Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention

Fiscal Year 2016 Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program

Preliminary Report on Programmatic Performance

March 26, 2020
Executive Summary

This report presents preliminary findings on the programmatic performance of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Grant Program, which concluded its original period of performance on July 31, 2019. Findings on program performance have been informed by quarterly performance reports and other deliverables provided to DHS by the grantees over the duration of the period of performance. The evidence gathered under this grant program, in conjunction with the conclusions of RAND Corporation’s Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center’s *Practical Terrorism Prevention* report, show that prevention activities are successful and need to be scaled across the country.

This evidence has informed the Department’s September 2019 *Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence* and will inform additional DHS prevention funding opportunities, such as a forthcoming program that Congress funded for FY 2020, in P.L. 116-93. In order for decision makers to assess the program’s outcomes and effectiveness, this report quantifies the activities and outputs of the grant projects and identifies six distinct models for replication in other communities:

1. **Intervention Capabilities**: Developing local capability to receive referrals of individuals with risk factors for targeted violence and terrorism and manage cases as needed.

2. **Regional Prevention Planning and Implementation**: Establishing frameworks for preventing mobilization or radicalization to violence of individuals within the community and institutionalizing those planned efforts in specific organizations or other entities.

3. **Law Enforcement Led Youth Resilience Building**: Using existing law enforcement officer resources to develop protective factors in youth, creating greater community trust in law enforcement, and enhancing law enforcement responsiveness to community concerns.

4. **Law Enforcement Training**: Training law enforcement on the threat of mobilization or radicalization to violence and ways they can support community efforts to intervene when individuals have not yet committed a crime.

5. **Community Led Resilience Building**: Using community-based organizations to engage with and encourage youth to develop protective factors that mitigate risks associated with targeted violence and terrorism.

6. **Training for Members of the Public**: Empowering the general public with knowledge and resources to protect their communities from targeted violence and terrorism.

Each model is supported by two or more grant projects that had indicators of successful program implementation, outputs, and outcomes which support replicating all or a portion of the project.

This report also identifies a variety of grant management practices for incorporation in future prevention programming and catalogs several lessons learned that will be useful for the federal government, state governments, and philanthropic organizations interested in replicating a targeted violence and terrorism prevention grant program in the future.
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Introduction

In FY 2016, Congress provided DHS with $10 million in grant funds to address the threat posed to the homeland by violent extremists of all ideologies.¹ These funds assisted DHS in carrying out the mission outlined in Sec. 101 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that requires DHS to “prevent terrorist attacks in the United States.” The threat of violent extremism or terrorism can be mitigated with a variety of tools from the department’s traditional counterterrorism toolset such as investigations, response planning, and physical security enhancements. However, this funding addressed a gap in our nation’s prevention capabilities:

- Enhancing awareness to the threat of individuals mobilizing or radicalizing to violence;
- Intervening with such individuals;
- Developing resilience or protective factors in communities and with individuals; and
- Providing alternative messages or activities that challenge violent narratives.

Research has indicated that prevention is cost-effective but requires a local-level, multidisciplinary approach. Congress provided funding for grants to assist states and local communities in developing their capabilities. DHS endeavored to design a grant program to deliver proven prevention capabilities, while simultaneously testing innovative approaches to this complex problem.

DHS began developing this grant program in January 2016. Utilizing the most recent research and experience involving prevention, extremism, and activities to prevent violence, DHS categorized potential grantee efforts into five focus areas for competition: Developing Resilience, Training and Engagement, Managing Interventions, Challenging the Narrative, and Building Capacity.

As the first competitive federal grant program dedicated to preventing domestic terrorism, DHS reviewed other federal grant programs and grant making best practices to develop the FY 2016 CVE Grant Program. Within DHS, the Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) was tasked as the overall programmatic lead, while the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Grant Programs Directorate (GPD), was tasked with providing financial management and administrative support. Together, they jointly developed and released the Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO)² and advised the Secretary on making awards.

The program management team originally housed in OCP, now the Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (OTVTP), established a monitoring and evaluation regime to monitor projects in near real time while providing technical support and evaluation of the overall program. Some projects included funding for internal or external evaluation of their specific project, and the DHS Science and Technology directorate utilized separate funding to secure independent evaluation of five of the on-going projects.

¹ P.L. 114-113
² Funding Opportunity Number: DHS-16-OCP-132-00-01 [https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/view-opportunity.html?oppId=285773]
The evidence gathered under this grant program, in conjunction with the conclusions of RAND Corporation’s Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center’s *Practical Terrorism Prevention* report, show that prevention activities are successful and need to be scaled across the country. Many prevention programs work by aiming to reduce risk factors, which underpins much of the work funded under this program. Research by the Department of Justice (DOJ), National Institutes of Justice (NIJ), identified 24 risk factors associated with radicalization and terrorism, which are associated with lone actors and members of violent extremist groups.³ DHS analyzed these factors and collapsed 22 of these 24 risk factors into four larger, thematic concepts that did not differentiate between lone actors or members of violent extremist groups. This allows for a broader assessment of grantee focus on terrorism prevention. These categories of risk are:

**Criminal/Terrorist History Risks:** This broad category represents individuals with previous or ongoing criminal history or association with criminals/delinquents, in addition to engaging with terrorist ideology or extremists. Specific risk factors identified by NIJ are: having a criminal history/history of criminal violence; having a criminal record; having been involved with a gang or delinquent peers; having a terrorist friend; being a member of an extremist group for an extended period; and having a deep commitment to a terrorist ideology.

**Psychosocial Risks:** This broad category refers to the confluence of social factors and individual thought and behavior and includes diagnosable mental health issues. Specific risk factors identified by NIJ are: having a personal & political grievance; having received a diagnosis of schizophrenia or delusional disorder; having psychological issues; having an enabler; and failing to achieve one’s aspirations.

**Socio-Economic Status Risks:** This broad category refers to the social standing of any individual or group. In general, this is measured as some combination of education, income, and occupation. Specific risk factors identified by NIJ are: being unemployed; having a sporadic work history; having ≤ bachelor’s degree; having less education; and having a lower socio-economic status.

**Social Alienation Risks:** This broad category refers to the level of social integration and values between individuals and between individuals and the community. Individuals who exhibit “social alienation” typically are not integrated into their community or work environment and exhibit traits of isolation from other individuals and the broader community. Specific risk factors identified by NIJ are: having problems in platonic/romantic relationships; having been abused as an adult; being distant from one’s family; being socially isolated; being single; and living alone.

Grantee projects addressed one or more risk factors identified in the NIJ study. Table 1 summarizes the categories of risk factors that are addressed by grantees.

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When assessing various projects in a grant program, it is helpful to understand how varying types of prevention projects fit in an overall framework of prevention. RAND Corporation’s Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center’s *Practical Terrorism Prevention* report\(^4\) created a framework (see Figure 1.) to visualize where different projects or lines of efforts have an impact on the radicalization process.

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\(^4\) [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2647.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2647.html) page 20
Methodology

This document is a preliminary report on the evaluation and effectiveness of the FY16 CVE Grant Program. To date, 23 of the original 26 awards have completed their projects within the original two-year period of performance, ending July 31, 2019, or within an approved extension to their period of performance; 10 projects received no cost extensions and of those, one continues to perform. Two projects terminated their awards prior to the end of the original period of performance, in accordance with 2 CFR 200.

