



# FAITH-BASED SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL

Countering Transnational Repression  
Subcommittee

Faith-Based Security Advisory Council  
June 24, 2024



Homeland  
Security

This publication is presented on behalf of the Faith-Based Security Advisory Council (FBSAC) Countering Transnational Repression (TNR) Subcommittee Co-Chaired by Hyepin Im and Todd Richins for the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Alejandro N. Mayorkas.



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On January 5<sup>th</sup>, 2024, Secretary Mayorkas tasked the FBSAC with forming a subcommittee on Countering Transnational Repression (TNR) to develop the DHS strategy to protect faith-based community stakeholders from incidents of TNR, consistent with the Department's authorities. The subcommittee met with numerous organizations that possess subject matter expertise on the topic.

The Subcommittee set out to identify the following: a process that faith-based leaders and security professionals can implement to inform faith-based communities about ongoing TNR threats and relevant resources; an effective way to encourage faith-based communities to report TNR threats they have experienced; and how faith-based leaders and security professionals can assess how well safety and security resources are working, both in terms of communities utilizing them and their effectiveness in mitigating TNR incidents.

The Subcommittee recognizes the many efforts being made by DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to address TNR. We applaud these efforts and strongly encourage these efforts to continue.

The Secretary's questions in the tasking memo led the Subcommittee to make several discoveries on outreach, reporting, and the impact of trust building to support resiliency. Through the extensive briefing process, the Subcommittee has drawn several other key findings on why TNR is a pervasive threat and how TNR can be mitigated. One such finding is that victims of TNR are targeted for many reasons in addition to religious affiliation, to include a person's political and cultural identity, dissidence, or criticism of their home country's regime.

It is also important to note that most of the Subcommittee's findings and recommendations are directly dependent on two foundational themes, outlined below.

- The lack of a formal, unified definition of TNR causes confusion across agencies and organizations and likely contributes to the lack of interagency coordination to counter TNR.
- No single department or agency owns domestic TNR response (e.g., FBI, DHS, or local law enforcement agencies). As a result, no department or agency has the authority to lead campaigns or to engage in collaboration between agencies, resulting in lackluster response and reporting.

These themes are further built out in the Key Findings section in this report:

1. The lack of a formal, unified definition of TNR causes confusion across agencies and organizations and likely contributes to a lack of coordinated interagency response and mitigation.

2. No single agency owns the domestic response to incidents of TNR and there is a lack of interagency coordination between the multiple stakeholders.
3. Avenues for reporting TNR incidents are confusing and there is inconsistent response to these incidents, causing further mistrust of law enforcement.
4. Outreach to communities of TNR victims can draw attention to those persons and communities, further hampering the response.
5. Victims of TNR are targeted for many reasons beyond religious affiliation, including a person's political and cultural identity, dissidence, or criticism of their home country's regime.
6. The U.S. Government often turns a blind eye when allied governments commit acts of TNR.
7. Codifying TNR is a necessary step in being able to address the threat. There are currently no legislative mechanisms to address TNR and so no legal mechanisms to prosecute it.

The Subcommittee made the following recommendations:

1. Support current or future legislative efforts to create a formal, unified definition of TNR.
2. DHS should work with federal partners to determine which agency or entity leads coordination on TNR response and ensure this agency or entity is required to report out on and provide updates on their actions.
3. Ensure that the government, and in particular DOS, equally identifies and responds to any country that engages in TNR regardless of whether the country is a U.S. ally or adversary.
4. Make reforms to the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP) to include mitigation of TNR as an allowable category for funding.
5. Train and empower local law enforcement to address cases of TNR.
6. Ensure community outreach and education is accessible to a wide range of communities in targeted populations. This includes providing resources in meaningfully accessible languages, as well as standardizing current TNR resources located on federal websites and those in printed form.
7. Law Enforcement should reach out to, and build trust with, faith communities regarding TNR.
8. Identify a central collection agency for TNR issues to which all local jurisdictions can report. This central collection agency may already exist; however, it should be clearly identified to the public as the central collection and reporting agency.
9. Partner with technology companies and faith organizations to mitigate TNR online and to increase outreach to targeted communities about online safety.
10. Empower existing local Victims Services Programs, or the like, to provide support to the victims and potentially families and communities impacted by incidents of TNR.
11. Collaborate with Five Eyes (FVEYS) partners to identify TNR prevention strategies.

