

DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook

Attachment Q2

Mobile Devices

Version 11.0 August 5, 2014

Protecting the Information that Secures the Homeland

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		Devices." Material added.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION

This document provides techniques and procedures for the secure use of mobile devices within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Information Technology (IT) Program. It is an Attachment to the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook, which is based on DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A. The Policy Directive contains wireless security requirements.

DHS Components should use the guidance in this Handbook Attachment as a foundation for developing and implementing wireless IT security programs. This Attachment incorporates many security techniques and procedures already in use by DHS Components and other Federal entities such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Department of Defense (DoD).

1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The guidance in this document is intended to amplify policy requirements and to provide a detailed explanation of the many countermeasures that can be applied to mobile devices. Because of the rapid evolution of wireless technology, all mobile devices may not offer the countermeasures described in this Attachment.

System Security Plans should address all currently effective security controls required to obtain Authority to Operate (ATO). The security checklist in Appendix A provides a summary of mobile device security guidelines.

Authorizing Officials (AO) should understand the risks associated with each particular mobile device, applying some or all of the countermeasures outlined in this Attachment. They should ensure that each risk is measured and mitigated to an acceptable level according to DHS policy. In approving mobile devices, AOs should pay particular attention to the potential risks presented by mobile devices that have technological barriers to countermeasure implementation.

1.2 MOBILE DEVICE BASELINE

The following characteristics are derived from the NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-124 Revision 1^{1} , and define the mobile device baseline:

- Small form factor
- At least one wireless network interface for network access (data communications). This interface uses Wi-Fi, cellular networking, or other technologies that connect the mobile device to network infrastructures with connectivity to the Internet or other data networks.
- Local built-in (non-removable) data storage

¹ "Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile Devices in the Enterprise," June, 2013 http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-124r1.pdf

- An operating system that is not a full-fledged desktop or laptop operating system
- Applications available through multiple methods (provided with the mobile device, accessed through web browser, acquired and installed from third parties)

Many mobile devices include advanced features, such as:

- Network services:
 - One or more wireless personal area network interfaces, such as Bluetooth or near-field communications
 - One or more wireless network interfaces for voice communications, such as cellular
 - Global Positioning System (GPS), which enables location services
- One or more digital cameras
- Video recording devices
- Microphone

1.3 Use of Appended Checklist

The checklist "Security Requirements Checklist for Mobile Devices," (Appendix A to this Attachment) can be used by DHS Components to verify compliance with Policy (items shown as "Required," and implementation of guidance and best practices (items shown as "Recommended.")

1.4 DHS 4300A POLICY REQUIREMENTS

Mobile devices include wireless-capable laptop computers, smart cellular telephones, two-way pagers, mobile radios, personal communications services (PCS) devices, multifunctional wireless devices, portable audio/video recording devices with wireless capability, scanning devices, messaging devices, and any other wireless clients capable of storing, processing, or transmitting sensitive information.

1.4.1 SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE

Security controls are designed to protect an organization against security threats; however, regardless of how effective those controls are, some security incidents are inevitable. Organizations need to have an effective response capability in place before the occurrence of such events.

1.4.2 SECURITY AWARENESS TRAINING

The goal of security awareness training is to educate DHS users to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of DHS IT assets and data.

1.4.3 MOBILE DEVICE SECURITY POLICIES

DHS mobile device security policy can be found in Section 4.6 of DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A. DHS Sensitive Systems Handbook 4300A (Section 4.6, especially subsection 4.6.2) provides policy implementation guidance, addressing technology, legal, security, privacy, procedure, and usage issues related to mobile devices.

2.0 THREAT OVERVIEW

Mobile devices are increasingly common in infrastructures because they offer many benefits in communication and collaboration while remaining location independent. Mobile devices, however, require strict security controls and governance to combat the rising threat these devices pose to DHS IT infrastructure and resources.

2.1 WIRELESS THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES

Wireless communications employ an inherently insecure medium; the technology can provide no security from interception or jamming. Due to the ubiquitous use of mobile devices in support of DHS missions, unauthorized disclosure of mobile device data-atrest or data-in-transit can reasonably be expected to cause significant damage.

