and Component Review, I&A expects the final Instruction to be signed by March 31, 2024.

<b>Component</b>	I&A
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-17-49
<b>Report Title</b>	Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/30/2017
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop and implement guidance for intelligence reporting in the field.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	As of September 30, 2023, a CAP update has been provided to OIG. DHS continues to revise Instruction 264-01-006, DHS IIR Program. The internal review time was extended due to I&A's internal realignment announced on May 4, 2023. After submission to MGMT and Component Review, I&A expects the final Instruction to be signed by March 31, 2024.
<b>Component</b>	I&A
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-17-49
<b>Report Title</b>	Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/30/2017
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop and implement guidance for field officials granting them local release authority for intelligence reporting.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	As of September 30, 2023, a CAP update has been provided to OIG. DHS continues to revise Instruction 264-01-006, DHS IIR Program. The internal review time was extended due to I&A's internal realignment announced on May 4, 2023. After submission to MGMT and Component Review, I&A expects the final Instruction to be signed by March 31, 2024.

<b>Component</b>	I&A
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-29
<b>Report Title</b>	I&A Identified Threats Prior to January 6, 2021, but Did Not Issue Any Intelligence Products before the U.S. Capitol Breach
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/04/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis provide enhanced annual training and guidance to Open-Source Collection Operations Branch (OSCO) staff reviewing the Intelligence Oversight and Program Guidelines, including all criteria for reporting open-source intelligence information.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	OSCO and Intelligence Training Academy (ITA) updated the two-week Open-Source Intelligence Report (OSIR) Workshop to incorporate all criteria for reporting open-source intelligence information, including whether the information contains true threats or incitement to violence, enhances I&A’s understanding of known threat actors, or demonstrates a risk of violence during a heightened threat environment. Curriculum updates were completed Friday, May 12, 2023. I&A issued an SOP “Finished Intelligence Production, Review, and Dissemination” on September 6, 2023. The purpose of the SOP is to provide instruction and guidance to I&A personnel on the drafting, coordinating, reviewing, and disseminating of I&A finished intelligence. I&A is in the process of submitting this update to OIG to request closure of both recommendations.
<b>Component</b>	I&A
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-29
<b>Report Title</b>	I&A Identified Threats Prior to January 6, 2021, but Did Not Issue Any Intelligence Products before the U.S. Capitol Breach
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/04/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4

<b>Recommendation</b>	The Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis develop and implement policies, procedures, or guidance on the timely issuance of warning analysis, both strategic and tactical, about threats or upcoming events across I&A’s mission areas.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	OSCO and ITA updated the two-week OSIR Workshop to incorporate all criteria for reporting open-source intelligence information, including whether the information contains true threats or incitement to violence, enhances I&A’s understanding of known threat actors, or demonstrates a risk of violence during a heightened threat environment. Curriculum updates were completed Friday, May 12, 2023. I&A issued an SOP “Finished Intelligence Production, Review, and Dissemination” on September 6, 2023. The purpose of the SOP is to provide instruction and guidance to I&A personnel on the drafting, coordinating, reviewing, and disseminating of I&A finished intelligence. I&A is in the process of submitting this update to OIG to request closure of both recommendations.
<b>Component</b>	I&A
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-49
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Could Do More to Address the Threats of Domestic Terrorism
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/05/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	DHS Secretary work with the Attorney General and the appropriate congressional committees, to ensure each Department collects and shares direct access to domestic terrorism information. Specifically: a. The Under Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis should immediately begin working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation to ensure Office of Intelligence and Analysis domestic terrorism analysts have appropriate access to Federal Bureau of Investigation case information.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS



<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	I&A is working on this recommendation. Recommendation remains open and resolved.
<b>Component</b>	I&A
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-60
<b>Report Title</b>	Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2021
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/19/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	I&A CIO revise policies and procedures to incorporate applicable new and revised NIST [National Institute of Standards and Technology] security controls to protect information stored and processed on C-LAN [Classified Local Area Network] and other DHS intelligence systems from unnecessary risks.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CAP Update Letter planned by April 30, 2024, to close recommendation number 1.
<b>Component</b>	I&A
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-60
<b>Report Title</b>	Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2021
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/19/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	I&A CIO develop qualitative and quantitative performance measures to assess the effectiveness of its information security program for intelligence systems. Specifically, the Department should develop the measures to assess the risk management; supply chain risk management; configuration management; data protection and privacy; security awareness and training;

	information security continuous monitoring; and incident response domains as defined under NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CAP Update Letter planned by October 31, 2023 to close recommendation number 2. A status of this update was sent to I&A SMEs.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-18-36
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/05/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Assistant Director of ICE ERO Field Operations immediately correct the limitations and challenges identified with KSTEP by ensuring that ERO offices have the infrastructure necessary to communicate on known or suspected terrorists.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	In March 2020, ICE ERO assessed its infrastructure to identify the communication capabilities for known or suspected terrorists, specifically classified connectivity access across field offices. The assessment identified 14 ERO field offices with secure compartmented information facility (SCIF) that currently provide connectivity to the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), leaving 11 field offices without access. ERO evaluated its resources (e.g., funding) to determine the feasibility of increasing its infrastructure to equip the remaining field offices with JWICS connectivity. This was ultimately not a viable option since funding was an issue and in the foreseeable future considering ERO competing priorities. For instance, the prior FY 2018 President's Budget did not include funding for additional Senior Deportation Officers in the field offices to help facilitate intelligence collection and produce bulletin reports to share across other ICE offices.

Consequently, ICE leadership streamlined the Component’s intelligence mission by integrating ERO and HSI, Office of Intelligence (Intel) functions under the established HSI Intel infrastructure. To achieve this objective, the ERO Operations and Intelligence Coordination Unit was restructured and renamed the ERO Combined Intelligence Unit (CIU). The ERO CIU will be managed by HSI Intel and consist of both ERO and HSI Intel personnel.

On February 23, 2023, ICE provided OIG with the MOA between ERO and HSI, leveraging Intel infrastructure and sharing of intelligence and communication on known or suspected terrorists.

ICE completed the recommendation CAP with the availability of the ERO 14 SCIF’s and HSI Intel infrastructure. This solution satisfies ERO’s strategic needs for intelligence and communication on known or suspected terrorists.

On October 4, 2023, ICE will again request that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed as implemented.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-18-36
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/05/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Assistant Director of ICE ERO Field Operations immediately correct the limitations and challenges identified by performing a resource assessment to determine how many additional officers they need and allocate resources that will ensure periodic Known or Suspected Terrorist Encounter Protocol screening of aliens on the non-detained docket.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The ICE ERO CIU conducted an assessment to determine how many additional officers would be needed to ensure periodic Known or Suspected Terrorist Encounter Protocol screening of aliens on the non-detained docket. The ERO CIU assessment resulted in the recommendation of additional ERO positions in the immediate-near and near terms. The full implementation of the CIU recommendation at HQ and field offices will allow for the screening and vetting of non-detained

	<p>populations. The recommendation is based on existing practices and gaps related to ERO’s screening and vetting of docketed populations for terrorism and national security concerns, and the agreed terms outlined in an ERO-HSI MOU.</p> <p>On February 23, 2023, ICE ERO provided OIG with information on the assessment it had performed containing the immediate-near term and near-term solutions.</p> <p>ICE will request a meeting with OIG to discuss the status and steps to close this recommendation.</p>
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-06
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/25/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Associate Director, ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations, coordinate with the Department of Health and Human Services to outline roles and responsibilities, and create and distribute standard operating procedures for migrant family reunification.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	<p>On December 2022, ICE informed OIG that the Family Reunification Task Force is identifying and implementing comprehensive strategies that will bring families back together, ensuring that the children and parents who were intentionally separated from each other from January 20, 2017, to January 20, 2021, through the Zero Tolerance Policy are reunited and provided support services to remedy the harm caused by the separation. ICE does not provide this direct assistance to families separated after January 20, 2021. However, the Task Force is charged with developing recommendations and policies to prevent this from happening again.</p> <p>On September 20, 2023, ICE ERO and Audit Liaison Unit met with OIG. OIG informed ICE that they reached out to the Task Force and that the Task Force is in the process of updating and issuing policies.</p>

	The OIG auditors also stated that due to litigation issues, OIG will reach out and request a meeting with DHS Policy and/or DHS OGC to further discuss and determine the next steps for this recommendation. ICE ERO will wait for additional guidance and feedback from OIG.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-13
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Criminal Alien Program Faces Challenges
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/18/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, conduct an independent workforce analysis to determine whether centralizing research of aliens and issuing detainers at the Pacific Enforcement Response Center would be more efficient than performing these tasks there as well as at local research centers.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	ICE took steps to reduce duplication. Specifically, ICE analyzed its immigration alien response and detainer processing and began efforts to consolidate these efforts at Pacific Enforcement Response Center (PERC). Litigation regarding these processes is ongoing. While ICE supports the general idea of consolidation and efficiency, ICE does not believe it is in the best interest to consolidate any positions or functions at the PERC or another location outside of the Central District of California while the Gonzalez lawsuit remains pending. If ICE implemented OIG’s recommendation, it would negatively impact ICE’s ability to issue detainers and would have adverse implications of the Gonzalez lawsuit. As July 2023, the Gonzalez detainer class action lawsuit settlement negotiations are ongoing, and a recently requested 90-day stay expired on August 17, 2023. Any changes to operational processes nationwide, but specifically within the Central District of California, are on hold due to the constraints of the Gonzalez litigation. The proposed workload/workforce analysis and completion of this recommendation should not be completed until the lawsuit is settled. Any settlement encompassing the entire nation, could potentially allow ICE to fulfill this recommendation by consolidating the processing of biometric interoperability IARs at the PERC, pending the results of the workload analysis and ICE/ERO senior leadership

	concurrency. On August 2023, ICE provided to the OIG Office of Counsel a copy of the next District Court dated August 18, expiring October 6, 2023. ICE will reengage OIG for reconsideration.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-13
<b>Report Title</b>	Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Criminal Alien Program Faces Challenges
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	02/18/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement evaluate how to consistently track lawful permanent residents with pending convictions.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	ICE ERO continues with its development of a Leads Management tool under the T8 Program. However, ICE delayed an initial operational capability deployment to FY 2024, Q2. ICE experienced technical complexities with integration of legacy ERO systems and other competing IT development efforts that emerged due to the SWB activity during the past 2 years.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-59
<b>Report Title</b>	HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/14/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	That the HSI Executive Associate Director renegotiate and update the existing 2003 MOA with DOJ on terrorism financing investigations to ensure: (a) all appropriate action to align guidance on handling of terrorism cases with current operations;

	(b) essential requirements defined in DHS Management Directive 0450.1 are included; and (c) a review and modification process is established to reflect future operational changes.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	DHS and DOJ have decided to work on the National Counterintelligence Task Force (NCITF) MOU first, which was approved on October 3, 2022. The approved NCITF MOU is being used as the template for the overarching DHS and DOJ JTTF MOU. The DHS-DOJ JTTF MOU has been opined on and sent back to the FBI for review. HSI continues to work with ICE's Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA) on the drafting of HSI's proposed Annex to an overarching NCITF MOU between DHS and the FBI. The HSI annex for the DHS-DOJ JTTF MOU will be drafted following the approval of the overarching MOU.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-59
<b>Report Title</b>	HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/14/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	HSI Executive Associate Director revise existing guidance including the 2003 and 2007 terrorism financing internal memoranda and its National Security Investigations Handbook to reflect changes implemented by departmental or interagency agreements.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	ICE HSI National Security Unit received and adjudicated additional comments and edits from ICE OPLA and has re-sent the handbook back to OPLA and HSI Policy. Once the handbook is approved, a copy of the handbook will be provided to OIG.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-15
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/13/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	<p>Assess I-9 processes and update the I-9 Guide to ensure it addresses risks and challenges, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. when employers make corrections to address substantive violations and when employers claim they were unaware that they employed Unauthorized Alien Workers;</li> <li>b. ICE's ability to conduct follow-up inspections with limited resources; and</li> <li>c. when I-9 inspections identify individuals using fraudulent documents to obtain unlawful employment.</li> </ul>
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	<p>ICE continues working on the CAP for this recommendation.</p> <p>For point (a), The updated HSI Labor Exploitation Investigations Handbook is still pending. ICE, Office of Regulatory Affairs and Policy had some edits and asked the parole unit to add language on deferred action. ICE HSI is waiting for that language to be added and then the updates get reapproved by everyone. That should be the last edits needed so that the updated handbook can continue with the final clearance process.</p> <p>For point (b), The Labor Exploitation Program and Employer Compliance Inspection Center (ECIC) is pending the arrival of two National Program Managers (NPM) who will serve as conduits for field referrals related to labor exploitation investigation and follow-up inspections. The NPMs will be in constant contact with the field and will keep their Section Chief apprised of investigations that require follow-up. The Section Chief, in concurrence with the Unit Chief, will send notifications to the field Document, Benefit, &amp; Labor Exploitation Unit Group Supervisor regarding cases requiring attention. If the field requires assistance from ECIC, the field will go through the proper channels to seek assistance from ECIC. The Labor Exploitation Program and ECIC bandwidth is still limited but the addition of NPMs will help initiate this recommendation.</p>