It is this subcommittee's assessment that it will be very difficult to determine how resources are working and their effectiveness in mitigating TNR until the top two key findings are implemented. Once these two steps have occurred, assessing their effectiveness will be simplified. A formal definition of TNR and the identification of one governmental body to lead the response is paramount and will facilitate the gathering of statistics on TNR (arrests, reported incidents, outreach classes). From there, mitigation strategies and effectiveness can be better analyzed.

## KEY FINDINGS

**The lack of a formal, unified definition of TNR causes confusion across agencies and organizations, and likely contributes to a lack of coordinated interagency response and mitigation.**

There is a working definition of TNR, however a formal definition does not currently exist. This needs to be addressed immediately. This lack of definition is hampering cross-agency collaboration and effective response. Every solution, or part of a solution, is dependent in some part upon the United States Government having a formal definition for TNR. The current working definition of TNR implies that it is being perpetrated by authoritarian regimes. Our findings indicate that although authoritarian regimes are perpetrating TNR, some democracies, and even some of our allies, are also perpetrating TNR. This is particularly concerning when incidents of TNR are occurring on American soil.

**No single agency owns the domestic response to incidents of TNR and there is a lack of interagency coordination between the multiple stakeholders.**

TNR, as a threat, is under the jurisdiction of many different agencies. There is no single owner of the threat and related incidents, and no clear avenue to prosecute offenders or mitigate incidents which contribute to mistrust in communities regarding the government's actions on TNR. There is a lack of transparency on follow-up actions once community members have reported incidents.

**Avenues for reporting TNR incidents are confusing and there is inconsistent response to these incidents causing further mistrust in law enforcement.**

Without clear authority for responding to incidents of TNR, it is difficult for individuals to pinpoint where to report. The FBI Call Center is currently the hub for reporting instances of TNR. Call center employees are trained to recognize, report, and discuss TNR with victims properly, which helps in reporting statistics. Although many individuals and groups who have reported TNR incidents have found success going to the FBI, that is not the experience across the board. Others who have reported through the FBI website have not received help. This discourages more reporting of TNR incidents.

Furthermore, many incidents of harassment, intimidation, and stalking reported to local law enforcement, are not identified as TNR because TNR is not well understood. TNR covers a broad spectrum of activities, some of which are clearly illegal, but others are more subtle



and nuanced. Any training to authorities responding to TNR and outreach campaigns geared toward potential victims need to account for both the illegal activities as well as the subtle and not so easily identifiable activities. Individuals and groups that are being targeted, or that are more likely to be targeted, need to feel a level of trust when reporting TNR incidents to law enforcement or other authorities. To build trust, it is important to explain what actions the government can take and provide feedback to those who report TNR incidents.

**Outreach to communities of TNR victims can draw attention to those persons and communities, further hampering the response.**

It is important to caution that certain outreach methods to victims and their communities targeted by TNR can inadvertently draw attention to those victims and may further exacerbate their vulnerabilities. Not all communities are the same, and their relationships with law enforcement can vary. This may influence some community members to report incidents directly to their faith leadership rather than law enforcement. Faith-based and spiritual leaders, as trusted leaders in their communities, may be able to be the amplifiers of training material and reporting resources on TNR. However, faith and spiritual leaders may already be victims of TNR or may become targets by playing an individual role in mitigating their community's threat from TNR. Thus, outreach to faith communities should be conducted on a broader scale, prioritizing cultural sensitivity and safety and security of targeted community members. One best practice may be to encourage victims not to report TNR to their faith or spiritual leader, but to report to law enforcement directly.

**Victims of TNR are targeted for many reasons beyond religious affiliation, including a person's political and cultural identity, dissidence, or criticism of their home country's regime.**

Many victims in the U.S. are targeted for holding certain political beliefs about their home country, and there is overlap with certain victims holding the same religious affiliation.

**The U.S. Government turns a blind eye when allied governments commit acts of TNR.**

Addressing TNR with foreign governments, including any allied nations involved in perpetrating TNR, is often hampered. This is because foreign governments may mislabel activities that resemble TNR as counterterrorism measures, triggering US national security agencies against political dissidents. Once a formal definition is in place, tracking reported incidents to better understand what and where TNR is occurring will be more feasible. TNR should be called out and addressed regardless of which foreign government (ally or not) is perpetrating it. Doing so will aid in alleviating issues of trust.