2.1.1 TAXONOMY OF WIRELESS ATTACK TYPES

Wireless systems are vulnerable to specifically engineered wireless attacks and to traditional wireline attacks. Attacks are categorized according to the following basic threat consequences: unauthorized disclosure, disruption, deception, and corruption. Generally, attacks fall into one of two categories: active or passive. Active attacks require actions on the part of the attacker to penetrate or disrupt the network, whereas passive attacks are used primarily for information gathering and surveillance. Figure 1 illustrates this taxonomy.




Figure 1: Taxonomy of Wireless Device Attack Types

2.1.1.1 Eavesdropping

Eavesdropping describes the threat whereby an attacker secretly captures wireless communication data. For instance, all wireless frames can be captured and inspected from a public wireless hotspot by any attacker using basic equipment and software.

Eavesdropping risk can be mitigated by using the federally-mandated Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)-140-2-validated data encryption for all sensitive data communications. Mobile device users are also required to use the DHS Virtual Private Network (VPN) service for remote access from locations not controlled by DHS.

2.1.2 TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

By secretly capturing and analyzing wireless communication data, an attacker could identify users and agencies, characterize the nature and pattern of the traffic, or identify the weakest link in security. Then the attacker can exploit networks based on their findings.

Implementation of this Attachment's guidance can provide safeguards against traffic analysis attacks. For instance, the wireless network footprint and power range should be carefully analyzed and controlled to minimize the wireless signal to outsiders. The use of strong FIPS-validated encryption also helps to counter this type of attack. Leveraging a layered security approach will further mitigate this threat.

2.1.2.1 Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)

A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on the wireless network occurs when an attacker floods the system with data packets, preventing or inhibiting legitimate users from accessing the network. Some physical layer DDoS attacks disrupt transmission by introducing interference with radio waves that prevent wireless hardware from properly receiving traffic. Disruptions can also be caused by other small appliances such as microwave ovens, cordless telephones, and other devices that use the same radio frequency bands as the attacked wireless network.

In a broad sense, a DDoS attack can happen at any of the seven Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layers. Besides the attacks that are unique to the wireless networks described above, well-known DDoS attacks include flooding networks with Ping packets, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) messages, Web site access, and other seemingly legitimate types of wireless traffic. To counter DDoS attacks, Components must implement a comprehensive defense-in-depth security strategy.

Data encryption mitigates DDoS attacks because most wireless hardware ignores traffic that is not properly encrypted. For a DDoS attack unique to the wireless environment, a standard wireless Intrusion Detection System (IDS), which must meet the requirements of NSA publication "Guidelines for the Development and Evaluation of IEEE 802-11 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)"², can be used to detect and log abnormal signals, and physically geolocate the suspicious devices via direction finding and triangulation algorithms. Wireless network monitoring and centralized management systems are also crucial to detecting and countering DDoS attacks. Furthermore, the wireless network and its associated systems must be integrated with firewalls, IDS, and wired network monitoring and management systems during the design and implementation phases.

² NSA Document I332-005R-2005, Version 1.1, November 2005

2.1.2.2 Message Manipulations

Outside attackers can intercept and manipulate legitimate wireless messages with inclusions, deletions, additions, changes, and by reordering, or replaying legitimate messages.

Enabling appropriate FIPS 140-2 validated encryption can mitigate message manipulation threats, as the the encryption algorithms are designed to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the data in wireless traffic. Wireless technology standards provide enhanced protection of data confidentiality and integrity using encryption, frame modification checking, frame discard and retransmission, and other security features. Data protection at higher layer protocols, such as dependable TCP using enhanced federally-mandated encryption and authentication, will also help to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of data.

2.1.2.3 Masquerading

Masquerading attackers disguise themselves as legitimate users, and try to access enterprise networks and resources. Wireless networks make this type of attack easier because attackers do not need to be physically connected to the wired network. In some cases, the attacker may be located outside of the agency's physical facility or campus.

