

Name (TO List)	Component	Email	
Odom, Maria	CISOMB	(b)(6)	
Veitch, Alexandra	OLA		
Ramanathan, Sue	OLA		
Neffenger, Pete	TSA		
Kerlikowske, Gil	CBP		
Saldana, Sarah	ICE		
Clancy, Joseph	USSS		
Rodriguez, Leon	USCIS		
Gowadia, Huban	DNDO		
Deyo, Russ	MGMT		
Brinsfield, Kathy	OHA		
Chavez, Rich	OPS		
Bersin, Alan	PLCY/OIA		
Bradsher, Tanya	OPA		
Bunnell, Stevan E	OGC		
Cantor, Jonathan	PRIV		
Mack, Megan	CRCL		
McNamara, Phil	IGA		
Neuman, Karen	PRIV		
Patrick, Connie	FLETC		
Fugate, Craig	FEMA		
Zukunft, Paul F ADM	USCG		
Brothers, Reginald	S&T		
Taylor, Francis X	I&A		
Spaulding, Suzanne	NPPS/OUS		
Name (CC list)	Component		
Silvers, Robert	DSEC		
Rezmovic, Jeffrey	DSEC		
Singleton, Kathy L	OCFO		
Simpkins, Lauren	OCFO		
Carey, Holly	OCFO		

Name	Component	Email
Christian Marrone	HQ	(b)(6)
Paul Rosen	HQ	(b)(6)
Rob Silvers	HQ	(b)(6)
Leonard Joseph	ICE	(b)(6)
Kim O'Connor	ESEC	(b)(6)
Michael Coen	FEMA	(b)(6)
Mary Peterson	I&A	(b)(6)
Alaina Clark	IGA	(b)(6)
Vince Micone	MGMT	(b)(6)
David Hess	NPPA	(b)(6)
Meghan Ludtke	OGC	(b)(6)
Terri Cheshire	OHA	(b)(6)
Ryan Ramsey	OLA	(b)(6)
Timothy Quinn	CBP	(b)(6)
Stephen Schorr	CBP	(b)(6)
Tom McDaniels	TSA	(b)(6)
Alan Metzler	TSA	(b)(6)
Mary Kruger	DNDO	(b)(6)
Tammy Howard	OPA	(b)(6)
Todd Heinz	OPS	(b)(6)
Holly Canevari	PLCY	(b)(6)
Jordan Gottfried	PRIV	(b)(6)
Christina Murata	S&T	(b)(6)
CAPT Michael Ryan	USCG	(b)(6)
Juliet Choi	USCIS	(b)(6)
Britton Yee	USSS	(b)(6)
David Gersten	CVE	(b)(6)
Gary Merson	CISOMB	(b)(6)
Pamela Jastal	FLETC	(b)(6)
George Kovatch	FLETC	(b)(6)
James Dinneen	PSO	(b)(6)
Sarah Morgenthau	HSAC-IGA	(b)(6)
Admiral Joanna Nunan	MIL	(b)(6)
Veronica Venture	CRCL	(b)(6)

Name	Component	Email
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Name	Component	Email
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From: Penland, Marineka (b)(6)
(b)(6)
"Guiler, Hadley </O>
(b)(6)
"Lotaro, Juliana </O>
To: (b)(6)
"Tarpley, Kyle </O>
(b)(6)
"Rezmovic, Jeffrey
CC: (b)(6)
"Hopkins, Brian </O>
(b)(6)

Subject: Boston CVE Panel
Date: 2014/04/10 10:48:03
Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

Here is a bit more info if you want to pass along:

Here is the link to the event S2 will be joining
Monaco: <https://forum.iop.harvard.edu/content/countering-violent-extremism-and-power-community>

Speech title: Countering Violent Extremism and the Power of Community

Themes:

- In response to the Boston marathon attack and other incidents of radicalized violence, we're working to build a comprehensive network of tools to more effectively address the evolving nature of threats to the homeland.
- Key is the recognition that local communities are best positioned to intervene and prevent violence, well before an individual commits a terrorist act.

Marineka Penland

Office of the Deputy Secretary

Department of Homeland Security

Phone: (b)(6)

Sender: Penland, Marinika (b)(6)
[Redacted]
"Guiler, Hadley </O>
(b)(6)
"Totaro, Juliana </O>
(b)(6)
Recipient: "Tarnley, Kyle </O>
(b)(6)
"Rezmovic, Jeffrey
(b)(6)
"Hopkins, Brian </O>
(b)(6)

Sent Date: 2014/04/10 10:48:03

**Homeland Security Advisory Council
Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee Meeting
April 14, 2016**

Overview:

- You will meet with the Homeland Security Advisory Council's (HSAC) Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee.
- The Subcommittee is chaired by Farah Pandith, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and Adnan Kifayat, Senior Resident Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States.
- During the meeting, the Subcommittee will hear from various subject matter experts and discuss how the Department can best collaborate with technology and social media companies, philanthropic organizations, and education and mental health sectors to help counter violent extremism.
- Your participation is as follows:
 - 11:30 a.m.: You will arrive during the meeting and greet the Subcommittee members.
 - 11:35 a.m.: You will receive a progress report from the co-chairs.
 - 11:45 a.m.: You will make remarks and provide feedback to the group.
 - 12:00 p.m.: You will depart.

Discussion Points:

- You will have thirty minutes to meet with the CVE Subcommittee, hear about the progress they have made to date, and receive an overview of the final report they will issue in June 2016.
- The Subcommittee is focused on six key areas regarding CVE efforts:
 - Communications and Messaging
 - Research and Analysis
 - Engaging with Technology and Social Media Companies
 - Funding and Resourcing Efforts
 - Incorporating the Education and Mental Health Sectors
 - Pop Culture and Millennials
- You should provide candid feedback and guidance to the group, specifically on their approach and overall direction of the report. The meeting is not open to the public, allowing you to speak freely and to fully leverage the expertise in the room.

Background:

- On January 21, 2016, the CVE Subcommittee co-chairs briefed you during the HSAC meeting at the Wilson Center.

- The CVE Subcommittee was stood up in December 2015 to act as an incubator of ideas for the Office for Community Partnerships, and to leverage outside expertise and new thinking to allow the Department to go beyond how it has conventionally framed and envisioned CVE efforts.
- The CVE Subcommittee is comprised of members of the HSAC as well as a number of selected subject matter experts and key thought leaders from private industry, academia, and non-governmental organizations.

Participants:

Secretary Johnson

George Selim, Director, Office for Community Partnerships

Sarah Morgenthau, Executive Director, Homeland Security Advisory Council

Homeland Security Advisory Council CVE Subcommittee Members

Attachments:

A. Meeting Agenda

B. CVE Subcommittee Membership List

C. Biographies

D. CVE Subcommittee Tasking Memo

E. CVE Subcommittee Federal Register Notice

Staff Responsible for Briefing Memo: Sarah Morgenthau, Executive Director, Homeland Security Advisory Council, OPE, (b)(6)

OGC Reviewer: Attorney in Component Counsel or HQ, Title, Phone Number.



COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM SUBCOMMITTEE DRAFT AGENDA

DHS HQ

3801 Nebraska Ave NW DC

Thursday, April 14th, 2016 – 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

- 9:00-10:00 a.m. **Classified Intelligence Briefing (Building (b)(6))**
- 10:10 a.m. **Welcome and Introductions (Building 1, Room 01-044)**
Sarah E. Morgenthau
Executive Director, Homeland Security Advisory Council
- 10:15-11:30 a.m. **Focus Area Progress Reports by Subcommittee Members**
Ali Soufan (Communications/Messaging)
Seamus Hughes (Funding and Resourcing)
Joel Meyer (Engaging with Tech and Social Media Companies)
Paul Goldenberg (Incorporating the Education and Mental Health Sectors)
Laila Alawa (Pop Culture/Millennials)
- 11:30-12:00 p.m. **Meeting with Secretary Johnson**
- 12:00-1:00 p.m. **Working Lunch (EDF Private Dining Room)**
Office for Community Partnerships and CVE Task Force Overview
George Selim, Director, Office for Community Partnerships
- 1:00 -2:00 p.m. **Panel on Digital Marketing, Startups and Early Stage Investing**
(b)(6)
- 2:00-2:30 p.m. **Tentative Call with Snapchat Representative**
TBD
- 2:30-3:00 p.m. **Tentative S&T Briefing on CVE Metrics and Assessments**
TBD
- 3:00-4:00 p.m. **Continued Focus Area Read Outs and Discussion on Next Steps**
Farah Pandith, Chair, CVE Subcommittee
Adnan Kifayat, Chair, CVE Subcommittee
- 4:00 p.m. **Meeting Adjourns**

Farah Pandith (Co-Chair)

Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations



Farah Pandith currently leads numerous efforts designed to counter extremism through new organizations, programs, and initiatives. Ms. Pandith was appointed the first-ever Department of State Special Representative to Muslim Communities in June 2009. From 2004 to 2007, she was the Director for Middle East Initiatives at the National Security Council (NSC). Prior to the NSC, Ms. Pandith was Chief of Staff at the Bureau for Asia and the Near East for the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Ms. Pandith is currently an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the Leadership Council of Women and Girls Lead. She also serves on the Board of Overseers at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and on the Smith College President's Council.

Adnan Kifayat (Co-Chair)

Senior Resident Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States




Adnan Kifayat is a senior resident fellow at The German Marshall Fund (GMF), where he advises the organization on its efforts to strengthen leadership development and Next Generation strategies in the transatlantic region and its joint work in programming the OCP Policy Center Atlantic Fellowship in Europe, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. He also contributes to the continued development of GMF's Leadership, Diversity and Inclusion Initiative.

Over the last 15 years, Kifayat has held senior positions in public service, including at the White House, State Department, and Treasury Department, where he established partnerships with strategic allies to cooperate in trade, finance, development, counterterrorism and national security. He has helped develop innovative and sustainable mechanisms to counter the spread of violent extremism and prevent the flow of funds to terrorist organizations.

Until recently, Kifayat served as Secretary of State John Kerry's acting special representative to Muslim communities and was instrumental in creating programs to broaden and deepen U.S. diplomatic engagement through social entrepreneurship, political empowerment, and shared commitments to security. As senior advisor to the Under Secretary of State for public diplomacy, he led the development and deployment of the Public Diplomacy 2.0 Initiative, which helped transform the State Department into a new media-savvy institution. His work at the Treasury Department resulted in initiatives and agreements to promote financial cooperation between the United States and key partners, in the Middle East, G8, and Asia. He served as an alternate executive director of the African Development Bank, shaping Bank activities on the African continent. He served twice on the National Security Council staff to coordinate counterterrorism and economic issues across the Middle East and Africa.

Kifayat's private sector experience includes creating strategies for Cargill to access Central Asian and Latin American agribusiness markets, and designing programs for Delphi International to promote U.S. economic and civil society engagement on a people-to-people basis around the world.

Laila Alawa



CEO and Founder, *The Tempest*

Laila Alawa is the CEO and Founder of *The Tempest*, a leading digital media company where the world goes to hear the voices and stories of underrepresented women. With more than half a million monthly visitors, the company covers everything from life to humor, entertainment to news through articles, videos, podcasts and mixtapes. She is also the host for *The Expose*, a *Coming of Faith* weekly podcast tackling tough topics with snark and wit. Her work and writing has been mentioned in *The New York Times*, *Al-Jazeera America*, *Yahoo! News*, *ThinkProgress*, *The Guardian*, *NPR*, *PRI*, *The Huffington Post*, *Feministing*, *Salon*, *Mashable*, *Color Lines*, *Bustle*, *Mic* and *Buzzfeed*. Her work was recently published in the literary anthology, *Faithfully Feminist: Jewish, Christian and Muslim Feminists on Why We Stay*. She was recently featured in *The New York Times'* *Women in the World*. She's also appeared on *Al-Jazeera America*, *BBC World News*, *NPR*, and *Huffington Post Live*. In 2015, Laila was named an *Ariane de Rothschild Fellow*.

Through her online activism and creative approach to digital issues, she has made it her mission to elevate the voices of those who are often not heard. As the creator of many viral multimedia campaigns, she is eager to work with organizations that both advocate and innovate in the public interest.

Prior to founding *The Tempest*, Laila was a research specialist at Princeton University, studying socio-cognitive processing under the framework of community identity and belonging.

She has a bachelor's degree from Wellesley College, and has studied leadership and social entrepreneurship at the University of Cambridge. A passionate runner, she lives in Washington, D.C.

John R. Allen

General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)



General John R. Allen is a retired U.S. Marine General who served as the Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and the Commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan from 2011 to 2013, the pivotal point in the war. General Allen recently served as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. He is the first Marine in history to command a theater of war, and is the longest serving commander in that conflict.

Concluding a distinguished 38 year career in the spring of 2013, General Allen worked as an advisor to both the Secretaries of Defense and State on Middle East Security, and has affiliations with the Brookings Institution, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the Atlantic Council, and Council on Foreign Relations.

General Allen holds numerous U.S. personal and international decorations, including the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, The Leftwich Leadership Trophy, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, the Humanitarian Service Medal, the NATO Meritorious Service Medal, the Afghan Ghazi Mir Bacha Khan Medal, the French Legion d'Honneur, the Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit of the Polish Republic, the Taiwan Order of the Resplendent Banner with Special Cravat, and the Mongolian Meritorious Service Medal, First Class.

Russ Deyo

Under Secretary for Management, Department of Homeland Security



Russ Deyo was sworn in as Under Secretary for Management at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on May 11, 2015. In the Department's number three post, Mr. Deyo exercises leadership authority over all aspects of the Department's management programs, processes, and workforce of more than 230,000 employees.

Mr. Deyo oversees management of the Department's nearly \$60 billion budget. He also serves as the Chief Acquisition Officer, administering control over the Department's approximately \$16.5 billion in procurements annually, and 72 major acquisition programs that are in development or sustainment with a life cycle cost estimate of more than \$300 million.

As Under Secretary, Mr. Deyo leads the Management Directorate's six lines of business, including financial management, human capital, procurement, information technology, security, and facilities and asset management. The management portfolio touches every aspect of Department operations. Leading with a data-driven focus, Mr. Deyo concentrates efforts on integrating management functions, improving customer service, and sustaining quality financial stewardship.

Mr. Deyo has over 30 years of management experience in both the government and private sector. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Deyo retired from Johnson & Johnson in 2012 after 27 years of service, where he held a number of positions, including Vice President of Administration and General Counsel. For 16 years, he also served as a member of the Executive Committee, the company's principal management group for global operations.

Prior to Johnson & Johnson, Mr. Deyo was an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey from 1978 to 1985, serving the last three years as Chief of Special Prosecutions. From 1977 to 1978, Mr. Deyo was an attorney at Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler in New York City.

Mr. Deyo is a graduate of Dartmouth College and holds a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center.

Paul Goldenberg

President and CEO, Cardinal Point Strategies, LLC



Paul Goldenberg is the President and CEO of Cardinal Point Strategies (CPS), LLC, a strategic advisory and business intelligence consulting firm. As President and CEO of Cardinal Point Strategies, Mr. Goldenberg is a trusted advisor with a long history of helping to resolve the highest profile and most confidential matters for governments, businesses, academia and NGOs around the world. Mr. Goldenberg also serves as the National Director of the Secure Community Network, the nation's first faith-based information sharing analysis center recognized by DHS as the a national model.

Mr. Goldenberg's public career includes more than two decades as the first State Chief of the Office of Bias Crimes and Community Relations in New Jersey leading the nation's first full time State Attorney General's effort focusing on hate crimes and ethnic terrorism, Director of the nation's 6th largest county social service and juvenile justice system, and as a law enforcement official leading investigation efforts for cases in domestic terrorism, political corruption, and organized crime.

From 2004-2009, Mr. Goldenberg played a key role in setting policy for the legislation and investigation of ethnic terrorism and hate crimes in his role as senior law enforcement advisor to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In the course of his law enforcement career, Mr. Goldenberg received South Florida's most distinguished citation for valor, Officer of the Year, an honor presented after serving as lead agent in one of South Florida's longest term undercover assignments.

Jane Harman

President and CEO, Woodrow Wilson Center



Jane Harman is the head of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, a Washington, D.C. think tank devoted to the ideals of former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. Congresswoman Harman served in Congress from 1993 to 1998 and 2001 to 2011. Following her resignation from Congress on February 28, 2011 she joined the Woodrow Wilson Center as its first female Director, President and CEO. During her time in Congress she represented the Aerospace Center of California during nine terms in Congress; she served on all the major security committees: six years on Armed Services, eight years on Intelligence and four on Homeland Security.

Congresswoman Harman has made numerous Congressional fact-finding missions to hotspots around the world including North Korea, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Guantanamo Bay to assess threats against the U.S. Harman received the Defense Department Medal for Distinguished Service in 1998, the CIA Seal Medal in 2007, and both the CIA Director's Award and the National Intelligence Distinguished Public Service Medal in 2011.

Seamus Hughes

Deputy Director of the Program on Extremism, George Washington University



Seamus Hughes is the Deputy Director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University. Hughes previously worked at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), serving as a lead staffer on the U.S. government's efforts to implement the national countering violent extremism strategy. He regularly led engagements with Muslim American communities across the country, provided counsel to civic leaders after high-profile terror-related incidents, and met with families of individuals who joined terrorist organizations. Mr. Hughes created a groundbreaking intervention program to help steer individuals away from violence through non-law enforcement means and worked closely with FBI Joint Terrorism Taskforces, Fusion Centers, and U.S. Attorney Offices.

Prior to the NCTC, Mr. Hughes served as the Senior Counterterrorism Advisor for the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. He has authored numerous legislative bills, including sections of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act and the Special Agent Samuel Hicks Families of Fallen Heroes Act. He is the recipient of National Security Council Outstanding Service and two NCTC Director's Awards for outstanding service.

Jeffrey Miller

Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer, National Football League



Jeffrey Miller is Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer of the National Football League (NFL) where he oversees all event security, investigative programs and services. Prior to joining the NFL, Mr. Miller spent 24 years with the Pennsylvania State Police, retiring in 2008 after serving six years as Commissioner. In that role, he oversaw a complement of over 6,000 enlisted and civilian personnel and a budget of \$800 million dollars. He was responsible for implementing crime-and crash-reduction strategies, anti-terrorism efforts, and general policing practices, including emergency response in all 67 counties in Pennsylvania.

Mr. Miller holds an Associate Degree from the University of South Florida, a Bachelor's of Professional Studies Degree in Criminal Justice from Elizabethtown College, and a Master's Degree in Public Administration from the Pennsylvania State University. He is a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Academy in Quantico, Virginia, and the FBI National Executive Institute.

Joel Meyer

Senior Vice President, Public Sector, Dataminr



Joel Meyer is Senior Vice President at Dataminr, Inc., a real-time information discovery company that analyzes all public tweets and other publicly available data to deliver the earliest signals for breaking news, real-world events, off the radar context and perspective, and emerging trends.

Prior to joining Dataminr in 2013, he served as a Director on the White House National Security Council staff focusing on countering domestic radicalization and at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the Office of the Secretary as Senior Advisor to the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. He previously practiced law at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, and is an inactive member of the California and District of Columbia bars.

Michael Nutter
Former Mayor of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania



Michael A. Nutter served two terms as Mayor of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was first elected in November 2007, and then re-elected to a second term in November 2011. Most recently, while Mayor of Philadelphia he worked closely with the Department of Homeland Security and Secretary Johnson on the operational security and contingency planning for the September 2015 Papal visit which was designated as a National Special Security Event. Before being elected mayor, he served for almost 15 years on the Philadelphia City Council representing the 4th District.

Mr. Nutter holds a B.A. from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.

Matthew Olsen

President of Consulting and Co-Founder, IronNet Cybersecurity



Matthew Olsen is President of Consulting and Co-Founder at IronNet Cybersecurity. Mr. Olsen is responsible for leading IronNet’s consulting services, providing strategic and operational guidance to companies on cybersecurity and cyber threats, and helping to guide IronNet’s business development. Mr. Olsen is also a lecturer at Harvard Law School and a national security analyst for ABC News.

Mr. Olsen has worked for over two decades as a top government official on national security, intelligence and law enforcement issues. Appointed by the President to serve as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Mr. Olsen led the government's efforts to integrate and analyze terrorism information and coordinate counterterrorism activities for three years. Prior to joining the NCTC, Mr. Olsen was the General Counsel for the National Security Agency. Mr. Olsen also served at the Department of Justice in a number of leadership positions, including Special Counselor to the Attorney General, responsible for national security and criminal cases. Mr. Olsen was also a federal prosecutor for over a decade and has served as Special Counsel to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Ali Soufan

Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, The Soufan Group LLC



Ali H. Soufan is Chairman & Chief Executive Officer of The Soufan Group LLC and has been a member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council since September 2012. Mr. Soufan is a former FBI Supervisory Special Agent who investigated and supervised highly sensitive and complex international terrorism cases, including the East Africa Embassy Bombings, the attack on the USS Cole, and the events surrounding the 9/11 attacks. Mr. Soufan also served on the Joint Terrorist Task Force, FBI New York Office, where he coordinated both domestic and international counterterrorism operations.

Mr. Soufan has received numerous awards for his counter-terrorism work, including the FBI Director's Award for Excellence in Investigation and the Respect for Law Enforcement Award. Mr. Soufan is the author of The New York Times Top 10 Bestseller, "The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda" and a recipient of the Ridenhour Book Prize.

Juan Zarate

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)



Juan Zarate is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the senior national security analyst for CBS News, a visiting lecturer at the Harvard Law School, and a national security and financial integrity consultant. Zarate served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism from 2005 to 2009 and was responsible for developing and implementing the U.S. government's counterterrorism strategy and policies related to transnational security threats. He was the first ever Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, where he led domestic and international efforts to attack terrorist financing, the innovative use of the Treasury Department's national security related powers, and the global hunt for Saddam Hussein's assets. He is also a former federal prosecutor who served on terrorism prosecution teams prior to 9/11, including the investigation of the USS Cole attack.

Zarate is the author of the recently published *Treasury's War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare* (PublicAffairs, 2013), *Forging Democracy* (University Press of America, 1994), and a variety of articles in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Washington Quarterly*, and other publications. He has his own weekly national security program on CBSNews.com called *Flash Points*. He is a graduate of both Harvard College and Harvard Law School and a former Rotary International Fellow (Universidad de Salamanca, Spain). Zarate sits on several boards of advisers, including for the director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and HSBC's Financial Services Vulnerabilities Committee.

William “Bill” Webster

Retired Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP



William H. Webster (HSAC Chair) served as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1987 to 1991. Prior to his service as CIA Director, Judge Webster served as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1978 to 1987, a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from 1973 to 1978, and a United States District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri from 1970 to 1973. In 1991, Judge Webster was presented the Distinguished Intelligence Medal. Judge Webster was also awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom and the National Security Medal. Following his departure from the CIA, Judge Webster joined the law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP in Washington, DC, and is now a retired partner.



Homeland Security Advisory Council

Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee Membership List

Name	Title, Organization
Farah Pandith (Chair)	Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Former Special Representative to Muslim Communities, U.S. Department of State
Adnan Kifayat (Chair)	Senior Resident Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States
Laila Alawa	Chief Executive Officer & Founder, The Tempest
John Allen	Retired U.S. Marine Corps. General and Former Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition against ISIL
Russ Deyo	Under Secretary for Management, Department of Homeland Security
Paul Goldenberg	President and Chief Executive Officer, Cardinal Point Strategies
Jane Harman	President and Chief Executive Officer, Woodrow Wilson Center
Seamus Hughes	Deputy Director, Program on Extremism at George Washington University
Joel Meyer	Senior Vice President, Public Sector at Dataminr
Jeffrey Miller	Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer, National Football League
Michael Nutter	Former Mayor, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Matthew Olsen	President of Consulting and Co-Founder, IronNet Cybersecurity
Ali Soufan	Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, The Soufan Group LLC
Juan Zarate	Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
William Webster (Ex-officio)	Retired Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP



Homeland Security

November 18, 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR: Judge William H. Webster
Chairman, Homeland Security Advisory Council

FROM: Jeh Charles Johnson
Secretary

SUBJECT: Homeland Security Advisory Council
Establishing a Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee

In May 2015, the Homeland Security Advisory Council (Council) provided me with a number of key findings and recommendations in a document called the "Foreign Fighter Task Force Report," which helped shape my thinking on where the Department needs to be on countering violent extremism (CVE). The report said among other things that:

Government should support credible messages and messengers aimed to counter the narratives of violent extremists through public/private partnerships. Government should not be the messenger, as it is immediately dismissed by the target audience, but it can assist to bring together social media, analytic experts, technology innovators, and young people to discuss, innovate and execute a counter-narrative initiative as well as net roots/grassroots capacity building efforts to amplify creditable messengers and challenge on and offline actions.

I agree with the Council's recommendation, and recently announced the creation of the Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) to help the Department move in this direction. This new office has a direct mandate to foster greater involvement from both the technology and philanthropic sectors in promoting private efforts to build and sustain networks and cultivate ideas to counter violent extremism. OCP will also explore ideas for better public messaging, how to increase the Department's public-facing CVE efforts, and suggest ways to improve our ongoing engagement, research, and law enforcement training to counter violent extremism.

Building on these efforts, I request the Council establish a Subcommittee that is focused on CVE and can act as an incubator of ideas for OCP. Establishing a CVE Subcommittee that leverages outside expertise and new thinking allows us to go beyond the way we have conventionally framed and envisioned our CVE efforts, and creates a space for us to “think big.” The CVE Subcommittee will be comprised of vetted members of the Council as well as a number of selected subject matter experts and key thought leaders from private industry, academia, and non-governmental organizations. As the Council is comprised of academic experts, community leaders, and senior level officials from industry and from state and local government, it is uniquely positioned to provide actionable findings and recommendations on CVE. The Council will provide those recommendations to the Department.

The CVE Subcommittee can expand on the recommendations from the Council’s May 2015 Task Force Report, identifying how the Department can best support non-governmental initiatives that either directly or indirectly counter violent extremism. Specifically, the Subcommittee should address the following:

- What opportunities or platforms will be useful for the facilitation of public-private partnerships with the technology and philanthropic sectors?
- How can the Department develop new networks and a framework for sustained dialogue and engagement with technology companies, foundations and philanthropic organizations?
- What other non-government sectors, besides technology and philanthropic, should be leveraged for CVE and how should the Department engage those sectors?
- How can the Department work with education and mental health professionals on CVE efforts to help parents and schools understand how they can counter youth radicalization to violence?
- How can the Department inspire peer-to-peer attempts to challenge violent extremism through public-private partnerships?

I request that the CVE Subcommittee provide a verbal update to the Council on January 21, 2016. I further request that the Subcommittee provide written interim recommendations to the Council by March 2016 and final recommendations by May 2016.

I thank you and the Council for the work that has been done to date on a wide range of important issues, and look forward to our continued work together.

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

[Public Notice: 9357]

Removal of Sanctions on Person on Whom Sanctions Have Been Imposed Under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended**AGENCY:** Department of State.**ACTION:** Notice.

SUMMARY: The Secretary of State has decided to terminate sanctions imposed under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) ("ISA"), as amended, on Dettin S.p.A. (a.k.a. Dettin) on the basis that the company is no longer engaging in sanctionable activity described in section 5(a) of ISA, and that this person has provided reliable assurances that it will not knowingly engage in sanctionable activities in the future. Therefore, certain sanctions that were imposed on Dettin on August 29, 2014 are no longer in effect.

DATES: Effective date: The sanctions on Dettin are lifted effective November 2, 2015.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: On general issues: Office of Sanctions Policy and Implementation, Department of State, Telephone: (202) 647-7489.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August 29, 2014, the Secretary of State made a determination to impose certain sanctions on, *inter alia*, Dettin S.p.A. (a.k.a. Dettin) under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended (P.L. 104-172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note). See 79 FR 59890 (October 3, 2014). Additional information regarding the basis for imposing sanctions and the specific sanctions imposed on Dettin is contained in the **Federal Register** notice cited above.

Pursuant to section 9(b)(2) of ISA and the authority delegated to the Secretary of State in the October 9, 2012 Memorandum to relevant agency heads, "Delegation of Certain Functions and Authorities Under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012," ("Delegation Memorandum"), the Secretary now has decided to terminate sanctions on Dettin on the basis that the company is no longer engaging in sanctionable activity described in section 5(a) of ISA, and that this person has provided reliable assurances that they will not knowingly engage in sanctionable activities in the future. The sanctions on Dettin, therefore, are no longer in effect.

Pursuant to the authority delegated to the Secretary of State in the Delegation Memorandum, relevant agencies and instrumentalities of the United States

Government shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this notice.

The following constitutes a current, as of this date, list of persons on whom sanctions are imposed under ISA. The particular sanctions imposed on an individual person are identified in the relevant **Federal Register** Notice.

- Bimeh Markazi-Central Insurance of Iran (See Public Notice 8268, 78 FR 21183, April 9, 2013)
- Cambis, Dimitris (See Public Notice 8268, 78 FR 21183, April 9, 2013)
- FAL Oil Company Limited (see Public Notice 7776, 77 FR 4389, January 27, 2012)
- Ferland Company Limited (See Public Notice 8352, 78 FR 35351, June 12, 2013)
- Goldentex FZE (see Public Notice 8897, 79 FR 59890, October 3, 2014)
- Impire Shipping (See Public Notice 8268, 78 FR 21183, April 9, 2013)
- Jam Petrochemical Company (See Public Notice 8352 78 FR 35351, June 12, 2013)
- Kish Protection and Indemnity (a.k.a. Kish P&I) (See Public Notice 8268, 78 FR 21183, April 9, 2013)
- Kuo Oil (S) Pte. Ltd. (see Public Notice 7776, 77 FR 4389, January 27, 2012)
- Naftiran Intertrade Company (see Public Notice 7197, 75 FR 62916, October 13, 2010)
- Niksima Food and Beverage JLT (See Public Notice 8352, 78 FR 35351, June 12, 2013)
- Petrochemical Commercial Company International (a.k.a. PCCI) (see Public Notice 7585, 76 FR 56866, September 14, 2011)
- Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (a.k.a. PDVSA) (see Public Notice 7585, 76 FR 56866, September 14, 2011)
- Royal Oyster Group (see Public Notice 7585, 76 FR 56866, September 14, 2011)
- Speedy Ship (a.k.a. SPD) (see Public Notice 7585, 76 FR 56866, September 14, 2011)
- Sytrol (see Public Notice 8040, 77 FR 59034, September 25, 2012)
- Zhuhai Zhenrong Company (see Public Notice 7776, 77 FR 4389, January 27, 2012)

Dated: November 5, 2015.

Kurt W. Tong,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs.

[FR Doc. 2015-30062 Filed 11-24-15; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4710-07-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

[Docket No. DHS-2015-0076]

Homeland Security Advisory Council—New Tasking

AGENCY: The Office of Intergovernmental Affairs/Partnership and Engagement, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of task assignment for the Homeland Security Advisory Council.

SUMMARY: The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Jeh Johnson, tasked his Homeland Security Advisory Council to establish a subcommittee entitled Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee on September 28, 2015. The CVE Subcommittee will provide findings and recommendations to the Homeland Security Advisory Council on best practices sourced from the technology and philanthropic sectors, education and mental health professionals, and community leaders. This notice informs the public of the establishment of the CVE Subcommittee and is not a notice for solicitation.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sarah E. Morgenthau, Executive Director of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs/Partnership and Engagement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security at (202) 447-3135 or hsac@hq.dhs.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Homeland Security Advisory Council provides organizationally independent, strategic, timely, specific, and actionable advice and recommendations for the consideration of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security on matters related to homeland security. The Council is comprised of leaders of local law enforcement, first responders, state and local government, the private sector, and academia.

Tasking: The CVE Subcommittee will develop actionable findings and recommendations for the Department of Homeland Security. The subcommittee will address the following: (1) What opportunities or platforms will be useful for the facilitation of public-private partnerships with both the technology and philanthropic sectors? (2) How can the Department develop new networks and a framework for sustained dialogue and engagement with technology companies, foundations and philanthropic organizations? (3) What other non-government sectors, besides technology and philanthropic, should be leveraged for CVE and how should the Department engage those sectors? (4) How can the Department work with

education and mental health professionals on CVE efforts to help parents and schools understand how they can counter youth radicalization to violence? (5) How can the Department inspire peer-to-peer attempts to challenge violent extremism through public/private partnership?

Schedule: The CVE Subcommittee findings and recommendations will be submitted to the Homeland Security Advisory Council for their deliberation and vote during a public meeting. Once the report is voted on by the Homeland Security Advisory Council, it will be sent to the Secretary for his review and acceptance.

Dated: November 19, 2015.

Sarah E. Morgenthau,
Executive Director.

[FR Doc. 2015-30064 Filed 11-24-15; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9110-9M-P

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 9359]

60-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Reporting Requirements for Responsible Investment in Burma

ACTION: Notice of request for public comment.

SUMMARY: The Department of State is seeking Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval for the information collection described below. In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, we are requesting comments on this collection from all interested individuals and organizations. The purpose of this notice is to allow 60 days for public comment preceding submission of the collection to OMB.

DATES: The Department will accept comments from the public up to January 25, 2016.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:

- *Web:* Persons with access to the Internet may comment on this notice by going to www.Regulations.gov. You can search for the document by entering "Docket Number: DOS-2015-0070" in the Search field. Then click the "Comment Now" button and complete the comment form.

- *Email:* steinjL@state.gov

- *Regular Mail:* Send written comments to: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, C/O Jennifer Stein, Rm 7822, U.S. Department of State, 2201 C Street NW.

You must include the DS form number (if applicable), information collection

title, and the OMB control number in any correspondence.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Direct requests for additional information regarding the collection listed in this notice, including requests for copies of the proposed collection instrument and supporting documents, to Jennifer Stein, who may be reached on 202-647-1211 or at SteinJL@state.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

- *Title of Information Collection:* Reporting Requirements for Responsible Investment in Burma.

- *OMB Control Number:* 1405-0209.

- *Type of Request:* Extension of a Currently Approved Collection.

- *Originating Office:* Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, DRL/EAP.

- *Form Number:* No form.

- *Respondents:* U.S. persons and entities engaged in new investment in Burma in an amount over \$500,000 in aggregate, per OFAC General License 17, which authorizes new investment in Burma.

- *Estimated Number of Respondents:* 30.

- *Estimated Number of Responses:* 30.

- *Average Time per Response:* 31 hours.

- *Total Estimated Burden Time:* 930 hours.

- *Frequency:* Within 180 days of new investment in Burma over \$500,000, annually thereafter.

- *Obligation to Respond:* Mandatory. We are soliciting public comments to permit the Department to:

- Evaluate whether the proposed information collection is necessary for the proper functions of the Department.

- Evaluate the accuracy of our estimate of the time and cost burden for this proposed collection, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used.

- Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected.

- Minimize the reporting burden on those who are to respond, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

Please note that comments submitted in response to this Notice are public record. Before including any detailed personal information, you should be aware that your comments as submitted, including your personal information, will be available for public review.

Abstract of proposed collection:

Section 203(a)(1)(B) of the International Emergency Economic

Powers Act (IEEPA) grants the President authority to, inter alia, prevent or prohibit any acquisition or transaction involving any property, in which a foreign country or a national thereof has any interest, by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. See 50 U.S.C. 1701 *et seq.*

In Executive Order 13047 of May 20, 1997, the President determined that the actions and policies of the Government of Burma, including its large-scale repression of the democratic opposition in Burma, constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, declared a national emergency to deal with that threat, and prohibited new investment in Burma. In subsequent Executive Orders, the President modified the scope of the national emergency to address additional concerns with the actions and policies of the Government of Burma. In Executive Order 13448 of October 18, 2007, the President modified the emergency to address the continued repression of the democratic opposition in Burma, manifested in part through the commission of human rights abuses and pervasive public corruption. In Executive Order 13619 of July 11, 2012, the President further modified the emergency to address, inter alia, human rights abuses particularly in ethnic areas.

In response to several political reforms by the Government of Burma and pursuant to authority granted by IEEPA, the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a general license (GL 17) on July 11, 2012 authorizing new investment in Burma, subject to certain restrictions and conditions.

In order to support the Department of State's efforts to assess the extent to which new U.S. investment authorized by GL 17 furthers U.S. foreign policy goals of, inter alia, improving human rights protections and facilitating political reform in Burma, GL 17 requires U.S. persons engaging in new investment in Burma to report to the Department of State information related to such investment, as laid out in the "Reporting Requirements on Responsible Investment in Burma," (hereafter referred to as the "collection"). This collection is authorized by section 203(a)(2) of

From: Walls, Erin <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
"IGA ExecSec
(b)(6)
"Barillas, Ben
To: (b)(6)
"Jessie Hernandez (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(
CC: "'Sarah Morgenthau' <(b)(6)>
Subject: Briefing Materials for HSAC CVE Subcommittee Meeting
Date: 2016/04/06 11:14:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

IGA ExecSec,

Please see the attached materials that the HSAC was tasked with preparing for S1 for the CVE Subcommittee meeting on April 14. Please be sure to include CMO when you send these out for coordination.

I spoke with (b)(6) in ESEC and we discussed that given the format of the meeting, talking points would not be necessary. I would also like to note that the agenda is in draft form and will likely be updated by HSAC during the review period. We will include the most current version when everything is sent up to ESEC.

Thank you,
Erin

Sender: Walls, Erin <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
"IGA ExecSec2 <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
"Barillas, Ben </O
Recipient: (b)(6)
"Jessie Hernandez (b)(6)
(b)(6)
"Sarah Morgenthau
Sent Date: 2016/04/06 11:15:01
Delivered Date: 2016/04/06 11:14:00



COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM SUBCOMMITTEE DRAFT AGENDA

DHS HQ

3801 Nebraska Ave NW DC

Thursday, April 14th, 2016 – 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

- 9:00-10:00 a.m. **Classified Intelligence Briefing** (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(E)
- 10:10 a.m. **Welcome and Introductions (Building 1, Room 01-044)**
Sarah E. Morgenthau
Executive Director, Homeland Security Advisory Council
- 10:15-11:30 a.m. **Focus Area Progress Reports by Subcommittee Members**
Ali Soufan (Communications/Messaging)
Seamus Hughes (Funding and Resourcing)
Joel Meyer (Engaging with Tech and Social Media Companies)
Paul Goldenberg (Incorporating the Education and Mental Health Sectors)
Laila Alawa (Pop Culture/Millennials)
- 11:30-12:00 p.m. **Meeting with Secretary Johnson**
- 12:00-1:00 p.m. **Working Lunch (EDF Private Dining Room)**
Office for Community Partnerships and CVE Task Force Overview
George Selim, Director, Office for Community Partnerships
- 1:00 -2:00 p.m. **Panel on Digital Marketing, Startups and Early Stage Investing**
(b)(6)
- 2:00-2:30 p.m. **Tentative Call with Snapchat Representative**
TBD
- 2:30-3:00 p.m. **Tentative S&T Briefing on CVE Metrics and Assessments**
TBD
- 3:00-4:00 p.m. **Continued Focus Area Read Outs and Discussion on Next Steps**
Farah Pandith, Chair, CVE Subcommittee
Adnan Kifayat, Chair, CVE Subcommittee
- 4:00 p.m. **Meeting Adjourns**

Farah Pandith (Chair)

Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations



Farah Pandith currently leads numerous efforts designed to counter extremism through new organizations, programs, and initiatives. Ms. Pandith was appointed the first-ever Department of State Special Representative to Muslim Communities in June 2009. From 2004 to 2007, she was the Director for Middle East Initiatives at the National Security Council (NSC). Prior to the NSC, Ms. Pandith was Chief of Staff at the Bureau for Asia and the Near East for the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Ms. Pandith is currently an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the Leadership Council of Women and Girls Lead. She also serves on the Board of Overseers at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and on the Smith College President's Council.

Adnan Kifayat (Chair)

Senior Resident Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States




Adnan Kifayat is a senior resident fellow at The German Marshall Fund (GMF), where he advises the organization on its efforts to strengthen leadership development and Next Generation strategies in the transatlantic region and its joint work in programming the OCP Policy Center Atlantic Fellowship in Europe, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. He also contributes to the continued development of GMF's Leadership, Diversity and Inclusion Initiative.

Over the last 15 years, Kifayat has held senior positions in public service, including at the White House, State Department, and Treasury Department, where he established partnerships with strategic allies to cooperate in trade, finance, development, counterterrorism and national security. He has helped develop innovative and sustainable mechanisms to counter the spread of violent extremism and prevent the flow of funds to terrorist organizations.

Until recently, Kifayat served as Secretary of State John Kerry's acting special representative to Muslim communities and was instrumental in creating programs to broaden and deepen U.S. diplomatic engagement through social entrepreneurship, political empowerment, and shared commitments to security. As senior advisor to the Under Secretary of State for public diplomacy, he led the development and deployment of the Public Diplomacy 2.0 Initiative, which helped transform the State Department into a new media-savvy institution. His work at the Treasury Department resulted in initiatives and agreements to promote financial cooperation between the United States and key partners, in the Middle East, G8, and Asia. He served as an alternate executive director of the African Development Bank, shaping Bank activities on the African continent. He served twice on the National Security Council staff to coordinate counterterrorism and economic issues across the Middle East and Africa.

Kifayat's private sector experience includes creating strategies for Cargill to access Central Asian and Latin American agribusiness markets, and designing programs for Delphi International to promote U.S. economic and civil society engagement on a people-to-people basis around the world.

Laila Alawa



CEO and Founder, *The Tempest*

Laila Alawa is the CEO and Founder of *The Tempest*, a leading digital media company where the world goes to hear the voices and stories of underrepresented women. With more than half a million monthly visitors, the company covers everything from life to humor, entertainment to news through articles, videos, podcasts and mixtapes. She is also the host for *The Expose*, a *Coming of Faith* weekly podcast tackling tough topics with snark and wit. Her work and writing has been mentioned in *The New York Times*, Al-Jazeera America, Yahoo! News, ThinkProgress, *The Guardian*, NPR, PRI, *The Huffington Post*, *Feministing*, Salon, Mashable, Color Lines, Bustle, Mic and BuzzFeed. Her work was recently published in the literary anthology, *Faithfully Feminist: Jewish, Christian and Muslim Feminists on Why We Stay*. She was recently featured in *The New York Times*' Women in the World. She's also appeared on Al-Jazeera America, BBC World News, NPR, and *Huffington Post Live*. In 2015, Laila was named an Ariane de Rothschild Fellow.

Through her online activism and creative approach to digital issues, she has made it her mission to elevate the voices of those who are often not heard. As the creator of many viral multimedia campaigns, she is eager to work with organizations that both advocate and innovate in the public interest.

Prior to founding *The Tempest*, Laila was a research specialist at Princeton University, studying socio-cognitive processing under the framework of community identity and belonging.

She has a bachelor's degree from Wellesley College, and has studied leadership and social entrepreneurship at the University of Cambridge. A passionate runner, she lives in Washington, D.C.

John R. Allen

General, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)



General John R. Allen is a retired U.S. Marine General who served as the Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and the Commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan from 2011 to 2013, the pivotal point in the war. General Allen recently served as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. He is the first Marine in history to command a theater of war, and is the longest serving commander in that conflict.

Concluding a distinguished 38 year career in the spring of 2013, General Allen worked as an advisor to both the Secretaries of Defense and State on Middle East Security, and has affiliations with the Brookings Institution, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the Atlantic Council, and Council on Foreign Relations.

General Allen holds numerous U.S. personal and international decorations, including the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, The Leftwich Leadership Trophy, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, the Humanitarian Service Medal, the NATO Meritorious Service Medal, the Afghan Ghazi Mir Bacha Khan Medal, the French Legion d'Honneur, the Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit of the Polish Republic, the Taiwan Order of the Resplendent Banner with Special Cravat, and the Mongolian Meritorious Service Medal, First Class.

Russ Deyo

Under Secretary for Management, Department of Homeland Security



Russ Deyo was sworn in as Under Secretary for Management at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on May 11, 2015. In the Department's number three post, Mr. Deyo exercises leadership authority over all aspects of the Department's management programs, processes, and workforce of more than 230,000 employees.

Mr. Deyo oversees management of the Department's nearly \$60 billion budget. He also serves as the Chief Acquisition Officer, administering control over the Department's approximately \$16.5 billion in procurements annually, and 72 major acquisition programs that are in development or sustainment with a life cycle cost estimate of more than \$300 million.

As Under Secretary, Mr. Deyo leads the Management Directorate's six lines of business, including financial management, human capital, procurement, information technology, security, and facilities and asset management. The management portfolio touches every aspect of Department operations. Leading with a data-driven focus, Mr. Deyo concentrates efforts on integrating management functions, improving customer service, and sustaining quality financial stewardship.

Mr. Deyo has over 30 years of management experience in both the government and private sector. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Deyo retired from Johnson & Johnson in 2012 after 27 years of service, where he held a number of positions, including Vice President of Administration and General Counsel. For 16 years, he also served as a member of the Executive Committee, the company's principal management group for global operations.

Prior to Johnson & Johnson, Mr. Deyo was an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey from 1978 to 1985, serving the last three years as Chief of Special Prosecutions. From 1977 to 1978, Mr. Deyo was an attorney at Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler in New York City.

Mr. Deyo is a graduate of Dartmouth College and holds a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center.

Paul Goldenberg

President and CEO, Cardinal Point Strategies, LLC



Paul Goldenberg is the President and CEO of Cardinal Point Strategies (CPS), LLC, a strategic advisory and business intelligence consulting firm. As President and CEO of Cardinal Point Strategies, Mr. Goldenberg is a trusted advisor with a long history of helping to resolve the highest profile and most confidential matters for governments, businesses, academia and NGOs around the world. Mr. Goldenberg also serves as the National Director of the Secure Community Network, the nation's first faith-based information sharing analysis center recognized by DHS as the a national model.

Mr. Goldenberg's public career includes more than two decades as the first State Chief of the Office of Bias Crimes and Community Relations in New Jersey leading the nation's first full time State Attorney General's effort focusing on hate crimes and ethnic terrorism, Director of the nation's 6th largest county social service and juvenile justice system, and as a law enforcement official leading investigation efforts for cases in domestic terrorism, political corruption, and organized crime.

From 2004-2009, Mr. Goldenberg played a key role in setting policy for the legislation and investigation of ethnic terrorism and hate crimes in his role as senior law enforcement advisor to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In the course of his law enforcement career, Mr. Goldenberg received South Florida's most distinguished citation for valor, Officer of the Year, an honor presented after serving as lead agent in one of South Florida's longest term undercover assignments.

Jane Harman

President and CEO, Woodrow Wilson Center



Jane Harman is the head of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, a Washington, D.C. think tank devoted to the ideals of former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. Congresswoman Harman served in Congress from 1993 to 1998 and 2001 to 2011. Following her resignation from Congress on February 28, 2011 she joined the Woodrow Wilson Center as its first female Director, President and CEO. During her time in Congress she represented the Aerospace Center of California during nine terms in Congress; she served on all the major security committees: six years on Armed Services, eight years on Intelligence and four on Homeland Security.

Congresswoman Harman has made numerous Congressional fact-finding missions to hotspots around the world including North Korea, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Guantanamo Bay to assess threats against the U.S. Harman received the Defense Department Medal for Distinguished Service in 1998, the CIA Seal Medal in 2007, and both the CIA Director's Award and the National Intelligence Distinguished Public Service Medal in 2011.

Seamus Hughes

Deputy Director of the Program on Extremism, George Washington University



Seamus Hughes is the Deputy Director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University. Hughes previously worked at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), serving as a lead staffer on the U.S. government's efforts to implement the national countering violent extremism strategy. He regularly led engagements with Muslim American communities across the country, provided counsel to civic leaders after high-profile terror-related incidents, and met with families of individuals who joined terrorist organizations. Mr. Hughes created a groundbreaking intervention program to help steer individuals away from violence through non-law enforcement means and worked closely with FBI Joint Terrorism Taskforces, Fusion Centers, and U.S. Attorney Offices.

Prior to the NCTC, Mr. Hughes served as the Senior Counterterrorism Advisor for the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. He has authored numerous legislative bills, including sections of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act and the Special Agent Samuel Hicks Families of Fallen Heroes Act. He is the recipient of National Security Council Outstanding Service and two NCTC Director's Awards for outstanding service.

Jeffrey Miller

Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer, National Football League



Jeffrey Miller is Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer of the National Football League (NFL) where he oversees all event security, investigative programs and services. Prior to joining the NFL, Mr. Miller spent 24 years with the Pennsylvania State Police, retiring in 2008 after serving six years as Commissioner. In that role, he oversaw a complement of over 6,000 enlisted and civilian personnel and a budget of \$800 million dollars. He was responsible for implementing crime-and crash-reduction strategies, anti-terrorism efforts, and general policing practices, including emergency response in all 67 counties in Pennsylvania.

Mr. Miller holds an Associate Degree from the University of South Florida, a Bachelor's of Professional Studies Degree in Criminal Justice from Elizabethtown College, and a Master's Degree in Public Administration from the Pennsylvania State University. He is a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Academy in Quantico, Virginia, and the FBI National Executive Institute.

Joel Meyer

Senior Vice President, Public Sector, Dataminr



Joel Meyer is Senior Vice President at Dataminr, Inc., a real-time information discovery company that analyzes all public tweets and other publicly available data to deliver the earliest signals for breaking news, real-world events, off the radar context and perspective, and emerging trends.

Prior to joining Dataminr in 2013, he served as a Director on the White House National Security Council staff focusing on countering domestic radicalization and at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the Office of the Secretary as Senior Advisor to the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. He previously practiced law at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, and is an inactive member of the California and District of Columbia bars.

Michael Nutter
Former Mayor of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania



Michael A. Nutter served two terms as Mayor of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was first elected in November 2007, and then re-elected to a second term in November 2011. Most recently, while Mayor of Philadelphia he worked closely with the Department of Homeland Security and Secretary Johnson on the operational security and contingency planning for the September 2015 Papal visit which was designated as a National Special Security Event. Before being elected mayor, he served for almost 15 years on the Philadelphia City Council representing the 4th District.

Mr. Nutter holds a B.A. from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.

Matthew Olsen

President of Consulting and Co-Founder, IronNet Cybersecurity



Matthew Olsen is President of Consulting and Co-Founder at IronNet Cybersecurity. Mr. Olsen is responsible for leading IronNet’s consulting services, providing strategic and operational guidance to companies on cybersecurity and cyber threats, and helping to guide IronNet’s business development. Mr. Olsen is also a lecturer at Harvard Law School and a national security analyst for ABC News.