**Codifying TNR is a necessary step in being able to address the threat. There are currently no legislative mechanisms to address TNR and so no legal mechanisms to prosecute it.**

We understand that there are several efforts to codify TNR legislatively. It is this subcommittee's strong opinion that codification is necessary to combat the threat from TNR. If current legislative efforts are unsuccessful, we urge continuing collaborative efforts to

ensure some legislation occurs. In that light, and working with the other branches of government, DHS, with its broad understanding of the threat and efforts on mitigation that are already underway, should consider making suggestions of key items that could be included in any future legislation designed to address the threat from TNR.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### **Recommendation #1: Support current or future legislative efforts to create a formal, unified definition of TNR.**

A formal definition should focus on key areas including interagency coordination, education on TNR, and protection of U.S. persons as key issues. We recommend a definition of transnational repression consider:

- 1) Threats of a physical nature to individuals, organizations, including lives and property;
- 2) Digital threats, such as doxing, coordinated online harassment, and censorship, including under the threat of prosecution and/or limiting economic rights;
- 3) The psychological impacts of harassment and misinformation on directly targeted individuals;
- 4) The role of third-party actors, either directly or indirectly spurred into action by the state or state-affiliated organizations, such as political parties;

It is essential to recognize that TNR occurs in many forms. Different ethnic minorities and religious groups are experiencing TNR in different ways, with some experiencing physical threats, and others receiving threats by way of targeting their families in their country of origin. Some are being subjected to TNR in the cyber realm. All of this needs to be accounted for when formalizing the definition of TNR.

### **Recommendation #2: DHS should work with federal partners to determine which agency or entity leads coordination on TNR response and ensure this agency or entity is required to report out on and provide updates on their actions.**

This would be the central coordinating group for federal TNR response with responsibility to liaise with state, local and tribal components. The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that there is one entity focused on comprehensively looking at ways that TNR is evolving and being mitigated. This recommendation is intended to foster greater coordination, accountability, and effectiveness in responding to TNR incidents and help build trust in communities who are frequent victims of TNR.

### **Recommendation #3: Ensure that the government, and in particular DOS, equally identifies and responds to any country that engages in TNR regardless of whether the country is a U.S. ally or adversary.**

Based on our findings, when TNR is perpetrated by nation states that are generally labeled as allied states, action to mitigate the threat is muted even though the victims are on U.S. soil and are often citizens of the U.S. It is this subcommittee's recommendation that all

incidents of TNR are addressed using the same yardstick. This includes ensuring equal application of DOS terminology such as “Country of Particular Concern” (CPC) in relation to countries that engage in TNR and developing one policy to prosecute acts of TNR no matter the country committing the crimes (one stance whether the country is an ally or adversary). Further, a review of national security policies to ensure that they do not hinder efforts to counter TNR is also recommended.

**Recommendation #4: Make reforms to the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP) to include mitigation of TNR as an allowable category for funding.**

Faith-Based Organizations and non-profits should be able to use grant funding under the NSGP to fund preparedness and prevention initiatives to combat TNR. In that light:

- Adjust the Notice of funding Opportunity (NOFO) to include explicit wording on TNR so that the community is aware that mitigation of TNR can be a justification in the request for funding.
- Include reference to TNR in NSGP training seminars and resources.
- Educate State Administrative Agencies on the threat, tactics and techniques of TNR so that when a grant request, specifically intending to mitigate TNR, is submitted, it is not rejected outright.

**Recommendation #5: Train and empower local law enforcement to address cases of TNR.**

Local law enforcement should be the first line of defense however, they are not subject to the same closed communications as the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the DOS. Therefore, there is a need to train and empower local law enforcement to address cases of TNR. FLETC (Federal Law Enforcement Training Center) resources should be dedicated to training law enforcement to recognize indicators of TNR. Existing resources like the FBI’s Threat Intimidation Guide can be used as a basis to build out a FLETC program. Additionally, resources including funding should be allocated to support local law enforcement and Fusion Center response to, and reporting of, TNR.

