





















extremist recruiters who may approach them on social media. Average Mohamed videos – created by a Muslim convenient store owner – are aimed at instilling civic and democratic values in the minds’ of eight to sixteen year-old Muslims. Each video has three messages, concepts, or ideas either promoting positive values or debunking extremist rhetoric.

## **Training**

Training programs equip stakeholders with the knowledge and experience to effectively serve their communities and prevent violent extremism. Trainings are focused on a broad array of issues, including building cultural competence for local law enforcement officers and teaching educators and mental health professionals identify radical behaviors.

Two notable training programs are Community Awareness Briefings (CAB) and Community Resilience Exercises (CREX). Conducted in collaboration with the DHS’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) and NCTC, CAB and CREX were frequently cited as examples of government sponsored training programs.

CREX hosts half-day tabletop events designed to improve communication between law enforcement and communities on how best to build community resilience. CREX focuses on empowering communities against domestic violent extremism domestically. During CREX events a city’s law enforcement officers and community members talk through foreign fighter scenarios formulating community-specific strategies that can be used to identify and respond to radicalized behaviors. This begins with a hypothetical scenario developed based on the behaviors of past violent extremists and participants discuss their responses at each stage of the scenario. The exercise concludes with the creation a local action plan focused on prevention and intervention, based on the findings of the exercise.

CABs have been conducted in twelve cities, and were originally designed to help communities and law enforcement better understand al-Qaida. Recently, due to the changing environment of global conflict and terrorism, the CABs have begun to address Western-based fighters traveling to conflict zones such as Syria and Somalia. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) is currently working with CRCL to produce a version of the CAB targeted specifically at law enforcement.

Additional federal government CVE trainings include programs conducted by the FBI and Secret Service. The FBI produces materials local educators can use – including the “Preventing Violent Extremism in Schools” policy document that offers tips for high schools to increase awareness of violent extremism in schools and information for identifying students that may be at risk for engaging in violent extremism. The Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) regularly provides trainings to local universities, police departments, and security agencies upon request, due to the fact the Secret Service relies heavily on these organizations to fulfil their mission.

Several NGOs, including the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), provide

trainings to law enforcement aimed at building cultural competence to aid in working with diverse communities and identifying violent extremism at the group and individual level. These trainings are generally focused on white supremacist groups. A SPLC stakeholder reported their organization trains 3,000 to 3,500 police officers each year tailored to hate groups with a significant presence in specific SPLC regions. The SPLC also produces “roll call” videos aimed at officer safety protocols for dealing with groups such as sovereign citizens, potential lone offender shooters, and far-right hate groups like Stormfront.

The ADL provides pro bono training to law enforcement groups upon request (either in the department or at conferences), and bi-annually in Washington, D.C. Training given to departments were described as “broad and holistic,” while trainings in D.C. were described as “more in-depth,” and often include higher-ranking law enforcement officers. Speakers from think tanks and NGOs are often invited to participate as well. A representative also reported occasionally taking groups of officers to Israel to learn from the Israeli police departments.

The IACP focuses on brief online trainings including fifteen-minute modules on community, cultural awareness, and various forms of violent extremism. The IACP is currently designing in-person training curricula through FEMA grant funding to expand their training program.

### **Long-term two-way engagement**

Long-term engagement programs engage community members in sustained activities, interactions, and interventions designed to further the CVE mission by extending beyond one-time message dissemination and trainings. One prominent example is the pilot cities project, established by the FBI and led by local U.S. Attorney’s Offices and the Shared Responsibility Committees (SRCs), to bring together mental health professionals and community leaders to de-engage individuals have been identified as engaging in violent extremist behavior.

Other long-term engagement programs focus on community resilience, including the Community Builders Council, a grass-roots organization located in Chicago, IL that hosts regular dinner forums to discuss local issues, network, and listen to talks by government or NGO officials on a variety of community issues.

The Community Builders Council in Chicago identified seven critical areas needed for strong, vibrant, and resilient communities: faith (in terms of values, not religion), finance, family structure, healthcare, education, culture, and civic engagement. According to the representative, these seven areas are necessary for the creation and maintenance of strong, resilient communities; and all of their events and programs can be linked directly to one or more of these areas.

Direct outreach to schools and community groups to discuss the issue of radicalization is another common form of long-term engagement programming. NGOs, including the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), the American Islamic Congress (AIC), and Average Mohamed regularly conduct information sessions with communities to talk about issues of radicalization and violent extremism. These meetings are usually in the form of a lecture or town-hall style meetings that occur on a periodic basis, with targeted audiences depending on

the specific focus. A representative from CAIR reported topics ranging from community involvement, to ISIS, to knowing your rights.

Bridges was originally designed for federal agencies, but is now a recurring forum for community leaders, law enforcement, and local government officials to come together to discuss issues affecting the greater Detroit area ranging from extremism and radicalization to community safety and deterrence of anti-Muslim violence.

One notable outreach program is “Bridges” based in Detroit. Bridges was founded by the American Human Rights Council (AHRC) with help from the former and current US Attorney in Detroit. Bridges hosts forums designed to build trust and foster cooperation between the government and local community. Stakeholders

considered this program a success, emphasizing that in the months after 9/11 Michigan had the highest response rate of any state during Department of Justice (DOJ) interviews. This is attributed to Bridges’ efforts to create safeguards such as voluntary participation, choice of interview location, provisions to have an attorney present during the interview, and guarantees of no legal ramifications information pertaining to immigration status divulged during the interview.

Youth engagement programs – mostly focused on getting youth involved in community activities such as sports teams, after-school programs, and community engagement—are another popular form of long-term two-way engagement. An example of this type of program is CAIR’s initiatives to encourage youth involvement in advocacy, media, and law professions. As one CAIR representative notes, “there is a stereotype that all Muslims are doctors or engineers; so when we see kids getting interested in the law, we know we are having an impact.” Several CAIR chapters routinely take youth groups to the local state capital to meet with legislators to discuss concerns and also learn more about the legislative process.

Peace Ambassadors in Chicago recruits kids from the local communities who are interested in rap music. Participants are trained to record and produce music, and are mentored by a local well-known Muslim rapper. The only guidelines are that the music cannot glorify violence. At the end of the program, the winner of a battle of the bands-style concert is given 30 bracelets with flash drives containing their music to distribute and market themselves. Peace Ambassadors was created as a direct response to the rap-influenced gang violence in the Chicago community as a way to show kids that they can still make music without perpetuating violence. One individual who went through Peace Ambassadors has successfully disengaged and off-ramped through a joint effort between the program and the local FBI.

Youth engagement programs tend to focus on engagement with youth who are considered well-adjusted and not considered threats to partake in violent activities, leading some federal government stakeholders to question whether CVE diversion and resilience programs effectively reach the most vulnerable individuals.

There are a few programs focused on individual diversion through long-term engagement, notably Life After Hate who provides diversion and disengagement from far-right organizations. However, no interviewed stakeholders were involved with or aware of formal

Life After Hate, an NGO actively involved in group-level engagement, was founded by a former right-wing extremist to connect with individuals currently in far-right extremist groups. Programs offered include: Exit USA, a disengagement program; Formers Anonymous, a group counselling program; Against Violent Extremism Network, a network and support group for former members of extremist groups; and Harmony Through Hockey, a hockey league for inner-city youth.

individual diversion programs for members of Islamic extremist groups. Instances where an individual was identified as at-risk and diverted could be better described as one-off occurrences as opposed to being a part of a systematic plan to provide off-ramping services. This could be due to challenges in two areas: 1.)

Identifying those who have been radicalized. 2.) Some stakeholders feel that many jurisdictions do not have adequate laws protecting programs from liability should an individual engage in violence.

## Research

In addition to funding CVE specific programs, the federal government is also funding research on violent extremism and CVE. Areas of research include emerging social, psychological, economic, legal, political, and cultural issues related to CVE as well as evaluations of current CVE programs. To this end, DHS and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) are both sponsoring grant programs focused on understanding risk factors that lead to violent extremism to help partners create more effective and efficient CVE programs. Additionally, there is increasing stakeholder interest aligning research and programming so that they complement, reinforce, and sustain best practices. For example, Dr. Stevan Weine, Ph.D. from the University of Illinois at Chicago is working closely with officials in Los Angeles to develop an evaluation framework for CVE programs. Research is striving to positively impact program needs, and assist in validating the efficacy of programs by evaluating how well they address a targeted issue.

## B. Current Perceptions on CVE

Stakeholders were in near universal agreement that the threat of violent extremism by a multitude of extremist ideologies is a legitimate concern and must be addressed—even if it sometimes is overemphasized or efforts are misdirected. The diversity of groups and target populations the interviewed stakeholders engage led to a wide range of experiences, opinions, and practical suggestions, however several key themes emerged around the idea of improving CVE by improving community relationships, broadening the scope of CVE, and finding transferable programs to create a more “all-hands” community centered model of CVE—shown in *Exhibit 6*.

*“I think CVE is important, but I am frustrated that I can't figure out what it should look like.”*




Exhibit 6. Path to a Community Centered Model of CVE

### Increased Coordination and Collaboration

While DHS is generally seen as the organizing force at the federal level, stakeholders from all components emphasized the need for greater coordination to reduce duplicative efforts and maximize limited resources. Many stakeholders could easily name several programs successfully tackling specific aspects of CVE, however this information is not being shared with the broader CVE community. If CVE innovations were disseminated more effectively, it would lead to more effective CVE programming. This lack of coordination created a perception for one stakeholder where the government and non-governmental entities are simultaneously doing “too much and too little.” In addition, several stakeholders mentioned many government programs working towards the same goals with no communication or information sharing, creating a sense of inefficiency. One stakeholder felt CVE efforts could be improved significantly if everyone just sat down and talked: “Everyone needs to sit down and hash things out, instead of screaming at each other in the media.” The Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) is seen as a step in the right direction, emphasizing increased communication between several government agencies and NGOs.

The Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) was created by DHS in 2015. OCP has rapidly become a coordination center for all CVE related activities and their efforts were praised by several stakeholders. OCP's efforts in aligning resources for government agencies and NGOs who are more focused on specific issues or threats. For example, the OCP has worked with the FBI to develop targeted intervention programs that are more effective than current outreach and engagement issues. OCP also earned praise for improving interactions between select federal government agencies and immigrant communities by leveraging the rapport United States Citizenship and Immigration Services has with these communities.

### **Funding and staffing**

Federal government stakeholders and stakeholders working closely with the federal government cited the need for additional funding to expand the breadth and depth of CVE research and programming to increase future CVE programming and better coordinate extant CVE programs. These stakeholders specifically cited the need for increased staffing to better coordinate CVE efforts.

NGO stakeholders—most notably Arab American and Muslim stakeholders—were less willing to call for more funding through CVE-specific channels. Instead they suggested reevaluating the current allocation of CVE resources and improving grant mechanisms. The general sentiment was there is enough money, it is just not making it to community members with a record of successfully implementing CVE programs—federal government stakeholders were not opposed to providing increased funding for communities, they just saw the need for increased funding at the federal level as well as the community level.

### **Increased Civic Engagement**

Related to the call for increased community funding is a near universal call for additional programming focused on fostering civic engagement – most notably stakeholders from the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), CAIR, and the Muslim Student Association (MSA). Civic engagement programs are seen as constructive outlets to engage youth, and prevent and violence. Notable programs include CAIR’s Muslim Day on the Hill – where youth groups meet their representatives in Washington, D.C. – and the Community Builders Council in Chicago, IL.

### **Increased Range of Threats**

Many Muslim American and Arab stakeholders perceive current CVE programs as unfairly targeting their communities, suggesting that CVE programs must be broad-based and not focused specifically on the Muslim community. As one interviewee stated, “So the point is, CVE must be, not just in word, but in action, extremely broad-based to cover all sorts of things and not focus on particular religious or ethnic groups.”

*“Stigmatizing groups is counterproductive and tears down trusting relationships. Even the CVE label is unpopular, with perceptions that it is either a spy program or anti-Muslim.”*

### **Flexibility**

When discussing ineffective CVE programs, stakeholders generally cited a lack of flexibility as one of the main reasons. With the diversity of targets for CVE programming, a one-size-fits-all approach will never be as effective as programs and funding mechanisms allowing communities to create programs target to their specific needs.

*“We are inventing the plane as we fly it. A lot of people in bureaucracy have a hard time with that model. We want to learn from what others are doing and try to get it right.”*

### **Clear Expectations**

Community-level and NGO stakeholders emphasized the need for clear policies outlining what is allowed when attempting to off-ramp at-risk individuals, especially allowing organizations to support CVE efforts without putting themselves at risk of being charged with material support for terrorism. The uncertainty stakeholders have about how they can engage with at-risk individuals in an attempt to divert them away from criminal acts makes it difficult for problems to be acknowledged and for individuals to receive treatment. This creates a feeling in Muslim communities that, “they don't have the ability to contact somebody that they could trust who'll actually divert their young people away.” One CAIR representative offered anecdotally, “if you advise a terrorist to not be a terrorist, you have just committed a crime.” He continued to describe a case of a young man whose friend went to Syria and wanted to learn Arabic (through online correspondence). The young man “was pre-law so he knew the vagaries of it” and declined to help. The representative concluded, “There is a great example of someone just trying to stay engaged [with his friend] to try to help, but he could have gotten himself into a lot of trouble.” These stakeholders feel that increased clarification on this issue would allow more individuals and organizations to engage in diversion and intervention programming.