	For Point©, HSI will pursue action against individuals using fraudulent documents to obtain unlawful employment by initiating fine proceedings against individuals or entities who knowingly commit, or attempt to commit, document fraud to obtain unlawful employment. Section 274C of the INA authorizes ICE to initiate fine proceedings and persons or entities found to have violated this section are subject to cease-and-desist order with a civil money penalty. Receiving a final order under this section may lead to deportation from the United States. The proceedings against violators of Section 274C will not require approval from an Assistant United States Attorneys but will be worked closely with the OPLA to ensure that the elements and consequences of a fine are carefully and accurately described when served upon a respondent.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-15
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/13/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop and implement a quality assurance process that allows ICE headquarters to sample cases on an objective, periodic basis, to determine whether field offices reduce fines, issue compliance letters, and conduct follow-up inspections of employers in accordance with ICE policies and procedures.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On November 30, 2022, ICE HSI informed OIG that HSI does not have the funding to complete the corrective actions.  ICE HSI has not been able to complete this corrective action due to lack of funding and personnel resources. To address this recommendation, ICE’s ECIC has selected a ECIC NPM who is pending Permanent Change of Station (PCS) and an Entrance Duty Date. In addition, the ECIC has been approved for two series 1801 Inspection and Compliance Specialist positions. HSI is waiting for these positions to be posted on www.usajobs.gov. ICE intends to task these positions/individuals with assisting the ECIC NPM with sampling cases to determine whether field offices reduce fines, issue compliance letters, and conduct follow-up inspections of employers in accordance with ICE policies and procedures. These positions will document findings in Investigative Case Management (ICM) using a restricted case number. The NPM

	will approve entries in ICM and keep management informed of the findings. Management will then address issues with the field by providing training and/or mandates.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-57
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE's Oversight of Capgemini Contracts Needs Improvement
<b>Report Received/Issued Date</b>	08/26/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Oversee the development and/or implementation of internal controls to ensure ICE procurement and programs personnel properly construct and monitor the terms of the contract. Specifically, the requirements in the statement of work should align with the type of contract awarded.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/01/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed - Implemented
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On November 01, 2023, OIG closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-57
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE's Oversight of Capgemini Contracts Needs Improvement
<b>Report Received/Issued Date</b>	08/26/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Direct contracting officer representatives perform oversight of the Capgemini Government Solutions, LLC contract, to include its subcontractor, and ensure compliance with statement of work contract terms.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/01/2023

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed - Implemented
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On November 01, 2023, OIG closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-57
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE's Oversight of Capgemini Contracts Needs Improvement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/26/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	-Direct procurement and program staff to review the qualifications for skill sets, education, and work experience of all Capgemini Government Solutions, LLC employees currently working on the contract and remove unqualified staff; and -Ensure the contracting officer representative reviews all invoices paid to Capgemini Government Solutions, LLC between August 2018 and December 2019. The review should highlight any cost for labor not provided and determine any amounts to recover.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The ICE ERO COR performed a review of the contract staff and examined their labor hours and qualifications for skill sets, education, and work experience. The review resulted in an alignment of contract staff and their labor category classifications, as well as some contract staff skill sets qualifying them for more senior labor categories. The ERO COR was able to reconcile the information and determine there were no costs for labor hours submitted nor any amounts to recover. On May 15, 2023, OIG and ICE met to discuss the documentation needed to close this recommendation. OIG requested current information and documentation. On May 15 and 19, 2023, ICE provided to OIG the status reports, staffing metrics, invoices, and resumes to close the recommendation. On August 17, 2023, OIG requested additional information and documents to close the recommendation. ICE is working to provide the additional information and documentation to OIG.
<b>Component</b>	ICE

<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-01
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Segregation Use in Detention Facilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/13/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	ICE ERO Assistant Directors for Custody Management and Field Operations update ICE policy and guidance and track all segregation placements to better ensure that facilities' use of segregation is necessary and in compliance with detention standards.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	ICE ERO is currently in the process of updating ICE Policy 11065.1, which will provide field office personnel with more detailed guidance on the information that should be included in the Segregation Review Management System (SRMS), as well as the appropriate level of detail justifying the segregation placement and documentation of any alternative placements considered, prior to placing the noncitizen in the Special Management Units.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-01
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Segregation Use in Detention Facilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/13/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	ICE ERO Assistant Directors for Custody Management and Field Operations require all detention facilities to collect and track standardized information for all segregation placements and provide this information to ICE for entry into the official system of record (i.e., SRMS).
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	ICE ERO will ensure required segregation placements information is reflected in the updated ERO Segregation Directive. Additionally, ERO is in the process of migrating SRMS onto a new and improved data platform which will enhance data collection and reporting capabilities. In September 2021, ICE ERO awarded a contract to migrate disparate data systems onto a shared ServiceNow platform to improve Custody Management’s overall data quality and reporting capabilities. Specifically, ICE ERO is including requirements that the new system automatically identify and flag when a noncitizen is identified in another portfolio system/tracker as having one or more special vulnerabilities. The migration of Custody Management data systems is scheduled for a phased deployment and SRMS is not included in the first phase of the overall migration of multiple Custody Management data systems. The migration of the SRMS system is part of a multi-phase deployment schedule. Over the course of this implementation, updates to requirements and unforeseen challenges have caused the overall project schedule to change, resulting in a delay for subsequent releases (to include SRMS). Requirements validation and code development/configuration for the new SRMS is currently ongoing. Estimated deployment is now scheduled for the end of March 2024.”
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-01
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Segregation Use in Detention Facilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/13/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	ICE’s Records Officer, in conjunction with the Executive Assistant Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations, update all policies, guidance, and contracts for detention facilities to ensure compliance with the National Archives and Records Administration’s record retention schedules.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	ICE ERO is working with ICE’s Records and Data Management Unit to ensure the updated Segregation policy is compliant with applicable record retention schedules, as well as references the appropriate policies and schedules.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-03
<b>Report Title</b>	Many Factors Hinder ICE's Ability to Maintain Adequate Medical Staffing at Detention Facilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/29/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Evaluate the feasibility of offering hiring and retention incentives for high-demand Public Health Service and General Schedule healthcare professionals. Provide evaluation results.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	<p>ICE Health Service Corps (IHSC) is continuing its efforts to address this recommendation and provided OIG the following updates for Public Health Service and General healthcare professionals.</p> <p>Public Health Service: IHSC continues to collaborate with the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) Commissioned Corps HQ (CCHQ) to offer Assignment Pay (AP) to officers. IHSC's new site, Folkston has been added for AP. In addition, IHSC is collaborating with CCHQ to implement Hazardous Duty Pay (HDP) for officers this CY who are assigned by lawful orders for a period of 30 consecutive calendar days or more to primary duties related to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Officers that meet the criteria for HDP are also eligible for the USPHS Hazardous Duty Award.</p> <p>Federal Civil Service: IHSC conducted an analysis and identified Clinical Psychologist for recruitment incentives. Clinical Psychologists positions are considered mission critical and hard to fill with most job announcements posted in 2021 yielding no candidates. Although ERO Human Resources Division (HRD) does not have official procedures in place to request recruitment and retention incentives, in November 2021 IHSC sent a Recruitment and Bonus Request memo for the psychologist profession to ERO HRD for consideration. In March 2022, IHSC met with ICE Office of Human Capital to discuss recruitment challenges for the psychologist profession and were advised to consider increasing the grade level to the full performance level GS-13. IHSC met with ERO HRD to begin the position upgrade process, which was completed August 2022. The four employees affected will be promoted to the GS-13 when applicable. In the future, psychologist vacancies will be announced as a career ladder GS-12/13. IHSC met with ERO HRD in April 2022 to discuss the recruitment and retention incentives for nursing. ERO HRD requested a memo similar to the memo IHSC sent in</p>

November 2021 for the psychologist profession. In FY 2023, IHSC collaborated with ERO HRD to develop a package requesting a grade level increase for nursing, similar to considerations provided to the psychologist profession. In FY22, IHSC lost three nurses to the VA, seven to resignations, and three due to acceptance to the Public Health Service.

IHSC continues to offer relocation incentives for Nurse Practitioners, Psych Nurse Practitioners, Physician Assistants, and Medical Officers. IHSC includes the ICE Student Loan Repayment (SLRP) incentive which launched June 2021 on all job announcements and has since used SLRP to assist with recruitment of hard to fill nurse and psychologist positions. IHSC also processes Special Agency Need salary request and annual leave accrual requests, offers flexible schedules, and performance awards (monetary and time off) as applicable.

IHSC inquired with ERO HRD about funding for PCS moves for clinical positions that are hard to fill. In 2020 and 2021, PCS moves were approved for physician assistant, nurse practitioner, dentist, psychiatrist, and physician. IHSC is proposing to continue the PCS incentive for these professions and add clinical psychologist. In March 2023, ERO HRD sent IHSC the process to request funding for the PCS incentive. IHSC planned to send the proposal to ERO HRD in FY 2023 Q4 to prepare for implementation in FY 2024. In addition, IHSC is collaborating with the IHSC Chief Nurse and ERO HRD to create a GS-13 supervisory nurse manager position, which will align with the USPHS supervisory nurse manager positions to provide supervisory and possibly promotion opportunities for eligible staff.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-03
<b>Report Title</b>	Many Factors Hinder ICE's Ability to Maintain Adequate Medical Staffing at Detention Facilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/29/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Evaluate staffing in Immigration and Customs Enforcement units supporting Immigration Health Service Corps personnel to ensure there are adequate staff to expedite processing applications for medical positions. Provide evaluation results.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	ICE HR Operations Center (HROC) has two Human Resources Staffing specialist that each dedicate 25 to 33 percent of their time in support of IHSC recruitment. The remainder of their time is spent in support of other ERO field offices. This is not sufficient time to fully support IHSC recruitment needs given their known recruitment challenges. It is estimated that HROC would need three Human Resources Staffing specialists dedicating 100 percent of their time to successfully support IHSC recruitment efforts. In FY 2022, the team posted one to two IHSC job opportunity announcements each month. If the Human Resources Staffing specialists were able to dedicate 100 percent of their time to supporting IHSC recruitment, HROC could potentially double the number of IHSC job opportunity announcements each month, as well as decrease the average amount of time it takes to issue certificates of eligibles from ranges of 30 to 45 days to 15 to 30 days. Currently, HROC is working with other ICE Office of Human Capital units, to improve or enhance systems automation to streamline physician pay tables, allow accurate tracking and reporting of physician pay plans, grades, and steps and to automate tentative selection letters.
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<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-03
<b>Report Title</b>	Many Factors Hinder ICE's Ability to Maintain Adequate Medical Staffing at Detention Facilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/29/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Evaluate the feasibility of including specific medical staffing requirements in future contract negotiations. Provide evaluation results.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	ICE ERO Custody Management continues to work with the ICE Office of Acquisition Management (OAQ) and IHSC in the facilitation of staffing requirements/plans. Documentation will be drafted depicting the results of the study and the improvement of contract language in new and existing contracts for medical staffing.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-03
<b>Report Title</b>	Many Factors Hinder ICE's Ability to Maintain Adequate Medical Staffing at Detention Facilities