**Recommendation #6: Ensure community outreach and education is accessible to a wide range of communities in targeted populations. This includes providing resources in meaningfully accessible language as well as standardizing current TNR resources located on federal websites and those in printed form.**

There is an increasing need for meaningful community education and outreach on TNR including in the appropriate language for the targeted communities where outreach is being conducted. Specific training and assistance in accessible locations and in meaningfully accessible languages should be provided at the federal and state levels to assist organizations and individuals with accessing resources, including grant opportunities. The DHS modular training video, which was developed by FLETC, and released in March 2024, should be amplified. A public service announcement campaign should be placed in airports and transportation hubs to bring awareness to TNR. The government should consider hosting a summit that displays its commitment to mitigate TNR, much like the United We

Stand Summit<sup>1</sup>. This effort should highlight the work of NGO organizations that are working to bring awareness to TNR and minimize harmful exposure of potentially targeted communities. Additionally, TNR resources on federal websites and in printed form are not consistent across agencies and should be standardized.

**Recommendation #7: Law Enforcement should reach out to, and build trust with, faith communities regarding TNR.**

National security and law enforcement agencies should engage in community trust building with faith communities. Community engagement and outreach specialists should be involved. Community trust building should be the foundation of any approach to working with the community. Victims of TNR who report to the federal government or local law enforcement should be kept abreast of any follow-on actions to the greatest extent possible. This will help build transparency and trust with communities and encourage others to report.

**Recommendation #8: Identify a central collection agency for TNR issues to which all local jurisdictions can report up. This central collection agency may already exist; however, it should be clearly identified to the public as the central collection and reporting agency.**

Fusion Centers are key in amplifying any awareness campaigns but may not play a big role in data collection. The identified central collection and reporting agency should:

- Allow for anonymous reporting. Many times, victims of TNR are reluctant to report it due to fear of escalation.
- Clearly provide resources to the community after a report is submitted so that the community can then seek immediate relief from the incident.
- Referring back to recommendation #2, provide data to the coordinating entity to assist with identifying the evolving threat and the mechanism for mitigation.

**Recommendation #9: Partner with technology companies and faith organizations to mitigate TNR online and to increase outreach to targeted communities about online safety.**

The federal government, in consultation with community-based organizations including faith organizations, should engage in more direct conversations and collaboration with major media and technology companies to address the mechanisms that foreign governments leverage to target and harass individuals, organizations, and communities. Congress and agencies with oversight of technology companies should demand clarity on takedowns and other requests to limit visibility of users' posts by foreign governments. DHS should leverage its existing relationships with technology companies to encourage increased cultural awareness, so they do not censor posts of religious or cultural significance.

**Recommendation #10: Empower existing local Victims Services Programs, or the like, to provide support to the victims and potentially families and communities impacted by incidents of TNR.**

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/09/15/fact-sheet-the-united-we-stand-summit-taking-action-to-prevent-and-address-hate-motivated-violence-and-foster-unity/>

Current local victim support services may not be equipped to respond to victims of TNR. In order to be effective in providing said support to TNR victims, those administering the programs or services should be provided with education on the terms, tactics, and techniques related to TNR. DHS has had success with elevating response strategies to threats at the local level e.g., countering human trafficking. Strategies that should be employed could include:

- Seeking improvements to deliver victim protection and robust identification.
- Increasing TNR victim identification through training, nationwide public awareness, and screening tools.
- Enhancing prevention efforts by aligning DHS's capabilities and expertise with local victim support approaches.
- Incorporating proven and promising victim-centered practices into DHS policies and protocols that can then permeate to local efforts.

**Recommendation #11: Collaborate with Five Eyes (FVEYS) partners to identify TNR prevention strategies.**

The Five Eyes alliance is an intelligence network established between the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and is intended as a cooperative arrangement for sharing signals intelligence. Since these nations collaboratively work on intelligence matters, pooling their resources and sharing sensitive information to ensure collective security and combat global threats, it is this subcommittee's recommendation that collaboration on TNR also occur within the FVEYS community. Some members of the FVEYS (e.g., Canada) have had greater success than others in addressing incidents of TNR. Information sharing and collaboration on mitigation would benefit U.S. based victims and their communities.