### **Grassroots Outreach**

Stakeholders cited the need for increased grassroots outreach when trying to divert or off-ramp individuals at risk of radicalizing. Stakeholders were notably optimistic about the prospects for social media counter messaging, which engages at-risk youth where they are, instead of forcing them into more clinical atmospheres that make them feel punished. Muslim youth need to be empowered to participate in advocacy to demonstrate pathways to constructively engage and make policy changes. Some NGO stakeholders suggested that these young first and second-generation immigrants, and minorities in general, often feel powerless to effect change which can contribute to driving individuals who are already becoming radical to engage in violence. Accordingly, grassroots civic engagement programs serve as both resilience and diversionary tactics against violent extremism for these communities.

*“[The] greatest impact is asking youth how their day was – taking a specific interest in them leads to success.”*

### **Increased Transparency**

NGO stakeholders, particularly those operating at the community level, believe there is an intentional lack of transparency around CVE programs. This results in a perception by communities that they are not told the real purpose of CVE efforts, which has led some advocacy and research groups to submit FOIA requests to the federal government to gain additional information. One former law enforcement official stated, “CVE should be transparent, but it is intentionally opaque, and gets shot down whenever anyone who is not part of the insider audience learns details.”

## Violent Extremism is not a Primary Threat

Many local stakeholders admitted that while violent extremism is a threat, it is not their primary focus. Due to their limited resources, they are forced to focus on more common threats like gang violence. While this may seem like a limitation, several stakeholders see it as a potential for creating a more robust CVE program. Applying lessons from adjacent fields that have already been adapted to the local context provides a rich opportunity for transferring these programs and policies to CVE. Creating this type of CVE model that considers all-hazards (violent

The call for an all-hazards, de-securitized approach to CVE was notable with Chicago stakeholders, who agreed that protecting Chicago from ideologically-motivated violence should be a priority, however their chief concern is the impact of gang violence. One local police official posited “violent extremism is not that detached from gangs.” A community representative with experience providing individual diversion counselling to a youth in Chicago suggested further, “Extremism will not occur isolated, it will occur in conjunction with the various other issues we have discussed such as gangs and drugs.” These quotes underscore the suggestion that Chicago stakeholders are aware of the concept of violent extremism, but their primary focus is on other issues—education, employment, drugs, and other local crimes—that affect all groups, including those vulnerable to violent extremism, while acknowledging that targeting these issues will help counter violent extremism.

extremism, gang violence, mental health, etc.), helps increase the amount of human capital that can be dedicated to CVE without overburdening local stakeholders.

## Rebrand CVE

Many stakeholders suggested “CVE” has become politically charged and could alienate certain communities. This point is emphasized by stakeholders reporting that OCP avoids using the term CVE, recognizing how unpopular the term is with target populations – stakeholders from target populations confirming this point. This suggests a need for a new name for CVE efforts to increase community buy-in. There also needs to be a differentiation between deradicalization and disengagement. Several stakeholders questioned whether or not it is possible to deradicalize someone, however it is possible to disengage them from committing or supporting acts of violence while allowing them to maintain their beliefs. Some NGO stakeholders thought vocabulary changes were irrelevant, suggesting that any name change would be seen as superficial until CVE programming becomes more community driven.

*“We need better interventions focused on disengagement rather than deradicalization. I don’t know how you would deradicalize someone, but I do have ideas on how you can disengage. They can still be radical in their views, but maybe they start to realize that violence is not the answer.”*

## Need for a community driven strategy

All of the above points were stated in some combination by the majority of the stakeholders as arguments for a CVE strategy that is more community driven. Several federal government stakeholders championed an approach where the federal government facilitates bottom-up

solutions—as opposed to imposing solutions from the top down. This perception was echoed by many of the NGOs engaged in CVE programming. NGO stakeholders recognize the threat of targeted violence and understand the importance of engaging at-risk individuals in a safe and supportive environment without the fear—real or perceived—of reprisal that can come from top down efforts. CVE programming is most effective and received more warmly when it comes from local community organizations—government branding of programs seems to delegitimize them amongst target communities.

Moving to a community-centered approach would help reduce the fears and frustrations of several stakeholders who reported a perception of being spied on and unfairly targeted. One example of this community driven model is the one used in Dearborn, Michigan, which was viewed by many stakeholders as an example of how CVE should be enacted by local police departments.

The Dearborn model emphasizes the importance of notifying the local police department or other government agencies if someone appears to be pursuing towards violence of any kind, made possible due to a strong sense of trust and collaboration between the citizens and local law enforcement. Warning signs of violent extremism identified by Dearborn Police department include: isolation, unusual use of the internet, appearing short tempered, growing a beard, change of wardrobe, personal protection orders, lashing out at family, withdrawing from school, and a decline in focus. Once an individual has been referred, they are introduced to a multidisciplinary approach of mentoring, counselling, and mental health services.

The Dearborn Police Department offers training to all schools, social services, and faith based organizations in Dearborn, and has received favorable evaluations from both Harvard University and the University of Southern California. Chief Ronald Haddad reported that four individuals have been successfully off-ramped in Dearborn—two children from an Iraqi family, one child from a local high school, and one Vietnam war veteran—using this “broad-based, intervention-focused” approach to CVE. Due to the close relationship and strong trust between the Dearborn PD and the community, this model should be considered a gold-standard; although it may not be as successful in other cities where relationships between the police department and community are not as strong.

Dearborn, Michigan—which has one of the oldest and largest Muslim populations in the United States—employs a “broad based, intervention-focused” CVE model spearheaded by the Dearborn Police Department and Police Chief Ronald Haddad. The police department’s involvement in CVE and the community relationships they have developed are the strengths cited by stakeholders when describing Dearborn as a model for CVE programming. Highlighting the high opinion of the Dearborn model, one stakeholder offered, “If the way Dearborn [local police] does it [CVE] was the norm, people would be more willing to support [the CVE policy and associated programs]. They would feel like they had a partner in the situation.”

### Criticisms of CVE

While most stakeholders were optimistic and made constructive suggestions for improving CVE, there were stakeholders who think CVE as a concept is fundamentally flawed and needs to be completely re-tooled or eliminated. Their primary concerns were:

- There is a perception in the Muslim community that the government is utilizing CVE policy and programming to unfairly target and ostracize segments of the American population. This stands in contrast to their perception that the federal government has repeatedly upheld the First Amendment protections afforded groups such as the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). These stakeholders believe that Muslim community members are fearful that the government may use their religious affiliation against them, their family members, and friends within their community. This fear prevents many community members and advocates from voicing their criticisms of the CVE policy—fearing their First Amendment rights will not be upheld.
- Several respondents stated that they did not believe there was any empirical evidence to support the success of CVE programming. According to one respondent, “We’re just headed in the wrong path, and there is no scientific evidence that suggests that suppressing extremist speech or belief reduces violence; and I would argue that historical examples will show the opposite, it actually is increasing violence.”
- Certain CVE researchers and program implementers frame their research only to legitimize programs in order to continue receiving government funds.

### VI. CONFERENCES

In addition to interviewing stakeholders, RTI staff attended seven conferences. Three of these conferences were specifically focused on CVE, while the other four were focused on areas adjacent to CVE (*Exhibit 7*). The purpose of attending the four non-CVE-specific conferences was to identify transferable programs applicable to CVE, and to discover whether CVE is a concern or priority to communities and stakeholders outside of the traditional CVE sphere. The following section presents key findings from each of the seven conferences.

Name	Description	Key Findings	CVE Specific
<b>Securing Global Cities</b>	Panel discussion at the Brookings Institute on identifying CVE threats and examining the tools to address said threats	More economically secure countries produce lower rates of terrorism	Yes
<b>American School Counselor Association (ASCA)</b>	Annual conference for school counselors	Universal mental health screening in schools, while it faces challenges, could be useful in CVE efforts	No









## VII. FOCUS GROUPS

### A. NASRO

RTI staff attended the 2016 annual conference for the National Association of School Resource Officers in Anaheim, California in order to conduct two focus groups. The structure of the focus groups mirrored that of the stakeholder interviews, but was carefully tailored to be more relevant to issues facing schools and school resource officers (SROs) (see *Appendix E*). Participants were selected and recruited by NASRO leadership, and comprised both men and women with a range of experiences in a variety of schools of different sizes, climates, and settings across the country. The first focus group had six participants and the second had seven. All participants were currently SROs, or on SRO rotations, except for one civilian SRO researcher. Although the SROs participating in the focus groups mentioned that CVE was not a specific concern for them in their schools, they emphasized that all types of violence – including violent extremism – posed a threat to the safety of their school and community. They also believed that the work they were doing in the schools – including, building trust, providing safe spaces for youth and mentoring, and partnering with parents – worked toward creating a healthy community that would be able to prevent and respond to all kinds of violence, including violent extremism.

#### Responsibilities and Goals of the SRO

A recurring theme in both focus groups was the importance of clearly defining the role of the SRO to the police department and school administration. Several SROs suggested that many

*[On preventing active shooter situations] “I think trust is more effective than an AR-15.”*

of the failures and issues they experience can be attributed to poor communication and lack of defined responsibilities. For example, some school administrators see SROs as little more than a personal police force, designed to arrest students at the principal’s discretion. Other administrators do not see a need for SROs, or do not want to give the perception to the public

that their school is unsafe and requires police presence. Similarly, securing parental buy-in is difficult when they do not understand the function of the SRO. Lastly, some police forces do not see the necessity of taking a police officer off the street and putting them into a school setting. Therefore, there was little to no consideration regarding the characteristics needed for a successful SRO in the selection process, contradicting the SROs’ call for a careful pairing of the SRO to the schools. For example, matching a strong SRO with a weak administration can lead to the SRO overstepping boundaries intended for the principal; and matching a weak SRO to a strong administrator can result in an abuse of arrest powers, or even increased violence in schools. As one respondent suggested, “You can’t have a hard-core street cop dealing with fourteen year olds not wanting to give up a cellphone, throwing him around the room...”

There was broad consensus in both groups on the general roles, responsibility, and goals of SROs. Nearly all participants agreed that the primary responsibility of the SRO is to create and maintain a safe environment for students and staff, conducive to learning and development; and to help students graduate and become productive members of society. SROs achieve these

goals through community policing, counselling, and educational programs. SROs who achieve these goals can potentially impact the community as a whole. One participant went so far as to describe the role of the SRO as tending a garden: “We plant the seeds of trust, communication, and safety [then] water the plant. The plant grows, produced fruit, and we do it all again.” This atmosphere is accomplished through a number of formal and informal programs including: working with clubs afterschool, presenting lectures in class rooms, and generally being a positive presence in the community. Participants provided examples of SROs positively impacting their communities through afterschool nature and sports programs. One SRO commented, “If you make one good contact with a kid, then parents see you on the ball field, the parents start to thank you for impacting their kid.”

In some cases, SROs are required to perform traditional police duties such as launching investigations, collecting evidence, and arresting students. These responsibilities varied between jurisdictions and the SROs had different protocols for making arrests and writing tickets. For example, one department has a policy of not arresting anyone under the age of twelve. In the event that a criminal act has been committed, there is a chain of review to determine whether or not the child and community would benefit from incarceration or receiving another form of assistance such as mental health outreach or mentoring. As several participants remarked, “the goal is to get the kid to graduate, not to arrest him.” However, another participant stated that in order to receive grants and in some instances justify the existence of the SRO program, they have to make arrests as their funders are “too data driven” and metrics such as arrests and calls for service (CFS) are incorrectly used as metrics of performance success.

### Partnerships

Respondents reported that strong partnerships built on trust are absolutely necessary for a successful SRO program. The SROs’ main partners included administrators, students, the FBI, Department of Education (DoEd), local school boards, municipal governments, parents, and local businesses. One SRO responded simply saying, “The entire community is a partner,” then proceeded to explain that getting the community and local businesses to buy-in to the success of their local school translates to a stronger, safer, and more resilient community as a whole.

*“A true partnership is about collaboration and staying in your own lane.”*

Nearly all SROs feel students are their greatest partners in keeping the school safe. Students are useful in gathering intelligence about what is happening in the hallways, on the playgrounds, and even in the community after school. However, partnerships are only as strong as the degree of trust in the relationship. Commenting specifically on the prevention and resiliency pillars in DHS’s CVE framework, one participant stated that trust between the SRO and students is developed through maintaining an active, supported presence in the schools on a daily basis. The respondent continued to say that the trust between some students and the SROs is so strong that students have reported crimes in the community, such as murder or child abuse, to the SRO.

### Measuring Success

Participants identified a variety of different quantitative and qualitative metrics of success, varying based on the SRO's individual responsibilities. For example, several participants stated that the students' reactions to their lessons and presence in the hallways was evidence of success. One participant said, "Personally, for me, I would define success as the kids being excited to see me when I go back into the classroom." Another stated that being asked by students to take pictures with them at graduation, or giving them a high five in the hallway are also indicative of success. Others offered quantitative measures of success such as low number of arrests in schools, participation in programs such as PALS and Explorers, and low number of incidents such as bullying, fights, and thefts. However, several SROs suggested that success is often very difficult to quantify with statistics, as it is difficult to count and measure the non-occurrence of incidents such as drug use, pregnancy, and arrests—an issue sometimes referred to in the literature as measuring the negative. In other cases, as one SRO pointed out, the non-occurrence of these events is sometimes seen as justification for removing SROs from schools, or can prevent the SRO from receiving grants. The respondent continued to suggest that many administrations and police departments do not understand that a lack of CFSs is evidence of a successful SRO program, and that the SRO is not needed. Another SRO suggested that an investigation of the effect on SRO programs conducted using epidemiological methods linking intervention to outcome would be useful for convincing districts and departments of the need for SROs.