This report describes OTVTP’s assessment of activities, outputs, and outcomes of the projects through observations, interactions with grantees, and grantee reported information (such as through quarterly programmatic performance reports covering data through June 2019). This report describes promising practices and lessons learned about specific projects, the program as a whole, and program management approaches. DHS will make a final report on this grant program in 2020 when final reports have been received and analyzed from grantees.

Program Activities and Outputs

The grantees funded under this grant program conducted projects with a wide variety of activities that are roughly grouped into five focus areas: Developing Resilience, Training and Engagement, Managing Interventions, Challenging the Narrative, and Building Capacity. Some projects produced a major deliverable at the end of the project, whereas others provided programming with target audiences throughout the period of performance.

DHS requested that grantees report on the number and types of activities and participants of their projects. This information provided insight into how projects were operating without collecting information that could identify the specific individuals, something DHS is prohibited from
The categories were selected by identifying grantee target audiences, audiences that research indicated were key stakeholders in prevention efforts, and other audiences that DHS senior leadership and other decision makers may find useful. Grantees logged in-person participation of approximately 49,050 people at their activities (see Figure 2).

The largest category of participants was general community audience, but the next two largest categories, totaling nearly 18,000 participants, were youth and their parents. Grantees sought participation of these groups primarily because of the research associating being younger with a “higher likelihood of engaging or attempting to engage in terrorism.” As one of the risk factors for terrorism and targeted violence, it is important not just to enhance resiliency of individuals with risk factors, but to also engage with those in a position to intervene early or spot other potential risk factors, for example, peers or parents. These categories represent 37% of total participants, which shows that these grant projects can be successful in reaching target audiences. Approximately 16% of participants are professionals (law enforcement, mental/behavioral health, educators, social service, and other service providers) that are poised to be able to leverage their experience to most effectively impact audiences within their communities.

Figure 2. Public Participation by Category (N=49050)

- Public Health Professionals: 126
- Youth Workers: 147
- Business Owners/Entrepreneurs: 254
- Other Service providers: 293
- Other Front Line Workers (government): 317
- Volunteers: 406
- Other Front Line Workers (non-government): 441
- Other Participants: 680
- Teachers/ School Staff / Educators: 681
- Government Representatives (Local, State, Federal, Tribal): 690
- Activists/Advocates: 705
- Mental/Behavioral Health Providers: 753
- Community Organization Representative: 754
- Faith Leaders/ Religious leaders: 1043
- Individuals Impacted by Terrorism: 1223
- Social Service Providers: 1792
- Police/Law Enforcement: 3240
- Parent of Youth or Young Adult (Ages 12-26): 5369
- Young Adult/Student: 12610
- General Community Audience: 17526

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5 Some of the participants may represent the same individual counted more than once, but only if they attended more than one event that was not part of a series of events. For example, a grantee holding a weekly meeting for two months with the same group of 15 participants reported 15 participants, not 120.

6 This category could easily include individuals in other categories but was used by grantees when they did not have a data collection method for determining the specific category, e.g. head count at the door of an event.

7 Smith, Allison G.
Of the nearly 1,000 individual activities conducted (see Figure 3.), over one third were educational in nature, with 10% being train-the-trainer activities that facilitate further education that is not captured in grantee reporting. Community engagement and recreation events, which promote community cohesion and lower risk factors, make up another third of the activities.

Figure 3. Activity by Type
(N=974)

Figure 4. Trainings, Youth Workshops, and Large Events
Several projects were geared toward challenging terrorist recruitment and radicalization narratives online. These projects reached a large audience, garnering over 5 million impressions (see Figure 5).

![Digital Activity Chart]

**Models for Replication**

This section identifies six distinct models for replication in other communities. It specifically analyzes the work of thirteen grantees to identify how each project was constructed and what outcomes they achieved. It also provides context and recommendations for how other communities can replicate each model. Several other grantees had successes that did not neatly fit into a model that could be easily replicated. These practices are referenced in the next section, and their work can be reviewed through quarterly reports published by DHS.

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Intervention Capabilities

Preventing targeted violence and terrorism requires many capabilities. One of the largest gaps in capabilities DHS has identified is the ability to intervene with an individual at risk of mobilization or radicalization to violence. There are many opportunities to intervene with individuals from resolving or preventing risk factors, to threat assessment and case management teams, to working to prevent recidivism for individuals exiting prison. Two such projects are described below.

Nebraska Emergency Management Agency

Nebraska Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) collaborated with the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Public Policy Center, and the Two Rivers Public Health Department to develop a pilot program of a public health approach aimed at preventing and intervening with individuals mobilizing and radicalizing to violence. This project attempted to implement a prevention framework in rural areas, whereas all previous prevention frameworks DHS has reviewed were closely associated with medium to large metropolitan areas. Initially designed as a training and engagement program, NEMA hoped to weave violence prevention training into state-enacted disease prevention programs. They conducted extensive outreach to two communities to identify barriers to reporting, develop local multidisciplinary teams, train the teams in threat assessment, and develop protocols for case management. The awareness and reporting functions of the program created a pathway for community members to report distressed individuals with a potential risk to violence, and a way for health and social service professionals to assist those individuals.

The two communities consisted of a small municipality of 10,000 people with a major employer and three distinct ethnic populations, and the second was a rural community with a dispersed population. The program assessed the capabilities of various community leaders across faith/religions, law enforcement, government, and education to help determine each community’s specific threat assessment awareness goals and challenges. For one jurisdiction, health workers were embedded in the community to make connections with potential violent offenders, allowing an opportunity to intervene.

As of March 31, 2019, NEMA conducted 26 community awareness briefings and/or community educational workshops on threat assessments, consisting of 254 community participants (social service/public health providers: 57, educators/school staff: 91, faith/religious leaders: 9, law enforcement sectors: 18, and other frontline, government representatives, and community leaders: 97).

As a result, the project has developed sustainable threat assessment and management capabilities in two communities and increased the likelihood of referral or self-referral to community-based support services. Importantly, NEMA and its partners designed a “toolkit”8 for rural and small to mid-sized communities to train community leaders and public health professionals for integration of engagement, planning, and threat assessment with public health initiatives. The program was

8 [http://cve.unl.edu/home/resources/#toolkit](http://cve.unl.edu/home/resources/#toolkit)
designed with replication in mind and the developed toolkit can be used by public health departments in most rural areas or small municipalities to develop a similar threat assessment and management capability.

**Crisis Intervention of Houston**

Crisis Intervention of Houston (CIH) launched a new hotline specifically for receiving calls related to individuals radicalizing to violence or who have risk factors for possible mobilization or radicalization to violence. While 911 is still the best way for people to report emergencies that need a response from law enforcement, fire, or emergency medical services, it is not equipped to handle complex issues without an imminent threat. Many jurisdictions now have 311 or 211 hotlines to request other, non-emergency services or be referred to resources and benefits. While these hotlines are good candidates to be augmented with crisis services, non-profit organizations have been running hotlines for decades to help individuals in crises. In the case of CIH, they have been running a general crisis hotline for almost 50 years. To implement the needs of the CVE Grant program, call counselors of the existing hotline were provided specialized training on violent extremism, and handle the calls by assessing risk of harm to self or others, identifying resources or services, and making referrals as necessary. The hotline was marketed primarily to young adults and organizations that serve them and took an approach that mitigated the stigma of seeking assistance in general, as well as the specific stigma of seeking mental health support. CIH is committed to maintaining the hotline and is exploring ways to expand marketing and expansions to neighboring jurisdictions. The hotline is sustainable in that CIH is almost 50 years old and exists to assist individuals in mitigating crises of all sorts. They do this not just by maintaining various hotlines, but in securing partnerships and making referrals to service providers that can assist with longer term care/assistance of the individual.