<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/29/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Evaluate current staffing levels for Field Medical Coordinators to determine whether additional staff could enable more effective oversight of contract medical care. Provide evaluation results.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	<p>The IHSC Executive Governing Board was briefed on the Medical Case Management Unit strategic initiative titled, “Field Medical Coordinators (FMC) Modernization,” that collected and analyzed multiple data sources to devise program modernization recommendations based on a workforce shaping model used by the Office of Personnel Management. Some of these recommendations included adding additional supervisory and field positions to the FMC program.</p> <p>For the Central Region: The Dallas, Harlingen, and Houston FMC positions were approved, and the assigned officers are currently on station and going through FMC orientation. They are scheduled to onboard into the unit during the October time frame. For the Western Region: The Denver FMC position has been approved and a selection has been made; awaiting HQ release to PCS the officer. The San Francisco FMC position was approved, and the officer will be on station as of October 1, 2023.</p>
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-03
<b>Report Title</b>	Many Factors Hinder ICE's Ability to Maintain Adequate Medical Staffing at Detention Facilities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/29/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	Integrate Immigration Health Service Corps personnel in contract re-negotiations with medical providers to create more oversight of medical staffing and its requirements.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/28/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	ICE ERO Custody Management continues to provide IHSC access review and approval of all non-IHSC staffed facility. The team is and will continue to champion these efforts as it coordinates with the COR and Contracting Officer within the ICE OAQ.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-31
<b>Report Title</b>	Management Alert - Immediate Removal of all Detainees from the Torrance County Detention Facility
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/17/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Relocate all detainees from Torrance County Detention Facility and place no detainees there unless and until the facility ensures adequate staffing and appropriate living conditions.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	ICE and Torrance County Detention Facility (TCDF) staff have taken steps to increase staff at the facility, to include: TCDF has participated in community job fairs and military job fairs; conducted hiring events; advertised on billboards, radio, other digital medium; placed ads in job-specific publications; and has sponsored or hosted jobs on various platforms. TCDF has also created roadside advertisement signage posted in all surrounding communities. TCDF is currently utilizing temporary duty (TDY) staff to fill in the gaps in staffing, as well as offering weekly incentives to TDY staff to work at the facility on TDY assignment. TCDF has increased the Detention Officer salary. Current staff at the facility are working overtime to ensure coverage of shifts, as appropriate. CoreCivic continues to hire and train new staff bi-weekly. ICE and TCDF staff have taken steps to ensure appropriate living conditions, to include completing the repairs at the facility; OIG closed the associated recommendation #2 from OIG-22-75. ICE has taken steps to hold the contractor accountable for meeting the contractual staffing level obligation by issuing a contract discrepancy report, which instilled a monthly 15

percent deduction until the contractual staffing requirement is met. ICE ERO continues to acknowledge contractual staffing challenges and received a CAP from CoreCivic regarding the staffing shortages at TCDF. ICE received the CAP on August 10, 2023. ICE ERO will continue to monitor TCDF staffing and a failure to demonstrate improvements may result in necessary actions to be taken by the ICE ERO Contracting Officer, up to or including reevaluation of the contract imposition of penalties. On September 28, 2023, OIG informed ICE that based on the documentation ICE provided to OIG, and ICE and TCDF's efforts to obtain a staffing population compliant with the contract requirements, OIG considers this recommendation resolved and open. The OIG will close this recommendation once ICE provides evidence that the staffing levels at Torrance meet the 85 percent contractual requirements.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-44
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE Did Not Follow Policies, Guidance, or Recommendations to Test Migrants for COVID-19 before Domestic Commercial Flights
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/18/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The ICE Executive Associate Director for ERO coordinate with CBP and the DHS Chief Medical Officer to determine and document whether noncitizen unaccompanied children and family units should be tested for COVID-19 before transport on domestic commercial flights. If ICE ERO determines noncitizen unaccompanied children and family units should be tested, we recommend ICE ERO develop detailed testing policies and establish controls to ensure staff and contractors follow the policies. These policies should include modes of transportation and timeframes for mandatory testing before transport.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On September 20, 2023, ICE met with OIG and agreed to provide a memo explaining who tests unaccompanied children and FMUs, how ICE transports (mode: bus, flight, etc.) if COVID 19 positive or negative, and that HHS makes the decision of where to transport based on COVID 19 test results. Based on the meeting, ICE will provide support documentation of these efforts to OIG. On September 28, 2023, ICE requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved while it completes implementation.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-44
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE Did Not Follow Policies, Guidance, or Recommendations to Test Migrants for COVID-19 before Domestic Commercial Flights
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/18/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The ICE Executive Associate Director for Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) establish controls to ensure staff and contractors follow existing requirements to test single adults for COVID-19 before transfer using domestic commercial flights.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On September 20, 2023, ICE met with OIG and agreed to provide additional information and supporting documentation about the controls in place (spot checks, staff on site, audits, etc.) to make sure that detention facility contractors are following policies to test. This should include examples of these “controls” recently conducted that included testing of transports. Information provided should clearly articulate to DHS OIG the controls in place and how the examples relate to the controls. On September 28, 2023, ICE requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-44
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE Did Not Follow Policies, Guidance, or Recommendations to Test Migrants for COVID-19 before Domestic Commercial Flights
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/18/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The ICE Executive Associate Director for ERO clarify existing COVID-19 testing policies to include modes of transportation and timeframes for mandatory testing before transport.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On September 20, 2023, ICE met with OIG. ICE’s policy implies “all modes of transportation” because it does not differentiate testing requirements by modes of transportation. DHS OIG accepts this as responsive to part of the recommendation. However, as it relates to timeframes for testing, ICE’s policy does not define “prior to transport.” DHS OIG recognizes the different nuances surrounding testing and that ICE follows Centers for Disease Control and Prevention guidelines. OIG requested ICE provide underlying guidance/guidelines for how detention facilities or contractors determine testing requirements. Based on the meeting, ICE will provide support documentation of these efforts to OIG. On September 28, 2023, ICE requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-44
<b>Report Title</b>	ICE Did Not Follow Policies, Guidance, or Recommendations to Test Migrants for COVID-19 before Domestic Commercial Flights
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/18/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The ICE Executive Associate Director for ERO maintain complete and accurate migrant testing and transport records.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On September 20, 2023, ICE met with OIG and agreed to provide a written explanation of how it maintains records (transport and medical records) for each population of migrants. This will include the types of documents maintained, where the documents are stored, how the records can be accessed if requested by DHS OIG, and examples of such documents. For the examples provided, ICE will clearly articulate the population represented, how ICE retrieved the

	examples, and what the documents represent. On September 28, 2023, ICE requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-47
<b>Report Title</b>	Violations of ICE Detention Standards at Folkston ICE Processing Center and Folkston Annex
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/30/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	12
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure Folkston maintains staffing levels outlines in the ICE contract.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The Folkston ICE Processing Center continues to actively and aggressively hire to fill all vacant positions notwithstanding a nationwide labor shortage. The recruitment efforts include: (1) updated recruitment flyers with wage increases posted in all surrounding communities/businesses; (2) large newspaper advertisement in the local independent newspapers that serve the local communities (i.e., Waycross Journal Herald, The Baxley News Banner, Chatham County Herald, The Brunswick News); (3) local radio daily advertising; (4) local TV (Channel 4 WJXT) daily advertising; (5) billboard advertisement running for 12 consecutive months; and (6) periodic hiring events in Folkston, Jacksonville, and the surrounding towns.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-62
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Can Better Mitigate the Risks Associated with Malware, Ransomware, and Phishing
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/22/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	ICE CIO ensure all users complete initial and annual refresher security awareness training as required and document, monitor, and retain individual cybersecurity awareness training records.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	ICE OCIO continues the process of improving cybersecurity awareness training, monitoring, and tracking, and is implementing the Continuous Diagnostics and Monitoring SailPoint solution to automate the account lifecycle management process. ICE OCIO previously intended to integrate SailPoint with Performance and Learning Management System (PALMS). However, the PALMS training platform has been decommissioned. As of October 2022, ICE OCIO automated the account lifecycle management process that led to automated alerts and disablement of user accounts within ICE. However, on November 21, 2022, the ICE Office of Leadership and Career Development announced the implementation of a new learning management system, ICE Training System, which will require testing and implementation of the automated account lifecycle management process to ensure integration, automated alerts, and account disablements for ICE personnel not compliant with training. As of August 2023, for FY 2023, ICE has been successful in a manual implementation of Cybersecurity Awareness Training (CSAT) tracking, reminder, and enforcement actions (including account disablement for non-compliance) for all ICE users in the Active Directory, with over 97 percent of users completing the course. A final disabling of remaining non-compliant accounts is expected by the end August 2023. Although ICE initially automated this process using the Account Lifecycle Management/SailPoint tool, LMS changes (at DHS) required new development work that is still delayed by CBP’s implementation of the solution. These external dependencies have necessitated continuing the manual process that is documented in the CSAT Handbook and Implementation Plan. When these external dependencies resolve, ICE will seek to implement automation in FY 2024. On August 30, 2023, ICE provided to OIG the “Cyber Security Awareness Training (CSAT) Implementation Handbook FY23” as supporting documentation of the progress for this recommendation. ICE is working to complete closure requirements.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-66
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/09/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the [CIO] for [ICE] implement solutions to reduce information sharing barriers, such as the [CAS], to additional Southwest Border Sectors and locations.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	In an effort to narrow the gap between CBP and ICE with automating processes, including viewing electronic A-Files and providing case acceptance and rejection responses back to CBP, the Case Acceptance System was deployed to the El Paso, San Antonio, Harlingen, Phoenix, Los Angeles and San Diego sectors in April 2021 to February 2022. This deployment enables CBP to: (1) transmit the case request for approval and receive a response from ICE ERO; (2) track the status of subjects in CBP custody awaiting acceptance by ERO; and (3) facilitate review of A-file documentation. Additionally, ICE ERO developed a CAS quick reference guide and screenshots to provide CBP users with information on how to submit requests for case/subject transfer of jurisdiction to the ICE ERO. On July 27, 2022, ICE provided OIG with documentation corroborating these efforts under a separate cover. Additionally, ERO has been responding to requests for additional information from OIG. In September and October 2022, ICE ERO provided additional CAS screenshots, records, and reports and is responding to follow-up questions for information and documentation. On August 30, 2023, ICE provided to OIG the required compendium of documentation. It should also be noted that in July 2023, CAS deployed the ability for CBP users to withdraw the submission of a subject to CAS and amend those submissions, as necessary. Additional information can be identified after processing an individual which may alter the need to leverage the CAS system (e.g., officers notice a non-citizen is pregnant). ICE requested that OIG consider this recommendation closed as implemented.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-66
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/09/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement evaluate adherence to current immigration policies and memorandums of agreement for internal and external collaboration and working groups and update them as needed.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/30/2023



<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	ICE ERO agreed that MOAs between ICE, CBP, and HHS regarding consultation and information sharing in matters relating to UCs, should be updated to reflect the interagency coordination presently occurring through the Southern Border Communities Coalition (SBCC). Specifically, the SBCC includes participation from ICE, CBP, and HHS stakeholders, who currently meet on a regular basis to discuss policies, challenges, and potential solutions affecting the SWB. Accordingly, ERO will work with CBP and HHS counterparts to update the MOA and will also review any other agreements in place to determine whether changes are needed as part of its continuous process improvement efforts. ERO is working with CBP and HHS counterparts at the SBCC to identify issues and best practices which will inform the updates to the MOA. The 2021, signed on March 11, 2021, has been reviewed, been determined to need no additional changes, and is still current as of August 30, 2023. ERO is continuously working with CBP and HHS counterparts regarding consultation and information sharing in matters relating to UCs. No additional MOAs have been located or drafted based upon consultation and interagency coordination and information sharing these partners. On August 30, 2023, ICE requested that OIG consider this recommendation closed as implemented.
<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-75
<b>Report Title</b>	Violations of Detention Standards at Torrance County Detention Facility
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Associate Director of ICE ERO direct the El Paso Field Office responsible for Torrance take the necessary and progressive steps needed to hold the contractor accountable for obtaining a staffing level of at least 85 percent of the contractually obligated amount, including the medical department.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	ICE ERO and TCDF staff have taken steps to increase staff at the facility, to include: TCDF has participated in community job fairs and military job fairs; conducted hiring events; advertised on billboards, radio, other digital medium; placed ads in job-specific publications; and has sponsored or hosted jobs on various platforms. TCDF has also created roadside

advertisement signage posted in all surrounding communities. TCDF is currently utilizing TDY staff to fill in the gaps in staffing as well as offering weekly incentives to TDY staff to work at the facility on TDY assignment. TCDF has increased Detention Officer salary. Current staff at the facility are working overtime to ensure coverage of shifts, as appropriate. CoreCivic continues to hire and train new staff, including seven new employees who are pending clearance and eight pending entrances on duty. ICE ERO acknowledges there has been continued contractual staffing challenges but has mitigated these challenges with the El Paso Field Office by decreasing the population at TCDF to approximately 200 ICE detained noncitizens. ICE ERO is only allowing a population in the facility that can be managed by existing staffing levels. In February 2022, CoreCivic leadership also provided ICE ERO with a staffing plan to address the staffing requirements outlined in the contract. ICE has taken steps to hold the contractor accountable for meeting the contractual staffing level obligation by issuing a contract discrepancy report, which instilled a monthly 15 percent deduction until the contractual staffing requirement is met. ICE ERO continues to acknowledge contractual staffing challenges and requested and received a corrective action plan from CoreCivic regarding the staffing shortages at TCDF. ICE received the CAP on August 10, 2023. ICE ERO will continue to monitor TCDF staffing and a failure to demonstrate improvements may result in necessary actions to be taken by the ICE ERO Contracting Officer, up to or including reevaluation of the contract imposition of penalties.