Mr. Olsen has worked for over two decades as a top government official on national security, intelligence and law enforcement issues. Appointed by the President to serve as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Mr. Olsen led the government's efforts to integrate and analyze terrorism information and coordinate counterterrorism activities for three years. Prior to joining the NCTC, Mr. Olsen was the General Counsel for the National Security Agency. Mr. Olsen also served at the Department of Justice in a number of leadership positions, including Special Counselor to the Attorney General, responsible for national security and criminal cases. Mr. Olsen was also a federal prosecutor for over a decade and has served as Special Counsel to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Ali Soufan

Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, The Soufan Group LLC



Ali H. Soufan is Chairman & Chief Executive Officer of The Soufan Group LLC and has been a member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council since September 2012. Mr. Soufan is a former FBI Supervisory Special Agent who investigated and supervised highly sensitive and complex international terrorism cases, including the East Africa Embassy Bombings, the attack on the USS Cole, and the events surrounding the 9/11 attacks. Mr. Soufan also served on the Joint Terrorist Task Force, FBI New York Office, where he coordinated both domestic and international counterterrorism operations.

Mr. Soufan has received numerous awards for his counter-terrorism work, including the FBI Director's Award for Excellence in Investigation and the Respect for Law Enforcement Award. Mr. Soufan is the author of The New York Times Top 10 Bestseller, "The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda" and a recipient of the Ridenhour Book Prize.

Juan Zarate

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)



Juan Zarate is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the senior national security analyst for CBS News, a visiting lecturer at the Harvard Law School, and a national security and financial integrity consultant. Zarate served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism from 2005 to 2009 and was responsible for developing and implementing the U.S. government's counterterrorism strategy and policies related to transnational security threats. He was the first ever Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, where he led domestic and international efforts to attack terrorist financing, the innovative use of the Treasury Department's national security related powers, and the global hunt for Saddam Hussein's assets. He is also a former federal prosecutor who served on terrorism prosecution teams prior to 9/11, including the investigation of the USS Cole attack.

Zarate is the author of the recently published *Treasury's War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare* (PublicAffairs, 2013), *Forging Democracy* (University Press of America, 1994), and a variety of articles in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Washington Quarterly*, and other publications. He has his own weekly national security program on CBSNews.com called *Flash Points*. He is a graduate of both Harvard College and Harvard Law School and a former Rotary International Fellow (Universidad de Salamanca, Spain). Zarate sits on several boards of advisers, including for the director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and HSBC's Financial Services Vulnerabilities Committee.

William “Bill” Webster

Retired Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP



William H. Webster (HSAC Chair) served as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1987 to 1991. Prior to his service as CIA Director, Judge Webster served as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1978 to 1987, a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from 1973 to 1978, and a United States District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri from 1970 to 1973. In 1991, Judge Webster was presented the Distinguished Intelligence Medal. Judge Webster was also awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom and the National Security Medal. Following his departure from the CIA, Judge Webster joined the law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP in Washington, DC, and is now a retired partner.

Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC)

Last Name	First Name	Title	Organization	Appt. Date	Term Expires	Proposed Reappointment ?	Charter Designation
HSAC MEMBERS							
Allen	John	General (Ret.)	U.S. Marine Corps	5/8/2014	4/30/2016	(b)(3)	Experts in academia and the research community
Holtzman	Elizabeth	Co-Chair	Herrick's Government Relations Practice	5/8/2014	4/30/2016		Leaders from the private sector
Kelly	Gary	Chairman, President, and CEO	Southwest Airlines	5/8/2014	4/30/2016		Leaders from the private sector
Canterbury	Chuck	National President	Fraternal Order of Police	6/8/2009	6/1/2016		Police, Fire, EMS, Public Works
Jones	Jim	Chairman and CEO	Manatt Jones Global Strategies	5/24/2012	6/1/2016		Leaders from the private sector
Lemack	Carie	Co-founder and CEO	DreamUp	5/24/2012	6/1/2016		National Policy Maker
McNeil	Walter	Former Chief of Police	Quincy, Georgia	5/24/2012	6/1/2016		Police, Fire, EMS, Public Works
Allen	Thad	Executive Vice President	Booz Allen Hamilton Inc	5/8/2014	6/1/2016		National Policy Maker
Acevedo	Art	Chief of Police	Austin City Police Department	9/6/2013	9/3/2016		State, Local, Tribal Official
Adegbite	Steve	Chief Information Security Officer	E*Trade Financial Corporation	9/6/2013	9/3/2016		Leaders from the private sector
Danzig	Richard	Senior Advisor	John Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory	9/6/2013	9/3/2016		National Policy Maker
Goldenberg	Paul	President and CEO	Cardinal Point Strategies, LLC	9/6/2013	9/3/2016		Leaders from the private sector
Harman	Jane	President and CEO	Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars	9/6/2013	9/3/2016		Experts in academia and the research community
Lute	Jane	Special Coordinator	On Improving United Nations Response to sexual exploitation and abuse, United Nations	9/6/2013	9/3/2016		National Policy Maker
Ramsey	Charles	Former Police Commissioner	Philadelphia Police Department	9/6/2013	9/3/2016		Police, Fire, EMS
Livingood	Wilson	President and Partner	Livingood Advisors, LLC	9/26/2012	10/1/2016		National Policy Maker
Moss	Jeff	Founder	Black Hat and DEF CON Conferences	6/8/2009	10/1/2016		Leaders from the Private Sector
Parker	Annis	Former Mayor	City of Houston, Texas	9/26/2012	10/1/2016		State, Local, Tribal Officials
Schaitberger	Harold	General President	International Association of Fire Fighters	6/8/2009	10/1/2016		Police, Fire, EMS, Public Works
Soufan	Ali	Chairman and CEO	The Soufan Group, LLC	9/26/2012	10/1/2016		Experts in academia and the research community
Thomas	Lydia	Retired President and CEO	Noblis, Inc.	9/6/2013	10/1/2016	Leaders from the private sector	
Duke	Elaine	Principal	Elaine Duke & Associates, LLC.	1/8/2015	1/30/2017	National Policy Maker	
Martin	David	Professor of International Law	University of Virginia School of Law	1/8/2015	1/30/2017	Experts in academia and the research community	
Olsen	Matthew	President of Consulting and Co-Founder	IronNet Cybersecurity	1/8/2015	1/30/2017	National Policy Maker	
Rose	Robert	Senior Advisor to the CEO	Securonix	1/8/2015	1/30/2017	Leaders from the private sector	

Stockton	Paul		Managing Director	Sonecon, LLC.	1/8/2015	1/30/2017	(b)(5)	Leaders from the private sector
Barber	Ron		Former Congressman	Arizona 2nd District	4/30/2015	5/31/2017		National Policy Maker
Kayyem	Juliette		Founder	Juliette Kayyem Solutions, LLC.	4/30/2015	5/31/2017		Leaders from the private sector
Norris	Ned, Jr.		Former Chairman	Tohono O'odham Nation	4/30/2015	5/31/2017		State, Local, Tribal Official
Pandith	Farah		Adjunct Senior Fellow	Council on Foreign Relations	4/30/2015	5/31/2017		Experts in academia and the research community
Webster	William		Retired Partner	Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP	9/6/2013	9/3/2017		National Policy Maker
Bratton	William		Police Commissioner	New York City Police Department	12/10/2010	9/3/2017		Police, Fire, EMS, Public Works
Augustine	Norman		Chairman & CEO (Ret.)	Lockheed Martin Corporation	3/3/2003	9/3/2017		National Policy Maker
Hamilton	Lee		Director	Center on Congress, Indiana University	1/8/2015	9/3/2017		Experts in academia and the research community
Fitz	Marshall		Senior Fellow	Center for American Progress	9/3/2015	9/3/2017		National Policy Maker
Magaw	John		Consultant	Domestic and International Security	6/8/2009	9/3/2017		Leaders from the private sector
Miller	Jeffery		Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer	National Football League	9/3/2015	9/3/2017		National Policy Maker
Pistole	John		President	Anderson University	6/19/2015	9/3/2017		Experts in academia and the research community
Marrone	Christian		Chief of Staff to the CEO and Vice President of Government Relations	CSRA Inc.	1/4/2016	1/4/2018		National Policy Maker
Nutter	Michael		Former Mayor	City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	1/4/2016	1/4/2018		State, Local, Tribal Official

Parameter Breakdown	Total =	40
Senior (65 & up)	13	32.5%
Middle Aged (50-64)	22	55.0%
Up and Comer (49 & under)	5	12.5%
White	30	75.0%
AfAm	5	12.5%
Latino/Hispanic	2	5.0%
Arab	2	5.0%
Native American	1	2.5%
Asian	0	0.0%
D.C.	17	42.5%
NE	13	32.5%
West	2	5.0%
South	4	10.0%
Southwest	2	5.0%
Midwest	2	5.0%
Male	32	80.0%
Female	8	20.0%

Last Name	First Name	Title	Organization	Rec'd By:	Term Expires?	Proposed Appointment?	Charter Designation
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Potential Replacements
(b)(5)

Advisory Committee	Last Name	First Name	Title	Organization	Work Address	City	State	Zip	Phone	Email	Gender	M	F	Diversity	Geography	Age	Senior	Middle Aged	Un and Cemr	Critical Infrastructure	State and Local Auth.	Preparedness	Immigration & Border	Int'l Issues	Dept. Issues
2nd State																									

FACT SHEET

Over the last decade, we have become a stronger, safer, and more secure nation. The Department of Homeland Security continues to make the United States more resilient, not only to terrorist and violent extremist attacks, but also to threats and disasters of all kinds, while safeguarding the fundamental rights of all Americans.

Below are some of the Department's significant achievements under the leadership of President Obama:

Counterterrorism

- *NTAS improvements*
 - In order to enable DHS to more effectively and quickly communicate information to the public and other partners regarding threats to the homeland in the evolving threat environment, and following discussions with homeland security stakeholders, on December 16, 2015, Secretary Jeh Johnson directed an update to the National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) to add a new form of advisory the NTAS "Bulletin" – to the existing NTAS "Alerts."
- *Strengthen the Visa Waiver Program*
 - In 2014, Secretary Johnson took steps to enhance the security of the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), by requiring additional personal information for the ESTA application. In 2015, Secretary Johnson announced additional security measures. Under the VWP, we are now seeking from participating countries the implementation of information sharing agreements, mandatory use of E-Passports, and a request for use of more Federal Air Marshals.
 - This year, we are implementing the Visa Waiver Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015, which was signed into law by President Obama on December 18, 2015 as part of the Omnibus bill. This bill places new restrictions on eligibility for travel under the Visa Waiver Program.

Aviation Security

- *Trusted traveler programs, including TSA Pre✓[®] and Global Entry*
 - The TSA Pre✓[®] application program has enrolled over 2 million travelers since its inception in December 2013, including more than 1 million in 2015 alone. In addition to these enrollments, CBP trusted travelers – those enrolled in other trusted traveler programs such as Global Entry, NEXUS and SENTRI — are also automatically eligible for TSA Pre✓[®].
- *Preclearance*

- Preclearance allows CBP to screen passengers bound for the U.S. before they arrive on U.S. soil. So far, we've established preclearance capability at 15 airports worldwide, and it has proven very effective. In 2015, Secretary Johnson announced 10 additional preclearance candidate airports in nine countries, and DHS's goal is to expand to several of them by the end of the Administration.
- *Enhanced security at foreign airports with flights directed to the U.S.*
 - In 2014, TSA directed additional security measures at airports overseas with direct flights to the United States. Those enhancements have been adopted as their own by many of the countries in which these airports exist. In response to the crash of Metrojet Flight 9268 on the Sinai Peninsula, and to enhance aviation security, TSA instituted a series of additional, precautionary security enhancements with respect to commercial passenger and cargo flights bound for the United States from foreign airports in the region.

Cybersecurity

- *Tangible Improvements to Cybersecurity*
 - DHS provides a common baseline of cybersecurity across the civilian Federal Government primarily through two programs. The first of these programs, called EINSTEIN, detects and blocks known cybersecurity threats attempting to compromise federal agencies. Deployment of the EINSTEIN phase that actively blocks cyber attacks, known as EINSTEIN 3A, increased by over 30% across the civilian Federal Government in 2015. EINSTEIN 3A now protects nearly half of the federal workforce. In the recent omnibus, Congress included the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, which requires all civilian agencies to participate in EINSTEIN 3A by the end of FY16. The second program, Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM), detects cybersecurity risks inside agency networks. The first phase of CDM, which detects vulnerabilities on agency computers, is available to 97 percent of the civilian Federal Government.
 - Under the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, DHS will now operate the Federal Government's portal for information sharing with the private sector. This means DHS will receive cyber threat indicators on a voluntary basis directly from the private sector and will share those indicators, as appropriate, with federal agencies and private sector participants to improve our collective resilience. The bill provides liability protections to the private sector when sharing this information with DHS, as well as requires DHS to implement extensive and robust privacy and civil liberties protections for the American people and to safeguard sensitive information.

Immigration

- *DACA*
 - In 2012, DHS implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy, which has provided an opportunity for undocumented immigrants who came here as children and are not enforcement priorities to seek temporary relief on a case-by-case basis. Since then, more than 700,000 people have received this

relief under the DACA policy.

- *Executive Actions on Immigration*
 - On November 20, 2014, DHS announced a series of executive actions to address as much of our broken immigration system as the agency could. These actions prioritize for apprehension, detention and removal threats to national security, public safety, and border security, and streamline legal immigration and promote citizenship for high-skilled immigrants, entrepreneurs, and families. The Administration continues to fight to implement policies that would enable up to 4 million parents of American citizens and lawful permanent residents, as well as additional DACA recipients, to be held accountable, work on the books, and pay their fair share of taxes.
 - The President created the White House Task Force for New Americans, which is co-chaired by the Domestic Policy Council and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. The Task Force has launched the Building Welcoming Communities Campaign to help local communities strengthen integration efforts and the Stand Stronger Citizenship Awareness Campaign to spread awareness about the rights and responsibilities of U.S. citizenship.
- *Prioritized the removals of national security and public safety threats and recent border crossers*
 - DHS, through the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, has refined its priorities to improve the quality of its removals by focusing on the most serious threats to national security, public safety, and border security.
- *Priority Enforcement Program*
 - DHS continues to make significant strides in building partnerships with local law enforcement and community leaders through the Priority Enforcement Program. This outreach is part of a nation-wide effort to promote collaboration with local law enforcement in order to implement the Priority Enforcement Program's common-sense approach that focuses enforcement resources on convicted criminals and individuals who threaten national security or public safety, while ensuring that law enforcement agencies maintain community trust. Of note, 15 of the top 25 jurisdictions with the largest number of previously declined detainees are now participating in PEP, representing 47 percent of previously declined detainees. Most law enforcement agencies are now cooperating via PEP.
- *Increased U.S. capacity to accept refugees*
 - DHS, along with the State Department, supports a diverse, worldwide refugee admissions program, representing the United States' proud heritage of offering a safe haven, freedom, and opportunity to those fleeing persecution. Each year, following rigorous background and security checks, thousands are admitted to this country as part of the overseas refugee program, and under this Administration we are increasing our capacity to accept refugees while ensuring national security.

Border Security

- *Decrease in attempted unlawful migration*
 - DHS has dedicated historical levels of resources to securing the Southern border. The number of apprehensions, an indicator of total attempts to cross the Southern

border, has dramatically declined. In Fiscal Year 2014, total apprehensions along the Southern border were 479,000. For FY2015, apprehensions along the Southern border were down to 331,333 – only one time since 1972 has that number been lower.

- *Established a Southern Border and Approaches Campaign*
 - On November 20, 2014, DHS initiated the creation of the Southern Border and Approaches Campaign, a unified approach to improve how the Department protects the homeland across our borders. The campaign more effectively coordinates the assets and personnel of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and other resources of the Department. The Plan achieved full operational capability in 2015.

Management

- *Unity of Effort*
 - In April 2014, DHS began implementation of the Unity of Effort initiative to build, sustain, and unify the Department's efforts to address the diverse challenges we face in ensuring the safety and security of the United States. This has brought about a more centralized process for making decisions concerning budget requests, acquisition, strategy, and other Departmental functions.
 - Since then, DHS has achieved efficiencies in acquisition management, and fostered greater collaboration and transparency with the private sector to strengthen program execution. Specifically, DHS instituted the Joint Requirements Council to provide an informed connection between its strategic guidance and the budget and acquisition process.

Community Engagement and Countering Violent Extremism

- *Meeting with communities to hear their concerns*
 - Since the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) last February, the United States Government has focused on strengthening our effort to prevent extremists from radicalizing and mobilizing recruits, especially here at home.
 - DHS senior officials have conducted over 200 meetings with community leaders as part of the U.S. government's countering violent extremism efforts.
- *Established Office of Community Partnerships*
 - In September, DHS announced the creation of the Office for Community Partnerships. This Office will lead the inter-agency CVE effort.
 - Just last Friday, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice announced the Countering Violent Extremism Task Force. The interagency CVE Task Force will be hosted by the Department of Homeland Security and will bring together the best resources and personnel from across the executive branch to ensure that we face the challenge of violent extremism in the White House in a unified and coordinated way.

U.S. Secret Service

- *2015 Papal Visit and 70th Anniversary United Nations General Assembly*
 - In September, 2015 the U.S. Secret Service and other components of DHS successfully protected over 160 world leaders at the 70th Anniversary of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, and coordinated security preparations for the Pope's visit to Washington, DC, New York, and Philadelphia, PA.

U.S. Coast Guard

- *Major drug interdictions*
 - Between May and August of 2015, the USCG STRATTON seized more than 66,500 pounds of cocaine worth more than \$1 billion. This included seizures of cocaine from two drug-running submarines – one of which amounted to 12,000 pounds of cocaine worth about \$181 million.
 - Between August and November of 2015, the BERTHOLF seized nearly 29,000 pounds of cocaine worth over \$432 million during 11 different interdictions. The BERTHOLF also took possession of an additional 20,000 pounds seized by Coast Guard and Canadian forces over a four-month period in the Eastern Pacific. BERTHOLF's total offload of more than 49,000 pounds of cocaine worth \$748 million represents a significant portion of the remarkable interagency and partner nation interdiction efforts for FY 2015, which totaled more than 110 interdictions, 700 suspected smugglers taken into custody, and the seizure of nearly 709,888 pounds of cocaine worth roughly \$9.4 billion.

Federal Emergency Management Agency

- *Disaster Resilience and Response*
 - The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has enhanced its disaster response capabilities, including through the creation of FEMA Corps and the DHS Surge Capacity Force and prepositioning resources before disasters hit.
 - FEMA has effectively led the response to major national disasters, including superstorm Sandy in 2012.

Academic Research

- *Stimulating Research and Development and Academic Engagement*
 - DHS has established Research and Development teams in the areas of border security, aviation, biological threats, cyber security, and counter-terrorism to ensure that future investments are directly linked to strategic priorities and operational needs.
 - DHS has strengthened its outreach efforts to academic institutions through the establishment of the Office of Academic Engagement, which supports the Department's mission by building and improving relationships with the academic community.
 - DHS also created the Homeland Security Academic Advisory Council, comprised of leadership from more than twenty universities and colleges around the country,

to provide recommendations on matters related to homeland security, including student and recent graduate recruitment, international students, academic research and faculty exchanges, campus resilience, homeland security academic programs, and cybersecurity.

###

From: Wenger, Lauren (b)(6)
(FYDIBOHF23SPR)
To: (b)(6)
"Morgenthau, Sarah </O=DHS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPR)>
CC: "Woodhams, Katrina </O=DHS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPR)>
(b)(6)
"Walls, Erin </O=DHS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPR)>
(b)(6)
Subject: Call
Date: 2016/02/22 10:02:00
Importance: High
Priority: Urgent
Type: Note

Hi (b)(6)

I am trying to arrange a call between Ali and Farah, Adnan and Sarah.

Do any of the times below work for Ali and Farah to hold a quick call on due outs from the CVE Subcommittee meeting?:

- Tuesday after 11 am, Wednesday between 9-12 or any time after 9:00 am on Thursday

Thanks,

Lauren

Lauren Wenger
Department of Homeland Security
Office for Community Partnerships

(b)(6)



cid:image003.png@01D08990.74538170

Sender: Wenger, Lauren (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
Recipient: "Morgenthau, Sarah </O=DHS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPR)>
(b)(6)
"Woodhams, Katrina </O=DHS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPR)>
(b)(6)
"Walls, Erin </O=DHS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPR)>
(b)(6)

Sent Date: 2016/02/22 10:01:58
Delivered Date: 2016/02/22 10:02:00

From: Wenger, Lauren (b)(6)
(b)(6)
"Wenger, Lauren"
(b)(6)
To: "/O=DHS/OU=EX"
(b)(6)
"Hill, John </O=DHS/OU=EX/>"
(b)(6)

Subject: Call for CVE Working Group to Discuss Data Tasking

Date: 2016/02/03 08:22:54

Start Date: 2016/02/03 14:00:00

End Date: 2016/02/03 14:30:00

Type: Appointment

Location: Dial in #: 866-816-7287, Pin: 5759658

Attendees: CVE Working Group; Hill, John

CVEWG Members,

In lieu of a meeting this week, there will be a call today at 2pm to discuss the tasking listed below in more detail. Please also note that we will be holding an in-person meeting next Wednesday, February 10th. Calendar invite and details for that will be sent shortly. Please see below for the data call:

Good Afternoon,

Below and attached you will find the data call related to personnel costs and funding levels for Countering Violent Extremism Programs and Initiatives in FY 2016 mapped to the recently outlined in the DHS CVE Action Plan.

Background: In order to ensure the United States is positioned to counter homegrown violent extremism and prevent domestic radicalization, the House Report directs the Office of Community Partnerships to provide a detailed description of all DHS countering violent extremism (CVE) programs and initiatives, including associated personnel and funding levels, not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of the DHS appropriation.

In the attached file, the CVE Interagency Budget Data is divided into 4 different portions:

- **CVE Program Funding Levels:** Each component should provide a brief summary of the CVE program or exercise that they funded.
- **FY16 Plan Budget:** Each component should provide an estimate of their funding of CVE programs for FY2016.
- **Salaries and Benefits:** Each component should provide the planned amount for FY 16 for salaries and benefits for CVE related work.

Attached is the DHS CVE Action Plan and, if you have any questions regarding this data call, please contact John Hill (b)(6). Please provide your completed file to Ryan Mitchell and John Hill by COB, 2/9/16.

V/R
John Hill

(b)(6)

Sender: Wenger, Lauren <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
"Wenger, Lauren <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
Recipient: "/O=DHS/OU=EXD
(b)(6)
"Hill, John </O=D
(b)(6)
Sent Date: 2016/02/03 08:22:54

28 page draft and Pre-Decisional documents

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of the Freedom of information and Privacy Act

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of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

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Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From: Morgenthau, Sarah <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
To: "Walls, Erin </O=DH
(b)(6)>
Subject: Can you have Mike send the CVE letter to the Judge to let him know we would like to circulate prior to the call
Date: 2016/02/25 09:52:52
Type: Note

Sender: Morgenthau, Sarah <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
Recipient: "Walls, Erin </O=DH
(b)(6)>
Sent Date: 2016/02/25 09:52:50
Delivered Date: 2016/02/25 09:52:52

- Good morning everyone and welcome to DHS Headquarters, otherwise known as the NAC.
- As most of you know my name is Sarah Morgenthau and I am the Executive Director of Secretary Johnson's Homeland Security Advisory Council, otherwise known as the HSAC. This is the third in person meeting of the HSAC's Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee.
- I am grateful to all of you for taking time out of your very busy schedules to be here. You are a very special group and I am excited about the work you are doing.
- These subcommittees are an important tool in the federal government where there is often a need to bring in fresh ideas and candid feedback from experienced senior advisors like yourselves who are not afraid of playing this role.
- Please know that Secretary Johnson and the Department leadership are very aware of the important work you are doing. The Secretary will be joining us at 11:30 this morning.
- This subcommittee was established at the request of Secretary Johnson in conjunction with the establishment of the new Office for Community Partnerships in September. This is the office at DHS that is devoted to domestic efforts to counter violent extremism.
- The recommendations this subcommittee puts forth will be an essential element to helping the Department stay ahead of the curve on efforts to counter violent extremism.

- The subcommittee has been operating on an aggressive timeline and will have some solid recommendations ready for the Secretary at the next full Council meeting on June 2nd.
- I need to remind everyone that this meeting is closed to the public. Please do not share any of the materials we provide to you today with anyone outside of the subcommittee. All of the discussions between subcommittee members and subject matter experts who meet with this group are not for attribution.
- I will now turn it over to our Co-chairs, Farah Pandith and Adnan Kifayat. We are very lucky to have these two very special individuals as our leaders.

From: Morgenthau, Sarah (b)(6)
(b)(6)
To: "Selim, George </O
(b)(6)
Subject: can you share this w OCP stakeholders?
Date: 2016/05/13 15:54:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

Hi George, per our convo earlier this week, I am attaching the FRN announcing the June 2nd CVE meeting. Do you want to share this with OCP stakeholders, to include some of your USG partners who are part of the interagency TF. They are welcome to join us at the CVE brief or any part of the day that is open to the public. Please make sure we get their names since need to track attendance for the Wilson Center. Thanks.

Sender: Morgenthau, Sarah (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Recipient: "Selim, George </O
(b)(6)
Sent Date: 2016/05/13 15:54:11
Delivered Date: 2016/05/13 15:54:00



Affected Public: Businesses.
Estimated Number of Respondents: 50.

Estimated Time per Respondent: 2 hours.

Estimated Total Annual Burden Hours: 100.

Dated: May 9, 2016.

Tracey Denning,

Agency Clearance Officer, U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

[FR Doc. 2016-11278 Filed 5-12-16; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9111-14-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

[Docket No. DHS-2016-0022]

Homeland Security Advisory Council Meeting

AGENCY: The Office of Partnership and Engagement, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of partially closed Federal Advisory Committee meeting.

SUMMARY: The Homeland Security Advisory Council ("Council") will meet in person on June 2, 2016. Members of the public may participate in person. The meeting will be partially closed to the public.

DATES: The Council will meet Thursday, June 2, 2016, from 10:05 a.m. to 5:15 p.m. EDT. The meeting will be open to the public from 1:50 p.m. to 4:25 p.m. EDT. Please note the meeting may close early if the Council has completed its business. The meeting will be closed to the public from 10:05 a.m. to 11:20 a.m. EDT, 1:00 p.m. to 1:40 p.m. EDT, and 4:30 p.m. to 5:15 p.m. EDT.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ("Wilson Center"), located at 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, DC 20004. All visitors will be processed through the lobby of the Wilson Center. Written public comments prior to the meeting must be received by 5:00 p.m. EDT on Monday, May 30, 2016, and must be identified by Docket No. DHS-2016-0022. Written public comments after the meeting must be identified by Docket No. DHS-2016-0022 and may be submitted by one of the following methods:

- *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
- *Email:* HSAC@hq.dhs.gov. Include Docket No. DHS-2016-0022 in the subject line of the message.
- *Fax:* (202) 282-9207.
- *Mail:* Homeland Security Advisory Council, Attention Mike Miron,

Department of Homeland Security, Mailstop 0445, 245 Murray Lane SW., Washington, DC 20528.

Instructions: All submissions received must include the words "Department of Homeland Security" and "DHS-2016-0022," the docket number for this action. Comments received will be posted without alteration at <http://www.regulations.gov>, including any personal information provided.

Docket: For access to the docket to read comments received by the Council, go to <http://www.regulations.gov>, search "DHS-2016-0022," "Open Docket Folder" and access your comments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Miron at HSAC@hq.dhs.gov or at (202) 447-3135.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice of this meeting is given under Sec. 10(a) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Public Law 92-463 (5 U.S.C. appendix), which requires each FACA committee meeting to be open to the public.

The Council provides organizationally independent, strategic, timely, specific, actionable advice, and recommendations to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on matters related to homeland security. The Council is comprised of leaders of local law enforcement, first responders, Federal, State, and local government, the private sector, and academia.

The Council will meet in an open session between 1:50 p.m. and 4:25 p.m. EDT. The Council will receive reports and recommendations from the Cybersecurity Subcommittee and the Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee.

The Council will meet in a closed session from 10:05 a.m. to 11:20 a.m. EDT, 1:00 p.m. to 1:40 p.m. EDT, and 4:30 p.m. to 5:15 p.m. EDT to receive sensitive operational counterterrorism information from senior DHS officials, information on current threats, and a southern border security update.

Basis for Partial Closure: In accordance with Sec. 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has determined this meeting requires partial closure. The disclosure of the information relayed would be detrimental to the public interest for the following reasons:

The Council will receive closed session briefings from senior DHS officials. These briefings will concern matters sensitive to homeland security within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(7)(E) and 552b(c)(9)(B). The Council will receive operational

counterterrorism updates on the current threat environment and security measures associated with countering such threats, including those related to aviation security programs, and southwest border security updates. The session is closed under 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(7)(E) because disclosure of that information could reveal investigative techniques and procedures not generally available to the public, allowing terrorists and those with interests against the United States to circumvent the law and thwart the Department's strategic initiatives. In addition, the session is closed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(B) because disclosure of these techniques and procedures could frustrate the successful implementation of protective measures designed to keep our country safe.

Participation: Members of the public will have until 5 p.m. EDT on Monday, May 30, 2016, to register to attend the Council meeting on June 2, 2016. Due to limited availability of seating, admittance will be on a first-come first-serve basis. Participants interested in attending the meeting can contact Mike Miron at HSAC@hq.dhs.gov or (202) 447-3135. You are required to provide your full legal name, date of birth, and company/agency affiliation. The public may access the facility via public transportation or use the public parking garages located near the Wilson Center. Wilson Center directions can be found at: <http://wilsoncenter.org/directions>. Members of the public will meet at 1:15 p.m. EDT at the Wilson Center's main entrance for sign in and escorting to the meeting room for the public session. Late arrivals after 1:45 p.m. EDT will not be permitted access to the facility.

Facility Access: You are required to present a valid original government-issued ID, to include a State Driver's License or Non-Driver's Identification Card, U.S. Government Common Access Card (CAC), Military Identification Card or Person Identification Verification Card; U.S. Passport, U.S. Border Crossing Card, Permanent Resident Card or Alien Registration Card; or Native American Tribal Document.

Information of Services for Individuals with Disabilities: For information on facilities or services for individuals with disabilities, or to request special assistance at the meeting, contact Mike Miron at HSAC@hq.dhs.gov or (202) 447-3135 as soon as possible.

Dated: May 10, 2016.
Sarah E. Morgenthau,
Executive Director, Homeland Security
Advisory Council, DHS.
 [FR Doc. 2016-11345 Filed 5-12-16; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9110-9M-P

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

[Docket No. FR-5910-N-07]

60-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Continuum of Care Homeless Assistance—Technical Submission

AGENCY: Office of Community Planning and Development, IIUD.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: HUD is seeking approval from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for the information collection described below. In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act, HUD is requesting comment from all interested parties on the proposed collection of information. The purpose of this notice is to allow for 60 days of public comment.

DATES: *Comments Due Date:* July 12, 2016.

ADDRESSES: Interested persons are invited to submit comments regarding this proposal. Comments should refer to the proposal by name and/or OMB Control Number and should be sent to: Colette Pollard, Reports Management Officer, QDAM, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 451 7th Street SW., Room 4176, Washington, DC 20410-5000; telephone (202) 402-3400 (this is not a toll-free number) or email at Colette.Pollard@hud.gov for a copy of the proposed forms or other available information. Persons with hearing or speech impairments may access this

number through TTY by calling the toll-free Federal Relay Service at (800) 877-8339.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Norm Suchar, Director, Office of Special Needs Assistance Programs, Office of Community Planning and Development, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 451 7th Street SW., Room 7262, Washington, DC 20410; telephone (202) 708-5015 (this is not a toll-free number). Persons with hearing or speech impairments may access this number through TTY by calling the toll-free Federal Relay Service at (800) 877-8339.

Copies of available documents submitted to OMB may be obtained from Ms. Pollard.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This notice informs the public that HUD is seeking approval from OMB for the information collection described in section A.

A. Overview of Information Collection

Title of Information Collection: Continuum of Care Homeless Assistance—Technical Submission.
OMB Approval Number: 2506-0183.
Type of Request: Extension of currently approved collection.
Form Number: HUD-40090-3a, HUD-40090-3b.

Description of the need for the information and proposed use: This submission is to request an extension of a currently approved collection associated with the Technical Submission phase of the Continuum of Care (CoC) Program Application. This submission is limited to the Technical Submission process under the CoC Program interim rule, as authorized by the HEARTH Act. Applicants who are successful in the CoC Program Competition are required to submit more detailed technical information before a grant agreement. The

information to be collected will be used to ensure that technical requirements are met prior to the execution of a grant agreement. The technical requirements relate to a more extensive description of the budgets for administration costs, timelines for project implementation, match documentation and other project specific documentation, and information to support the resolution of grant conditions. IIUD will use this detailed information to determine if a project is financially feasible and whether all proposed activities are eligible. All information collected is used to carefully consider conditional applicants for funding. If IIUD collects less information, or collected it less frequently, the Department could not make a final determination concerning the eligibility of applicants for grant funds and conditional applicants would not be eligible to sign grant agreements and receive funding. To see the regulations for the CoC Program and applicable supplementary documents, visit HUD's Homeless Resource Exchange page at <https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/cac/>. The statutory provisions and the implementing interim rule (also found at 24 CFR part 587) that govern the program require the information provided by the Technical Submission.

Respondents (i.e., affected public): Applicants that are successful in the Continuum of Care Homeless Assistance Grant competition.

Estimated Number of Respondents: 750.

Estimated Number of Responses: 750.

Frequency of Response: 1.

Average Hours per Response: 8.

Total Estimated Burdens: 6,000.

Note: Preparer of this notice may substitute the chart for everything beginning with estimated number of respondents above:

Information collection	Number of respondents	Frequency of response	Responses per annum	Burden hour per response	Annual burden hours	Hourly cost per response	Annual cost
	750	1	750	8	6,000	21	126,000
Total	750	1	750	8	6,000	21	126,000

B. Solicitation of Public Comment

This notice is soliciting comments from members of the public and affected parties concerning the collection of information described in section A on the following:

(1) Whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of

the agency, including whether the information will have practical utility;

(2) The accuracy of the agency's estimate of the burden of the proposed collection of information;

(3) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and

(4) Ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond; including through

the use of appropriate automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic submission of responses.

HUD encourages interested parties to submit comment in response to these questions.

Authority: Section 3507 of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. chapter 35.

From: Cohen, John <(b)(6)>

Sent Via: Cathey-Blomquist, Trishia <(b)(6)>

"CVE Working Group" <(b)(6)>

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

CC:

Subject: Canceled: CVE Working Group Meeting

Date: 2012/07/09 11:27:11

Start Date: 2012/07/11 10:00:00

End Date: 2012/07/11 11:00:00

Importance: High

Priority: Urgent

Type: Schedule.Meeting.Canceled

Location: NAC 4; ROOM 101; Telecon: 1-800-320-4330 PIN: 119832

CVE Working Group; (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Attendees: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

All,

Due to the NCR CVE Workshop on Wednesday, there will be no CVE Working Group meeting this week. The next meeting will take place on Wednesday, July 18, 2012.

Thanks,
Caroline

Caroline Simmons
Director of Special Projects
Counterterrorism Working Group
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

(b)(6)

NEW LOCATION; NAC 4; ROOM 01-101; please delete all other invites for this meeting.

Purpose: To coordinate all internal and external operations and outreach efforts related to CVE.

If you have any questions, please contact Nate Snyder at (b)(6) or Caroline Simmons at (b)(6)

Bridge info:

(b)(6)

Cohen, John (b)(6)
Sender: Cathey-Blom (b)(6)

"CVE Working Group <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)

Recipient:

"Gersten, David (b)(6)

(b)(6)

"Susel, Irving </p></p>

Sent Date: 2012/07/09 11:27:08

Delivered Date: 2012/07/09 11:27:11

From: John Allen (b)(6)

SentVia: borino@brookings.edu

"Morgenthau, Sarah (b)(6)

(b)(6)

"Adnan Kifayat <AK

"Farah Pandith <FP

To: "Wenger, Lauren <

(b)(6)

"Alysha Tierney <al

"Walls, Erin </O=D

(b)(6)

Subject: Canceled: HSAC CVE Working Lunch

Date: 2016/05/03 10:10:28

Start Date: 2016/05/03 11:00:00

End Date: 2016/05/03 12:30:00

Importance: High

Priority: Urgent

Type: Schedule.Meeting.Canceled

Location: Cosmos Club, 2121 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20008

Sender: John Allen (b)(6)

"Morgenthau, Sarah <(b)(6)

(b)(6)

"Adnan Kifayat <AKif

"Farah Pandith <FPand

Recipient: "Wenger, Lauren </O=

(b)(6)

"Alysha Tierney <alys

"Walls, Erin </O=DHS

(b)(6)

Sent Date: 2016/05/03 10:09:54

Delivered Date: 2016/05/03 10:10:28

30 page draft document "2016 CCA Program
NOFO"

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of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From: Farah Pandith (b)(6)
To: "Morgenthau, Sarah <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
Subject: CFR 6/6 DC: Adolescent Minds, Extremism, and the Power of Pop Culture
Date: 2016/05/26 10:19:29
Type: Note

 THE ROUNDTABLE SERIES ON COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND U.S. FOREIGN
Adolescent Minds, Extremism, and the Power of Pop Culture

Naif A. Al-Mutawa, *Creator of THE 99 and Assistant Professor of Clinical Psychology, Kuwait University*

Sarah E. Morgenthau, Homeland Security Advisory Council

Farah Pandith, *Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations*

Monday, June 6, 2016
12:00 p.m.–1:30 p.m.

Dear Ms. Morgenthau:

Council on Foreign Relations
1777 F Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

DC Comics' Justice League of America have joined forces with Teshkeel Comics' THE 99 to create an unstoppable army of superheroes, and forge a link between pop culture and international affairs that was long overdue. Despite pop culture's tremendous influence on youth and adolescents, it has been a weak component in CVE landscape.

[Member Directory.](#)

Ahead of the curve and a pioneer in this space, Dr. Naif Al-Mutawa understands kids and their minds. An award winning serial entrepreneur, clinical psychologist and clinical hypnotherapist,

Dr. Mutawa is the creator of THE 99, the first group of comic superheroes born of an Islamic archetype. THE 99 has received positive attention from the world's media; *Forbes* named THE 99 as one of the top 20 trends sweeping the globe and President Barack Obama praised Dr. Naif and THE 99 as perhaps the most innovative of the thousands of new entrepreneurs viewed by his Presidential Summit on Entrepreneurship.

To influence the demographic of Muslims under the age of thirty, which is nearly a billion strong, ideas like this must be scaled up and fast. Influencing this generation requires using powerful role models, pop culture and knowledge about the human brain. How can for-profit companies, civil society and governments work to bring forward ideas that can help fight the lure of extremist ideology? What ideas are missing and who are the next generation of superheroes?

We invite you to join us as we discuss these questions, and how the power of all kinds of "superheroes" can be enlisted in the fight against extremism.

With best regards,
Farah Pandith

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[log](#) [ook](#) [tter](#) [din](#) [ube](#) [RSS](#)

Council on Foreign Relations — 58 East 68th Street — New York, NY 10065
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x

Sender: Farah Pandith <(b)(6)>

Recipient: "Morgenthau, Sarah" <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)

Sent Date: 2016/05/26 10:18:56

Delivered Date: 2016/05/26 10:19:29

From: Farah Pandith (b)(6)
To: "Morgenthau, Sarah" (b)(6)
Subject: CFR DC 5/24 Illuminating the Threat of Extremists: How Media Makes its Choices
Date: 2016/05/11 12:05:23
Type: Note

×

THE ROUNDTABLE SERIES ON COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND U.S. FOREIGN

Illuminating the Threat of Extremists: How Media Makes its Choices

Phil Kent, *Former President and COO of CNN News Group, Non-Executive Chairman, Vevo LLC and Advanced Leadership Fellow, Harvard University*

Sarah E. Morgenthau, Homeland Security Advisory Council

Tuesday, May 24, 2016
12:00 p.m.–12:30 p.m.
12:30 p.m.–1:00 p.m.

Farah Pandith, *Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations*

Council on Foreign Relations
1777 F Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Ms. Morgenthau:

There is no bigger megaphone to learn about what is happening around the globe than the one media holds on and offline. What is the responsibility to the public when covering the complicated and nuanced aspects of groups like ISIS, Al Qaeda and Boko Haram and how do media executives make choices about the way they bring stories to the world? Can media be independent while still helping governments by covering the road to recruitment?

[Member Directory.](#)

Phil Kent, recently chairman and chief executive officer of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. (TBS, Inc.) has a

wealth of experience to examine these questions. At TBS, Inc., Phil was responsible for a portfolio of news, entertainment and animation, young adult & kids networks and businesses including CNN/U.S., CNN International, CNN.com and HLN. He also oversaw the strategic reorganization of the news division while serving as president and chief operating office of CNN News Group.

We invite you to join us as we discuss the role of the media in the years after 9/11 and the new terrain in the years to come as citizens, countries and communities fight violent extremists.

With Best Regards,
Farah Pandith

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x

Sender: Farah Pandith (b)(6)

Recipient: "Morgenthau, Sarah" (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Sent Date: 2016/05/11 12:05:08

Delivered Date: 2016/05/11 12:05:23

From: Walls, Erin (b)(6)
(b)(6)
To: "Wenger, Lauren" (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: checking in
Date: 2016/05/12 10:04:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

Hi,

Do you have a few minutes to talk today to go through where everything stands re: the CVE report? I am around most of the day.

Thanks!

Erin Walls
Director, Homeland Security Advisory Council
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

(b)(6)

Sender: Walls, Erin (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Recipient: "Wenger, Lauren" (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Sent Date: 2016/05/12 10:04:48
Delivered Date: 2016/05/12 10:04:00

From: Miron, Mike (b)(6)
(b)(6)
To: "McQuillan, Patrick (b)(6)"
(b)(6)
Subject: Chief Haddad on national security board (with video)
Date: 2010/05/06 08:13:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

I think the Chief meant to say he is on the HSAC's CVE work group?

Chief Haddad on national security board (with video)

Published: Friday, April 30, 2010

By Sean Delaney, Press & Guide Newspapers

DEARBORN -- Police Chief Ronald Haddad was recently appointed to serve on the Homeland Security Advisory Council, which provides advice and recommendations to Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano on matters related to homeland security.

The council is comprised of leaders from state and local government, first responder communities, the private sector, and academia.

"It's an honor, a privilege and a tremendous responsibility," said Haddad, who traveled to Washington, D.C. earlier this month to meet with his fellow council members.

The group's efforts, Haddad said, will be focused on sharing information and improving communication on the national stage.

In addition to Haddad, the group currently has more than two-dozen individuals listed on its membership roster, including Maryland Gov. Martin O'Malley, Austin Police Chief Art Acevedo, Community Engagement Officer Omar Alomari with Ohio Homeland Security, Acting Professor of Law Asli Bali of the UCLA School of Law, President and CEO Richard Cohen of Southern Poverty Law Center, Sheriff Doug Gillespie of the Las Vegas Police Department, Senior Analyst and Executive Director Dalia Mogahed of the Gallup Center for Muslim Studies, Executive Director Dan Rosenblatt of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and Director Nadia Roumani of the American Muslim Civic Leadership Institute.

"Our job is to identify what type of training would suit front line law enforcement, officers, and to improve their ability to work more effectively with community members to mitigate threats or actual crime," Haddad said.

The council, he said, was formed in the wake of a growing number of attacks on American soil, including the attempted bombing of a Northwest Airlines flight on Christmas Day in 2009 and the arrest of the Hutaree militia group charged with plotting to levy war against the U.S.

“When you look at those things, it’s clear that we can ill afford to work in a vacuum,” Haddad said. “We need to reach out to members of the community and open up the lines of communication.”

The city of Dearborn and its police department has already established several similar advisory committees to facilitate communication between different cultural and religious groups, as well as various groups and organizations throughout the city.

“We’re engaging the community in a way that’s never been done before,” Haddad said.

The Homeland Security Advisory Council will continue that effort on a larger scale.

“There’s no cookie-cutter model for something like this,” he said. “It needs to be broad enough to work for the entire country.”

But it still starts at home, Haddad said. He encourages Dearborn residents to sign up for Nixle, a community information service provider built exclusively to provide secure and reliable communications.

It connects the Dearborn Police Department to residents in real-time, delivering information to residents of a geographically targeted area.

The information is instantly available over cell phones by text message, by e-mail and over the Web at no cost.

Visit the city’s Web site at www.cityofdearborn.org for more information.

Contact Staff Writer Sean Delaney at (b)(6)

Sender: Miron, Mike (b)(6)
"McQuillan, Patrick <(b)(6)>

Recipient: (b)(6)

Sent Date: 2010/05/06 08:13:33

Delivered Date: 2010/05/06 08:13:00

From: Rezmovic, Jeffrey <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
To: "Santiago, Heather" <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
Subject: chiefs of staff
Date: 2015/07/08 13:29:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

HQ: Christian Marrone, Paul Rosen, Rob Silvers
ICE: Leonard Joseph
ESEC: Kim O'Connor
FEMA: Michael Coen
I&A: Mary Peterson
IGA: Alaina Clark
MGMT: Vince Micone
NPPD: David Hess
DGC: Meghan Ludtke
DHA: Terri Cheshire
DLA: Ryan Ramsey
CBP: Timothy Quinn, Stephen Schorr
TSA: Tom McDaniels, Alan Metzler
DNDO: Mary Kruger
OPA: Tammy Howard
OPS: Todd Heinz
PLCY: Holly Canevari
PRIV: Jordan Gottfried
S&T: Christina Murata
USCG: CAPT Michael Ryan
USCIS: Juliet Choi
USSS: Britton Yee
CVE: David Gersten
CISOMB: Gary Merson
FLETC: Pamela Jastal, George Kovatch
PSO: James Dinneen
HSAC: Sarah Morgenthau
MIL: Admiral Joanna Nunan
CRCL: Veronica Venture

Jeff Rezmovic
Office of the Deputy Secretary

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Office: (b)(6)

Mobile

Sender: Rezmovic, Jeffrey (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Recipient: "Santiago, Heather" (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sent Date: 2015/07/08 13:29:17

Delivered Date: 2015/07/08 13:29:00

From: Azar, Haroon (b)(6)
To: (b)(6)

Subject: Christopher Jordan Dorner Manifesto

Date: 2013/02/07 19:27:50

Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

A few folks from the CVE WG have asked about Christopher Dorner's manifesto so I'm attaching it below. For those unaware, this individual is accused of targeting law enforcement officials in the Southern California area in the last few days and is still at large. As my office is across the street from LAPD HQ, it seems like downtown LA has been effectively on lockdown most of today.

Haroon Azar
Regional Director for Strategic Engagement
National Protection and Programs Directorate
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

City Hall | Los Angeles, CA 90012

Office: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Christopher Dorner w/ Chief William Bratton
<<http://hiphopandpolitics.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/screen-shot-2013-02-07-at-5-21-53-am.png?w=462&h=413>>

Christopher Dorner w/ Chief William Bratton

I know most of you who personally know me are in disbelief to hear from media reports that I

Sender: Azar, Haroon (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Recipient: (b)(6)

Sent Date: 2013/02/07 19:27:48

Delivered Date: 2013/02/07 19:27:50

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of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From: Simmons, Caroline <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
To: "CVE Working Group"
(b)(6)
CC: "Cramer, Drew </O=" <(b)(6)>

Subject: Classified CVE Working Group Mtg/SVTC on Wednesday
Date: 2011/12/19 14:14:13
Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

All –

As discussed in last week's CVE Working Group meeting, this week, I&A will be providing a classified briefing to the group on internet radicalization. Ideally, they would like to provide the presentation at the TS/SCI level in the BLDG 3 SCIF but we want to make sure that every Component/office will be able to send a representative with that clearance level. Do you mind confirming by COB today whether you are cleared at the TS/SCI level and/or whether you can send another representative from your Component/office who is cleared? If you are not attending in person, do you mind sending your VTC POC and/or site location for where you will participate via SVTC? Drew Cramer (cc'd) is helping to set up the SVTC and can assist with any technical issues.

Additionally, we would like to send out the slide deck from last week's FBI-DHS SVTC to this group. As such, do you mind sending me your JWICS email?

Thanks!

Caroline

Sender: Simmons, Caroline <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
Recipient: "CVE Working Group"
(b)(6)
"Cramer, Drew </O=" <(b)(6)>

Sent Date: 2011/12/19 14:14:11
Delivered Date: 2011/12/19 14:14:13

From: Simmons, Caroline (b)(6)
(b)(6)
To: "CVE Working Group" (b)(6)
"Cramer, Drew </O" (b)(6)
CC: "CT Staff </O=DHS" (b)(6)

Subject: Classified CVE Working Group Mtg/SVTC on Wednesday
Date: 2012/02/06 17:08:14
Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

All -

Please see the attached agenda for the CVE meeting this week in the BLDG 5 SCIF at 10 AM on Wednesday, February 8, 2012. I&A will be providing a classified briefing to the group on Somalia at the TS/SCI level. If you would like to video conference in via SVTC, please provide your VTC POC name and contact information to Drew Cramer (b)(6)

(b)(6) by COB Tuesday, February 7, 2012.

Thanks,
Caroline

Caroline Simmons
Director of Special Projects
Counterterrorism Working Group
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

(b)(6)

Sender: Simmons, Caroline (b)(6)
(b)(6)
"CVE Working Group" (b)(6)
"Cramer, Drew </O" (b)(6)
Recipient: "CT Staff </O=DHS" (b)(6)

Sent Date: 2012/02/06 17:08:08
Delivered Date: 2012/02/06 17:08:14
Message Flags: Unread

From: Simmons, Caroline (b)(6)
(b)(6)
To: "CVE Working Group"
(b)(6)
"Cramer, Drew </O"
CC: (b)(6)

Subject: Classified CVE Working Group Mtg/SVTC on Wednesday
Date: 2012/01/09 18:21:05
Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

All -

In this week's CVE meeting, I&A will be providing a classified briefing to the group on internet radicalization to violence in the BLDG 5 SCIF at 10 AM on Wednesday, January 11. The presentation will be at the TS/SCI level. If you would like to video conference in via SVTC, please provide your VTC POC name and contact information to Drew Cramer (b)(6) (b)(6) by COB Tuesday, January 10.

Thanks!
Caroline

Sender: Simmons, Caroline (b)(6)
(b)(6)
"CVE Working Group"
(b)(6)
Recipient: "Cramer, Drew </O"
(b)(6)
"CT Staff </O=DHS"
(b)(6)

Sent Date: 2012/01/09 18:21:00
Delivered Date: 2012/01/09 18:21:05

2 page draft letter to Hon. Michael McCaul

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1. What is the status of DHS efforts to develop domestic counter messaging programs targeting the violent Islamist extremist ideology?