Enabling FIPS 140-2 validated encryption can mitigate masquerading threats, as an adversary will be unable to masquerade data unless the attacker can validly encrypt the traffic. It will still be possible for an adversary to spoof Media Access Control (MAC) addresses, as these are unencrypted, but such activity is of limited use to the attacker.

Strong authentication requirements such as the use of two-factor authentication will mitigate the risks of a masquerading attack. Components should also impose strong password requirements by implementing password management tools and user security training, and should follow the recommendations in the NIST SP 800-118, "Guide to Enterprise Password Management (DRAFT)"³ and the DHS 4300A Handbook.

3.0 SECURING THE PHYSICAL DEVICE

A mobile device should be considered to be a critical component of the DHS wireless network and an extension of the DHS network infrastructure. Critical risks associated with securing the device include authentication of the user and the device, data protection, central management, monitoring of the device and application, virus protection, and physical security.

3.1 AUTHENTICATION

Identification and authentication will be implemented to access the device and the data on the device.

³ DRAFT, April 2009. <u>http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-118/draft-sp800-118.pdf</u>

3.2 VIRUS PROTECTION

Approval of anti-virus software for mobile devices is the responsibility of the AO. Software support and capability may vary based on the platform. Information security mechanisms for DHS enterprise IT systems and services should be used to protect mobile devices. For example, email should be scanned at the DHS email servers before it is delivered to mobile devices. In the event that anti-virus software is not effective for a particular type of mobile device, vulnerable features must be disabled to make the mobile devices more secure, or use of the mobile device should be prohibited. For example, disabling e-mail attachments, Java 2 Platform Micro Edition (J2ME) support, and the Web browser can substantially lessen the likelihood that malicious code will be downloaded to the mobile device.

3.3 DISABLING UNDESIRABLE MOBILE DEVICE CAPABILITIES

Mobile device capabilities left in default unprotected configuration can be attack vectors to the mobile device or trusted network. Wireless capabilities that may not be required include infrared, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, games, and other built-in tools and applications.

3.4 MOBILE DEVICE AND APPLICATION MANAGEMENT

IT security managers should limit mobile device deployment to DHS-sanctioned devices, technologies, and applications by using Mobile Device Management (MDM) systems. An MDM allows DHS to centrally manage mobile devices and enforce security policies on the devices by supporting the following key capabilities: malware detection, Over-the-Air (OTA) software distribution, configuration change detection, remote data-wipe , remote configuration, and asset/property management.

Mobile applications should also be centrally managed by DHS enterprise Mobile Application Management (MAM), which functions to evaluate and select mobile applications, and acts as an authorized enterprise application store for DHS users. It also provides DHS the ability to monitor installed applications and remotely upgrade or uninstall applications as necessary.

3.5 DATA PROTECTION

The AO ensures that all information stored on mobile devices is encrypted using FIPS 140-2 validated encryption schemes consistent with the sensitivity of the stored information. Implementing countermeasures such as file and data encryption helps to ensure the confidentiality of information residing on the device.

3.6 MONITORING OF SYSTEM FILES

Information Systems Security Officers (ISSO) should implement mechanisms that periodically scan for unauthorized changes to system files and other critical files on all mobile devices.

3.7 DEVICE SYNCHRONIZATION AND BACKUP

Mobile devices, when wirelessly synchronizing, must use products or modules with FIPS 140-2 validated encryption.

3.8 RECOMMENDED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES

Data on a mobile devices will be sanitized or zeroized when the device are retired. It is important to understand that a soft or hard reset will not permanently erase the data on a mobile device, nor will a file management utility will also not permanently remove files.

3.9 RECOMMENDED SAFEGUARDS FOR TRAVEL

Travelers need to be especially vigilant and wary to mitigate loss, theft, eavesdropping, and other increased vulnerabilities and heightened risks to mobile device security Section 3.9 of the appended checklist focuses on guidance for DHS travelers.

4.0 SECURING THE WIRELESS LINK

The wireless interface (the link between a mobile device and a network endpoint or between two mobile devices) is a critical component of DHS network infrastructure, and is vulnerable to wireless attacks.

4.1 AUTHENTICATION

Access to mobile devices and to the data on the devices requires mutual network identification and two-factor authentication.