<b>Component</b>	ICE
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-75
<b>Report Title</b>	Violations of Detention Standards at Torrance County Detention Facility
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/28/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	10
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Executive Associate Director of ICE ERO direct the El Paso Field Office responsible for Torrance retain complete video records for all use of force incidents for at least 1 year after all investigative efforts have been completed.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On April 30, 2022, ICE ERO instructed CoreCivic to provide video records for all use of force incidents involving ICE detained noncitizens directly to ICE ERO for recordkeeping. ICE ERO maintains video records of all use-of-force incidents involving ICE detained noncitizens up to 1 year after all investigative efforts have been completed. TCDF has provided a

retention schedule to ICE ERO that states: “all incident information, which includes this incident, is kept for a three (3) year period” excluding non-Prison Rape Elimination Act cases. CoreCivic will continue to provide this information to the ICE ERO El Paso Field Office management to ensure compliance. ICE provided OIG with information on the use of force incident, including the full video.

For the use of force that occurred on July 11, 2023, TCDF provided Use of Force Review documentation that supports the use of force video was provided to the ICE ERO supervisor on July 12, 2023. Additionally, the incident report indicates video was recorded, and on August 31, 2023, ICE provided to OIG the retention schedule supports maintenance of the video. ICE requested that OIG consider this recommendation resolved and closed. However, on September 28, 2023, OIG notified ICE that this recommendation remains resolved and open. In the initial management comments to this report, ICE committed to providing the video footage of the August 2021 use of force event by October 31, 2022. OIG will close this recommendation when ICE provides the full video footage of the event.

<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CFO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-62
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting DATA Act Requirements, But Challenges Remain
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/14/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Chief Financial Officer develop and apply effective solutions to improve the implementation and use of the government-wide financial data standards for data elements associated with the award description, place of performance, unique record identifier [URI], legal entity information, program activity data, and financial assistance aggregate reporting.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA OCFO is responsible for the remaining two financial assistance data elements of this recommendation of Unique Record Identifier and Legal Entity Information. The latest interaction with OIG occurred on March 10, 2023. The outcome of this exchange was OIG’s latest analysis response to DHS’s that closed two procurement data elements of this recommendation on May 10, 2023. Work remains for the remaining two financial assistance data elements of Unique Record Identifier and Legal Entity Information. Implementation of the FEMA GO system will need to be completed; thus,

	final documents have not been provided for closure consideration due to incomplete artifacts for the financial assistance data elements of this recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CFO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-04
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Continues to Make Progress Meeting DATA Act Requirements, But Challenges Remain
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/04/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Acting Chief Financial Officer develop and apply solutions to ensure FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] fully complies with the new DATA Act requirements in OMB Memorandum M-20-21 for reporting cumulative COVID-19 outlays on a monthly basis and linking spending to emergency and disaster appropriations through the Disaster Emergency Fund Code [DEFC] data element. Ensure the solutions produce complete and accurate data elements that can be independently traced and verified to an auditable file.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA OCFO is responsible for the next step of the recommendation. The latest interaction with OIG occurred on June 8, 2023, to inform OIG of FEMA's progress and status. FEMA OCFO performed updates to their legacy systems to comply with OMB Memorandum M-20-21 requirements of accurately reporting DEFC data; however, these updates have yet to include a process to report cumulative monthly COVID-19 outlays by award, just obligations and outlays incurred by award. FEMA OCFO continues working on updates to their Electronic Data Warehouse (EDW) and process to take advantage of the recent legacy systems' updates.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CFO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-04
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Continues to Make Progress Meeting DATA Act Requirements, But Challenges Remain
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/04/2021

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Acting Chief Financial Officer develop and apply solutions to improve the implementation and use of the government-wide financial data standards for procurement and financial assistance data elements that had an accuracy error rate of 10 percent or more.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	DHS OCFO Resource Management Transformation (RMT) and Financial Assistance Policy and Oversight (FAPO) divisions, and FEMA OCFO are responsible for the next steps of recommendation 3. The DEFC data element requires FEMA OCFO to work on updates to their EDW to take full advantage of the recent legacy systems' updates. After the EDW updates for cumulative outlay totals' FEMA's DATA Act team will need to update their processes and SOPs. For the remaining 14 financial assistance data elements, this recommendation is not near closure. The OCFO RMT and FAPO divisions are working with FEMA OCFO to create artifacts to close 7 of the 14 financial assistance data elements; however, full implementation of FEMA's Grant Outcome system will need to be completed to provide artifacts for closure consideration on the remaining 7 financial assistance data elements of this recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CFO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-45
<b>Report Title</b>	Department of Homeland Security's FY 2021 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/08/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure that FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] continues to enhance internal control procedures over the Disaster Case Management and Urban Search & Rescue programs by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. developing and implementing policies and procedures for establishing and defining documentation requirements;</li> <li>b. providing appropriate training to personnel responsible for developing and operating internal controls;</li> <li>c. ensuring the implementation and operating effectiveness of policies and procedures over labor rate review and payment processing; and</li> </ul>

	d. reviewing unknown payments to determine whether they are proper or improper and reporting the review results in future years as required by OMB Circular A-123.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FEMA has completed all remediation efforts for Disaster Case Management. In addition, verification and validation (V&V) was performed at the end of July with no remaining issues noted. Urban Search and Rescue is completing final remediation step, after which V&V will be initiated. Once V&V is provided for both programs, DHS Risk Management and Assurance will be moving forward to request closure for the recommendation.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CFO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-45
<b>Report Title</b>	Department of Homeland Security's FY 2021 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/08/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Ensure that DHS' Risk Management and Assurance Division follows OMB requirements for agencies that do not comply with PIIA, as defined in OMB Circular A-123.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/22/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	DHS has complied and implemented OMB requirements, and DHS has requested that OIG close the recommendation as implemented. Common prior practice would have been for OIG to close this recommendation upon issuance of a newer related one in OIG-23-25 (May 2023), but this did not happen.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CFO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-78

<b>Report Title</b>	The Department of Homeland Security Unified Coordination Group for Operation Allies Welcome Coordinated Afghan Resettlement but Faced Challenges in Funding and Authority
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/29/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Acting Under Secretary for Management: In preparation for establishing a UCG, DHS should propose that Congress create a contingency fund to allow UCG officials to set up the internal organization, to include funding, when directed funding is not available via disaster aid, Stafford Act funds, congressional appropriations, or other means.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	DHS is working with OMB to identify the best path forward to meet the intent of this recommendation. DHS will submit a request for contingency funding with the FY 2025 budget submission to OMB. A copy of the OMB justification will be provided to OIG.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CHCO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-42
<b>Report Title</b>	Lessons Learned from DHS' Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Initiative
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/10/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	DHS MGMT OCHCO designate, direct, and oversee component representatives to maintain rosters of essential employees in each category defined by existing DHS policy.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	MGMT is actively revising DHS Directive 250-05, Designation of Essential and Exempt Personnel, and its corresponding Instruction 250-05-001. The revised Directive and Instruction will include and provide specific direction as appropriate. DHS will provide a copy of the final directive to OIG auditors once complete. The last interaction with the OIG was on September 11, 2023.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-73
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Faces Challenges in Meeting the Responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act of 2018
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/23/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Identify and apply the resources needed in the Geospatial Management Office to the Department to fulfill covered agency responsibilities under section 759 of the Geospatial Data Act of 2018
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The Geospatial Management Office has created a workforce assessment survey and is currently working through the approval process to distribute it to components.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-73
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Faces Challenges in Meeting the Responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act of 2018
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/23/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Work with the Geospatial Information Officer to coordinate with internal and external stakeholders to ensure a common definition of geospatial data, including the classification of Law Enforcement Sensitive Information, as it applies to the DHS mission and operating environment.



<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	In August 2023, DHS voted with the Federal Geospatial Data Commission (FGDC) Steering Committee on the definition of “Federal-Wide” geospatial data assets intended to clarify the Geospatial Data Act definitions in anticipation of the revised Circular A-16. DHS continues to meet with the FGDC and their partners at OMB to understand the Circular A-16 revision content and timeline.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Title</b>	OIG-20-77
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	Evaluation of DHS’ Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	09/30/2020
<b>Recommendation</b>	1
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	The Deputy Under Secretary for Management consider whether the former DHS CIO’s May 2019 decision to permit the Coast Guard to submit its cybersecurity and FISMA reports to the Department of Defense was in compliance with the terms outlined in the 2016 and 2017 agreements established by both Departments’ senior leadership, as well as all applicable statutory reporting requirements under FISMA and OMB reporting requirements, and update the agreement, where appropriate.
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	DHS
<b>Component</b>	DHS continues to coordinate with USCG. DHS OCIO Chief Information Security Officer Division (CISOD) continues to work with the newly installed USCG CISO to align the agency with the DHS scorecard. HQ is analyzing the initial data from USCG to support integrating USCG into the DHS Monthly FISMA Scorecard.
<b>Report Number</b>	MGMT-CIO
	OIG-20-77

<b>Report Title</b>	Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2019
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/30/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Assess the risk posed to the Department's information security program by allowing the Coast Guard to submit its cybersecurity information to the Department of Defense, inform DHS senior leadership of the risks identified, document senior leadership's concurrence or non-concurrence with the former CIO's decision, and communicate the decision, in writing, to OMB and selected congressional oversight committees.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	DHS continues to coordinate with USCG. DHS OCIO CISOD continues to work with the newly installed USCG CISO to align the agency with the DHS scorecard. HQ is analyzing the initial data from USCG to support integrating USCG into the DHS Monthly FISMA Scorecard.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-77
<b>Report Title</b>	Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2019
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/30/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Revise the Department's information security policies to reflect senior leadership's approval and any revisions regarding the Coast Guard's FISMA reporting to the Department of Defense.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	DHS continues to coordinate with USCG. DHS OCIO CISOD continues to work with the newly installed USCG CISO to align the agency with the DHS scorecard. HQ is analyzing the initial data from USCG to support integrating USCG into the DHS Monthly FISMA Scorecard.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-66
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/09/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Chief Information Officer for DHS continue to evaluate the use of manual processes employed at the Southwest Border to identify, develop, and implement IT system efficiencies.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The initiative remains on track with the initial response for Digital Immigration Processing, UIP, and Non-Detained Technology Capability. Consistent with the Technology Modernization Fund (TMF) SWB Technology Integration Program award, on June 26, 2023, DHS briefed the TMF Board and received approval on August 16, 2023, to combine Increment 3 (\$15.5 million) and Increment 4 (\$15.5 million) into a single Increment 3 transfer of \$31 million with execution in Q1 FY 2024. This combination into a single increment transfer eliminates an estimated 4+ month internal clearance process and allows more continuous work, while reducing the risk of delays.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CIO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-66
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/09/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7

<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Chief Information Officer for DHS establish a policy or agreement to ensure ongoing collaboration and standardized information sharing, especially during surges, among: DHS components; DHS and external partner agencies; and IT professionals and system operators.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The CDO developed and submitted for component review a new DHS Data Policy Directive which re-emphasizes the key requirements from the One DHS memorandum, DHS Management Directive 103-01 Enterprise Data Management Policy, and the Evidence-Based Data Strategy that all data and information, where applicable will be shared across the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE). CDO anticipates that the Data Policy directive will be approved by DHS Senior Leadership before the end of CY 2023. Additionally, CDO will include in its future closure request the recently released IT Strategic Plan. The Plan sets forth specific goals that ensures the successful sharing of data and information across the HSE.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CRSO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-40
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting SAVE Act Requirements But Challenges Remain for Fleet Management
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/15/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer work with component vehicle fleet managers to establish a consistent process for funding the acquisition, leasing, and maintenance of vehicles to meet mission needs.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/05/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed - Implemented
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On October 05, 2023, OIG closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CSO

<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-19-42
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/24/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Review DHS logon banners for unclassified systems at all components and determine whether they are legally sufficient.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The DHS Insider Threat Program (ITP) continues to work with the DHS PARM and the JRC to implement the recommendation. ITP continues to develop the necessary artifacts for the acquisition program review process leading to ADE-1. A closure request for recommendations 1, 3, and 4 is being prepared, along with supporting documentation.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CSO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-19-42
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/24/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Determine, with the aid of the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management, whether the expanded ITP is an acquisition program, what level of acquisition program it is using a Rough Order Magnitude or other Cost Estimate, and where the program is in the Acquisition Life Cycle. Determine, along with the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management, the acquisition documentation required for the Acquisition Life Cycle Framework phase the program is in.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The DHS ITP continues to work with the DHS PARM and the JRC to implement the recommendation. ITP continues to develop the necessary artifacts for the acquisition program review process leading to ADE-1. A closure request for recommendations 1, 3, and 4 is being prepared along with supporting documentation.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-CSO
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-19-42
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/24/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Work with the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management to complete the required Systems Engineering Life Cycle Framework.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The DHS ITP continues to work with the DHS PARM to develop the artifacts needed for the acquisition program review process leading to ADE-1, per Recommendation 3. Once these are completed and validated, ITP will continue to work with PARM on additional documentation and events required, including those needed for the Systems Engineering Life Cycle Framework. A closure request for recommendations 1, 3, and 4 is being prepared along with supporting documentation.
<b>Component</b>	MGMT- Federal Protective Services (FPS)
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-19-15
<b>Report Title</b>	The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/11/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The FPS Director should initiate collection actions to recover \$1,768,768 in unsupported costs representing overtime payments determined to be ineligible for payment.