The Internet is a powerful networking and communication tool that can be used to disseminate messages and empower networks to counter violent extremism. At DHS, part of our strategy emphasizes raising awareness and empowering community efforts to build an online capacity and develop their own counter-narrative and engagement efforts. Efforts such as the Peer to Peer Challenging Extremism program is an example of what DHS is seeking to support. Further, the new CVE Interagency Task Force has four major lines of effort that it will cover, one in particular is on strategic communications. This line of effort will explore counter-narrative effectiveness and best practices. The Task Force will also bring a Digital Strategy Officer on board. Last, The Global Engagement Center (GEC), housed at the Department of State, will lead the coordination, integration, and synchronization of Government-wide communications activities directed at foreign audiences in order to counter the messaging and diminish the influence of international terrorist and violent extremist organizations. The GEC will closely coordinate with the CVE Interagency Taskforce.

2. How is the Department working with social service agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Education, as part of a whole of government approach to CVE?

The Department will work with domestic agencies through the CVE Interagency Task Force.

a. What role will the recently established Interagency CVE Task Force have as part of this process?

The Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Education are members of the Interagency CVE Task Force. Part of the rationale for creating the Task Force was to create ways for non-security and non-law enforcement agencies to play an active role in a tangible whole-of-government approach.

3. What is the timeline for the CVE grant selection and award process for the funding included in P.L. 114-113?

DHS currently anticipates that the funding opportunity will be announced sometime in the Summer of 2016, with awards happening in the Fall of 2016.

a. How will the Department award CVE grants? How will projects or organizations be vetted? What role will the Director of the Office for Community Partnerships have in this process?

DHS will utilize FEMA's Grants Program Directorate (GPD) infrastructure for awarding grants. It will similarly follow the current model in place for the Transit and Port Security Grant Programs. FEMA GPD awards and conducts fiscal audits, and the subject matter expertise is provided by the Transportation

Security Administration and the United States Coast Guard. DHS Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) will continue to be involved in all CVE related aspects, from designing the funding opportunity's purpose, goals, eligible activities, and evaluation criteria, to providing CVE subject matter expertise in the evaluations of applicants and collecting the performance measures for incorporation into the Department's overall CVE activities.

4. What accountability and auditing plans and capabilities does DHS have in place to ensure that once these funds will be used for their intended purpose once allocated?

FEMA GPD will administer the funding, conduct financial accountability assessments, audits, and ensure the integrity of the competitive process. Like all grant programs, FEMA GPD will conduct audits on the fiscal side of activities. OCP will ensure that the outcomes on CVE are as planned.

a. Does DHS have any metrics or measures for success to ensure programs using these funds are successful? If so, what are they?

Given the wide variety of the activities that would be eligible, there is not a specific set of metrics that have been established. Projects will be evaluated, in part, on the metrics they identify, and OCP will review each application's proposed metrics for adequacy.

5. Under what circumstances would these funds be transferred for emergent threats, as allowed in title five, section 543, Subsection (a), (b)?

The funds were appropriated in a "general provision" which contains no programs, essentially as a place holder to be transferred by the Secretary to the appropriate place within the Department in consultation with the appropriations committees. The intent being that the funds would be transferred to carry out the initiatives described in the JES. The entirety of the \$10 million for the CVE initiatives will be transferred to FEMA State and Local Programs appropriations to be awarded by FEMA GPD in accordance with the plan agreed upon by FEMA GPD and OCP.

a. How will you ensure that CVE programs do not suffer as a result of a transfer of funds?

See above.

6. Does DHS plan to utilize information and themes from public testimonials of former or estranged extremists in the Department's CVE efforts?

DHS is exploring this tactic and will continue to pursue it through the CVE Interagency Task Force. This will include empirical research to determine the effectiveness of developing counter-narratives using testimony from "former" violent extremists.

a. If so, can you provide examples similar efforts undertaken by foreign partners?

The United Kingdom has several prominent examples of “formers” who are engaged in countering violent extremism such as the work of the Quilliam Foundation, which is headed by a former member of an Islamist group.

Canada has developed a program called Extreme Dialogue that features a film-based curriculum to tell the personal stories of Canadians profoundly affected by violent extremism, including the testimony of a former member of the extreme far-right. Finally, in 2011 Google Ideas hosted a major Summit Against Violent Extremism which launched the international Against Violent Extremism Network that draws on the experiences of violent extremists, gang members and survivors of violence to work together to prevent violence. The Network remains active today.



One Hundred Fourteenth Congress
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20515

April 5, 2016

The Honorable Jeh Johnson
Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, D.C. 20528

2016 APR -5 PM 5:01
SCANNED/RECEIVED
BY ENCLERO

Dear Secretary Johnson,

In your recent testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security, you noted that “countering violent extremism (CVE) given the current threat environment—is in my judgment as important as any of our homeland security missions...I’m very supportive and appreciative of the Congress’s efforts to help us out with grant money to do all this. There’s bipartisan support in Congress for our CVE efforts, and I’m glad to see that.” The Committee agrees with you regarding the importance of this effort, and with your comments highlighting violent Islamist extremist groups as the greatest terrorist threat to the US Homeland. In Congressional testimony last year you acknowledged, “At the moment, my priority has been focusing on communities that I believe are most vulnerable, at least some members of the community, to appeals from ISIL, Al-Qaeda, and other terrorist groups overseas who are actively targeting individuals in these communities. And so I think we need to focus on communities that themselves have the ability to influence who may be turning in the direction of violence.”

As you know, several hundred U.S. persons have joined or attempted to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and other Islamist groups overseas and over 80 have been arrested in the U.S. for terror-related activity. Despite the terror threat in the homeland being at its highest levels since the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Federal government lacks a cohesive strategy to counter the violent Islamist extremist ideology of al Qaeda, ISIS, and their allies.

Therefore, I am pleased that funding was included in Public Law (P.L.) 114-113, the “Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016,” to expand the Department of Homeland Security’s support to states, local governments, tribal governments, nonprofit organizations, and institutions of higher education. As outlined in this legislation, \$10 million has been allocated for “a countering violent extremism (CVE) initiative to help states and local communities prepare for.

prevent, and respond to emergent threats from violent extremism...”¹. In addition to these appropriated funds, as you know, the Department requested \$10 million in the fiscal year 2017 budget request for CVE activities. I am supportive of this request as well.

We support an adequately resourced CVE effort across the Federal government and particularly within the Department of Homeland Security. However, it is vital that the Department have a transparent strategy for how the \$10 million provided in P.L. 114-113 will be allocated, a process for ensuring that the funds are used for their intended purpose, and the capability to measure effectiveness of CVE initiatives. We also expect the Department to develop a plan for the dedicated CVE grant program to provide the resources to 501(c)(3) organizations working to, of note, counter the propaganda and recruitment efforts of ISIS and al Qaeda, as well as their affiliates and ideology. Additionally, the Department should ensure the bulk of the \$10 million goes toward counter-messaging and other engagement efforts that utilize credible voices to enhance CVE efforts and related targeted programs. It is imperative that the Department support vetted organizations that offer credible voices countering the ISIS message while ensuring these funds are distributed effectively and responsibly.

On March 30, 2016, representatives from the DHS Office of Community Partnerships (OCP) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided a briefing to Committee staff on the Department’s plans for this funding. I thank the Department for their willingness to assist the Committee in its oversight. As a follow up to this briefing, I am writing to request written answers on the status of DHS CVE efforts, including spending plans for the \$10 million provided in P.L. 114-113 and the \$50 million requested in the FY2017 budget. Please provide answers to the following questions no later than April 22, 2016:

1. What is the status of DHS efforts to develop domestic counter messaging programs targeting the violent Islamist extremist ideology?
2. How is the Department working with social service agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Education, as part of a whole of government approach to CVE?
 - a. What role will the recently established Interagency CVE Task Force have as part of this process?
3. What is the timeline for the CVE grant selection and award process for the funding included in P.L. 114-113?
 - a. How will the Department award CVE grants? How will projects or organizations be vetted? What role will the Director of the Office of Community Partnerships have in this process?

¹ Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, § 5-543 (2015). Available at: <https://www.congress.gov/bills/114th-congress/house-bill/2029/text>

4. What accountability and auditing plans and capabilities does DHS have in place to ensure that once these funds will be used for their intended purpose once allocated?
 - a. Does DHS have any metrics or measures for success to ensure programs using these funds are successful? If so, what are they?
5. Under what circumstances would these funds be transferred for emergent threats, as allowed in title five, section 543, Subsection (a), (b)?²
 - a. How will you ensure that CVE programs do not suffer as a result of a transfer of funds?
6. Does DHS plan to utilize information and themes from public testimonials of former or estranged extremists in the Department's CVE efforts?
 - a. If so, can you provide examples similar efforts undertaken by foreign partners?

I appreciate your continued efforts in protecting the nation against the threat of violent extremism, and look forward to conducting rigorous oversight of how you use these appropriations. If you have any questions, please contact Alan Carroll or Paige Davies on the Committee staff at (202) 226-8417.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Michael T. McCaul". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

MICHAEL T. McCAUL
Chairman

² Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, § 5-543.

From: Lee, SY (b)(6)
(FYDIBD)
(b)(6)

To:

CC:

Subject: [CLEARANCE BY CDB] DHS FY 17 Budget Fact Sheet
Date: 2016/01/15 07:01:39
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

All

OMB has requested all agencies to submit a fact sheet the FY17 budget request, scheduled for rollout on Feb. 9

Draft fact sheet attached and below has been coordinated and cleared by MGMT/Chip Fulghum.

Please review and let us know if there are any edits.

Note that changes could occur between now and the budget release, but OMB has requested a draft by COB today for their first round of review and passback. Thanks

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS)

9 pages of draft budget proposals

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
Homeland
Security

August 26, 2016

DECISION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM:


George Selim
Director, Office for Community Partnerships

SUBJECT:

Community Partnership Strategy for
Countering Violent Extremism

Purpose: To request your approval of the DHS *Community Partnership Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism* (CVE).

Background: Over the past several years, the U.S. Government has acknowledged the need to supplement traditional counterterrorism and law enforcement approaches to address the evolving threat from violent extremism. In accordance with the 2011 White House *National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* and the subsequent *Strategic Implementation Plan*, the Office for Community Partnerships, with support from across the Department, has developed the DHS *Community Partnership Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism*. This strategy emphasizes community-based solutions to counter all forms of violent extremism by equipping state, local, tribal, and territorial governments, community organizations, and other partners with the necessary information and resources to support a grassroots CVE approach.

Discussion

The threat from violent extremism continues to evolve. Terrorists at home and abroad are increasing attempts to radicalize and recruit individuals to conduct violence within the United States. Accordingly, DHS must adapt to the changing violent extremism threat by supplementing traditional law enforcement and counterterrorism operations with programs that empower communities to recognize warning signs and intervene before violence occurs in suspected cases of radicalization. These programs mitigate the effects of messaging and targeted propaganda material on the internet and technology platforms that attempt to radicalize individuals to conduct violence. In the homeland security context, CVE activities focus on deterring individuals from committing or materially supporting foreign and domestic extremist violence.

The DHS *Community Partnership Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism* outlines goals and objectives that the Department can take over the next five years to decrease communities' receptiveness to violent extremist recruitment narratives; provide peaceful avenues for expressing grievances; educate communities about the threat of online recruitment and radicalization to violence; and prepare and equip communities to address all forms of violent extremism. To achieve this vision, DHS will coordinate internal CVE programs, build trust and partnerships among local community partners, provide local partners with CVE training and tools, and continue researching and analyzing the causes of radicalization. Throughout these activities, DHS will preserve civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy.

Timeliness: An approved department-level strategy will serve to articulate DHS CVE aims and vision, and solidify the business principles and efforts across the department to conduct and manage CVE programs and activities.

Recommendation: That you approve the DHS *Community Partnership Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism* and issue the Memorandum to DHS Leadership for Implementation, signaling the approval of the strategy and our new CVE Approach.

Approve/date _____ Disapprove/date _____

Modify/date _____ Needs discussion/date _____

Attachment:

A. The DHS *Community Partnership Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism*



THE COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIP
STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM

**Date (to be filled in
after signature)**

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Department of Homeland Security Countering Violent Extremism Programs and Initiatives

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Homeland Security Advisory Council



Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee

Interim Report and Recommendations
June 2016

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PREFACE

In November 2015, Jeh C. Johnson, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (the Department), directed the Homeland Security Advisory Council (“HSAC”), to establish a subcommittee (“Subcommittee”) that is focused on Countering Violent Extremism (“CVE”).¹ The Subcommittee was stood up to act as an incubator of ideas for the new Office for Community Partnerships (DHS/OCP), and has worked to leverage outside expertise and new thinking to support and enhance as well as assist in reframing and re-envisioning, where necessary the Department’s CVE efforts.

Specifically, the Subcommittee was asked to address how the Department can best support non-governmental initiatives that either directly or indirectly counter violent extremism, including:

- Identifying opportunities or platforms useful for the Department’s facilitation of public-private partnerships with both technology and philanthropic sectors
- The development of new networks and a framework for sustained dialogue and engagement with those partners to include non-governmental sectors
- Other non-governmental sectors, besides technology and philanthropic, that should be leveraged for CVE and how the Department should engage them
- How best to work with education and mental health professionals to help parents and schools understand how they can counter youth radicalization to violence
- How the Department can inspire peer-to-peer attempts to challenge violent extremism through public-private partnerships

This report focuses on the spread of violent extremist ideology and the recruitment of American youth to extremist groups, and how the Department can be a platform and an engine to leverage partnerships in the technology, health, education, communications, cultural, philanthropic, financial, and non-government sectors to counter such recruitment. While recognizing previous efforts – from those of the Spring 2010 Countering Violent Extremism Working Group to the more-recent Foreign Fighter Task Force – this report seeks to focus on discrete areas, separate and distinct than those undertaken in other efforts.

Subcommittee Findings

To effectively address and conquer the challenge of violent extremism, our nation requires the full engagement of our whole community, and entities across sectors. Chief among these elements are the American people and the American private, non-governmental and academic sectors, working in partnership with the government. Today, more than ever, we must harness the power of American ingenuity, creativity, and resilience. We must engage, activate, and align the private and non-governmental and academic sectors to address violent extremism, and the threat that it poses – in all its forms, across all communities.

¹ Please see Appendix #5 for CVE definition.

Subcommittee Members recommend a range of initiatives to support the Department's approach to the above focus areas, having solicited a broad array of views from leaders in the non-governmental, technology, philanthropic, public, health, and academic sectors.

Notably, the Subcommittee unanimously recommends significantly increasing staffing funding by as much as \$100 million for both grants and program administration for the DHS/OCP charged with implementing CVE efforts and representing the Department within the newly designated CVE Task Force. This funding would be used to develop a nationwide infrastructure of federal support to local community efforts, continue to spur innovation online and in the social sciences, and provide necessary grant funding to support non-profits and local governments in their CVE work. The current funding level of \$10 million in FY 16 for grant programs through DHS/OCP is insufficient to effectively counter the spread of violent extremist ideology in the United States, and does not in itself offer the chance to level – much less gain advantage against – increasingly aggressive efforts to recruit and radicalize our youth by violent extremist organizations at home and abroad.² Securing additional funding can help mitigate the threat of violent extremist ideologies but will require close and sustained coordination with Congress – potentially to include a new Congressional Liaison within DHS/OCP. This will include dedicated funding spanning all forms of violent extremism and funding for data and metrics such that future programing may be supported based on evidence.

Just as significantly, while many related national security challenges (such as public health or climate change)³ receive funding for initiatives through private foundations and other non-profits, CVE receives very little. As such, in the immediate term, *all* of the weight of this challenge is on government to mobilize resources and encourage stronger private sector engagement. Given the credibility of non-government actors to achieve CVE objectives, and adaptive nature of private philanthropy, incentivizing their involvement will be paramount for success. Experts strongly recommend that government act quickly to enable a conducive environment for private sector action.

Many experts expressed concerns that funding is tied to the same agencies that have law enforcement mandates or that CVE stigmatizes some of the very communities it seeks to help, notably the American Muslim communities. As noted in the recommendations, addressing the core of these perceptions and otherwise creating incentives for private foundations to help address this challenge cooperatively is critical if we are to have a lasting impact.

This report seeks to catalyze efforts between the public and private sectors. The Subcommittee notes the need not just for a high volume of activities, but also for more targeted, professional, and comprehensive actions. Of note, better data analysis and use of

² Consistent with the understanding that \$10 million is not sufficient, on May 26, 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out S. 3001, The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2017 which provides \$50 million for CVE grants for FY17. <https://www.congress.gov/bills/114th-congress/senate-bill/3001>

³ The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. "Fact Sheet: The 2015 National Security Strategy." News release, February 6, 2015. The White House. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/06/fact-sheet-2015-national-security-strategy>.

innovative measures of effectiveness will be important to ensure future efforts are evidence-based.

In addition, a common theme that underlies the majority of recommendations is the need to recognize the cultural and technological trends shaping identities of Millennials and to directly engage them in efforts.

Also notable is what the government should *not* do, such as to act as the messenger (as opposed to *empowering* “credible messengers” or “influencers”). Further, government must avoid stigmatizing specific communities or those seeking mental health services and ensure adherence to the privacy restrictions inherent in The Privacy Act and The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).

The use of social media and technology are part of the challenge, the Department must fully understand and leverage social media in its policy and programmatic activities. To generate new ideas and bring additional expertise to the Department’s CVE work in this sector, the Subcommittee spoke with a range of experts in digital marketing and branding, technology, and social media.

The United States Government must take all forms of violent extremism and radicalization seriously, prioritizing those forms that pose the greatest threats to safety and security, most urgently.

Ultimately, the approaches this report recommends for the Department will help it evolve over time and adapt to the changing nature of violent extremism itself, namely, the convergence and alliances of violent extremist groups across the full spectrum of grievances: To include those that espouse and/or undertake violence justified through various ideologies, to include anarchists, sovereign citizens, white-supremacists, and others.

The subcommittee believes that the U.S. Government needs to build mechanisms for animating state, local, civil society, and the private sector as key enablers to adapt to this new era of challenges. This report seeks to assist in that effort. Based on these themes, and in light of the functional areas requested by the Secretary for examination, the Subcommittee respectfully submits the following recommendations.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)⁴ Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) engaged with a wide range of experts and leaders to assess the status of efforts to counter violent extremism in the Homeland. Based on their input, the Subcommittee is making recommendations to expand on non-governmental partnership principles referenced in the HSAC Foreign Fighter Task Force Interim Report, Spring 2015. Specifically, the Subcommittee recommends:

- **Strengthening the Department to Do the Job:** The Department is significantly under-resourced to provide the activities and programming to stem online and offline radicalization and recruitment to extremist violence in the United States. A clear-eyed view of the threat before us, which the Subcommittee recognizes, requires an immediate *and* significant increase in funding and other resources – including possibly new authorities – for the Department to accomplish its goals.

Key Recommendations

- Strengthen the Office for Community Partnerships by immediately increasing funding and authority
 - Redesign infrastructure of communications to take into account new technologies and methods being used by the non-governmental sector
 - Given the evolving threat and how the process of radicalization itself is evolving, update and change the rules on how government uses lexicon
 - Invest in deeper and more deliberate data analysis and more well-trained professionals in government to coordinate efforts efficiently
 - Develop partnerships with the Departments of State, Education, and Health and Human Services to build new lines of interaction on CVE programs
 - Strengthen partnerships with State, Local, Tribal and Territorial law enforcement stakeholders to ensure connectivity and coordination on CVE efforts.
- **Focusing on a National Architecture Across All 50 States:** Given that we live in an open and democratic system, and regardless of ideological persuasion, the threat of violent extremism does not recognize U.S. jurisdictional boundaries – state and local, national or tribal. The Department must be aggressive about building the necessary networks nationally. Existing efforts that have proven effective must be scaled up. Our approach must be focused on the power of government to encourage and unleash our greatest strengths. The private, non-governmental sector – including the full range of civil society across *all* communities, working hand-in-hand with leaders in science, faith, and technology – and with the full endorsement of our elected leaders at all levels offers the best chance to counter the threat of violent extremism for future generations.

⁴ In this report, CVE is defined as actions to counter efforts by extremists to radicalize, recruit or mobilize followers to violence and to address the conditions that allow violent extremist recruitment and radicalization

Key Recommendations

- Scale existing partnerships with the non-governmental sector that are already funded by government and have proven to be effective
 - Establish new strategic partnerships with the private sector
 - Catalyze new networks with the philanthropic and financial sectors
 - Create and leverage networks and professional associations of mental health and social services organizations to create scalable partnerships with the philanthropic sector
 - Partner and expand national networks of mayors and governors.
- **Prioritizing Attention on the Millennial Generation:** Our nation's youth are at risk of online radicalization and recruitment like never before. They are by far the largest demographic being targeted by extremists, especially online. It is therefore our duty to protect them. Prioritized attention to the generation under 30 years old (digital natives across race, religion, ethnicity, location, socioeconomic levels, ideology, and gender) is required to prevent violent ideologies from influencing this segment of our population.

Key Recommendations

- Prioritize attention on efforts to counter the recruitment of youth to violent ideologies across race, religion, ethnicity, location, socioeconomic levels, and gender
- Establish partnerships for collaboration with the Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Education to address a range of pathways to recruitment, exchange of best practices and lessons learned.
- Scale up platforms (social media, technology, new, and emerging media) to encourage private sector creation of more and more targeted online content and micro-targeted distribution channels
- Partner with public and private colleges and universities across the country

In this report, the Subcommittee lays out a conceptual framework for the Department and offers specific actions that should be taken to leverage its strength, address areas of improvement, and provide a way forward that is measurable and comprehensive. This report offers the Secretary of Homeland Security a clear assessment of what must be done in the short and long term. The recommendations herein are paramount to keep the Department appropriately adaptive to the new generation of threats to the Homeland related to the threat of violent extremism.

I. THE DEPARTMENT: SETTING US UP TO DO THE JOB

Background

Based on consultations with a wide range of experts, the Subcommittee recommends that the Department of Homeland Security develop a comprehensive organizational plan to address the issue of the rising appeal and impact of violent extremist ideologies to domestic audiences. This will require significantly scaling the Department's footprint and capacities to engage civil society and the private sector. Our investment must match our rhetoric and rise to the generational challenge that we face, so that words can translate into concrete and measurable action. In order to do so, the Department must look inward to change the way it speaks to itself and the world and to invest in best practices that catalyze research and harness the full spectrum of American technology and creativity to take on this challenge while, at the same time, looking beyond government to identify partners-as well as resources- who can assist in this effort.

The Subcommittee urges the Department to recognize its strategic strengths as an institution in fulfilling its objective, including acting as convener and facilitator, and as a thought leader and intellectual partner to prioritize what is working. Building the right platforms and networks across U.S. society and facilitating connectivity with non-governmental partners presents an appropriate role for the Department as it seeks to engage a new generation of change-makers. In order to empower such momentum, the Department must have clear leadership and direction, with a broad footprint to complement non-governmental actors. With inspiration from a wide variety of experienced organizations and people ranging from non-profits, entrepreneurs, business leaders, and those within government, progress towards defeating violent extremist ideologies is possible.

Recommendation 1: Strengthen the Office for Community Partnerships

Context:

In September 2015, Secretary Johnson established DHS/OCP to “build relationships and promote trust, and, in addition, find innovative ways to support communities that seek to discourage violent extremism and undercut terrorist narratives.”⁵ DHS/OCP is charged with leading the Department's CVE efforts and with serving as the inaugural chair of the interagency CVE Task Force.

Given its central role within both the Department and the interagency, DHS/OCP is well suited to lead the efforts described throughout this document, and will require significant new resources to do so. Despite increased public and policy focus on CVE, federal funding has not matched the scope of this very real and present challenge. The initial national CVE strategy released in 2011, “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent

⁵ Department of Homeland Security. Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on DHS's New Office for Community Partnerships. September 28, 2015.

Violent Extremism in the United States”⁶ provided unfunded or under-funded roles and responsibilities for federal, state, local, and community partners on prevention. For five years, the Department has been placed in the untenable position of implementing a national strategy with no new funding. In FY16, for the first time, Congress allocated \$10 million dollars to the Department for CVE grants, and \$3.1M for the establishment of the office; it should move quickly to hire staff for DHS/OCP and efficiently and effectively dispense grant funding, including establishing new mechanisms for moving federal funding immediately to effective partners and programs.

In January 2016, Secretary Johnson announced the creation of the permanent interagency CVE Task Force which is responsible for bringing together personnel from across the executive branch to ensure that the challenge of violent extremism is faced in a unified and coordinated way. The CVE Task Force’s work is important and integral to the success of CVE efforts. To this end, since all of the domestic focused recommendations, particularly those that are operational in nature would be best carried out by DHS/OCP.

Actions:

1. Establish DHS/OCP as the Secretary’s CVE office, ensuring its leadership reports directly to the Secretary.
2. Significantly increase funding to DHS/OCP and authorize it to distribute funds to state, local, and non-governmental actors.
 - a. Provide DHS/OCP with \$100 million per fiscal year in funding. This funding will be used for CVE grants for programs and networks implemented across the nation. This would include office infrastructure, field staff expansion, and program resources.
3. Formalize DHS/OCP’s role as the single CVE coordinator for the Department and a single point of contact to facilitate ease of dialogue between non-governmental entities and the Department.
4. Extend the mandate of the HSAC CVE Subcommittee to serve as a standing partner to DHS/OCP, the Department’s Private Sector Office, and the Department in implementing the recommendations of this report and facilitating input and engagement from outside subject matter experts.
5. Establish regional offices around the country to facilitate DHS/OCP partnerships across state and local jurisdictions.
6. Formalize a partnership for a DHS/OCP Innovation Lab modeled after the State Department and Defense Department’s similar efforts.⁷ The Lab should facilitate the full range of efforts related to innovation and partnerships with technology innovators.
7. Task DHS/OCP and the Department’s Private Sector Office to:
 - a. Aggressively implement a philanthropic development strategic plan to provide ways for regional philanthropic fundraising for

⁶ The White House. “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.” August 2011.

⁷ Pellerin, Cheryl. DoD’s Silicon Valley Innovation Experiment Begins.” *U.S. Department of Defense*. 29 October 2015. and *Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Strategy Lab*

- community programs, working with the new Philanthropic Advisor to the HSAC (see Section II, Recommendation 2).
- b. Build new access points for American companies, social entrepreneurial organizations, and educational institutions to contribute to CVE in-kind and otherwise.
 - c. Build on what we have done overseas and remodel it for the American context. Seizing the best ideas and content on all aspects of CVE from other agencies and departments and other countries – requires new lines of interaction with the State Department, USAID, and Voice of America (See further: Section III, Recommendation 2).

Recommendation 2: Redesign Infrastructure of Communications

Context:

The changing nature of technology and the access it provides to ideas, notably the type and volume of violent extremist content and efforts to recruit youth to violent extremism has created an evolving challenge and opportunity. We are struggling to keep up with its pace and impact. Importantly, the process of radicalization begins at an individual level and relies on a constant feed of reinforcing ideologies that are spread both on and offline. Looking at the way ideas are spread in both domains is vital to our efforts. Local communities are central to understanding not only the origin but also the impact of changes taking place within neighborhoods, among peer groups, and as a result of influencers. In the online space, extremist groups have mastered the facility of integrated systems of communication, globally and at a scale and pace that has surpassed our current efforts to dominate the playing field. Their 24/7 efforts require us to be equally as constant and we must engage on this challenge on a level that is commensurate. With numerous forums wholly dedicated to messaging hate, current counter-narrative efforts are insufficient to keep up in time or volume of content. We must address the challenge of micro-targeting by our adversaries, which puts an onus on communities and the private sector to help confront and counter in creative ways.

In the case of foreign fighters seeking to join groups like ISIL, the Subcommittee sees the potential of a significant chapter ahead. A March 2015 Brookings Institution report suggested that ISIL supporters used approximately 46,000 Twitter accounts worldwide.⁸ According to the Department's Center of Excellence, the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), in 2002, the Internet was a factor contributing to the radicalization of 37% of the foreign fighters and aspirants who attempted travel to conflict zones to fight on behalf of terrorist organizations there. By 2015, the Internet contributed to the radicalization of 86% of those attempting travel since 2005, and 83% of the same in 2015 alone. Half of the individuals used the Internet and other technology tools as their primary source of information about traveling to the conflict zones. Further, approximately half of the

⁸ Berger, J.M. and Morgan, Jonathan. "The ISIS Twitter Consensus: Defining and describing the population of ISIS on Twitter." Brookings Institution. The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World. March 2015.

successful travelers maintained an active presence on social media, most often using social media to encourage others to travel, document experiences, and share tips for evading law enforcement detection. The data indicates that 20% of individuals attempting travel had established relationships with online travel facilitators who helped arrange safe houses and escorts to conflict zones.

American youth are not immune to this and there are increasing efforts to recruit young Americans to violent extremist ideologies. The nature of social media and the way extremists seed their ideas means that our communication system must be specific to the American context. The Department must adapt to this new era while amplifying our knowledge of how extremists lure youth offline in more traditional means. Arguably our nation has extraordinary possibilities of saturating the on and offline space.

Actions:

1. Leverage private sector expertise and best practices for deploying technology, communications, and marketing across mediums:
 - a. Bring private sector talent into the government through the Department's Loaned Executive Program to assess and provide recommendations on communications and marketing efforts to support the CVE mission, including how to design measures of effectiveness.
 - b. Institute a new exchange program whereby the Department's professionals can embed with technology, marketing, and communications companies for short periods of time to learn expertise and build relationships; this can be accomplished through the Exemplar Program authorized through the Department's Private Sector Office.
 - c. Appoint "Technology Advisers" who are employed in the private sector but who are able to work with and provide expertise to the Department through the HSAC CVE Subcommittee.
 - d. Build mechanisms for the exchange of best practices and lessons learned from the media and technology sectors on the creation of adjacent and native content for persuasion.
2. For the Department to help support the efforts of non-profit programs and organizations working to address messaging, technology, and communications issues by identifying one dedicated point of contact within DHS/OCP to convene non-profit and the private sector stakeholders to further the Department's and OCP's work in this field.
3. Appoint a new Member to the HSAC who works for a communications, branding or marketing agency and has a range of relevant experience in media and related industries.

Recommendation 3: Change Our Lexicon by Shifting How We Speak with Each Other and the World

Context:

The term CVE was developed to describe soft power tools focused on countering and defeating the ideology of violent extremists. It encompasses the range of communications, community engagement, mental health, and related practices that may reduce ideological, psychological, or community-driven factors conducive to support for violent extremist ideologies. In recent years, the term has moved into new spaces and has created unintended implications. CVE is not hard power, and it is not an investigative tool for law enforcement. Regardless, there is now a great deal of confusion among a new generation of government officials and civic leaders about what it means, what actual CVE programs do, and how to measure their impact. Recognition of this problem is critical, but it is possible to begin to change the perception and reclaim the original intent.

There are several layers to the issue around lexicon in the context of CVE. On the one hand, it might seem obvious to change the term CVE because there is a perception about its meaning that securitizes relationships between government and—in particular—Muslim communities. This results in credible influencers rejecting work that at all connects them to CVE. On the other hand, reformulating a new term that is agreed upon by the inter-agency and community groups could take years and is unlikely to yield a sustainable consensus. Subcommittee members do not recommend that the Department engage in a process to redefine CVE itself. Instead, the Subcommittee recommends focusing on immediate steps now that can help engage the full range of actors in the private and non-governmental sectors across communities in our nation.

There is a disagreement among scholars, government officials, and activists about the right lexicon to use around the issues of violent extremism. At the same time, report after report has recommended that the U.S. Government be consistent in its language and its meaning, highlighting that tone and word choice matter. Under no circumstance should we be using language that will alienate or be disrespectful of fellow Americans. Thus, we need to be clearer in what we mean and how we say it. Further, we are at a particular moment on the world stage with global events driving fear, political and cultural rhetoric leaning on sharp and divisive language, and deep polarization and distrust across communities. All of this is set against the backdrop of digitally connected recruitment efforts that are actively trying to exploit differences and create divisions across U.S. society. We must speak with honor and respect about all communities within the United States. We should give dignity to the many histories and diversities within our nation and advocate for a consistent whole of government approach that utilizes agreed terms and words. Tone and word choice matter.

Mental health experts and educators connect the environment we live in to emotional and physical well-being, behavior and issues of identity, belonging, and security. Words are part of that environment. Often without knowing it, we have constructed language in daily use that promotes an “us and them” narrative of division. Though it was

within the context of the “War on Terror,” the Department’s 2008 guidance about lexicon is important to review as it has bearing on groups like ISIL. It instructs the Department to ensure terminology is “properly calibrated to diminish the recruitment efforts of extremists who argue that the West is at war with Islam.”

In condemning violent extremism in all forms, we must also be better at communicating with the public and within government. In sum, we are in a complicated and challenging chapter: more people know we need to fight the spread of extremist ideologies but many do not know what we mean when we say we want to do that through CVE programs.

Actions:

1. Renew efforts to describe CVE, its origin of soft power,⁹ and attempt to re-establish the term to ensure that prevention programs are not inter-mingled with surveillance or intelligence-gathering programs.
2. Bring consistency into government use of language and meaning.
3. Ensure the Department reviews the 2008 directive and uses a vocabulary when discussing extremism that avoids the “us versus them” framing.
4. Reject religiously-charged terminology and problematic positioning by using plain meaning American English.
 - a. US v THEM: For example, use “American Muslim” rather than “Muslim American”; “Muslim communities” rather than “Muslim world.”
 - b. AMERICAN ENGLISH: For example, on using American English instead of religious, legal and cultural terms like “*jihad*,” “*sharia*,” “*takfir*” or “*umma*.”

Recommendation 4: Investing in Deeper Research and Data Analytics

Context:

In the 15 years since 9/11, there has been a significant amount of research in the field of extremism including how extremist groups prey upon young people, what techniques they use, and which types of messages resonate. We must be ahead of the curve and understand these trends. This means we need research and data that will give us the information we need to build a long-term CVE infrastructure that is evolved and adaptive.

We have seen new aspects to the threat emerge, like women radicalizing, and, compared to what we know about foreign populations and radicalization, there is limited data on American youth and their vulnerabilities. Moreover, as important as research focused on the entire scope of the radicalization process is, we do not have complete information around the measurement and evaluation of programs that intend to stop the

⁹Soft power can be defined as the ability to persuade rather than coerce to achieve a desired end. See Nye, Joseph S. “Soft Power.” *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (1990): 153-71.

appeal of extremists' ideologies. As such, we need to construct more effective tools to allow greater access to CVE research, and comprehensive and open source data. The Department must act as a catalyst to promote more aggressive research and analysis and find ways to collaborate with non-governmental experts doing such work.

Actions:

1. Catalog all CVE programs within America (see map in Appendix 3) both government-funded and independent – to create a comprehensive and transparent overview of what exists in America and where gaps might exist. Remarkably none exists anywhere.
2. Assess the scope of work that exists on youth between 7 and 30 years of age regarding education and the process of violent extremist radicalization.
3. Develop clear measurements of impact based on the nature of the threat before us, and utilizing private sector approaches to measurement.
4. Build a practicum of research on the connectivity between other forms of extremism such as hate speech, cults, and other related issues.
5. Ensure there is a research focus on offline efforts to radicalize, including offline efforts that support online recruitment.
6. Catalog communications efforts and strategies currently underway that seek to provide counter, alternative, or proactive narratives by key stakeholders so that there is greater connectivity in the collective research. Stovepipes must be broken down.
7. Reduce redundancy in research and analysis. Facilitate cohesive purpose between the Department and the Department of State and other government entities to have access to and utilize U.S. Government-funded research and knowledge about U.S. Government funded programs abroad, and better understand approaches, lessons-learned and successes from our international partners.
8. Pioneer research around content from diverse communities within America, using this information to design and develop counter-narratives and bespoke programs for specific communities.
9. Redirect more research around gender differences, including child and adolescent behavior.

II. BUILDING AN ARCHITECTURE FOR ALL 50 STATES

Background

No region in the world is immune to the ideology of violent extremists and America has not been immune from terrorist attacks inspired by violent extremist ideologies. Rapid technological evolution and aggressive peddling of extremist ideology of all kinds suggests that extremist groups are exposing America's children to an unprecedented array of techniques, narratives, and tactics to radicalize. Although the United States has powerful advantages to fortify ourselves against the spread of violent extremist ideology, including our traditions of community activism and awareness on and offline, there has been significant growth in the ability of violent extremists to scale their efforts. In addition to a rise in hate-related crimes and speech reported across the country, there are open investigations by law enforcement agencies on American citizens in all 50 states targeting groups like ISIL.

We must scale up our efforts proportionally to ensure that future generations have the capacity and tools to stem the appeal of violent extremist ideology and thus, diminish the threat of terrorism in our own nation. We do not have the luxury of time. We must help create a new system of awareness, resilience, and understanding around extremism and the violence that comes from it. We must include all aspects of the trajectory to radicalization and develop a comprehensive response to the threat we face. To date, we have not built a nationwide architecture that integrates all that we know about radicalization and its prevention. As a result, efforts are ad hoc, disparate, under-funded, and sometimes redundant or counter-productive.

Efforts to counter extremist violence overseas since 9/11 has cost the United States over \$1.6 trillion.¹⁰ Funding in FY16 represents the first time ever in the Executive Branch that the Department will fund \$10M to support and expand locally led efforts to implement CVE programing. There is no guarantee from the Congress that these funds will continue to grow in the FY17 budget request. Such funding is woefully low and has left us with a domestic approach that is segmented and insufficient.

The Subcommittee believes that the U.S. Government needs a national CVE plan that looks at the spread of ideology and its impact, which is distinct from a particular terrorist threat and its intersection with law enforcement. Because we know that cross-border communication and transit are easier than they have ever been, all states and localities must be part of addressing the challenge of violent extremism. In order to do so, the U.S. Government notably DHS/OCP must have the platforms to coordinate and communicate with partners locally, and those partners must be viewed as central components of an integrated system of networks. These networks run across all segments of society, from faith leaders to cultural icons, from mental health and science experts to teen entrepreneurs to philanthropists and corporations, to parent-teacher networks.

¹⁰ Belasco, Amy. "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11." Congressional Research Service. December 8, 2014

The U.S. Government's ability to be the convener and facilitator, catalyze new networks, and pioneer new relationships with the non-governmental sector is essential to the success of creating a new American roadmap to build resilient communities.

Empowering local mayors and governors by giving them the insights, ideas, and information they need, along with linkages to best in class experts and organizations will be a game changer. The Subcommittee urges a nationwide approach to CVE, tailoring particular components in line with the individual cities and towns.

Recommendation 1: Build and Expand Platforms, Networks and Partnerships:

Context:

In order to expand to a nationwide footprint, we must create partnerships, platforms, and networks across states and localities. Notably we must invigorate non-governmental partners who have the expertise, skills, and credibility to construct a comprehensive approach to national CVE awareness and understanding around radicalization and recruitment. Further, as non-governmental people and systems are often the best practitioners of CVE programs, widening the connectivity across expertise areas will allow for innovation, creativity, sharing of best practices and coordinating efforts. New national platforms, networks and partnerships will allow us to quickly scale up our efforts and impact key areas.

Individuals in the marketing and technology industries have informed the Subcommittee of their interest in contributing time and expertise to this challenge. Many of CVE's challenges would benefit from this expertise, particularly counter-messaging and empowering communities; but, given restrictions on government accepting gifts or in-kind donations, a new approach must be imagined so that these partners can contribute.

Digital marketing experts have a sophisticated set of tools and methodologies that are proven to work, such as discovering a range of relevant information, creating, branding and marketing compelling content, and tracking real-world metrics to identify the most effective content for further distribution. Therefore, outside entities can be far more effective in leveraging digital marketing best practices than the government and if connected to non-governmental organizations can make a difference to achieving CVE objectives.

Family members, close friends, teachers, and clergy are often the first to notice that their loved one or friend is showing a warning sign of radicalization. According to a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report, in more than fifty percent of terrorist cases, family members see signs of radicalization but few consider a call for help. Finding ways to bring both experts and the general public into the CVE community is paramount for success. In short, we must create mechanisms to allow this critical group of people to both get help for their loved ones and find ways to seek counsel.

State and local government, especially in the prison system, and those who have experience and understanding around these issues have seldom been brought into the larger conversation and lack mechanisms to make that happen. There is an important continuum of law enforcement, the judiciary, and the corrections systems that must be incorporated into CVE efforts. Working in partnership with key departments and agencies, DHS has the capacity to help create a common understanding of the challenges of CVE and the potential opportunities for cooperation.

Finally, educators, schools and networks of parents and teachers, as well as organizations that impact youth, have had little to no connectivity to issues around radicalization and should be brought into the fold.

Actions:

1. Create mechanisms for the exchange of ideas and expertise on CVE beyond just the Department and include, potentially, the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services so that their extensive networks can add to our understanding of how violent ideologies are permeating across communities.
2. Create partnerships with cities and states to develop training and toolkits on CVE best practices. Leverage current networks of mayors and governors to develop working partnerships and strategies, and share best practices.
 - a. Utilize existing networks such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors and National Governors Association.
 - b. Work with the State Department to strengthen the Strong Cities Network for a national network of mayors and Governors in the United States.
3. Partner with public and private colleges and universities across the country. Scale up access to information on CVE by building a comprehensive CVE curriculum and create partnerships with universities nationwide so that “innovation labs” around CVE may be stood up.
4. Facilitate a network of corrections officials and re-entry service providers to identify the prison radicalization risk and spearhead rehabilitation best practices.
5. Develop demonstration programs that partner service-providers, faith-based actors, and local government to other localities. Take best practices from around the world to understand how such partnerships may be created and scaled up.
6. Create an information-sharing network for mental health, faith-based organizations, community centers, social work, and law enforcement actors, ensuring partners with access to sensitive information use separate servers with respect to HIPAA compliance.

Recommendation 2: Mental Health and Social Services Partnerships

Context:

Remarkably, though we know that understanding the child and adolescent mind is critical to understanding the radicalization and recruitment process, the U.S. Government has not built a formal system of accessing the very best data, research, and experts on a

regular basis. Because developmental experts consider adolescent and young adult brain development and cognition to continue until roughly age 26, adolescence stretches into adulthood.¹¹ As recruits to violent extremist groups get younger and younger, and ISIL in particular is curating precise content for youth at specific stages of development, we are woefully behind in bringing the very best our nation has to offer into protecting our youth. Even further, we have not built any substantive outlets for youth to access help as they find themselves being drawn into the ideology, nor have we sufficiently offered America's parents a way to get help for their children as they perceive a change in their behavior. Consulting with mental health experts seems obvious, but there is no regular system in place to do so nor have we connected the world-class medical expertise in this field to our understanding about radicalization and extremism. We need to "complicate"¹² the thinking of adolescents around decision making, appeal to their individuality, openly discuss radicalization rather than avoid it, and understand their thinking on and impact of emotional impulses. It is rare to find partnerships between those that work on CVE and these medical and scientific experts who can help build more targeted and effective programs.

The subcommittee believes that the U.S. Government must do far more with our mental health sector. We have reached out to almost every other sector in America and we must execute a new chapter and partnership with the health sector, broadly speaking. Child and adolescent mental health resources must be a part of the architecture to protect our nation's youth so as emerging adults develop their worldview and subsequent behavior they have the tools needed to be resilient to the appeal of violent extremist ideologies.^{13 14}

Actions:

1. Work with leading hospitals and medical schools nationally to convene a high level group of researchers from psychology/psychiatry whose work specifically addresses violent extremism and those whose work could inform important aspects of CVE.
2. Create a system of ongoing dialogue between mental health sector experts with those in the policy sphere, and support dialogue between those doing research in the field and those designing content and distribution channels to reach our youth.
3. Create a new dynamic and innovative center by using an existing mental health venue (hospital, child-mind institute, research center, etc.) to bring together every element and dimension of the challenge. America needs a place that is the leading

¹¹ Interview with subject matter experts from Massachusetts General Hospital

¹² Term was presented and explained to the Subcommittee during conversation with subject matter experts from Massachusetts General Hospital.

¹³ Additionally, researchers at World Health Organization (WHO) recently concluded that 27% of the adult population has experienced at least one mental disorder in the past year – the best way to tackle this concerning trend is through prevention early in childhood development. Thus, a national approach that focuses on children and young adults on and offline will provide the best opportunity to help prevent our youth from finding extremist ideology appealing.

¹⁴ Clinicians have also noted that we should not adopt "the simplistic notion that mental illness could act as a marker for potential assassins, when psychotic illnesses are relatively common and assassins are extraordinarily rare." That is, we should not regard those who are seeking mental help as a "pool" of potential lone actor terrorists, not only because it is inaccurate, but because it could stigmatize those being in therapy and deter people who need help from seeking it, which could have serious consequences for the individual and his or her environment.

- touchstone on how to help teens and young adults by understanding what is happening in the mind and that connects the behavioral, medical and scientific expertise on this issue.
- a. Part of this center will use BioPsychoSocial¹⁵ and Socio-Ecological¹⁶ frameworks in addition to several critical domains, including social bonds, identity, marginalization, discrimination, trauma, civic engagement/youth voice, individual and community resilience, and community engagement as well as participatory research including in-group and out-group dynamics and online behavior research.
 - b. In each of these spheres, it is also important to think not only about risk/protective factors but how people have translated this knowledge into interventions that work. The center can be a place that can offer a holistic analysis of what is happening to teens and young adults and ways communities can get help as needed.
4. Create a network of grassroots organizations that counsel and disengage, using health, family, and social work resources, modeled on successful programs in other countries, but tailored to the U.S. context.
 5. Create a national hotline for rapid intervention teams in the event of a radicalization concern.
 6. Utilize the vast array of programs that already exist for other purposes, such as reducing juvenile crime, countering gangs, and preventing violence. We must develop a keen understanding of the mental health progression from childhood through adulthood with this particular kind of threat, incorporating CVE goals into existing mental health programs rather than having to consider creating new programs from scratch.

Recommendation 3: Catalyze Efforts in the Philanthropic and Private Sectors

Context:

Non-governmental actors can play a significant role in generating ideas and expertise, networks, momentum, and substantive funds to tackle problems that once were perceived to be the sole responsibility of government. Cause related philanthropy has built momentum among Millennials and interestingly, cultural icons from finance, tech, music and film have championed causes to fight child exploitation, including the plights of child soldiers and child slavery. Despite this fact, the issue of radicalization and recruitment of young people has not yet been a mainstream topic of philanthropy.

¹⁵ BioPsychoSocial - Psychology/psychiatry often takes a "biopsychosocial approach to understanding health and illness. And more specifically considers how psychological (i.e., emotions, feelings, thoughts, behaviors), social (i.e., socioeconomic status, culture, societal context) and biological (i.e., genetics, basic neuroscience processes, physiology) factors and their complex interactions influence health and behavior.

¹⁶ The Socio-Ecological model considers the complex interplay between an individual and his/her levels of social ecology (e.g., family, friends, school, neighborhood, nation, culture). This model highlights the range of social contexts/factors that a person lives within and that may make him/her vulnerable or serve to protect him/her. This model emphasizes that each level of one's social ecology influences another and therefore can be an opportunity for invention and will ultimately have impact across levels.

Ironically, it is this very sector that is needed most in order to scale up local ideas to fight the recruitment of youth for several reasons. Through seeding new ideas and creative approaches, increasing the power of ongoing projects or building new momentum, these kinds of private resources are very powerful. To inject alternative spaces and ideas into communities that are vulnerable, it takes organic and local initiatives to resonate because they are trusted.

Unfortunately, despite the seriousness of the threat of extremists, and the increase in fear and awareness in America that extremist ideology is increasing, non-governmental sectors continue to give little funding to organizations or initiatives that deal with this threat. Indeed, we have not seen the non-governmental sector realize its potential in providing funds to protect youth from violent extremists.

Despite the attempts at very high levels, there have been few major foundation initiatives or notable individual philanthropists who have initiated a new wave of philanthropic giving to communities who want to protect youth from the appeal of violent ideologies. The common perception that “government has money” or “it is a government problem” from potential donors has resulted in serious challenges and slowed the scaling up of effective local CVE programs. Local grassroots efforts, which could have the most impact, have difficulty accessing the needed resources to execute their ideas at scale. Organic ideas in the social media sector that beg to be tested require money. Professionalizing the fight against extremists in the ideological space requires more resources and, at present, the American effort at the grassroots is insufficient compared to the significant and growing threat posed by extremists preying on youth. However, while we have seen lots of money flow to other cause related philanthropy, American donors and civic investors have not yet taken on the issue of the spread and impact of extremist ideology.

At the same time, the evolving challenge of micro-targeting by our adversaries puts an onus on communities and the private sector to help confront and counter in creative ways and these communities require resources to be activated and grow. Government has a role to play in catalyzing private resources and leveraging limited government money to encourage more private resources to focus on this challenge. We also must find mechanisms that can move resources and funding quickly to private sector partners who are working at a pace commensurate with our adversaries to counter the threat in real time. Speed of funding is important and this may require a reexamination of vetting processes to streamline and create momentum where possible.

The new era of this threat requires a proliferation of local programs across the nation in a wide variety of ways to protect our nation’s children, and Americans must be made aware for the need for non-governmental money to achieve this common goal. America has over 120 million youth under age 30. There are less than five small regional U.S. Government funded programs that deal specifically with stopping the appeal of groups like ISIL, a handful of experimental initiatives in the pipeline, and limited private donation to this cause. Things must change.

Actions:

DHS/OCF and the Department's Private Sector Office to carry out and coordinate:

1. Place personnel within philanthropic organizations, modeled after the USDA supply chain coordinator program.¹⁷
2. Build regional philanthropic plans of action and activate a corps of volunteer, expert fundraisers to help community stakeholders access funds by partnering with experienced philanthropic advisory organizations.
3. Appoint a philanthropic advisor as a new Member of the HSAC and task the HSAC to develop a follow-on report on private philanthropy supporting CVE.
4. Facilitate networks between philanthropic organizations and non-governmental organizations that are seeking funding.
 - a. Seek legal guidance on what role is appropriate for the Department in these types of meetings.
 - b. Examine vetting processes and funding mechanisms to ensure they are the quickest possible so that momentum and speed are encouraged.
 - c. All meetings should be open to the public to ensure transparency in the process.
 - d. Encourage non-profits to share best practices for fundraising, development, and building credibility.
5. Convene actors and encourage the creation of philanthropic hubs for funding content creation and distribution channels for online programs. Engage and utilize selected foundations focused on the threat of violent extremism as third-party vehicles for the Department to engage in funding and support of online and offline grassroots efforts directly. Foundations acting as intermediaries for government funding to these organizations can help activate a broad spectrum of technology innovators, local organizations and expertise.
6. Examine federal gift regulations to ensure the government may welcome private sector contributions that may reduce extremism.
7. Incentivize a generation of social entrepreneurs focused on these issues, through tax incentives, seed funding, and rewarding change-maker successes.
8. Explore creating a consortium of technology companies which can partner with the Department on content development, share best practices in the industry, and provide expertise on how best to develop counter extremist messaging, including preventing technology platforms from being used for violence and violent extremist recruitment.

¹⁷ Interview with Eric Kessler, Founder, Principal and Senior Managing Director, Arabella Advisors. May 11, 2016.