### Programs

SROs identified five exemplary programs currently being implemented in schools across the country: GREAT, Pals, Explorers, and Red Flag Kids. GREAT is a federally funded gang resistance and education program that "almost doesn't mention gangs at all," focusing on making good choices, anger management, bullying, and reacting to stressful situations in productive and appropriate manners. Pals is similar programs designed to positively impact school climate and provide students with a better understanding of the roles of SROs and police officers in the wider community. In Explorers, students learn a condensed version of what SROs and police officers are taught. Students must be 15 years old to participate, and can enter law enforcement themselves at age 21. One SRO commented, "They are a good resource, if something does happen, [and the SRO is not present] they [have] some training." Red Flag Kids is a training aimed at teachers to recognize and mitigate warning signs of emotional and physical trauma that may manifest into physical violence either at school, in the home, or in the community.

### Threat Assessments

In the first focus group, when asked about the SRO's primary role or mission, one respondent listed threat assessment. Whereas threat assessment was only mentioned briefly in the second session, the first session discussed threat assessment procedures and tools at length. One respondent commented, "I think the SROs are uniquely positioned [to conduct] threat assessments. This is the core of what they do." The respondent continued to state that SROs

have been conducting threat assessments in schools for decades, but only recently have threats become ideologically-motivated. Another participant noted that SROs have specific tools, such as the Violence Risk Assessment, “but a lot of times SROs do not know they [threat assessment tools] exist.” The participant continued to suggest that the school principal or counselor could also use these tools, but an SRO needs to be present during its administration to ensure it is properly administered and any red flags indicating the potential for violence are properly investigated.

The participant offered an anecdote illustrating the need for SROs to be present during the assessment, in which the principal asked a student if he ever saw people or heard voices in his head. The child responded that the devil sometimes spoke to him, but the principal did not want to discuss that issue further. Because the SRO was present, she was able to interject during the assessment and investigate the issue further. She continued to explain that many administrators do not want to actually increase security, but prefer to “[make] everyone feel safe” [participant’s emphasis]. Another SRO offered an example of using a threat assessment tool on a student who was eating family pets and writing essays about it, but the administration “[did] not want to hear about it.” Participants familiar with threat assessments stated that even though they did not find a credible threat, having the tools present allowed them to make that judgement with confidence and prescribe appropriate steps to managing the student’s well-being. Furthermore, participants suggested that many districts who have access to threat assessment tools either do not use it, use it incorrectly, or do not follow-up with recommendations outlined in the tool itself; and these are the reasons why the SRO needs to be involved in the assessment process.

Many participants stated that they have conducted informal and unstructured threat assessments throughout the course of their career, but rarely (if ever) in the context of ideologically-motivated violent extremism. One stated, “In Georgia, we have white supremacists, but we don’t approach it as a cause—it’s just part of our threat assessment. The thought that a student might be recruited for ISIS is very new [for us].” Other participants, however, revealed that they have seen a few signs of Jihadist radicalization in schools recently. Knowing when and how to implement the tool, though, will largely be determined by the strength of relationships, trust, and familiarity between the SRO and the student. One participant suggested, “Deciding on whether or not you are going to do the threat assessment, is finding the kids who have a really defined change in behavior.” He continued to provide an example of a Palestinian student whom he knew well. As a freshman he was outgoing and very interested in whether or not Muslims could become police officers, but as a senior he became more invested in the Israel-Palestine conflict. Simultaneously, his dress, demeanor, and friends changed dramatically. The participant concluded by saying he did not have access to a tool at the time, and did not think the student was a threat to himself or the school, but “...using that tool to determine where he [had] psychologically [issues]...would have been helpful...”

*“If it’s a mental health issue, we are not going to arrest [the student]. We are more interested in the mental health piece, not the law enforcement piece.”*

Threat assessment tools, according to the SRO, are “helpful to see how concrete ideas and threats are,” but cannot replace the need for strong relationships built on trust and understanding. In many cases, an SRO who is tuned-in to the student body can effectively recognize warning signs (such as a change in interests, dress, behavior, demeanor, friends, etc.) and informally reach out to the student to ask if everything is okay. One participant countered that SROs in larger schools simply cannot get to know every kid well-enough to notice changes that might warrant further assessment, rather teachers are the front-line for recognizing warning signs and alerting the administration and SRO of their concerns. Many teachers, according to participants, are either not aware of the warning signs or do not want to report students to the SRO for fear of the student being arrested. One participant offered an anecdote where a student came back to school after the Christmas holidays wearing a duster-coat, carrying a briefcase, and long slicked-back hair. After a few weeks, a gun was eventually confiscated from the student who was planning to shoot a female student. “The threats were there, but they were not prosecuted...all of the teachers knew him, and they missed all of the threats.” The goal of the SRO and threat assessments, according to one participant, is not to arrest the child, but to see if they need to intervene and provide help. Another participant agreed and suggested that threat assessment tools need to be “retooled” to determine where potentially violent or radical students are in the radicalization process.

### Conclusion

In summary, SROs are a valuable presence in schools due to their ability to recognize warning signs of potential violence both from within and outside the school; and they have a diverse tool kit to respond to a range of threats and non-threats alike. Success of each individual SRO program is determined by the strength of relationships between both the administration and the SRO, and the student body and the SRO. The strength of these relationships are measured by cooperation and trust respectively. The administration and the SRO rely on knowing defined roles and responsibilities in order to cooperate effectively, and the SRO and students rely on trust to maintain a safe learning environment. Trust is built through developing relationships with students through formal exercises such as lectures and counselling, and informally through mentoring and taking an active interest in the lives of students. This trust can potentially extend beyond the school, into the community, affecting multiple generations throughout the community. The SRO is also uniquely trained and situated to conduct threat assessments, in order to properly investigate and qualify potentially violent situations and students. After the assessment, the SRO and administration can cooperate to evaluate if the student poses a potential risk, and if so, whether the student would benefit from additional social or mental health services.

## **VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS**

Based on our analysis of the stakeholder interviews, we identified three broad categories for improving CVE efforts: Improved programming, research capacity and program evaluations.

## A. Improving CVE Programming

**Dedicated funding and staffing.** Most federal stakeholders saw the creation of OCP as a positive step, giving CVE an identifiable address within the government. However, concerns were expressed over low OCP staffing levels and funding. NGO and local government stakeholders also expressed frustration with FEMA’s grant mechanism, which they cited as problematic in getting funding to local communities. One way to mitigate these concerns would be to increase the scope of programs with access to CVE funding, particularly small grassroots organizations with few existing resources and a limited understanding of how federal government grant mechanisms work.

**Utilize a community driven approach.** Nearly all stakeholders unanimously acknowledged that effective CVE efforts can only be achieved using a bottom-up community based approach, where community stakeholders implement programs to address the unique needs of their communities. At the federal level, current approaches to achieve these outcomes include offering grants to community organizations—for example OCP and FEMA are working together to disperse \$10M in grant awards. At the local level, organizations and government stakeholders should take an approach similar to the Dearborn Police Department, making sure the citizens are engaged and informed throughout the process.

**Better target and engage with actual at-risk individuals.** Many stakeholders expressed concerns that current programming did not ‘filter down’ to reach the actual at-risk individuals. Specifically, several stakeholders questioned whether CVE programming is effectively connecting programs and outreach to individuals who are actually at-risk. Unfortunately, the success of many CVE programs is based on the number of individuals successfully diverted from violent extremism, which is difficult to measure. A better alternative is the development of an evaluation frameworks and logic model to ensure programs are reaching intended audiences, aligning strategic objectives and collecting relevant data to affirm program efficacy.

**Develop and implement strategic communication plan.** Over the course of the stakeholder interviews, several successful CVE programs were operating at all levels—federal government, local government, and NGOs. However, these programs and there results are usually not shared effectively. Increased coordination and information sharing would reduce redundancy of several CVE efforts and allow everyone to learn from each other and plan more effectively. Coordinated communication could begin with the development of a strategic communications plan for CVE, however it is unclear who could most effectively assume this role.

One difficult aspect of coordinating and developing appropriate messages about CVE is the development of an understood and accepted vocabulary, and guidance on when best to utilize certain terminology based on audience, purpose, and intended outcomes. While the FBI uses the term countering violent extremism readily, including in their widely distributed guidance on countering violent extremism in schools, most of the stakeholders

interviewed agreed that the term CVE is toxic within the Muslim community. According to respondents, they recognized and appreciated that OCP intentionally did not use the term CVE when operating in the field, but many communities remained suspicious because they view the entire office as a cover for CVE efforts. Many first and second-generation immigrant communities do not consciously separate the various branches and offices of the government, so any government intervention (particularly from a security agency such as DHS) has the potential for tremendous community opposition at launch. Therefore, there needs to be a coordinated effort for all agencies working in the domestic CVE sphere to develop and accept a strategic communication plan, and work to deliberately utilize this plan to demonstrate to the communities a sincere attempt to address current and relevant grievances.

**Better Inter and Intradepartmental Coordination and Cooperation.** Many federal government stakeholders reported friction between different agencies in the same department, in addition to tension between different agencies throughout all levels of government. These tensions are primarily related to the rapidly evolving federal CVE portfolio which necessitates multiple agencies clearly understanding and defining their roles in alignment to the broader CVE strategy. The CVE Working Group was cited by respondents as a good forum for working out these issues and developing an integrated approach. Further, the development of OCP as the coordinating center and the lead for CVE strategy is a positive step toward improved coordination.

**Additional recommendations based on stakeholder feedback include:**

- More informational materials, with those materials interpreted for the different languages present in the community
- Develop programs to engage the youth in community activities such as sports leagues or local government
- Look to other off-ramping programs and therapy (such as gang diversion) for lessons on how to successfully reintegrate individuals back into society after incarceration
- Create programs for refugees and recent immigrants to volunteer and integrate into the community so they can feel they are giving back and contributing
- Provide cultural awareness training to local law enforcement and health care providers
- Provide bystander training for peers, teachers, and parents to recognize warning signs, offer “first aide,” and refer individuals to professionals who can help intervene.

**B. Building CVE Research Capacity**

**Link Researchers and Program Implementers and encourage the creation of long term relationships.** Several stakeholders feel that current feedback loops linking researchers and program implementers are insufficient and need to be strengthened by increasing communication and coordination between researchers and community programs. The hope for both parties, as well as the government, is the development of a

knowledge management systems that sustains the scientific bases for the development of programs and the systematic collection of best practices. This process has the potential to inform and benefit current and future program implementers, but also allows for current and future researchers interested in CVE, organizational psychology, program evaluations, etc. to find new and innovative ways to work together to serve populations in need of solutions in this difficult problem space. Nurturing close relationships between researchers and program implementers will require careful communication and coordination on the part of the government. It will also require strong communications skills in building bridges between two very different communities. On one side the government will need to assist in the translation of theory into actionable practice, on the other side it will need to educate program implementers on the value of having a scientifically grounded program built on systematic data collection for improved decision making and planning.

### **Improved Integration of Research from Adjacent Fields**

CVE programmers and researchers would benefit by borrowing from and having greater knowledge of studies from related fields that are not traditionally included in current CVE efforts, most notably public health, mental health, gang cessation, and cult disengagement. The broadening of the CVE dialogue to include other academic fields not traditionally a part of this conversation will allow for CVE to be discussed and placed into the larger social context of violence prevention, program evaluation, and individual and group behavioral outcomes. This infusion of additional research will provide CVE experts with additional knowledge and information to streamline their efforts and focus on improving and refining interventions for their programs, as opposed to reinventing the wheel and wasting valuable time.

### **Additional basic research requested from stakeholders include:**

- Better understand ‘radicalization pathways. Stakeholders requested more studies that better identify at-risk individuals to violent extremism in the pre-criminal space. Respondents want theoretically validated models to understand radicalization pathways.
- Long-term longitudinal studies to track interventions. Studies that track communities over an extended period of time to develop a more holistic view of the issues facing these communities. Too much current research focuses on individual incidents and is not a part of a comprehensive research agenda.
- More research on extremist group recruitment practices. Stakeholders identified a need to better understand the recruitment practices used by violent extremist groups, particularly online and in prisons.
- More research on public health models for prevention and community engagement.

### C. Improving CVE Program Evaluations

Program evaluation is a systematic approach to assessing a program's implementation or outcomes, compared to some standard, with the purpose of improving the project (Weiss, 1998). Program evaluation is a means of ensuring accountability for planning and execution of a program and serves as a process for identifying opportunities for improving efficiency and effectiveness. The term "program" can be applied broadly and encompasses "any set of organized activities supported by a set of resources to achieve a specific and intended result," such as direct service interventions, community mobilization efforts, research initiatives, advocacy work, or training programs (CDC, 2005, p. 1). Programs are evaluated to address a range of questions, including (Weiss, 1998, p. 6):

- How is the program being conducted?
- What is the program actually doing?
- How well is the program following the guidelines that were originally set?
- What kinds of outcomes is a program producing?
- How well is a program meeting the purposes for which it was established?
- Is a program worth the money it costs?
- Should a program be continued, expanded, reduced, changed, or abandoned?
- Does a program benefit all intended beneficiaries or only certain groups?