Given the generally rare nature of targeted violence and terrorism, CIH devised an innovative and sustainable approach to a hotline that can intervene in mobilization or radicalization to violence or address the risk factors or crises upstream from violence.

While CIH is situated to take a call from an individual or someone close to them that is in the process of radicalizing to violence and refer them for intervention, they did not receive that specific call during the grant period. Instead, their value has been in mitigating personal crises. A personal crisis can introduce several risk factors for violent extremism in the individual, which in turn makes the individual more susceptible to mobilization or radicalization to violence. It is important to note that a crisis or existence of risk factors do not cause mobilization or radicalization, however, by addressing the crisis prior to the introduction of new risk factors or mitigating risk factors present, the threat of violent extremism is lowered. The key success to this program comes from its mitigation of risk factors for targeted violence by people who, at a minimum, perceive they are experiencing a crisis.

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9 Compared to other forms of death such as traffic incidents, drug overdose, or suicide.
The hotline received 167 calls over the course of the grant period. Call volume generally correlates to how well a hotline is marketed. It is noteworthy that CIH received more than a nominal amount of calls. This is a testament to the marketing of the new hotline, which indicates that the target audience for the marketing may have found this hotline more appealing than a traditional hotline. An analysis of the call information shows four roughly even categories of calls: Line Testing (quick hang-ups that indicate someone was made aware of the hotline and checking to see if it is in service), Basic Needs (housing, money to pay bills, etc.), Mental Health/Stress, and Relationship Problems. In total, CIH has trained 55 call counselors with CVE training which includes information on the role of crises in radicalization to violence, how radicalization occurs, and what appropriate steps can be taken to mitigate crises or risk factors. In addition to operating the hotline, CIH provided training to youth, parents, law enforcement, and general community audiences. 193 parents participated in online safety and awareness workshops, 91% of participants reported being able to better identify risks associated with violent extremism. Over 717 community members participated in workshops on the hotline and 98% reported that they are better able to identify the risks associated with violent extremism. They trained 85 youth to develop their capacity to counter bullying; 100% determined they were able to counter bullying and see the signs of bullying against others following the training. 189 law enforcement officers reported awareness of the hotline. Six callers reported being referred to the hotline by peers.

Overall, CIH successfully expanded their crisis hotline services to fill a gap in intervention capability in the area it serves. CIH intends to maintain the hotline and expand it into neighboring jurisdictions. Replication of this effort by other crisis hotlines will require some initial start-up funding (training, marketing, awareness raising, collaborating with new partners) and there will be a nominal ongoing operations cost. DHS assesses this program is a model and low-cost way for regions to enhance their intervention capabilities and efficiently address risk factors in their vulnerable populations.

Regional Prevention Planning and Implementation

Targeted violence and terrorism prevention does not lend itself to a one size fits all approach. Recent research identified that, “Different cities face different distributions of threats, have different levels of existing capability, have different community dynamics, and so on.” Designing or improving prevention frameworks needs to be tailored to the specific communities that would implement the program, and several grantees were able to establish standardized program-design models to help communities design and implement their own framework.
National Governor’s Association

The National Governor’s Association (NGA) developed a roadmap on State Approaches to Preventing Targeted Violence\(^\text{12}\), to be utilized by states to develop an executive-led strategy that builds and fosters communities’ resilience to all forms of targeted violence and terrorism. They developed the roadmap with expertise from a national network of practitioners and refined it by piloting it through a series of Policy Academies with teams from four states: Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, and Virginia. Through these states’ governors’ offices, cabinet officials, and other senior state and local officials, the roadmap helps state-level planners create and disseminate training and educational resources, empower state leaders and local communities to implement evidence-based practices, and develop interdisciplinary and cross-governmental teams to intervene in targeted violence. For example, one state used their time working with NGA to identify ways to expand the existing Behavioral Threat and Assessment Models outside of their existing work in the State’s schools. They explored models for businesses to conduct behavioral assessments and identified an agency to own the process of regional behavioral assessments.

NGA has assisted the four Policy Academy states with completion of state goals to increase awareness, knowledge, and skills on evidence-based violence prevention strategies. As a result, pilot states have increased access to subject matter experts and training. They have also been able to identify specific policies, procedures, and strategic action plans that can provide solutions to existing and new challenges related to targeted violence.

NGA has released an online beta version of the roadmap at the end of 2019 limiting access to State Homeland Security Advisors and their staff, it will be publicly available in 2020. This roadmap is chiefly designed to assist states in their approaches, but may also have applicability in regional, municipal, county, or community efforts to prevent targeted violence and terrorism.

Peace Catalyst International

Peace Catalyst International (PCI) developed local interfaith working groups through their Seek the Peace Consultation to empower grassroots religious leaders by implementing and evaluating countering violent extremism projects. PCI’s regional prevention planning tailored local community needs and capacities to strengthen protective resources within each community in order to counter exclusionary attitudes and narratives of radicalization to violence. This organization has effectively empowered local projects by involving trusted faith leaders within local working groups and helped establish short and long-term community mechanisms for intra faith communities to prevent or mitigate radicalization to violence.

Across seven cities in different regions throughout the United States, PCI encouraged local projects, empowered by cross-faith CVE activities, to establish inclusivity between Muslim and

\(^{12}\) [https://www.nga.org/center/issues/preventing-targeted-violence/](https://www.nga.org/center/issues/preventing-targeted-violence/)
Christian populations through community resilience and capacity-building activities such as sponsoring dinners, weekend workshops, book clubs, training for educators, community service events, and listening events with cross-faith panels. Additionally, PCI provided opportunities for in-person relationships between Christians and Muslims that enabled further collaboration and helped communities gain confidence in positive, respectful Muslim-Christian relationships that proved effective to changing behaviors and attitudes in those communities.

The focus of regional projects to empower local working groups has proven to be an effective means to support collaboration between Christians and Muslims that create a buffer for individuals’ resilience to mobilization or radicalization to violence. Research suggests that promoting protective factors can mitigate against engaging in extremist violence and building up protective resources may prevent or lessen the likelihood of participation in violent acts, in addition to a community’s ability to mitigate risk factors.13

This approach by PCI is based on research that shows successful counter-narratives against radicalization to violence work not only due to the content, but also due to who disseminates it. PCI utilizes trusted faith leaders to foster inclusivity and build cross faith relationships, and then are trained by PCI to measure behavioral and attitude changes. Each project implemented by the working groups employs a shared understanding of how and what to observe to measure attitude changes. Project leaders not only survey participants after and/or prior to the events to monitor results, they also record qualitative accounts of changed behaviors within the affected communities through solicited feedback or observed behaviors. PCI reported 4,364 participants through the working group interfaith programs, 3,204 of those from outreach and community engagement events. Across all programs, PCI had 695 faith leaders/religious lead or participate in local events. To date, survey results reported more than 95% of those who participated in local projects across each regional network indicated an improved relationship of the interfaith communities, and more than 50% reported plans to collaborate with other cities and communities.