III. GENERATIONAL THREAT

Background

The Millennial Generation in the United States (those born between 1982 and 2000) now represent a quarter of the nation's population, exceeding that of the Baby Boomer generation.¹⁸ Millennials are also the most diverse generation compared to any of those that preceded them—44.2 percent of Millennials are part of a minority race or ethnic group. Notably, the population currently under 5 years of age is a majority-minority generation, illustrating the diversity the next generation of adults represents. The Millennial generation are digital natives, yet they are influenced both on and offline. Their exposure to news, world events, and each other, profoundly affect their ideas, behavior, and worldviews. Naturally, connectivity to their peers globally is an important characteristic of this under 30 generation. Beyond simply recognizing that they are unique in the way they use social media to interact and influence each other, this digitally connected generation is the prime target for extremists. The American Freedom Party (AFP), a white supremacist group, recently established a youth wing,¹⁹ and they are not alone in doing so. Further, youth-focused wings of extremist organizations allow young people to draw in their peers and to facilitate youth-friendly marketing strategies. It is working. In the last few years, we have watched as youth in our country and globally are being radicalized at a concerning rate, crossing lines of race, nationality, socio economic status, ideology, education, and gender.

Researchers confirm that the median age for those recruited and radicalized to become foreign fighters for ISIL is 26 years old,²⁰ with the Internet playing a primary or contributing role in almost all radicalization processes. Even further, because extremists have developed kid and young adult friendly content, we must focus our attention on the online space. However, because youth are influenced by peers and move along emotionally through one-to-one persuasion, we also need to create an offline approach that is community driven and generational friendly. Effecting change in the environment means that we have to build a 24/7 comprehensive approach to influencing this generation. In order to do so, we must mobilize a range of efforts to protect them from recruitment and radicalization. Together with national networks of experts, peer influencers and credible content producers we can have enormous impact now. Stopping recruitment means expanding our understanding of the threat to this generation from diverse groups. We must restructure our national CVE efforts toward a framework that is attune with this demographic and design a system of influence on and offline that can significantly diminish the appeal of extremist ideology.

Recommendation 1: Protection/Predator Awareness

¹⁸ 2015 Census Bureau Report.

¹⁹ "Racist Group Begins Youth Recruitment Effort." *Anti-Defamation League*, January 12, 2015. <http://blog.adl.org/extremism/white-supremacist-group-begins-youth-recruitment-effort>.

²⁰ Program on Extremism at the George Washington University. Report. "April 2016." Accessed May 25, 2016. https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/April_Report_Update.pdf.

Context:

The Department's CVE efforts are an attempt to protect our nation's young people from extremists who prey upon the Millennial generation.²¹ The Department must reframe the conversation to reflect this reality and design a robust program around the protection of our youth, which must include predator awareness and an understanding of radicalization. In doing so, our citizens will be better equipped for this threat. Because family members, close friends, teachers, and clergy are often the first to notice that their loved one or friend may become radicalized, public awareness is a critical first step.

Significant collaborations forged with tech companies and other non-governmental and local community partners over the years have resulted in a willingness to facilitate Internet safety and related educational and awareness efforts. With parents as the first line of defense, we must work with our partners to teach parents how to identify extremist ideological recruitment and also to teach them what to do in the event that they believe their child is radicalizing. Using all aspects of influence, we must find community spearheaded approaches to be responsive to America's parents and children.

Actions:

1. Develop a curriculum in partnership with the Department of Education and education experts and non-profits to disseminate to schools, teaching children appropriate online etiquette to mitigate online hate.
2. Create an action plan with the Department of Education to provide the training and expertise to school superintendents and others about radicalization.
3. Create a network connecting technology solutions to non-profit organizations and small businesses whose missions or interests overlap with CVE but lack the technical expertise, branding, and marketing, to actualize their full impact potential.
4. Build a network of parents who can collaborate on related issues, such as grassroots organizing to raise awareness of and raise funds for efforts to prevent online predators.
5. Build a network of mothers by partnering with existing organizations to scale up efforts for innovation and awareness.
6. Develop a Peer Mediation and Training Program through the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) for peer mediation and training related to violent extremism in all of its forms.

Recommendation 2: Providing Alternative Outlets and Counter Narrative Content

²¹ Johnson, Secretary Jeh. "Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson At The University of Michigan Dearborn As Prepared." Speech, University of Michigan-Dearborn, Dearborn, MI, January 13, 2016. <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/01/15/remarks-secretary-homeland-security-jeh-johnson-university-michigan-dearborn>

Context:

“Generations, like people, have personalities, and Millennials have begun to forge theirs: confident, self-expressive, liberal, upbeat, and open to change.”²² As optimistic as this is, it is important to note that this generation and the one below it is the demographic that is of interest to extremists and one that ISIL has exploited. They are aware that youth are, among other things, searching for belonging, navigating their identity, and looking for emotional connectivity and purpose. This period of discovery is compounded by adolescence and unique social-contextual factors. It is in this environment that extremist narratives find fertile soil. In the years since 9/11, this generation has experienced a unique set of factors that set them apart not the least of which is their exposure to a 24/7 media storm, instant images, likes, tweets, and sound bites from around the world and their peers. They are taking part in concurrent systems of influence and experiencing global events in new and personal ways. A significant number of violent extremists begin their radicalization process online where social media facilitates access to answers they are seeking and promotes a personal connection to those interested in ideological dialogue. Such connectivity to extremists online can turn to coordination of plans, and the development of both online and offline relationships as well as exposure to messages of opportunity, adventure, and purpose. Speaking of the three sisters radicalized by ISIL, Shiraz Maher describes the roots of radicalization like this: “It’s identity, stupid.”²³

Regardless of the brand of extremist interested in winning them over, they are positioning their narratives to appeal to a sense of belonging, purpose, and identity. Whether the recruitment is by the Klu Klux Klan or that of ISIL, young people are targeted and persuaded around issues of belonging and identity. William McCants, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, commented, “Our brain may be wired to love our own group and dislike outsiders, but culture is the software that helps us determine who’s in and who’s out.”²⁴ The cultural context in America is distinct from any other western nation, particularly around issues of identity. We should exploit this advantage in a real way. Beyond the rhetoric about American values, Millennials need to see, experience, and own their unique stories. Just presenting Americans as the most diverse nation in the world does not go far enough. We must help ignite the development of content where peers of different cultural upbringings have the opportunity to influence each other and create their own influential voices both on and offline. Further, we have a unique opportunity to develop ethnically precise and very specific content marketing to segmented audiences delivered by grassroots partners. However, the involvement of the government is an

²² Pew. *Millennials: Confident, Connected, Open to Change* Report. February 24, 2010.

<http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/02/24/millennials-confident-connected-open-to-change/>.

²³ Maher, Shiraz. “The roots of radicalization? It’s identity, stupid.” *The Guardian*. June 17, 2015.

<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/17/roots-radicalisation-identity-bradford-jihadist-causes>. See Also: Wood, Graeme. “What ISIS Really Wants.” *The Atlantic*. March 2015.

<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/>; Berger, J.M. “Enough about Islam: Why religion is not the most useful way to understand ISIS.” Brookings. February 18, 2015.

<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/18-enough-about-islam-berger>

²⁴ McCants, William. “How Terrorists Convince Themselves to Kill.” *TIME*. December 10, 2015.

<http://time.com/4144457/how-terrorists-kill/>

immediate disqualifying and delegitimizing factor for any messaging campaign government, and will not have recognition by or resonance in the target audience. What does demonstrate success is the utilization of “influencers” with existing credibility and following, who can directly engage in both a broadcast as well as a direct dialogue with volume, tone, and content to which the target demographic will respond.²⁵

Special attention should be focused on the use of “formers” – those who have been disengaged from the path to violent extremism – as credible messengers. Some international coalition partners have been quite successful in reducing recidivism and leveraging the voices and actions of disengaged extremists in countering narratives and working within at-risk communities. The U.S. Government should better understand the use of these voices and how to integrate them into programming.

Reaching Millennials through a variety of constructive, positive, and identity-building approaches will, in turn, encourage community and belonging within the greater American space. As we develop alternative narratives we must learn from mistakes in the past and recommit to finding new ways to offer the target audiences messages delivered through credible influencers (such as activists, peer leaders, actors, comedians, athletes and others). Further, cause-related marketing and initiatives that incorporate Millennials seamlessly and clearly into the greater American space, both online and in-person, offers great promise. This is either undertaken commensurately or followed closely by on-the-ground influences, with personal interaction between individuals, many of whom could be considered social influencers and/or who are positioned within particular networks of individuals who have demonstrated interest and willingness to join violent extremist organizations. These various factors may be determinative in mobilizing individuals to join or adopt to violent extremist groups, their messages, and their efforts. Our best hope to counter negative influence is positive influence, to offer alternatives to the propaganda of extremist groups, through which we may help young people find alternate pathways. In the development of alternative narratives and programs, government can have a role to play, but for a number of reasons, that role must be minimal.

Actions:

1. Leverage entrepreneurs from influencer communities, who may act as messengers, change-makers, or inspiration for their cohorts.
2. Facilitate the use of “formers” in CVE programming and messaging.
3. Build out networks of “former” violent extremists nationally from the wide array of groups including far right, anti-government, and other extremists groups seeking to radicalize and recruit.
4. Facilitate credible messenger and similar training of individuals in at-risk populations with social media and related companies, such as YouTube.
5. Work with the technology sector to amplify counter extremist content from diverse communities from across America and build grassroots campaigns to further this effort.

²⁵ Interview with Chris Graves and Shelina Janmohamed of Ogilvy Noor. May 20, 2016.

6. Create and implement a cohesive redesign of discussion around American history to puncture incorrect understanding of American history through partners such the Smithsonian, the Department of State's Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Department of Education, and the Public Broadcasting Service, and other organizations and experts, to normalize cross-community conversation to eradicate ideas that any community is an "other."
7. Focus on gender diversity of youth through careful attention to the range of push and pull factors that attract individuals of differing gender.
8. Work with Department of State to scale effective programs that have already been funded by the U.S. Government to develop leadership skills and engage diverse youth change-agents and connect them to their American peers.
9. Work with think tanks that run international networks of change-makers and invest in long-term leadership development in key communities to build out American partnerships.
10. Re-examine existing legal and policy architecture to facilitate strategic communications within the United States based on content produced by other departments and agencies, and federally funded efforts.
11. Create a Virtual Department of Homeland Security Corps made up of university students modeled after the Department of State's Virtual Foreign Service.

CONCLUSION

Our nation's children will grow up in a world we could not have imagined a generation ago – a thriving world where human ingenuity and knowledge continues to expand by leaps and bounds. As that process of human evolution, including the expansion of freedom and liberties across the globe proceeds, our government must remain vigilant, adapt, and evolve to protect them.

We must do so by demonstrating faith in the American people, in their government, and we must be confident in the power of America's ideas. No new policy area, and no response to a historically unprecedented threat, comes without growing pains – and the Department will need to make difficult choices to adapt.

The recommendations in this report provide an overview of essential areas for countering efforts by extremists to radicalize, recruit, or mobilize followers to violence, including the conditions that allow violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to take hold. Foundational to each recommendation is embedded a belief that by acting as a convener, facilitator, and responsible financial partner, the government can help the American people defeat the threat of violent extremism. By looking clearly at what we need and what we must do to get there, we can build a sustainable architecture of engagement that incorporates all our tools and all the components that will protect our youth and future generations. This report is, by no means, an all-encompassing strategy – all components of the U.S. Government must coordinate their efforts to ensure that authorities are properly exercised. The Homeland is vital and central to all efforts. This report helps provide a basis for how the Department can more effectively organize and operationalize against the threat of violent extremism.

The Subcommittee thanks you for the opportunity to provide our thoughts and recommendations and stand ready to help the Department in any way.

Farah Pandith (Chair)
Adnan Kifayat (Chair)
General (Ret.) John Allen
Paul Goldenberg
Seamus Hughes
Joel T. Meyer
Jeffrey Miller
Michael Nutter
Matthew Olsen
Ali Soufan
Juan Zarate
William Webster (Ex-officio)

Appendix 1: Members of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council

Name	Title, Organization
Farah Pandith <i>(Chair)</i>	Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Former Special Representative to Muslim Communities, U.S. Department of State
Adnan Kifayat <i>(Chair)</i>	Senior Resident Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Head of Global Security Ventures, Gen Next Foundation
John Allen	General, US Marine Corps (Ret.) and Co-Director, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, the Brookings Institution
Paul Goldenberg	President and Chief Executive Officer, Cardinal Point Strategies
Seamus Hughes	Deputy Director, Program on Extremism at George Washington University
Joel T. Meyer	Senior Vice President, Public Sector at Dataminr
Jeffrey Miller	Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer, National Football League
Michael Nutter	Former Mayor of Philadelphia, and David N. Dinkins Professor of Professional Practice of Urban & Public Policy, Columbia University/SIPA
Matthew Olsen	Co-Founder and President, Business Development, IronNet Cybersecurity
Ali Soufan	Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, The Soufan Group LLC
Juan Zarate	Chairman and Co-Founder, The Financial Integrity Network
William Webster <i>(Ex-officio)</i>	Retired Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP

Members of the Department of Homeland Security Staff: Sarah Morgenthau, Erin Walls, and Lauren Wenger

Special Thanks to: Lila Ghosh, Ryan B. Greer, Michael Masters, Lauren Wenger, Erin Walls, and Alysha Tierney for their advice and assistance in compiling this report.

Appendix 2: Experts Consulted Include:


*Individuals*²⁶

- Kevin Bearden, VP of Foreign Affairs, Federal Civilian Agencies for General Dynamics
- Charlotte Beers, Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State (2001-2003)
- Gene Beresin, MD, Executive Director, The Clay Center for Young Healthy Minds at Mass General Hospital
- Ambassador Matthew Bryza, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
- Soraya Chemaly, Director, Women's Media Center Speech Project
- Kathleen Deloughery, Science and Technology Directorate, DHS
- Heidi Ellis, MD, Director, Center for Refugee Trauma and Resilience at Boston Children's Hospital
- Omar Fekeiki (Mahmood), Managing Editor, Raise Your Digital Voice at MBN
- Ambassador James Glassman, Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State (2008-2009)
- Christopher Graves, Global Chair, Ogilvy Public Relations
- Sasha Havlicek, Chief Executive Officer, Institute for Strategic Dialogue
- John Herman, MD, Associate Chief, Department of Psychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital
- Shelina Janmohamed, Vice President, Ogilvy Noor
- Jonathan Keidan, Co-Founder and President, InsideHook
- Eric Kessler, Founder, Principal and Senior Managing Director, Arabella Advisors
- Imam Mohamed Magid, Executive Director, All Dulles Area Muslim Society
- Alisa Miller, PhD., Research Associate, Refugee Trauma and Resilience Center at Children's Hospital
- Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, World Organization for Resource Development and Education
- William Sabatini, General Manager, Radio Sawa
- Parisa Sabeti Zagat, Policy and Communications, Facebook
- Ron Schouten, MD, Director of the Law and Psychiatry Service, Massachusetts General Hospital
- George Selim, Director, the Office for Community Partnerships, DHS
- Tara Sonenshine, Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State (2012-2013)
- Peter Stern, Policy Manager for Risk, Facebook

²⁶ Individuals consulted did not necessarily speak on behalf of their organizations and their contributions should be viewed as theirs alone.

Appendix 3: Infographics

U.S. Government funded programs that seek to address violent extremism



Millennials' Social Media Use

Percentage of American 18-29 year olds who have accounts on social media platforms.



facebook



snapchat



tumblr



pinterest



twitter



instagram

Source: Harvard University Institute of Politics

Appendix 4: Relevant Reports and Recommendations

Beutel, Alejandro J. *Building Bridges to Strengthen America: Forging an Effective Counterterrorism Enterprise between Muslim Americans & Law Enforcement*. Executive Summary. Muslim Public Affairs Council. Recommendations:

- a) MPAC argues for a domestic counterterrorism enterprise centered on community-oriented policing.
- b) Law enforcement focuses on criminal behavior while communities address the ideological and social components which lead to violent extremism.
- c) Move away from a “securitized” relationship.

Briggs, Rachel and Sebastien Feve. *Policy Briefing: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online*. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Recommendations:

- a) Strengthening digital literacy and critical consumption among young people.
- b) Increasing counter-messaging, counter narrative, and alternative narrative activity. Government communications need to be centralized and coordinated. Governments need to be realistic about their ability to play an active messenger role and make significant investments in funding non-governmental organizations to offer credible alternatives.
- c) Building the capacity of credible messengers: governments should make investments in building skills and expertise of the most effective counter messengers. Governments should use their convening power to bring in private sector.

Davis, Thomas J. September 2014. *Now is the Time for CVE-2. Updating and Implementing a Revised U.S. National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism*. Naval Postgraduate School. Recommendations:

- a) Identifying the federal agency in charge of administering the U.S. CVE strategy.
- b) Developing a more robust and actionable national CVE framework.
- c) Refocusing the federal government on support and not local engagement of CVE.
- d) Requiring all CVE related terms be defined in every document.
- e) Requiring regular evaluations and updates of the U.S. CVE strategy.

Department of State, and USAID. Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism. Report. May 2016. Recommendations:

- a) Enhance CVE diplomacy.
- b) Focus on CVE strategic communications.
- c) Expand rule of law and develop programs to advance CVE.
- d) Promote research and learning.
- e) Elevate CVE within broader U.S. foreign policy.

Muslim Public Affairs Council. *Policy Report: Data on Post-9/11 Terrorism in the United States*. Recommendations:

- a) Expand community-oriented policing initiatives.
- b) Increase support for research on combating biased policing.
- c) Expand investments in better human capital acquisitions.

- d) Highlight citizen contributions to national security.
- e) Reform the fusion center process to increase coordination among law enforcement. Adopt MPAC's "four essential principles" to successful engagement with Muslim American communities.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *American Foreign Fighters: Implications for Homeland Security Final Report*. August 31, 2015. Pages 43-44. Publication RP14-01.03.11-01. Recommendations:

- a) Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts can be strengthened by incorporating travel behaviors of foreign fighters.
- b) Relying on a range of international, federal, state, local, community partners, and families is critical for the U.S. to continue focusing on efforts to identify potential foreign fighters as early as possible.

Vidino, Lorenzo and Seamus Hughes. *Countering Violent Extremism in America*. The George Washington University Center for Cyber & Homeland Security: Program on Extremism. Recommendations:

- a) If the U.S. government truly wants to engage in robust CVE, it will need to provide sufficient funding.
- b) The administration should appoint one department as the lead for CVE efforts to ensure more focused programs and a single point of contact for public advocacy and congressional oversight.
- c) Engagement and other trust-building initiatives are useful and should be continued.
- d) Build trust in American Muslim communities.
- e) Develop accountability for CVE at the federal level.

Appendix 5: Glossary

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): Actions to counter efforts by extremists to radicalize, recruit, or mobilize followers to violence and to address the conditions that allow violent extremist recruitment and radicalization.

Credible Messengers: Individuals or organizations that have the ability and authority to influence audiences. Whether they are religious leaders, teachers, parents, pop culture idols, those who are the best placed to create change are those whom CVE efforts must prioritize.

ISIL: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Disengagement: The process whereby an individual experiences a change in role or function that is usually associated with a reduction of violent participation. It may not necessarily involve leaving the movement, but is most frequently associated with significant temporary or permanent role change. Additionally, while disengagement may stem from role change, that role change may be influenced by psychological factors such as disillusionment, burnout or the failure to reach the expectations that influenced initial involvement. This can lead to a member seeking out a different role within the movement.²⁷

Formers: Individuals who have been involved in violent extremism but have become rehabilitated and offered to serve as credible messengers in CVE programming.

Network: Offices; organizations; communities associated based on location, ethnicity, or some other demographic association. Communities of disenfranchised individuals and those who influence them will represent those for whom CVE programming will be scoped and by whom it should be carried out; creating connectivity across these individuals will be paramount for success.

Platform: A technological tool or organizational mechanism to facilitate coordination or communication. Platforms will enable cross-sector and interagency cohesion for efforts.

Radicalization: The social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology. Radicalization may not necessary lead to violence but it is one of the several risk factors required for this.²⁸

Violent Extremist: An individual who supports or commits ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals.

²⁷ Horgan, John, and Kurt Braddock. "Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 22 (2010): 267-91.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

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4 page draft document

Page 1 of 4

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
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act



Homeland
Security

JAN 23 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary Jeh Charles Johnson

FROM: Alan D. Bersin 
Assistant Secretary & Chief Diplomatic Officer
Office of Policy

SUBJECT: **Request for Signature: Letter to Norwegian Minister of Justice and Public Security Anders Anundsen Regarding Enhanced U.S.-Norwegian Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement Cooperation (WF# 1059891)**

Context: The attached letter was drafted in conjunction with the strategy that I presented to the Counterterrorism Advisory Board (CTAB) in December 2014 to leverage the February 2015 Visa Waiver Program site visit to improve security cooperation with Norway, particularly with regard to the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters. In the letter, you urge the Norwegian Minister of Justice and Public Security to take the following steps to improve his ministry's counterterrorism posture and cooperation with DHS:

- 1) Fully implement and regularly share terrorism and law enforcement information through the Homeland Security Presidential-6 and Preventing and Combating Serious Crime Agreements;
- 2) Initiate systematic collection of Advance Passenger Information for all flights entering Norway and develop and implement a Passenger Name Records system; and
- 3) Expand Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) cooperation with DHS.

In addition, you thank the Norwegian government for its interest in the preclearance program and encourage the continuation of expert-level exchanges between DHS and the Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security.

OGC/Chief Counsel Coordination: This document has been reviewed in its entirety for legal sufficiency by Daniel Ahr, and it has not been substantially changed since his/her review.

Clearance: The attached letter was cleared by the following components:

- CBP: Steve Schorr, cleared with comment, 01/12/2015
- CRCL: Tamara Kessler cleared with comment, 01/13/2015
- CVE Coordinator: David Gersten, cleared with comment, 01/09/2015
- I&A: Mary Peterson, cleared no comment, 01/12/2015
- ICE: Leonard Joseph, cleared with edits, 01/13/2015
- MGMT: Vince Micone, cleared with comments, 01/12/2015
- OGC: Daniel Ahr, cleared with comments, 01/16/2015
- PRIV: Jordan Gottfried, cleared with comments, 01/13/2015

Timeliness: The attached letter will be delivered during the February 2-5, 2015 Visa Waiver Program site visit to Norway.

Transmittal: The Visa Waiver Program site visit team will hand-deliver the attached letter to the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security.

Attachment

3 page draft letter "Minister of Justice and Public Security Norway"

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Page 2 of 3

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Page 3 of 3

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BILLING CODE 9110-9M

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

[Docket No. DHS-2016-0022]

MEETING: Homeland Security Advisory Council

AGENCY: The Office of Partnership and Engagement, DHS

ACTION: Notice of partially closed Federal Advisory
Committee meeting

SUMMARY: The Homeland Security Advisory Council ("Council") will meet in person on June 2, 2016. Members of the public may participate in person. The meeting will be partially closed to the public.

DATES: The Council will meet Thursday, June 2, 2016, from 10:05 a.m. to 5:15 p.m. EDT. The meeting will be open to the public from 1:50 p.m. to 4:25 p.m. EDT. Please note the meeting may close early if the Council has completed its business. The meeting will be closed to the public from 10:05 a.m. to 11:20 a.m. EDT, 1:00 p.m. to 1:40 p.m. EDT, and 4:30 p.m. to 5:15 p.m. EDT.

ADDRESSES: The meeting will be held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars ("Wilson Center"), located at 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20004. All visitors will be processed through the lobby of the Wilson Center. Written public comments prior to the

meeting must be received by 5:00 p.m. EDT on Monday, May 30, 2016, and must be identified by Docket No. DHS-2016-0022. Written public comments after the meeting must be identified by Docket No. DHS-2016-0022 and may be submitted by one of the following methods:

- **Federal eRulemaking Portal:** <http://www.regulations.gov>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
- **E-mail:** HSAC@hq.dhs.gov. Include Docket No. DHS-2016-0022 in the subject line of the message.
- **Fax:** (202) 282-9207
- **Mail:** Homeland Security Advisory Council, Attention Mike Miron, Department of Homeland Security, Mailstop 0445, 245 Murray Lane SW, Washington, DC 20528.

Instructions: All submissions received must include the words "Department of Homeland Security" and "DHS-2016-0022," the docket number for this action. Comments received will be posted without alteration at <http://www.regulations.gov>, including any personal information provided.

Docket: For access to the docket to read comments received by the Council, go to <http://www.regulations.gov>, search "DHS-2016-0022," "Open Docket Folder" and provide your comments.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mike Miron at

HSAC@hq.dhs.gov or at (202) 447-3135.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice of this meeting is given under Section 10(a) of the **Federal Advisory Committee Act** (FACA), Public Law 92-463 (5 U.S.C. Appendix), which requires each FACA committee meeting to be open to the public.

The Council provides organizationally independent, strategic, timely, specific, actionable advice, and recommendations to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on matters related to homeland security. The Council is comprised of leaders of local law enforcement, first responders, federal, state, and local government, the private sector, and academia.

The Council will meet in an open session between 1:50 p.m. and 4:25 p.m. EDT. The Council will receive reports and recommendations from the Cybersecurity Subcommittee and the Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee.

The Council will meet in a closed session from 10:05 a.m. to 11:20 a.m. EDT, from 1:00 p.m. to 1:40 p.m. EDT, and 4:30 p.m. to 5:15 p.m. EDT to receive sensitive operational counterterrorism information from senior DHS officials, information on current threats, and a southern border security update.

Basis for Partial Closure: In accordance with Section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has determined this meeting requires partial closure. The disclosure of the information relayed would be detrimental to the public interest for the following reasons:

The Council will receive closed session briefings from senior DHS officials. These briefings will concern matters sensitive to homeland security within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. §§ 552b(c)(7)(E) and 552b(c)(9)(B). The Council will receive operational counterterrorism updates on the current threat environment and security measures associated with countering such threats, including those related to aviation security programs, and southwest border security updates. The session is closed under 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(7)(E) because disclosure of that information could reveal investigative techniques and procedures not generally available to the public, allowing terrorists and those with interests against the United States to circumvent the law and thwart the Department's strategic initiatives. In addition, the session is closed pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(9)(B) because disclosure of these techniques and procedures could frustrate the successful

implementation of protective measures designed to keep our country safe.

Participation: Members of the public will have until 5 p.m. EDT on Monday, May 30, 2016, to register to attend the Council meeting on June 2, 2016. Due to limited availability of seating, admittance will be on a first-come first-serve basis. Participants interested in attending the meeting can contact Mike Miron at HSAC@hq.dhs.gov or (202) 447-3135. You are required to provide your full legal name, date of birth, and company/agency affiliation. The public may access the facility via public transportation or use the public parking garages located near the Wilson Center. Wilson Center directions can be found at:

<http://wilsoncenter.org/directions>. Members of the public will meet at 1:15 p.m. EDT at the Wilson Center's main entrance for sign in and escorting to the meeting room for the public session. Late arrivals after 1:45 p.m. EDT will not be permitted access to the facility.

Facility Access: You are required to present a valid original government issued ID, to include a State Driver's License or Non-Driver's Identification Card, U.S. Government Common Access Card (CAC), Military Identification Card or Person Identification Verification Card; U.S. Passport, U.S. Border Crossing Card, Permanent

Resident Card or Alien Registration Card; or Native American Tribal Document.

Information of Services for Individuals with Disabilities:

For information on facilities or services for individuals with disabilities, or to request special assistance at the meeting, contact Mike Miron at HSAC@hq.dhs.gov or (202) 447-3135 as soon as possible.

Dated: May 3, 2016.

Sarah E. Morgenthau,

Executive Director, Homeland Security Advisory Council,
DHS.

From: Sheedfar, Megan (b)(6)
(b)(6)
To: "Macdonald, Jennifer (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
CC: "O'Connor, Kimberly (b)(6)
(b)(6)
"Swain, Donald (b)(6)
(b)(6)
"Plostock, Michael
(b)(6)
Subject: Clearance Request: Response to Chairman McCaul regarding the CVE grant program
Date: 2016/07/26 10:52:51
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

Jennifer,

Attached for your review and clearance, please find the incoming, cover memo, and draft response to Chairman McCaul regarding the CVE grant program.

This response was drafted by OCP for Secretary Johnson's signature and has been cleared by the following Components:

- MGMT/DJ Harper – 7/14/2016
- OGC/Mike Goad – 7/18/2016
- PLCY/Briana Petyo – 7/21/2016
- FEMA/Michael Coen – 7/21/2016
- OLA/Connie LaRossa – 7/25/2016

Please let us know if you have any questions.

Thanks,

Megan Sheedfar

Office of the Executive Secretary

Office of the Secretary

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

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1127728

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Sender: Sheedfar, Megan (b)(6)
(FYDIBOHF23SPD)

"Macdonald, Jennifer (b)(6)
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Recipient: O'Connor, Kimberly <

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Sent Date: 2016/07/26 10:52:47

Delivered Date: 2016/07/26 10:52:51

Message Flags: Unread



One Hundred Fourteenth Congress
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20515

July 7, 2016

The Honorable Jeh Johnson
Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington D.C., 20528

Dear Secretary Johnson,

I am writing to express my serious concern with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) approach to distributing "Countering Violent Extremism Grants" as provided for in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-113). DHS guidance for these grants shows yet again that the Administration is failing to acknowledge the nature of the enemy we face and refuses to call the threat what it is—radical Islamist terrorism. Based on the Department's announcement and the briefing provided to Congressional staff, I have serious concerns that the current approach will not be effective in keeping Islamist terrorists from recruiting Americans.

Rather than focus on combating jihadist propaganda, DHS has chosen to continue the Administration's politically-correct approach to the threat. Nowhere is radical Islamist terror even mentioned, and the evaluation criteria for these grants fails to give priority to pushing back against this hateful ideology. Instead, the Department appears to be treating all extremist ideologies equally and is not seeking to confront threats in a risk-based manner. It is crucial that this money be allocated to organizations that are prepared to fight back against ISIS and other jihadist groups, especially those targeting Americans to join their fight abroad or to kill at home. Failure to make this a clear priority undermines the purpose of these grants and risks making them a costly distraction for taxpayers—rather than an important layer of defense against terror.

Furthermore, the scope of these grants is dangerously broad. Indeed, as written, the guidance seems to suggest they could be used for anything from jobs programs to business development. This is not what we need in a high-threat environment. As experts and top officials have noted, what we need to do is counter the narrative of Islamist terrorist groups head-on by using credible voices and community organizations. But the vague approach outlined by DHS wastes an opportunity to decisively push back against a violent ideology that is putting our people and country in danger. I am also concerned DHS is not prepared to keep applicants from using these funds for unauthorized or even detrimental purposes.

These flaws are unacceptable. We face the most severe terror threat since 9/11, and we need policies and programs that will protect Americans from the real danger—radical Islamist

terrorism. I urge you to clarify the guidance for these grants and to use this critical funding to fight back against terrorist recruitment more decisively. My Committee will exercise rigorous oversight on how the funds are awarded and used, and we will be watching to make sure the Department allocates them strategically. Time is not on our side. Our enemies are dead set on attacking the United States and undermining our way of life, and the American people expect your Department to stop groups like ISIS from turning our city streets into war zones in this generational struggle.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Michael T. McCaul". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Michael" being the most prominent.

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL
Chairman

July 25, 2016



**Homeland
Security**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM: George Selim 
Director, Office for Community Partnerships

SUBJECT: **Response to Chairman McCaul's July 7, 2016 letter regarding
the Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program
(WF1127728)**

Context: The attached letter provides a coordinated response to Chairman McCaul's inquiries regarding the Department's recently launched Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program. The response addresses the Chairman's concerns surrounding the scope, focus, eligibility, accountability, and administration of the program. Further, it acknowledges the need for continued support from the Chairman on increased funding and authorization for the Office for Community Partnerships.

OGC/Chief Counsel Coordination: This document has been reviewed in its entirety for legal sufficiency by Michael Goad/OGC, and it has not been substantially changed since his review.

Clearance:

- MGMT: Deputy CoS DJ Harper per CoS Bruce cleared with edits on 7/14/16
- PLCY: Briana Petyo cleared with comments on 7/21/16
- OGC: Michael Goad cleared with edits on 7/18/16
- OLA: DAS Connie LaRossa cleared with edits on 7/25/16
- FEMA: CoS Michael Coen cleared with edits on 7/21/16

Timeliness: Given the intricacies of the new grant program, the response required multiple rounds of extensive coordination; OLA needed additional time for clearance.

Transmittal: OLA will transmit the response.

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Page 8 of 8

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From: Sheedfar, Megan (b)(6)
(b)(6)
To: "Macdonald, Jenn
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
CC: "O'Connor, Kimberly (b)(6)
(b)(6)
"Swain, Donald </O=
(b)(6)
"Plostock, Michael <
(b)(6)

Subject: Clearance Request: Response to Chairman Perry regarding CVE subcommittee

Date: 2016/07/06 12:31:18

Priority: Normal

Type: Note

Jennifer,

Attached for your review and clearance, please find the incoming, cover memo, draft response, and enclosure to Chairman Perry regarding the CVE subcommittee.

This response was drafted by IGA for Sarah Morgenthau's signature and has been cleared by the following Components:

- PLCY/Briana Petyo – 6/27/2016
- MGMT/DJ Harper – 6/27/2016
- OGC/Eric Columbus – 6/28/2016
- OLA/Susan Corbin – 6/28/2016
- OCP/Nathaniel Snyder – 6/29/2016
- OPA/Marsha Catron – 6/30/2016

Please let us know if you have any questions.

Thanks,

Megan Sheedfar

Office of the Executive Secretary

Office of the Secretary

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Desk: (b)(6)
Cell: 2

(b)(6)

1126343

16-2840

Sender: Sheedfar, Megan <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
"Macdonald, Jennife
(b)(6)

Recipient: "O'Connor, Kimberly
(b)(6)
"Swain, Donald </C
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"Plostock, Michael <
(b)(6)

Sent Date: 2016/07/06 12:31:09

Delivered Date: 2016/07/06 12:31:18

Message Flags: Unread



One Hundred Fourteenth Congress
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20515

June 20, 2016

The Honorable Jeh C. Johnson
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

SCANNED/RECEIVED
BY ESD/SSG
2016 JUN 20 PM 3:13

Dear Secretary Johnson

In November 2015, the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) established a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee, which was tasked with developing findings and recommendations related to CVE. In June 2016, the Subcommittee submitted to you an interim report. I was outraged to learn that one of the members of the CVE Subcommittee, Ms. Laila Alawa, tweeted in September 2014, among other inflammatory tweets, that “9/11 changed the world for good, and there’s no other way to say it.”¹ It is extremely concerning, and frankly disgraceful, that someone who believes there was anything good about the deadliest attack on American soil, an event that claimed the lives of thousands of Americans, has been tasked with providing advice to senior government officials responsible for ensuring there is never another event like 9/11. Whether or not this individual is a paid DHS employee, receiving advice from a person with such radical views calls into question the Subcommittee’s work and reputation.

In furtherance of the Committee on Homeland Security’s oversight efforts, please provide the following information no later than July 4, 2016.


1. Given the sensitivity of some issues related to CVE, was Ms. Alawa granted a security clearance in her capacity as a member of the HSAC’s CVE Subcommittee? If so, please provide the level of clearance she held and how long the clearance was scheduled to be active?
2. What were Ms. Alawa’s qualifications to be selected for the CVE Subcommittee? Why was Ms. Alawa chosen to serve as a member of the Subcommittee?

¹ <https://twitter.com/lulainlife/status/509922675129851904>

3. It is my understanding that members of the HSAC and its Subcommittees serve in an unpaid capacity. However, does DHS reimburse any costs (travel, lodging, meals and expenses, etc.) associated with an individual's service on the HSAC or its Subcommittees? If so, please provide a detailed accounting of any DHS expenses associated with Ms. Alawa's participation on the CVE Subcommittee.
4. How, if at all, were members of the CVE Subcommittee vetted? What did this vetting entail and which official made the final decision to select Ms. Alawa?
5. The June 2016 report that the CVE Subcommittee submitted to you was an interim report. Given that these statements of Ms. Alawa's have now been called into question, will DHS end her participation on the Subcommittee? Please provide a justification for the Department's decision.

Thank you in advance for your prompt attention to this matter. Should you have any additional questions, please do not hesitate to have your staff contact Ryan Consaul with the Committee on Homeland Security majority staff at 202-226-8417.

Respectfully,



SCOTT PERRY
Chairman
Subcommittee on Oversight and
Management Efficiency




Homeland Security

July 1, 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

THROUGH: Philip A. McNamara, 
Assistant Secretary for Partnership and Engagement

FROM: Sarah E. Morgenthau, 
Executive Director, Homeland Security Advisory Council

SUBJECT: **Request for Signature: Response to Congressman Perry on information regarding CVE Subcommittee (WF 1126343)**

Context: Congressman Scott Perry, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency, House Homeland Security Committee, sent a letter to Secretary Johnson requesting information on the Homeland Security Advisory Council's (HSAC) CVE Subcommittee and one of its members, Laila Alawa. Congressman Perry is concerned about tweets made by Ms. Alawa, including a comment made by her in September 2014 that "9/11 changed the world for good, and there's no other way to say it." According to recent press reports, Ms. Alawa clarified that the meaning of the comment cited in Congressman Perry's letter was that the events of 9/11 changed the world forever, not for the [greater] good. Congressman Perry believes Ms. Alawa's social media tweets call into question the work and reputation of the CVE Subcommittee. He is asking for information on her participation and qualifications to serve on the CVE Subcommittee, as well as specifics on any travel reimbursements she received and the internal vetting process for the HSAC and its subcommittee members.

Clearances:

OGC: Eric Columbus, cleared, 6/28/2016, with comments.

PLCY: Briana Petyo, cleared, 6/27/2016, with comments.

OLA: Susan Corbin, cleared, 6/28/16, with edits.

OCP: Nathaniel Snyder, cleared, 6/29/16, with edits.

MGMT: DJ Harper, cleared, 6/27/2016, with comments.

OPA: Marsha Catron, cleared, 6/30/2016.

Timeliness: Congressman Perry requested a response no later than July 4, 2016.

4 page draft letter with attachments

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From: Brought, Nathaniel (b)(6)
(b)(6)
"Rezmovic, Jeffrey"
(b)(6)
To: "Kuepper, Andrew"
(b)(6)
CC: "O'Connor, Kimberl"
(b)(6)
"Swain, Donald </>
(b)(6)
"Allen-Gifford, Patri"
(b)(6)

Subject: Clearance Request: Response to Finnish Minister Orpo regarding CVE

Date: 2015/10/28 18:12:39

Priority: Normal

Type: Note

Jeff and Drew,

Attached for your review and approval, please find the incoming, cover memo, and draft response to Finnish Minister Orpo regarding CVE collaboration between the United States and Finland.

This response was drafted by PLCY for the Secretary's signature and has been cleared by the following Components:

- CRCL/Tamara Kessler – 10/23/2015
- S&T/Christina Murata – 10/26/2015
- MGMT/DJ Harper – 10/26/2015
- DLA/Susan Corbin – 10/26/2015
- I&A/Mary Peterson – 10/27/2015
- OCP/David Gersten – 10/27/2015
- OGC/Meghan Ludtke – 10/27/2015
- PRIV/Jonathan Cantor – 10/27/2015

Please let us know if you have any questions.

Thanks,

Nathaniel J Brought
Office of the Executive Secretary
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Desk: (b)(6)
Cell: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

1109368
15-4161

Sender: Brought, Nathaniel (b)(6)
(b)(6)
"Reznovic, Jeffrey <
(b)(6)>
"Kuepper, Andrew <
(b)(6)>
(b)(6)

Recipient: (b)(6)

"O'Connor, Kimberly
(b)(6)
"Swain, Donald </O
(b)(6)>
"Allen-Gifford, Patric
(b)(6)

Sent Date: 2015/10/28 18:12:38

Delivered Date: 2015/10/28 18:12:39

**Homeland
Security**

OCT 28 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary Jeh Charles Johnson

FROM: Alan D. Bersin 
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs
& Chief Diplomatic Officer, PLCY

SUBJECT: **Request for Signature: Response to Finnish Minister of the Interior Petteri Orpo Regarding Your September 25, 2015 Meeting and the Establishment of a U.S.-Finland Homeland Security Dialogue (WF #1109368)**

Context: Minister Orpo wrote to you on October 13, 2015, to thank you for meeting with him during his visit to Washington on September 25. Furthermore, he proposes measures to strengthen U.S.-Finland bilateral homeland security cooperation in the following areas: 1) countering violent extremism; 2) information sharing; 3) traveler targeting; 4) refugee screening; and 5) science and technology collaboration in emergency management and critical infrastructure protection. In the attached response, you thank Minister Orpo for your meeting and advise him of steps DHS is taking to strengthen collaboration in these areas.

Clearance:

- CRCL: Tamara Kessler, cleared, 10/23/15, with comments/edits.
- I&A: Mary Peterson, cleared, 10/27/2015, without comment.
- MGMT: DJ Harper, cleared, 10/26/2015, with edits.
- OCP: David Gersten, cleared, 10/27/2015, with edits.
- OGC: Meghan Ludtke, cleared, 10/27/2015, without comment.
- OLA: Susan Corbin, cleared, 10/26/2015, without comment.
- PRIV: Jonathan Cantor, cleared, 10/27/2015, without comment.
- S&T: Christina Murata, cleared, 10/26/2015, without comment.

Timeliness: PLCY is submitting the draft response beyond ESEC's deadline due to the need for additional Component review.

Transmittal: PLCY/OIE will transmit both the original letter and an electronic copy directly to the Finnish Ministry of the Interior.

2 page draft letter

Page 6 of 7

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of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 7 of 7

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of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From: Broome, Michael (b)(6)
(b)(6)
To: "Harrison, Sarah"
(b)(6)
CC: "O'Connor, Kimbe"
(b)(6)
"Swain, Donald <
(b)(6)>"
"Plostock, Michael"
(b)(6)
Subject: Clearance Request: Response to Representative McCaul regarding the CVE Grants Programs application review process
Date: 2016/09/20 19:02:26
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

Sarah,

Attached for your review and clearance, please find the incoming, a subsequent incoming, cover memo, and draft response to Representative McCaul regarding the CVE Grants Programs application review process. Please note that this this one letter is being submitted in response to both incomings.

This response was drafted by OCP for the Secretary's signature and has been cleared by the following Components:

- MGMT/Melissa Bruce – 9/8/2016
- FEMA/Michael Coen – 9/9/2016
- PLCY/Briana Petyo 9/13/2016
- I&A/Mary Peterson 9/13/2016
- OGC/Eric Columbus 9/15/2016
- OLA/Connie LaRossa 9/20/2016

Please let us know if you have any questions.

Thank you,

Michael Broome
Office of the Executive Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
Phone: (b)(6)
Cell: [redacted]

16-4413
1130837

Sender: Broome, Michael (b)(6)
(b)(6)
"Harrison, Sarah
(b)(6)
(b)(6)

Recipient: (b)(6)
"O'Connor, Kimbe
(b)(6)
"Swain, Donald <
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"Plostock, Michael
(b)(6)

Sent Date: 2016/09/20 19:02:21

Delivered Date: 2016/09/20 19:02:26



Homeland Security

September 20, 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM: George Selim 
Director, Office for Community Partnerships

SUBJECT: **Response to Representative McCaul's August 28 and September 8, 2016 letters regarding the Countering Violent Extremism Grants Program applicant security review process (WF 1130837 and WF 1131212)**

Context: The attached letter provides a coordinated response to Representative McCaul's inquiries regarding the CVE Grant Program's applicant security review process. This response also acknowledges the September 1, 2016 briefing led by the Office for Community Partnerships along with the Office for Intelligence and Analysis and the Federal Emergency Management Agency that Representative McCaul's staff received on the same inquiry. Further, the response assures the Department will continue to work closely with his Committee to keep him informed and involved.

OGC/Chief Counsel Coordination: This document has been reviewed in its entirety for legal sufficiency by Michael Isacco/OGC, and it has not been substantially changed since his review.

Clearance:

- MGMT: Melissa Bruce cleared without comment on 9/8/16
- PLCY: Briana Petyo cleared with comments on 9/13/16
- I&A: Mary Peterson cleared without comment on 9/13/16
- OGC: Eric Columbus cleared with edits and comments on 9/15/16
- OLA: Connie LaRossa cleared with edits and comments on 9/20/16
- FEMA: CoS Michael Coen cleared with edits on 9/9/16

Timeliness: The fully cleared draft and cover memo are due for transmittal on 9/21/16.

Transmittal: OLA will transmit the response.



One Hundred Fourteenth Congress
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20515

August 29, 2016

2016 AUG 27 PM 1:45
COMMUNICATIONS DIVISION

The Honorable Jeh Johnson
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
Washington D.C. 20528

Dear Secretary Johnson:

Thank you for your response to the concerns I raised regarding the lack of focus and prioritization of radical Islamist terrorism in DHS's Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program. While I appreciate your work on this issue and understanding of the threat, I remain concerned that DHS efforts lack the focus necessary to address the primary terrorist threat facing the Homeland. I will continue to work to ensure this grant program and other Federal "CVE" efforts are laser focused on countering this deadly and growing ideology.


In addition to the issues I raised in my July 7th correspondence, I have serious concerns about how the Department will vet "CVE" grant applicants. On July 5th, my staff attended a briefing with the Office of Community Partnerships (OCP) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regarding the grant program. During this briefing, DHS officials stated that the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) would handle the security vetting of grant applicants. To date and despite repeated requests for information, the Department has failed to provide the Committee with information regarding the vetting process and screening criteria that will be used.

The applicant vetting process must include security checks against the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), as well as criminal databases. It is also vital that DHS consider what foreign funding grant applicants receive and how that funding influences their ideology and outreach activities. American taxpayers and Congress must have assurances that domestic non-profit groups and other entities receiving funds under this program are not being influenced by foreign powers.

According to the Notice of Funding Opportunity, applications are due on September 6, 2016. After this date, vetting of applications will begin. I am writing to ask you to ensure that details on the vetting process are provided to the Committee as quickly as possible but not later than September 1, 2016.

As you know, the radicalization of Americans by foreign terrorists like ISIS is a growing threat and much more needs to be done to counter their efforts, including their online propaganda. Thank you for your continued attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Michael T. McCaul". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL
Chairman

cc: The Honorable Francis X. Taylor
The Honorable Craig Fugate
Mr. George Sefim



One Hundred Fourteenth Congress
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20515

SCANNED
2016 SEP - 8 AM 10: 23

September 8, 2016

The Honorable Jeh Johnson
Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528


Dear Mr. Secretary:

On September 1, 2016, representatives from the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Community Partnerships (OCP), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) provided a briefing to Committee Staff on the Department's plans for vetting "countering violent extremism" (CVE) grant applicants. I thank you for the Department's responsiveness to the Committee's letter on this topic and appreciate your willingness to engage on this issue. However, the Committee remains concerned that the vetting plans that were presented are insufficient.

It is clear FEMA has a time-tested process to monitor organizations that have been awarded grants for potential misuse of funds. However, it is essential that more be done to thoroughly vet applicants prior to making awards. I remain concerned that the Department cannot articulate clear criteria which would cause an application to be denied, including something as obvious as ensuring that any organization listed as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation case be disqualified from receiving homeland security grant funding, such as the Islamic Society of North America and the Council on American-Islamic Relations. Additionally, it was relayed that DHS does not have defined agreements with other departments and agencies which will assist in field vetting individuals and organizations. Also, it was presented that DHS has no plan or intention to check for any possible maligned foreign influence on an applicant.

Taken together, these gaps and other related issues increase the Committee's apprehension that these grants will be provided to institutions or individuals that could undermine the Department's efforts to counter radical Islamist terrorism. I write to urge you to resolve these concerns and ensure such weaknesses are addressed *before* grants are awarded. Should you have any questions or concerns, please contact Alan Carroll with the Committee on Homeland Security staff at (202) 226-8417.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Michael T. McCaul". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, stylized "M" and "C".

MICHAEL T. McCAUL
Chairman

2 page draft letter

Page 8 of 9

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
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act



**Homeland
Security**

February 19, 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM: Megan H. Mack 
Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

SUBJECT: **Request for Signature: Response to The Syrian American Council's
1/29/2015 letter regarding partnership with the Syrian American
community, WF #1065490**

Context: At the request of the DHS Counter-Terrorism Advisory Board, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) created a strategy to expand Department engagement with Syrian American communities with strong equities in the conflict in Syria.

As part of this engagement plan, you met with key Syrian American stakeholders, including the Syrian American Council (SAC) at a roundtable in Chicago, Illinois, on June 13, 2014. The meeting gave the stakeholders the opportunity to express to you their thoughts and concerns. CRCL has continued its extensive engagement with the Syrian American community since the June meeting.


The president of the SAC has written to alert you to the difficulties the Syrian American community faces and to encourage continued collaboration with the Department. CRCL recommends that the response to the letter be signed by you, given the long-term strategic interests of the Syrian American Community on key Department initiatives, including combatting the foreign fighter threat, countering violent extremism, and community engagement. This response by you would highlight the fact that DHS values its partnership with the SAC.

OGC/Chief Counsel Coordination: This document has been reviewed in its entirety for legal sufficiency by Daniel Ahr, OGC/NPPD, and it has not been substantially changed since his review.

Clearance: I&A - Mary Peterson, cleared, 2/18/15, w/o comment
MGMT - DJ Harper, cleared, 2/18/15, w/o comment
PLCY - Holly Canevari, cleared, 2/19/15, w/o comment
USCIS - Lori Scialabba, cleared, 2/19/15, w/o comment

Timeliness: CRCL requests that you sign the response as soon as practicable.

Draft letter to "Mirna Barg"



Page 1 of 1

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MAR 14



Homeland
Security

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM:

David Heyman *David Heyman*
Assistant Secretary for Policy

SUBJECT:

Request for Signature: **Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) Thank You for Service Letter for Governor Martin O'Malley (WF 1011439)**

Context: The Honorable Martin O'Malley, Governor of the State of Maryland, tendered his resignation from the HSAC, Tuesday, March 4, 2014. Governor O'Malley was appointed by former Secretary Napolitano to the HSAC in June 2009, and reappointed in September 2012. Governor O'Malley is resigning before his term expires in September 2014. Governor O'Malley served in the position of HSAC Council Member. With his departure, your council membership stands at 33 out of a possible 35 positions.

The HSAC is the Secretary's primary advisory Council. The HSAC was established in 2002, via Executive Order 13260, to advise the White House Office of Homeland Security, and was reconstituted as a Federal Advisory Committee Act-chartered committee by then Secretary Tom Ridge during DHS's formation. HSAC members are Special Government Employees who serve as senior advisors and, upon request by the Secretary, provide organizationally independent advice and recommendations on homeland security policies, programs, and operations.