Although program staff may feel capable of informally providing answers to the above questions, a program evaluation relies on systematic research methods and provides a more objective assessment of a program's operations and outcomes. This allows organizations to make informed decision about progress, next steps, and impact of a program. It also permits the development of and sharing of knowledge and best practices so that programs can be sustainable and scalable over time.

As we mentioned in our report: *Countering Violent Extremism- Developing a Research Roadmap: Literature Review*, this type of rigorous and systematic examination of the extent to which policies and programs implemented are achieving their intended goals is largely missing, both from the academic literature as well as in practice. As noted by Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley in their Campbell Systematic review *The Effectiveness of Counter Terrorism Strategies*, they reported that "from over 20,000 studies located on terrorism, [they] found only seven which contained moderately rigorous evaluations of counter terrorism programs (Lum et al., 2006, p.3). However, in addition to examining the published literature, over the course of the 2016 calendar year, RTI interviewed representatives from federal, state, and local government agencies, as well as research, policy, and community organizations to better understand and catalogue CVE specific programs, hoping to identify evaluated programs. From the 89 interviews conducted, we were able to examine and identify 15 CVE programs focused on issues ranging from civic engagement, violence prevention, to improved mental health. In addition to varying focus areas, the programs also targeted both adults and youth, encouraging continuous dialogue and relationship building. Many of the local law enforcement agencies worked closely

with community based organization, and with the civic and religious leaders to build cultural understanding, increase local capacity, and to effectively communicate threats and issues of major concern to their localities. However, after conversations with stakeholders throughout the government and civil society about the development and impact of the programs they implemented, we discovered that none of the programs had been formally or informally evaluated to ensure fidelity to stated objectives and goals nor for overall impact.

When asked directly about measuring program success and evaluation of outcomes, all of the respondents agreed on the value and importance of evaluations. In fact one national advocacy group insisted that the government utilize evaluations to inform funding decision stating that “research [should] show a program has impact. Don’t want tons of money dumped into something that [only] sounds great.” However, during the course of the conversation, many of the respondents admitted that they lacked the technical expertise and knowledge in developing measurable goals, collecting and analyzing relevant data, and translating findings into actionable tasks for improving and growing the program. Another national level organization stated that “[they] need improvement in metrics and recognize [its] importance. Doing surveys after events are not that particularly useful. [They] are looking for ways to gauge impact- hopefully in a couple of years.” When speaking with the government sponsors of the Community Resilience Exercises (CREX) that have taken place in several cities throughout the United States, the respondents mentioned that after the exercise a quick one page performance evaluation is given to each of the participants. They are asked to rate on a Likert scale the facilities, facilitation of the exercises, and their overall impressions of the value of the day. After being provided a few of the evaluations to review, the participants expressed valued in the CREX events, and provided positive feedback on the activities. Unfortunately, there has not been a systematic review of all of the evaluations from the past CREX events; therefore, the evaluations of previous events have had little to no impact on changes or improvements for the next event. Good will and stories of praise from program participants informally and unsolicited by implementers tend to be the norm for most of the respondents interviewed, with most programs citing success based on their growing reputations, traditional and social media coverage, and increased influence within their target audience e.g. community, university students, etc. However, the anecdotes of individual successes and failure are not systematically collected based on set questions and timelines; therefore, even the rich qualitative data that programs have in abundance are not analyzed and correlate to meaningful metric that the programs can utilize to make decision about programmatic approach, resources, and future directions.

During the interview conducted with our study participants, we ask them what resources they needed from the government. Unsurprisingly, their immediate and first response was additional funding for programs. Local organizations mentioned again and again “without resources we struggle.” And when their primary concern is to stay open, evaluating a program and better understanding its impact seemed of secondary concern. However, after prodding them to think very deliberately and intentionally about the sustainability and

growth of their programs, many respondents also spoke about non-monetary resources such as training, technical assistance, and knowledge sharing that they needed the government to champion and lead. Community organizers in multiple cities requested training from the government in applying for grants, proposal writing, and financial management. A community organizer mentioned that “many smaller community groups do not really know how to apply to grants or solicit money from the government.” They want the skills and knowledge required to ask for additional funds so that they are able to build and sustain programs over time. In addition to training on grants, many of the local agencies and community groups asked for specific subject matter training in mental health response and threat assessment. The Chicago Police Department mentioned that “we are supposed to have a higher trained response [to mentally ill people]--something that I want to and would use with CT cases that really are those with mental illness. The department needs depth there - very viable funding focus for many depts.” Even if DHS is not able to provide the training, the agency can direct funding to specific training sources and should be an information repository so that local groups are able to identify training as needed. And in some instances, it looks as if the DHS component agencies are already providing some training when they are able. In our conversation with DHS Secret Service, the respondent specifically mentions offering trainings to local LEO and colleges for free on request, as a quid-pro-quo for all of the assistance the PDs and schools provide to the Secret Service.

Through the provision of funds for community level CVE programs, the government is in a strong position to include technical assistance support and guidelines for evaluating programs for future grant recipients. In addition to requirements and guidelines that will allow the government to track and monitor the success of the grant awards, the technical assistance support encouraged and provided by the government will build capacity for systematic decision making and continuous learning both within organizations and throughout the communities. Although many of the community organizations spoke about their hesitation of accepting funds from DHS due to the lingering negative perceptions in their communities, DHS is in a position to work with other federal agencies like the Department of Education (DoEd), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to not only offer program funds, but to offer technical assistance and training in the development of evaluation frameworks, SMART objectives, data collections methods, and analysis of findings. Mechanisms and avenues that can alert local groups to existing sources of funding, trainings, and resources are just as valuable at the grassroots level, in addition to new sources of funding. A community leader in Chicago also mentioned that the government could support and assist in engagement with universities interested in evaluating local programs. With the government’s vast network of academic researchers and funding to universities, community leaders would like greater access to relevant studies as well as support from the government in linking universities and communities together to develop evidence based programs to support long term impact evaluations that sustain behavior change.

## IX. CONCLUSION

Overall, the government's CVE policy and programs continues to be controversial, particularly among Muslim and Arab-American stakeholders, and needs better leadership, coordination, and communication in order to achieve its intended policy and program goals. Conversations about CVE policy and programs elicit complicated feelings of alienation, frustration, and anger due to perceptions within communities that the government is utilizing community building initiatives solely to target and spy on them, their families, and their friends. Not all groups felt this way, some Arab and Muslim community members stated that they generally support government CVE initiatives, however, many remained deeply suspicious of CVE programs.

Among government stakeholders, the importance placed on CVE varied, notably between stakeholders working at the national level and those working at the local level. Government stakeholders, both federal and local, working at the local level were often familiar with CVE, but stated it was not a daily priority. For example, police officers in Chicago are primarily focused on their daily responsibilities in the neighborhood, and not necessarily thinking about (or even aware of) overarching CVE goals. FBI involvement with CVE at the field level was largely determined by the individual office, with most discussions occurring at the policy and theoretical level and rarely translating into concrete local programs. This could be due to the relatively infrequent occurrence of violent extremism compared with the near daily-occurrence of gang violence in many urban communities.

While stakeholders approach CVE from very different and evolving perspectives, there is a broad consensus on several key issues including: the need to build trust, programming occurring at the community level, and CVE being placed into an all-hazards approach, which also needed to consider education, mental health, economic, and community health. Additionally, CVE policies need to be broad in scope and cannot single out any one group or motivator (such as religious affiliation or ethnic background). Stakeholders repeatedly stated that there is no single pathway to violence, nor a unique profile of perpetrators. Accordingly, violent extremism should be approached from a variety of different angles, reflective of the multi-faceted and dynamic nature of violent extremism.

Although not explicitly mentioned during the interviews, we found a recurring need for the understanding and development of program evaluations – including the development of useful outcome measures – and information dissemination on current programs and evaluations. Our conversations with both government officials and NGO included comments on the lack of knowledge concerning applied research for program evaluations, existing programs outside their communities, and current government services available. Many stakeholders, even the larger national level organizations with more staff and resources, tended to provide the names of similar researchers and one or two well-known programs, indicating that most stakeholders operate in a small bubble, and are not familiar with the larger context in which they could be familiar.

This provides an enormous opportunity for DHS to become a central hub for leadership, coordination, and improved communications for the larger CVE stakeholder community. The

opportunity exists to develop an effective strategic communication plan and to develop a process to collect, catalogue and disseminate research, policy papers, and resources from various academic fields from program evaluations, public health, mental health, education, and community engagement. DHS is positioned to be create bridges and translate best practices and knowledge into actionable tasks for law enforcement agencies, schools, and community based organization who are on the fronts lines working together to mitigate the most pressing needs of their community. DHS can become a repository of knowledge and a match maker linking federal partners, state and local agencies, as well as academic and private partnerships together to develop meaningful and impactful CVE programs.

Violent extremism is a complex subject that requires understanding of multiple disciplines, and to counter that threat with sound evidence based interventions, it will require a federal agency willing to take the lead for defining and understanding the CVE threat, to collect current knowledge and research from multiple academic disciplines, to coordinate various stakeholders through all levels of government and society, and to communicate consistently and continually not only the evolving threats, but also possible solutions to mitigate those threats.

**X. APPENDIX A: LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS BY ORGANIZATION TYPE**

<b>Stakeholder Organization</b>	<b>Site</b>	<b>Organization Type</b>
<b><i>Academic/Research Partner</i></b>		
Brennan Center for Justice	National	Academic/Research Partner
Center for School Mental Health	National	Academic/Research Partner
Center for the Study of Extremism and Hate	National	Academic/Research Partner
EdVenture Partners	National	Academic/Research Partner
George Washington University	National	Academic/Research Partner
George Washington University	National	Academic/Research Partner
Institute for Inclusive Security	National	Academic/Research Partner
Institute for Social Policy and Understanding	National	Academic/Research Partner
Institute for Strategic Dialogue	National	Academic/Research Partner
Institute for Strategic Dialogue	National	Academic/Research Partner
Private Practice Psychiatrist	National	Academic/Research Partner
The Soufan Group	National	Academic/Research Partner
<b><i>Federal Government</i></b>		
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Chicago	Chicago	Federal Government
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Chicago	Chicago	Federal Government
United States Attorneys' Office, Northern District of Illinois	Chicago	Federal Government
United States Attorneys' Office, Northern District of Illinois	Chicago	Federal Government
United States Attorneys' Office, Eastern District of Michigan	Detroit/Dearborn	Federal Government
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services	Detroit/Dearborn	Federal Government
United States Attorneys' Office, District of Maryland	Montgomery County	Federal Government
Community Oriented Policing Services	National	Federal Government
Department of Defense	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government

**Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) - Developing a Research Roadmap  
Final Report**

---

<b>Stakeholder Organization</b>	<b>Site</b>	<b>Organization Type</b>
Department of Justice	National	Federal Government
Department of Justice	National	Federal Government
Department of State	National	Federal Government
Federal Bureau of Investigation	National	Federal Government
Federal Bureau of Investigation	National	Federal Government
Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers	National	Federal Government
National Counterterrorism Center	National	Federal Government
National Counterterrorism Center	National	Federal Government
National Institute of Justice	National	Federal Government
Transportation Security Administration	National	Federal Government
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services	National	Federal Government
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services	National	Federal Government
United States Secret Service	National	Federal Government
<b><i>Local Government</i></b>		
Chicago Police Department	Chicago	Local Government
Chicago Police Department	Chicago	Local Government
Chicago Public Schools	Chicago	Local Government
Chicago Public Schools	Chicago	Local Government
Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority	Chicago	Local Government
Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority	Chicago	Local Government
Dearborn Police Department	Detroit/Dearborn	Local Government
Dearborn Public Schools	Detroit/Dearborn	Local Government
Dearborn Public Schools	Detroit/Dearborn	Local Government
Detroit Office of Immigrant and International Affairs	Detroit/Dearborn	Local Government
Detroit Public Schools	Detroit/Dearborn	Local Government
Montgomery County Department of Corrections	Montgomery County	Local Government
Montgomery County Government	Montgomery County	Local Government
Montgomery County Office of Community Partnerships	Montgomery County	Local Government
Montgomery County Police Department	Montgomery County	Local Government
Montgomery County Police Department	Montgomery County	Local Government
<b><i>NGO</i></b>		
Arab American Family Services	Chicago	NGO
Community Builders Council	Chicago	NGO
Council on American Islamic Relations – Chicago	Chicago	NGO

**Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) - Developing a Research Roadmap  
Final Report**

---

<b>Stakeholder Organization</b>	<b>Site</b>	<b>Organization Type</b>
Council on American Islamic Relations – Chicago	Chicago	NGO
Leadership Development Institute	Chicago	NGO
Syrian Community Network	Chicago	NGO
University of Illinois at Chicago	Chicago	NGO
ACCESS	Detroit/Dearborn	NGO
American Human Rights Council	Detroit/Dearborn	NGO
American Civil Liberties Union	National	NGO
American Islamic Congress	National	NGO
American School Counselors Association	National	NGO
Anti-Defamation League	National	NGO
Arab American Family Services	National	NGO
Average Mohamed	National	NGO
Council on American Islamic Relations	National	NGO
Council on American Islamic Relations – California	National	NGO
Council on American Islamic Relations – Florida	National	NGO
Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund	National	NGO
International Association of Chiefs of Police	National	NGO
Life After Hate	National	NGO
Moonshot CVE	National	NGO
Muflehun	National	NGO
Muslim Justice League	National	NGO
Muslim Public Affairs Council	National	NGO
Muslim Students' Association	National	NGO
Muslim Students' Association	National	NGO
National Association of School Psychologists	National	NGO
National Association of School Psychologists	National	NGO
National Association of School Psychologists	National	NGO
National Association of School Resource Officers	National	NGO
Southern Poverty Law Center	National	NGO
The Soufan Group	National	NGO