Law Enforcement Led Youth Resilience Building

Successful terrorism prevention efforts often rely on bystander reporting and a trusted relationship with law enforcement. Several grantees implemented community resiliency programs designed to bring law enforcement officers and youth populations together in collaborative environments to build relationships between those unfamiliar or sensitive to law enforcement.

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“I’m grateful for those little moments of intention and curiosity that lead to greater understanding and I’m happy to use my voice and influence to care for the students and educators in my community.”

“We talked about violent extremism on both sides as a problem instead of labeling a particular community faith-based values with those issues.”

- Seek the Peace Consultation Participants
The Police Foundation

The Police Foundation, in partnership with the Boston Police Department, implemented the Youth & Police Initiative Plus (YPIP) program to foster trust between the BPD and youth in the Somali immigrant community. Using a set curriculum, the grantee and their partners created a mentorship and skill development program for Somali-American youth in Roxbury, MA. They have seen increases in protective factors and skills in the youth (e.g. conflict resolution) as well as more engaged and informed police officers who’ve participated in the mentorship program.

Police Foundation held 11 educational workshops between officers and youth, with 129 youth and 43 law enforcement officers participating. Police Foundation recorded the number of positive interactions between youth participants, police, and peers, while cross-referencing the number of crime reports and quality of life issues. They also saw an increased participation by the program participants’ parents in police sponsored opportunities. Using surveys, they assessed that the youth in the program enhanced their ability to choose nonviolent paths through strengthening of networks and increased sense of personal and civic responsibility. Simultaneously, the police department measured the increased willingness of officers and youth to work collaboratively to de-escalate potential violent conflicts. Surveys determined the percentage of officers who developed a greater knowledge of Somali culture and number of instances police reported new action to address community concerns. Communities were also surveyed to determine if there was a positive change in attitudes of the communities regarding police officers.

Officers, youth, parents, and a YPIP trainer have noted the difficulties of a community that is struggling to integrate; social isolation and other risk factors associated with integrating

“The workshop helped me understand that I can contact police and feel comfortable and trust them.”

“Before I was unaware about how much the police cared to keep their communities safe, and how much alike we were. At the end of the YPI workshop I felt a connection between us and the police officers.”

- YPIP Youth Participants
communities are correlated with terrorism. The program has helped Somali youth and local officers find common ground and build a relationship of trust and understanding. The YPIP program goals align with research that identifies critical components for community-based countering violent extremist programming and has addressed and mitigated risk factors by promoting and implementing activities that built upon protective and resilience factors.

Seattle Police Department

The Seattle Police Department (SPD) worked with a diverse set of immigrant and refugee families where a family member has been involved with the juvenile justice system. Their curriculum, like others in resilience building activities, engages youth, a parent/guardian, and Seattle police officers in a dialogue that enhances youth protective factors and engages the police with community members who live in some of the most at-risk neighborhoods.

SPD also promoted violence prevention protective factors through their existing micro-policing framework, which assesses policing needs in 57 Seattle neighborhoods. SPD adapted violence prevention protective factors into micro-neighborhood strategies that were tailored for each neighborhood with input and support of local community partners to shape community resilience. Additionally, SPD implemented a new program, Immigrant Family Institute (IFI), which provided communities with knowledge of police procedures and laws, and provided officers the ability to improve their understanding of the diverse cultures within their communities. The existing programs, made more robust by the grant, and IFI have increased participants’ connection to their communities, and promoted increased police-citizen dialog and understanding. SPD has also credited the success to community connection and youth engagement with the Seattle Police Athletic League (SEAPAL), which provided joint activities between police and youth that saw police as mentors, coaches, and role models for youth.

SPD conducted pre-post IFI workshop surveys that conveyed an increase in understanding of policing policies and resilience resources. Additionally, SPD’s launch of the SEAPAL mentorship program for youth engagement identified ways to address specific risk factors in youth that might

“"The workshop helped me a lot. I always knew that all cops weren't bad and that's exactly what the workshop was about. It was very helpful for the teenagers to have that kind of interaction with the police. It's also important to let people see the good side of cops, especially nowadays with everything going on social media.”

- Parent of YPIP Youth Participant

“I like soccer and the officers make it fun; so much to do; officers make me feel safe; my brother says he talks to police about crime by our house. He likes police, so do I now.”

- Youth Sports Participant

14 Smith, 2018
lead to crime, truancy, and mobilization or radicalization to violence. SPD conducted focus groups around the youth engagement programs, which were almost uniformly positive. Youth participants stated they felt more comfortable speaking with officers and reaffirmed increased trust and credibility with police officers. Research also notes that, “in communities characterized by trust and social connection, youth will be both less likely to radicalize to violence, and more likely to be brought into the care of supportive and preventative services if they do.”15 With the goal to complete 20 workshops and SEAPAL events, as of March 30, 2019, SPD completed 31 programs, and was on track to complete at least 4 additional workshop and events for the last quarter of the grant. As of March 31, 2019, the IFI workshop graduated 36 families (85 total participants) through two different sessions of 8 workshops each. The 30 officers who facilitated the workshops contributed over 1,300 hours of service. SEAPAL held 12 programs and workshops with 1,854 youth participants. Over 150 youth had more than 10 hours of contact within the programming.

Replication of the SPD program can be an extension of many law enforcement agencies’ existing community policing activities in jurisdictions with existing positive police community relations.

Law Enforcement Training

DHS works to inform, equip, and train homeland security professionals to enhance their prevention and protection capabilities. Law enforcement officers are one of the most numerous and visible members of this community of practitioners. Several grantees focused on enhancing knowledge and skills of the officers who work directly in communities and are poised to encounter individuals with risk factors for mobilizing or radicalizing to violence.

National Consortium for Advanced Policing

The National Consortium for Advanced Policing (NCAP) worked to develop an implementation guide, Preventing Terrorism and Targeted Violence Implementation Guide for Law Enforcement, for major city police departments to develop or modify existing programs to enhance law enforcement’s role in terrorism prevention. The guide was developed in coordination with the Major City Chiefs Association and replication with additional funding would involve assisting medium and large police departments and sheriffs’ offices in taking action to follow the implementation guide.

The guide was developed after an exhaustive review of existing programs and practices in effect that are directly or tangentially related to preventing targeted violence and terrorism such as Crisis Intervention Teams, community policing initiatives, and training curriculum. The implementation guide addresses a series of topics that serve as the basis for the implementation framework, including: the minimum and advanced capability needs by all police departments to prevent terrorism and targeted violence; necessary police programs to engage with the private sector; and

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the necessary components of a police program to enhance trust with the community and to provide connections to services providers.

NCAP has held information sessions with 85 participants and hosted a Leadership in Counter Terrorism Conference with police, public health professionals, individuals impacted by terrorism, and business owners with 365 participants. The grantee identified several existing promising practices by police departments which have been validated by both police and community leaders; NCAP identified how those practices can be modified or adopted to establish the capabilities identified in the Implementation Guide.

Denver Police Department

The Denver Police Department (DPD) used a portion of their award to train a cadre of trainers in a variety of terrorism prevention materials, notably DHS’ Law Enforcement Awareness Briefing (LAB). Those trainers have trained 250 officers as of June 30, 2019. They train on all forms of violent extremism and place a special focus on domestic terrorism.