Governor O'Malley previously served as the Chair of the HSAC's Community Resilience Task Force and a member of the Countering Violent Extremism Working Group. Both of these HSAC subcommittees have provided key recommendations that the Department has implemented.

Coordination: This action has been coordinated with the Department's Committee Management Office, OGC, and MGMT.

OGC/Chief Counsel Coordination: This document has been reviewed in its entirety for legal sufficiency by DCOS Prudence Carr and it has not been substantially changed since her review.

Timeliness: There is no timeliness concern related to this letter.

Transmittal: The signed letter may be mailed directly to Governor O'Malley using the address shown on the thank you letter.

Executive Secretariat Recommendation: I recommend you sign the enclosed letter.

Elisa Montoya, Executive Secretary

Date

www.dhs.gov

DHS-001-425-007190

Draft letter to "Hon. Martin O'Malley"

Page 1 of 1

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33 page Pre-Decisional Draft document.

National Prevention Framework

Second Edition
October 2015 – DRAFT



**Homeland
Security**



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28 page draft document "International Engagement Strategy"

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DETERMINATION TO PARTIALLY CLOSE A
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL MEETING

The Homeland Security Advisory Council (“Council”) will meet on January 21, 2016, from 10:10 a.m. to 4:35 p.m. EST at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington D.C. A portion of the Council meeting will include briefings on sensitive information which, if released to the public prematurely, could significantly frustrate implementation of proposed agency actions.

In accordance with the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b, five agenda items, presented from 10:10 a.m. to 1:25 p.m. EST and 3:05 p.m. to 4:35 p.m. EST, require closure of their respective portions of the meeting. The Council will receive sensitive operational counterterrorism information from senior officials and information on current threats and security measures from the Cybersecurity Subcommittee and Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee leadership. Disclosure of this information could frustrate the successful implementation of protective measures designed to keep our country safe. In addition, disclosure of that information could reveal investigative techniques and procedures not generally available to the public, allowing terrorists and those with interests against the United States to circumvent the law and thwart the Department’s strategic initiatives.

After consultation with the Office of the General Counsel, and in accordance with section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. Appendix, I approve the partial closure of the Council meeting which will:

1. “(7) disclose investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, or information which if written would be contained in such records, but only to the extent that the production of such records or information would—
(E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures”, 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(7)(E).
2. “(9) disclose information the premature disclosure of which would—
(B) in the case of any agency, be likely to significantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency action”, 5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(B); and

Date:

Jeh Charles Johnson
Secretary, Department of Homeland Security

From: Rinehart, Kalee <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
To: "Barry, Patrick <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
CC: (b)(6)

Subject: Clearance Request: Response to Rep. Collins regarding CVE
Date: 2015/03/20 09:35:16
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

Pat,

Attached for your review and approval, please find the incoming, cover memo, and draft response to Representative Doug Collins regarding CVE.

This response was drafted by CRCL for the Deputy Secretary's signature and has been cleared by the following Components:

- MGMT/Vince Micone – 3/16/2015
- PLCY/Holly Canevari – 3/17/2015
- DGC/Erica Woods – 3/17/2015
- OPA/Tammy Howard – 3/17/2015
- CVE-C/David Gersten – 3/17/2015
- OLA/Alexandra Veitch – 3/18/2015

Please let us know if you have any questions.

Thanks,

Kalee Rinehart
Office of the Executive Secretary
Office of the Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

(b)(6)

1070373
15-0984

Sender: Rinehart, Kalee <(b)(6)>
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"Barry, Patrick <(b)(6)>
Recipient: (b)(6)

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Sent Date: 2015/03/20 09:35:14

Delivered Date: 2015/03/20 09:35:16

DDUG COLLINS

3rd District, Georgia

1 STREET OFFICE

219 WASHINGTON STREET NW

SUITE 202

COLUMBIA, GA 31901

770-387-3398

ADDITIONAL OFFICE

1504 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC 20515

202-225-3713



Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-1009

COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY

U.S. CHAIRMAN: JUDITH S. GIBBS
MEMBERS: BOB BISHOP, ANDREW
BISHOP

REPRESENTATIVE MEMBERS: STEPHEN
AND ANTHONY DILLON

COMMITTEE ON RULES

CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE
CREATIVE RIGHTS CAUCUS

February 26, 2015

The Honorable Jeh Johnson
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
3801 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Secretary Johnson:

I write to ensure that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is focused on its stated mission to protect America and defend the homeland in light of recent comments concerning your priorities.

In opening the second day of the White House Summit on Combating Violent Extremism last month, you said, "we in the administration and the government should give voice to the plight of Muslims living in this country and the discrimination that they face. And so I personally have committed to speak out about the situation that very often people in the Muslim community in this country face: the fact that there are 1.6 billion Muslims in the world and the Islamic faith is one about peace and brotherhood."

Your words raised concern among some of my constituents that DHS is more interested in scoring political points than its primary mission. Having reviewed your agency's stated vision and goals, I fail to see how the promotion or public defense of any single group by DHS falls into the agency's jurisdiction or goals.

According to your agency's website, "the vision of homeland security is to ensure a homeland that is safe, secure, and resilient against terrorism and other hazards."

DHS' website also articulates five homeland security missions: "preventing terrorism and enhancing security, securing and managing our border, enforcing and administering our immigration laws, safeguarding and security cyberspace, and ensuring resilience to disasters."

Simply put, Mr. Secretary, I do not believe that DHS serving as a PR agency for a group it has unilaterally decided merits attention falls under any of the missions outlined by the agency itself.

SCANNED AND COVERED
BY EXERCISES
2015 MAR -9 PM 1:17

The Hon. Jeb Johnson
February 26, 2015

I'm sure you share my belief that your agency has limited resources to complete its numerous responsibilities vital to the security of our nation. Therefore, I strongly encourage you and other DHS officials to leave concerns regarding discrimination to the Department of Justice, the federal agency legally responsible for addressing such situations.

DHS has many important duties that ensure the safety of our citizens as well as the well-being of American commerce and travel. As the leader of this agency, I trust you will prioritize DHS' mission over the promotion of any single community or faith.

Sincerely,



Doug Collins
Member of Congress



Homeland
Security

March 19, 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY

FROM: Megan H. Mack 
Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

SUBJECT: **Request for Signature: Response to Letter from Representative Doug Collins regarding the Department and CVE, WF #1070373**

Context: Representative Collins sent correspondence to Secretary Johnson regarding the Department's role in CVE, especially in light of the Secretary's statement at the White House CVE Summit on February 18, 2015. You have been asked to respond.

Representative Collins' letter draws attention to the Secretary's comments regarding the government's outreach efforts to Muslims, their vulnerability to violent extremism, as well as the discrimination they face worldwide. Representative Collins raises concerns that these comments and the Department's efforts in general are focused more on "scoring political points" and "serving as a PR agency for a group," than on protecting the homeland.

The response outlines the Department's primary mission of protecting the homeland, its strategy to counter violent extremism, and its basic understanding that violent extremism knows no one ideology or group.

OGC/Chief Counsel Coordination: This document has been reviewed in its entirety for legal sufficiency by Erica Woods, OGC, and it has not been substantially changed since her review.

Clearance: OLA – Alexandra Veitch, cleared, 3/18/15, w/o comment
OPA – Tammy Howard, cleared, 3/17/15, w/o comment
PLCY – Naomi Wilson, cleared, 3/17/15, w/o comment
CVE-C – David Gersten, cleared, 3/17/15, w/comment
OGC – Erica Woods, cleared, 3/17/15, with edits
MGMT – Vince Micone, cleared, 3/16/15, w/o comment

Timeliness: CRCL requests that you sign the response as soon as practicable.

2 page draft letter to "Hon. Doug Collins"

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2 page draft letter to "Ms. Sasha Wijeyerante"

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From: Walls, Erin <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
To: "Miron, Mike"
CC: "Wenger, Lauren" <(b)(6)>
Subject: Clearances
Date: 2016/03/29 11:37:00
Priority: Normal
Type: Note

Mike,

Can you review the list of CVE subcommittee members and provide Lauren and I the clearance levels for everyone? We are arranging an intel briefing for the in person meeting on April 14 and need to determine what level everyone can be briefed at.

Thanks,
Erin

Sender: Walls, Erin <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
Recipient: "Miron, Mike"
"Wenger, Lauren"
Sent Date: 2016/03/29 11:37:10
Delivered Date: 2016/03/29 11:37:00

UNCLASSIFIED

7 page draft



Statement for the Record

**The Honorable Alejandro N. Mayorkas
Deputy Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security**

Before the

**United States Senate
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee**

Regarding

**“Steps Taken by the Department of Homeland Security to Mitigate the
Threat to the Homeland from ISIS and Affiliated Terrorist Groups and our
Response in the Wake of the Brussels Terror Attacks”**

May 26, 2016

UNCLASSIFIED

DHS-001-425-007298

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From: (b)(6)

To:

(b)(6)

4/7/

(b)(6)

Subject: Community Engagement Online Resource Center (CE-ORC) - Weekly Updates (July 16)

Date: 2012/07/17 08:05:35

Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

Greetings!

Here are this week's highlights from the Community Engagement Online Resource Center at www.communityengage.net.

- * Kareem Shora from DHS/CRCL created the Blog "DHS CRCL Partners with State Department in Germany Community Engagement CVE Exchange Program".
- * I will leave the new video "How to set up an iftar dinner" starring Haroon Azar from DHS/NPPD on the Home page (also on the Iftar Dinner page and a Blog entry). Ramadan begins Friday, July 20 and ends on Saturday, August 18. Iftar

dinners provide great opportunities to do community outreach!

- * DHS/CRCL is holding a Somali Cultural Training Session on July 18 in Seattle, WA.

- * DHS/CRCL is holding a Quarterly Los Angeles Community Engagement Roundtable Meeting on July 18.

- * DHS/CRCL is holding a Quarterly Seattle Community Engagement Roundtable Meeting on July 19.

- * On September 12 and 13, 2012, NCTC will host a two day gathering of the CVE/Community Engagement community of interest. Participants will include

Sender: (b)(6)

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Sent Date: 2012/07/17 08:05:20

Delivered Date: 2012/07/17 08:05:35

From: (b)(6)

To:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Community Engagement Online Resource Center (CE-ORC) - Weekly Updates (July 2)

Date: 2012/07/03 11:00:01

Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

Greetings!

Here are this week's highlights from the Community Engagement Online Resource Center at www.communityengage.net.

* I added a new video "How to set up an iftar dinner" starring Haroon Azar from DHS/NPPD to the Home and Iftar Dinner page and also created a Blog entry. Ramadan begins Friday, July 20 and ends on Saturday, August 18. Iftar dinners provide great opportunities to do community outreach. We hope to produce more videos in the future and will look to our CE-DRC members as interviewees!

- * DHS/CRCL is holding a Somali Cultural Training Session on July 18 in Seattle, WA.
- * DHS/CRCL will participate in USPAK Foundation Annual Youth Leadership Conference in Washington, DC from July 8 - 11.
- * The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Victims of Terrorism Conference will be held in Madrid, Spain from July 9 - 11
- * On September 12 and 13, 2012, NCTC will host a two day gathering of the CVE/Community Engagement community of interest. Participants will include a

Sender: (b)(6)

Recipient:

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Sent Date: 2012/07/03 10:59:51

Delivered Date: 2012/07/03 11:00:01

From: (b)(6)

To:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Community Engagement Online Resource Center (CE-ORC) - Weekly Updates (July 23)

Date: 2012/07/24 09:43:53

Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

Greetings!

Here are this week's highlights from the Community Engagement Online Resource Center at www.communityengage.net <<http://www.communityengage.net/>> . I added the links so you can go directly to the page or article of interest without having to look for it from the Home page. After clicking the link, you will first be required to sign in to the website before it takes you to your desired page or article.

* Seamus Hughes from NCTC created the Blog "Statement by the President on the Occasion of Ramadan
<<https://sites.google.com/a/communityengage.net/engage/blog/statementbythepresidentontheoccasionoframadan>> ". The President released his statement on July 20, 2012.


* Jenny Presswalla from NCTC created the Blog "US Government Hosts CVE Workshop for Law Enforcement in the National Capital Region
<<https://sites.google.com/a/communityengage.net/engage/blog/usgovernmenthostscveworkshopforlawenforcementinthenationalcapitalregion>> ". DHS and NCTC, in collaboration with the D

Sender: (b)(6)

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Sent Date: 2012/07/24 09:43:42

Delivered Date: 2012/07/24 09:43:53

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From: (b)(6)

To:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Community Engagement Online Resource Center (CE-ORC) - Weekly Updates (June 12)

Date: 2012/06/12 09:00:48

Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

Greetings!

Here are this week's highlights from the Community Engagement Online Resource Center at www.communityengage.net.

- * I added Countering Violent Extremism in the United States by Congressional Research Service (CRS) released in May 2012 to Publications of Interest.
- * I added Islamic Community Outreach by U.S. Attorney Peter F. Neronha (District of Rhode Island) to Best Practices. U.S. Attorney Neronha published Islamic Community Outreach to his Spring 2012 edition "Federal Notes" newsletter.
- * The LASD CVE Conference will be held in Los Angeles, CA on June 14.
- * DHS/CRCL will participate in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) National Convention from June 21 - 24.

If you have forgotten your login and/or password please send me an email and I will provide your login with a new temporary password.

Have a great week!

Very Respectfully,

--

Lee A. Wilkinson

(b)(6)

Sender: (b)(6)

Recipient:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Sent Date: 2012/06/12 09:01:21

Delivered Date: 2012/06/12 09:00:48

Message Flags: Unread

From: (b)(6)

To:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Community Engagement Online Resource Center (CE-ORC) - Weekly Updates (June 4)

Date: 2012/06/04 13:13:54

Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

Greetings!

Here are this week's highlights from the Community Engagement Online Resource Center at www.communityengage.net.

- * "Beyond the Revolution" is the video highlighted this week from a recent Google Zeitgeist event with Farah Pandith, the State Department's Special Representative to Muslim Communities. Zeitgeist Minds is a collection of videos from Google's Zeitgeist events (<https://zeitgeistglobal.appspot.com>).
- * I added Promoting Good Campus Relations: Working With Staff And Students To Build Community Cohesion And Tackle Violent Extremism In The Name Of Islam At Universities And Colleges by the UK Department of Education and Skills released in December 2011 to Publications of Interest.
- * I began updating POC information in the different department/agency pages. Please validate your POC information and ensure I represented your department/agency description appropriately.

* The DHS CRCL/State Department CVE Community Engagement Exchange Program and Speaker Tour

Sender: (b)(6)

Recipient:

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Sent Date: 2012/06/04 13:14:45

Delivered Date: 2012/06/04 13:13:54

From: (b)(6)

To:

(b)(6)

Subject: Community Engagement Online Resource Center (CE-ORC) - Weekly Updates (Mar 02)

Date: 2012/03/02 14:23:57

Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

Greetings!

Here are the highlights of this week's updates (Feb 18-Mar 02) to the Community Engagement Online Resource Center (CE-ORC) at www.communityengage.net <<http://www.communityengage.net/>> .

- * Several posts were added to the Blog this week including "LA police say they don't spy on Muslims" added by Haroon Azar from DHS/CRCL detailed to the LA mayor's office.
- * The American Mosque 2011: Report Number 1 was added to the Statistics page and it highlights the rapid growth of mosques in America. I noticed yesterday morning that the Drudge Report (www.drudgereport.com) links to an article related to this document.
- * Alex Abboud added the recently released Norwegian CVE Strategy to the Norwegian CVE Strategy page under the National Strategies drop down menu.
- * Quintan Wiktorowicz, the Senior Director for Community Partnerships at the National Security Staff, passed the article Building Trust Between Law Enforcement and Arab- and Muslim-American Communities to me from the DO

Sender: (b)(6)

Recipient:

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Sent Date: 2012/03/02 14:23:44

Delivered Date: 2012/03/02 14:23:57

From: (b)(6)

To:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Community Engagement Online Resource Center (CE-ORC) - Weekly Updates (Mar 09)

Date: 2012/03/09 12:34:58

Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

Greetings!

Here are the highlights of this week's updates (Mar 03 - Mar 09) to the Community Engagement Online Resource Center (CE-ORC) at www.communityengage.net <<http://www.communityengage.net/>> .

* Renee McMahon posted notes from the CVE Community of Interest Conference to the Blog. The countering violent extremism (CVE) community of interest (COI) attendees spanned several Departments and Agencies, including the DHS, DOD, DOJ, FBI, State, Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Education (DoED), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Treasury, US Institute of Peace (USIP), and US Agency for International Development (USAID).

* I started building an interactive POC map that you will find under Gov't Points of Contact. It is still currently under construction but feel free to check it out. Depending on the browser version you are using, you may or may not be able to see it. I am continuing to work on it. Using a map is a great way to visualize al

Sender: (b)(6)

Recipient:

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Sent Date: 2012/03/09 12:34:52

Delivered Date: 2012/03/09 12:34:58

From:

(b)(6)

To:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Community Engagement Online Resource Center (CE-ORC) - Weekly Updates (Mar 16)

Date: 2012/03/16 13:47:29

Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

Greetings!

Here are the highlights of this week's updates (Mar 10 - 16) to the Community Engagement Online Resource Center (CE-ORC) at www.communityengage.net <<http://www.communityengage.net/>> .

- * Kareem Shora posted to the Blog "2012 DHS CRCL Community Engagement Section Roundtables" with a map of the roundtable locations throughout the US.
- * Added Robert "Brad" Deardorff's Naval Postgraduate School thesis "Countering Violent Extremism: The Challenge and the Opportunity" and the white paper "Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods & Strategies" to the Publications of Interest page.
- * Posted the article to the Blog, "Muslims question no-fly detention, other issues in meeting with Homeland Security advisers". This article ran in the press after Kareem Shora and Abdi Farah fielded questions and criticisms at a Portland, OR roundtable.
- * I've been updating POC pages and I'm almost finished.

Did you know that you have the ability to make edits to ANY page on

Sender: (b)(6)

Recipient:

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Sent Date: 2012/03/16 13:47:25

Delivered Date: 2012/03/16 13:47:29

Message Flags: Unread

From: (b)(6)

To:

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Subject: Community Engagement Online Resource Center (CE-ORC) - Weekly Updates (May 14)

Date: 2012/05/13 19:42:33

Type: Note.EnterpriseVault.Shortcut

Greetings!

Here are this week's highlights from the Community Engagement Online Resource Center at www.communityengage.net <<http://www.communityengage.net/>> .

- * Haroon Azar posted Somali Film Company Launches in Kenya to the Blog.
- * Jeremy Stembler added the ADAMS Center Event Report to the Best Practices page. On April 13, 2012, the All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS) hosted an Internet Safety Workshop to teach parents about threats their children face online. Participants included NCTC's CVE Group, the FBI Washington Field Office (WFO), DHS/CRCL, the Loudon County Sheriff's Department, and Muflehun, a non-profit organization that works to educate communities about radicalization. The workshop was attended by approximately 100 parents.
- * Added John Brennan's "Ethics and Efficacy of the Presidents CT Strategy" speech to the Speeches & Testimony page and it is also featured on the Home page this week. Mr. Brennan's speech was delivered at the Woodrow Wilson International


Sender: (b)(6)

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Sent Date: 2012/05/13 19:43:00

Delivered Date: 2012/05/13 19:42:33

Message Flags: Unread

From: Saeed, Irfan (b)(6)
(b)(6)
"Sharp, Becca"
(b)(6)
To: "Miron, Mike"
(b)(6)

Subject: Community Engagement to Counter Violent Extremism- Best Practices

Date: 2012/12/13 14:36:51

Priority: Normal

Type: Note

Becca, Mike

Please see below a message that will be transmitted to your respective Executive Secretariat, seeking clearance on the CVE Engagement Best practices document.

This document is due to the White House National Security Staff as a due out from the Strategic Implementation Plan on Domestic Radicalization.

Please review and add any best practices from HSAC, as it relates to CVE.

Please contact me if I can be of assistance.

Best,

Irfan

The National Engagement Task Force (NETF), co-led by DHS-CRCL and the DOJ Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, is tasked by the Domestic Radicalization IPC to guide engagement activities designed to counter violent extremism, by helping to coordinate federal community engagement efforts at the national level. The NSS has tasked the interagency, through the NETF, to develop and disseminate best practices in community engagement to local government officials, law enforcement, US Attorney's Offices, and fusion centers.

As such, CRCL has drafted the attached document to describe best practices of engagement efforts conducted by DHS in an effort to counter violent extremism in the US. CRCL requests DHS's review of the attached draft Best Practices- Community Engagement to Counter Violent Extremism.

CLEARANCE DUE NOON, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19:

Please provide clearance and (a) indicate your concurrence or "no comment", or (b) explain your comments, including specific textual changes where needed to address your comments.

Silence will be construed as concurrence.

For questions, please contact:

Irfan Saeed
Senior Policy Advisor

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Washington, D.C.

(b)(6)

BACKGROUND

The White House led Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) on Domestic Radicalization recently developed a strategic approach to countering violent extremism (CVE), entitled *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. The Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) to implement this approach to CVE outlines how the government will support and help empower American communities and their local partners in their grassroots efforts to prevent violent extremism.

As the Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (SIP) states, "Communication and meaningful engagement with the American public is an essential part of the Federal Government's work, and it is critical for developing local partnerships to counter violent extremism." Engagement and outreach initiatives are directed towards a range of goals, including addressing grievances, protecting civil rights, building trust with law enforcement agencies, and promoting integration and community resilience. Active engagement also undermines key recruiting narratives used by violent extremist groups, including al-Qa'ida, and its affiliates.

The SIP details three broad objectives:

1. Enhance federal engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists
2. Build government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism
3. Countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals

The National Engagement Task Force is charged by the SIP with the following responsibilities: Coordinating federal engagement efforts with communities targeted by violent extremist radicalization; working with departments and agencies to increase their support to U.S. Attorney-led engagement efforts in the field; and disseminating regular reports on best practices in community engagement to U.S. Attorneys' Offices, law enforcement, local government officials, and fusion centers.

NETF meetings are regularly attended by representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, State Department, Treasury Department, National Counterterrorism Center, Department of Health and Human Services. Other components of DHS and DOJ, including United States Attorneys, also regularly participate.

Sender: Saeed, Irfan <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
"Sharp, Becca"
Recipient: (b)(6)
"Miron, Mike" <(b)(6)>
(b)(6)
Sent Date: 2012/12/13 14:36:50
Delivered Date: 2012/12/13 14:36:51

5 page draft "Community Engagement to Counter Violent Extremism Best Practices."

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Legislative Text (Relevant Language)

SEC. 543.

(a) For an additional amount for emergent threats from violent extremism and from complex, coordinated terrorist attacks, \$50,000,000 to remain available until September 30, 2017.

(b) Funds made available in subsection (a) for emergent threats may be transferred by the Secretary of Homeland Security between appropriations for the same purpose, notwithstanding section 503 of this Act.

(c) No transfer described in subsection (b) shall occur until 15 days after the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives are notified of such transfer.

1) Joint Explanatory Statement to Legislative Text (Relevant Section)

Responding to Emergent Threats from Violent Extremism

A general provision in title V of this Act provides \$50,000,000 for emergent threats from violent extremism and from complex, coordinated terrorist attacks, and allows the Secretary to transfer such funds between appropriations after notifying the Committees 15 days in advance. Within these funds, not more than \$10,000,000 is for a countering violent extremism (CVE) initiative to help states and local communities prepare for, prevent, and respond to emergent threats from violent extremism; not less than \$39,000,000 is for an initiative to help states and local governments prepare for, prevent, and respond to complex, coordinated terrorist attacks with the potential for mass casualties and infrastructure damage; and not less than \$1,000,000 shall be for expanding or enhancing the Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series, which brings together federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector to help regions improve their counterterrorism preparedness posture, including the ability to address the threat of complex terrorist attacks.

All funds under the CVE initiative shall be provided on a competitive basis directly to states, local governments, tribal governments, nonprofit organizations, or institutions of higher education. Eligible activities for the CVE initiative shall include, but not be limited to, planning, developing, implementing, or expanding educational outreach, community engagement, social service programs, training, and exercises, as well as other activities as the Secretary determines appropriate. Existing programs should be utilized wherever practical. Eligible activities for the initiative related to complex coordinated terrorist attacks shall include, but not be limited to, planning, training and exercises to support plans, and other activities the Secretary determines appropriate, consistent with this statement.

Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Department shall brief the Committees on plans for execution of the initiatives, to include timelines, goals, metrics, and how the Whole of Community will be included.

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TWENTY
YEARS

COUNTERING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM

Faiza Patel and Meghan Koushik

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

President Donald Trump's animosity towards Muslims is well documented. During his campaign, he often expressed suspicions about American Muslims, called for greater surveillance of their mosques and communities, and refused to rule out forced registration of Muslims in government databases.¹ Within a week of taking office, he fulfilled his campaign promise to institute a "Muslim ban," issuing an executive order temporarily barring people from seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States and halting the Syrian refugee program. Two federal courts halted implementation of the order, relying in part on his calling for a ban on Muslims entering the country.² Trump transition officials have also signaled the administration's intent to target American Muslims in other ways. They have floated the idea of renaming the Department of Homeland Security's Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program "Countering Radical Islam or Countering Violent Jihad," to make clear it will target only American Muslims.³ Reports suggest that such a change is imminent.⁴ New DHS Secretary John Kelly is conducting a review of the program which will determine its final contours.⁵ Four groups previously awarded over \$2.2 million in federal dollars to work on CVE projects aimed at Muslim communities worried by the new administration's statements have stated that they will decline the funds, and others may follow suit.⁶

Regardless of whether CVE is called Countering Radical Islam or not, the programs initiated under this rubric by the Obama administration — while couched in neutral terms — have, in practice, focused almost exclusively on American Muslim communities. This is despite the fact that empirical data shows that violence from far right movements results in at least as many fatalities in the U.S. as attacks inspired by Al Qaeda or the Islamic State.⁷ CVE not only stigmatizes Muslim communities as inherently suspect, it also creates serious risks of flagging innocuous activity as pre-terrorism and suppressing religious observance and speech. These flaws are only exacerbated when CVE programs are run by an administration that is overtly hostile towards Muslims, and that includes within its highest ranks individuals known for their frequent and public denunciations of a faith that is practiced by 1.6 billion people around the world.⁸

CVE has been part of the conversation about counterterrorism for over a decade, but the approach became more prominent in the United States starting in 2011, when the White House issued its "National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States." CVE aims to supplement law enforcement counterterrorism tactics such as surveillance, investigations, and prosecutions with a secondary set of prevention measures. Roughly speaking, these can be divided into three categories:

1. Initiatives focused on identifying American Muslims — especially young people — who have adopted "radical" or "extremist" ideas, or who supposedly exhibit signs of alienation and are therefore assumed to be at risk for becoming terrorists. These are frequently called intervention programs, and are supported by research grants aimed at identifying the predictive signatures of people who become terrorists.
2. Programs to fund or facilitate the provision of health, education, and social services to American Muslim communities, based on the theory that adverse economic and social conditions facilitate terrorism.

3. The promotion of messages that the government believes will counter the propaganda of groups like ISIS, as well as monitoring and sometimes suppressing messages that the government believes foster extremism, including encouraging Internet companies to remove extremist or terrorist content from their websites and promote counter-messages.⁹

In 2014, the Department of Justice (DOJ) announced CVE pilot programs in Boston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Montgomery County, Maryland. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has launched its own initiatives and Congress has allocated \$10 million for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Community Partnerships to distribute in grant funding. These funds were awarded in the waning days of the Obama administration to a mix of 31 police departments, academic institutions, and non-profit groups.¹⁰

CVE proponents often present the strategy as a “soft” approach, which aims to divert at-risk American Muslims away from terrorism. A central goal of the Obama administration was to develop partnerships between the government and Muslim civil society to identify individuals at risk of terrorism and conduct interventions, which could include counseling, mentoring, or mental health treatment. The aim may be laudable, but CVE’s negative consequences outweigh any assumed and unproven benefits.

Many CVE programs label people as potential terrorists using disproven criteria and methods. The first is that extremist ideology is a precursor to, and driver of, terrorism. While this proposition has some intuitive appeal, it has been disproven by decades of empirical research. Many people hold views that can be described as “extreme” and never act violently; the reverse is also true.

The second disproven premise underlying CVE is that there is a predictable path toward terrorism, and that potential terrorists have identifiable markers. This notion has also been repeatedly debunked by empirical findings acknowledged by the White House and various law enforcement agencies. Yet CVE programs run or sponsored by the government continue to use unscientific lists of markers or signs in a misguided effort to identify individuals who are supposedly on their way to becoming terrorists. This overly broad approach creates a grave risk that people who have nothing to do with terrorism will be labeled potential threats, particularly because schoolteachers and social service and healthcare providers who come into contact with young Muslims, but have no law enforcement or intelligence experience, are expected to make these determinations.

CVE intervention programs are framed as community-led efforts to counsel young Muslims. In practice they are mostly led, funded, and administered by law enforcement agencies, including the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, U.S. Attorney’s Offices, the FBI, and state and local law enforcement agencies. The involvement of these agencies increases the likelihood that these programs will act as a vehicle for intelligence reporting about people and organizations in CVE-targeted communities who have been identified as terrorism risks based on disproven indicators. Publicly available information about these programs does not include rules preventing the entities that receive funding for, or participate in, CVE programs from sharing information with the FBI and police.

It is unlikely that either new or existing CVE programs will carry tangible security benefits. Channeling

law enforcement resources into investigating people based on a potpourri of unproven indicators isn't likely to snare criminals, but rather to draw scrutiny to individuals whose speech or beliefs are outside the mainstream. In addition, these programs risk damaging critical relationships between law enforcement and Muslim communities, further undermining the goal of preventing terrorism.

These risks are far from theoretical. The United Kingdom has used a similar approach, which has resulted in thousands of people, including children, being wrongly identified as potential terrorists. The U.K.'s CVE program is widely perceived as targeting Muslims, particularly their political views; and has resulted in widespread suspicion of government among British Muslims. Top officials in the government have called for its review or dismantling.

Finally, by targeting extreme or radical viewpoints — either by identifying political views as potential indicators of terrorism, or by seeking to suppress them online — CVE programs restrict discourse and debate. This not only undermines First Amendment values, but also drives terrorist narratives underground, where they are harder to challenge.

This report aims to trigger a much-needed course correction by highlighting the risks of CVE programs. It recommends a shift away from CVE to a framework that focuses on viewing American Muslims as a source of strength rather than suspicion. The report makes six recommendations, which should be implemented by the responsible federal, state, and local agencies.

First, counterterrorism and law enforcement officials should focus on what has been proven to work, rather than trying to identify pre-terrorists based on disproven criteria. This means vigorously investigating any suspicion of criminal activity, a tactic that has a proven track record of leading to counterterrorism successes. Communities should feel comfortable sharing information when they suspect criminal activity, rather than pressured to detect nebulous markers of radicalization.

Second, although American Muslims have a strong record of assisting law enforcement, these relationships have been frayed by 15 years in which their communities have been the primary focus of counterterrorism efforts, most recently by CVE. To increase mutual trust, government agencies should reset engagement efforts with American Muslims to cover a broad range of issues, rather than focusing resources on contentious counterterrorism programs. Law enforcement officers should not lead engagement efforts and there should be strict protocols for the sharing of information gathered in the course of community outreach.

Third, to the extent that the federal government continues to conduct or provide funding for CVE programs, it should ensure that the agencies running CVE programs, as well the groups and agencies that receive federal dollars, have in place public and robust safeguards against the manifest risks posed by these programs before they are implemented.

Fourth, while there is no evidence to suggest that providing funds for social and educational programs helps prevent terrorism, these initiatives are generally beneficial and could be continued. However, to

avoid the risks associated with CVE, these programs should be conducted outside the counterterrorism and law enforcement umbrella, and include safeguards to prevent them from turning into vehicles for intelligence gathering.

Fifth, with respect to CVE measures relating to the Internet — i.e., monitoring and removal of content and counter-messaging — this report recommends greater transparency and the development of procedural safeguards.

Finally, government funding of terrorism research should adhere to scientific protocols, measure the effectiveness of CVE programs, and pay close attention to their impact on community relations and constitutional norms.

Even if the federal government pulls back from its active sponsorship of CVE or renames it to make clear that the target is “radical Islam,” the infrastructure for these programs has already been developed at the local level. It is therefore critical that government agencies, particularly at the state and local levels, heed the recommendations set out above and dismantle, or at the very least substantially reconfigure, their CVE programs.

I. CVE TAKES CENTER STAGE

While the ideas underlying CVE have been around for years, the approach became an increasingly prominent part of U.S. counterterrorism policy since 2011.

A. White House CVE Strategy and Plans

In August 2011, President Obama unveiled the “National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” (White House CVE Strategy),¹¹ which was followed by an implementation plan (2011 White House CVE Implementation Plan).¹² The latter was updated in October 2016 (2016 White House CVE Implementation Plan).¹³

The first plank of Obama’s White House CVE Strategy was “enhancing [f]ederal engagement with and support to local communities targeted by violent extremists.”¹⁴ While CVE was framed without reference to a particular group or ideology, President Obama’s introduction to the document suggests that American Muslims are the primary target.¹⁵ Indeed, the Brennan Center’s research shows that the bulk of these initiatives, as well as the pilot programs discussed later in this report, are focused on American Muslims.¹⁶ The aim of the strategy was to leverage post-9/11 outreach efforts designed to foster better relations between law enforcement and Muslim communities to encourage them to work with law enforcement to identify potential violent extremists and develop intervention strategies.¹⁷ This goal was highlighted in the White House 2016 CVE Implementation Plan and in the DHS implementing grant program, both of which explicitly envision support for interventions.

Research on CVE was the second plank of the strategy,¹⁸ in order to develop training for communities and government “about how people are radicalized to accept violence, and what has worked to prevent violent extremism.”¹⁹ The 2016 CVE Implementation Plan included an additional emphasis: making such research more easily accessible to the public in order to inform CVE programs.²⁰

The final goal was to develop methods to counter internet propaganda that promotes violent extremism.²¹ This included monitoring social networking sites that advance violent extremist narratives and refuting their messages.²² The 2011 White House CVE Implementation Plan acknowledged that the latter was the “most challenging area of work, requiring careful consideration of a number of legal issues, especially those related to the First Amendment.”²³

Obama’s CVE Strategy recognized the risks posed by this approach and put forward broadly worded principles aimed at ameliorating them. These included the need to protect civil rights and civil liberties and to ensure that the government did not “stigmatize or blame communities because of the actions of a handful of individuals,” as well as the admonition that strong religious beliefs and opposition to government policy should not be confused with violent extremism.²⁴ Yet, despite repeated requests from civil rights and community organizations, the Obama administration never provided information on how these principles would be implemented.²⁵

The 2016 White House CVE Plan acknowledged community opposition, noting that “some have expressed fear of stigmatization and general distrust regarding CVE efforts, specifically citing community engagement as being carried out for purposes of law enforcement investigations or intelligence collection.”²⁶ In response, the plan noted that investigation and intelligence collection are “not the goal of CVE efforts” and that “[p]rotection of individual privacy and freedom of expression . . . will be woven into all efforts.”²⁷ Agency lawyers would “analyze potential privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties considerations” for federal CVE programs. But there is no indication that assessments will be made public or that federally-funded programs run by state and local agencies or non-governmental organizations (which make up a significant portion of these efforts) will be evaluated.²⁸ Indeed, as discussed later in this report, there is little evidence that such assessments have been undertaken or that protections have been incorporated into either the FBI’s CVE initiatives or the pilot programs funded by the federal government.²⁹

B. Action by Congress and Federal Agencies

An inter-agency CVE task force was established in early 2016, led by the Justice Department and DHS.³⁰ A few months earlier, DHS established an Office of Community Partnerships, with the stated mission of countering violent extremism,³¹ which recently issued its own CVE strategy (2016 DHS CVE Strategy). The guiding principles of the strategy state that “[i]ntelligence and law enforcement investigations are not part of CVE activities,” and that “[p]reservation of individual liberty, fairness, and equality under the law and respect for civil rights, civil liberties, and privacy are fundamental to CVE.”³²

Funding for CVE has also increased. Because grants for these programs flow through several different agencies and programs, and may not even be designated as CVE, it is not possible to get a complete picture. For the last few years, the government dedicated between \$3 million to \$4 million annually of the National Institute of Justice’s budget for research aimed at understanding what leads individuals to terrorism.³³ In addition, DHS’s newly-created Office of Community Partnerships was allotted \$13 million, of which \$10 million was earmarked for grants “to help states and local communities prepare for, prevent, and respond to emergent threats from violent extremism.”³⁴ CVE dollars may also be available through other sources, such as the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services at the Justice Department, which funded a program in Montgomery County, Maryland in 2014.³⁵

The request for grant proposals from the DHS Office for Community Partnerships recognized the need to ensure that CVE programs do not “infringe on individual privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.”³⁶ Those seeking grants were required to “describe any potential impacts to privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties and ways in which applicants will protect against or mitigate those impacts and administer their program(s) in a nondiscriminatory manner.”³⁷ Applications that did not appropriately protect civil rights and civil liberties would not be eligible for grants.³⁸

On January 13, 2017, days before Obama left office, DHS released the list of 31 CVE grant recipients, which includes the broad categories into which they fall.³⁹ Approximately \$2 million was allocated for “developing resilience.”⁴⁰ About the same amount was earmarked for training and engagement activities and on intervention programs each, while about \$2.7 million is allocated to challenging the narrative.

Exporting CVE to the World

The U.S. has been a vocal proponent for CVE at the U.N. In 2014, it sponsored a Security Council resolution requiring governments to take action against foreign fighters, which included a section on CVE.⁴¹ Although the resolution neither defined violent extremism nor affirmatively stated that it leads to terrorism,⁴² it nonetheless elevated CVE as an essential part of addressing terrorism and asked states to take measures to combat violent extremism.⁴³

President Obama placed his personal imprimatur on these efforts, putting in a rare appearance at the meeting that approved the resolution on foreign fighters. In February 2015, President Obama brought together high-ranking officials from 70 countries for a three-day summit on CVE.⁴⁴

The U.S. has also led efforts to embed CVE in the U.N.'s human rights institutions, sponsoring a resolution at the U.N. Human Rights Council.⁴⁵ The passage of the resolution was contentious, necessitating a rare vote in the Council.⁴⁶ Four of the original sponsors — Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom — withdrew their support after its passage because of concerns about changes made during the floor debate.⁴⁷

In December 2015, the U.N. Secretary General issued a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, which positioned CVE as a human rights-focused alternative to security-based counterterrorism approaches.⁴⁸ Critics have noted that, like U.N. resolutions on CVE, the plan does not define “violent extremism,” fails to present convincing evidence of the causes or “drivers” of “violent extremism,” and “despite these threshold failings, . . . nonetheless prescribes a host of programmatic, political, and institutional actions with significant implications.”⁴⁹

U.N. human rights experts have raised concerns about the impact of CVE. In 2016, Ben Emmerson, the Special Rapporteur for Counterterrorism and Human Rights, issued a report highlighting the conceptual weaknesses of the CVE framework and cautioned that the approach jeopardizes anti-discrimination norms, freedom of expression, freedom of movement, and securitizes the protection of human rights in undesirable ways.⁵⁰ In their annual Joint Declaration in May 2016, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, David Kaye, and his counterparts from the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, also raised concerns that CVE programs “risk undermining freedom of expression.”⁵¹ Kaye warned that: “efforts to counter ‘violent extremism’ can be the ‘perfect excuse’ for democratic and authoritarian governments around the world to restrict free expression and seek to control access to information.”⁵²

A final tranche of a little over \$1 million was awarded to “building capacity” of community-level non-profit organizations active in CVE. As of this writing, four groups awarded funds have stated that they will decline the funding in light of the Trump administration's apparent antipathy to Muslims, while one other has stated that it will do so if the framework for the program is changed to combating radical Islam rather than violent extremism generally.⁵³

It is impossible to evaluate the actual programs being funded because grant applications have not been made public; we also do not know whether they have incorporated adequate non-discrimination and civil rights and civil liberties protections. Two points about the grants are, however, worth noting. First, almost one-third of the funding will go to police and public service agencies and policing research institutions, underlining the central role of law enforcement in CVE. Second, of the non-profit groups providing services to communities and individuals, groups focusing on Muslims were awarded almost 80 percent of funding.⁵⁴ A notable exception is the allocation of \$400,000 to Life After Hate, a group run by former members of the “American violent far-right extremist movement,” which is known for its work in counseling individuals who wish to leave these movements.⁵⁵ An important distinction between Life After Hate and the intervention programs targeted at Muslim communities is that the group assists those who have self-identified as belonging to violent extremist movements with disengagement, and not on identifying pre-terrorists.⁵⁶

II. CVE'S SHAKY FOUNDATIONS

CVE programs are built on two shaky premises. The first is that extremist ideology is a precursor to, and driver of, terrorism. While this proposition has some intuitive appeal, it has been disproven by decades of empirical research. Many people hold views that can be described as “extreme” and never act violently; the reverse is also true. The second premise is that there is a predictable path toward terrorism with clear markers that can be used to identify potential terrorists. This notion has also been repeatedly debunked by empirical research.

Below, we detail what empirical research tells us about how people become terrorists. In the next section, we explain how the U.S. government’s CVE framework departs from these findings.

A. Extremist Beliefs Do Not Cause Terrorism

Extreme or radical views are often assumed to lie at the heart of terrorism. But evidence shows that the overwhelming majority of people who hold radical beliefs do not engage in, nor support, violence. Prominent counterterrorism experts sum up what the research shows:

- Prof. Randy Borum, University of South Florida: “A focus on radicalization ... risks implying that radical beliefs are a proxy — or at least a necessary precursor — for terrorism. We know this not to be true. Most people who hold radical ideas do not engage in terrorism, and many terrorists — even those who lay claim to a ‘cause’ — are not deeply ideological and may not ‘radicalize’ in any traditional sense.”⁵⁷
- Prof. John Horgan, Georgia State University: “The idea that radicalization causes terrorism is perhaps the greatest myth alive today ... the overwhelming majority of people who hold radical beliefs do not engage in violence [and] there is increasing evidence that people who engage in terrorism don’t necessarily hold radical beliefs.”⁵⁸
- Prof. Andrew Silke, University of East London: “The evidence isn’t there to say ideology is the prime reason why people are becoming terrorists, and yet ideology is the foundation on which the counterterrorism effort is built. ... That is a mistake.”⁵⁹
- Dr. Marc Sageman, former CIA Officer: “[I]deology is commonly blamed for this turn to violence ... [b]ut my interviews with terrorists in the name of Islam showed me that they were not ideologues and, indeed, did not understand much about their ideology ... there are big problems with the ideology thesis. It is not a necessary condition to becoming a terrorist.”⁶⁰

These views are supported by a multitude of empirical studies, several of which were funded or conducted by governments, including those of the United States and the United Kingdom.⁶¹

Even the FBI acknowledges the difficulty of pinpointing the role of ideology in terrorism. In 2011, the Bureau analyzed 57 terrorism plots⁶² to evaluate the impact of Anwar al-Awlaki, the high-profile American-born cleric who was killed by a drone strike in Yemen.⁶³ He is widely considered the “inspiration” for several terrorist attacks, including the 2005 London subway bombings and the attempted 2010 Times Square bombing.⁶⁴ The FBI concluded:

It is difficult to quantify the degree to which Islamist materials and ideologues — such as Anwar al-Aulaqi (US Person), Abdullah e-Faisal, and Feiz Muhammed, all of whom appeal to English-speaking audiences — played a part in the radicalization of the persons included in this assessment. ... While Internet personalities are often cited as a source of radicalization, factors outside the scope of this assessment — such as social environment and personal psychology (how a person processes both external and internal messaging) — were also influential.⁶⁵

The FBI’s assessment hints at the difficulty in predicting who will become a terrorist, a topic explored in the next section.

B. No “Terrorist Profile” or Tell-Tale Signs of Terrorism

Western governments have spent millions trying to find a predictable trajectory that leads someone to terrorism or the tell-tale signs of a potentially violent actor. While the search continues,⁶⁶ empirical analysis has produced two definitive conclusions:

- There is no fixed profile of a terrorist. The process by which a person embraces violence is dynamic and involves an array of personal, social and political factors that interact with each other in complex, individualistic ways.
- Precisely because it is a complex mix of factors that leads to terrorism, there is no predictable path to violence. It is simply impossible to reliably assess who will become a terrorist within a population and who will not.

As detailed in the Brennan Center’s 2011 report, *Rethinking Radicalization*, law enforcement agencies, including the FBI and the New York City Police Department (NYPD), initially embraced a “religious conveyor belt” theory of how an individual becomes a terrorist. In essence, both agencies posited that there is a consistent, predictable pattern of stages of radicalization, which begins with the adoption of extremist religious beliefs.⁶⁷ The notion of a religious or ideological “conveyor belt” with visible markers along the way has been thoroughly debunked.⁶⁸

Noted counter-terrorism scholar and former CIA officer Marc Sageman, summed up the state of research, stating: “[d]espite decades of research ... we still do not know what leads people to engage in political violence. Attempts to discern a terrorist ‘profile’ or to model terrorist behavior have failed to yield lasting insights.”⁶⁹ The original proponents of the theory, the NYPD and the FBI, have retreated from their positions. In 2016, the NYPD’s report on homegrown terrorism — which set out the conveyor belt theory — was removed from the department’s website as part of the settlement of a lawsuit about

the department's surveillance of Muslims.⁷⁰ The FBI's Strategic Plan to Curb Violent Extremism goes even further. Obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request and never before published, it unambiguously states:

There is neither one path or personality type, which is prone to adopting extremist views of exhibiting violent tendencies, nor is there a singular path or personality that leaves an individual vulnerable to others who may seek to impress these views or tendencies upon them. *There are no individually unique behavioral changes for those who mobilize to violent extremism.*⁷¹

Rather, according to the FBI, social science research has developed “numerous behavioral models outlin[ing] the dynamics and factors leading to violent extremism” and has come to the conclusion that “violent extremism is not a linear progression, but an evolving, dynamic situation involving numerous factors, catalysts, inhibitors, and mobilization variables.”⁷²

In sum, researchers agree, as does the FBI, that there are no unique signs of individuals who may be likely to commit terrorism.

III. U.S. GOVERNMENT CVE MODEL NOT SUPPORTED BY EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

There is a deep disconnect between counterterrorism researchers who believe that “we are no closer to answering our original question about what leads people to turn to political violence” and government agencies that recognize this reality, but nonetheless promote CVE programs which assume that there *must* be ways to identify people who might become terrorists.⁷³ CVE relies on community partners — such as schools, social workers, and religious leaders — to pinpoint such individuals. But experience has shown that even trained law enforcement professionals with access to secret intelligence and state-of-the-art analytics have difficulty predicting who might become violent in the future.

Additionally, CVE undermines the social compacts and trusting relationships school teachers, social workers, and religious figures require to effectively serve communities. This is because CVE programs are often run by, or in close cooperation with, law enforcement officials, without safeguards to prevent the exchange of confidential information. This means that personal details about people identified as potential terrorists — on the basis of disproven indicators — can easily be shared with law enforcement agencies, essentially resulting in a system of soft surveillance and reporting by entities that are traditionally bound to confidentiality. People will withhold information from doctors, counselors, social workers, and teachers if they think they will report their conversations to the police.

This approach is also unlikely to contribute to safety. CVE programs will result in the reporting of large numbers of people who have nothing to do with terrorism and the diversion of law enforcement resources from more fruitful pursuits. Moreover, CVE has been counterproductive; it is sowing distrust of government in the very American Muslim communities that have been strong partners in counterterrorism efforts.

What is Violent Extremism?

The White House CVE Strategy states that violent extremists are “individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals.”⁷⁴ Similar definitions are used by DHS,⁷⁵ the FBI,⁷⁶ and the National Counterterrorism Center.⁷⁷

This definition encompasses criminal activity, but is also broad enough to cover speech and beliefs. The 2011 White House CVE Plan states that its goal is to “prevent violent extremists and their supporters from *inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting* individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence.”⁷⁸ While financing or recruiting someone to commit violence is a criminal act, “inspiring” or “supporting” violence is not necessarily a crime. In the landmark case, *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, the Supreme Court upheld the right of a Ku Klux Klan member to voice support for racist violence. It found that constitutional guarantees to free speech apply even to “advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”⁷⁹

The term “radicalizing” too, could include speech and ideas.⁸⁰ In fact, as discussed later in this report, several CVE pilot programs list political viewpoints, such as concern about U.S. foreign policy or human rights abuses in the Middle East, as signs that someone might be on the path to violence.⁸¹

A. Discredited Ideological Markers; Vague Behavioral Indicators

The first post-9/11 models of radicalization, such as those put forward by the FBI and the NYPD, identified belief systems — particularly conservative interpretations of Islam, often described as “jihadi” or “salafi” ideology — as the key drivers of terrorism.⁸² Although these crude religious markers have been fully discredited by empirical research and have now been rejected by some of the very agencies that once put them forward, they remain influential in the terrorism discourse.⁸³ They have been supplemented by more coded references to ideological viewpoints, such as concerns about U.S. foreign policy or the belief that West is at war with Islam. In addition, recent government documents suggest that American Muslims, particularly youth, who are “alienated,” “withdrawn,” or feel “unjustly treated” are at high risk of becoming terrorists. Table 1, which lists the various markers of vulnerability to terrorism identified by federal agencies and local CVE programs, demonstrates this evolution, as well as common themes. For purposes of comparison, the chart also includes the markers used by the U.K.’s CVE program, which, as will be discussed later, has had a significant influence on U.S. policy.⁸⁴

The notion that concerns about U.S. foreign policy or feelings of alienation are markers of terrorism originates, in great part, from law enforcement studies seeking to identify commonalities among past terrorism cases.⁸⁵ These are used to create checklists to identify those “at risk” of committing terrorism.⁸⁶

While such analyses may be valuable as a post-mortem tool for law enforcement and researchers, they are not a useful *predictive* tool. Accepted social science methodology requires a comparison between behaviors and beliefs common to terrorists and a control group.⁸⁷ As Sageman explains:

Any attempt to assess the validity of indicators or factors that might lead an individual to commit political violence would require a study including both (a) individuals who actually carried out acts of political violence, and (b) individuals (the control group) who are similar to the first set in all respects except that they did not engage in violence. Use of a control group is critically important because it is only by a comparison with this control group, in which the indicator of actual violence is *absent*, that one can make the argument that other indicators specific to the subject group are valid. In short, a control group helps to lower the probability of generating a false positive, that is, falsely identifying someone as a future terrorist when he is not.⁸⁸

Sageman also noted that in his three decades of experience studying terrorism, he observed a “repeated failure within the government to employ basic scientific principles, such as the use of a control group, to test the specificity and validity of terrorism-related measures.”⁸⁹ The Brennan Center’s own research bears out this conclusion.