## **CONCLUSION**

The Countering Transnational Repression Subcommittee has outlined seven findings and eleven recommendations. Any efforts to increase awareness, address, and mitigate incidents of Transnational Repression cannot occur if Transnational Repression is not defined, codified, and addressed with the governments that are perpetrating TNR. Further, the lack of a formal, unified definition of TNR causes confusion across agencies and organizations and likely contributes to the lack of interagency coordination to counter TNR.

Further, the Subcommittee found that incidents of Transnational Repression are occurring and potentially increasing, and targets include but are not limited to faith-based institutions and persons of faith. Faith-based spiritual leaders, and the faith-based community as whole, may be able to assist with identifying incidents, consoling victims and assisting with recovery and as such can benefit from understanding the threat.

No single department, agency or entity owns domestic Federal TNR response. As a result, no agency or entity has the overall responsibility to lead collaboration between agencies, or to be the primary liaison with state, local and tribal components. This contributes to lackluster response and reporting. Determining which federal agency or entity is responsible for coordinating overall TNR response will go a long way in alleviating some of the concerns related to response and reporting.

The subcommittee notes that victims of TNR are targeted for many reasons including religious affiliation, a person's political and cultural identity, dissidence, and/or criticism of their home country's regime. A cornerstone of any mitigation and response program should include building trust with those affected by these incidents. In that light, it is critical that the federal government takes all incidents of TNR seriously, whether the perpetrating country or regime is a U.S. ally or adversary. One such approach could be increasing collaboration with Five Eyes (FVEYS) partners to identify TNR prevention strategies.

The federal government should lead efforts to address programs to identify, report, mitigate, and respond to TNR, however, response efforts should occur at the local level where they can be most effective. Standardizing language, identifying resources, expanding reporting mechanisms, training, and allocating funding should occur at the federal level. Outreach and victim support would be better addressed by local jurisdictions with the support of the federal government. Lastly, partnering with technology companies to increase awareness would be welcome as many incidents of TNR are being perpetrated in the cyber realm.

## APPENDIX 1: TASKING LETTER

*Secretary*  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, DC 20538



January 5, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: Kiran Kaur Gill  
Chair, Faith-Based Security Advisory Council

FROM: Alejandro N. Mayorkas  
Secretary

SUBJECT: **New Faith-Based Security Advisory Council Subcommittees  
and Taskings**

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I respectfully request that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Faith-Based Security Advisory Council (FBSAC) form two subcommittees to provide findings and recommendations in these critical areas of the Department's work:

1. Develop a DHS strategy to protect faith-based community stakeholders from incidents of transnational repression (TNR), consistent with DHS authorities. This effort will focus on how faith-based leaders and security professionals can amplify DHS information on TNR threats, encourage reporting of incidents to appropriate authorities, and provide feedback on the effectiveness of existing safety and security resources.
2. Survey existing multi-faith initiatives nationwide to establish a "best practices toolkit" on how faith-based organizations and institutions can build resiliency against threats of targeted violence and terrorism.

These subjects are described in greater detail below.

I request that the FBSAC submit its findings and key recommendations to me no later than 120 days from the date of this memorandum, consistent with applicable rules and regulations.

Thank you for your work on these important matters, your service on the FBSAC, and your dedication to securing our homeland.

## **Countering Transnational Repression**

Transnational repression (TNR) occurs when foreign repressive governments stalk, intimidate, or assault individuals beyond their borders, including within the United States. Foreign governments have targeted individuals specifically because of their faith community affiliation. The objectives of foreign repressive governments that engage in this activity beyond their borders is typically to silence dissent, obtain information, intimidate community advocates, or coerce individuals to return to their countries of origin. When foreign repressive governments are unable to threaten an individual in the United States, they may resort to targeting that individual's family members overseas. TNR activities are intended to have a chilling impact that extends beyond specific targeted individuals, and many TNR tactics are illegal. It will require a comprehensive and coordinated approach to effectively counter TNR in the homeland.

The U.S. Government is taking a whole-of-government approach to deter foreign repressive governments from engaging in TNR, promote accountability for those that engage in it, and increase measures to protect victims against it. To these ends, DHS is working to heighten domestic awareness of this threat and develop tools to counter all forms of TNR.

Faith-based organizations and institutions have unique insights into the security challenges faced by their memberships. This can include any form of targeting of communities and individuals on the basis of their faith or belief. Countering TNR will require a process to report potential TNR incidents, no matter how small. Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities, including law enforcement, can then coordinate to investigate and respond as appropriate.