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	FPS was notified that DOJ would not pursue criminal prosecution in this case. The FPS Office of Internal Investigations is now conducting an Administrative Investigation into the matter.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-FPS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-31
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	04/16/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Establish and implement a plan, policy, and process to improve preparedness for multi-component response to future incidents of civil disturbance at Federal facilities including: A. a process for designating DHS component personnel under 40 U.S.C. § 1315 and verification of required legal training completion; B. equipment and training needs and requirements; and C. consistent tactics and operational policies.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/21/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The working group is continuing to draft the policy. A final draft will be completed in early FY 2024 and submitted through DHS's approval process for signature.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Component</b>	MGMT-PARM
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-52
<b>Report Title</b>	CBP Has Not Demonstrated Acquisition Capabilities Needed to Secure the Southern Border

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/14/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Under Secretary for Management of DHS require CBP to conduct an up-to-date independent Analysis of Alternatives to identify the most appropriate and effective solutions to obtain complete operational control of the southern border.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The DHS PARM met with OIG on July 18, 2023, to ensure alignment on the planned path forward to closing the recommendation for the Border Wall Systems Program (BWSP). OIG concurred in concept with DHS' plan to remove the BWSP from the Master Acquisition Oversight List (MAOL) and transition delivered portions of the Wall to sustainment. CBP prepared updated briefing materials to address the status of the BWSP and provide a summary of the DHS Secretary's approved projects that will be completed by the program. Following the Acquisition Review Board (ARB) briefing on July 25, 2023, PARM is working to document the results of the ARB in an ADM, including a summary of the capability delivered and the scope of the remaining Secretary's approved projects. This ADM will direct PARM to remove the program from the MAOL and would essentially complete all required actions. PARM intends to request that OIG close this recommendation as implemented after the ADM is signed.
<b>Component</b>	OGC
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-16-91
<b>Report Title</b>	TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/13/2016
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	That DHS General Counsel (OGC) effectively coordinate with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to expedite the implementation of the remaining passenger rail requirements of the 9/11 Act.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2025



<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	TSA published the Security Training for Surface Transportation Employees Final Rule in March 2020 with an effective date of June 22, 2020; however, based on the ongoing impact of the pandemic, the compliance deadline for submission of the required security training program was extended to June 21, 2021. On June 23, 2023, TSA published a proposed rule, Vetting of Certain Surface Transportation Employees, with an opportunity for public comment through August 21, 2023. TSA is addressing the comments and will make necessary changes to the rule text. The final rule must go through the same clearance process as the NPRM before publication.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-43
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Has Limited Capabilities to Counter Illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/25/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Under Secretary of Strategy, Policy, and Plans develop a timeline with achievable goals for Counter-Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS) capability implementation across the Department.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	06/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	PLCY is pending C-UAS Program Management Office review of status update to provide to the OIG audit team to request revised ECD and recommendation closure.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-20-59
<b>Report Title</b>	HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/14/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1

<b>Recommendation</b>	Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, in consultation with the Under Secretary of Management, coordinate with DHS JTTF contributors to: (a) ensure agreements governing participation in the JTTF are binding; (b) evaluate whether new agreements or terms governing JTTF participation are required; and (c) develop guidance defining each DHS JTTF contributors' authorities, roles and responsibilities, skill sets, and access to systems.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	PLCY provided updates to OIG on September 27, 2023. PLCY is working to address the recommendations.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-09
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/13/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	DHS Under Secretary for the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans establish an oversight mechanism to ensure department components implement DHS Policy Directive 045-05 as required, including: (a) Providing annual domestic violence awareness training for law enforcement officers and their supervisors; (b) Orally advising all law enforcement officers, during quarterly firearms qualifications, of their duty to report when law enforcement contacts them concerning engagement in domestic violence; and (c) Ensuring all law enforcement officers annually complete Lautenberg Amendment certifications.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Law Enforcement Policy is working to update the Lautenberg Policy. PLCY will provide updates to the OIG audit team for recommendation closure.

<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-35
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Law Enforcement Components Did Not Consistently Collect DNA from Arrestees
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/17/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	DHS Office of the Secretary ensure ICE, FPS, CBP, and TSA fully implement DNA collection for arrestees and non-U.S. detainees to comply with the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) fingerprint Act of 2005 and 28 C.F.R. § 28.12.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	PLCY is developing, in cooperation with Criminal Justice Information Services and the respective components, performance reporting that will track and verify DNA collection to determine if the results are consistent with the DNA directive. PLCY Screening and Vetting is working to establish reporting criteria for FBI and DHS Components.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-35
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Law Enforcement Components Did Not Consistently Collect DNA from Arrestees
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/17/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	DHS Office of the Secretary ensure ICE, FPS, CBP, and TSA implement internal controls, including modifying booking systems to track and verify DNA collection. If components pursue memorandums of agreement with other agencies to collect DNA samples, they must implement internal controls to track and verify DNA collection.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	PLCY is reviewing respective components SOPs to ensure polices are consistent with the DNA Directive.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-02
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Needs to Better Demonstrate Its Efforts to Combat Illegal Wildlife Trafficking
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/27/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Designate an office or official to establish adequate controls for overseeing the Department's efforts to combat wildlife trafficking. The designated office or official should: a) work with the Commissioner of CBP and the Director of ICE to jointly develop and implement clear and comprehensive policies and procedures to oversee wildlife trafficking efforts and ensure consistency for CBP and ICE; and b) ensure the Commissioner of CBP and the Director of ICE collect, analyze, and report complete and accurate data to demonstrate performance and results.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	PLCY provided the requested reference guide and distribution memo to fulfill the requested information for the OIG audit team. The OIG audit team received the documentation and had follow up questions, to which PLCY is working to respond.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-06
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Needs Additional Oversight and Documentation to Ensure Progress in Joint Cybersecurity Efforts
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/08/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5

<b>Recommendation</b>	Establish a plan, in coordination with CISA, for the appropriate allocation of technical personnel to ensure DHS-DOD effective coordination and collaboration efforts.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	07/03/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	PLCY provided a closure request memorandum on July 03, 2023 and is pending a response from the OIG audit team.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	PLCY OIG-22-49
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Could Do More to Address the Threats of Domestic Terrorism
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/05/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Under Secretary of Science and Technology and the Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans partner with agencies or Department of Homeland Security components to obtain access to appropriate information that may inform development of national-level statistics on terrorism and targeted violence.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The Office of Homeland Security Statistics (OHSS) has evolved from the legacy Office of Immigration Statistics. The new OHSS will have expanded responsibilities on a wider range of DHS data and statistics. The additional review required will take time as the OHSS team evolves into its new responsibilities.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	PLCY OIG-22-52
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS and CBP Should Improve Intellectual Property Rights Management and Enforcement

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/18/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Assistant Secretary for Trade and Economic Security of DHS' Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, in coordination with ICE and CBP, develop, implement, and monitor a departmental strategic, risk-based approach for managing and enforcing intellectual property rights.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	04/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	PLCY reached out to S&T to identify appropriate POCs to participate in a PLCY-led IPR Policy Coordination Working Group to take action in addressing the recommendation. S&T provided the POC as requested.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-64
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/06/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	<p>We recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a comprehensive contingency plan to support similar emergency situations in the future and account for, screen, vet, and inspect all individuals during unprecedented events when limited biographic data is available.</p> <p>Specifically:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The plan should include, at a minimum, lessons learned from departmental after-action reports that can be incorporated into the plan for future events, lead roles and responsibilities, points of contact, established processes, and expected timeframes.</li> <li>b. The policies and procedures should ensure accountability, standard practices, and quality assurance across DHS components involved in screening, vetting, and inspecting individuals in emergency situations.</li> </ol>

<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	PLCY responded on June 29, 2023, to follow-up questions from OIG audit team. PLCY is pending a response from OIG.
<b>Component</b>	PLCY
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-78
<b>Report Title</b>	The Department of Homeland Security Unified Coordination Group for Operation Allies Welcome Coordinated Afghan Resettlement but Faced Challenges in Funding and Authority
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/29/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Under Secretary for the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY): Develop and implement DHS-specific guidance on lines of authority for future UCGs formed for events requiring government-wide coordination.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	PLCY notified OIG that as part of the Secretary's 2023 priorities, DHS is working to develop doctrine that aligns DHS's available resources for managing or coordinating incidents and crises. The doctrine will outline the characteristics of HSI, DHS's strategy and resources for managing such incidents, and DHS's command and coordination structures.
<b>Component</b>	PRIV
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-06
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Privacy Office Needs to Improve Oversight of Department-wide Activities, Programs, and Initiatives
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/04/2020

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop, implement, and formally communicate a process to ensure review of all proposed Information Sharing Access Agreements [ISAA] involving personally identifiable information.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On September 20, 2023, PRIV notified OIG that the needed policy Directive and Instruction has stalled. PRIV will move it forward in FY 2024 but was unable to make progress with it after the spring of 2023, as other urgent priorities took over.
<b>Component</b>	S&T
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-30
<b>Report Title</b>	S&T Needs to Improve Its Management and Oversight of R&D Projects
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/07/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	OIG recommended that the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary for S&T in consultation with the Office of Procurement Operations, develop and implement a process, to ensure required special clauses are included in contracts for project acquisitions with a high risk of unauthorized access to or disclosure of sensitive information.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	S&T has updated the draft Policy/Procedure of S&T (PoST) “Ensuring Homeland Security Acquisition Regulation (HSAR) Clauses are Included in S&T Contracts to protect Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI),” to include new required terminology from the HSAR Final Rule on the Safeguarding of CUI, which became effective on July 23, 2023. Additional updates to the procedure include references and links to the new Homeland Security Acquisition Manual (HSAM) Appendix G – Individual Checklist for CUI, which became accessible on the HSAM website in early August 2023. In early October 2023, S&T will resubmit the draft PoST to OGC for review. This internal S&T guidance document was drafted in



	coordination with the OPO Science and Technology Acquisition Division (STAD). After OGC approval is received, the procedure will be returned to OPO/STAD for final review and approval, prior to final review and signature by S&T leadership.
<b>Component</b>	SEC
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-49
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Could Do More to Address the Threats of Domestic Terrorism
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/05/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	We recommend the Counterterrorism Coordinator, with support from the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and the Management Directorate perform a needs assessment to identify the staffing and budget necessary for overseeing the Department-wide mission to counter domestic terrorism.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	I&A has a meeting planned with PLCY and the CT Coordinator on October 27, 2023, to plan a way forward for recommendations that fall under the CT Coordinator's responsibility.
<b>Component</b>	SEC
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-49
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Could Do More to Address the Threats of Domestic Terrorism
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/05/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Counterterrorism Coordinator use the results of the needs assessment to establish a long-term governing body to oversee and coordinate the Department's efforts to counter domestic terrorism by creating: a. a charter with business rules and roles and responsibilities for long-term action; b. a formalized documented process to monitor and track completion of action items; and

	c. a formalized documented feedback process to review, update, and measure the impact of priority actions taken in response to changes in the domestic terrorism threat environment.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	I&A has a meeting planned with PLCY and the CT Coordinator on October 27, 2023, to plan a way forward for recommendations that fall under the CT Coordinator's responsibility.
<b>Component</b>	SEC
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-49
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Could Do More to Address the Threats of Domestic Terrorism
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/05/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	Counterterrorism Coordinator use the results of the needs assessment to ensure a dedicated level of staff support and resources to execute National Terrorism Advisory System functions
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	TBD
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	I&A has a meeting planned with PLCY and the CT Coordinator on October 27, 2023, to plan a way forward for recommendations that fall under the CT Coordinator's responsibility.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-16-91
<b>Report Title</b>	TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	05/13/2016