While most government studies remain secret, The Intercept published a 2014 National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) document entitled “Countering Violent Extremism: A Guide for Practitioners and Analysts,” which contains a rating system for risk of violent extremism.⁹⁰ The guide suggests that individual American Muslims — not suspected of any wrongdoing — be evaluated on a range of measures, such as expressions of hopelessness, sense of being unjustly treated, general health, and economic status. Of course, these traits are not predictive of violence and would raise no suspicion if found in non-Muslims. It is not known whether the NCTC guidance has been used in practice. However, a similar NCTC document, “Radicalization Dynamics: A Primer,” has been used in training by Los Angeles police,⁹¹ and

Table I: Terrorism Indicators Identified by Government Agencies and Programs

Date	Source	Indicators
2006	FBI ⁹²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Isolation from former life; • Wearing traditional Muslim attire, growing facial hair; • Frequent attendance at mosque or prayer group; • Travel to a Muslim country; • Increased activity in a pro-Muslim social group or political cause.
2007	New York City Police Department ⁹³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Giving up cigarettes, drinking, gambling, urban hip-hop gangster clothes; • Wearing traditional Islamic clothing, growing a beard; • Involvement in social activism and community issues; • Reading religious scripture; • Showing unusual maturity and seriousness.
2011	Los Angeles Police Department ⁹⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong need to join a social group, psychiatric disorders; • Pattern of violent behavior; • Outrage over U.S. or western foreign policy; • Perceived glory of fighting for a cause; • Interest in adventure and action.
2014	National Counterterrorism Center ⁹⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceived economic stress; • Sense of being unjustly treated; • Low trust in institutions and law enforcement; • Expressions of hopelessness and futility; • Lack of access to healthcare and social services; • Isolation from friends, family, community; • Personal ties to other violent extremists; • Concerns about anti-Muslim discrimination; • Foreign policy concerns relating to U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, Israel's treatment of Palestinians and others.
2015	Montgomery County ⁹⁶	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ideology, beliefs, and values: notion that West poses a threat to group, bifurcated world view of "us v. them," justifying violence; • Psychological factors: PTSD, mental illness, search for purpose or adventure; • Sociological motivators: alienation, acculturation problems, marginalization, discrimination, kinship ties; • Political grievances: human rights abuses, lack of political rights and civil liberties, corruption, conflict and foreign occupation; • Economic factors: unemployment, relative deprivation, financial incentives.
2015	"Don't Be a Puppet," ⁹⁷ FBI online game for high school students	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personal need for excitement, power, purpose, importance, and achievement; • Fears and frustrations such as social alienation and anxiety.
2015	Minneapolis CVE Framework ⁹⁸	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disaffection; • Disconnect between youth and religious leaders; • Internal identity crises; • Community isolation; • Lack of opportunity, including high unemployment, lack of activities for youth, and few mentors.
2015	Boston CVE Framework ⁹⁹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feeling isolated and alienated • Frustration at U.S. policy and events around the globe.
2015	United Kingdom Prevent Strategy ¹⁰⁰	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feelings of grievance and injustice; • A desire for political or moral change; • Over-identification with a group or ideology; • "Them" and "us" thinking; • Being at a transitional time of life.

likely other law enforcement agencies as well.¹⁰¹ These themes are also found in NCTC briefings aimed at training communities to identify violent extremists.¹⁰² Two such community awareness briefings state that “common steps toward violent extremism” include experiences of “alienation, racism, blocked social mobility, humiliation.”¹⁰³ They suggest a linear progression from concerns about U.S. aggression against Muslims, to the view that the “U.S. is at war with Islam,” to an embrace of violence as the appropriate response.¹⁰⁴

In sum, U.S. policymakers, while acknowledging that there are no tell-tale signs of who is likely to become a terrorist, nonetheless promote an approach that maintains that likely terrorists come with visible flags. Although the newer checklists tend to avoid obvious religious stereotypes, these are replaced with subjective personality assessments and evaluations of political beliefs. Empirical research does not support the use of these as predictive of terrorism.

B. Enlisting Parents, School Teachers, and Mental Health Workers

Law enforcement agencies have long relied on Muslim communities to alert them to potential terrorist plots.¹⁰⁵ However, CVE is not about reporting suspected crimes. In practice, it is about identifying Muslims as terrorism risks on the basis of common behaviors. President Obama’s National Security Adviser Lisa Monaco explained the approach at an April 2014 forum at Harvard’s Kennedy School:

What kinds of behaviors are we talking about? For the most part, they’re not related directly to plotting attacks. They’re more subtle. For instance, parents might see sudden personality changes in their children at home — becoming confrontational. Religious leaders might notice unexpected clashes over ideological differences. Teachers might hear a student expressing an interest in traveling to a conflict zone overseas. Or friends might notice a new interest in watching or sharing violent material.¹⁰⁶

Several of the behaviors identified by Monaco — personality changes and ideological differences with authority figures — are extremely broad and subjective and are present in many young adults.¹⁰⁷ To support asking the families, friends, and teachers of young Muslims to watch out for pre-terrorist behavior,¹⁰⁸ Monaco cited studies showing that in more than 80 percent of cases involving violent extremists, “people in the community — whether peers or family members or authority figures or even strangers — had observed warning signs a person was becoming radicalized to violence.”¹⁰⁹ The 2016 White House CVE Implementation Plan echoed this view.¹¹⁰

Neither Monaco nor the White House provided references for these studies. However, two frequently cited examinations of lone wolf terrorism suggest that these offenders signal their intent to commit violence, either via social media or to family and friends. A 2014 review of 119 cases of known lone terrorists found: “In 82.4 percent of the cases, other people were aware of the individual’s grievance that spurred the terrorist plot, and in 79 percent other individuals were aware of the individual’s commitment to a specific extremist ideology. In 63.9 percent of the cases, family and friends were aware of the individual’s intent to engage in terrorism-related activities because the offender verbally told them.”¹¹¹ Another study covered 98 cases between 1940 and 2013, concluding that roughly 80 percent had broadcast their intent to commit a violent act through various means, including: social media, TV appearances, as well “statements to friends, family members, and mental health providers, transportation workers and police officers.”¹¹²

At first glance, these studies may appear to support CVE's focus on training people to spot signs of terrorism. But the studies do not adequately take into account the phenomenon of "confirmation bias," the tendency to interpret information that conforms to pre-existing viewpoints.¹¹³ Only in retrospect would changes in behavior — particularly subtle ones — appear consequential. There is also no data on all the cases where friends or family members noticed something "off" about someone but no violence resulted (i.e., there is no control group). As Professor John Horgan, the author of one of the studies referenced in the previous paragraph, has said, "[i]t's not that easy to reverse-engineer violent extremism."¹¹⁴

Enlisting schoolteachers and other adults who are in contact with young people into CVE is of particular concern. Not only does it turn trusted adult role models into informants, the reporting process can become an outlet for anti-Muslim sentiment. There is no reason to believe, for example, that teachers are different from the rest of Americans, 61 percent of whom have a negative view of Islam, according to a 2015 Brookings poll.¹¹⁵

Stereotypes about American Muslim children are not uncommon in schools. The case of Texas ninth-grader Mohammed Ahmed is an extreme example, but illustrates the point. Last September, Ahmed, who lives in a Dallas suburb, brought a homemade digital clock to school to show to his engineering teacher. When the clock beeped in English class, Ahmed showed it to the teacher, who thought it looked like a bomb.¹¹⁶ Ahmed soon found himself questioned by police, handcuffed, and fingerprinted. His treatment provoked outrage from many quarters, including President Obama and Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg.¹¹⁷ Yet Ahmed is hardly alone. According to a 2015 study by the California Chapter of the Council on American Islamic Relations, 55 percent of 621 Muslim students said they had faced religion-based bullying¹¹⁸ (approximately twice the national average for school bullying).¹¹⁹ One in five students reported discrimination from a teacher, including 27 percent of female respondents who wore a hijab (headscarf).¹²⁰ Another survey, conducted by a Montgomery County CVE program, found that 10 percent of Muslim students felt a teacher or school administrator had "treated them unfairly because they are Muslim."¹²¹

Teachers and psychologists have sounded the alarm about CVE. The nation's second-largest teachers' union, the American Federation of Teachers objected strongly to an FBI CVE program, describing it as "ideological profiling and surveillance" that would have "a chilling effect on our schools and immigrant communities, jeopardizing children's sense of safety and well-being and threatening the security and sense of trust of entire communities."¹²² Two psychologists writing in *Psychology Today* criticized CVE programs for asking mental health professionals to report young Muslims on the basis of unproven signs that someone might be on the path to violence.¹²³ Professional ethics, they noted, already require them to take action if they know that someone is "imminently at risk of harming him/herself or others." But CVE programs advocate reporting far beyond that standard, requiring mental health professionals to "spy on their patients, read minds, and predict the future."¹²⁴

C. CVE Programs Will Not Improve Public Safety

The unfounded and imprecise nature of the indicators used in CVE programs strongly suggests that they will result in large numbers of false positives. This effect is magnified by the rarity of domestic terrorist attacks.

Terrorism expert Sageman offers the following hypothetical. Suppose the government has a tool to identify

potential terrorists based on certain types of information, which is 100 percent sensitive — i.e., it is associated with and can identify all potential terrorists who will actually carry out violent acts. The information is also exceptionally specific, and would result in only one error — i.e., one false positive — in 100 predictions. The accuracy of the hypothetical tool (which is far more accurate than anything found in real life) would depend on the number of terrorists in the population. If there were 100 terrorists in a population of one million people (a base rate of 1/10,000), the predictive tool would identify all 100 of them, because it is 100 percent sensitive. However, because the tool is only 99 percent specific, for every hundred evaluations, it would make one error and thus falsely identify another 10,000 people as actual terrorists. In sum, even though the tool is near “perfect,” the probability that it would identify a person who is an actual terrorist is less than 1 percent.¹²⁵

The practical difficulty of predicting who will engage in violence is illustrated by recent cases investigated by the FBI. Omar Matteen (who killed 49 people at the Pulse night club in Orlando) and Tamerlan Tsarnaev (one of the perpetrators of the Boston Marathon bombing) were both investigated and questioned by the FBI. But the agents — who had counterterrorism expertise and access to intelligence databases — were not able to discern that they would later carry out attacks and ultimately closed down their investigations.¹²⁶

CVE efforts also undermine security by sowing division and distrust among American Muslim communities who are a vital source of information for law enforcement. Studies show that Muslims have provided information in between 33 to 40 percent of foiled U.S. terrorist plots.¹²⁷

Although under the Obama administration CVE was deliberately framed without reference to a particular ideology, one would be hard-pressed to find a CVE program directed at non-Muslims.¹²⁸

Can Anti-Gang Programs Serve as a Model for CVE?

The White House CVE Strategy cites the Justice Department’s Comprehensive Gang Model as an inspiration for CVE.¹²⁹ While a full-scale evaluation of gang prevention programs is beyond the scope of this report, a few facts suggest that these programs may not provide a sound model for CVE.

First, the scope of gang violence is far greater than terrorism. There were approximately 30,000 active gangs in the United States in 2012, with roughly 850,000 gang members,¹³⁰ and gangs are estimated to be responsible for as much as 90 percent of violent crime in some jurisdictions.¹³¹ By contrast, the annual number of terrorist incidents (of every stripe) in the U.S. in the last 15 years totals in the low hundreds at most.¹³² Developing accurate predictive models for crime is difficult generally and near impossible with such low frequency.

Second, the track record of gang reduction programs is mixed. The DOJ’s Comprehensive Gang Model failed in three of its six test sites and had “no measurable effect on the growth of gang membership.”¹³³

Finally, like CVE, gang reduction programs disproportionately target minorities,¹³⁴ while excluding predominantly white groups, such as motorcycle gangs and hate groups;¹³⁵ they also use vague and ill-defined criteria for placing individuals on gang lists,¹³⁶ which can subject them to sentencing enhancements for otherwise legal associations with “known gang members.”¹³⁷ Concerns about gang lists led to a California law requiring people to be informed before they are added to a gang database and a chance to challenge the designation.¹³⁸ Minority communities have also long feared that anti-gang initiatives are a cover for intelligence collection.¹³⁹

A 2016 survey of nearly 400 state, county, and municipal law enforcement agencies found that although they had serious concerns about anti-government extremism, not one “had a formal outreach program designed to counteract anti-government, racist, or other forms of violence.”¹⁴⁰

Given this focus, it is hardly surprising that many American Muslims perceive these programs as stigmatizing, particularly since in the last 15 years, violence from individuals inspired by anti-government and neo-Nazi ideologies has resulted in many more fatalities in the U.S. than have al-Qaeda or Islamic State inspired attacks.¹⁴¹ Law enforcement’s central role in CVE and the history of surveillance of Muslim communities have raised concerns that these programs are a pretext for intelligence gathering.¹⁴²

Indeed, there is widespread acknowledgement, both among researchers and even the government, that American Muslims have serious concerns about CVE.¹⁴³ Below are a few prominent critiques of the framework:

- Yusufi Vali, Executive Director, Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center: CVE “seems to reinforce the same stereotype that society holds of American Muslims: that they or Islam are inherently violent.”¹⁴⁴
- Islamic Shura Council of Southern California, which represents 86 mosques and Muslim organizations in the greater Los Angeles area: CVE programs “will specifically target, stigmatize, and infringe upon the protected rights of Muslim community members in Southern California.”¹⁴⁵
- Muslim student groups at 27 colleges in California: CVE provides “reinforcement ... to the stereotypes that Muslims are security threats, as well as the climate of fear the surveillance program will create, especially amongst Muslim youth.”¹⁴⁶
- Forty-four Somali and Muslim groups from Minnesota, including the largest mosques in the state: “CVE is based on the premise that religion or nationality (Somali) determines an individual’s propensity towards violence. ... It will further stigmatize and marginalize the Somali/Muslim community by treating all of its members as suspects and by holding an entire community responsible for the actions of others.”¹⁴⁷
- Council of American-Islamic Relations and 18 other American Muslim and Asian organizations: “CVE is likely to result in law enforcement targeting an individual based on his/her political opinion and exercise of religion. These are First Amendment protected activities which no government-sponsored programs should encroach upon. Law enforcement cannot be allowed to use them as a basis for action.”¹⁴⁸
- Coalition of 27 civil liberties and community organizations including Muslim Advocates and the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee: “The FBI and local law enforcement could feed information they gather in CVE and community outreach settings into ongoing surveillance and monitoring practices — including the demographic mapping of American Muslim communities, pressuring individuals to become informants and placing people on the No-Fly List and other watchlists based on loose standards.”¹⁴⁹

So unpopular is CVE among Muslims, that the very term is considered toxic.¹⁵⁰ As a result, many programs have rebranded themselves. The Minnesota CVE initiative is now called “Building Community Resilience,” the Boston program is “Promoting Engagement, Acceptance and Community Empowerment” (PEACE), Los Angeles goes by Recognizing Extremist Network Early Warnings (RENEW), and Montgomery County calls itself Build Resilience Against Violent Extremism (BRAVE).¹⁵¹

D. U.K. Experience Demonstrates Shortcomings of CVE

While formal CVE programs are still new in the U.S., the United Kingdom has used a similar approach for over a decade.¹⁵² The results show that thousands of people, including children, were wrongly singled out (false positives). The program is widely perceived as targeting Muslims, particularly their political views, and has resulted in widespread suspicion of government among British Muslims.

The United Kingdom’s CVE program, called Prevent, launched in 2003. It initially focused on providing resources to Muslim communities for “integration and social cohesion” programs,¹⁵³ but grew to encouraging teachers, doctors, and social workers to identify people “vulnerable” to extremism.¹⁵⁴ Those identified as at risk are evaluated by a panel to determine whether they need support — such as mentoring or guidance on theology, health, educational opportunities, and career guidance — in order to divert them from terrorism.¹⁵⁵

As Table 1 shows, the Prevent vulnerability assessment criteria are very similar to those espoused by U.S. CVE programs.¹⁵⁶ They too are empirically unproven, vague, and allow for bias and stereotypes to drive reporting. Of the 22 indicators listed in the U.K.’s “vulnerability assessment framework,” the vast majority is so capacious they could include almost anyone. Some examples: feelings of grievance and injustice; a need for identity, meaning, and belonging; and a desire for political or moral change.¹⁵⁷ Sir David Omand, an architect of the U.K. program and the former head of the country’s signals intelligence agency, GCHQ, has conceded the lack of scientific basis for these criteria, noting that a study by the Security Service “concluded there was no discernible pattern that could be of operational use to separate those who might be vulnerable to radicalization from those of similar backgrounds who would not be.”¹⁵⁸ More recently, the U.K.’s Royal College of Psychiatry questioned the research underlying the risk factors being used for referrals, noting that it had not been made public and subjected to scientific scrutiny.¹⁵⁹

In a sign that bodes ill for U.S. programs, of the nearly 4000 people identified as potential terrorists between 2007 and 2014, some 80 percent were unfounded.¹⁶⁰ This means that thousands of people who had nothing to do with terrorism were referred to the police. Indeed, it is unclear whether even the remaining 20 percent had any connection to terrorism, because there is no publicly available information on these cases.¹⁶¹ Unsurprisingly, the U.K.’s CVE program is perceived by many Muslims as discriminatory and stigmatizing.¹⁶²

As detailed in separate 2016 reports from the Open Society Justice Initiative and the Institute of Race Relations, these concerns have been greatly exacerbated by the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015, which imposes a legal duty on local authorities, schools, social services departments, and even nurseries, to report those they believe to be vulnerable to being drawn into

terrorism (formerly, such reporting was encouraged but not required).¹⁶³ The program has also become more explicitly focused on extremist speech and ideology rather than violence, with “extremism” defined as opposition to “fundamental British values.”¹⁶⁴ The combination of compulsory reporting and this nebulous standard led to Muslim children being suspected of terrorism in the following situations:

- A 12-year old boy for playing a terrorist in drama class;¹⁶⁵
- A 17-year old boy who became more overtly religious;¹⁶⁶
- A 14-year old boy who talked about “eco-terrorism” in class;¹⁶⁷
- A teenage boy who came to school with leaflets promoting a boycott of Israel;¹⁶⁸
- A teenager who went to a peaceful protest against the Israeli deputy ambassador;¹⁶⁹ and
- A two-year-old who sang an Islamic song and said “Allahu Akbar” (God is great).¹⁷⁰

Prominent British mosques have criticized the U.K.’s CVE approach as “ill-conceived and flawed policy” used to “spy [on] and denigrate the Muslim community and cause mistrust,” and called for its boycott.¹⁷¹ In a July 2015 open letter, 280 prominent academics, writers and activists wrote that the program “reinforces an ‘us’ and ‘them’ view of the world, divides communities, and sows mistrust of Muslims,” calling on the U.K. government to end the policy.¹⁷² In June 2016, the country’s National Union of Teachers passed a motion calling for the CVE effort to be scrapped because it causes “suspicion in the classroom and confusion in the staffroom.”¹⁷³ As summed up by the UK’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, “the lack of confidence in aspects of the Prevent program[], particularly but not exclusively among Muslims, is undeniable.”¹⁷⁴

The net effect of CVE in the U.K., which has been exacerbated since the introduction of the statutory duty to report, has been to generate hostility and suspicion among Muslim communities, which is counterproductive. The former Chief Superintendent for London’s Metropolitan police summed up the problem: “you need a good relationship with the community for people to come forward with intelligence. If the community doesn’t trust law enforcement, they will be reluctant to share information vital for countering terrorism.”¹⁷⁵

IV. CVE IN PRACTICE

While there is much talk about CVE principles, little is known about its practice. In the U.S., only a few programs have been mounted, many of which are in the early stages of implementation, and information about them is limited. In an effort to learn more, the Brennan Center filed several Freedom of Information requests, some of which are still pending.¹⁷⁶

As noted, community-oriented CVE consists of two elements: 1) ensuring that Muslim communities have certain resources; and 2) identifying potential radicals and intervening before they become violent. While there is no particular evidence suggesting that after-school and mentorship programs contribute to reductions in terrorism,¹⁷⁷ these types of programs, if properly structured to avoid law enforcement involvement, can offer concrete benefits to many underserved communities. Intervention programs, however, pose serious risks of labeling Muslims as terrorists on the basis of little more than conjecture, and offer little benefit from the perspective of either law enforcement or relevant communities.

A. Federal Initiatives

In 2016 the FBI launched two initiatives aimed at enlisting civilians to spot individuals at risk of becoming terrorists. First, it published a CVE program for schools, warning principals about the “emerging trend” of young people “embracing violent radical ideologies.”¹⁷⁸ Formally titled “Preventing Violent Extremism in Schools” (FBI CVE School Guidance), the guide states that young people “possess inherent risk factors making them susceptible to violent extremist ideologies or possible recruitment.”¹⁷⁹ In fact, the data shows that the number of people younger than age 18 involved in terrorism is tiny. Of the 101 people prosecuted for ISIS-related offenses up to mid-2016, only five were aged 18 or under.¹⁸⁰ Meanwhile, nearly 15 million students are enrolled in the nation’s high schools.¹⁸¹

Contrary to the FBI’s own CVE Plan, which states there is no single path to becoming a terrorist,¹⁸² its guidance to schools embraces the notion that there *is* a “trajectory to radicalization.”¹⁸³ According to the FBI CVE Plan, there are no “individually unique behavioral changes for those who mobilize to violent extremism.”¹⁸⁴ In contrast, the School Guidance states that students “on the pathway to becoming radicalized or mobilizing, often exhibit behaviors or engage in communications, indicating support for extremist ideologies or highlighting future intentions.”¹⁸⁵ While it disavows the use of profiles, the guidance urges schools to keep watch on students’ political views and identify those who are “curious about the subject matter” of extremism.¹⁸⁶ Such an approach undermines educational institutions’ traditional role as environments where robust and open inquiry is nourished; instead placing them in the role of actively monitoring students’ political and religious views for signs of violent extremism.¹⁸⁷

The FBI asks schools to stage “interventions” for students displaying “concerning” behaviors, which would involve school resource officers (who are law enforcement officers) and state and local police.¹⁸⁸ Of course, schools routinely get involved when students have behavioral problems. But the increased participation of law enforcement in schools has come under severe criticism for criminalizing disciplinary issues; adding a counter-terrorism element to the mix is only likely to increase these types of problems.¹⁸⁹

As of this writing, it is not known whether any schools have implemented the FBI's recommendations. However, another FBI CVE tool that debuted last year and is already up and running is a website, "Don't Be A Puppet." (<https://cve.fbi.gov/home.html>) The video's imagery encourages the audience to "free" a "puppet" from the "strings" of violent extremism that control it. The website identifies suspicious behavior so broadly that it practically invites stereotypes to influence what gets reported. For example, using "private messaging apps"¹⁹⁰ or playing violent "internet games"¹⁹¹ are deemed signs of trouble, as are "stress by problems at home, grades, peer pressure, bullying and ... frustration."¹⁹²

Muslim community and civil rights groups have criticized the site, noting that instructions such as reporting someone "traveling to places that sound suspicious" would likely lead to reporting of Muslims. According to a letter sent to FBI Director James Comey from the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee:

A trip to France or Germany, which are home to many far-right groups, is not likely to be considered suspicious by most teachers and community leaders. Although there should be nothing inherently suspicious about traveling either to Saudi Arabia or Iraq, where some Muslim holy sites are located, bias could lead individuals to report innocent, constitutionally protected activity to law enforcement.¹⁹³

The American Federation of Teachers, along with 18 other educational and immigrants' rights organizations, asked the FBI to end "Don't Be a Puppet," arguing that the venture was contrary to public schools' mission to be safe, welcoming places of learning.¹⁹⁴ They particularly emphasized the risks to American Muslim children:

The harmful effects of such a campaign cannot be overstated. Racial profiling is marginalizing and will take an emotional and psychological toll on innocent children. A generation of children is growing up living in fear due to the current hateful rhetoric in the public arena targeted at their family and communities. Efforts like Don't Be a Puppet will only exacerbate the bullying and profiling of Middle Eastern and Muslim students by creating a culture of animosity and distrust.¹⁹⁵

The FBI also has announced plans to create Shared Responsibility Committees (SRCs) to review cases of individuals who might be at risk of becoming terrorists, to decide whether they can be diverted from this path via counseling.¹⁹⁶ Although the Bureau has not fully disclosed how these committees will work,¹⁹⁷ leaked draft letters to potential members (Draft SRC Letter),¹⁹⁸ press reports,¹⁹⁹ and FBI briefings²⁰⁰ provide an outline of likely SRC operations.

FBI: CVE is an Intelligence Program

Despite claims that CVE is not a means for intelligence gathering, internal documents from the FBI's CVE office describe the approach as designed to "strengthen our investigative, intelligence gathering, and collaborative abilities to be proactive in countering violent extremism."²⁰¹ The conflict of interest between the FBI's "fundamental law enforcement and intelligence responsibilities" and CVE's emphasis on social or mental health interventions was highlighted in the 2015 report of the 9/11 Review Commission, a Congressionally-mandated panel set up to review the Bureau's operations.²⁰² The panel recommended that CVE responsibilities be transferred to another agency "more directly involved with community interaction."²⁰³

The membership of SRCs is not well defined, and neither are the parameters of their work. The committees are described as “multi-disciplinary groups voluntarily formed in local communities ... at the initiative of the group and sometimes with the encouragement of the FBI.”²⁰⁴ It is not clear how SRC members will be selected, although it seems likely that the Bureau will play a central role. Membership of SRCs will be secret, with the FBI undertaking to “make all reasonable efforts not to divulge the identities of SRC members.”²⁰⁵ There is no information on what confidentiality rules SRCs will follow, on what basis they will make assessments about whether a person is suitable for an “intervention,” or even what such an intervention might entail.

Although the Draft SRC Letter says the FBI “will not... use the SRC as a means to gather intelligence on the subject or... potential connections to terrorism,”²⁰⁶ the operational model of these committees suggests otherwise. It explicitly allows for broad information sharing, stating that “[t]he SRC can, but will not be required to, inform the FBI of an individual’s progress throughout the course of the program.”²⁰⁷ Committee members may be subpoenaed for documents or testimony related to a referred individual in any criminal or civil investigation.²⁰⁸ Moreover, since the FBI is the agency creating the committees, and in some instances financing them,²⁰⁹ there is a considerable likelihood that the committees will perceive pressure, if not an obligation, to share information about people it evaluates.

According to the Draft SRC Letter, the FBI can refer individuals who it believes are “potential violent extremists” to the Committee, a category that appears to be broader than those being investigated by the Bureau under its expansive intelligence gathering mandate.²¹⁰ The committees may also receive referrals from other sources.²¹¹ This means that the SRCs could serve as a conduit of personal information about individuals who are not suspected of any criminal activity or involvement in terrorism or even being assessed as potential threats by the Bureau.

Although there has been no official announcement, it may be that the Bureau is reconsidering SRCs, as it previously indicated to a handful of Muslim community groups in October 2016.²¹² In discussing the 2016 White House CVE Implementation Plan, Brette Steele, who led the Countering Violent Extremism Task Force under President Obama, reportedly said that “We determined that efforts to build intervention teams are less likely to succeed if they are driven by the federal government,” and suggested that the teams should instead be community-led.²¹³

But the 2016 White House CVE Plan retains a central role for law enforcement. Intervention teams will be “led by a variety of practitioners, including, *but not limited to*, behavioral and mental health professionals, *local law enforcement officials*, and faith-based and other non-governmental representatives.”²¹⁴ This does not preclude FBI participation and explicitly envisions local law enforcement agencies as potentially leading intervention teams. Moreover, where such programs do not exist, “DOJ, in coordination with [f]ederal partners” is charged with making sure they are established.²¹⁵ Finally, while the plan states that “[m]any intervention teams will work independent of the government,”²¹⁶ it obviously leaves open the possibility that others will not.

Even leaving aside FBI-led intervention programs, as discussed below, federal law enforcement agencies remained integrally involved in several federally-funded CVE programs that are being carried out at the local level, raising similar conflict of interest issues.

B. CVE Pilot Programs

1. Montgomery County, Maryland

In 2014, the Justice Department gave approximately \$500,000 to the World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE)²¹⁷ to run a CVE program in Montgomery County, Maryland. WORDE describes itself as “a nonprofit, educational organization whose mission is to enhance communication and understanding between communities to mitigate social and political conflict.”²¹⁸ The Montgomery County program is worth considering in detail because WORDE has been publicly described as an effective, evidence-based model that could be scaled up for use in other locales.²¹⁹

WORDE runs several programs under the CVE rubric. Many of these are fairly standard community building initiatives such as educational programs on conflict resolution, the impact of 9/11 on youth, family support, and town halls with public officials.²²⁰ It also sponsors programs that give Muslims the chance to work with people of other races and religions on cooperative ventures such as delivering food to the homeless.²²¹ These types of initiatives are sometimes described in the academic literature as “CVE relevant” to denote that they may have some long-term impact in reducing the likelihood that people will turn to violence, but are not expected to have a direct or immediate effect.

Under a separate DOJ grant, these WORDE programs were evaluated by three academics.²²² This evaluation is the basis for WORDE’s claim that it follows an evidence-based model. But the evaluation has been criticized by researchers at the University of Illinois for its circular reasoning.²²³ Without any scientific basis, the evaluators named certain qualities — feeling lonely or making friends with people from another race — that would impact an individual’s risk of becoming a violent extremist.²²⁴ The programs were then evaluated to see whether effected these risk factors. Even by this measure, as the study itself concedes, WORDE’s results were no better than those of other multicultural programs, which did not have CVE as their goal.²²⁵

In addition, WORDE runs two programs that can be categorized as “CVE specific” — i.e., they aim to identify American Muslims vulnerable to violent extremism. These programs, which raise the greatest concerns about individual rights, were not evaluated because they were started after the evaluation process began.²²⁶ The first is the “Cyber Civility Curriculum,” a “peer gatekeeper training” program that “train[s] high school students on recognizing and assisting peers experiencing isolation, personal crisis, and bullying.”²²⁷ Not much information is publicly available about this program and it is not clear that it is even operational.²²⁸ The second program is its intervention program, which claims to utilize “professionally trained, culturally sensitive clinicians [who] engage with clients (including refugees) on a wide range of psychological and social work issues, including those related to acculturation.”²²⁹ Its focus is on immigrants from the Middle East, South Asia and North, West, and East Africa — mostly Muslim regions.

WORDE has released a CVE instructor’s manual, which sets out its approach to intervention based on “lessons learned and best practices from two years of programming and evaluation.”²³⁰ The manual states that “radicalization to violent extremism is multi-faceted, interconnected and often entails overlapping potential factors” and identifies “five clusters of potential risk factors of radicalization: sociological motivators; psychological conditions; ideology/belief/and values; political grievances; and economic factors.”²³¹

The manual concedes:

This framework was developed using terms such as ‘risk factor’ or ‘indicators of vulnerability’ in the colloquial sense. It is important to note that scientifically, ‘risk factors’ may assume that risk is quantifiable, or that there is a proven causal link between two factors (for example, smoking is a common risk factor of lung cancer). However because there are no studies to date that have demonstrated a causal link between any one risk factor, or combination of factors, and an individual becoming a terrorist, our use of the term ‘risk factor’ is not predictive of who will become radicalized. Instead, it represents a structured guide to explore variables that have a potential to contribute to one’s radicalization.²³²

Despite these nods to scientific inquiry, WORDE in fact seems to use these factors to do just what the group says they cannot. The very report, which states that researchers have not identified any “risk factor, or combination of factors” unique to individuals likely to become terrorists, simultaneously aims to teach others how to identify individuals as vulnerable to violent extremism based on “potential risk factors.”²³³ Earlier WORDE trainings, including for police officers in schools, reflect the same model.²³⁴ But, as one CVE expert, Dr. Arun Kundnani, has explained, if the model has no “predictive power” as WORDE concedes, then it “shouldn’t be used ... because it means the variables it focuses on have no demonstrable relationship to radicalization.”²³⁵

There is no information available on the number or type of interventions conducted by WORDE since it received DOJ funding.²³⁶ Indeed, Professor John Horgan of Georgia State University, one of the researchers who assessed the program after it received government dollars, publicly criticized the group’s lack of transparency in this regard, noting that we cannot accept “at face value claims that these programs are effective.”²³⁷

Many of the “potential risk factors” WORDE identifies as relevant to assessing risk for violent extremism are capacious enough to encompass any number of common problems faced by human beings, such as stress or feelings of alienation. Others, such as those listed under the headings of “political grievances” and “ideology, beliefs and values” — are shared by many people who never commit an act of violence and are at the core of the values protected by the First Amendment. For example, WORDE identifies several prominent extremist narratives, suggesting that ascribing to these views could signal a propensity for violent extremism. First on the list is the view that the West is at war with Islam and Muslims based on “US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, drone attacks in Pakistan, the establishment of military bases in Muslim majority countries, human rights abuses against Muslims in Guantanamo Bay, civil rights infringements, US support for Israel, and Washington’s reluctance to support regime change in authoritarian states in the Middle East.”²³⁸ Similarly, WORDE portrays concerns about Western foreign policy and abuses in Muslim countries as signals of a potential inclination toward terrorism. This includes concerns regarding: “state repression,” “the brutal practices of repressive authoritarian regimes in the Middle East,” “lack of political representation, perceptions of political discrimination and feelings of disenfranchisement,” “government corruption,” and “foreign interventions.”²³⁹

These views are hardly unique to budding terrorists. They comprise a list of current national security-related issues discussed on the pages of American newspapers and debated in Congress every day. Repression in the Middle East is routinely documented and criticized by human rights organizations and the U.S.

government. Suggesting that opposition to drone strikes is a suspect “extremist narrative,” or that human rights concerns are an extremist “grievance” and precursors to terrorism, is not only patently absurd, but also illustrates how government-funded CVE programs can impinge on political speech.

American Muslims identified as potential problems based on this unfounded evidence are referred to WORDE’s CVE intervention program, which works hand-in-glove with the Montgomery County Police Department. This could give the police access to information about individuals who have been identified as at risk, potentially based solely on their political beliefs. Information about WORDE’s relationship with Montgomery County police are set out in its grant application:

- More than a third of WORDE’s DOJ funding was sub-granted to Montgomery County police to employ a social worker to assist with CVE cases;²⁴⁰
- The police are in charge of coordinating “referrals and interventions specifically to combat violent extremism;”²⁴¹
- Police officers and WORDE caseworkers decide jointly whether a “CVE case” should be handled by the “criminal-intelligence system or utilizing the public and private social services resources available.”²⁴²

Information may also flow from WORDE to the police *after* a referral is made and in the course of an intervention. According to the group, it follows the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) standard and reports those it considers an “imminent threat” or a threat to “national security,” but it has no formal guidance on what this open-ended standard entails.²⁴³

Finally, whatever assurances WORDE may offer, law enforcement’s perspective on CVE could not be clearer. Montgomery County assistant police chief Darryl McSwain views the program as a “way to gather information on security threats and share it with state and federal officials.”²⁴⁴

In sum, WORDE’s CVE intervention program has significant deficiencies. The program uses a checklist of broadly described measures, including widely held political views, as a way to identify individuals at “risk” for becoming terrorists. At root, WORDE adopts the thoroughly debunked approach of trying to predict who is likely to become a terrorist. The group also works closely with Montgomery County police when deciding which cases to refer for intervention and it appears that information can also flow to the police during counseling. Finally, despite claims of demonstrated effectiveness, the intervention aspect of WORDE’s programs has simply never been scientifically evaluated.

2. Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis

In September 2014, the Department of Justice announced plans to create CVE pilot programs in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis-St. Paul.²⁴⁵ Run by local U.S. attorneys, these programs include two features: CVE-relevant efforts that aim to provide Muslim communities with social and educational programs, and CVE-specific efforts to identify potential radicals and conduct interventions, possibly through the FBI-led SRCs.

Boston

Boston's Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies (Boston CVE Framework) envisions CVE-relevant activities such as skills training, efforts to increase awareness about mental health resources, and training on digital literacy.²⁴⁶ The framework notes that “[r]esearchers across the globe have made it clear that the path to violent extremism is not linear and there are no valid or reliable indicators to ‘predict’ who is more likely to engage in violent extremism.”²⁴⁷ The lead agency in charge, the Massachusetts U.S. Attorney's office, also conceded that “[w]ithout specific behavior indicators, it may be challenging to craft specific intervention protocols.”²⁴⁸

Nonetheless, the framework calls for programs to train people to identify “individuals vulnerable to isolation, alienation and becoming disenfranchised,”²⁴⁹ perhaps through teacher-created “lists of students to determine which students appear not to be connected”²⁵⁰ and those who express anger or frustration at U.S. foreign policy.²⁵¹ According to the framework, it does not have a law enforcement component and police will become involved only “once an individual has begun to prepare for or engage in ideologically-motivated violence.”²⁵² However, the framework does not specify who will be responsible for deciding that a person has crossed the line into criminal activity, or on what basis.

So far, the Boston program appears to be proceeding along two tracks: trainings and a grant program. Trainings, which are frequently arranged by the U.S. Attorney's office,²⁵³ are meant to teach educators, public health providers, and community and faith-based leaders to spot individuals vulnerable to violent extremism.²⁵⁴

The grant program is run by the Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and Human Services (MA-HHS), which was awarded some \$217,000 by the U.S. attorney's office to distribute CVE funds to “non-profits, for-profits, and/or education systems.”²⁵⁵ The agreement between the two offices acknowledges that “there is a lack of understanding regarding violent extremism,” but specifically envisions intervention programs for individuals are vulnerable to recruitment to terrorism because they “feel[] isolated and alienated” or because they are frustrated and angered by “U.S. policy and events around the globe.”²⁵⁶

In early 2016, MA-HHS solicited information from stakeholders on a range of CVE initiatives including intervention programs for individuals who display “concerning behavior” to “prevent mobilization to violence.”²⁵⁷ Several community and civil rights groups expressed concerns with respect to this and other aspects of the proposed grant program.²⁵⁸

When the agency issued its final request for proposal in August 2016, it appeared to take account of some of these criticisms. The program, which has been rebranded as the Promoting Engagement, Acceptance and Community Empowerment (PEACE) project, identifies its overall goal as preventing “violence” motivated by prejudice (as defined in hate crimes laws) or that meets the federal definition of terrorism.²⁵⁹ The solicitation bars the use of grant funds to “prohibit[] protected speech; suppress[] political dissent; profil[e] based on race, national origin, religious affiliation, ethnicity and/or ideology,” or to “erod[e] confidentiality protections established by law.”²⁶⁰ Importantly, the program appears to have moved away from a reporting framework based on discredited signs of pre-terrorism to one that requests proposals for “[i]nformation and referrals” for “spouses, parents, guardians or caretakers who are concerned that a child in their care or custody, or adult, may be recruited by organizations that promote, plan or engage in violence.”²⁶¹

These are welcome developments, which are further buttressed by the award of grants that do not appear to include any intervention component. The grants announced are as follows:

- **Empower Peace** will outreach to high schools and work with students to develop social media strategies and campaigns to promote tolerance and acceptance, and will offer a one day academy on social media and messaging related to violence prevention.
- **Somali Development Center** will convene local Somali leaders to promote economic development, community engagement, and social adaptation and cohesion. The Center will focus on the prevention of harmful cultural practices, the development of women and girls, and opportunities for immigrant and refugee youth.
- **United Somali Youth** will work with Somali and other African and Middle Eastern youth in the Greater Boston area to help build academic, social, athletic and critical life skills. The organization will offer afterschool programs, counseling, college readiness assistance, extracurricular activities, and community events.²⁶²

Despite this progress, it is clear that Massachusetts CVE is focused on American Muslims. Two out of the three grants were given to groups that work primarily with Muslims and it is not clear whether the grant to Empower Peace will also be focused on these communities. It should also be noted that the improvements in the Massachusetts approach may be entirely undercut if the U.S. Attorney’s Office or other government agencies continue to sponsor trainings that promote debunked indicators of violent extremism²⁶³ or initiates intervention programs along the lines of the FBI’s Special Responsibility Committees.

Los Angeles

The Los Angeles Framework for Countering Violent Extremism includes a CVE-general component, which mainly relies on existing rather than new programs, the overwhelming majority of which involve Muslim communities.²⁶⁴ It also envisages the creation of a CVE-specific intervention program to provide individuals “already deemed to be on a path towards violent extremism, with off-ramps to needed social services, mental health, faith-based, and other services.”²⁶⁵

In September 2016, the LAPD's Deputy Chief of Counterterrorism, Michael Downing, outlined how the Los Angeles intervention program would work.²⁶⁶ Called Recognizing Extremist Network Early Warnings (RENEW), is run jointly with the FBI, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's office, the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health, as well as the Joint Regional Intelligence Center. According to Downing:

- The Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which includes representatives from Los Angeles police and the FBI as well as other state and federal agencies, notifies a designated coordinator in the LAPD's mental evaluation unit if they come across a "subject they would like the program to look into." Calls from the public would also be referred to the coordinator.
- The coordinator transmits the person's name to the Joint Regional Intelligence Center for a "full work-up," including criminal records, whether the person has a weapon, a "Social Media analysis," and travel and financial records.
- The work-up is assessed by a joint LAPD-LA Department of Mental Health program that will decide whether: 1) the subject is a threat and should be held for evaluation, 2) the subject exhibits signs of mental illness and should be referred for outpatient therapy; or 3) the subject is not mentally ill but "may be isolated and would respond well to better integration with community or social services such as a mentorship [or] cross-cultural program."
- The result is reported back to the coordinator, who may also inform the JTTF.

Missing from Downing's presentation is the basis on which individuals would be referred to RENEW in the first place. If only those already under investigation by the JTTF were referred, the program could work as a means of exploring alternatives to prosecution. But the program appears to be broader. It starts with an evaluation by the regional intelligence center, which would hardly seem necessary in the case of an existing investigation suggesting that RENEW also anticipates collecting names from the public. While the criteria for referring someone are not specified, it seems likely that they will be similar to those previously identified by the LAPD as characterizing violent extremists, including political speech (e.g., outrage over U.S. or western foreign policy), psychological disorders, patterns of violent behavior, and capacious criteria that allow ample room for preconceptions (e.g., interest in adventure and action, strong need to join a social group).²⁶⁷

Remarkably, Downing's model does not allow for a perfectly plausible outcome: a person may be wrongly referred. In such cases, individuals wrongly identified as potential violent extremists — potentially on the basis of political views or common behaviors — will be thoroughly investigated and, even if they are found to have nothing to do with terrorism, could be added to intelligence databases of suspicious activity.²⁶⁸

Minneapolis

Minneapolis-St. Paul has the nation's largest Somali-American community and the area's CVE plan is largely focused on them. The Minneapolis Framework lists five "community-identified root

causes of radicalization:” “disaffected youth;” “a deepening disconnect between youth and religious leaders;” “internal identity crises;” “community isolation;” and “lack of opportunity.”²⁶⁹ Now called “Building Community Resilience” and funded with \$1 million in government and private money, the initiative includes: a mentorship program for Somali youth operated by Big Brothers Big Sisters of the Greater Twin Cities; an education and career resource hub for Somali youth in the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood; and some \$500,000 in grants to be distributed by Youthprise, a non-profit organization focused on teenagers.²⁷⁰ Thus far, most of the programming has been “CVE-relevant,” meaning long-term initiatives that may reduce violence.

While these initiatives are no doubt broadly helpful, it is not at all clear they do anything to prevent people from turning to terrorism.²⁷¹ Moreover, even these benign initiatives have raised suspicions because a previous community engagement program obtained funding from the federal government by promising to identify radicals among youth.²⁷²

The Minneapolis Framework also anticipates an intervention component, but does not provide details on how subjects will be identified. It suggests that “community volunteers” such as mothers, community organizers, religious leaders, and mental health professionals mobilize to work “directly with families before law enforcement is ever involved.”²⁷³ The framework does not address the issue of when or how law enforcement should become involved. It is not clear whether such an intervention program has been established, although in 2014, the Minneapolis public school system announced that it planned to place youth workers in lunchrooms and other non-classroom settings to “identity issues and disaffection at school.”²⁷⁴ According to news accounts, the program was in effect in the 2015 school year but was discontinued due to a lack of funds.²⁷⁵

V. CVE ONLINE

CVE is increasingly moving into the online space. Counterterrorism officials are concerned about ISIS's online recruitment and propaganda, although both have diminished dramatically in the last year.²⁷⁶ The Obama White House repeatedly urged companies to monitor social media for terrorist or extremist content, remove certain accounts and posts, promote counter speech by funding voices that it considers useful counterpoints to ISIS, and encouraged companies to promote these counter-messages on their platforms.²⁷⁷ While these efforts may seem different in kind from the community programs discussed above, they too rest on the disproven premise that terrorism is driven by extreme ideologies. The way to address the threat, the thinking goes, is to find ways to combat the spread of these ideas, either by removing them from the internet or by promoting the voices of those who contest them.

Online CVE is a complex subject, worthy of its own investigation. However, some core issues have emerged that are discussed below.

A. Monitoring Social Media and Removing Information

Social media companies, such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter, have been urged to screen content on their platforms. Often, this is described as looking for “terrorist content” and “terrorist activity,”²⁷⁸ but also includes attempts to monitor “radicalization,” which appears to be something short of terrorism.²⁷⁹

An initial question is whether companies like Twitter and Facebook should be running analytical tools on *all* their users to identify vague concepts like “radicalization,” which inevitably involves core political views, or whether they should instead rely on reporting by users.²⁸⁰ Another difficulty is identifying such information. Social media companies take the position that there is no “magic algorithm” for distinguishing “terrorist content”²⁸¹ and doing so requires them to make challenging judgments based on limited information and guidance.²⁸² Detecting “radical” or “extreme” material is even harder since these concepts are elusive, especially for global online platforms operating across cultures and languages.²⁸³

Nonetheless, several companies have become more active in monitoring their platforms, removing posts and closing accounts that violate “community standards,” generally banning “hate speech” and/or the promotion or praise of “acts of terror.”²⁸⁴ In August 2016, Twitter reported that it had deleted 360,000 accounts for promoting terrorism since mid-2015.²⁸⁵ Facebook, too, has taken a more vigorous approach. According to its head of public policy, when the company becomes “aware of an account supporting terrorism, we look at their friends, and associated accounts, so we can remove them.”²⁸⁶ In December 2016, Facebook, Microsoft, and Twitter announced that they would create a shared database of the digital fingerprints of “the most extreme and egregious terrorist images and videos we have removed from our services — content most likely to violate all of our respective companies’ content policies.”²⁸⁷ Even supporters of the initiative are concerned about the lack of transparency about what the database captures.²⁸⁸ Critics worry that the initiative will squelch speech.²⁸⁹ Facebook has drawn criticism for, among other things, deactivating the accounts of several prominent Palestinian journalists,²⁹⁰ deleting accounts and posts relating to the conflict in Kashmir,²⁹¹ and removing an iconic Vietnam War photo of a young napalm victim because it ran afoul of nudity restrictions.²⁹² While

Facebook conceded that these materials and accounts were taken down by mistake and restored them, the cases illustrate the difficulty of making judgments about what materials fall within its broadly phrased community standards.²⁹³

Selected Removal Standards

Facebook: organizations engaged in “terrorist activity” not allowed to have a presence on the site; removes content that expresses support for groups engaged in terrorist or organized criminal activity, supports or praises leaders of such groups, and condones their violent activity.²⁹⁴

Twitter: blocks accounts that “make threats of violence or promote violence, including threatening or promoting terrorism.”²⁹⁵

YouTube: prohibits content intended to recruit for terrorist organizations, incite violence, celebrate terrorist attacks or otherwise promote acts of terrorism, and does not permit foreign terrorist organizations to use the site.²⁹⁶

Microsoft: deletes “terrorist content” by, or in support of, terrorist organizations identified for sanctions by the United Nations Security Council if the material “depicts graphic violence, encourages violent action, endorses a terrorist organization or its acts, or encourages people to join such groups.”²⁹⁷

It is an open question whether removing online content is particularly useful in fighting terrorism. ISIS’s use of Twitter has been examined in a handful of studies, some of which suggest that suspending accounts of ISIS supporters is helpful in limiting the group’s reach.²⁹⁸ Others scholars, however maintain that these efforts are futile and that accounts simply re-appear under other names.²⁹⁹ For example, according to *The New York Times*, Twitter repeatedly tried to cut off the pro-ISIS account of a group called Asawitiri Media, which in 2015 was on its 335th iteration.³⁰⁰ Indeed, removals may even be counterproductive: they can destroy potentially valuable sources of intelligence; close avenues for engaging with and dissuading ISIS supporters (a core part of CVE counter-messaging strategy); and result in a smaller, but more focused and coherent group operating in a “much louder echo chamber,” thus creating greater risks.³⁰¹ Another unresolved question is whether it is “ethical to suppress political speech, even when such speech is repugnant?”³⁰² While most may find it acceptable to remove ISIS accounts, doing so risks the proverbial slippery slope that could result in the removal of posts and videos from groups that may not be violent but are nonetheless distasteful or unpopular.