Identity Access Management is further detailed in the DHS IT Security Program Handbook for Sensitive Wireless Systems and DHS IT Security Architecture Guidance Application Infrastructure Design, Volume III.

4.2 END-TO-END SECURE COMMUNICATIONS

End-to-end security means that the entire message is encrypted from sending device to receiving device. Both devices must use appropriate FIPS 140-2 validated encryption. Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), and Secure Shell (SSH) are common means of providing end-to-end encryption. SSL and SSH are also used for applications such as email and telnet. The use of certificates is also essential to implementation of strong end-to-end encryption. Users need to be conscious of security warnings indicating certificate error warnings. These precepts should be included in mobile security awareness training.

4.3 PERSONAL FIREWALLS

Personal firewalls are software-based solutions that reside on client machined and are either client-managed or centrally managed. A firewall helps to secure the mobile device from unauthorized access by blocking specific types of inbound and outbound network traffic. Client-managed versions are not recommended because users can easily circumvent security settings. Managed IT solutions standardize Department-wide mobile device protection because IT departments can centrally configure and remotely manage client devices. Although personal firewalls offer some measure of protection, they do not protect against all advanced forms of attack.

4.4 VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK (VPN)

Because they are not controlled by DHS, networks that are maintained by third parties may introduce security risks when used by DHS personnel. For example, cellular infrastructure facilities are often not owned by the cellular carrier, and are accessible to other carriers and to maintenance subcontractors; therefore, DHS personnel who use public wireless networks such as those in airports ,conference centers, and other public places, should use the DHS VPN service to access DHS resources.

4.5 INTRUSION PROTECTION SYSTEMS

Intrusion systems are host- or network-based technologies used to protect information assets from exploitation. An Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is proactive prevention technology that makes automated access control decisions based on application content. An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a more reactive technology that is used to detect attacks as or after they occur. Systems Security Plans shall adopt appropriate network protection mechanisms such as IDS. Refer to the DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook Section 5.4, "Network Communications Security," and especially to Section 5.4.2.1, "What Is Intrusion Detection," for further explanation and information.

4.6 SECURING THE NETWORK INTERFACE

When referring to the network interface or endpoint, two basic components are usually considered: network base stations (e.g., an access point for Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) access) and client stations.

Typical mobile device wireless interfaces are illustrated in Figure 2, such as Bluetooth, WLAN, and cellular technology.




Figure 2: Typical Mobile Device Wireless Interfaces

4.6.1 BLUETOOTH

Bluetooth is a Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) technology that is commonly used for close-proximity wireless communications for devices such as headphones, keyboards, and other peripheral devices. Bluetooth technology, standardized by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.15.1, provides pre-shared key authentication and encryption capabilities to enable devices to authenticate each other and encrypt data traffic, but its security protocol is not FIPS-validated, and the technology has known inherent vulnerabilities. Several Bluetooth versions are currently available, including high speed 3.0 +HS and Low Energy (LE) 4.0, and they support different levels of security modes. For example, for Bluetooth 3.0, Security Mode 3 is the strongest mode because it requires establishment of authentication and encryption before the Bluetooth physical link is completely established. For Bluetooth LE 4.0, Security Mode 1 Level 3 is considered the strongest mode because it requires authenticated pairing and encryption. NIST SP 800-121, "Guide to Bluetooth Security,"⁴ provides detailed security recommendations as well as information on vulnerabilities.

⁴ Rev 1, June 2012. <u>http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-121-rev1/sp800-121_rev1.pdf</u>

4.6.2 WIRELESS LOCAL AREA NETWORKS (WLAN)

A WLAN can communicate with mobile devices equipped with IEEE 802.11 wireless network adaptors. Although a WLAN typically covers only a limited area, an adversary wanting to intercept data can greatly extend WLAN range by using special directional equipment.

4.6.3 CELLULAR TECHNOLOGY

A cellular Wireless Wide Area Network (WWAN) is a network composed of many small radio cells. Each cell covers a limited geographic area (with a radius of 3 to 5 kilometers), and is equipped with a fixed transmitter that connects the mobile device via its air interface to the cellular carrier's network. The security offered by commercial cellular providers does not meet DHS policy requirements; therefore, it is critical for AOs and system owners to ensure that mobile device system administrators and users are properly trained and that security controls are properly implemented.