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	That the TSA Administrator ensures TSA develops and adheres to a detailed, formal milestone plan to deliver the remaining 9/11 Act Notices of Proposed Rulemaking to DHS.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2025
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	TSA published the Security Training for Surface Transportation Employees Final Rule in March 2020, with an effective date of June 22, 2020; however, based on the ongoing impact of the pandemic, the compliance deadline for submission of the required security training program was extended to June 21, 2021. On June 23, 2023, TSA published a proposed rule, Vetting of Certain Surface Transportation Employees, with an opportunity for public comment through August 21, 2023. TSA is addressing the comments and will make necessary changes to the rule text. The final rule must go through the same clearance process as the NPRM before publication.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-18-04
<b>Report Title</b>	FAMS: Contribution to Domestic Aviation Transportation Security is Questionable
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/25/2017
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Recommend the Administrator for the Transportation Security Administration conduct a validation and verification study for the Dynamic Aviation Risk Management Solution report. Upon completion of the study, the Transportation Security Administration should conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the \$583.1 million in flight operations is being spent mitigating the most serious threat facing aviation transportation.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	TSA's LE/FAMS continues its efforts to implement programmatic changes that would lead to recommendation implementation. On September 27, 2023 LE/FAMS leadership briefed OIG on steps being taken to implement the new Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) Roadmap (strategic plan) and agreed to continue providing updates to OIG on their progress in implemented the concepts in the Roadmap. Once the concepts in the Roadmap are fully implemented, TSA will be able to request recommendation closure.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-18-04
<b>Report Title</b>	FAMS: Contribution to Domestic Aviation Transportation Security is Questionable
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	10/25/2017
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Recommend that the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service improve existing performance measures to determine the effectiveness of in-flight operations in addressing all risks facing aviation transportation, with a strong emphasis to ensure the highest risks are addressed.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	TSA's LE/FAMS continues its efforts to implement programmatic changes that would lead to recommendation implementation. On September 27, 2023, LE/FAMS leadership briefed OIG on steps being taken to implement the new FAMS Roadmap (strategic plan) and agreed to continue providing updates to OIG on their progress in implemented the concepts in the Roadmap. Once the concepts in the Roadmap are fully implemented, TSA will be able to request recommendation closure.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-18-70
<b>Report Title</b>	FAMS Need to Demonstrate How Ground Based Assignments Contribute to TSA's Mission
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/27/2018

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration develop performance measures for all activities in FAMS' strategic plan as well as improve measurements for its Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response operations by fiscal year 2019.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	TSA's LE/FAMS continues its efforts to implement programmatic changes that would lead to recommendation implementation. LE/FAMS leadership briefed OIG on steps being taken to implement the new FAMS Roadmap (strategic plan) and agreed to continue providing updates to OIG on their progress implementing the concepts in the Roadmap. Once the concepts in the Roadmap are fully implemented, TSA will be able to request recommendation closure.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-18-70
<b>Report Title</b>	FAMS Need to Demonstrate How Ground Based Assignments Contribute to TSA's Mission
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	07/27/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration develop a method for tracking the Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshall Service's funding by operations.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	TSA's LE/FAMS continues its efforts to implement programmatic changes that would lead to recommendation implementation. LE/FAMS leadership briefed OIG on steps being taken to implement the new FAMS Roadmap (strategic plan) and agreed to continue providing updates to OIG on their progress implementing the concepts in the Roadmap. Once the concepts in the Roadmap are fully implemented, TSA will be able to request recommendation closure.

<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-19-35
<b>Report Title</b>	TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security Officers
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	03/28/2019
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	<p>We recommend the Assistant Administrator, Human Capital, continue to coordinate efforts with Security Operations to implement actions that facilitate improvements in the hiring process to ensure applicants are informed of the Transportation Security Officer duties and that TSA continues to hire qualified applicants. At a minimum, TSA should:</p> <p>a. require an applicant affirm whether he/she has reviewed the Transportation Security Officer Realistic Job Preview video and understands duties include interacting with passengers, passenger pat-downs, shift work, weekend work, and holidays. If the applicant has not, ensure the applicant reviews the video as part of the application process; and</p> <p>b. finalize the implementation of the agency's job compatibility assessment tool for use during the hiring process.</p>
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	TSA continues to implement and is meeting the intent of the recommendation by adding specific competencies to the interview process and by assessing other competencies through the Transportation Security Officer (TSO) background check process. OIG believes these actions are responsive to the recommendation and has asked TSA to provided data reflecting that the changes have improved TSO hiring/retention results.

<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-11
<b>Report Title</b>	TSA Needs to Improve Management of the Quiet Skies Program - Sensitive Security Information
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/25/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1

<b>Recommendation</b>	TSA Administrator establish and ensure a centralized Quiet Skies oversight program to monitor and ensure the program is operationally effective and using the information to protect travelers from emerging threats. This oversight should include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• development and codification of policies and procedures,</li> <li>• development of performance measures, and</li> <li>• establishment of goals for all program offices involved in the program</li> </ul>
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/12/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	TSA provided OIG with an update to the recommendation, to include the latest approved SOP along with the action memo and requested closure on September 12, 2023. TSA is waiting on OIG's determination.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-11
<b>Report Title</b>	TSA Needs to Improve Management of the Quiet Skies Program - Sensitive Security Information
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	11/25/2020
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	TSA Assistant Administrator, Intelligence and Analysis, in coordination with other TSA offices: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mandate that quarterly Quiet Skies oversight meetings with Department of Homeland Security are formally and consistently documented by, at a minimum, meeting minutes, records of key decisions made, and lists of meeting attendees.</li> <li>Establish a formal quality assurance process and capability that TSA can use for compliance and performance checks to validate individuals identified by Quiet Skies rules have been designated by the Secure Flight system as Quiet Skies passengers and receive enhanced screening at checkpoints.</li> <li>Develop and codify procedures to ensure Quiet Skies data is reliable and passengers are cleared as outlined in the Implementation Plan as approved by the Department of Homeland Security.</li> </ol>
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/12/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	TSA provided OIG with an update to the recommendation, to include the latest approved SOP along with the action memo and requested closure on September 12, 2023. TSA is waiting on OIG's determination.
<b>Component</b>	TSA
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-52
<b>Report Title</b>	TSA Did Not Assess Its Explosives Detection Canine Team Program for Surface Transportation Security
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/05/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Recommendations that the TSA Executive Assistant Administrator of Security Operations coordinate with local law enforcement agency partners to develop an agency-wide strategy for deployment of Explosives Detection Canine Teams in the surface transportation system that aligns with TSA's Surface Transportation Risk-Based Security Strategy and complies with the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	OIG met with TSA on August 15, 2023, regarding the status of this recommendation. TSA continues to make progress on this recommendation and remains on track to close by the end of CY 2023.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-17-74-IQO
<b>Report Title</b>	Oversight Review of the United States Coast Guard Investigative Services
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/23/2017
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Articulate in policy what constitutes an OIG-referable allegation, train all necessary staff accordingly, and ensure that the Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) refers the requisite allegation to the OIG.



<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CGIS has completed revisions to the CGIS Investigation Instruction, COMDTINST 5527.1 (series), which is currently under review.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-17-74-IQO
<b>Report Title</b>	Oversight Review of the United States Coast Guard Investigative Services
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/23/2017
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	Consult with the Coast Guard Directives and Publications Division, CG-612, and replace the existing Coast Guard Investigations Manual with a document that complies with Systems Manual requirements.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CGIS has completed revisions to the CGIS Investigation Instruction, COMDTINST 5527.1 (series), which is currently under review.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-17-74-IQO
<b>Report Title</b>	Oversight Review of the United States Coast Guard Investigative Services
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	06/23/2017
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7

<b>Recommendation</b>	Continue to update investigative policy and follow the Coast Guard clearance process outlined in M5215.6 prior to issuing new policy.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CGIS has completed revisions to the CGIS Investigation Instruction, COMDTINST 5527.1 (series), which is currently under review.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	USCG OIG-18-88
<b>Report Title</b>	Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of TWIC Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/28/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Coast Guard's Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy take action to more clearly define the applicable facilities that have certain dangerous cargo in bulk and which must implement the use of electronic TWIC readers as an access control measure
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/08/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The determination regarding which certain dangerous cargo facilities will be required to use electronic readers will be informed by the rulemaking process, including the public comment process. A provision in the 2022 CGAA directs the Secretary of DHS to not implement transportation worker identification card (TWIC) reader regulations for certain facilities before May 8, 2026. The Office of the Federal Register (OFR) published the conforming amendment rule on April 17, 2023. The rule will appear on the OFR's public inspection website [ <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/current">https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/current</a> ] at <a href="http://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-08040">http://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-08040</a> . There is a separate ongoing rulemaking to address whether the implementation date should remain May 8, 2026, or be moved to a later date.

<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-18-88
<b>Report Title</b>	Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of TWIC Program
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/28/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	<p>4. Coast Guard's Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy revise and strengthen the Coast Guard TWIC Verification and Enforcement Guide. At a minimum, the policy should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• streamline guidance for oversight of the TWIC program by consolidating requirements from other interim Coast Guard policy documents;</li> <li>• include more specific procedures for recording the results of electronic TWIC verifications in the Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement system, such as updating the reference to the appropriate user guide and requiring inspectors to add a narrative explanation when card readers are not used for verifications;</li> <li>• define Coast Guard facility inspectors as law enforcement personnel, clarify the inspectors' authority for performing regulatory confiscations of TWIC cards, and outline the required procedures for documenting regulatory confiscations in the Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement system and returning the cards to TSA; and</li> <li>• specify key documents that Coast Guard facility inspectors must upload in the Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement system for annual compliance exams and security spot checks at regulated facilities, including but not limited to the completed inspection checklist, Form CG-835F, enforcement actions, and evidence of corrective action taken.</li> </ul>
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/08/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	<p>The determination regarding which certain dangerous cargo facilities will be required to use electronic readers will be informed by the rulemaking process, including public comment process. A provision in the 2022 CGAA directs the Secretary of DHS to not implement TWIC reader regulations for certain facilities before May 8, 2026. The OFR published the conforming amendment rule on April 17, 2023. The rule will appear on the OFR's public inspection website [<a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/current">https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/current</a>] at <a href="http://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-08040">http://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-08040</a>. There is a separate ongoing rulemaking to address whether the implementation date should remain May 8, 2026, or be moved to a later date.</p>

<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-65
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Should Prioritize Upgrades to Rescue 21 Alaska and Expand its Public Notifications During Outages
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/21/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Prioritize funding and purchasing of the appropriate technology needed to ensure full operational capability of Rescue 21 Alaska.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	08/31/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	<p>The Assistant Commandant for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Information Technology continues to carry out a three-phase modernization plan. The primary mission degraders will be corrected in Phase 1, which is expected to bring significant improvements to the Rescue 21 Alaska system:</p> <p>Phase 1: Replace obsolete generators and microwaves at Rescue 21 Alaska Remote Fixed Facilities (RFF).</p> <p>a. Generators – 18 of the 23 generators were replaced, and the remaining 5 sites are planned for completion by Q4 of FY 2024. This effort is fully funded. *In October 2022, CG-431 identified a 23<sup>rd</sup> generator requiring recapitalization.</p> <p>b. Microwaves – 17 of the 18 microwave links were replaced. The final site is planned for completion by Q4 of FY 2023. This effort is fully funded.</p> <p>Phase 2: Replace obsolete very high frequency (VHF) radios at Rescue 21 Alaska RFFs.</p> <p>a. The contract for VHF radio recapitalization was awarded in September 2021. The project also includes replacing much of the obsolete network equipment at remote fixed facility sites. This project is expected to be completed by the summer of 2026, pending available funds.</p> <p>b. Motorola Remote Radio Control System (RRCS) Upgrade – The RRCS is used to continually monitor the network and proactively mitigates potential security issues. This upgrade occurs every two years.</p> <p>c. Phase 2 can be completed in parallel with phase 1.</p>

	<p>Phase 3: Replace obsolete network infrastructure equipment.</p> <p>Modernization of RFFs – This effort will replace legacy equipment with modernized network equipment, allowing sectors to remotely monitor the health of the RFF. Estimated completion for this effort is the summer of 2026, pending funding availability.</p> <p>b. Phase 3 must be completed after phase 2.</p>
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-65
<b>Report Title</b>	Coast Guard Should Prioritize Upgrades to Rescue 21 Alaska and Expand its Public Notifications During Outages
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/21/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop and implement a plan to use additional methods to notify the public of VHF communications coverage outages in the District 17 area of responsibility.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/05/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	OIG
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	<p>The Coast Guard’s Seventeenth District (D17) currently announces VHF outages through Broadcast Notice to Mariners (BNM), Local Notice to Mariners, and email user groups including: Local news outlets; Pilots associations; Tug and barge companies; Fishing groups and associations; Borough assemblies; Sportsman’s groups; Alaska Fish and Game; and Local harbormasters. Coast Guard Command Centers also notify the maritime public by broadcasting outages over VHF-FM through adjacent RFF to reach mariners at sea. Additionally, the Coast Guard transmits outage information through Automated Identification System (AIS) messages.</p> <p>On April 1, 2023, the D17 Sector Command Centers began providing links to outage information, contained on their public facing homeport sites and their social media sites (see Sector Juneau/Captain of the Port (COTP), Southeast Alaska and Sector Anchorage/COTP Western Alaska Communications). D17 also used the following methods to notify mariners of outages in areas with limited cellular connectivity: Broadcast outage information via VHF on adjacent RFFs; Release of BNMs; Coast Guard’s Communications Command broadcasts information on Navigational Telex; and Releasing AIS</p>