The goal of DPD was to enhance an understanding of violent extremist threats within communities through officer training to understand how to: 1) identify warning signs; 2) differentiate criminal and non-criminal behaviors; and 3) refer people for community-based support with an increased ability to train and engage community members in preventing mobilization and radicalization to violence.

In addition to training officers on the LAB, DPD performed refresher training for Community Resource Officers on the Community Awareness Briefing (CAB), and officers routinely practiced delivering the material and learning the case studies. DPD leadership also supported districts to begin offering the CAB trainings during their monthly community meetings. Additionally, DPD established the Citywide Impact Team, which responds to the segments of the community impacted by a bias-motivated incident and to check-in with the community and seek to build up resilience in the impacted community. A mental health clinician and a victim advocate participate in these interaction to help address fears, anxieties, and harm felt by community members.

DPD’s program for law enforcement training serves as a promising practice to other mid- to large city police departments looking to establish or build up a preventative curriculum against violent extremism. After establishing a LAB curriculum that tailored to local interests, DPD conducted the briefings on a consistent schedule. The trainers and staff were able to find an effective manner to teach the class, kept the content dynamic based on input from community organizations, and made continued progress in trainer recruitment and retention.

By June 30, 2019, DPD exceeded their original goal for training officers (240) and continued training officers during a short extension of their grant. Additionally, DPD decided to integrate the program coordinator from the grant project into the police department as a full-time civilian employee and will continue officer training and outreach. In addition to the law enforcement training
training, DPD has held 165 community outreach events, reaching 2,763 community members. DPD additionally collaborated with Good Will Industries Youth Mentoring Program to introduce at-risk youth to the concept of community-oriented policing, which resulted in the enrollment of 115 students. They surpassed their goal to reach communities about preventing targeted violence and terrorism by over 500%, with 753 individuals reporting that DPD raised their awareness about the issue.

Denver is covered by one of the most robust intervention programs in the country, the Colorado Resilience Collaborative. DPD’s activities under this grant program filled a gap in prevention capabilities, notably making first responders and their local partners aware of the threat and giving them opportunities to refer individuals to the intervention capability of a separate entity in the region. Denver also has a full-time staff member from OTVTP coordinating activities and providing technical assistance. The interaction of multiple activities by different entities, as evidenced in Denver, is a promising practice in this mission area. Organizations looking to build or enhance their prevention capabilities need to understand the region’s collective capabilities and gaps, both to avoid duplication and enhance the handoff from one component to another.

Community Led Resilience Building

Community understanding of violence prevention is essential to mitigate against risk factors that allow vulnerable individuals to be recruited and mobilized to violence and further emphasize the “whole of society” approach to terrorism and violence prevention.

Nashville International Center for Empowerment

The Nashville International Center for Empowerment (NICE) Proactive Engagement to Achieve Community Empowerment (PEACE) project increased the resilience of communities that may have risk factors for mobilization or radicalization to violence by creating a sustainable system that provides youth with community engagement services and expanding protective resources throughout the community. The program was modeled after Best Practices for Developing Resilient Communities and Addressing Violent Extremism.17

The program’s youth engagement focused on building communication and conflict resolution skills, offering opportunities for civic engagement, promoting leadership, and facilitating mentoring. Youth are encouraged to become advocates for tolerance, and additional projects supported by critical thinking and values-oriented education interventions among at-risk student

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populations. The program provided services and resource referrals including translation services, English language courses, access to government assistance, and youth mentorship.

As of June 30, 2019, NICE conducted 26 sessions of the Youth Empowered to Achieve! (YEA!) Programming, with 1,286 youth participants implementing 12 group community projects. NICE recruited and trained 122 mentors for the YEA! programs. They conducted 12 cultural exchanges among new American and community members, with 553 participants. There were 53 Leadership Dialogues between organizational and community leaders, with 1,043 participants, and NICE conducted 20 community outreach events that reached 2,126 individuals. NICE assessed an increase in youth engagement, leadership, and community connectedness behaviors. Youth participants were observed engaging in activities that indicated an increased respect for their community and enhanced self-worth. The program reported an increase in local resources available and utilized by community members. Overall, the program has increased protective factors and enhanced stronger region wide integration of diverse communities while also providing key resources to community gatekeepers.

Communities should consider broad-based resilience building activities for youth as part of a comprehensive approach to prevention. Community based organizations are readily available to adopt curriculums to reduce risk factors of the participants. These programs need funding to operate, but a partnership with a school district could allow for the programming to be provided as part of the school day or at a low cost as after school programming.

**University of San Diego**

The University of San Diego partnered with three community-based organizations to enhance their capabilities to provide sustainable services to youth communities at-risk of social isolation. The Connected Youth-Resilient Communities (CY-RC) model worked to build capacity among community partners to implement a model of youth programming designed to reduce social isolation and promote social integration among refugee youth. The project also worked to build trust between law enforcement and youth in order to connect youth to their community. The community partners are now equipped to provide resilience building educational services to youth communities following the conclusion of the period of performance of the grant.

CY-RC partners implemented programming for youth to participate in leadership and community engagement courses that focused on individual skill-building, activities to increase youth participants’ knowledge about their community, and community-based projects that youth participants designed and implemented. Through extensive research on building the capacity of community protective factors against social isolation, CY-RC noted the key to success for capacity building with youth engagement is the need for one-on-one conversations to build strong relationships. By developing and building these relationships, CY-RC programs were able to assess whether the programs represented an effective, replicable model, and allowed greater access to measure factors of social integration.
The project was supported by vigorous evaluation methods and research to help determine the success of the program objectives to reduce social isolation amongst at-risk youth. CY-RC conducted pre-post surveys with the youth, comparison surveys of youth not participating, youth focus groups, and community focus groups to determine if project activities were creating the desired outcomes. Since the CY-RC program was designed to encourage and promote youth engagement by creating their own initiatives, the evaluation focused on positive outcomes such as increased sense of community or increased place attachment. Through the surveys and observations, CY-RC determined the level of youth connectedness to community improved according to positive increases in sense of community, individual resilience, place attachment, and social trust.

CY-RC community-based organizations delivered programming to two cohorts totaling 191 youth participants, which conducted 12 different community projects. CY-RC conducted three individual training and evaluation assessments with the community-based partners to ensure effective curriculum training. CY-RC programs noted several key takeaways essential to building youth-led community resiliency programs. First, by having youth lead the programs to design and implement community projects, it created greater buy-in to the programs, and helped facilitate trust and credibility to the program objectives. Second, because the youth had greater responsibility and trust to create and run the community projects, the programming model can be easily adopted across various community sizes and demographics, according to the community needs and values. The CY-RC program is a model of replicability to help other communities assess and implement youth-led community resiliency programs to reduce the risk factors for mobilization or radicalization to violence.

"I liked that we put our ideas together - and that we weren't just doing this for ourselves, but we got to do this for our community."

"Now we have connections within the community, with law enforcement and others, I feel that we can do this work by ourselves. We feel confident leading our projects now, we feel empowered. And we know there are people outside of the community that care about our community."

- Somali Youth Refugees from City Heights

"The session with the police was very helpful. We are usually afraid of people who have authority, so we didn't interact with them here at first. But now we feel we can go to them, it has gotten better. We know that if you follow the rules, you won't have problems. We love the law here because we lost so much law in our country."