5.0 EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES

This section examines emerging security technologies that may impact security guidance for mobile devices.

5.1 **BIOMETRICS AND SMART CARDS**

Biometrics has been introduced as an added layer of security, providing the ability to identify and authenticate users by means of their unique personal characteristics. Some laptops are now available with built-in fingerprint biometrics and smart cards, which can allow the user immediate access to sensitive information, eliminating the necessity of having the information stored on a host computer. Although less desirable, Universal Serial Bus (USB) fingerprint biometric readers are also commercially available, and can provide authentication to the device, protection of user profiles in the operating system, and encryption services for files and folders. Unlike passwords or public key infrastructure, which require exactly matching credentials for successful authentication, biometrics incorporates a sliding scale of assurance, based on a certain degree of matching, to balance false acceptance with false rejection rates.

5.2 Environmentally Adaptable Security Policies

Mobile devices should be configured to adapt to changing network environments by automatically switching between authorized network security policies and applying adaptive controls.

5.3 NEAR FIELD COMMUNICATION SECURITY POLICES

Near Field Communication (NFC) is a wireless technology designed to enable communications between two devices over very close distances (only a few centimeters). In NFC, range is limited by operating frequency, power consumption, and hardware and software design. NFC allows two devices to establish a communication channel that

complies with ISO/IEC Standard s 18092 and 21481. For instance, two NFC-capable smartphone users can share photos by placing their phones close together and clicking the photos.

NFC standards require few security features. Because the two devices must be in very close proximity, NFC is less vulnerable to threats such as eavesdropping, data modification, and man-in-the-middle attacks. Nevertheless, a secure channel at a higher OSI layer, such as a Transport Layer Security (TLS) at the application layer, should be used for sensitive data exchange. In addition, unless required by operations or business considerations, the NFC feature on devices should be disabled by default and enabled manually by users to minimize potential data leakage.

APPENDIX A—CHECKLIST FOR SECURING MOBILE DEVICES

	SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CHECKLIST FOR MOBILE DEVICES	CES	
✓	Section 1.4: Policy Requirements	Required	Recom- mended
	Personally owned equipment and software is not used to process, access, or store sensitive information without the written prior approval of the AO.	X	
	ONLY government furnished equipment (GFE) that has been properly configured by DHS-managed services is used on DHS wireless systems.	X	
	Personally-owned contractor mobile devices are not used on DHS wireless systems. Personally owned mobile devices used to communicate directly with DHS systems are specifically approved by the AO.	X	
✓	Section 1.4.1: Security Incident Response	Required	Recom- mended
	Security incident response Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) specify methods for mobile device users and other personnel to report security incidents, including a lost or stolen mobile device, in accordance with <i>DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook</i> , Attachment F.	x	
	One of the methods used to report security incidents SHALL be telephone communications to a security operations center or to on-call security operations personnel.	X	
	Security incident response capability is available on a continuous basis (i.e., 24 hours a day, 365 days a year).	X	
~	Section 1.4.2: Security Awareness Training	Required	Recom- mended
	Appropriate security awareness training is provided in accordance with DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A.	X	
	Wireless security awareness training is included in annual training at the Component level.		Х
	All employees who use or administer mobile devices have completed IT security awareness training prior to use of the system. (The security awareness training may be combined with similar training for other systems and may be provided during an employee's orientation program.)	x	
	IT security awareness training recurrs annually, and evidence of completion is submitted to the Information System Security Manager (ISSM) of the program or to the appropriate responsible security authority.	x	Х

	SECTION 3: SECURING THE PHYSICAL DEVICE		
~	Section 3.1: Authentication	Required	Recom- mended
	Mobile devices implement password protection for device and data access.	Х	

	SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CHECKLIST FOR MOBILE DEVI	CES	
	Passwords to access data on mobile devices follow the password strength guidance given in <i>DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook</i> Section 5.1.1.1, "Selecting Strong Passwords."	x	
	Passwords to access data on mobile devices are combined with the use of a smart card or a biometrics authentication method.		Х
	Numerical passwords used for mobile device access contain a minimum of six digits, or the maximum allowed by the device is used if the device's maximum is less than six.	X	
	Mobile device authentication mechanisms are not configured for automatic access, and mobile devices require device re-authentication after a 10-minute timeout.	X	
√	Section 3.2: Virus Protection	Required	Recom- mendec
	Anti-virus software is centrally managed and continuously updated on mobile devices to prevent the transfer of malicious mobile code (e.g., viruses, Trojan horses, key loggers).		Х
	Companion devices that provide personal information management (PIM) synchronization have anti-virus software installed so that mobile code is not transferred between the mobile device and the companion device.		Х
	If no suitable anti-virus software exists for a particular mobile device, then the AO should take this into consideration when approving or disapproving the adoption of the mobile device.		Х
√	Section 3.3: Disabling Undesirable Mobile Device Capabilities	Required	Recom- mendec
	Unapproved or unnecessary mobile device capabilities and applications are disabled or	37	
	removed whenever possible.	X	
		X	X
	removed whenever possible. Device-integrated capabilities such as cameras and recording mechanisms are subject to the approval of the AO, recognizing that these capabilities have varying degrees of risk and should be disabled unless specifically required, in order to mitigate the risk of	X	X
	removed whenever possible. Device-integrated capabilities such as cameras and recording mechanisms are subject to the approval of the AO, recognizing that these capabilities have varying degrees of risk and should be disabled unless specifically required, in order to mitigate the risk of exposing sensitive information. Short Message Service (SMS) and Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) are not used to process, store, or transmit sensitive information, unless they are protected by appropriate		X
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Mobile device configuration management includes secure updates to security policies and	Х	
user profiles where possible.	21	
An MAM system is used to centrally manage approved mobile applications.	Х	
Section 3.5: Data Protection	Required	Recom mende
Applications such as file sharing are disabled on mobile devices, and all file sharing ports are blocked in both directions, especially when processing sensitive information.		X
Where possible, data protection is extended to include PIM databases, telephone contact lists, text messages, and temporary browser files.		X
Mobile devices encrypt all data-at-rest by securing either the individual files or the file system (operating system, storage partition and removable media).	Х	
Section 3.6: Monitoring of System Files	Required	Recom mende
Integrity verification mechanisms are deployed to perform system file integrity checks automatically, by means such as routinely comparing a cryptographic hash of the current system files on the mobile device to a "known good" previously recorded hash.		Х
Section 3.7: Device Synchronization and Backup	Required	Recon mende
Mobile devices are periodically synchronize and back up all stored information. Recommended intervals are daily for incremental data backups and weekly for full data backups.		Х
A replacement device supports full restoration functionality of the archived file(s) to limit the downtime and loss of productivity possible after an attack or loss has taken place.		Х
Wireless capabilities are disabled during hot-synchronization with companion devices.		Х
To prevent unauthorized connections between multiple networks, only a single wired or wireless network connection is active at any one time.		Х
Section 3.8: Recommended Maintenance Activities	Required	Recom mende
Data on mobile devices is properly sanitized by degaussing, overwriting, or destroying the hardware.	Х	
SECTION 4.0: SECURING THE WIRELESS LINK		
Section 4.0: Securing the Wireless Link	Required	Recon mende
Because communication cannot be protected from interception, controls are implemented to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of information.	Х	
Because all receivers of the transmitted signal will not be authorized users, security mechanisms are put in place to protect wireless resources and data.	Х	