The FBSAC is tasked to form a subcommittee to develop the DHS strategy to protect faith-based community stakeholders from incidents of TNR, consistent with the Department's authorities. The questions to consider for this tasking include, but are not limited to:

1. What is a process that faith-based leaders and security professionals can implement to inform faith-based communities about ongoing TNR threats and relevant resources?
2. What is an effective way to encourage faith-based communities to report TNR threats they have experienced?
3. How can faith-based leaders and security professionals assess how well safety and security resources are working, both in terms of communities utilizing them and their effectiveness in mitigating TNR incidents?

## **Countering and Responding to Targeted Violence and Terrorism**

In response to the hostage situation at the Congregation Beth Israel synagogue in Colleyville, Texas, on January 15, 2022, law enforcement and local faith leaders came together quickly to assess and respond to the situation. A gunman entered the synagogue and took four worshippers hostage, including their rabbi, for 11 hours. As the world watched along in real time, DHS reached out to faith leaders on the scene to ask how we could be of support. We spoke with an imam and a pastor, who were across the street at a Catholic church, comforting the Jewish community, including the wife of Rabbi Charlie Cytron-Walker. In the end, all of the hostages



escaped safely, and Rabbi Cytron-Walker credited his active shooter training with saving their lives.

Similarly, the survivors of the shooting at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh, PA in October 2018 credit the cohesiveness of their community and relationships with local law enforcement prior to that attack with their ability to remain resilient and recover in its aftermath.

While we never want a situation of those sorts to happen again, the reality is that they happen all too often. Domestic violent extremists prey on target-rich, resource-poor environments, including the communities that many places of worship serve. What we do want to see going forward is the type of coordinated and effective response we saw in Colleyville and the community resilience that was witnessed in Pittsburgh. The faith leader in Colleyville had the requisite training and resources to keep his congregants safe, and law enforcement responded efficiently and effectively. Both there and in Pittsburgh, the entire faith community came together to support their affected community members and keep DHS informed about their needs.

To that end, DHS is looking to solicit insights from faith-community leaders and professionals to see how the successes of the Colleyville response and Pittsburgh recovery can be scaled and made into a process that others can follow.

The FBSAC is tasked to form a subcommittee to survey existing multi-faith initiatives nationwide to establish a “best practices toolkit” on how faith-based organizations and institutions can build resiliency against threats of targeted violence and terrorism. The questions to consider for this tasking include, but are not limited to:

1. Are there examples of faith-based entities that have worked towards preventing an incident of targeted violence or terrorism by utilizing DHS safety and security resources? What are some best practices from those examples that other faith communities can adopt?
2. What are some examples of how faith communities have utilized federal government resources in the immediate aftermath and in the long-term following an incident of targeted violence or terrorism?
3. How can DHS assist with community building to increase resilience across faith groups in the event of an act of targeted violence?

## APPENDIX 2: SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS AND OTHER WITNESSES

Throughout February and March 2024, the Subcommittee met with officials from DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the Department of Justice, as well as the following individuals listed below.

Name	Title	Organization
Nausher Ali	Deputy Director	Office of Multilateral and Global Affairs, Bureau of Human Rights
Emraan Ansari	Policy and Advocacy Officer	Freedom House
Annie Boyajian	Vice President for Policy and Advocacy & Mark Palmer Distinguished Fellow	Freedom House
Kelli Ann Burriesci	Deputy Under Secretary	Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY)
Ria Chakrabarty	Policy Director	Hindus for Human Rights (HfRF)
Marian Drake	Senior Policy Advisor,	Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)
Elizabeth Edwards	Program Analyst	CRCL
Chief Heather Fong	Assistant Secretary	Office for State & Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE)
Louisa Greve	Director of Global Advocacy	Uyghur Human Rights Project (UHRP)
Omer Kanat	Executive Director	UHRP
Mannirmal Kaur	Research and Policy Manager	Sikh Coalition
Anna Kuntz	Director of Partnership Engagement	OSLLE
Kevin Quinn	Supervisory Program Analyst	CRCL
Nate Schenkkan	Senior Director of Research on Countering Authoritarianism	Freedom House
Harman Singh	Co-Interim Executive Director	Sikh Coalition
Nury Turkel	Co-Founder	Uyghur Human Rights Project