- Syrian Youth Refugee from El Cajon
Training for Members of the Public

A whole-of-society approach to preventing targeted violence and terrorism requires the participation of individual citizens. A variety of projects worked with the public to foster a more engaged and informed population.

**Dearborn Police Department**

The Dearborn Police Department’s project focused around educating their community on the threat of terrorist recruitment and protecting their community from domestic terrorist attacks. Using their existing relationship with the FBI through a JTTF, they included locally based case studies in their awareness raising briefings to community members. They also provided information on Dearborn’s capability to intervene in a person mobilizing or radicalizing to violence.

They provided training to 359 community members over the course of the grant period and conducted pre and post-test surveys. Of note, they saw a 98% increase of the average response on the awareness of community services to assist with individuals at risk for engaging in violent extremism. The average response increased by over 44% on familiarity of the following topics: Ways in which individuals are radicalized or recruited by violent extremist groups; Extremist groups that may try to recruit members of my community; Use of the internet to radicalize or recruit individuals to commit violence; and recognizing the signs of individual radicalization or recruitment to violence. The surveys asked about various protective factors such as civic engagement, interactions with those outside their social group, and trust in government and law enforcement, which saw only slight increases from the pre-test to the post-test. However, the pre-test indicated that respondents already had high levels of protective factors.

This grant award was the second smallest award amount in the entire program, and though at times had difficulty getting a large audience for its presentation, those that did participate showed enhanced awareness of the threat and what they can do about it and could potentially increase protective factors in audiences where they are not already high. For a very low cost, Dearborn made an impact in their community. They intend to maintain the awareness briefing and provide it on an as needed basis moving forward. DHS can work with law enforcement agencies to tailor off the shelf trainings so they can present them in their communities as needed, with or without direct financial support; most law enforcement agencies already have a community outreach and training function that they could leverage.

“It was a great forum to educate the citizens of Dearborn on a variety of topics. The CVE workshops also gave citizens a chance to voice their concerns and allowed the Dearborn Police Department an opportunity to build new relationships with the community.”

- Sergeant from Dearborn Police Department

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18 Response rate for the pre-survey was approximately 57% and for the post-survey 50%
Global Peace Foundation

The Global Peace Foundation (GPF) developed a digital awareness training for a general community audience. The training provides information on how the internet is used to mobilize and radicalize individuals to violence as well as providing some general cybersecurity information the community found useful. Violent extremist ideologies of all forms exploit similar vulnerabilities to attract adherents and move them toward violence. General digital literacy informs members of the public how various social media platforms work and can be exploited, how loved ones may be using encryption to obscure their activities, how to determine bias in encountered materials, and how to improve general critical thinking skills. This set of skills has benefits in preventing: financial crimes, child exploitation, and violent extremist recruitment online. Similar to many homeland security programs, GPF’s online education had a variety of public safety benefits in addition to preventing terrorism.

While counter messaging and challenging recruitment narratives are a necessary element of prevention to ensure that positive messages are available to those seeking information, being able to reject clearly biased or logically unsound recruitment narratives when first encountered provides a protective factor against terrorism and targeted violence. Schools, law enforcement organizations, and public messaging campaigns can replicate digital literacy training programs.

Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority

The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority (ICJIA) developed a training curriculum for a general community audience on how to identify concerning behavior in individuals in their community and determine the appropriate course of action from engaging with the person directly, referring them to available resources, or reporting to law enforcement. The training clearly articulates concepts to protect the “engaged bystanders” from harm, while ensuring that participants in the training are discouraged from taking any actions that may be discriminatory in nature or based on personal bias.

The curriculum includes a pre-training tool-kit for instructors, which identifies the steps the instructor needs to take to identify an appropriate audience and provide contact information or direct connection to available resources. The curriculum can be made available to experienced violence prevention practitioners and deployed nationwide.
DHS documented a variety of grant management practices that may facilitate better outcomes in future programs as well as two additional promising practices from grantee activities.

**Competition:** Congress instructed that the program be competitive, and DHS actively used the competition not just to gauge the most qualified applicants, but to encourage innovation and sustainable program design, and to enhance prevention activities without the guarantee of funding. Examples include:

- Communities beginning or developing work on local/regional frameworks for prevention of violent extremism during the call for applications, to obtain additional points in the competitive scoring.
- Applicants developing multidisciplinary partnerships or plans for partnerships to execute their proposals, to improve their scoring.
- Several projects that did not receive awards have separately received funding to carry out the proposals and other work they submitted as part of the competition in this program.

**Expertise:** Several grantees gained expertise through their work under this program by identifying lessons learned and successes. DHS will facilitate making connections between these experts and communities that want to replicate their work as much as possible. In general, there are only a limited number of individuals in the United States with expertise in the field of targeted violence or terrorism prevention. However, there are many individuals with expertise in connected and related fields. Several grantees have endeavored to engage those professionals with their outreach or training to enhance targeted violence and terrorism prevention expertise in those fields.

**Sustainability:** DHS sought sustainable projects, that is projects that would continue after the period of performance. DHS provided points in the application scoring process based on the program’s sustainability plan. This criterion was given additional weight later in the evaluation of
applications by the Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly. Sustainability was a key consideration not only because of the uncertainty of future funding in this area, but also recognizing that $10 million in funding could only support the creation of programs in a small fraction of U.S. communities and future funding would need to support projects in additional communities. At the time of publication, over 80% of our projects will continue some or all of their work following the period of performance, for some projects the sustainment of the work will be more fruitful than the period of performance.

**Continued Demand:** DHS received 197 complete, eligible applications by the deadline, and dozens more incomplete applications, requests for extensions, or comments indicating they were interested but could not meet all the federal grants administrative work and apply by the deadline. The 197 applications requested over $100 million, showing that demand for the grant program was over ten times the appropriated amount. DHS routinely receives inquiries about future funding for these efforts. There is a clear need for this support from the federal government to help local communities stand up their framework and transition it to a sustainable funding source.

**Cost Effectiveness:** Through managing these grants, DHS has learned that much of the activities are less expensive than previously thought. It also confirmed that while starting up a prevention program has initial costs, sustainment comes at low or no cost. The federal investment, in many cases, was key to removing the barrier to entry. For example, many local and state government grantees, when shown the value of prevention programs, decided to take on the activity out of their base budgets or assign staff or volunteers to the work on the projects as a collateral duty. Specifically, specialized terrorism prevention training for law enforcement might only begin if a dedicated pool of overtime funding is provided through a grant, but if officers report that the training enhanced their skills, it may be incorporated into basic training.

**Partnerships:** The grant program relied on research that suggested that multidisciplinary approaches were best suited to preventing violent extremism. DHS strongly encouraged grantees to utilize a wide variety of partners to carry out their work. Most grantee partners did not receive any funding, yet have been critical to the sustainability of the projects. Grantees developed partnerships with over 1600 entities (see Figure 5) in the course of conducting their projects or will utilize these partners to sustain their capabilities. Many projects realized that prevention requires many people completing a small portion of the work, based on their role, mission, or resources. In many cases, the work needed for a prevention framework is part of the core or ancillary missions of an organization. As the threat and coverage of targeted violence and terrorism increases, more professionals will volunteer or adopt as part of their mission the necessary element for a successful framework.
Monitoring: In a field that is just coalescing around promising practices and where there are massive capability gaps around the country, it was important to develop a robust monitoring and evaluation regime. Prior to gaining access to their funding, all grantees need to have an approved Program Implementation and Evaluation Plan (PIEP) which asked grantees to list their activities and anticipated outputs to provide DHS with a granular view of how each grantee was going to accomplish what they proposed. It also set out an evaluation plan that included the specific indicators that would determine whether an outcome was achieved. DHS required quarterly qualitative and quantitative reporting, conducted several site visits, remained in frequent contact, and provided technical assistance as needed to grantees.