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	SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CHECKLIST FOR MOBILE DEVI	CES	
	approved by the appropriate AO.		
	AOs ensure that proper authentication and encryption mechanisms are implemented, so as to ensure data integrity, confidentiality, and availability.	Х	
✓	Section 4.1: Authentication	Required	Recom- mended
	Authentication is required after power-up, reset, restart, or five minutes of user inactivity.	Х	
	Components configure systems to lock a user's account for 20 minutes after ten consecutive failed logon attempts.	х	
	Passwords for access to data on mobile devices follow the password strength guidance described in DHS 4300A Sensitive Systems Handbook, Section 5.1.1.1, "Selecting Strong Passwords."	Х	
	Passwords for access to data on mobile devices are combined with the use of a smart card or biometric authentication.		Х
	Numerical passwords used for mobile device access contain a minimum of six digits, or the maximum allowed by the device is used if the device's maximum is less than six.	Х	
	Administrators are aware that the access control mechanisms supported by many wireless systems identify client stations and not users, and that unauthorized users may gain access through lost or stolen devices or by a combination of the types of attacks described in Section 2.0.		Х
	Authentication mechanisms are put into place to require smart cards, certificates, or security tokens to verify user identity.	Х	
	Identity management systems authenticate wireless users and mobile devices, and take full advantage of any existing public key infrastructure when accessing DHS resources. (Identity Access Management is further detailed in the DHS IT Security Program Handbook for Sensitive Wireless Systems and DHS IT Security Architecture Guidance Application Infrastructure Design, Volume III.		X

~	Section 4.2: End-to-End Secure Communication	Required	Recom- mended
	Users Sare trained not to ignore warning messages and to report suspicious activity. For more information regarding incident response, see Section 1.0.		Х
	Encryption keys stored on client stations aree protected from unauthorized disclosure.	X	
	The use of dynamic keys includes Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). (Using dynamic keys mitigates the risks associated with shared static keys, and is highly recommended.)		Х
	Symmetric encryption keys (AES-256-bit) are used to protect all transmitted information. Technologies such as IPSec VPN incorporate the use of public key cryptography and inherently use dynamic key exchange to set up the encrypted VPN tunnel.		Х

	SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CHECKLIST FOR MOBILE DEVI	CES	
	Key distribution occurs over a secure channel to minimize risk of compromise.		
~	Section 4.3: Personal Firewalls	Required	Recom- mended
	Personal firewalls block access to high-risk ports.		Х
	Personal firewalls enable audit logging.		Х
~	Section 4.4: Virtual Private Network (VPN)	Required	Recom- mended
	Mobile device communications between third-party networks and the DHS network are prohibited, being considered inherently untrustworthy given the lack of network control and the public nature of these networks.		X
	Implemented VPNs have NIST FIPS 140-2 validated encryption and appropriate key management mechanisms. [A list of FIPS 140-2 validated products may be found in the DHS Technical Reference Model (TRM)].		X
	Remote access of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) complies with all DHS requirements for sensitive systems, including strong authentication.	X	
	Strong authentication is accomplished via VPN or by an equivalent approved method.	X	
~	Section 4.5: Intrusion Systems	Required	Recom- mended
	Components routinely scan wireline and wireless networks to determine whether unauthorized mobile devices are connected to DHS networks.		Х

~	Section 4.6: Securing the Network Interface	Required	Recom- mended
	Other components are included in the architecture to provide additional security services, such as authentication servers, firewalls, and VPN concentrators. Refer to the DHS IT Security Program Handbook for Sensitive Wireless Systems and DHS IT Security Architecture Guidance Volumes (I–III) for more detailed guidance.		х
	As wireless convergence continues to increase, capabilities or functions are restricted to specific wireless interfaces whenever possible.		Х
~	Section 4.6.1: Bluetooth	Required	Recom- mended
	The strongest security mode is used for Bluetooth communications. Details can be found in the NIST SP 800-121 Rev. 1 for various Bluetooth versions.	X	

	SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CHECKLIST FOR MOBILE DEVICES				
~	Section 4.6.2: Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN)	Required	Recom- mended		
	Mobile devices use authentication and encryption mechanisms as required by applicable policies. ⁵	Х			
~	Section 4.6.3: Cellular Technology	Required	Recom- mended		
	Mobile devices implement strong identification and authentication controls to access DHS resources and SHALL encrypt all data-in-transit.	Х			
	SECTION 5.0: EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES				
~	Section 5.1: Biometrics and Smartcards	Required	Recom- mended		
	Smart cards and biological recognition systems (e.g., retina scanner, handprint, voice recognition), are cost-justified through the risk assessment process.	Х			
~	Section 5.2: Environmentally Adaptable Security Policies	Required	Recom- mended		
	Whenever a mobile device is outside the corporate network or communicating from an insecure location, capabilities such as VPNs and firewalls self-configure to the changing operational environment.		Х		