	<p>messages. D17 Sector Command Centers also coordinate with local radio stations to widely broadcast the Homeport webpages, which has the latest Rescue 21 and other communications outage information available for mariners.</p> <p>The Coast Guard requested that OIG close this recommendation as implemented on May 5, 2023.</p>
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-66
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Did Not Fully Comply with Requirements in the Transportation Security Card Program Assessment
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/22/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Re-evaluate the HSOAC assessment, and report on further corrective actions necessary to address the four areas of concern from the assessment findings, as identified in this report, or justify excluding these areas of concern from the corrective action plan.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	A provision in the 2022 CGAA directs the DHS Secretary to not implement TWIC reader regulations for certain facilities before May 8, 2026. The OFR published the conforming amendment rule on April 17, 2023. The rule will appear on the OFR's public inspection website [ <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/current">https://www.federalregister.gov/public-inspection/current</a> ] at <a href="http://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-08040">http://www.federalregister.gov/d/2023-08040</a> . There is a separate ongoing rulemaking to address whether the implementation date should remain May 8, 2026, or be moved to a later date. Coast Guard's Office of Port and Facility Compliance will be taking the recent recommendations of the RAND report and National Maritime Security Advisory Council into consideration before drafting a rulemaking project proposal, forming a rulemaking team, and formulating a project plan for the TWIC reader rule regulatory process.
<b>Component</b>	USCG
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-67
<b>Report Title</b>	DHS Component Collaboration on Law Enforcement Virtual Training Is Limited

<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/15/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	Commandant, United States Coast Guard, ensure that Coast Guard Investigative Services has access to operational training systems available to meet training requirements.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	09/30/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	CGIS identified a preferred judgmental training system and is exploring funding and contracting options for FY 2024. In the interim, CGIS continues to coordinate with surrounding units to complete their judgmental training using the Coast Guard Judgmental Use of Force Evaluation training and qualification process, as outlined in COMDTINST 3574.57.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-18-78
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS' Medical Admissibility Screening Process Needs Improvement
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/21/2018
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	USCIS Chief of the Regulatory Coordination Division for the Office of Policy and Strategy develop stricter ineligibility requirements for civil surgeon designations, which could include standards used by the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General, and implement processes to strengthen the vetting process of physicians and active civil surgeons.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/30/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS had planned for the Civil Surgeon NPRM to be published by July 2022. However, because of competing priorities and resources, USCIS was not able to complete the work as planned. USCIS remains committed to completing the draft

	proposed rule and fully intends to submit the draft for DHS and OMB clearance. The work remains on the USCIS Office of Policy and Strategy's internal list of projects and will be addressed as resources become available.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-56
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS Needs to Improve its Electronic Employment Eligibility Process
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/23/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop a plan to ensure E-Verify's photo-matching process for Permanent Resident Cards and EADs is conducted in accordance with E-Verify system use requirements.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS established a project team, consisting of staff from the Verification Division and USCIS OIT, to develop a plan to ensure E-Verify's photo-matching process for Permanent Resident Cards and Employment Authorization Documents is in accordance with E-Verify user requirements. The project team is moving forward with its work and USCIS is on track to finalize and implement the plan.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-56
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS Needs to Improve its Electronic Employment Eligibility Process
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/23/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	Conduct a study to determine the feasibility of automating E-Verify's photo matching and identity verification capabilities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023



<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	While the majority of the E-Verify photo matching process is automated, the Verification Division will identify electronic tools to further automate E-Verify's photo matching and identity confirmation capabilities and will determine the feasibility of using such tools in E-Verify. USCIS established a project team, consisting of staff from the Verification Division and USCIS OIT, to identify and determine the feasibility of using such tools. The project team is moving forward with its work and USCIS is on track to finalize the feasibility study.
<b>Component</b>	
<b>Report Number</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Title</b>	OIG-21-56
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	USCIS Needs to Improve its Electronic Employment Eligibility Process
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	08/23/2021
<b>Recommendation</b>	5
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	Collaborate with individual states and/or the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System to determine whether USCIS can obtain driver's license photos for E-Verify's photo matching.
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	11/17/2023
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	Closed - Implemented
<b>Component</b>	On November 17, 2023, OIG closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Report Number</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Title</b>	OIG-21-56
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	USCIS Needs to Improve its Electronic Employment Eligibility Process
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	08/23/2021
<b>Recommendation</b>	6

<b>Recommendation</b>	Conduct a study to determine an appropriate approval threshold for the confidence score and update USCIS procedure accordingly.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The new, advanced USCIS Person Centric Identity System (PCIS) continues to be under development, and the Verification Division continues to collaborate with other USCIS offices to improve confidence score thresholds. USCIS also continues to update the Verification Information System in preparation for the integration with PCIS, which includes improved testing libraries and processes.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-56
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS Needs to Improve its Electronic Employment Eligibility Process
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/23/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	Conduct a study to determine the feasibility of further automating E-Verify to ensure that employer-petitioned visa holders (e.g., H-1B) are verified as required or implement manual review procedures to ensure adequate verification.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS established a project team consisting of staff from the Verification Division and the OIT to study and determine the feasibility of further automating E-Verify to ensure that employer-petitioned visa holders (e.g., H-1B) are verified as required or if manual review procedures were necessary to ensure adequate verification. The project team continues their work as planned.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-56

<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS Needs to Improve its Electronic Employment Eligibility Process
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/23/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	9
<b>Recommendation</b>	Conduct a study to determine the appropriate resources needed to fully test the E-Verify system's current and projected workload capabilities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/17/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed - Implemented
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On November 17, 2023, OIG closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-21-56
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS Needs to Improve its Electronic Employment Eligibility Process
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	08/23/2021
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	10
<b>Recommendation</b>	Establish and execute agreements with E-Verify's data partners for testing and coordinating workload capabilities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/31/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	A USCIS project team, including staff from the Verification Division and the OIT, developed an internal Project Charter document that outlines measurements of success, issues, and risks with associated mitigation strategies. Specifically, this Charter outlines that USCIS will engage relevant data partners and continue engaging stakeholders to validate relevant POCs, understand agency needs relevant to the tasking, and ultimately producing a high-level timeline for total E-Verify testing integration (pursuant to data partner participation).

<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-10
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS' U Visa Program is Not Managed Effectively and is Susceptible to Fraud
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/06/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	Implement additional controls that mitigate risks of fraudulent Supplement B forms, such as requiring certifying officials to submit forms directly to USCIS.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	12/29/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS has undertaken multiple efforts to preserve the integrity of the U Visa Program. For example, Service Center Operations Directorate Center for Fraud Detection Operations engages in multiple activities to promote the integrity of the U Visa Program. In addition, USCIS is drafting a NPRM for the U visa program. The U NPRM is expected to publish in December 2023.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-10
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS' U Visa Program is Not Managed Effectively and is Susceptible to Fraud
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/06/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	Develop a plan to track the outcome of U visa-related fraud referrals and take steps to further mitigate fraud risks.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	01/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS

<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS currently relies on the FDNSNexGen system as a central data repository for Center Fraud Detection Operations (CFDO) across USCIS. This enables the sharing of information, leads, and collaboration in ongoing investigations. Any potential fraud issues that are referred to CFDO and result in the creation of leads or cases are entered into the FDNSNexGen system. Information submitted to USCIS and CFDO regarding potential fraud is thoroughly reviewed to determine how the petition will proceed. USCIS has completed a draft document outlining an SOP for fraud risk assessments and how fraud risk profiles will be developed. USCIS is also forming a working group that will review, edit, and validate the SOP. The group will then develop a fraud risk assessment and fraud risk profile. As previously noted to OIG, this framework will not be specific to I-918s, but rather will incorporate all adjudicative product lines, including I-918s.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-10
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS' U Visa Program is Not Managed Effectively and is Susceptible to Fraud
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	01/06/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5
<b>Recommendation</b>	Enhance performance metrics to ensure the program achieves its purpose.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	05/31/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS is revising Form I-765 to introduce a specific code for employment authorization documents issued under the U visa bona fide determination process. The projected schedule for the revised Form I-765 has been changed due to the initial review process and additional discussions within USCIS regarding the form development. The final form is expected to be published by May 2024.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-12
<b>Report Title</b>	Continued Reliance on Manual Processing Slowed USCIS' Benefits Delivery during the COVID-19 Pandemic
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	12/28/2021

<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Director of USCIS update the USCIS pandemic plan to incorporate additional technology guidance and lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	10/10/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	Closed - Implemented
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	On October 10, 2023, OIG closed this recommendation as implemented, after the universe of open recommendations for this annual report was identified.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-65
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to its Systems and Information
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/07/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Office of Human Capital and Training in conjunction with the Office of Information Technology evaluate the Employee and Contractor Exit Clearance Process and update as needed to ensure it provides the controls necessary to identify and communicate all separated employees in accordance with DHS policy of immediately revoking access to network and systems.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS Office of Human Capital and Training (HCT) and OIT are in the process of completing multiple actions related to this recommendation, including working with relevant stakeholders to identify solutions and deploying technical solutions and updated policies and procedures. Once this work is completed, HCT and OIT plan to obtain a list of USCIS users who separated after a technical solution has been effectively applied. They also review evidence and close applicable milestones within the OIT system of record if timelines for disablements generally meet applicable policy requirements.

<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-65
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to its Systems and Information
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/07/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	2
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Office of Human Capital and Training in conjunction with the OIT develop and implement a process to identify all transferred employees and ensure that their access is reviewed and verified immediately in accordance with DHS policy.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS HCT and OIT are working with stakeholders to identify and deploy technical solutions as required, and update policies and procedures, as necessary. Once this work is completed, HCT and OIT will obtain a list of USCIS users who separated after the solutions have been implemented and review evidence to determine if the timelines for disablements generally meet applicable policy requirements.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-65
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to its Systems and Information
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/07/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	3
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Office of Information Technology develops and implements a myAccess capability or an alternative manual review process to ensure that all privileged user and service account accesses are reviewed and validated at least annually.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS OIT is currently completing work to identify and deploy technical solution(s), and update policies and procedures, as necessary. Once this work is completed, OIT will obtain a list of USCIS applicable privileged and service accounts and review the last recertification date to ensure applicable accounts generally meet current policy requirements.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-65
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to its Systems and Information
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/07/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	4
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Office of Information Technology finalize implementation of the proposed tiered privileged account project that allows users to use separate accounts when accessing less secure assets.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS OIT is working with stakeholders to identify and deploy technical solutions, as required, and specifically ensure segregation of duties and least privilege is addressed in design. Once this is completed, OIT plans to update policies and/or procedures, as necessary, and verify that tiered access has replaced options for dash administrative accounts in myAccess. They will then have program officials validate that access related to older privileged accounts has been revoked.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-65
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to its Systems and Information
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/07/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	5



<b>Recommendation</b>	The Office of Information Technology implement managed service accounts or additional manual/technical controls to deny interactive logon and reset service account passwords timely.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS OIT Identity, Credential, and Access Management Branch continues to work with stakeholders to review and update relevant policies and procedures, as necessary. In addition, work continues to determine a strategy for the technical enforcement of required service account password changes and service account management, and to have stakeholders identify and implement the solutions. Finally, using a list of sampled service accounts, program officials will validate that solutions applied meet current policy.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-65
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to its Systems and Information
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/07/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	6
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Office of Information Technology perform an evaluation of Active Directory configurations based on users' roles and responsibilities and remove unnecessary privileges that allow access to service accounts.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	02/29/2024
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS OIT is working with stakeholders to identify and deploy technical solutions, as required, and specifically ensure separation of duties and least privilege access are addressed in the design of the solutions. OIT will then update policies and procedures, as necessary, and verify that tiered access has replaced options for dash administrative accounts in myAccess. Finally, OIT will validate that access related to older privileged accounts has been revoked before closing.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS

<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-65
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to its Systems and Information
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/07/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	7
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Office of Information Technology finalize and implement patching procedures for assessing and resolving system vulnerabilities.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2026
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	The USCIS Vulnerability Management Team (VMT) is currently working with stakeholders to hire and train additional SMEs to assist with configuration management (CM) remediation efforts. Following this work, the VMT plans to develop dashboards to clearly identify non-compliant configuration settings and then meet with Enterprise SMEs to identify and remediate non-compliant settings at the Enterprise-Level. In addition, USCIS plans to develop an SOP to establish and clearly define CM processes.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-65
<b>Report Title</b>	USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to its Systems and Information
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/07/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	8
<b>Recommendation</b>	The Office of Information Technology implement all required DISA STIG configuration settings for Enterprise Hosting Services, Enterprise Infrastructure Services, and Identity Credential Access and Management and Citizenship and Immigration Services Network or request a waiver to exclude settings that cannot be implemented.
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	03/31/2026

<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS OIT is currently working with stakeholders to hire and train additional SMEs to assist with vulnerability remediation efforts. Moving forward, USCIS OIT's work will include developing dashboards to clearly identify vulnerabilities that are coming due/overdue; meeting with Enterprise SMEs to discuss options to improve enterprise patching processes and timeliness; and working with appropriate SMEs to identify and remediate vulnerabilities and the Enterprise and System-Levels.
<b>Component</b>	USCIS
<b>Report Number</b>	OIG-22-79
<b>Report Title</b>	The Unified Coordination Group Struggled to Track Afghan Evacuees Independently Departing U.S. Military Bases
<b>Report Received/ Issued Date</b>	09/29/2022
<b>Recommendation Number</b>	1
<b>Recommendation</b>	The DHS Secretary ensure U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• identify Afghan evacuees who independently departed safe havens, were not on the Task Force's list of evacuees to contact, and have not yet completed medical requirements; and</li> <li>• provide Afghan evacuees with counseling on their parole requirements.</li> </ul>
<b>Estimated Completion Date (or Date Closed)</b>	11/30/2023
<b>Next Step is Up To</b>	DHS
<b>Most Recent Actions Taken</b>	USCIS and ICE have provided counseling and outreach to educate and remind Afghan evacuees of their parole requirements. On March 10, 2023, USCIS requested that OIG close this recommendation as resolved and implemented, and subsequently provided OIG with additional documentation. On August 7, 2023, USCIS provided a summary of all of the information that had been provided to OIG and again requested that the recommendation be closed. OIG has asked for information regarding the identification of the Afghan evacuees; USCIS is in the process of providing that information to OIG.