Leveraging Online and Offline Activities: Most Americans live highly connected lives, frequently using internet connected devices and communicating through social media and messaging apps. All types of projects attempting to reach people need to strike a balance and consider the benefits of both offline and online activities. Grantees working on projects heavily
geared toward online messaging found success in having in-person engagements such as Masjid Muhammad, which convened experts to help develop their message and then hosted a symposium to highlight how their online content was engaged with. Similarly, locally based projects that rely on hosting community events need to consider various online platforms geared toward local community communication or targeted digital marketing to spread the word about their events or available services. Dearborn Police Department and Nebraska Emergency Management Agency utilized such outreach methods, and Tuesday’s Children has extensively used digital communications and hosts their training online to reach geographically dispersed communities affected by terrorism and targeted violence. DHS has developed a Digital Marketing Academy for Terrorism Prevention that was piloted with grant recipients. All practitioners in the prevention field need to know how digital marketing works in order to maximize reach and success of the prevention program. For instance, Rochester Institute of Technology is finalizing the development of a mobile app and website that will assist any individual, who may be active in their local communities, to develop and market counter messages.

**Research Based Program Design**: DHS designed the grant program based on the latest research on prevention of ideologically motivated violence. Furthermore, the NOFO contained an appendix with relevant research for applicants to design their proposals. In this burgeoning field, it is important to continue research and evaluation of the projects to continue to grow the research base and continuously improve prevention programming. To that end, several grantees have funded in-house and third-party evaluations of their work. The monitoring and evaluation regime DHS implemented emphasized data collection in order to assess programs for sustainability and replication. The program has also partnered with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to conduct independent evaluations of five of the grantee projects.

**Bringing Activities to Scale**: Several grantees devised ways to scale their projects with minimal funding. A few grantees used Train-the-Trainer models which has the potential to exponentially expand the reach of the training. Global Peace Foundation used a Train-the-Trainer model for its law enforcement training and is collaborating with the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office and other law enforcement entities in New Jersey to receive the training incorporated in the in-service training schedules for all NJ law Enforcement officers. They are also working to upload the training to the State’s Training system, NJ Learns. Several Grantees, including Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, Tuesday’s Children, Illinois Criminal Justice Information authority, and Global Peace Foundation worked extensively with practitioners such as mental/behavioral health providers, social service providers, public health practitioners, and other professionals who will have a lasting impact in the communities they serve as it relates to violence prevention.

**Flexibility**: The application period for the grant program was July 6- September 6, 2016, during the peak of ISIS control in Syria and Iraq and news reporting about foreign fighters and Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs) inspired by ISIS. While DHS asked for applications dealing with all forms of terrorism, the timing of the application period skewed the applications somewhat (122 ISIS/Al Qaeda; 60 General/All Forms; and 15 Domestic Terrorism). DHS did not apply a quota to make selections but looked for innovative, sustainable programs that could be
replicated. Nevertheless, grantees and their project approaches were flexible given that the individual risk factors related to domestic or foreign inspired terrorism are similar, as are they for committing an act of targeted violence. As programs began performance, over a year from when they submitted their applications, a DHS analysis of the recipients found that 18 focused on all forms of extremism (to include projects that also worked on targeted violence in general), many of those also had specific activities related to domestic terrorism. Several grantees had pivoted from an ISIS-only approach to an all forms of terrorism approach. Approaches that focus on or have the capacity to target a broad array of risk factors for terrorism and targeted violence are going to be the most flexible as the threat evolves.

**Lessons Learned**

DHS documented the following lessons learned through close monitoring of project implementation and review of project performance measures. They may be useful to federal or state governments implementing a prevention grant program or to practitioners working on grant projects in the future.

**Challenging the Narrative:** The grant projects that focused on challenging the narrative produced some powerful content which was seen or interacted with over five million times. Without diminishing this accomplishment, it is important to note that there are four million likes every minute on Facebook\(^{19}\) and it is impossible to know if the content generated by our grantees was seen by the intended audience or if it had any impact. There are innovative projects in the private sector to redirect people to alternative content, and there will continue to be a need for positive content challenging violent radicalization narratives. DHS efforts to spur counter messaging in the future should be focused on force multiplier efforts. Two grantees did work on force-multiplier efforts with mixed success. America Abroad Media hosted hackathons, in one case helping to incubate a feature length film, but in another, failing to generate enough of a buzz to produce useful content. Rochester Institute of Technology completed their App, which enables users to develop and market their own messages under a common branding. The Ex-Out App as well as a partner website\(^{20}\) launched in the fall of 2019.

**Terminated Grants:** Two projects had promising ideas that outside forces prevented from being tested. In each case, the projects did not expend any of the awarded funds, so they have been returned to the U.S. Treasury. The Los Angeles Mayor’s Office of Public Safety received an award to develop intervention capabilities in the LA area. They faced local opposition to the grant that included misconceptions over the nature of the work to be performed, fueled by conspiracy theories as well as concern over the change in U.S. presidential administrations from some political activists and elected officials. While the Mayor’s office was vocal in pushing back on these criticisms, they were unable to gain the necessary approval from the City Council in a time that would allow them to complete the work in the period of performance. The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department’s (LVMPD) award to manage interventions had been going very smoothly with a community coalition established to receive referrals. However, the contractor they engaged to

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train the coalition, develop intervention protocols, and conduct interventions never delivered the required materials, providing various pretexts for the lack of delivery for several months. LVMPD did not pay any funds to the contractor and severed ties. LVMPD determined that because of the delays with their contractor, that they could not deliver on the activities they proposed to DHS in a timely fashion and terminated their award.

**Contractors:** In addition to the contractor that failed to perform on the LVMPD grant, other grantees had issues related to contracting. For example, all grant recipients need to follow the basic rules of competition in 2 CFR 200, but state and local governments need to follow their own rules if they are more stringent. As a result, some state and local grantees had large wait times to make the procurements necessary to support their projects, cutting into their time to perform or necessitating an extension. Additionally, several grantees listed contractors in their proposals to be considered as part of the competitive application process. In part, the specific contractors added value to the proposal, and the NOFO encouraged partnerships and teaming. In some cases, the grantee had previously conducted an acceptable level of competition to meet the federal regulations, in others, the grantees conducted new competition or sought sole-source procurement approval from DHS. Both issues could be settled by making clear the procurement standards in future solicitations or by providing a longer period of performance.

**Approvals:** Several grantees required approvals from their city/county council before formally accepting their awards. This created some delays in getting projects started. In future grant opportunities, applicants should be encouraged to start those processes prior to submitting their applications and DHS should encourage letters of recommendation to be submitted as part of the application in order to identify if projects have sufficient support to be approved.

**Political Considerations:** Several states and local governments involved in the grants experienced political leadership transitions during the period of performance and others had to secure approval from elected boards/councils, which resulted in delays. Applicants should consider political conditions of their jurisdiction and design programs with institutional support to mitigate against changes in leadership.