⁵ <u>http://dhsconnect.dhs.gov/org/comp/mgmt/cio/iso/Documents/Forms/Knowledge%20View.aspx</u>

APPENDIX B—REFERENCED PUBLICATIONS

DHS Publications

ISSM Guide to the DHS Information Security Program, Version 2.0, July 19, 2004,

ISSO Guide to the DHS Information Security Program, Version 0.6, July 26, 2004

DHS Sensitive Systems Policy Directive 4300A, Version 9.1, July 24, 2012

DHS Sensitive Systems Handbook, Version 9.1, July 24, 2012

"IT Security Architecture Guidance Volume I: Network and System Infrastructure," Version 2.0, 2005

http://dhsconnect.dhs.gov/org/comp/mgmt/cio/iso/Documents/Information%20Security% 20Architecture%20Guidance%20vol%201.doc

"IT Security Architecture Guidance Volume II: Security Operations Support," Version 2.0, 2005

http://dhsconnect.dhs.gov/org/comp/mgmt/cio/iso/Documents/Information%20Security% 20Architecture%20Guidance%20vol%202.doc

"IT Security Architecture Guidance Volume III: Application Infrastructure Design (Draft), ver. 1.0, 2005

http://dhsconnect.dhs.gov/org/comp/mgmt/cio/iso/Documents/Information%20Security%20Archit ecture%20Guidance%20vol%203.doc

Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Publications

Wireless Security Technical Implementation Guide (STIG), and Addendums Current versions at: <u>http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/net_perimeter/wireless/wireless_net.html</u>

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Publications

National Vulnerability Database, Version 2.2, July 19, 2004

NIST SP 800-48, Rev 1, "Guide to Securing Legacy IEEE 802.11 Wireless Networks," July 2008

NIST SP 800-53, Rev 4, <u>"Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations," April 2013</u>

NIST SP 800-121, "Guide to Bluetooth Security," June 12, 2012

NIST SP 800-124, Rev 1 <u>"Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile Devices in the Enterprise,"</u> June 2013

National Security Agency (NSA) Publications

National Security Agency / Central Security Service Web Site, <u>http://www.nsa.gov</u>

Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Instructions

CNSS Instruction No. 4009 (Revised), "National Information Assurance Glossary," April 2010

National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) Publications

Wireless Protection Profiles <u>http://www.niap-ccevs.org/pp/</u>

Other Publications

FAQS.ORG, Network Working Group, "Request for Comments (RFC) 2828, Internet Security Glossary" <u>http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2828.html</u>

APPENDIX C—ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

Acronym	Definition
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AO	Authorizing Official
ATO	Authority to Operate
CISO	Chief Information Security Officer
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DoD	Department of Defense
EAP	Extensible Authentication Protocol
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
GFE	Government Furnished Equipment
GPS	Global Positioning System
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IPS	Intrusion Prevention System
IPsec	Internet Protocol Security
ISSO	Information System Security Officer
IMT	International Mobile Telecommunications
IT	Information Technology
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
J2ME	Java 2 Platform Micro Edition
LE	Low Energy
MAC	Media Access Control
MAM	Mobile Application Management
MDM	Mobile Device Management
MMS	Multimedia Messaging Service
NFC	Near Field Communication
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSA	National Security Agency
OSI	Open Systems Interconnection

Acronym	Definition
ΟΤΑ	Over-the-Air
PCS	Personal Communications Services
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PIM	Personal Information Management
SMS	Short Message Service
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SP	Special Publication
SSH	Secure Shell
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
ТСР	Transmission Control Protocol
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TRM	Technical Reference Model
USB	Universal Serial Bus
VPN	Virtual Private Network
WLAN	Wireless Local Area Network
WWAN	Wireless Wide Area Network