**XI. APPENDIX B: LIST OF STAKEHOLDERS BY SITE**

Stakeholder Organization	Site	Organization Type
<i>National</i>		
Brennan Center for Justice	National	Academic/Research Partner
Center for School Mental Health	National	Academic/Research Partner
Center for the Study of Extremism and Hate	National	Academic/Research Partner
EdVenture Partners	National	Academic/Research Partner
George Washington University	National	Academic/Research Partner
George Washington University	National	Academic/Research Partner
Institute for Inclusive Security	National	Academic/Research Partner
Institute for Social Policy and Understanding	National	Academic/Research Partner
Institute for Strategic Dialogue	National	Academic/Research Partner
Institute for Strategic Dialogue	National	Academic/Research Partner
Private Practice Psychiatrist	National	Academic/Research Partner
The Soufan Group	National	Academic/Research Partner
Community Oriented Policing Services	National	Federal Government
Department of Defense	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Homeland Security	National	Federal Government
Department of Justice	National	Federal Government
Department of Justice	National	Federal Government
Department of State	National	Federal Government
Federal Bureau of Investigation	National	Federal Government
Federal Bureau of Investigation	National	Federal Government
Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers	National	Federal Government
National Counterterrorism Center	National	Federal Government
National Counterterrorism Center	National	Federal Government

**Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) - Developing a Research Roadmap  
Final Report**

---

<b>Stakeholder Organization</b>	<b>Site</b>	<b>Organization Type</b>
National Institute of Justice	National	Federal Government
Transportation Security Administration	National	Federal Government
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services	National	Federal Government
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services	National	Federal Government
United States Secret Service	National	Federal Government
American Civil Liberties Union	National	NGO
American Islamic Congress	National	NGO
American School Counselors Association	National	NGO
Anti-Defamation League	National	NGO
Arab American Family Services	National	NGO
Average Mohamed	National	NGO
Council on American Islamic Relations	National	NGO
Council on American Islamic Relations – California	National	NGO
Council on American Islamic Relations – Florida	National	NGO
Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund	National	NGO
International Association of Chiefs of Police	National	NGO
Life After Hate	National	NGO
Moonshot CVE	National	NGO
Muflehun	National	NGO
Muslim Justice League	National	NGO
Muslim Public Affairs Council	National	NGO
Muslim Students' Association	National	NGO
Muslim Students' Association	National	NGO
National Association of School Psychologists	National	NGO
National Association of School Psychologists	National	NGO
National Association of School Psychologists	National	NGO
National Association of School Resource Officers	National	NGO
Southern Poverty Law Center	National	NGO
The Soufan Group	National	NGO
<b><i>Chicago</i></b>		
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Chicago	Chicago	Federal Government
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Chicago	Chicago	Federal Government
United States Attorneys' Office, Northern District of Illinois	Chicago	Federal Government

**Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) - Developing a Research Roadmap  
Final Report**

---

<b>Stakeholder Organization</b>	<b>Site</b>	<b>Organization Type</b>
United States Attorneys' Office, Northern District of Illinois	Chicago	Federal Government
Chicago Police Department	Chicago	Local Government
Chicago Public Schools	Chicago	Local Government
Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority	Chicago	Local Government
Arab American Family Services	Chicago	NGO
Community Builders Council	Chicago	NGO
Council on American Islamic Relations – Chicago	Chicago	NGO
Council on American Islamic Relations – Chicago	Chicago	NGO
Leadership Development Institute	Chicago	NGO
Syrian Community Network	Chicago	NGO
University of Illinois at Chicago	Chicago	NGO
<b><i>Detroit</i></b>		
United States Attorneys' Office, Eastern District of Michigan	Detroit/Dearborn	Federal Government
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services	Detroit/Dearborn	Federal Government
Dearborn Police Department	Detroit/Dearborn	Local Government
Dearborn Public Schools	Detroit/Dearborn	Local Government
Dearborn Public Schools	Detroit/Dearborn	Local Government
Detroit Office of Immigrant and International Affairs	Detroit/Dearborn	Local Government
Detroit Public Schools	Detroit/Dearborn	Local Government
ACCESS	Detroit/Dearborn	NGO
American Human Rights Council	Detroit/Dearborn	NGO
<b><i>Montgomery County</i></b>		
United States Attorneys' Office, District of Maryland	Montgomery County	Federal Government
Montgomery County Department of Corrections	Montgomery County	Local Government
Montgomery County Government	Montgomery County	Local Government
Montgomery County Office of Community Partnerships	Montgomery County	Local Government
Montgomery County Police Department	Montgomery County	Local Government
Montgomery County Police Department	Montgomery County	Local Government

## **XII. APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS**

### **A. Federal Government Protocol**

## **Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)-Developing a Research Roadmap Interview Guide**

### **Introduction**

Good evening. My name is **XX** and I'm joined by **YY**. We will be asking you a few questions and capturing notes from our discussion.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) developed a CVE Research Framework, the goal of which is to provide a comprehensive strategy and context for thinking about violent extremism, and ways to mitigate that threat. This current project is being conducted to identify programs and projects that may fall within the four main pillars of the DHS S&T CVE Framework, and to help DHS better understand the gaps and priorities based on input from valuable stakeholders like you.

I'm not sure how familiar you are with the Framework, so I wanted to provide you with this graphic and provide a brief overview of the DHS S&T Framework:

1. Diversion programs focus on avoiding long-term harm to (or from) the individual and communities by moving an offender or potential offender away from pathways that lead to violent extremism as early as possible in the process.
2. Prevention programs seek to understand, implement, and assess programs that effectively demotivate offenders, making targets less accessible/desirable, or enhancing capabilities of security personnel or self-advocacy of the public.
3. Mitigation programs seek to understand, implement, and assess programs that reduce risk by implementing policies, actions, or technologies that reduce the overall consequences of an attack, should one occur.
4. And finally, Resilience programs focus on building capacity among individuals, groups, organizations, and local communities to prevent recruitment to, or engagement in, extremist violence, and to restore social cohesion and public trust in government, following extremist attacks.

The information gleaned from our conversation with various stakeholders across numerous sectors will be used to assist DHS S&T in strengthening their framework, setting research priorities, and identifying gaps in both research and programming.

We expect the interview to last about 60 minutes.

## Consent and Confidentiality

Before we begin, we'd like to remind you that your participation in this interview is completely voluntary and you may stop at any time. You can choose to skip any question you do not want to answer. We will be recording this interview so as not to miss any important information. The recording will be transcribed so that we will be able to identify and compare the major themes that cut across all of the interviews that we conduct for analysis. We will also be taking notes about your responses to our questions, but your name will not be recorded or connected in any way to your responses. We request that all participants maintain the confidentiality of the interview participants and the content of the conversations during the interview. Likewise, we ask that you refrain from disclosing any information about the interview session, including the identity of the other participants. Keep in mind that we are only interested in gaining a better understanding of the national strategy outreach activities within your community, and not about any details tied to you specifically.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

## Questions

### 1. Background - Understanding the Risk

- Do you have a CVE strategy? If so, what is it? When was it developed? How has the strategy/approach evolved over time?
- Which VE threats are most concerning to you?
- What is the magnitude of the VE issue for your agency? (Probe to better understand CVE within the context of their agency's mission, and where CVE ranks among their other core objectives. Also, ask for the stories, especially from the field offices- it will be good to hear the personal stories that we can collect around the issues.)

### 2. Programs

In the background section, we were able to understand the threat and the magnitude of the problems that they are facing in VE. The goal of this section is discuss the ways they are addressing the threat. Probe for programs, especially internal training programs around CVE issues.

- Do you have specific programs to address CVE?
- When did the program start?
- Who manages the program?
- How is it funded?
- Who is the target audience of the program?
- How do you measure success for the program?

- If the program has gone on for a few years: How has the program evolved over time? (Probe for decisions made over time to change course if the program has changed, and how they came to those decisions.)
- Which partnerships support your program's success?
- What has been the impact of the program?

Repeat questions for each program discussed.

### **3. Partnerships**

- Who are your partners in CVE? (Probe for various organizations, schools, universities, etc.)
- How are efforts coordinated? How do you communicate about CVE with each other? (Probe about interactions with DHS component agencies and fusion centers, DOJ and the US Attorney's offices, and local law enforcement.) Are there standard reporting procedures? What is the frequency of communications? How are communications prioritized?
- What are your goals/outcomes for collaborating with other government agencies?
- What impact do changes in policy have on your programs? (Probe at all levels of government- local, state, and federal policy.)
- What have you learned from your collaborations? What was positive? Negative? What would you do differently? What would you like for the other agencies to do differently to enhance collaboration?

### **4. Gaps and Priorities**

- Aside from money, what types of knowledge and resources would be most helpful to you and your organizations?
- What do you see as the largest gaps in CVE research?
- What do you think should be the top 3-5 priorities for the government in countering violent extremism?

### **5. Recommended Contacts/Referrals**

- I have one final question for you. Who else do you think we should interview for this project?

Thank you again so much for your time and consideration.

\*\* Remember to ask for documents if they have any on their program, policy papers, strategic plans, research. \*\*

## B. NGO Protocol

# Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)-Developing a Research Roadmap Interview Guide

## Introduction

Good evening. My name is **XX** and I'm joined by **YY**, we will be asking you a few questions and capturing notes from our discussion.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) developed a CVE Framework- the goal of which is to provide a comprehensive research strategy and provide a context for thinking about violent extremism, and ways to mitigate that threat. This current project is being conducted to identify programs and projects that may fall within the four main pillars of the DHS S&T CVE Framework, and to help DHS better understand the gaps and priorities based on input from valuable stakeholders like you.

I'm not sure how familiar you are with the Framework, so I wanted to provide you with this graphic and provide a brief overview of the DHS S&T Framework:

1. Diversion programs focus on avoiding long-term harm to (or from) the individual and communities by moving an offender or potential offender away from pathways that lead to violent extremism as early as possible in the process.
2. Prevention programs seek to understand, implement, and assess programs that effectively demotivate offenders, making targets less accessible/desirable, or enhancing capabilities of security personnel or self-advocacy of the public.
3. Mitigation programs seek to understand, implement, and assess programs that reduce risk by implementing policies, actions, or technologies that reduce the overall consequences of an attack, should one occur.
4. And finally, resilience programs focus on building capacity among individuals, groups, organizations, and local communities to prevent recruitment to, or engagement in, extremist violence, and to restore social cohesion and public trust in government, following extremist attacks.

The information gleaned from our conversation with various stakeholders across numerous sectors will be used to assist DHS S&T in strengthening their framework, setting research priorities, and identifying gaps in both research and programming.

***For organizations that may not have direct CVE related programming:***

*Though the project ultimately is focused on CVE, we understand that not all our stakeholders will have direct CVE-specific programming. We believe that it's of utmost importance to consider established models/approaches from other fields, such as education and public health,*

*as those models and lessons learned may be transferrable to CVE programming. That is why we appreciate this opportunity to speak with you, and believe you have a valuable perspective that will be of benefit to this project.*

We expect the interview to last about 60 minutes.

## **Consent and Confidentiality**

Before we begin, we'd like to remind you that your participation in this interview is completely voluntary and you may stop at any time. You can choose to skip any question you do not want to answer. We will be recording this interview so as not to miss any important information. The recording will be transcribed so that we will be able to identify and compare the major themes that cut across all of the interviews that we conduct for analysis. We will also be taking notes about your responses to our questions, but your name will not be recorded or connected in any way to your responses. We will request that all participants maintain the confidentiality of the interview participants and the content of the conversations during the interview. Likewise, we ask that you refrain from disclosing any information about the interview session, including the identity of other participants. Keep in mind that we are only interested in gaining a better understanding of the outreach activities within your community, and not about any details tied to you specifically.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

## **Questions**

### **1. Background**

- What is the mission(s)/goal(s) of your organization? How do you support and implement your objectives? What types of programs do you have and why? *(Probe for target audience and why they chose this particular group.)*
- How are your programs delivered? *(Probe for logistics: how often program occurs, duration, timing throughout the year, funding sources, how programs are carried out.)*
- How do you define success? *(Probe for how they are defining impact, do they have any evidence that they have made a difference?)*
- Who are your partners? Main stakeholders? *(Probe for other organizations, schools, universities, local law enforcement. Also ask about stakeholders, making clear the difference between partners and stakeholders. Stakeholders are not necessarily people who help run/support the programs, but folks they are beholden to for reasons beyond implementation.)*
- How familiar is the concept of countering violent extremism (or CVE) to you? For how long has it been on your radar? Is it a growing, decreasing, or steady concern?

**2. Programs** (Probe: Based on the background information we just received, the objective of this section is to understand better the threat/problem they are looking to solve, why they believe the problem exists, what evidence they may have to prove its existence, and how their programs mitigate/prevent/divert their target audience from this threat.)

- Which threats are most concerning for you? (Probe: Make sure they understand we are trying to identify the underlying risk they are combatting.)
- How do you know this threat/problem exists, and what is the magnitude of this problem for the community you serve? (Probe: ask for the stories, it will be good to hear the personal stories that we can collect around the issues.)

Based on the background section, we got a quick glimpse into the programs, this section will probe deeply about the specific programs that they mentioned earlier. Select a few of their major, flagship programs and ask the following questions (as they apply) about each program. Be mindful of the time.