Lastly, it must be noted that the policies governing takedowns are set by the corporations that own these platforms. While some progress has been made in increasing transparency about removals for counterterrorism or CVE purposes, the data is anecdotal and — except in cases of a public outcry — little information is available about the actual types of information and accounts that are deleted.³⁰³

B. Counter-messaging

The Obama administration also encouraged alternatives to the messaging of groups like ISIS through direct funding and by encouraging “the private sector to consider ways to increase the availability of alternative content.”³⁰⁴

Government counter-messaging efforts are not new. During the Cold War, the U.S.-owned Radio Free Europe beamed programs to those living behind the Iron Curtain.³⁰⁵ Until recently, these efforts were for overseas consumption and conducted primarily through the State Department. In 2013, key portions of the Smith-Mundt Act were repealed,³⁰⁶ lifting the requirement that the State Department disseminate its programs only to audiences abroad.³⁰⁷ This paves the way for domestic distribution of the State Department’s programs.³⁰⁸ DHS recently awarded \$2.7 million in CVE funding for counter-messaging³⁰⁹ and such campaigns are also a part of the agenda of the CVE pilot programs in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis.³¹⁰

In addition, encouraged by the government, at least some companies are taking steps to promote messages that rebut “extremist” views. Google has given grants to nonprofit organizations “to enable [them] to place counter-radicalization ads against search queries of their choosing.”³¹¹ In 2016, the company’s “tech incubator” Jigsaw (previously called Google Ideas) tested a program called the Redirect Method. A search for one of 1,700 keywords triggered ads leading to anti-ISIS playlists curated from existing material on the internet.³¹² Similarly, the State Department piloted a four-week Facebook campaign targeting people in Morocco, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia who “expressed an interest in Iraq, Syria, or Islamic State-related topics, as indicated by their Facebook activity” and directed them to videos that were meant to dissuade them from supporting ISIS.³¹³

Counter-messaging campaigns raise several questions. First, how are companies identifying users to in order to provide targeted content? If they are running algorithms that identify users searching for certain terms, which are likely closely associated with political views, this information may be available to the companies and potentially shared with the government. Second, while providing the opportunity for sponsored ads as Google has done is relatively harmless, larger scale attempts at manipulating information available on the internet may damage companies’ reputations. Facebook faced a firestorm of criticism when it was alleged that it had manipulated the “Trending Topics” portion of its newsfeed to demote conservative sources.³¹⁴ Similar concerns have been raised about recent efforts by the company to identify “fake news” on its site.³¹⁵

A key issue when the government funds counter-messaging campaigns is whether its involvement will be disclosed. CVE programs seek to work through third-party interlocutors who are perceived as more effective messengers than the government.³¹⁶ But concealing government sponsorship has the potential to backfire; here too the U.K.’s experience again proves instructive. The British government funded a multi-million dollar “series of clandestine propaganda campaigns intended to bring about ‘attitudinal and behavioral change’ among young British Muslims as part of a counter-radicalization program[].”³¹⁷ When the initiative became publicly known, it was met with broad condemnation for “undermining, rather than amplifying, the work of Muslim civil society,” generating further distrust among the U.K.’s Muslim communities,” and treating citizens as a fifth column.³¹⁸

Indeed, elevating certain types of information through government funding may be inimical to free speech if the sponsor is not disclosed. While it is not clear that there are any legal rules requiring the disclosure of government sponsorship for CVE messaging, courts and individual judges have regularly expressed concerns about the distorting impact of allowing government speech to be disseminated without attribution.³¹⁹

Finally, there is little consensus about the effectiveness of counter-messaging campaigns. Proponents point to the number of people reached by such methods,³²⁰ but there is a significant leap from getting people to click on a link or watch a video to changing their views. As one of the State Department officials involved in setting up early counter-messaging ventures stated: “Nobody wants to cop to the fact that [messaging is] pretty tangential to stopping fighters from carrying out attacks,” although “[i]t probably helps at the margins.”³²¹

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The government's primary interest in engaging with American Muslim communities is to ensure that they report individuals they suspect of involvement in terrorism. CVE expands the pool of individuals whom the government seeks to identify to include those who are considered in some way vulnerable to becoming terrorists, with the promise that there are methods for diverting such individuals from the path to extremism. As the above discussion demonstrates, empirical research does not support the idea that such individuals can be reliably identified. Moreover, the notion that the government will use non-law enforcement approaches rather than prosecutions is belied by placing CVE programs under the jurisdiction of law enforcement agencies and by the close involvement of law enforcement. Not only does this approach put any troubled or politically active Muslim in the crosshairs of counterterrorism policing, but it also adds little to our security because the likelihood of false positives is so high. By creating suspicion among large segments of the Muslim community, as these programs have demonstrably done, CVE also damages the already strained relationship between American Muslims and law enforcement, undermining counterterrorism cooperation.

It is recommended that government agencies abandon the CVE framework. This means more than just changing the name. Rather, it is recommended that they do the following.

A. Focus Counter-Terrorism on Evidence of Wrongdoing, Not Vague and Disproven Indicators

The goal of preventing terrorism is best met by pursuing those who are suspected of planning or committing acts of violence based on concrete facts. This approach focuses law enforcement resources on actual criminal activity rather than vague notions of alienation and political beliefs. Targeted intelligence gathering and normal police work — exploring the connections of known terrorist networks (including online) and investigating tips of genuinely suspicious activity, for example — would allow law enforcement officers to identify individuals before they undertake violence. The Institute of Homeland Security Solutions, which examined 86 terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009, confirms this common sense conclusion. More than 80 percent of the foiled plots were discovered “via observations from law enforcement or the general public.”³²² While the study did not discount the importance of intelligence gathering, it emphasized “the importance of more basic processes, such as ensuring that investigative leads are properly pursued, which unclassified reporting suggests have foiled an order of magnitude more cases.”³²³

B. Repair Relations with Muslim Communities

Like any other American community, Muslims have a critical role to play in reporting suspicious activity of all sorts, including relating to terrorism. And the evidence shows Muslims are responsible for providing information on up to 40 percent of thwarted terrorism plots.³²⁴ Yet the relationship has been frayed. For the last 15 years, law enforcement agencies have treated Muslims as suspect communities. There needs to be a re-set, forming broad-based partnerships with Muslim that are not based solely counterterrorism cooperation and are designed to allay fear and build trust. In concrete terms, this means:

- Outreach efforts to American Muslims should identify and address *community* concerns, rather than build relationships to advance a contentious counter-terrorism framework. A broad lens on engagement efforts will ameliorate the concerns of American Muslims that they are viewed as a suspect community, providing a more sustainable and stable basis for building trust.
- All community engagement programs should be completely transparent, with a clear articulation of their purpose and the government agencies involved.
- Law enforcement agencies should not lead engagement programs. Rather, they should be called upon when necessary to answer questions, or if invited by community institutions.
- To quell concerns about spying, all community partnership programs should include specific, publicly announced, robust safeguards to ensure that they are not used as intelligence gathering vehicles. The FBI, as well as local police and other law enforcement agencies, should adopt public, comprehensive policies that enshrine a bright line between community outreach and intelligence gathering, except in instances where an official becomes aware of criminal activity.³²⁵

C. Build Concrete Safeguards into CVE Programs

If government agencies continue to run CVE programs or fund them, then they and grant recipients must adhere to certain rules to ameliorate the numerous risks posed by CVE. In a welcome development, DHS's notice of CVE funding opportunities asks those applying for grants to describe potential impacts to privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, and "ways in which applicants will protect against or mitigate those impacts."³²⁶ And the 2016 White House CVE Plan provides that Agency lawyers will "analyze potential privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties considerations"³²⁷ for federal CVE programs. These protections should be bolstered in the following ways:

- Safeguards should uniformly cover all agencies and programs, and information about all programs should be posted online on a central portal;
- All CVE programs supported or funded by government agencies should be evaluated by privacy and civil liberties officers or attorneys at the relevant agency using publicly available criteria and methodology.
- All safeguarding plans and evaluations should be disclosed to the public.
- There should be a complaints process for those who believe their rights have been violated by CVE.
- CVE training materials, information sharing procedures and evaluation tools should be publicly available so that they may be reviewed by experts who are independent of the government.

- Specific and publicly available protocols should be developed to protect confidentiality during sensitive intervention and mental health-oriented programs.

D. Delink Social and Educational Programs from Counter-Terrorism

The CVE programs in Minneapolis and Montgomery County include several social and educational programs — such as conflict resolution, youth engagement and family support — that may, in the long term, contribute to reducing violence. While there is no evidence to show that these programs are useful for counterterrorism, they are broadly beneficial. For the most part, they do not present the same level of risk as individualized intervention efforts. On the other hand, there is a significant history of spying on Muslim communities via community engagement programs. Accordingly, it is recommended that these efforts be housed in appropriate agencies and not under a counterterrorism or law enforcement umbrella. And like community engagement programs, these too should include specific, publicly announced, robust safeguards to increase community trust. Giving law enforcement access to data collected through these programs would increase community distrust of all government programs.

E. Greater Transparency About Online CVE

Online CVE initiatives online requires a different range of fixes. These programs affect a broad swath of Americans who may be researching or discussing politics or religion online. At the very least, the government should refrain from pressuring social media companies to monitor their platforms for vague and disproven indicators of “radicalization.” Companies should be more forthright about what exactly they are doing in terms of monitoring and removal. They should build on their transparency record in the context of government requests for removal by publicly disclosing information about the process for identifying content that might violate their community standards or terms of service (e.g., does it involve an algorithm? what role do humans play in making decisions?) and disclose the number of posts or accounts they are deleting. In addition, they need to find mechanisms to assure their customers that information is being removed from their platforms in an even-handed way and is not distorting the flow of information online.

Finally, government funding of domestic counter-messaging initiatives should be disclosed so that these programs not to cross the line into secret government propaganda, which is antithetical to democratic values.

F. Ensure Government-Funded Research Adheres to Scientific Protocols

For at least the last several years, a significant focus of CVE funding has been research into the drivers and signs of radicalization. As experts have noted, and as is demonstrated in this report, this research often fails to adhere to basic scientific protocols, and studies are often kept secret. The 2016 CVE Implementation Plan and the 2016 DHS CVE Strategy both include welcome commitments to making research public.³²⁸ However, it is also critical that the research the government relies on when

formulating and disseminating policies is conducted in accordance with scientific principles. This means that government should, at the very least, require researchers to: 1) use valid and reliable social scientific methods, including unbiased sampling and control groups; and 2) subject their findings to academic peer review.

For all the research dollars that have been spent on counterterrorism, little seems to have been channeled to measuring effectiveness. Again, the 2016 CVE Implementation Plan and the 2016 DHS CVE Strategy are promising first steps in that they include a greater focus on measuring the effectiveness of programs.³²⁹ Data-driven analysis is vital for both community-oriented programs and for online CVE initiatives, and should be integral to project design and approval.

Finally, evaluations must find ways to measure the negative consequences of programs as well, including in terms of erosion of trust, undermining of constitutional norms, and stigmatization of Muslim communities. These should serve as a basis for developing concrete safeguards that go beyond the assurances of consideration of civil rights and civil liberties issues that have thus far been provided.

Simply put, CVE is not the right solution for preventing terrorism in the United States. The way forward with Muslim communities is to treat their integration and success — rather than their ability to spot terrorists — as the goal of government programs.

ENDNOTES

- 1 See, e.g., Maggie Haberman, *Donald Trump Calls for Surveillance of ‘Certain Mosques’ and a Syrian Refugee Database*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2015, at A24, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/22/us/politics/donald-trump-syrian-muslims-surveillance.html>; Maggie Haberman & Richard Pérez-Peña, *Donald Trump Sets Off a Furor With Call to Register Muslims in the U.S.*, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2015, at A1, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/21/us/politics/donald-trump-sets-off-a-furor-with-call-to-register-muslims-in-the-us.html?_r=0; Associated Press, *Trump and Carson Repeat Calls to Spy on U.S. Muslims*, PBS, Nov. 22, 2015, <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/trump-and-carson-repeat-calls-to-spy-on-u-s-muslims/>. At a town hall in October 2016, Trump falsely claimed “many people saw the bombs all over the apartment” of the couple who fatally shot 14 in San Bernardino, CA in 2015 and failed to tell police, while further arguing that Muslims should inform law enforcement whenever “they see hatred going on.” *Transcript of the Second Debate*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/us/politics/transcript-second-debate.html?_r=1.
- 2 *Washington v. Trump*, No. 17-35105, slip op. at 5, 24-26 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2017) (per curiam); *Aziz v. Trump*, No. 1:17-cv-116, slip op. at 7-9 (E.D. Va. Feb. 13, 2017).
- 3 Michael Crowley, *Trump’s Terror-Fighting Team yet to Take Shape*, POLITICO, Dec. 12, 2016, <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/donald-trump-terrorism-232870>. The Chair of the House Homeland Security Committee made a similar statement. Michael McCaul, Chairman, Homeland Sec. Committee, “State of Homeland Security Address” at The Heritage Foundation 4 (Dec. 7, 2016), available at <https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/State-of-Homeland-Security-Address-2016.pdf>.
- 4 Julia Edwards Ainsley, et al., *Exclusive: Trump to Focus Counter-Extremism Program Solely on Islam*, REUTERS, Feb. 2, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-extremists-program-exclusiv-idUSKBN15G-5VO> [hereinafter “REUTERS, *Trump to Focus CVE Solely on Islam*”].
- 5 *Hearing on the Nomination of General John F. Kelly to be Secretary, Department of Homeland Security Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs*, 115th Cong. 38-39 (2017) (pre-hearing questionnaire of Gen. John F. Kelly, Nominee, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.), available at <http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/kelly-pre-hearing-questions>.
- 6 Ron Nixon, Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, *Pointing to Trump Groups Reject U.S. Aid to Fight Extremism*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2017, at A19, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/02/us/politics/trump-muslim-groups-aid-extremism.html?_r=0; REUTERS, *Trump to Focus CVE Solely on Islam*, *supra* note 4; Associated Press, *Citing Trump, 3rd Nonprofit Rejects Funds to Fight Extremism*, FOXNEWS.COM, Feb. 8, 2017, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/02/08/citing-trump-3rd-nonprofit-rejects-funds-to-fight-extremism.html>; Stephen Montemayor, *Citing Trump, Minneapolis Somali Nonprofit Rejects \$500,000 Counterextremism Grant*, MINN. STAR TRIB., Feb. 3, 2017, <http://www.startribune.com/citing-trump-minneapolis-somali-nonprofit-rejects-500-000-counterextremism-grant/412514513/>; Associated Press, *Fourth Muslim Group Rejects Federal Grant to Fight Extremism*, YAHOO NEWS (Feb. 11, 2017), <https://www.yahoo.com/news/fourth-muslim-group-rejects-federal-grant-fight-extremism-063321100--politics.html>.
- 7 See *infra* text accompanying notes 132, 141.
- 8 Scott Shane, Matthew Rosenberg & Eric Lipton, *Trump Pushes Dark View of Islam to Center of U.S. Policy-Making*, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2017, at A1, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/us/politics/donald-trump-islam.html>; David Shariatmadari, *How War on Islam Became Central to the Trump Doctrine*, GUARDIAN, Jan. 30, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/30/war-on-islam-central-trump-doctrine-terrorism-immigration>.
- 9 See *infra* text accompanying notes 14-22. A possible fourth category of initiatives focus on what is called “de-radicalization” – i.e., measures aimed at ensuring that individuals who have been convicted of terrorism (or

pled guilty to terrorism charges) do not return to criminal activity. This report does not address these types of back-end programs.

- 10 Press Release, Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Jeh Johnson Announcing First Round of DHS’s Countering Violent Extremism Grants (Jan. 13, 2017) [hereinafter “DHS CVE Grant Press Release”], *available at* <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/01/13/statement-secretary-jeh-johnson-announcing-first-round-dhss-countering-violent>.
- 11 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (Aug. 2011) [hereinafter “WHITE HOUSE CVE STRATEGY”], *available at* https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf. As explained in the December 2011 implementation plan, the Strategy was developed under the leadership of the National Security Staff and involved a number of agencies: the Department of State, Treasury, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Education, Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of Homeland Security, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Counterterrorism Center. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (Dec. 2011) [hereinafter “2011 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN”], *available at* <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf>.
- 12 *Id.*
- 13 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (Oct. 2016) [hereinafter “2016 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN”], *available at* https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2016_strategic_implementation_plan_empowering_local_partners_prev.pdf.
- 14 WHITE HOUSE CVE STRATEGY, *supra* note 11, at 5.
- 15 *See id.* Preface by President Obama (noting that while all types of extremist violence are a problem “countering al-Qa’ida’s violent ideology is one part of our comprehensive strategy” and requires the cooperation of “Muslim American communities whose children, families and neighbors are being targeted for recruitment by al-Qa’ida”). *Id.* (n.p.). In his speech after the 2015 San Bernardino attacks, President Obama was careful to point out that ISIS did not represent Islam; at the same time, he stated the spread of extremist ideology within some Muslim communities was a “real problem that Muslims must confront, without excuse.” President Barack Obama, Address to the Nation by the President (Dec. 6, 2015), (transcript available at <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/06/address-nation-president>).
- 16 *See infra* text accompanying notes 54-56, 82-86, 90-100, 128, 140-151, 193-195, 218, 238-239, 262, 269-275.
- 17 WHITE HOUSE CVE STRATEGY, *supra* note 11, at 2-4.
- 18 *Id.* at 6; *see also* 2011 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 11, at 12-14. The particular areas identified as needing further research are: 1) pre-operational indicators of violent extremism; 2) the role of the Internet; 3) single-actor terrorism, including lessons learned from school shooters; 4) disengagement; and 5) non-al-Qaida threats.
- 19 WHITE HOUSE CVE STRATEGY, *supra* note 11, at 6. The 2011 White House CVE Plan also notes the need for improved training on CVE, especially in light of what it characterizes as “a small number of instances of [f]ederally sponsored or funded CVE-related and counterterrorism training that used offensive and inaccurate information.” 2011 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 11, at 15. To improve the quality of materials, the Plan prioritizes identifying offensive training materials and improving review processes, devel-

oping a CVE curriculum for inclusion in existing training programs in this area, establishing a DHS committee to review training materials and experts, ensuring that training guidance is incorporated into FEMA grants, and introducing measures to increase the quantity of training materials. *Id.* at 17-18. This appears to be a reference to the discovery that the training materials used by the FBI promoted the idea that “main stream [sic] American Muslims are likely to be terrorist sympathizers.” Spencer Ackerman, *FBI Teaches Agents ‘Mainstream’ Muslims Are ‘Violent, Radical’*, WIRED, Sept. 14, 2011, <https://www.wired.com/2011/09/fbi-muslims-radical/>. In response, the White House ordered the DHS to lead an inter-agency process to review and improve CVE-related training and the FBI stated that it had purged several hundred pages of documents. Letter from John O. Brennan, Ass’t to the President for Homeland Sec., to Farhana Khera, President & Exec. Dir., Muslim Advocates (Nov. 3, 2011), *available at* <https://www.muslimadvocates.org/files/JOB-CVE-training-letter-to-Khera-11.3.11.pdf>; Spencer Ackerman, *FBI Purges Hundreds of Terrorism Documents in Islamophobia Probe*, WIRED, Feb. 15, 2012, <https://www.wired.com/2012/02/hundreds-fbi-documents-muslims/>. The response was criticized by civil rights and Muslim grassroots groups because “no public accounting was given indicating that more comprehensive inter-agency review was initiated as promised, no re-training of officers and agents tainted by the biased and inaccurate trainings was apparently ever done, and no disciplinary action appears to have been taken against those responsible for preparing and providing the trainings.” Debi Kar, *End the Use of Anti-Muslim Training Materials by the Federal Government*, MUSLIM ADVOCATES (Aug. 14, 2014), <https://www.muslimadvocates.org/end-the-use-of-anti-muslim-training-materials-by-the-federal-government/>.

- 20 2016 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 13, at 5-6.
- 21 WHITE HOUSE CVE STRATEGY, *supra* note 11, at 6-7.
- 22 2011 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 11, at 18-20. The plan states that a “separate strategy” will be developed focusing on CVE online, but our research has not uncovered any such publicly available document, except for the updates set out in the 2016 White House CVE Implementation Plan. *See* 2016 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 13, at 13-14; *see also infra* text accompanying notes 276-321.
- 23 2011 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 11, at 18.
- 24 WHITE HOUSE CVE STRATEGY, *supra* note 11, at 7-8.
- 25 *See* Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union et al. to Lisa Monaco, Ass’t to the President for Homeland Sec. (Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter “Coalition Letter to Lisa Monaco”], *available at* https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/141218_cve_coalition_letter_2.pdf. This request was renewed in April 2016. *See* Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union et al. to Hon. Jennifer Easterly, Senior Dir. for Counterterrorism, White House (Apr. 22, 2016), *available at* https://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/CounteringViolentExtremism_April2016.pdf. The Brennan Center and the American Civil Liberties Union also filed Freedom of Information Act requests with several agencies to unearth policies or guidance for ensuring that CVE programs include appropriate safeguards. In early 2016, both organizations filed suit to compel the government to produce documents that explain how these programs are intended to work. *See* Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law, Brennan Center Files Suit to Make “Countering Violent Extremism” Records Public (Jan. 29, 2016) [hereinafter “Brennan Ctr. CVE Press Release”], *available at* <https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/brennan-center-files-suit-make-countering-violent-extremism-records-public>; *ACLU v. Department of Homeland Security: FOIA Lawsuit Seeking Records on “Countering Violent Extremism” Programs*, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (last updated Feb. 9, 2016), <https://www.aclu.org/cases/aclu-v-department-homeland-security-foia-lawsuit-seeking-records-countering-violent-extremism>. While documents have been produced in response to these lawsuits and are referred to throughout this report, none of those reviewed thus far indicate the development of safeguards against these risks.
- 26 2016 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 13, at 3.
- 27 *Id.*
- 28 The DOJ and DHS may, however, “provide advice and consultation about potential privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties issues to state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities regarding their proposed CVE programs and activities.” *Id.*

- 29 See *infra* text accompanying notes 201-203, 205-211, 212-216, 240-243, 266-268.
- 30 The task force is charged with coordinating support and outreach to CVE “stakeholders,” providing technical assistance to CVE “practitioners,” working “with CVE stakeholders to develop multidisciplinary intervention programs” and managing communications. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet on Countering Violent Extremism Task Force (Jan. 8, 2016), *available at* <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/01/08/countering-violent-extremism-task-force>.
- 31 Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on DHS’s New Office for Community Partnerships (Sept. 28, 2015), *available at* <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/09/28/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson-dhs%E2%80%99s-new-office-community-partnerships>.
- 32 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 2 (Oct. 28, 2016) [hereinafter “DHS CVE STRATEGY”], *available at* https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/16_1028_S1_CVE_strategy.pdf.
- 33 Starting in 2012, the National Institute Justice (NIJ) launched a \$3.2 million grant program with a focus on “understanding extremism and advancing strategies for effective prevention and intervention.” OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE: ANNUAL REPORT 22 (2012), *available at* <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/244249.pdf>. In 2015, this program was funded at \$4 million. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE, NIJ-2015-3983, RESEARCH AND EVALUATION ON DOMESTIC RADICALIZATION TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM 8 (2015), *available at* <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/sl001152.pdf>; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2016 DOJ REQUEST: STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE 1 (2016), *available at* https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/pages/attachments/2015/01/30/3_2016_state_and_local_chart.pdf.
- 34 161 Cong. Rec. H10162, H10163 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2015), *available at* <https://www.congress.gov/crec/2015/12/17/CREC-2015-12-17-pt3-PgH10161.pdf> (statement explaining Division F of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 submitted by Rep. Harold Rogers, Chairman of the House Committee on Appropriations).
- 35 See Cooperative Agreement #2014-CK-WX-K043 between Ronald L. Davis, Dir., Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, and Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, World Organization for Resource Development and Education (last updated Oct. 2014), *available at* <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/01-%20Cooperative%20Agreement%20COPS.pdf> (obtained by the Brennan Center through Freedom of Information Act request).
- 36 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS-16-OCP-132-00-01, NOTICE OF FUNDING OPPORTUNITY: FISCAL YEAR 2016 COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE) GRANT PROGRAM 4 (June 6, 2016) [hereinafter “2016 CVE GRANT NOFO”], *available at* https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1467814173660-58024ff00713060a31e54a2b0b54deb9/FY16_CVE_NOFO_Final.pdf.
- 37 *Id.* at 4-5.
- 38 *Id.* at 12.
- 39 DHS CVE Grant Press Release, *supra* note 10. The full list is as follows. **Developing Resilience:** Police Foundation - \$463,185 (Boston); Ka Joog Nonprofit Organization – \$499,998 (Minneapolis); Heartland Democracy Center – \$165,435 (Minneapolis); Leaders Advancing and Helping Communities - \$500,000 (Dearborn, Mich.); Tuesday’s Children - \$147,154 (Nationwide); Music in Common - \$159,000 (Nationwide); Peace Catalyst International, INC - \$95,000 (Nationwide); Coptic Orthodox Charities - \$150,000 (Nationwide). **Training and Engagement:** City of Houston, Mayor’s Office of Public Safety & Homeland Security - \$400,000 (Houston); City of Arlington, Police - \$47,497 (Arlington, TX); Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority - \$187,877 (Illinois); Global Peace Foundation - \$150,000 (New Jersey); Nebraska Emergency Management Agency - \$300,000 (Ne-

braska); City of Dearborn Police Department - \$51,521 (Dearborn, Mich.); City of Los Angeles, Mayor's Office of Public Safety - \$400,000 (Los Angeles); Denver Police Department - \$240,000 (Denver); National Consortium for Advanced Policing - \$200,000 (Nationwide). **Managing Interventions:** City of Los Angeles, Mayor's Office of Public Safety - \$425,000 (Los Angeles); Crisis Intervention of Houston, Inc. - \$400,000 (Houston); Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department - \$425,000 (Las Vegas); Life After Hate Inc. - \$400,000 (Nationwide); Muslim Public Affairs Council Foundation - \$393,800 (Nationwide). **Challenging the Narrative:** Project Help Nevada, Inc. - \$150,000 (Reno, Nev.); Unity Productions Foundation - \$396,585 (Nationwide); America Abroad Media - \$647,546 (Nationwide); Rochester Institute of Technology - \$149,955 (Nationwide); Masjid Muhammad, Inc. - \$450,000 (Nationwide); The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill - \$866,687 (Nationwide); Muslim American Leadership Alliance - \$40,000 (Nationwide). **Building Capacity:** Counter Extremism Project - \$298,760 (New York); Claremont School of Theology - \$800,000 (Los Angeles).

- 40 The Notice of Funding Opportunities defines resilience as “communities where violent extremists routinely meet disinterest and opposition, recruitment attempts routinely fail, and communities know what tools and support are available to assist individuals that may be on a path towards violence.” 2016 CVE GRANT NOFO, *supra* note 36, at 2.
- 41 S.C. Res. 2178, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2178 ¶¶ 15-19 (Sept. 24, 2014), available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/2015/SCR%202178_2014_EN.pdf. See generally Justin Sink, *UN Security Council Approves Foreign Fighters Resolution Pushed By Obama*, HILL (Sept. 24, 2014, 3:26 PM), <http://thehill.com/policy/international/218803-un-security-council-approves-resolution-to-stop-foreign-terrorist>
- 42 See Colum Lynch & Elias Groll, *Obama's Foreign Fighters Campaign is a Gift to the World's Police States*, FOREIGN POL'Y, Sept. 30, 2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/30/obamas-foreign-fighters-campaign-is-a-gift-to-the-worlds-police-states/>; Faiza Patel, *President Obama to Preside Over Flawed UN Security Council Resolution on Foreign Fighters*, JUST SEC. (Sept. 23, 2014, 9:25 AM), <https://www.justsecurity.org/15393/security-council-resolution-foreign-fighters/>; Martin Scheinin, *Back to 9/11 Panic? Security Council Resolution on Foreign Terrorist Fighters*, JUST SEC. (Sept. 23, 2014, 2:54 PM), <https://www.justsecurity.org/15407/post-911-panic-security-council-resolution-foreign-terrorist-fighters-scheinin/>.
- 43 Most of the measures suggested in Resolution 2178 are positive – e.g., “promoting political and religious tolerance, economic development and social cohesion and inclusiveness, ending and resolving armed conflicts, and facilitating reintegration and rehabilitation” – but, with the exception of armed conflict, it is unclear that there is evidence that they constitute drivers of terrorism. See Naz Modirzadeh, *If It's Broke, Don't Make it Worse: A Critique of the U.N. Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*, LAWFARE (Jan. 23, 2016, 7:48 AM), <https://www.lawfareblog.com/if-its-broke-dont-make-it-worse-critique-un-secretary-generals-plan-action-prevent-violent-extremism> [hereinafter “LAWFARE, *Critique of the U.N. Secretary-General's CVE Plan*”].
- 44 Tanya Somanader, *President Obama Chairs the U.N. Security Council Meeting on Foreign Terrorist Fighters*, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 24, 2014, 7:04 PM), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/09/24/president-obama-chairs-un-security-council-meeting-foreign-terrorist-fighters>; Press Release, White House, FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, (Feb. 18, 2015), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism>. The program for the summit reflects the priorities of the White House CVE Strategy: finding ways for identifying violent extremists, including by asking Muslim communities to do so, and developing ways of countering extremist narratives. See Steven W. Hawkins, *Obama's Anti-Extremism Plan lacks Human Rights Safeguards*, AL JAZEERA AMERICA, Feb. 19, 2015, <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/2/obamas-extremism-plan-lacks-human-rights-safeguards.html>.
- 45 Human Rights Council Res. 30/15, Human Rights and Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, A/HRC/RES/30/15 (Oct. 12, 2015); Press Release, Dep't of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Fact Sheet on Key U.S. Outcomes at the UN Human Rights Council 30th Session (Oct. 8, 2015), available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/10/248047.htm>.

- 46 The debate revealed significant differences among countries about whether the resolution should address “ideology or action, or both, and how either would be defined, and whether ‘violence’ was even a necessary element.” *See UN HRC: Resolution on “Violent Extremism” Undermines Clarity*, ARTICLE 19 (Oct. 8, 2015), <https://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/38133/en/un-hrc-resolution-on-%E2%80%9Cviolent-extremism%E2%80%9D-undermines-clarity>. This ambiguity continues into the resolution itself, which does not define “violent extremism” or distinguish it from terrorism, except to imply that it is a broader concept.
- 47 *See* Vice-President and Rapporteur of the U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Human Rights Council on Its Thirtieth session, ¶ 196, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/30/2 (May 19, 2016) (by Mothusi Bruce Rabasha Palai), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session30/Documents/A-HRC-30-2_en.doc. In addition, Ireland on behalf of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Iceland, Mexico, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland expressed concerns about oral revisions added during the discussion of the resolution. *See id.* ¶ 210 at 39; Letter from Ireland, on behalf of a Group of States, to the President of the U.N. Human Rights Council (Oct. 2, 2015), *available at* <https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebstimedia/ourrolesandpolicies/int-priorities/humanrights/HRC30---General-Comment-by-Ireland-after-the-vote-regarding-the-draft-resolution-on-human-rights-and-preventing-and-counteracting-violent-extremism.pdf>.
- 48 U.N. Secretary-General, *Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism*, U.N. Doc. A/70/674 (Dec. 24, 2015), *available at* <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/456/22/PDF/N1545622.pdf>.
- 49 LAWFARE, *Critique of the U.N. Secretary-General’s CVE Plan*, *supra* note 43.
- 50 Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Rep., Human Rights Council, ¶¶ 36-47, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/65 (Feb. 22, 2016), *available at* <https://goo.gl/xPx0wi>. For a discussion of the report, *see* Faiza Patel & Amrit Singh, *The Human Rights Risks of Countering Violent Extremism*, JUST SEC. (Apr. 7, 2016, 12:15 PM), <https://www.justsecurity.org/30459/human-rights-risks-counteracting-violent-extremism-programs/>.
- 51 Press Release, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Countering Violent Extremism, A ‘Perfect Excuse’ to Restrict Free Speech and Control the Media – UN Expert (May 3, 2016), *available at* <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19916&LangID=E>.
- 52 *Id.*
- 53 *See supra* text accompanying notes 4, 6.
- 54 Out of the nearly \$5 million allocated to groups that provided services to individuals and communities, approximately \$3.9 million (78%) was dedicated to groups that focus on Muslims and Muslim communities. The breakdown of Muslim-focused groups is as follows: America Abroad Media, Coptic Orthodox Charities, Global Peace Foundation, Heartland Democracy Center, Ka Joog Nonprofit Organization, Leaders Advancing and Helping Communities, Life After Hate Inc., Masjid Muhammad Inc., Muslim American Leadership Alliance, Muslim Public Affairs Council, Peace Catalyst International Inc., and Unity Productions Foundation.
- 55 *About Us*, LIFE AFTER HATE, <http://www.lifeafterhate.org/about>.
- 56 ExitUSA and Against Violent Extremism (AVE) Network are Life After Hate programs that provide services and support to current and former members of violent extremist organizations. *Programs & Partners*, LIFE AFTER HATE, <http://www.lifeafterhate.org/programs/>.
- 57 Randy Borum, *Radicalization into Violent Extremism I: A Review of Social Science Theories*, 4 J. STRATEGIC SEC. 7, 8 (2011), *available at* <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1139&context=jss>.
- 58 John Knefel, *Everything You’ve Been Told About Radicalization is Wrong*, ROLLING STONE, May 6, 2013, <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/everything-youve-been-told-about-radicalization-is-wrong-20130506>

(quoting Professor John Horgan, Global Studies Inst., Dep't of Psychology, at Georgia State University).

- 59 Matthew Weaver, *Cameron's Anti-terror Strategy is "Barking Up Wrong Tree," Says Expert*, GUARDIAN, July 20, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jul/20/david-ferman-anti-terror-strategy-wrong-expert-says> (quoting Professor Andrew Silke, Dir., Terrorism Studies, University of East London).
- 60 *Interview – Marc Sageman*, E-INT'L RELATIONS (Nov. 20, 2014), <http://www.e-ir.info/2014/11/20/interview-marc-sageman/> (quoting Marc Sageman, former CIA officer, terrorism researcher and psychologist).
- 61 *See, e.g.* EUROPOL PUB. INFORMATION, CHANGES IN MODUS OPERANDI OF ISLAMIC STATE TERRORIST ATTACKS ¶ 8 (Jan. 25, 2016), *available at* https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/changes_in_modus_operandi_of_is_in_terrorist_attacks.pdf; Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko, *Individual and Group Mechanisms of Radicalization*, in TOPICAL STRATEGIC MULTI-DISCIPLINARY WHITE PAPERS IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COUNTER-WMD 88 (Laurie Fenstermacher ed., 2010), *available at* https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/U_Counter_Terrorism_White_Paper_Final_January_2010.pdf; Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko, *Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism*, 20 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 415, 418, 429 (2008), *available at* <http://www.brynmawr.edu/aschcenter/mc-cauley/webpage%20stuff/2008%20mechanisms%20rad%20Mc%20Moskale.pdf>; RICHARD ENGLISH, TERRORISM: HOW TO RESPOND 52 (2009); JAMIE BARTLETT, JONATHAN BIRDWELL AND MICHAEL KING, DEMOS, THE EDGE OF VIOLENCE: A RADICAL APPROACH TO EXTREMISM 37-38 (2010), *available at* http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Edge_of_Violence_-_full_-_web.pdf?1291806916; Andrew Gilligan, *Hizb Ut Tahrir is Not a Gateway To Terrorism, Claims Whitehall Report*, TELEGRAPH, July 25, 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-gilligan/7908262/Hizb-ut-Tahrir-is-not-a-gateway-to-terrorism-claims-Whitehall-report.html>; Alan Travis, *M15 Report Challenges Views on Terrorism in Britain*, GUARDIAN, Aug. 20, 2008, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2008/aug/20/uksecurity.terrorism1> (summary of a report conducted by the British intelligence service M15, which reviewed hundreds of case studies and found that there was “no typical profile” of a British terrorist; that the majority of those associated with violent extremist activity were largely religious novices rather than “Islamic fundamentalists”; and also downplayed the importance of radical extremist clerics as a diminishing influence in mobilizing would-be terrorists).
- 62 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DECADE IN REVIEW: SELF-SELECTING US PERSONS DRIVE POST-2006 INCREASE IN ANTI-US PLOTTING (2011) [hereinafter “2011 FBI REPORT ON ANTI-US PLOTS”], *available at* https://d3gn0r3afghep.cloudfront.net/foia_files/2016/09/13/Decade_in_Review__March_7-2011__.pdf.
- 63 According to the U.S. government, al-Awlaki was targeted because he maintained “operational and leadership roles” with al-Qaeda and “continues to plot attacks intended to kill Americans.” Greg Miller, *Legal Memo Backing Drone Strike that Killed American Anwar al-Awlaki is Released*, WASH. POST, June 23, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legal-memo-backing-drone-strike-is-released/2014/06/23/1f48dd16-faec-11e3-8176-f2c941cf35f1_story.html.
- 64 *See* Scott Shane, *Times Sq. Bomb Suspect Is Linked to Militant Cleric*, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A13, *available at* <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/07/world/middleeast/07awlaki-.html>; Philip Sherwell, *Fort Hood Shooting: Radical Islamic Preacher Also Inspired July 7 Bombers*, TELEGRAPH, Nov. 23, 2009, *available at* <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/6630555/Fort-Hood-shooting-radical-Islamic-preacher-also-inspired-july-7-bombers.html>.
- 65 2011 FBI REPORT ON ANTI-US PLOTS, *supra* note 62, at 7.
- 66 *See supra* text accompanying note 61.
- 67 FAIZA PATEL, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, RETHINKING RADICALIZATION 14-18 (2011) [hereinafter “RETHINKING RADICALIZATION”], *available at* <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/RethinkingRadicalization.pdf>.

- 68 *See id.* at 8-9.
- 69 Declaration of Marc Sageman in Opposition to Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Latif v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice et al., No. 3:100-cv-00750, 2015 WL 1883890 ¶ 14 (D. Or. Aug. 7, 2015) [hereinafter “Sageman Affidavit”], *available at* https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/268._declaration_of_marc_sageman_8.7.15.pdf.
- 70 *Raza v. City of New York—Legal Challenge to NYPD Muslim Surveillance Program*, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, <https://www.aclu.org/cases/raza-v-city-new-york-legal-challenge-nypd-muslim-surveillance-program> (last updated Jan. 7, 2016). *See also* Faiza Patel, *Opinion: Build on NYPD’s Clarified Approach to Muslims*, NEWSDAY (Sept. 17, 2009), <http://www.newsday.com/opinion/opinion-build-on-nypd-s-clarified-approach-to-muslims-1.1458017>.
- 71 COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM OFFICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI STRATEGIC PLAN TO CURB VIOLENT EXTREMISM 2 (declassified March 2015) [hereinafter “FBI CVE PLAN”] (emphasis added), *available at* <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/1318911-0%20-%20FBI%20Strategic%20Plan%20to%20Curb%20Violent%20Extremism-Section%201-Imported%20Media.PDF> (obtained by the Brennan Center through Freedom of Information Act request).
- 72 *Id.* at 3.
- 73 Matt Apuzzo, *Who Will Become a Terrorist? Research Yields Few Clues*, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2016, at A1, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/28/world/europe/mystery-about-who-will-become-a-terrorist-defies-clear-answers.html> [hereinafter “N.Y. TIMES, *Who Will Become a Terrorist*”] (quoting former CIA officer, terrorism researcher and psychologist Marc Sageman).
- 74 WHITE HOUSE CVE STRATEGY, *supra* note 11, at 1.
- 75 DHS CVE STRATEGY, *supra* note 32, at 1. (“Individuals who commit acts of violent extremism are inspired by diverse political, religious, and philosophical beliefs, and are not limited to any single population or region.”).
- 76 FBI CVE PLAN, *supra* note 71, at 2 (“The FBI defines violent extremism as *encouraging, condoning justifying, or supporting the commission of a violent criminal act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social or economic goals.*”). The mission of the FBI’s Countering Violent Extremism Office is described as “leveraging its resources” in communities to “prevent violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence.” Exec. Staff of the FBI’s Nat’l Sec. Branch, *A New Approach to Countering Violent Extremism: Sharing Expertise and Empowering Local Communities*, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Oct. 7, 2014, <https://leb.fbi.gov/2014/october/a-new-approach-to-countering-violent-extremism-sharing-expertise-and-empowering-local-communities>.
- 77 NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., (U//FOUO) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: A GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONERS AND ANALYSTS 3 (May 2014) [hereinafter “NCTC CVE GUIDE”], *available at* <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1657824-cve-guide.html> (“A violent extremist advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically motivated violence to further political or social objectives.”).
- 78 2011 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 11, at 1-2 (emphasis added).
- 79 *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
- 80 It is commonly used to describe how individuals (primarily Muslims) become terrorists, covering both an ideological component (i.e., embracing “radical” ideas) and a criminal component (i.e., actions in furtherance of a terrorist plot, including financing, recruitment, planning and execution). *See* RETHINKING RADICALIZATION, *supra* note 67, at 32 n.1.

- 81 See *infra* Table 1.
- 82 MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, NYPD INTELLIGENCE DIV., *RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT 6* (2007) [hereinafter “NYPD REPORT 2007”], available at http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/files/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf (“Jihadist or jihadi-Salafist ideology is the driver that motivates young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out ‘autonomous jihad’ via acts of terrorism against their host countries. It guides movements, identifies the issues, drives recruitment and is the basis of action.”). The FBI’s analysis of radicalization is different from the NYPD in its focus on the *venues* where a person might be exposed to radical ideas. The accompanying commentary makes clear, however, the Bureau too is concerned with individuals who either convert to Islam or adopt a conservative form of Islam. See, e.g., *infra* text associated with note 92; Carol Dyer et al., *Countering Violent Extremism*, 76(12), FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1, 3-9 (Dec. 2007), available at <https://leb.fbi.gov/2007-pdfs/leb-december-2007>. For a detailed analysis of these theories, see RETHINKING RADICALIZATION, *supra* note 67, at 14-18.
- 83 See, e.g., *Willful Blindness: Consequences of Agency Efforts To Deemphasize Radical Islam in Combating Terrorism: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, Fed. Rights and Fed. Courts of the S. Comm. on Judiciary*, 114th Cong. (2016) (statement for the record of Sen. Grassley, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.), available at <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-28-16p%20Grassley%20Statement.pdf>; *id.*, (statement for the record of M. Zuhdi Jasser, President, American Islamic Forum for Democracy), available at <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/06-28-16%20Jasser%20Testimony.pdf>. See also Soharab Ahmari, Opinion, *Global Jihad’s Deadly Calendar*, WALL ST. J., March 22, 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/global-jihads-deadly-calendar-1458688588>; Cora Currier, *The FBI Wanted to Target Yemenis Through Student Groups and Mosques*, INTERCEPT (Sept. 29, 2016, 2:33 PM), <https://theintercept.com/2016/09/29/the-fbi-wanted-to-target-yemenis-through-student-groups-and-mosques/>; Merit Kennedy, *Investigators Say Orlando Shooter Showed Few Warning Signs Of Radicalization*, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 18, 2016, 3:54 PM), <http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/06/18/482621690/investigators-say-orlando-shooter-showed-few-warning-signs-of-radicalization>.
- 84 See *infra* text accompanying notes 152-175.
- 85 For example, in 2011, DHS authored a report titled “A Model for Understanding the Motivations of Homegrown Violent Extremists” which examined past cases of “violent extremism” within the United States to identify commonalities. This report has not been released to the public but is referenced in the CVE WORKBOOK. See COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: OUTREACH STRATEGY WORKBOOK EXECUTIVE SESSION FOR STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT at 15, n. 1. (2011) [hereinafter “CVE WORKBOOK”], available at https://d3gn0r3afghep.cloudfront.net/foia_files/2016/09/13/_CVE_Executive_Workbook_.pdf (obtained via California Public Records Act request from the LAPD, this workbook is a companion to LAPD CVE CURRICULUM COMPONENTS). DHS also conducted an analysis of various cases of Somali-American youth joining terrorist groups in order to determine trends that can “help federal, state and private partners prioritize efforts countering violent extremism (CVE) and invest in the most promising strategies.” OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE & ANALYSIS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IA-0214-15, (U//FOUO) EMPOWERING SOMALI [REDACTED] KEY FOR COUNTERING YOUTH RADICALIZATION AND THEIR TRAVEL ABROAD FOR TERRORISM 1 (June 16, 2015), available at <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/Empowering%20Somali%20Parents%20Key%20for%20Countering%20Youth%20Radicalization.pdf> (obtained by the Brennan Center through Freedom of Information Act request). The NCTC has released findings from an interagency study of homegrown terrorists, which describes four “mobilizing patterns” among extremists. NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., BEHAVIORAL INDICATORS OFFER INSIGHTS FOR SPOTTING EXTREMISTS MOBILIZING FOR VIOLENCE 2 (2011) [hereinafter “2011 NCTC REPORT”], available at <https://info.publicintelligence.net/NCTC-SpottingHVEs.pdf>. Another 2011 study by the NCTC, conducted in conjunction with DHS and the FBI, reportedly examined 62 homegrown violent extremists in order to identify “warning signs” that “might help local law enforcement better understand and detect threats,” Eileen Sullivan, *Police Chiefs Meet at WH on Homegrown Terror Fight*, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 18, 2012, https://archive.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2012/01/18/police_chiefs_meet_

at_wh_on_homegrown_terror_fight/.

- 86 The push for simple, reductionist answers has led counter-terrorism researchers, including those who receive government funding, to publicly express frustration with the government's "preoccupation with research that can be distilled into simple checklists, even at the risk of casting unnecessary suspicion on innocent people." N.Y. TIMES, *Who Will Become a Terrorist*, *supra* note 73 (quoting Clark R. McCauley Jr., a professor of psychology at Bryn Mawr College).
- 87 MARC SAGEMAN, MISUNDERSTANDING TERRORISM 55-89 (2016) (explaining the importance of control groups, representativeness of a sample, the sensitivity and specificity of an instrument, and Bayesian probability in the context of social science methodology in terrorism analysis); Jeff Victoroff, *The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches*, 49(1) J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3, 9 (Feb. 2005), available at <https://www.surrey.ac.uk/politics/research/researchareasofstaff/isppsummeracademy/instructors%20/The%20Terrost%20mind.pdf> (explaining that in the absence of valid and reliable behavioral measures and without a control group, various terrorism studies cannot distinguish terrorists from non-terrorists). See also *Why Randomize?*, YALE INST. FOR SOC. & POL'Y STUDIES, <http://isps.yale.edu/node/16697> (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) ("Random assignment controls for both known and unknown variables that can creep in with other selection processes to confound analyses."); BERNARD H. RUSSELL, SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS: QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE APPROACHES 144 (2000) (noting the importance of random sampling in research attempting to estimate the ideas or preferences of a larger group).
- 88 Sageman Affidavit, *supra* note 69, at ¶ 21.
- 89 *Id.*
- 90 Murtaza Hussain, Cora Currier & Jana Winter, *Is Your Child a Terrorist? U.S. Questionnaire Rates Families at Risk for Extremism*, INTERCEPT (Feb. 9, 2015, 12:39 PM) [hereinafter "INTERCEPT, *Is Your Child a Terrorist?*"], <https://theintercept.com/2015/02/09/government-develops-questionnaire-see-might-become-terrorist/>.
- 91 LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP'T, COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: POTENTIAL CURRICULUM COMPONENTS (WORKING DOCUMENT) 18 (2010) [hereinafter "LAPD CVE CURRICULUM COMPONENTS"], available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/CVE%20initiative%20to%20develop%20training_0.pdf (obtained by the Brennan Center through California Public Records Act request) (section D(3)(b) references page 11 in NAT'L COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, U//FOUO: (U) RADICALIZATION DYNAMICS: A PRIMER (2010) [hereinafter "RADICALIZATION DYNAMICS"], available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/Radicalization%20Dynamics%20Primer%20Sept.%202010_0.pdf (obtained via California Public Records Act request)); LOS ANGELES POLICE DEP'T, COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: EXPANDED COURSE OUTLINE VERSION 6 at 1 (2011) [hereinafter "LAPD CVE EXPANDED COURSE OUTLINE"], available at https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/LAPD%20CVE%20draft%20course%20outline%20red%20_0.pdf (obtained by the Brennan Center through California Public Records Act request) (section A(3)(a)(2) references RADICALIZATION DYNAMICS).
- 92 FBI COUNTERTERRORISM DIV., (U//FOUO) THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS: FROM CONVERSION TO JIHAD 10 (2006), available at <http://cryptome.org/fbi-jihad.pdf>.
- 93 NYPD REPORT 2007, *supra* note 82, at 23, 31.
- 94 LAPD CVE CURRICULUM COMPONENTS, *supra* note 91, at 12-16; CVE WORKBOOK, *supra* note 91, at 15-16; see also LAPD CVE EXPANDED COURSE OUTLINE, *supra* note 91, at 3, 4.
- 95 RADICALIZATION DYNAMICS, *supra* note 91, at 10-16; NCTC CVE GUIDE, *supra* note 77, at 20-21; see also INTERCEPT, *Is Your Child a Terrorist?*, *supra* note 90.
- 96 WORLD ORG. FOR RES. DEVELOPMENT AND EDUC., DEVELOPING A COMMUNITY-LED APPROACH TO COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: AN INSTRUCTOR'S MANUAL 43 (2016) [hereinafter "WORDE CVE MANUAL"],

available at <http://www.worde.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/WORDE-Developing-a-Community-Led-Approach-to-CVE.pdf>.

- 97 *Don't Be a Puppet: Why Do People Become Violent Extremists?* FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, <https://cve.fbi.gov/why/> (last visited Feb. 1, 2017) [hereinafter “*Don't Be a Puppet: Why Do People Become Violent Extremists?*”].
- 98 U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, DISTRICT OF MINN., BUILDING COMMUNITY RESILIENCE: MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL PILOT PROGRAM: A COMMUNITY-LED LOCAL FRAMEWORK 4 (2015) [hereinafter “MINNEAPOLIS CVE FRAMEWORK”], available at <http://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/file/642121/download>.
- 99 U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, DISTRICT OF MASS., A FRAMEWORK FOR PREVENTION AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES: INCORPORATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM INTO VIOLENCE PREVENTION EFFORTS 3 (2015) [hereinafter “BOSTON CVE FRAMEWORK”], available at <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ma/pages/attachments/2015/02/18/framework.pdf>.
- 100 HM GOVERNMENT, CHANNEL DUTY GUIDANCE: PROTECTING VULNERABLE PEOPLE FROM BEING DRAWN INTO TERRORISM (Apr. 2016) [hereinafter “2016 CHANNEL DUTY GUIDANCE”], Annex C, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/425189/Channel_Duty_Guidance_April_2015.pdf. See also, HM GOVERNMENT, CHANNEL: VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK 2, 3 (Oct. 2012) [hereinafter “CHANNEL FRAMEWORK”], available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118187/vul-assessment.pdf; HM GOVERNMENT, REVISED PREVENT DUTY GUIDANCE: FOR ENGLAND AND WALES (2015), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445977/3799_Revised_Prevent_Duty_Guidance__England_Wales_V2-Interactive.pdf (originally issued on March 12, 2015 and revised on July 16, 2015).
- 101 The primer states that it is intended to be a reference for U.S. policymakers, law enforcement officers, civilians and military personnel who “report, analyze, or act on radicalization trends,” RADICALIZATION DYNAMICS, *supra* note 91, at 3.
- 102 While there is no comprehensive list of these briefings, it is known that they have been conducted in at least “12 U.S. cities over the past few years.” DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS CVE INVENTORY [DRAFT] 2 (Aug. 1, 2014), available at <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/140814%20Report%20--%20DHS%20CVE%20Inventory.pdf> (obtained by the Brennan Center through Freedom of Information Act request). According to the White House “United States Attorneys have hosted or attended more than 1,000 engagement related events and meetings where they build relationships with communities, dispel myths and misperceptions, and develop locally-based partnerships.” Memorandum concerning the White House CVE Summit (unclassified on Feb. 25, 2015) [hereinafter “WHITE HOUSE CVE SUMMIT PRESS POINTS”], available at <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/1318911%20White%20House%20CVE%20Summit%20Press%20Points.pdf> (obtained by the Brennan Center through Freedom of Information Act request). Similarly, in Connecticut, DHS and NCTC officials held a closed-door briefing with Pakistani American physicians on “what the community needs to know” about “Radicalization and De-Radicalization Strategies.” The FBI's Cincinnati field office, in partnership with local U.S. Attorneys' offices and the Columbus Division of Police, also hosted a radicalization awareness program for members of the local Somali community. Amna A. Akbar, *National Security's Broken Windows*, 62 UCLA L. REV. 834, 867 (2015), available at <http://www.uclalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Akbar-final-article-5.29.15.pdf>.
- 103 GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT GROUP, NAT'L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., PROMOTING SAFE AND RESILIENT AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 13 (released Apr. 28, 2016) [hereinafter “GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT GROUP PRESENTATION”], available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/DF-2015-00054/DF-2015-00054%20%282010%20CAB%29.pdf>; see also OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, COMMUNITY AWARENESS BRIEFING 7, 8 (n.d., released 2016), available at <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/DF-2015-00054/DF-2015-00054%20%282014%20CAB%29.pdf>.