**Audience:** Some grantees had trouble finding large or appropriate audiences for their training, engagement, or counter messaging efforts. There is not always a natural audience for violence prevention efforts. Occasionally, there will be a spike of interest following a local or national incident. As such, projects should be designed in a way to account for this concern and should consider offering training/engagement in conjunction with other topics of interest or to be prepared to surge their resources when there is a spike in interest. Using locally oriented social media, cross-promoting events with partners, using train-the-trainer models, and working with gatekeepers and professionals with a multiplying effect are all strategies to expand the audience.

**Myths and Misconceptions:** The concept of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), and to some lesser extent, the grants awarded under the FY16 CVE Grant program have been inaccurately described as counterterrorism or surveillance tools. While DHS has moved away from the term *countering violent extremism*, it is important to note that many CVE activities fall under the umbrella of preventing targeted violence and terrorism. These activities encourage local
communities to address the root causes of ideologically motivated violence and they are separate and distinct of any counterterrorism, intelligence, and surveillance activities by other federal agencies and offices with explicit legal authority to conduct such activities. Preventing targeted violence and terrorism involves training, engagement, education, social services, mental health services, and counter messaging to communities on a voluntary basis. They enhance the resilience of communities and individuals filling a gap where law enforcement or intelligence cannot operate because of constitutionally based civil rights and civil liberties. To that end, DHS is prohibited from collecting or using the Personally Identifiable Information (PII) of individuals who participate in or are beneficiaries of its prevention programs, to include grantees under the FY16 CVE Grant Program. DHS does collect anonymized demographic information from grantees to assess the outcomes of the projects (e.g. 10 youth and 3 law enforcement officers participated in a mentoring session). Grantees who collect PII to stay in contact with their participants are required by the terms of their award to have a publicly available privacy policy governing how they use that information, and they were repeatedly reminded not to send that information to DHS. DHS will continue to be more explicit about how programming of this nature protects privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties

**Transparency:** DHS always envisioned that this program would be run with the utmost transparency, in part due to unwarranted concerns over surveillance, but also because the efficacy of the program was of keen interest to decision makers. DHS issued guidance, press releases and other materials about the program when the opportunity opened, held two webinars, and answered over 200 questions via email during the application period. DHS was required by Congress to write one report on the grant program which it delivered in March of 2018. However, DHS also publicly committed to publishing quarterly reports on the progress of the program covering eight quarters of performance. This report satisfies that commitment, and DHS plans to proactively release additional reports and information for use by practitioners and other interested parties. Additionally, DHS has released troves of records in response to FOIA requests about the selection process, the awarded applications, a list of applicants, correspondence with applicants, internal communications about the program, and program records about grantee work. There have been two issues related to transparency outside of the program management’s control: First, several FOIA requesters sought the applications of “awarded grants” after DHS made an announcement of the intention to make awards. However, until awards were made, over six months later, there were no responsive records to those requests. This led to some confusion by requesters. Second, when records searches were completed, the FOIA backlog at DHS meant there were not adequate FOIA resources to process the records for release in a timely fashion. While the program management office took efforts to speed release of records via FOIA, future grant programs should consider ways to proactively release similar information without a FOIA request being made.

**Length of Period of Performance:** In choosing the original period of performance, it was important to have a short horizon for getting results and having an impact, and a two-year period of performance with no extensions was chosen. While this relatively short and rigid period of performance was useful in spurring aggressive timelines by most grantees, several encountered delays or identified changes to their schedules to maximize impact that necessitated no-cost extensions. Based on legal review and approval, extensions were considered on a case by case
basis and 10 extensions were approved. In future funding, projects that develop a new capability require a longer period of performance or the discretion to offer no-cost extensions.

**Peer Reviewers:** DHS utilized non-federal peer reviewers to score and evaluate applications, a best practice from other competitive grant programs. Given the small pool of expertise in this field and the number of applications received, it was unwieldy to find enough reviewers to score the applications in a timely manner. DHS reviewed the average scores from the non-federal Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and the federal SMEs and found no discernable difference in the scores, either in total or in specific scoring categories. Given that this program had less than a 15% application to award rate, DHS will need to simplify the scoring process in future funding.

**Performance Measures:** As a best practice in program management, DHS emphasized strong performance measures in the applications. While DHS had output and outcome level performance measures drafted for various project types, they were not included in the NOFO in order to encourage innovation in the development of new ways to measure performance in terrorism prevention programs. Ultimately, no groundbreaking metrics were submitted, and most applicants identified metrics that DHS had already identified. Future grant programs in this field should be prescriptive in the metrics required and ensure that applicants have the budget and capabilities to collect the necessary data.

**Logic Models:** Applicants were encouraged, but not required, to include a logic model of their project in their application. A logic model, or theory of change, identifies the inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes of a project to show how the investment will logically lead to the intended outcomes. The logic models included in applications were helpful to understand the project, almost at-a-glance and DHS undertook an effort to build a logic model for each grantee if they did not submit one. Prevention relies on somewhat complex outcomes to determine success, as such, it is recommended that logic models are required for future prevention grant programs.

**Staffing:** DHS missed several opportunities to maximize the impact of the grant projects during the period of performance due to lack of program staff. Optimally, DHS would have worked in real time with grantees to build out models for replication as they were being piloted by grantees, rather than doing so only near the end of the grants. Grantees would have been able to coordinate with DHS to develop more partnerships or to showcase their work during the period of performance when grant funds were available to travel and provide their expertise for replication elsewhere. Oversight work could have been conducted more efficiently with additional staff, rather than using staff detailed to the office and collateral duties of other permanent staff to review quarterly reports. Future prevention grants should be managed using a portfolio model where there is one full-time employee for every 5-10 projects depending on project type and complexity. Innovative projects need more close oversight, whereas replicating developed models would use

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21 For example, $10,000 (input) will be used to buy school-breakfast for low-income children who may not otherwise be fed at home (activity). This will provide 25 children with breakfast for one school year (output) and enhance their ability to learn (outcome). Test scores for these students will be measured and compared to previous year’s scores (outcome indicator). For more information on using logic models in preventing targeted violence see: Helmus, Todd C., Miriam Matthews, Rajeev Ramchand, Sina Beaghley, David Stebbins, Amanda Kadlec, Michael A. Brown, Aaron Kofner, and Joie D. Acosta, RAND Program Evaluation Toolkit for Countering Violent Extremism. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017. [https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL243.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/tools/TL243.html). p. 7-42.
fewer staff resources. Finally, with limited national subject matter expertise in preventing targeted violence and terrorism, having more available staff to provide technical assistance could have allowed grantees to enhance their impact.

**Security Review**: DHS envisioned conducting a pre-award security review on non-profit entities when the program was initially designed. The program management team was advised that the discretion provided to the secretary in making awards in the NOFO was legally sufficient to conduct such a review, and not detailing the exact protocol for the review would provide a level of operational security. Initially, DHS intended to use a security review process that had been informally established for another grant program, however it was later determined that that process was not rigorous enough to meet the needs of this program, necessitating the creation of a new process after the NOFO had been released. Program management staff then rapidly engaged with the Privacy Office and determined it was in the best interest of transparency to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) on the security review process. Additionally, DHS made notifications to applicants and allowed them to opt out of the review by rescinding their application. DHS received no complaints or requests to opt out by applicants; and in fact, DHS received several comments from applicants applauding the Department’s diligence in conducting the security reviews.