- When did the program start?
- Who manages the program?
- How is it funded?
- Who is the main recipient of the program? (probe about the selection criteria (both for entry and exit) and the barriers to entering the program)
- How does a participant graduate from the program?
- How do you measure success for the program, for the participants?
- Which partnerships support your program's success?
- What has been the impact on the community?
- What has been the community's reaction to the program? Has it changed over time?

**3. Interactions with**

- Have you partnered with the government before? (Probe: Any level of government, local, state, federal)
- What impact do changes in policy have on your organization? (Probe at all levels of government, local, state, federal policy)
- If you have partnered with the government before, what have you learned from that collaboration? What was positive? Negative?
- If you have not interacted with the government before, is this something you would like to do? What are your reasons for not interacting? What are your concerns? What could the government do to help you overcome your concerns?

#### 4. Gaps and Priorities

- Outside of money- what types of knowledge and resources would be most helpful to you and your organizations?
- What do you see as the largest gaps in CVE research?
- What do you think should be the top 3-5 priorities for the government in countering violent extremism?

I have one final question for you, who else do you think we should interview for this project?

Thank you again so much for your time and consideration.

Also, remember to ask for documents if they have any on their program, policy papers, strategic plans, research throughout the interview.

## C. Law Enforcement Protocol

# Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)-Developing a Research Roadmap Interview Guide

## Introduction

Good evening. My name is **XX** and I'm joined by **YY**, we will be asking you a few questions and capturing notes from our discussion.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) developed a CVE Framework, the goal of which is to provide a comprehensive research strategy and context for thinking about violent extremism, and ways to mitigate that threat. This project is being conducted to identify programs and projects that may fall within the four main pillars of the DHS S&T CVE Framework, and to help DHS better understand the gaps and priorities based on input from valuable stakeholders like you.

I'm not sure how familiar you are with the Framework, so I wanted to provide you with this graphic and provide a brief overview of the DHS Framework:

1. Diversion programs focus on avoiding long-term harm to (or from) the individual and communities by moving an offender or potential offender away from pathways that lead to violent extremism as early as possible in the process.
2. Prevention programs seek to understand, implement, and assess programs that effectively demotivate offenders, making targets less accessible/desirable, or enhancing capabilities of security personnel or self-advocacy of the public.
3. Mitigation programs seek to understand, implement, and assess programs that reduce risk by implementing policies, actions, or technologies that reduce the overall consequences of an attack, should one occur.
4. And finally, Resilience programs focus on building capacity among individuals, groups, organizations, and local communities to prevent recruitment to, or engagement in, extremist violence, and to restore social cohesion and public trust in government, following extremist attacks.

The information gleaned from our conversation with various stakeholders across numerous sectors will be used to assist DHS S&T in strengthening their research framework, setting research priorities, and identifying gaps in both research and programming.

We expect the interview to last about 60 minutes.

## Consent and Confidentiality

Before we begin, we'd like to remind you that your participation in this interview is completely voluntary and you may stop at any time. You can choose to skip any question you do not want to answer. We will be recording this interview so as not to miss any important information. The recording will be transcribed so that we will be able to identify and compare the major themes that cut across all of the interviews that we conduct for analysis. We will also be taking notes about your responses to our questions, but your name will not be recorded or connected in any way to your responses. We request that all participants maintain the confidentiality of the interview participants and the content of the conversations during the interview. Likewise, we ask that you refrain from disclosing any information about the interview session, including the identity of the other participants. Keep in mind that we are only interested in gaining a better understanding of the outreach activities within your community, and not about any details tied to you specifically.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

## Questions

### 1. Background - Understanding the Risk

- How familiar is the concept of countering violent extremism (or CVE) to you? For how long has it been on your radar? Is it a growing, decreasing, or steady concern?
- Do you have a CVE strategy? If so, what is it? When was it developed? How has the strategy/approach evolved over time?
- Which threats are most concerning to you? (Probe to see if their priority threats are actually related to VE. If VE is not a major issue, it would be good to understand the magnitude of their other threats and what their concerns around VE are- this would be a comparison point to understand their VE priorities, but then compare that to their other major issues.)
- What is the magnitude of the VE issue in your community? (Probe: ask for the stories, it will be good to hear the personal stories that we can collect around the issues.)

### 2. Programs

In the background section, we were able to understand the threat and the magnitude of the problems that they are facing in VE. The goal of this section is to discuss the ways they are addressing the threat. Probe for programs that are directed toward the public as well as internal training programs around CVE issues.

- Do you have specific programs to address CVE?
- When did the program start?
- Who manages the program?

- How is it funded?
- Who is the main recipient of the program? (probe about the selection criteria- both for entry and exit- and the barriers to entering the program)
- How does a participant graduate from the program?
- How do you measure success for the program, for the participants?
- If the program has gone on for a few years: How has the program evolved over time? (Probe for the decision they have made over time to change course if the program has changed. How did they come to those decisions?)
- Which partnerships support your program's success?
- What has been the impact on the community?
- How has the community responded to your program? Do they trust or distrust it? Do they support it?

Repeat questions for each program discussed.

### **3. Partnerships**

- Who are your partners in CVE? (Probe for various organizations, schools, universities, etc.)
- How are efforts coordinated? How do you communicate about CVE with each other? (Probe about interactions with DHS component agencies and fusion centers, DOJ and the US Attorney Offices, and local law enforcement) Are there standard reporting procedures? What is the frequency of communications? How are communications prioritized?
- What are your goals/outcomes for collaborating with other government agencies?
- What impact do changes in policy have on your programs? (Probe at all levels of government- local, state, and federal policy)
- What have you learned from your collaborations? What was positive? Negative? What would you do differently? What would you like for the other agencies to do differently to enhance collaborations?

### **4. Gaps and Priorities**

- Aside from money, what types of knowledge and resources would be most helpful to you and your organization?
- What do you see as the largest gaps in CVE research, policy and programming?
- What do you think should be the top 3-5 priorities for the government in countering violent extremism?

## 5. Recommended Contacts/Referrals

- I have one final question for you. Who else do you think we should interview for this project?

Thank you again so much for your time and consideration.

\*\* Remember to ask for documents if they have any on their program, policy papers, strategic plans, research, etc. \*\*

## D. School Official Protocol

# Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)-Developing a Research Roadmap Interview Guide

## Introduction

Good evening. My name is **XX** and I'm joined by **YY**. We will be asking you a few questions and capturing notes from our discussion.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) developed a CVE Research Framework- the goal of which is to provide a comprehensive strategy and provide a context for thinking about violent extremism, and ways to mitigate that threat. This current project is being conducted to identify programs and projects that may fall within the four main pillars of the DHS S&T CVE Framework, and to help DHS better understand the gaps and priorities based on input from valuable stakeholders like you.

I'm not sure how familiar you are with the Framework, so I wanted to provide you with this graphic and provide a brief overview of the DHS S&T Framework:

1. Diversion programs focus on avoiding long-term harm to (or from) the individual and communities by moving an offender or potential offender away from pathways that lead to violent extremism as early as possible in the process.
2. Prevention programs seek to understand, implement, and assess programs that effectively demotivate offenders, making targets less accessible/desirable, or enhancing capabilities of security personnel or self-advocacy of the public.
3. Mitigation programs seek to understand, implement, and assess programs that reduce risk by implementing policies, actions, or technologies that reduce the overall consequences of an attack, should one occur.
4. And finally, resilience programs focus on building capacity among individuals, groups, organizations, and local communities to prevent recruitment to, or engagement in, extremist violence, and to restore social cohesion and public trust in government, following extremist attacks.

The information gleaned from our conversation with various stakeholders from numerous sectors (provide examples as needed) will be used to assist DHS S&T in strengthening their framework, setting research priorities, and identifying gaps in both research and programming.

### ***For organizations that may not have direct CVE related programming:***

*Though the project ultimately is focused on CVE, we understand that not all our stakeholders will have direct CVE-specific programming. We believe that it's of utmost importance to consider established models/approaches from other fields, such as education and public health,*

*as those models and lessons learned may be transferrable to CVE programming. That is why we appreciate this opportunity to speak with you, and believe you have a valuable perspective that will be of benefit to this project.*

We expect the interview to last about 60 minutes.

## **Consent and Confidentiality**

Before we begin, we'd like to remind you that your participation in this interview is completely voluntary and you may stop at any time. You can choose to skip any question you do not want to answer. We will be recording this interview so as not to miss any important information. The recording will be transcribed so that we will be able to identify and compare the major themes that cut across all of the interviews that we conduct for analysis. We will also be taking notes about your responses to our questions, but your name will not be recorded or connected in any way to your responses. We will request that all participants maintain the confidentiality of the interview participants and the content of the conversations during the interview. Likewise, we ask that you refrain from disclosing any information about the interview session, including the identity of other participants. Keep in mind that we are only interested in gaining a better understanding of the outreach activities within your community, and not about any details tied to you specifically.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

## **Questions**

### **1. Background**

- How familiar is the concept of countering violent extremism (or CVE) to you? For how long has it been on your radar? Is it a growing, decreasing, or steady concern?
- Do you see a role for schools in countering violent extremism? If so, what role do you think schools/educators play?
- Do you think schools/educational organizations should have a CVE strategy? If so, what should it look like, what models do you think you would follow? And how would schools and educators look to implement such a policy?
- Which threats are priority concerns for you? Are any of those concerns related to VE? (Probe to understand the risk context of schools- and where VE falls within that context. Need to understand how they identify and assess risks for youth.)

### **2. Programs**

(The background sections should help to frame the program section. If they have direct CVE programs ask specifics about those programs. But for those that do not have direct CVE programs, ask about their other threats and programs that they have in place to prevent/mitigate/divert the risk they identified in the previous questions. The goal of this

section is to understand the program that are directed toward their students and to see if any of those programs can be adapted to CVE programs. So it's ok if we are not directly talking about CVE.)

- Based on some of the priority threats you mentioned, what programs are in place to help you address some of those issues? **Or if they do have CVE issues and programs, ask the following:** Do you have specific programs to address CVE?
- How was the program developed? Was it based on an existing model?
- When did the program start?
- Do you know why the program was implemented?
- Who manages the program?
- How is it funded?
- Who is the target audience of the program?
- How do you measure success for the program?
- If the program has gone on for a few years: How has the program evolved over time? (Probe for the decisions they have made over time to change course if the program has changed and how they came to those decisions.)
- Which partnerships support your program's success?
- What has been the impact of the program?
- What has been the parental and/or community response to the program?

Repeat questions for each program discussed.

### 3. Partnerships

- Who are your partners in developing and implementing these programs? (Probe for various organizations, schools, universities, etc.)
- Do you collaborate with other government agencies? (Probe for partnerships at all levels of government, and for relationships that are more than just financial.)
- What are your goals/outcomes for collaborating with other government agencies?
- What impact do changes in policy have on your programs? (Probe at all levels of government, local, state, federal policy)
- What have you learned from your collaborations? What was positive? Negative? What would you do differently? What would you like for the other agencies to do differently to enhance collaborations?

#### 4. Gaps and Priorities

For schools that have CVE programs:

- Outside of money- what types of knowledge and resources would be most helpful to you?
- What do you see as the largest gaps in CVE research?
- What do you think should be the top 3-5 priorities for the government in countering violent extremism?

For schools not focused on CVE issues:

- Reflecting on the programs you discussed earlier, where do you see potential areas of intersection with CVE?
- What types of partnerships do you think would be most valuable in making an impact?

I have one final question for you: who else do you think we should interview for this project?

Thank you again so much for your time and consideration.

\*\* Remember to ask for documents if they have any on their program, policy papers, strategic plans, research throughout the interview. \*\*

### **XIII. APPENDIX D: FOCUS GROUP PROTOCOL**

## **Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)-Developing a Research Roadmap Focus Group Protocol**

### **Introduction**

Good evening. My name is XX and I'm joined by YY, I will be facilitating a discussion with all of you about programming to counter violent extremism, and YY will be capturing notes from our discussion.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) developed a CVE Framework- the goal of which is to provide a comprehensive research strategy and provide a context for thinking about violent extremism, and ways to mitigate that threat. This current project- Developing a CVE Research Roadmap- is being conducted to identify programs and projects that may fall within the four main pillars of the DHS S&T CVE Framework, and to help DHS better understand the gaps and priorities based on input from valuable stakeholders like you.

I'm not sure how familiar you are with the Framework, so I wanted to provide you with this graphic and provide a brief overview of the DHS S&T Framework:

1. Diversion programs focus on avoiding long-term harm to (or from) the individual and communities by moving an offender or potential offender away from pathways that lead to violent extremism as early as possible in the process.
2. Prevention programs seek to understand, implement, and assess programs that effectively demotivate offenders, making targets less accessible/desirable, or enhancing capabilities of security personnel or self-advocacy of the public.
3. Mitigation programs seek to understand, implement, and assess programs that reduce risk by implementing policies, actions, or technologies that reduce the overall consequences of an attack, should one occur.
4. And finally, resilience programs focus on building capacity among individuals, groups, organizations, and local communities to prevent recruitment to, or engagement in, extremist violence, and to restore social cohesion and public trust in government, following extremist attacks.

The information gleaned from our conversations with various stakeholders across numerous sectors will be used to assist DHS S&T in strengthening their framework, setting research priorities, and identifying gaps in CVE research and programming.