## V. Recommendation Discrepancies

Since 2010, DHS strictly adheres to a self-imposed practice of not closing any open recommendations without first reaching agreement with GAO or OIG staff. Specifically, DHS only closes recommendations in its database of record on the basis of monthly closures listings received from both GAO and OIG. This practice provides added confidence to Congress and the public, in addition to DHS's formal management response to each recommendation, that appropriate actions were taken to implement these recommendations or otherwise to resolve any disagreements.

DHS reconciles its list of open and closed recommendations to OIG's semiannual report to Congress every 6 months, and to GAO's public website at least annually. DHS has not identified any significant discrepancies between its information and OIG and GAO information. The few minor variances found during these reconciliations typically are due to database entry/update timing issues and are corrected quickly by mutual agreement.

## VI. Determining Whether to Implement Recommendations Less Than 12 Months Old

DHS prepares a formal management response letter to every draft audit report with recommendations to the Department. DHS leadership, program officials, SMEs, and others, as appropriate, collaborate to determine whether the Department will concur (i.e., agree) or non-concur (i.e., disagree) with a recommendation when writing these letters, which GAO and OIG include in their entirety as an Appendix to their final reports.

These letters address any significant accuracy and/or contextual concerns that were not addressed during the audit, as appropriate. Additionally, DHS also clearly agrees or disagrees with each recommendation and identifies what actions were taken, are ongoing, or are planned; identifies which specific office or individual (by title) is responsible for this activity; and includes an ECD, as appropriate. If an ECD is more than 12 months in the future, the response generally includes interim milestones.

DHS provides updated CAPs for audit recommendations via 180- and 90-day letters for GAO and OIG recommendations, respectively. In accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 720, “Agency Reports” (amended by P.L. 115-414), DHS provides Congress, OMB, and GAO with updated CAPs on or before the 180<sup>th</sup> day after the date that final GAO reports with recommendations to DHS are received by DHS. Similarly, in accordance with DHS Instruction # 077-01-001, “Instruction on Follow-up and Resolution for Office of Inspector General Report Recommendations,” DHS provides OIG with updated CAPs on or before the 90<sup>th</sup> day after the date of final OIG reports with recommendations to DHS.

## Appendix: Abbreviations

<b>Abbreviation</b>	<b>Definition</b>
ACE	Automated Commercial Environment
AD/CVD	Antidumping/Countervailing Duty
ADE 1	Acquisition Decision Event 1
ADE-2B	Acquisition Decision Event-2B
ADM	Acquisition Decision Memorandum
ADMO	Alternatives to Detention Monitoring Officers
AES	Automated Export System
AIS	Automated Identification System
AMO	Air and Marine Operations
AP	Assignment Pay
APB	Acquisition Program Baseline
ASIP	Arctic Strategic Outlook Implementation Plan
ATD	Alternatives to Detention
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
ATO	Authority to Operate
ATS	Automated Targeting Systems
BD21	Bio-Detection 21
BEST	Border Enforcement Secondary Tool
BIA	Biological Incident Annex
BNM	Broadcast Notice to Mariners
BSITS	Border Safety Initiative Tracking System
BWSP	Border Wall Systems Program
C5I	Coast Guard's Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Cyber, and Intelligence
CAE	Component Acquisition Executives
CAFRA	Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
CAP	Corrective Action Plan
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CDO	Chief Data Officer
CDM	Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation
CEAR	Commercial Enforcement Analysis and Response

CEE	Centers for Excellence and Expertise
CF	Credible Fear
CFATS	Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
CFDO	Center Fraud Detection Operation
CGCM	Coast Guard Case Management
CGIS	Coast Guard Investigative Service
CIS	Community Information System
CISO	Chief Information Security Officer
CISOD	Chief Information Security Officer Division
CIU	Combined Intelligence Unit
CMD	Custody Management Division
CMS	Cyber Mission Specialist
COAC	Commercial Customs Operations Advisory Committee
CODA	Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operational Data and Analytics
COMDTINST	Commandant Instructional Manual
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COR	Contracting Officer Representative
COVID 19	Coronavirus Disease 2019
CPMO	Checkpoint Program Management Office
CPO	Chief Procurement Officer
CPS	Contingency Preparedness System
CSAT	Cybersecurity Awareness Training
CSC	Cargo Security and Control Division
C-SCRM	Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management
CTOD	Chief Technology Officer Directorate
CUI	Controlled Unclassified Information
CWMD	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
CY	Calendar Year
D17	District 17
DARTTS	Data Analysis and Research for Trade and Transparency System
DEFC	Disaster Emergency Fund Codes
DET	Data Entry Tool
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIMT	Data Integrity and Management Team
DNA	Deoxyribonucleic Acid

DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DSO	Designated School Official
EAGLE	EID Arrest GUI for Law Enforcement
ECC	Emergency Communication Coordination
ECD	Estimated Completion Date
ECIC	Employer Compliance Inspection Center
EDW	Electronic Data Warehouse
EFSP	Emergency Food and Shelter Program
ERO	Enforcement and Removal Operations
ESC	Executive Steering Committee
ESF	Emergency Support Functions
ESFLG	Emergency Support Function Leadership Group
FAMS	Federal Air Marshal Service
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDNS	Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate
FedRAMP	Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEMA GO	Federal Emergency Management Agency Grants Outcomes
FIMA	Flood Insurance and Mitigation Administration
FISMA	Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014
FMC	Field Medical Coordinators
FMCSA	Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
FMU	Family Unit
FOC	Full Operating Capability
FOD	Field Operations Directorate
FPS	Federal Protective Services
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GMM	Grants Management Modernization
GNDA	Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
GSA	General Services Administration
HART	Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology
HCT	Human Capital and Training
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services



HMA	Hazard Mitigation Assistance
HMAD	Hazard Mitigation Division
HMGP	Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
HPIB	Heavy Polar Icebreaker Program
HRD	Human Resources Division
HROC	HR Operations Center
HSAM	Homeland Security Acquisition Manual
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
HSOAC	Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center
HUD	Department of Housing and Urban Development
I&A	Intelligence and Analysis
IAPPG	Individual Assistance Program and Policy Guide
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICS	Industrial Control Systems
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IHP	Individuals and Households Program
IHSC	ICE Health Service Corps
IIR	Intelligence Information Report
IMF	International Mail Facility
IOP	Internal Operating Procedure
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IPT	Integrated Project Team
IT	Information Technology
ITA	Intelligence Training Academy
ITAR	Information Technology Acquisition Review
ITP	Insider Threat Program
JFK	John F. Kennedy
JMP	Joint Management Plan
JRC	Joint Requirements Council
JRTF	Joint Ransomware Task Force
JTTF	Joint Terrorism Task Force
LB	Local Boards
LCCE	Life-Cycle Cost Estimate
LE/FAMS	Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service

LEOD	Law Enforcement Operations Directorate
LMD	Logistics Management Directorate
LPMS	Lifecycle Process Management System
MA	Mission Assignment
MAR	Mission Analysis Report
MGMT	Management
MISLE	Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement
MMP	Missing Migrant Program
MNS	Mission Needs Statement
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSST	Mail Sorting and Singulation Technologies
NAIC	National Association of Insurance Commissioners
NAS	National Academies of Science
National Plan	National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NCITF	National Counterintelligence Task Force
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NEP	National Exercise Program
NFIP	National Flood Insurance Program
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NPM	National Program Manager
NPRM	Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
NSC	National Security Council
NSM	National Security Memorandum
NSPM-33	National Security Presidential Memorandum 33
NSSE	National Special Security Event
NTA	Notice to Appear
OAQ	Office of Acquisition Management
OBIM	Office of Biometric Identity Management
OBP	Office for Bombing Prevention
OCC	Office of Chief Council
OCFO	Office of the Chief Financial Officer
OCHCO	Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer
OCIO	Office of the Chief Information Officer
OCMO	Office of the Chief Medical Officer

OCPO	Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
ODO	Office of Detention and Oversight
OFO	Offices of Field Operations
OFR	Office of the Federal Register
OGC	Office of the General Counsel
OIG	Office of the DHS Inspector General
OIPE	Office of Immigration Program Evaluation
OIT	Office of Information Technology
OIT	Offices of Facilities and Asset Management and Information Technology
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPC	Offshore Patrol Cutter
OPE	Office of Partnership and Engagement
OPLA	Office of the Principal Legal Advisor
OPO	Office of Procurement Operations
OPPA	Office of Policy and Program Analysis
OPR	Office of Professional Responsibility
ORD	Operational Requirements Document
ORR	Office of Response and Recovery
ORSA	Operational Review Self-Assessment
OS	Operations Support
OSCO	Open-Source Collection Operations Branch
OSIR	Open-Source Intelligence Report
OSPP	Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
OSTP	White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
OT	Office of Trade
PA	Public Assistance
PAPPG	Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide
PARM	Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management
PBG	Patrol Border Group
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PD	Policy Directorate
PERC	Pacific Enforcement Response Center
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PLCY	Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
PM	Project Management

PMO	Project Management Office
POC	Point of Contact
PoST	Policy/Procedure of S&T
PPAE	Planning, Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate
PPD-21	Presidential Policy Directive 21
PRA	Paperwork Reduction Act
PREA	Prison Rape Elimination Act
PRIV	Privacy Office
PSR	Procurement Strategy Roadmap
PTA	Privacy Threshold Analysis
PTI	Priority Trade Issue
Q	Quarter
R&D	Research and Development
RCA	Office of Requirements and Capabilities Analysis
RCS	Radio Control System
RDC	Research and Development Center
RFF	Remote Fixed Facility
RTPD	Recovery Technology Program Division
S&T	Science and Technology Directorate
SAMEPH	Seized Asset management and Enforcement Procedures Handbook
SBA	Small Business Administration
SBCC	Southern Border Communities Coalition
SBIR	Small Business Innovation Research
SCADA	Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SCIF	Secure Compartmented Information Facility
SCRM	Supply Chain Risk Management
SETA	SEVP External Training Application
SEVIS	Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
SEVP	Student and Exchange Visitor Program
SI	System Integration
SIW	Self-Inspection Worksheet
SLTT	State, Local, Tribal, Territorial
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SOE	Senior Officials Exercise
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure

SOW	Statement of Work
SRMAs	Sector Risk management Agencies
SRMS	Segregation Review Management System
SSA	State Set-Aside
SSPs	Sector-Specific Plans
STRIDE	Office of Strategic Talent Recruitment, Inclusive Diversity and Engagement
SWB	Southwest Border
TBML	Trade-Based Money Laundering
TCDF	Torrance County Detention Facility
TDY	Temporary Duty
TRA	Trade Regulatory Audit
TRA/MRA	Technology Readiness Assessment/Manufacturing Readiness Assessment
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TTHU	Transportable Temporary Housing Units
TTO	Trade Transformation Office
TTU	Trade Transparency Unit
TWIC	Transportation Worker Identification Card
UC	Unaccompanied Children
UDR	User Defined Rules
UIP	Unified Immigration Portal
USBP	U.S. Border Patrol
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
USPS	United States Postal Service
USSS	United States Secret Service
UWW	United Way Worldwide
V&V	Verification and Validation
VA	Department of Veterans Affairs
VDS 3.0	Vessel Documentation System 3.0
VHF	Very High Frequency
VRP	Vessel Response Plan
WSO	Warrant Service Officer
WYO	Write Your Own