Though the project ultimately is focused on CVE, we understand that not all of you will have direct CVE-specific programming experience. We believe that it's of utmost importance to

consider established models/approaches from other fields, such as education and public health, as those models and lessons learned may be transferrable to CVE programming. That is why we appreciate this opportunity to speak with you, and believe you have a valuable perspective that will be of benefit to this project.

We expect this focus group to last about 90 minutes.

## Consent and Confidentiality

Before we begin, I'd like to remind you that your participation in this focus group is completely voluntary and you may stop at any time. You can choose to skip or not answer any of the questions you do not want to answer. We will be recording this interview so as not to miss any important information. The recording may be transcribed so that we will be able to identify and compare the major themes that cut across all of the interviews that we conduct for analysis. We will also be taking notes during the session, but your name will not be recorded or connected in any way to your responses. We request that all participants maintain the confidentiality of the other participants and therefore, we ask that you refrain from disclosing any information about this session. Keep in mind that we are only interested in gaining a better understanding of the activities within your community and schools, and not about any details tied to you specifically.

Do you have any questions before we begin?

## Questions

### 1. Background

- What do you believe is the goal of Resource Officers in schools? How do you implement your objectives? What types of programs do you develop and why? (*Probe for target audience and why they chose this particular group.*)
- How are your programs delivered? (*Probe for logistics: how often program occurs, duration, timing throughout the year, funding sources, how programs are carried out.*)
- How do you define success? (*Probe for how they are defining impact, do they have any evidence that they have made a difference?*)
- Who are your partners? Main stakeholders? (*Probe for other organizations, schools, universities, local law enforcement. Also ask about stakeholders, making clear the difference between partners and stakeholders. Stakeholders are not necessarily people who help run/support the programs, but folks they are beholden to for reasons beyond implementation.*)
- Is the concept of CVE familiar to you and how familiar is the concept to you? If so, how do you define CVE? How long has it been on your radar? Is it a growing, decreasing, or steady concern?

- What is the role schools in CVE? Do you see a need for CVE programs in schools? Should CVE programs be implemented in schools?

**2. Programs** (Probe: Based on the background information we just received, the objective of this section is to understand better the threat/problem they are looking to solve, why they believe the problem exists, what evidence they may have to prove its existence, and how their programs mitigate/prevent/divert their target audience from this threat.)

- Which threats are most concerning for you? (Probe: Make sure they understand we are trying to identify the underlying risk they are combatting.)
- How do you know this threat/problem exists, and what is the magnitude of this problem for the community you serve? (Probe: ask for the stories, it will be good to hear the personal stories that we can collect around the issues.)

Based on the background section, we got a quick glimpse into the programs, this section will probe deeply about the specific programs that they mentioned earlier. Select a few of their major, flagship programs and ask the following questions (as they apply) about each program. Be mindful of the time.

- When did the program start?
- Who manages the program?
- How is it funded?
- Who is the main recipient of the program? (probe about the selection criteria (both for entry and exit) and the barriers to entering the program)
- How does a participant graduate from the program?
- How do you measure success for the program, for the participants?
- Which partnerships support your program's success?
- What has been the impact on the community?
- What has been the community's reaction to the program? Has it changed over time?

### **3. Interactions with Government**

- Describe your partnership with government? (Probe: Any level of government, local, state, federal)
- What impact do changes in policy have on you? (Probe at all levels of government, local, state, federal policy)
- What have you learned from your collaboration with government? What was positive? Negative?
- Would you like to increase your interaction with the federal government? What are your reasons for not interacting? What are your concerns? What could the federal government do to help you overcome your concerns?

#### **4. Gaps and Priorities**

- Outside of money- what types of knowledge and resources would be most helpful to you?
- What do you see as the largest gaps in CVE research?
- What do you think should be the top 3-5 priorities for the government in countering violent extremism?

Thank you again so much for your time and consideration.

**XIV. APPENDIX E: COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM RESEARCH ONTOLOGY CODING SCHEME**

**Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Research Ontology Coding Scheme**

The following coding scheme was developed by RTI International for the United States Department Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). The categories below reflect current discussions and research related to CVE and the field of countering targeted violence against communities. Due to the ever-changing CVE landscape, this coding scheme is meant to be a living document that can be amended and added to reflect the most current state of the science.

- 1. Prevention** — The overarching goal of CVE, to prevent the occurrence of ideologically-motivated attacks by diverting individuals from the path of violence, building resilient communities, and supporting mitigating measures and programs should attacks occur.
  - 1.1. Radicalization — a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that (1) reject or undermine the status quo or (2) reject and/or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice
    - 1.1.1. Types of Radicalization
      - 1.1.1.1. Religious Radicalization – radicalization into extremist organizations or ideologies who use religious doctrine to rationalize violence.
      - 1.1.1.2. Political Radicalization – radicalization into extremist organizations or ideologies who are driven primarily by political motives to rationalize violence.
      - 1.1.1.3. Social Radicalization – radicalization into extremist organizations or ideologies who are driven primarily by political movies to rationalize violence.
      - 1.1.1.4. Individual Radicalization – radicalization into extremist organizations with little to no ideological base of support, the individuals and dyads often sympathize with extremist groups but are not affiliated with them.
      - 1.1.1.5. Group Radicalization – radicalization of a large group of people en masse.
    - 1.1.2. Vulnerable Populations
      - 1.1.2.1. Youth – vulnerable people under the age of 18.
        - 1.1.2.1.1. Non-Immigrant Youth – person(s) born and currently residing in the country of focus
        - 1.1.2.1.2. Immigrant Youth – person(s) born outside of, and currently residing in the county of focus
        - 1.1.2.1.3. International Youth – person(s) born outside and currently residing outside of the country of focus
      - 1.1.2.2. Adult

- 1.1.2.2.1. Non-Immigrant Adult—person(s) born and currently residing in the country of focus
- 1.1.2.2.2. Immigrant Adult – person(s) born outside of, and currently residing in the country of focus
- 1.1.2.2.3. International Adult – person(s) born outside and currently residing outside of the country of focus
- 1.1.2.3. Incarcerated – individuals who are either previously or currently incarcerated.
- 1.1.3. Recruitment Method
  - 1.1.3.1. Social Media – recruitment that occurs primarily on social media sites and forums.
- 1.2. Types of threats
  - 1.2.1. Jihadist/Wahhabism – while no single definition has been agreed upon, these terms are generally understood to refer to a sect of Islamic fundamentalism who justifies the use of oppression and violent through religious doctrine.
    - 1.2.1.1. Boko Haram – translated to “Western education is forbidden,” Boko Haram is an Islamic extremist group operating primarily in Nigeria. In March 2015, the group pledged its allegiance to ISIL.
    - 1.2.1.2. al-Qaeda – translated to “The Foundation,” al-Qaeda is a world-wide Islamic extremist organization who has held substantial influence in parts of Africa and the Middle East. Al-Qaeda has taken credit for the 9/11 terror attacks on the World Trade Center in the United States.
    - 1.2.1.3. al-Shabaab – translated to “The Youth,” al-Shabaab is a fundamentalist Islamic extremist organization with substantial influence in Somalia and Yemen. Al-Shabaab is known to be very effective in messaging techniques over the radio and through the internet.
    - 1.2.1.4. ISIS/ISIL – translated to “The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,” ISIS/ISIL is a fundamentalist Islamic extremist organization attempting to establish a new Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. They are known for recruiting foreign fighters from several countries from around the world, and inspiring several terrorist attacks in the West.
    - 1.2.1.5. Foreign Fighters – this term refers to any individual or group who resides in one country and travels to a conflict zone with the express intention of participating in warfare.
    - 1.2.1.6. Abu Sayyaf – an Islamic fundamentalist extremist group operating primarily in the Philippines. In 2014, Abu Sayyaf pledged allegiance to ISIS/ISIL.
    - 1.2.1.7. Jemaah Islamiyah – translated to “Islamic Congregation,” Jemaah Islamiyah is a Southeast Asian militant group attempting to establish an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia.

- 1.2.2. Right Wing Extremism –refers to a set of social and political ideologies that espouse tradition and is usually known for extreme nationalism and an opposition to immigration.
  - 1.2.2.1. White Supremacism – a form of extremism that asserts the superiority of white, non-colored peoples.
  - 1.2.2.2. Neo Nazism – a social and political movement seeking to revive the far-right tenets of Nazism.
- 1.2.3. Left Wing Extremism – refers to a set of social and political ideologies that typically align with extreme-left Marxist and communist ideologies.
  - 1.2.3.1. Red Army Faction – also known as the Baader-Meinhof Group, the RAF were active in Germany from 1970 until their dissolution in 1998.
- 1.2.4. Separatist Groups – groups which are primarily motivated to violence through a desire to separate politically and nationally from a parent state.
  - 1.2.4.1. Provisional (PIRA) and Irish Republican Army (IRA) – based in the United Kingdom, the IRA and subsequent PIRA are motivated through a desire for an independent and unified Ireland.
  - 1.2.4.2. Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) – native to the Basque region of Spain, the ETA is motivated through a desire to secede from Spain and form an independent Basque state.
  - 1.2.4.3. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) – FARC was a left-wing anti-imperialist guerrilla organization active in Colombia from 1964 to early 2017.
  - 1.2.4.4. National Liberation Army (ELN) – ELN is a left-wing Marxist extremist organization operating in Colombia since 1964.
  - 1.2.4.5. Tamil Tigers – also known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the Tamil Tigers was a militant extremist organization operating in Sri Lanka from 1976 to 2009.
- 1.2.5. Other
  - 1.2.5.1. Abortion – individuals and groups who commit acts of violence targeting abortion clinics, individuals who get an abortion, doctors who facilitate abortions, and companies who support or fund abortion.
  - 1.2.5.2. Environmental – individuals and groups who commit acts of violence targeting companies and individuals they perceive to be causing harm to the natural environment, including animals.
  - 1.2.5.3. Militia – citizen-groups who conduct para military attacks with no sanction from any government; individuals in these groups often consider themselves patriots despite typically being anti-government.
  - 1.2.5.4. Black Nationalist – advocates a racial definition or redefinition of national identity for black people; black separatist and supremacy groups are subtypes of Black Nationalism.

- 1.2.5.5. Sovereign Citizen – also known as Free Men On the Land, these are individuals in the United States, Australia, and Canada who maintain they are answerable only to their particular interpretation of common law and are not subject to government statutes or regulations.
- 1.2.5.6. Anarchists – groups and individuals who oppose authority or hierarchical organization in society by the state.
- 1.2.5.7. Homegrown Extremist – are individuals inspired—as opposed to directed—by a foreign terrorist organization and radicalized in the countries in which they are born, raised, or reside.
- 1.2.5.8. Lone Attacker – also known as a lone wolf, this is an individual or pair of individuals who commit an act of ideologically-motivated violence on their own, independent of any instruction from a parent organization or group.
- 1.2.6. Mode of Attack
  - 1.2.6.1. Suicide Bombing – bombing in which the explosive device is intended to kill or maim the individual who delivers and/or triggers the device.
  - 1.2.6.2. Group Violence – violence in which a group of people participate in a coordinated attack.
  - 1.2.6.3. Mass Shooting – while no one official definition is recognized, several US agencies broadly define a mass shooting as one in which four or more people selected indiscriminately are killed by the shooter(s).
  - 1.2.6.4. Assassination – the murder of an individual or individuals to further an ideological goal.
  - 1.2.6.5. Bombing – a bombing in which the explosive device is not intended to kill or maim the individual who delivers and/or triggers the device.
- 1.3. Best Practices—Examples of or suggestions for either gold-standard programming, research or policy changes.
- 2. Diversion** — Programs and research designed to disengage and re-direct individuals on the path to radicalization and/or violent extremism.
  - 2.1. Passive deradicalization/disengagement
    - 2.1.1. Narratives and Counter-narratives — Accounts from actual or fictitious former-extremists designed to dissuade individuals from radicalization and/or violence, as well as messaging designed to delegitimize extremist propaganda, or to promote prosocial behavior and ideologies.
      - 2.1.1.1. Emic Narratives – narrative work which is driven by potentially impacted communities
      - 2.1.1.2. Etic Narratives – narrative work which is organized by those outside potentially impacted communities
  - 2.2. Active Deradicalization/Disengagement
    - 2.2.1. Counselling (Diversion) – programs where a trained individual works through the concerns of a (potentially) radicaliz[ing/ed] individual

- 2.2.1.1. Family Counselling – counselling conducted by a family member to help an individual deradicalize, and counselling to help family members cope.
  - 2.2.1.2. Professional Counselling – counselling provided by trained mental health professionals towards diverting a (potentially) radicaliz[ing/ed] from a path to violence
  - 2.2.1.3. Peer Counselling—counselling conducted by trusted friends and peers
  - 2.2.2. Mentoring (Diversion) — pairing the individual with a trusted member of the community before or during radicalization in attempts to divert the individual from the path of violent extremism, or to increase resilience to recruitment.
- 3. Mitigation** — The collection of individual measures, taken before a violent event, to save as many lives as possible, reduce damage to infrastructure, and preserve the normal functioning of society during and in the aftermath of an attack
- 3.1. Globalization — research on how ever-increasing connections across the world influence radicalization and violent extremism
    - 3.1.1. Economic Development – programs and research addressing how socioeconomic conditions influence radicalization
  - 3.2. Emergency Preparedness — research on actions taken in advance of violent extremism events
    - 3.2.1. Target Hardening — the strengthening of potentially vulnerable structures and systems
      - 3.2.1.1. Vulnerability Analysis – analyses of a potential target's weaknesses and susceptibility to attack
      - 3.2.1.2. Cost-Benefit Analyses – analyses of the financial costs of structural, or systemic improvements compared to the number of potential lives saved, or other metrics
      - 3.2.1.3. Protocols – guidelines and step-by-step procedures on how to reach to violent extremist attacks
    - 3.2.2. Bystander training (mitigation) – research and programs aimed at training civilians on how to best react in the event of a violent extremist attack
    - 3.2.3. Decision Making — research and evaluations of how actions and orders are given before, during, and after a violent extremist event
      - 3.2.3.1. Bias Reduction – procedures to take personal opinion out of decision making and create standardized procedures
      - 3.2.3.2. Predictive Modeling — formulas and methods designed to predict the occurrence of violent events
- 4. Resilience** — Programs and research designed to promote the recovery of individuals and communities after violent attacks have occurred; or programs and research aimed at buffering resistance to radicalization.

- 4.1. Individual Resilience – resilience programs and research focused on individual people or family units, rather than the community at large from which they come
    - 4.1.1. Rehabilitation and Reintegration
      - 4.1.1.1. Counselling (Resilience) – programs and research designed to make individuals more resilient to radicalization through counselling
      - 4.1.1.2. Mentoring (Resilience) – programs and research designed to make individuals more resilient to radicalization through mentoring
  - 4.2. Community Resilience – resilience programs and research focused on the public as a whole, rather than individuals or family units
    - 4.2.1. Mental Health – programs and research focused on maintaining the psychological wellbeing of the community in the wake of violent attacks
    - 4.2.2. Physical Trauma – programs and research focused on repairing physical trauma resulting from a violent attack
      - 4.2.2.1. Hospital Capabilities – research on how medical centers address the effects of a violent attack
    - 4.2.3. Perception of Threats – programs and research that address awareness of the potential for violent extremism
      - 4.2.3.1. Bystander training (resilience)—programs and research on training civilians to recognize signs of radicalization into violent extremism, and how to address these signs safely and constructively
    - 4.2.4. Engagement—Discussions of issues and concerns with communities vulnerable to radicalization.
      - 4.2.4.1. Forging partnerships – programs and research designed to increase positive interaction between stakeholders.
      - 4.2.4.2. Roundtable Discussions – providing opportunities for those who have grievances (whether others view these as real or perceived)
    - 4.2.5. Economic Development (Resilience)—programs and literature designed to increase economic opportunities for communities and individuals in efforts to counter violent extremism.
- 5. Program Evaluations** — Critiques and evaluations of existing CVE and related programs
- 5.1. Type of Evaluation
    - 5.1.1. Empirical Evaluation – evaluations of efficacy or impact of a program or programs using empirical analysis techniques to link specific interventions to outcomes.
    - 5.1.2. Program Overview – an evaluation presenting a broad overview of a program or suite of programs.
    - 5.1.3. Case Study—an evaluation that discusses a program or programs in depth, but does not use empirical analysis techniques to evaluate efficacy or impact.
  - 5.2. Evaluation Methods

- 5.2.1. Focus Groups – a small group discussion used as a proxy to observe perceptions and opinions of a phenomena shared by a group too large to interview each individual member.
  - 5.2.2. Interviews – conversations with an individual or small group of individuals which can range from structured to unstructured in nature, participants are often considered experts on a topic or representatives of a larger population.
  - 5.2.3. Literature Review – a review of the currently-available peer-reviewed research on a given topic.
  - 5.2.4. Quantitative Analysis—evaluations using quantitative methodologies.
  - 5.2.5. Survey – an interview method designed to solicit input from a large amount of participants; can be in person, web-based, mail-based, mobile, or phone-based.
  - 5.2.6. Qualitative Analysis—evaluations using qualitative methodologies.
  - 5.3. Evaluation Guides and Protocols – guides and protocols to conducting evaluations for CVE programs.
- 6. Transferable Programs and Research** — Programs and research from disciplines not explicitly related to CVE, but which can be applied to CVE
- 6.1. Criminal Justice – the system of practices and institutions of governments directed at upholding social control, deterring and mitigating crime, or sanctioning those who violate laws with criminal penalties and rehabilitation efforts
    - 6.1.1. Legal issues and equity Concerns – research and opinions on the legal implications of CVE programs and policy.
    - 6.1.2. Community Policing -- a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.
    - 6.1.3. Gangs – research relating to gang-prevention and disengagement from gangs.
  - 6.2. Public Health – concerned with protecting the health of entire populations, measures include surveillance, disaster preparedness, disaster response, and health education
  - 6.3. Anthropology – the comparative study of human societies and cultures, including historical and cultural motivations influencing radicalization to extreme violence
  - 6.4. Education – covering early childhood learning through university, this focuses on programs to promote safety and to counter violent extremism in schools
  - 6.5. Psychology – the scientific study of the human mind, including the mental and emotional factors governing a situation or activity related to violent extremism
  - 6.6. Communication – outreach and public relations to inform the public about activities
  - 6.7. Economics—concerned with the economic impact of violent extremism events as well as mitigating measures.
  - 6.8. Political science – analysis of macro-level political trends relating to terrorism.
  - 6.9. Sociology—analysis of societal trends relating to terrorism or violent extremism.

## 7. International

### 7.1. Europe

#### 7.1.1. United Kingdom (U.K.)

##### 7.1.1.1. Northern Ireland

#### 7.1.2. Netherlands

#### 7.1.3. Germany

#### 7.1.4. France

#### 7.1.5. Belgium

#### 7.1.6. Denmark

#### 7.1.7. Spain

#### 7.1.8. Kosovo

#### 7.1.9. Norway

#### 7.1.10. Sweden

#### 7.1.11. Czech Republic

#### 7.1.12. Slovenia

#### 7.1.13. Serbia

#### 7.1.14. Greece

#### 7.1.15. Romania

#### 7.1.16. Poland

#### 7.1.17. Ukraine

#### 7.1.18. Finland

#### 7.1.19. Switzerland

#### 7.1.20. Russia

### 7.2. Africa

#### 7.2.1. Somalia

#### 7.2.2. Mali

#### 7.2.3. Eritrea

#### 7.2.4. Tanzania

#### 7.2.5. Ethiopia

#### 7.2.6. Kenya

#### 7.2.7. Uganda

#### 7.2.8. Nigeria

#### 7.2.9. Algeria

#### 7.2.10. Egypt

#### 7.2.11. South Africa

#### 7.2.12. Libya

#### 7.2.13. Burkina Faso

#### 7.2.14. Morocco

#### 7.2.15. Zimbabwe

### 7.3. Asia

- 7.3.1. Pakistan
  - 7.3.2. Japan
  - 7.3.3. Thailand
  - 7.3.4. Kyrgyzstan
  - 7.3.5. Russia
    - 7.3.5.1. Kabardino-Balkaria
    - 7.3.5.2. Chechnya
  - 7.3.6. Israel
  - 7.3.7. Palestine
  - 7.3.8. Lebanon
  - 7.3.9. Indonesia
    - 7.3.9.1. Bali
  - 7.3.10. Syria
  - 7.3.11. Saudi Arabia
  - 7.3.12. Maldives
  - 7.3.13. Iraq
  - 7.3.14. Bangladesh
  - 7.3.15. United Arab Emirates
  - 7.3.16. Kazakhstan
  - 7.3.17. Tajikistan
  - 7.3.18. Turkey
  - 7.3.19. India
  - 7.3.20. Philippines
  - 7.3.21. Singapore
  - 7.3.22. Malaysia
  - 7.3.23. Yemen
  - 7.3.24. Afghanistan
  - 7.3.25. China
  - 7.3.26. Iran
- 7.4. Australia and New Zealand
    - 7.4.1. Australia
    - 7.4.2. New Zealand
  - 7.5. North America
    - 7.5.1. Canada
    - 7.5.2. Cuba
    - 7.5.3. Mexico
  - 7.6. South America
    - 7.6.1. Colombia
    - 7.6.2. Peru

## 8. Risk Assessment

- 8.1. Assessment Tools – tools used to evaluate the risk an individual poses to themselves, other individuals, or the general public.
  - 8.1.1. Violent Extremism Assessment Tools – tools used to evaluate the risk an individual poses to becoming radicalized or potentially committing an act of ideologically-motivated violence.
    - 8.1.1.1. Violence Extremism Risk Assessment (VERA/VERA-2)
    - 8.1.1.2. Multi-Level Guidelines (MLG)
    - 8.1.1.3. Extremist Risk Guidelines (ERG 22+)
    - 8.1.1.4. RADAR
    - 8.1.1.5. Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP 18)
    - 8.1.1.6. Risk Assessment Toolbox (RAT)
  - 8.1.2. General Violence Assessment Tools – tools used to evaluation the risk an individual poses to potentially committing an act of violence, not motivated by any ideology.
    - 8.1.2.1. Historical, Clinical, Risk Management (HCR 20)
    - 8.1.2.2. Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY)
  - 8.1.3. Reintegration and Rehabilitation Assessment Tools – tools designed to assess whether an individual is a good candidate for reintegrating into society, or will be receptive to rehabilitation post-incarceration or after leaving an extremist organization.
  - 8.1.4. Other Assessment Tools – assessment tools that do not have anything to do with violence, violent extremism, or reintegration.
  - 8.1.5. Assessment Tool Validation – research pertaining to the validation of an existing assessment tool, or roadmaps to conducting such an evaluation.
  - 8.1.6. Assessment Training Documents – protocols and guides to conducting a risk assessment.
- 8.2. Risk Factors and Indicators
  - 8.2.1. Protective Factors – factors that serve as a buffer to the influences of radicalization, making an individual more resilient to recruitment.
  - 8.2.2. Push/Pull Factors – pull factors are those which compel an individual into involvement with a violent extremist group, while push factors are those which push the individual away from normative society.
  - 8.2.3. Individual factors – factors that operate on an individual level.
  - 8.2.4. Group factors – factors that operate on a group level.
- 8.3. Radicalization Pathway – refers to the assertion that there is no one profile of radicalization into violent extremism, rather radicalization is a unique pathway one travels down.
- 8.4. End-users – individuals and organizations who use risk assessment tools.
  - 8.4.1. Peers – non-professional acquaintances of the individual under analysis.

- 8.4.2. School staff – education professionals, not including school resource officers.
- 8.4.3. Law Enforcement – law enforcement professionals, including school resource officers.
- 8.4.4. Clinicians – professionals with formal training to conduct risk assessments.
- 8.5. Threat Assessment Theory – theories driving the development and operationalizing of risk assessment tools.
  - 8.5.1. Actuarial assessment – tools that rely primarily on a rubric or check list to diagnose an individual.
  - 8.5.2. Clinical assessment – tools that rely primarily on the expertise of a trained professional to diagnose an individual.
  - 8.5.3. Structured Professional Judgement (SPJ) assessment – tools that combine features of both actuarial and clinic assessment techniques to diagnose an individual.
- 9. Research Gaps** – Articles where gaps are identified in the literature
  - 9.1. Domestic Communities
  - 9.2. Grooming
  - 9.3. Longitudinal studies
  - 9.4. Empirical research on pathways to and from violence
  - 9.5. Reliable evaluation of security risks
  - 9.6. Uniform language
  - 9.7. Risk Factors
  - 9.8. Protective Factors
  - 9.9. Empirical program evaluations
  - 9.10. Validation of assessment tools

## XV. APPENDIX F: REFERENCES

### References:

- Atran, S. (2010). *Pathways to and from violent extremism: The case for science-based field research*. Washington, DC: ARTIS.
- Atran, S. (2011) *Hearing before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services*. United States Senate. One Hundred Eleventh Congress Second Session. March 10, 2010. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). (2005). *Introduction to program evaluation for public health programs: A self-study guide*. Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control.
- Choi, S. (2015). *Economic growth and terrorism: Domestic, international, and suicide*. Oxford Economic Papers, 67(1), 157–181.
- Lum, C., Kennedy, L. W., & Sherley, A. (2008). *Is counter-terrorism policy evidence-based? What works, what harms, and what is unknown*. *Psicothema*, 20(1), 35-42.
- Montibeller, G., & von Winterfeldt, D. (2015). *Cognitive and motivational biases in decision and risk analysis*. *Risk Analysis*, 35(7), 1230-1251.
- Neria, Y., DiGrande, L., & Adams, B. G. (2011). *PTSD following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks: A review of the literature among highly exposed populations*. *American Psychologist*, 66(6), 429-446.
- Nickerson, R. S. (2011). *Roles of human factors and ergonomics in meeting the challenge of terrorism*. *American Psychologist*, 66(6), 555-566.
- Stewart, M. G. (2010). *Risk-informed decision support for assessing the costs and benefits of counter-terrorism protective measures for infrastructure*. *International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection*, 3, 29-40.
- Stewart, M. G. (2011). *Life-safety risks and optimisation of protective measures against terrorist threats to infrastructure*. *Structure and Infrastructure Engineering*, 7(6), 431–440.
- Watson, P. J., Brymer, M. J., & Bonanno, G. A. (2011). *Postdisaster psychological intervention since 9/11*. *American Psychologist*, 6(6), 482-494.
- Weiss, C. H. (1998). *Evaluation: Methods for studying programs and policies*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
- Younas, J. (2015). *Does globalization mitigate the adverse effects of terrorism on growth?*. Oxford Economic Papers, 67(1), 133-156.
- Zimmermann, E. (2011). *Globalization and terrorism*. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 27(S1), S152–S161.