- 104 GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT GROUP PRESENTATION, *supra* note 103, at 14. The ODNI has released guidance for Community Resilience Exercise (CREX) run by federal law enforcement agencies, which are table-top exercises designed to highlight responses from communities and law enforcement in the face of cases of potential violent extremism. COMMUNITY RESILIENCE EXERCISE (CREX) TPs (released Apr. 28, 2016), *available at* <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/FOIA/DF-2015-00054/DF-2015-00054%20%28CREX%20TPs%29.pdf>. The actual scenarios used in these exercises have not been released, but the Brennan Center attended a CREX exercise in New York City on September 3, 2014, which reflected many of the themes in the community awareness briefings.
- 105 *See, e.g.*, Mark Berman, *Donald Trump Says Muslims Should Report Suspicious Activity. The FBI Says They Already Do.*, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2016/live-updates/general-election/real-time-fact-checking-and-analysis-of-the-2nd-2016-presidential-debate/donald-trump-says-muslims-should-report-suspicious-activity-the-fbi-says-they-already-do/> (quoting FBI director, James Comey, “They do not want people committing violence, either in their community or in the name of their faith, and so some of our most productive relationships are with people who see things and tell us things who happen to be Muslim.”); Kristina Cooke & Joseph Ax, *U.S. Officials Say American Muslims Do Report Extremist Threats*, REUTERS, June 16, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-florida-shooting-cooperation-idUSKCN0Z213U> (Michael Downing, deputy chief of the LAPD and head of its Counterterrorism and Special Operations Bureau, stating that the city’s Muslim community has been helpful in reporting “red flags”); *see also Eight Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t Affairs*, 111th Cong. 6 (2009) (statement for the record by Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation) (“[T]he FBI understands that protecting America requires the cooperation and understanding of the public. The FBI has an extensive outreach program to Muslim, South Asian, and Sikh communities to address concerns and develop trust about the FBI and federal efforts to protect the Homeland.”), *available at* <http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/2009-09-30-mueller-testimony>.
- 106 Lisa Monaco, Ass’t to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism, *Countering Violent Extremism and the Power of Community*, Remarks at the Harvard Kennedy School Forum (Apr. 15, 2014) [hereinafter “Lisa Monaco Remarks”], *available at* <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/16/remarks-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counterterrorism-lisa->
- 107 *See* Naureen Shah, *Terrorist or... Teenager?*, SLATE (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2014/11/justice_department_s_countering_violent_extremism_program_ripe_for_abuse.html; JANE KROGER, *IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT: ADOLESCENCE THROUGH ADULTHOOD* 107 (2006) (“Among late adolescents, renegotiating relationships with parents and other family members has generally occurred during the identity-formation process.”).
- 108 One NCTC document makes this clear, explaining that “[l]ocal-level contacts such as school officials” were most likely to see an indicator such as “withdrawal from established social networks.” 2011 NCTC REPORT, *supra* note 85, at 4.
- 109 Lisa Monaco Remarks, *supra* note 106.
- 110 2016 CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 13, at 11 (“Studies indicate that family members, friends, or close acquaintances are the most likely to observe activities or behaviors suggesting an individual is being radicalized or has violent intent.”) Similarly, the 2016 DHS CVE Strategy states: “Research shows that parents, neighbors, colleagues, peers, teachers, and community leaders are best positioned to ... recognize when an individual becomes ideologically-motivated to commit violence, and intervene before an individual or a group commits an act of violent extremism.” 2016 DHS CVE STRATEGY, *supra* note 32, at 1.
- 111 Paul Gill et al., *Bombing Alone: Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorists*, 59 J. FORENSIC SCI. 2, 425, 429 (2013), *available at* <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4217375/pdf/jfo0059-0425.pdf>. The authors note that the number of family and friends who were aware of the individuals’ intent to engage in terrorism was comparatively lower than the 81% found in a study of school

- shooters. *Id.* n. 18. (citing BRIAN VOSSEKUIL ET AL., THE FINAL REPORT AND FINDINGS OF THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF SCHOOL ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES (2004), available at <https://www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/preventingattacksreport.pdf>).
- 112 MARK HAMM & RAMON SPAAJ, LONE WOLF TERRORISM IN AMERICA: USING KNOWLEDGE OF RADICALIZATION PATHWAYS TO FORGE PREVENTION STRATEGIES 9 (2015), available at <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf>.
- 113 Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, *First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias*, 144 Q.J. ECON 37, 38 (1999), available at http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/faculty/keith.chen/negot.%20papers/RabinSchrag_ConfirmBias99.pdf.
- 114 Email from John Horgan, Professor, Global Studies Institute Dep't of Psychology, at Georgia State University to Waqas Mirza, Journalist, Muckrock (May 17, 2016, 1:14PM ET) (on file with author); see also John Horgan, Remarks at the Res. for the Real World Seminar (March 7, 2016), in *Video Transcript: Community-Level Efforts to Prevent Violent Extremism*, NAT'L INST. JUSTICE (June 16, 2016) [hereinafter "Horgan Panel"], <http://nij.gov/multimedia/Pages/video-rfrw-community-level-effort-to-prevent-violent-extremism-transcript.aspx> ("Much of what we do know is verified only in hindsight and to further complicate matters, our understanding is constantly shifting... it is like tracking a moving target through the wrong end of the telescope.... It refuses to fit into any of our analogies. It refuses to bend to our models. Its complexity sometimes threatens to overwhelm us. Because there so little systematic research on these issues, that situation is not going change anytime soon, so let's not kid ourselves.").
- 115 Shibley Telhami, *What Americans Really Think About Muslims and Islam*, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 9, 2015), <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/12/09/what-americans-really-think-about-muslims-and-islam/>. Some surveys suggest that more than half of Americans support banning Muslims from entering the nation and 45 percent believe that police should have the authority to "patrol and secure Muslim neighborhoods before they become radicalized," as suggested by Sen. Ted Cruz and echoed by Donald Trump, the 2016 Republican Presidential nominee. See, e.g., Katie Zezima and Adam Goldman, *Ted Cruz Calls for Law Enforcement to 'Patrol and Secure' Muslim Neighborhoods*, WASH. POST, March 22, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/03/22/ted-cruz-calls-for-law-enforcement-to-patrol-and-secure-muslim-neighborhoods/>; Jonathan Easley, *Trump Calls for Muslim Patrols, Torture in Wake of Brussels Attacks*, HILL (March 22, 2016, 6:24 PM), <http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/273970-trump-calls-for-muslim-patrols-torture-in-wake-of-brussels-attacks>; Cameron Easley, *Half of Voters Back Muslim Travel Ban, Patrols of Muslim Neighborhoods*, MORNING CONSULT (March 29, 2015), <https://morningconsult.com/2016/03/29/polling-muslim-travel-ban-patrolling-muslim-neighborhood/>; Peter Moore, *Divide on Muslim Neighborhood Patrols But Majority Now Back Muslim Travel Ban*, YOU.GOV (March 28, 2016, 1:06 PM), <https://today.yougov.com/news/2016/03/28/divide-muslim-neighborhood-patrols/>.
- 116 See, e.g., Sarah Kaplan & Abby Phillip, *They Thought It Was a Bomb: 9th Grader Arrested After Bringing a Home-Built Clock to School*, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/09/16/they-thought-it-was-a-bomb-ahmed-mohamed-texas-9th-grader-arrested-after-bringing-a-home-built-clock-to-school/>. Similarly, in Dallas, a 12-year-old Sikh boy was handcuffed and held in a juvenile detention center for three days after a classmate joked about a bomb in his backpack. Michael Miller, *Another 'Clock Kid'? Family Outraged As 12-Year-Old Sikh Boy Arrested Over Alleged Bomb Threat at Tex. School*, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/12/18/another-clock-kid-family-outraged-as-12-year-old-sikh-boy-arrested-over-alleged-bomb-threat-at-tex-school/>. See also Faiza Patel, *Obama's Response to Ahmed Mohamed's Clock is Hypocritical*, TIME, Sept. 20, 2015, <http://time.com/4041210/obamas-response-to-ahmed-mohameds-clock-is-hypocritical/>.
- 117 Tanya Basu, *Ahmed the Clockmaker Meets President Obama*, TIME, Oct. 20, 2015, <http://time.com/4079766/ahmed-mohamed-clockmaker-president-obama/>; Nick Statt, *Facebook, Google Roll Out Welcome Mat to Ahmed Mohamed*, USA TODAY (Sept. 17, 2015), <http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2015/09/16/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-google-box-aaron-levie-ahmed-mohamed-clock/32510935/>.

- 118 COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS CAL., MISLABELED: THE IMPACT OF SCHOOL BULLYING AND DISCRIMINATION ON CALIFORNIA MUSLIM STUDENTS 4 (2015) [hereinafter “CAIR-CA REPORT”], available at <https://ca.cair.com/sfba/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/CAIR-CA-2015-Bullying-Report-Web.pdf>.
- 119 Dep’t of Health & Human Services, *Facts About Bullying*, STOPBULLYING.GOV, <https://www.stopbullying.gov/media/facts/index.html#listing> (last visited Feb. 4, 2017).
- 120 CAIR-CA REPORT, *supra* note 118, at 15.
- 121 *Flyer from the Int’l Cultural Ctr., a Program of the World Org. for Res. Dev. and Educ., Bullying of Muslims Students*, https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/styles/large/public/Impact-of-Bullying-in-Montgomery-County_0.png?itok=AgmSk4yP (last visited Feb. 27, 2017); Donna St. George, *During a School Year of Terrorist Attacks, Muslim Students Report Bullying*, WASH. POST, June 14, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/during-a-school-year-of-terrorist-attacks-muslim-students-report-bullying/2016/06/14/1b066a44-3220-11e6-8758-d58e76e11b12_story.html. See also *Protecting the Civil Rights of American Muslims: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights of the S. Comm. of the Judiciary*, 112th Cong. 15 (2011) (statement of Farhana Khera, President & Exec. Dir., Muslim Advocates), available at https://www.muslimadvocates.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Muslim-Advocates-Testimony_final.pdf. Yet another indication of anti-Muslim bias in schools have been efforts in at least five states to remove or reduce mentions of Islam from history textbooks because the studying Islam was considered by some parents and school board members to be equivalent to indoctrination. See Cameron McWhirter, *References to Islam in School Textbooks Stir Up a Fight*, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/references-to-islam-in-school-textbooks-stir-up-a-fight-1452853800>.
- 122 Letter from the American Federation of Teachers et al. to Hon. James Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Aug. 9, 2016) [hereinafter “AFT Letter”], available at http://www.aft.org/sites/default/files/ltr_dont_be_a_puppet_aug2016.pdf.
- 123 Alice LoCicero & J. Wesley Boyd, *The Dangers of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programs*, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 19, 2016), <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/almost-addicted/201607/the-dangers-countering-violent-extremism-cve-programs>.
- 124 *Id.*
- 125 Sageman Affidavit, *supra* note 69, at ¶ 28.
- 126 See Bryan Bender, *Russian Alerted US About Tamerlan Tsarnaev*, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 2013, <https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/04/20/bombmain/IQ48jNsFSG21X8jkkcSsMJ/story.html>; Eric Lichtblau & Matt Apuzzo, *Orlando Gunman Was On Terror Watchlist, F.B.I. Director Says*, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/omar-mateen-fbi.html>.
- 127 KEVIN STROM ET AL., INST. FOR HOMELAND SEC. SOLUTIONS, BUILDING ON CLUES: EXAMINING SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN DETECTING U.S. TERRORIST PLOTS, 1999-2009 at 19 (2010) [hereinafter “HSS STUDY”], available at https://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf; CHARLES KURZMAN, TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SEC., MUSLIM-AMERICAN TERRORISM IN THE DECADE SINCE 9/11 at 5 (Feb. 2012), available at http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Terrorism_in_the_Decade_Since_9_11.pdf; MUSLIM PUB. AFF. COUNCIL, DATA ON POST-9/11 TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2012), available at <http://www.mpac.org/assets/docs/publications/MPAC-Post-911-Terrorism-Data.pdf>.
- 128 The exception that proves the rule is a recently-announced program that looks at ways of disengaging from the white power movement. See 2016 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 13, at 12. Since the program works with individuals who self-identify, it does not involve efforts to identify violent extremists in white communities.

- 129 See *Factsheet: A Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Countering Violent Extremism*, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., <http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/US%20Government%20Approach%20to%20CVE-Fact%20Sheet.pdf> (last visited Jan. 30, 2017) [hereinafter “*Factsheet: Comprehensive CVE Approach*”] (“We can learn from intervention approaches in other situations, such as gang prevention.”); MINNEAPOLIS CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 98, at 4 (stating that the Minneapolis CVE framework “borrow[s] elements” from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention’s Gang Reduction Model); Shelley Murphy, *Federal Initiative in Boston Aims to Counter Violent Extremism*, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 4, 2014, <https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/10/03/attorney-details-efforts-stop-violent-extremists/jC6JDiUiLa3Wv8TrblOM1J/story.html> (explaining that Boston was chosen as a CVE pilot city because of its “strong community-oriented policing that has been successful in targeting gangs and gun violence”); Maya Rhodan, *What the War on Terrorism Can Learn from the War on Gangs*, TIME, Feb. 20, 2015, <http://time.com/3716160/terrorism-gangs-white-house-summit/> (describing LAPD CVE efforts as “draw[ing] inspiration from anti-gang models”). Proponents of CVE outside the government have made similar arguments as well. See BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., PREVENTING VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN AMERICA 42 (2011), available at <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf>.
- 130 *National Youth Gang Survey Analysis: Measuring the Extent of Gang Problems*, NAT’L GANG CENTER, <https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/survey-analysis/measuring-the-extent-of-gang-problems> (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).
- 131 NAT’L GANG INTELLIGENCE CTR., 2011 NATIONAL GANG THREAT ASSESSMENT—EMERGING TRENDS 9 (2011), available at <https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment/2011-national-gang-threat-assessment-emerging-trends>.
- 132 A 2015 study by Duke’s Triangle Center showed that between Sept. 11, 2001 and June 22, 2015, there had been an average of six terrorism-related plots involving American Muslims. CHARLES KURZMAN & DAVID SCHANZER, TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SEC., LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSESSMENT OF THE VIOLENT EXTREMIST THREAT 7 (2015) [hereinafter “2015 TRIANGLE STUDY”], available at https://sites.duke.edu/tcths/files/2013/06/Kurzman_Schanzer_Law_Enforcement_Assessment_of_the_Violent_Extremist_Threat_final.pdf. According to a study by the United States Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center, right-wing extremists averaged 307.5 attacks per year in the first 11 years of the twenty-first century. ARIE PERLIGER, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT, CHALLENGERS FROM THE SIDELINES: UNDERSTANDING AMERICA’S VIOLENT FAR-RIGHT 87 (Nov. 2012), available at <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/ChallengersFromtheSidelines.pdf>. These two studies would total 313.5 terrorism incidents per year. Other studies show lower numbers. For example, the Global Terrorism Database maintained by the START at the University of Maryland identifies 256 terrorist attacks from 2001 to 2014. NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, FACT SHEET: AMERICAN DEATHS IN TERRORIST ATTACKS 1 (Oct. 2015), available at https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_AmericanTerrorismDeaths_FactSheet_Oct2015.pdf.
- 133 See MALCOLM W. KLEIN & CHERYL L. MAXSON, STREET GANG PATTERNS AND POLICIES 126 (2006). See also Erika Gebo et al., *The OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Strategy: The Comprehensive Gang Model*, in THE HANDBOOK OF GANGS 399-402 (2015) (Scott H. Decker & David C. Pyrooz eds., 2015); Irving Spergel et al., *The Comprehensive, Community-Wide Gang Program Model: Success And Failure*, in STUDYING YOUTH GANGS 222 (James F. Short & Lorine A. Hughes eds., 2006).
- 134 The Justice Policy Institute’s examination of data shows that African-Americans and Latinos were roughly fifteen times more likely than non-Hispanic whites to be identified by law enforcement as gang members. JUDITH GREENE & KEVIN PRANIS, GANG WARS: THE FAILURE OF ENFORCEMENT TACTICS AND THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGIES 36 (2007), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/07-07_rep_gangwars_gc-ps-ac-jj.pdf; See also Stacey Leyton, *The New Blacklists: The Threat to Civil Liberties Posed by Gang Databases*, in CRIME CONTROL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (Samuel L. Meyers Jr. & Randolph N. Stone eds., 2003) [hereinafter “Leyton, *The New Blacklists*”] (noting the disproportionate

targeting of minority groups for inclusion in gang databases by law enforcement).

- 135 For instance, the National Youth Gang Survey, which incorporates data from all police departments serving populations with at least 2,500 people, and all county police and sheriff's departments, does not include hate groups and motorcycle gangs in its definition of gangs—both groups that are predominantly white. Sara Lynn Van Hofwegen, *Unjust and Ineffective: A Critical Look at California's STEP Act*, S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J., 679, 684 (2009), available at <http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~idjlaw/PDF/18-3/18-3%20Van%20Hofwegen.pdf>.
- 136 See, e.g., *id.* (“For example, police commonly place African American youth in gang databases merely because they have a childhood nickname or are seen congregating on a street corner with friends. Once an individual is placed in a gang database, his friends are also likely to find themselves in the database because of their association with a “known” gang member. As a result of these practices, black and other minority males are disproportionately targeted, arrested, and incarcerated for gang involvement at far higher rates than their actual participation dictates.”); Daniel Alarcon, *How Do You Define a Gang Member?*, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/31/magazine/how-do-you-define-a-gang-member.html>; Leyton, *The New Blacklists*, *supra* note 134.
- 137 See generally YOUTH JUSTICE COALITION, TRACKED AND TRAPPED: YOUTH OF COLOR, GANG DATABASES, AND GANG INJUNCTIONS 6, 7 (2012), available at <http://www.youth4justice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/TrackedandTrapped.pdf>.
- 138 Assemb. B. 2298 (Cal. 2016) (codified at CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 70615 and CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 186.34, 186.35); see also Dave Maass, *Victory! Gov. Brown Signs Bill to Overhaul California's Broken Gang Databases*, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Sept. 28, 2016), <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/09/gov-brown-signs-bill-overhaul-californias-broken-gang-databases>.
- 139 See, e.g., Will Hobson, *Police Gang Lists Can Have Life-long Impacts and are Questioned by Legal Experts*, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Sept. 15, 2012, <http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/police-gang-lists-can-have-life-long-impacts-and-are-questioned-by-legal/1251855>; Charles Hallman, *Gang List Criticized as Racial Profiling*, TWIN CITIES DAILY PLANET (Aug. 6, 2009), <http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/gang-list-criticized-racial-profiling/>; Josmar Trujillo, *Gangbusters: How the Upsurge in Anti-Gang Tactics Will Hurt Communities of Color*, TRUTHOUT (Jan. 19, 2016), <http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/34475-the-upsurge-in-gang-conspiracy-charges-is-not-protecting-communities-of-color>. Cf. Kate Abbey-Lambertz & Joseph Erbraut, *The Simple Strategies That Could Fundamentally Change How Communities View Their Police*, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 17, 2015, 7:35 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/community-policing-police-trust_n_6607766 (“Like some of the skeptics in Madison, [Opal] Tometi, the #BlackLivesMatter co-founder, is hesitant to embrace community policing, which she describes as ‘a euphemism for more surveillance’ of minority communities.”).
- 140 DAVID SCHANZER ET AL., THE CHALLENGE AND PROMISE OF USING COMMUNITY POLICING STRATEGIES TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM 11 (2016) [hereinafter “SCHANZER ET AL., THE CHALLENGE AND PROMISE OF USING COMMUNITY POLICING STRATEGIES TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM”], available at <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249674.pdf>. CVE's construction of American Muslim communities as particularly suspect is also reflected in how anti-extremism programs are conceived: for “anti-government extremism,” police assume that they should target groups identified with that movement not the broader communities from which their members come, but initiatives to counter “extremism connected with al Qaeda or like-minded terrorist organizations” are aimed at all Muslims, not groups that support ISIS or some other terrorist group. *Id.*
- 141 A report from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), led by the University of Maryland, found that attacks committed by al-Qaeda and affiliated movements resulted in fewer deaths (62) than far-right extremists (245) in the U.S. from 1990 to 2014, excluding 9/11 and the Oklahoma City bombing. WILLIAM S. PARKIN ET AL., NAT'L CONSORTIUM FOR THE STUDY OF TERRORISM

AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF IDEOLOGICAL HOMICIDE VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 (2016), *available at* https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_EC_DB_25YearsofIdeologicalHomicideVictimizationUS_March2016.pdf. Other studies also show a serious threat from right-wing violence, although numbers vary depending on what cases are counted as terrorism. Moreover, because of the overall number of terrorist attacks is very low, a single incident can easily skew numbers, especially if statistics cover only a few years. For example, an ongoing 2016 study by the New America Foundation shows that prior to June 2016, “jihadist” attacks in America had resulted in fewer deaths (45 as of May 26, 2016) than “right wing” attacks (48 as of May 26, 2016). Data from a single attack, the June 12, 2016 Orlando shooting, reversed that conclusion. *What Is the Threat to the United States Today?*, NEW AMERICA FOUND., <https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/what-threat-united-states-today/> (accessed May 26, 2016 and Jan. 31, 2017). A 2014 nationwide survey of 382 police departments by the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security and the Stanford School of Public Policy at Duke University showed that 74 percent rated anti-government extremism, such as sovereign citizen’ movements, as one of the top three terrorist threats in their jurisdiction, while 39 percent listed extremism connected with al Qaeda or like-minded terrorist organizations as a top terrorist threat. Another 33 percent listed environmental extremism as the biggest threat. 2015 TRIANGLE STUDY *supra* note 132, at 3, 4.

142 The outreach programs that form the basis of many CVE efforts have in the past been used as a means of gathering intelligence on participating groups and individuals. *See, e.g.*, MICHAEL PRICE, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, COMMUNITY OUTREACH OR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING? A CLOSER LOOK AT ‘COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM’ PROGRAMS (2014) [hereinafter “COMMUNITY OUTREACH OR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING”], *available at* https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Community_Outreach_or_Intelligence_Gathering.pdf. In addition, documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests demonstrate that even routine observations of Federal Bureau of Investigation officers on members of Muslim communities ended up in intelligence records. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACLU EYE ON THE FBI (Mar. 27, 2012), *available at* https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_eye_on_the_fbi_-_mosque_outreach_03272012_0_0.pdf. As explained by Los Angeles-based community and civil rights groups: “We understand [CVE] against the backdrop of the over decade-long history of the federal government’s intrusive surveillance on mosque communities and American Muslims more generally, absent evidence of their engaging in any criminal activity.... In light of the failure of the federal government at any level to ensure safeguards against religious profiling, we cannot help but believe that CVE programs will open the doors to further profiling of American Muslims and other impacted communities.” Press Release, Asian Americans Advancing Justice- Los Angeles et al., Los Angeles Based Groups Serving American Muslim Communities Question Federal Government’s “Countering Violent Extremism” Programs as Ill-Conceived, Ineffective, and Stigmatizing (Nov. 13, 2014) [hereinafter “Los Angeles Press Release”], *available at* <http://www.advancingjustice-la.org/sites/default/files/20141113%20-%20MR%20-%20CVE%20Statement.pdf>. Similarly, in a 2015 letter, a number of Boston groups noted: “CVE programs developed with the input of law enforcement agencies threaten to incorporate intelligence gathering into the process by which individuals are referred to or use mental health and other social services.” Letter from Muslim Justice League et al. to Lisa O. Monaco, Ass’t to the President for Homeland Sec. and Counterterrorism (Feb. 13, 2015), *available at* <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Boston%20Organizational%20Letter%20re%20CVE%20Concerns.pdf>. Somali groups in Minnesota have also expressed unease. Letter from Minnesota Muslim Groups to Department of Justice et al. (May 1, 2015) [hereinafter “Minnesota Letter”], *available at* <http://files.ctctcdn.com/bd15115b001/d068ad69-9ad8-46a0-bdcd-b9d57454ed20.pdf>. So important is this issue in the Somali community that even the groups working with the U.S. Attorney on youth programs included a “no spying” clause in their agreement with him. Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Minnesota and the Somali American Taskforce, 1 (2015) [hereinafter “USAO-SATF MOU”] *available at* <http://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/file/764306/download>.

143 SCHANZER ET AL., THE CHALLENGE AND PROMISE OF USING COMMUNITY POLICING STRATEGIES TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM, *supra* note 140, at 19-31; 2016 CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 13, at 3; Robert McKenzie, *Countering Violent Extremism in America: Policy Recommendations for the Next President*, BROOKINGS

INST. (Oct. 18, 2016), <https://www.brookings.edu/research/countering-violent-extremism-in-america-policy-recommendations-for-the-next-president/>. Of course not all Muslims are opposed to CVE. Six Muslim and Somali groups were part of the Greater Boston Regional Collaborative, which developed the Boston CVE Framework. BOSTON CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 99, at 16. The Somali American Taskforce, which consists of 12 Somali-American individuals including “religious leaders, teachers, students and mental health professionals,” entered into an agreement with the Minnesota U.S. Attorney to develop CVE programs such as mentorships and education and career resources for Somali youth. See Angela Davis, *Community-Led Force Looking to Curb Terror Recruitment*, CBS MINN. (May 14, 2016, 5: 35 PM), <http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/05/14/community-led-task-force-looking-to-curb-terror-recruitment/>; USAO-SATF MOU, *supra* note 142, at 4 (identifies twelve individuals who signed and dated the document). In Los Angeles, the Muslim Public Affairs Council works closely with the LAPD and runs a program called Safe Spaces, which is broadly in line with the government’s CVE model. MUSLIM PUB. AFF. COUNCIL, SAFE SPACES: AN UPDATED TOOLKIT FOR EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES AND ADDRESSING IDEOLOGICAL VIOLENCE, MUSLIM PUB. AFF. COUNCIL (2015), available at <http://www.mpac.org/safespaces/files/MPAC-Safe-Spaces.pdf>. The LA CVE Framework cited MPAC’s Safe Spaces as a “grassroots approach to prevention.” LOS ANGELES INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUP, THE LOS ANGELES FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM 5 (2015) [hereinafter “LA CVE FRAMEWORK”], available at <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Los%20Angeles%20Framework%20for%20CVE-Full%20Report.pdf>. However, the group has rejected FBI-sponsored CVE. See *The Problem with the FBI’s ‘Shared Responsibility Committees’*, MUSLIM PUB. AFF. COUNCIL (Mar. 31, 2016), <http://www.mpac.org/policy-analysis/the-problem-with-the-fbis-shared-responsibility-committees.php>.

144 BOSTON CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 99, at 20 (dissenting opinion of Yusufi Vali, Exec. Dir., Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Ctr.).

145 Los Angeles Press Release, *supra* note 142.

146 Statement, MSA West, Muslim Student Associations Across CA Against Federal Government’s Countering Violent Extremism Programs (Feb. 21, 2015), <http://us4.campaign-archive2.com/?u=30d739eae2442c8d20aaad278&id=25a5c44b43&e=%5bUNIQID>.

147 Minnesota Letter, *supra* note 142.

148 Letter from Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) et al., on behalf of a Coalition of Nineteen Civil Liberties and Community Organizations, to Hon. Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (Aug. 31, 2016), available at <http://www.cair.com/images/pdf/2016-CVE-Grant-Program.pdf>.

149 Coalition Letter to Lisa Monaco, *supra* note 25, at 3.

150 The Boston CVE Framework, for example, acknowledges community hostility to CVE by cautioning against “creat[ing] and/or brand[ing] separate programs labeled CVE which may have a certain stigma.” BOSTON CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 99, at 2. The LA CVE Framework similarly notes the “antipathy and opposition towards CVE as a concept... voiced by some civil rights and advocacy groups in Los Angeles and around the country.” LA CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 143, at 9. Professor John Horgan, in a National Institute of Justice panel states, “I am not entirely sure when this happened, but at some point over the last two years, CVE, the term CVE became the new terrorism. It is a very deeply contentious label that if you used it, you were seen as compromised or in the service of federal government or in the service of interest[s] that really ran counter to what it is that we say on paper that we are trying to do.” Horgan Panel, *supra* note 114.

151 MICHAEL DOWNING, THE RENEW PROGRAM: A NEW APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING EARLY WARNINGS OF POTENTIAL VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (2016) [hereinafter “RENEW FRAMEWORK”] (on file with the Brennan Ctr.); Philip Marcelo, *What’s In a Name? Government Recast Anti-Extremism Efforts*, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 26, 2016 12:32 AM EDT), <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/29e87290d5a74a988cce221ef6a14996/whats-name-governments-recast-anti-extremism-efforts/>; *Montgomery Country BRAVE Model*, WORLD ORG. RES. DEV. AND EDUC., <http://www.worde.org/programs/the-montgomery-county-model/> (last visited Jan. 30, 2017).

- 152 Samuel J. Rascoff, *Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization*, 64. STAN. L. REV., 125, 148 (2012) (“American domestic counter-radicalization is emerging mainly as a (modified) import from Europe, chiefly from the United Kingdom”).
- 153 HM GOVERNMENT, CM 6888, COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY ¶¶ 49, 102 (2006), *available at* https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272320/6888.pdf.
- 154 HM GOVERNMENT, PREVENT STRATEGY ¶¶ 10.143, 10.35-10.43 (2011) [hereinafter “2011 PREVENT STRATEGY”], *available at* https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf
- 155 2016 CHANNEL DUTY GUIDANCE, *supra* note 100, at ¶¶ 80, 83. Integration and social cohesion initiatives have been substantially scaled back and are now run by a separate government agency from Prevent, although the two initiatives remain coordinated. 2011 PREVENT STRATEGY, *supra* note 154, at ¶¶ 6.30-6.31; OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INST., ERODING TRUST: THE UK’S PREVENT COUNTER-EXTREMISM STRATEGY IN HEALTH AND EDUCATION 25 (2016) [hereinafter “OSJI PREVENT STUDY”], *available at* https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/eroding-trust-20161017_0.pdf.
- 156 *See supra* text accompanying notes 92-100.
- 157 Most interventions under Prevent seem to be conducted under a program named Channel and the guidance on how to identify individuals is issued under the auspices for that program. *See* 2016 CHANNEL DUTY GUIDANCE, *supra* note 100, at ¶ 7; CHANNEL FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 100, at 2. The other factors listed in the Channel vulnerability assessment include “feelings of grievance and injustice; feeling under threat; a need for identity, meaning and belonging; []desire for status; []desire for excitement and adventure; []need to dominate and control others; susceptibility to indoctrination; a desire for political or moral change; opportunistic involvement; family or friends involvement in extremism; being at a transitional time of life; being influenced or controlled by a group; relevant mental health issues; over-identification with a group or ideology; ‘them and us’ thinking; dehumanisation of the enemy; attitudes that justify offending; harmful means to an end; harmful objectives; individual knowledge, skills and competencies; access to networks, funding or equipment; and criminal capability.”
- 158 OSJI PREVENT STUDY, *supra* note 155, at 37.
- 159 ROYAL COLLEGE OF PSYCHIATRISTS, POSITION STATEMENT PS04/16, COUNTER-TERRORISM AND PSYCHIATRY 7 (Sept. 2016), *available at* http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/pdf/PS04_16.pdf. The Royal College also noted “potential conflicts with the duties of a doctor” and the possibility that “Prevent could reduce the willingness of people to access mental health treatment.” *Id.* at 4. *See also* British Academics, Letter, *Anti-Radicalization Strategy Lacks Evidence Base in Science*, GUARDIAN, Sept. 28, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/sep/29/anti-radicalisation-strategy-lacks-evidence-base-in-science>.
- 160 *National Channel Referral Figures*, NAT’L POLICE CHIEF’S COUNCIL, <http://www.npcc.police.uk/FreedomofInformation/NationalChannelReferralFigures.aspx> (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
- 161 According to a recent report by the government of the U.K., interventions for “the vast majority of cases” in which an individual has been linked to extremism have been successful because “there are no remaining concerns that the individual will be drawn into terrorism.” This, of course, begs the question of whether there was a substantiated reason to suspect them of being pre-terrorists in the first instance. HM GOVERNMENT, CM. 9310, CONTEST: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR 2015 (July 2016), ¶ 2.37, *available at* https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539683/55469_Cm_9310_Web_Accessible_v0.11.pdf.

- 162 TUFYAL CHOUDHURY & HELEN FENWICK, THE IMPACT OF COUNTER-TERRORISM MEASURES ON MUSLIM COMMUNITIES at vii, 63-65 (2011), *available at* <http://dro.dur.ac.uk/10715/1/10715.pdf>; ARUN KUNDNANI, THE MUSLIMS ARE COMING!: ISLAMOPHOBIA, EXTREMISM, AND THE DOMESTIC WAR ON TERROR 167 (2014).
- 163 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, § 26 (1), Schedule 6, *available at* http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/6/pdfs/ukpga_20150006_en.pdf (listing municipal authorities obliged to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism); *see* OSJI PREVENT STUDY, *supra* note 155, at 27; INST. OF RACE RELATIONS, PREVENT AND THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS CONVENTION 1-2 (2016) [hereinafter "PREVENT & CHILDREN'S RIGHTS STUDY"], *available at* http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/IRR_Prevent_Submission.pdf.
- 164 Prevent defines extremism as "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance for those with different faiths and beliefs." 2011 PREVENT STRATEGY, *supra* note 154, at 107.
- 165 OSJI PREVENT STUDY, *supra* note 155, at 74.
- 166 *Id.* at 83.
- 167 *Id.* at 84-86.
- 168 *Id.* at 86-89.
- 169 PREVENT & CHILDREN'S RIGHTS STUDY, *supra* note 163, at 4.
- 170 *Id.* at 5.
- 171 Diane Taylor, *Society of Mosques to Boycott 'Racist' Anti-Terror Prevent Programme*, GUARDIAN, Dec. 17, 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/society-of-mosques-to-boycott-anti-terror-prevent-programme>. The chairman of the Birmingham Central Mosque called for a boycott of the U.K.'s CVE program on the grounds that it "unfairly targets Muslims and school children." Lexi Finnigan, *Birmingham Central Mosque Calls for Boycott of 'Racist' Prevent Programme*, TELEGRAPH, Jan. 23, 2016, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/12117605/Birmingham-Central-Mosque-chairman-calls-for-boycott-of-racist-Prevent-programme.html>.
- 172 British Academics, Letter, *PREVENT Will Have a Chilling Effect on Open Debate, Free Speech and Political Dissent*, INDEPENDENT, July 10, 2015, <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/letters/prevent-will-have-a-chilling-effect-on-open-debate-free-speech-and-political-dissent-10381491.html>.
- 173 Richard Adams, *Teachers Back Motion Calling for Prevent Strategy to be Scrapped*, GUARDIAN, Mar. 28, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/mar/28/teachers-nut-back-motion-calling-prevent-strategy-radicalisation-scrapped>.
- 174 Supplementary Written Evidence submitted by David Anderson QC, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, to the Home Affairs Select Committee Inquiry into Countering Extremism (Jan. 29, 2016), at 1, *available at* <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-committee/countering-extremism/written/27920.pdf>.
- 175 OSJI PREVENT STUDY, *supra* note 155, at 109 (quoting Dal Babu, a former Chief Superintendent for the Metropolitan Police).
- 176 Several agencies did not respond at all or inadequately to our requests, leading us to commence litigation in early 2016. *See* Brennan Ctr. CVE Press Release, *supra* note 25. Since the filing of this lawsuit, some documents have been produced and form part of the basis for this report.
- 177 Alan B. Kruger & Jitka Malekova, *Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Casual Connection*, 17 (4) J.

ECON. PERSPECTIVES 119 (2003), *available at* <http://www.rochester.edu/College/PSC/clarke/214/Krueger03.pdf> (“Any connection between poverty, education, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak.”); David R. Francis, *Poverty and Low Education Don’t Cause Terrorism*, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES. (last visited Nov. 2, 2016), <http://www.nber.org/digest/sep02/w9074.html>; N.Y. TIMES, *Who Will Become a Terrorist*, *supra* note 73.

178 OFFICE OF PARTNER ENGAGEMENT, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN SCHOOLS 3 (Jan. 2016) [hereinafter “FBI CVE SCHOOL GUIDANCE”], *available at* <https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-PreventingExtremismSchools.pdf>.

179 *Id.*

180 FORDHAM UNIV. CTR. ON NAT’L SEC., CASE BY CASE: ISIS PROSECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 1, 2014 – JUNE 30, 2016 at 10 (2016), <https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55dc76f7e4b013c872183fea/t/577c5b43197aea832bd486c0/1467767622315/ISIS+Report+-+Case+by+Case+-+July2016.pdf>. A study by the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, found four cases involving individuals ages 15-17 and another 26 between ages 18 and 20, but did not provide a breakdown of the latter category. *ISIS Recruits in the U.S. Legal System*, PROGRAM ON EXTREMISM, GEO. WASH. U. (Nov. 30, 2016), *available at* <https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Nov.%202016%20Snapshot.pdf>. These statistics do not reflect the number of those indicted who came to the attention of law enforcement while at school, but were only indicted at a later date. That data is not available, nor is comparable data for prosecutions relating to violence committed in the name of other groups.

181 *Factsheet of Elementary and Secondary School Statistics for 2015*, NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STATISTICS, <http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372> (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).

182 *See supra* text accompanying notes 71.

183 FBI CVE SCHOOL GUIDANCE, *supra* note 178, at 15.

184 *See supra* text accompanying note 71.

185 FBI CVE SCHOOL GUIDANCE, *supra* note 178, at 15.

186 *Id.* at 11.

187 *See* Danielle Jefferis, *The FBI Wants Schools to Spy on Their Students’ Thoughts*, JUST SEC. (Mar. 11, 2016, 11:50 AM), <https://www.justsecurity.org/29901/fbi-schools-spy-students-thoughts/>.

188 FBI CVE SCHOOL GUIDANCE, *supra* note 178, at 19-20, 23.

189 *See generally* CHRISTOPHER MALLET, THE SCHOOL TO PRISON PIPELINE: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS (2015); Clyde Haberman, *The Unintended Consequences of Taking a Hard Line on School Discipline*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2016, <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/us/the-unintended-consequences-of-taking-a-hard-line-on-school-discipline.html>.

190 *Don’t Be a Puppet: When to Report Violent Extremism*, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, <https://cve.fbi.gov/where/?state=report> (last visited Jan. 31, 2017)

191 *Don’t Be a Puppet: How Do Violent Extremists Make Contact?*, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, <https://www.fbi.gov/cve508/teen-website/how> (last visited Jan. 31, 2017)

192 *Don’t Be a Puppet: Why Do People Become Violent Extremists?*, *supra* note 97.

193 Letter from American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee et al, to Hon. James Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation (Apr. 5, 2016), *available at* <http://www.adc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Coalition->

Letter-to-FBI-RE-Website-Profiling-Arab-Youth1.pdf.

194 AFT Letter, *supra* note 122.

195 *Id.*

196 See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik to Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Homeland Security (Mar. 10, 2016), *available at* <https://democrats-homeland.house.gov/sites/democrats.house.gov/files/sitedocuments/pclobletter.pdf>.

197 In response to the Brennan Center's Freedom of Information Act request on SRCs, the FBI claimed in that it had no responsive records. See Letter from David M. Hardy, Section Chief, Record/Information Dissemination Section, Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Michael Price, Counsel, Brennan Ctr. for Justice (Nov. 19, 2015) (on file with the Brennan Center). Such "no records" responses are used by the FBI to effectively refuse to disclose whether or not it has responsive records. For an explanation of this practice, see Marcy Wheeler, *DOJ Admits It Has Been Lying for 24 Years; Journalists Applaud*, EMPTYWHEEL (Nov. 4, 2011), <https://www.emptywheel.net/2011/11/04/doj-admits-it-has-been-lying-for-24-years-journalists-applaud/>. After the Center filed suit, the FBI discovered relevant documents that it could release, several of which have been incorporated in this report.

198 See Letter from Unnamed, Fed. Bureau of Investigation to Members of Shared Responsibility Committees 1 (n.d.) [hereinafter "Draft SRC Letter"], *available at* <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2815794-FBI-SRC-Letter.html>; Cora Currier & Murtaza Hussain, *Letter Details FBI Plan for Secretive Anti-Radicalization Committees*, INTERCEPT (Apr. 28, 2016, 1:02 PM), <https://theintercept.com/2016/04/28/letter-details-fbi-plan-for-secretive-anti-radicalization-committees/>.

199 See, e.g., Michelle Boostein, *Muslim Activists Alarmed by the FBI's New Game-Like Counterterrorism Program for Kids*, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/11/02/muslims-and-arab-groups-concerned-about-fbi-counter-extremism-program-aimed-at-schools/>; Michael Hirsh, *Inside the FBI's Secret Muslim Networks*, POLITICO, Mar. 24, 2015, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/fbi-muslim-outreach-terrorism-213765> [hereinafter "*Politico on FBI Spying*"]; Hannan Adely, *N.J. Anti-Terrorism Plan Aims to Spot Those Vulnerable to Being Radicalized*, NORTHJERSEY.COM, Apr. 30, 2016, <http://www.northjersey.com/news/n-j-anti-terrorism-plan-aims-to-spot-those-vulnerable-to-being-radicalized-1.1556340> [hereinafter "*N.J. Anti-Terrorism Plan*"]; Murtaza Hussain & Jenna McLaughlin, *FBI's "Shared Responsibility Committees" to Identify "Radicalized" Muslims Raise Alarms*, INTERCEPT (Apr. 9, 2016, 11:46 AM), <https://theintercept.com/2016/04/09/fbis-shared-responsibility-committees-to-identify-radicalized-muslims-raises-alarms/>.

200 See Arjun Singh Sethi, *The FBI Needs to Stop Spying on Muslim-Americans*, POLITICO, Mar. 29, 2016, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/03/muslim-american-surveillance-fbi-spying-213773>.

201 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (U//FOUO) ASAC CONFERENCE – COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM TRAINING 2 (Aug. 13, 2016), *available at* <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/9D189AFA9E878DF18145FA7D70DE4A5B36CFB1E.pdf> (obtained by the Brennan Center through Freedom of Information Act request).

202 9/11 REVIEW COMMISSION, (U) THE FBI: PROTECTING THE HOMELAND IN THE 21ST CENTURY 96 (March 2015), *available at* <https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/9-11-review.pdf>.

203 *Id.* at 99.

204 Draft SRC Letter, *supra* note 198 at 1. According to press reports, the committee may include mental health professionals, religious leaders, social service workers, and mentors. *N.J. Anti-Terrorism Plan*, *supra* note 199; *Politico on FBI Spying*, *supra* note 199.

- 205 Members must sign confidentiality agreements that prevent them from sharing information about individuals referred to them, except with law enforcement agencies and cannot consult with outside experts except with the FBI's permission. Draft SRC Letter, *supra* note 198, at 2.
- 206 *Id.* at 1.
- 207 *Id.* at 3. There is no requirement to obtain the consent of the individual concerned for this type of information sharing. In addition, the SRC must report information “regarding any serious threat of physical violence” and notify the FBI if any case referred by them is “an inappropriate candidate for intervention.” If the individual concerned agrees, the SRC must also report to the FBI the results of any intervention. *Id.*
- 208 *Id.*
- 209 *Id.*
- 210 *Id.* at 1. Under its guidelines for domestic investigations, the FBI has broad leeway to conduct investigations called “assessments,” even when it does not have any particular suspicion of wrongdoing so long as it believes that it is acting to protect against national security threats. Since even this minimal standard is not mentioned in the Draft SRC Letter, it appears that the Bureau has absolute discretion to identify individuals as violent extremists and trigger committee scrutiny. See MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS § II(B)(4)(a)(i), available at <http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf>. For a discussion of the different types of investigations the FBI is authorized to conduct, see EMILY BERMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: NEW POWERS, NEW RISKS (2011), available at <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/AGGReportFINALed.pdf>.
- 211 It appears that individuals may be referred to SRCs from other sources because certain obligations listed in the Draft SRC letter apply only “[w]here the FBI is the referring entity,” while others apply more broadly. Draft SRC Letter, *supra* note 198, at 3.
- 212 Press Release, Muslim Advocates Commends Justice Department Decision to Stop Plans for Dangerous CVE Program That Would Trample on Americans' Civil Rights, (Oct. 4, 2016), available at <https://www.muslimadvocates.org/dojendsplansforsrc/>; Jeff Goldman, *Muslim Outreach Program Reportedly Dropped by FBI*, NEWJERSEY.COM, Oct. 19, 2016, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2016/10/muslim_outreach_reportedly_program_dropped_by_fbi.html.
- 213 Julia Edwards, *White House Plans Plans Community-Based Prevention of Violent Ideologies*, REUTERS, Oct. 19, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-counterterrorism-idUSKCN12J15A>.
- 214 2016 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 13, at 11 (emphasis added).
- 215 *Id.*
- 216 *Id.*
- 217 Letter from Ronald L. Davis, Dir., Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Justice to Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, World Organization for Resource Development and Education concerning Cooperative Agreement# 2014CKWXK043 (Oct. 1, 2013), available at <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/11-%20WORDE%20Grant%20award%20letter.pdf> (obtained by the Brennan Center through Freedom of Information Act request).
- 218 *About Us*, WORLD ORG. FOR RES. DEV. AND EDUC., <http://www.worde.org/about/> (last visited Oct. 27, 2016).
- 219 *Inside the Mind of ISIL: Understanding Its Goals and Ideology to Better Protect the Homeland: Hearing Before the S. Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs Comm.* 114th Cong. 2 (2016) [hereinafter “Mirahmadi Testimony”], available at <https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/testimony-mirahmadi-2016-01-20> (state-

ment of Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, World Organization for Resource Development and Education); *The Montgomery County BRAVE Model*, WORLD ORG. FOR RES. DEV. AND EDUC., <http://www.worde.org/programs/the-montgomery-county-model/> (last visited Jan. 31, 2017) (“The model is now evidence-based and has undergone an independent, scientific evaluation.”); *see also Factsheet: Comprehensive CVE Approach*, *supra* note 129, at 3; Press Release, White House, FACT SHEET: Leaders’ Summit to Counter ISIL and Violent Extremism (Sept. 26, 2016), *available at* <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/29/fact-sheet-leaders-summit-counter-isil-and-violent-extremism>; *Obama Administration Looks to Community-Led Program to Stop Homegrown Radicals*, WORLD ORG. RES. DEV. AND EDUC. (October 23, 2014), <http://www.worde.org/publications/commentary/can-a-community-program-help-stop-homegrown-radicals/>.

220 *Events*, INT’L COMMUNITY CTR., <http://www.theicc.net/events> (last visited Oct. 28, 2016); *see also* MICHAEL WILLIAMS, JOHN HORGAN & WILLIAM EVANS, EVALUATION OF A MULTI-FACETED, U.S. COMMUNITY BASED, MUSLIM-LED CVE PROGRAM 15 (2016) [hereinafter “WORDE EVALUATION”], *available at* <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf>.

221 *Youth Against Hunger*, INT’L CULTURAL CTR., <http://www.theicc.net/programs/social-action-programs/youth-against-hunger> (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).

222 WORDE EVALUATION, *supra* note 220.

223 Letter from Nicole Nguyen & Stacey Krueger, Researchers from the University of Illinois at Chicago, to Members of Congress et al., Concerning the Questionable Use of Academic Research to Support CVE Initiatives (October 5, 2016) [hereinafter “UIC Letter”], *available at* <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/Nguyen%20Krueger%20WORDE%20final%20%284%29.pdf>.

224 WORDE EVALUATION, *supra* note 220, at 22.

225 *Id.* at 63.

226 *Id.* at 85.

227 *Cyber Civility Curriculum*, INT’L CULTURAL CTR., <http://www.theicc.net/programs/educational-programming/cybercivility>; WORDE EVALUATION, *supra* note 220, at 17.

228 In response to a Freedom of Information Law request, the director of the Montgomery County School District informed a reporter from Muckrock that no high schools in Montgomery County participated in the training. Email from Waqas Mirza, Journalist, Muckrock to Faiza Patel, Co-Director, Liberty & Nat’l Sec. Program, Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law (Dec. 19, 2016, 7:21PM ET) (on file with author). The program may have been implemented in other school districts.

229 *About Crossroads*, INT’L CULTURAL CTR., <http://www.theicc.net/programs/crossroads> (last visited Oct. 28, 2016); WORDE EVALUATION, *supra* note 220, at 85; WORLD ORG. FOR RES. DEV. AND EDUC., TOPIC AND PROGRAM OUTCOME IDENTIFICATION AND JUSTIFICATION 4 (2014) [hereinafter “WORDE PROGRAM OUTCOME IDENTIFICATION AND JUSTIFICATION”], *available at* https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/05-%20Grant%20Application%20Topic%20%26%20Program%20Outcome%20_0.pdf (obtained by the Brennan Center through Freedom of Information Act request).

230 WORDE CVE MANUAL, *supra* note 96, at 3.

231 *Id.* at 42; *see also* Mirahmadi Testimony, *supra* note 219, at 2.

232 WORDE CVE MANUAL, *supra* note 96, at 44.

233 *Id.* at 43, 44.

234 WORLD ORG. FOR RES. DEV. AND EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT 2014 at 9 (2015), *available at* <http://www.worde.org/publications/annual-report-2014/>.

worde.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/WORDE-2014-Annual-Report.pdf; WORLD ORG. FOR RES. DEV. AND EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT 2013 at 3, 7, 15 (2014), *available at* <http://www.worde.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/WORDE-2013-Annual-Report.pdf>.

235 Waqas Mirza, *Montgomery County's Flawed Model for Nationwide Counterterrorism Programs*, (Sept. 28, 2016), <https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2016/sep/28/cve-community-resistence/>.

236 At the time that WORDE applied for federal funds for its CVE programs, it stated that during the previous year, more than 25 people had been referred to its existing counseling services for things such as “homesickness,” “acculturation related stress,” “feelings of alienation,” and “economic stressors in the family,” which the group characterized as suggesting that they “*may* be at risk of violent extremism.” WORDE PROGRAM OUTCOME IDENTIFICATION AND JUSTIFICATION, *supra* note 229, at 3, 4 (emphasis added).

237 Mila Koumpilova, *What Maryland's Test Lab Can Teach Minnesota About Thwarting Radical Recruiters*, MINN. STAR TRIB., May 16, 2016, <http://www.startribune.com/what-maryland-s-test-lab-can-teach-minnesota-about-thwarting-radical-recruiters/379484141/>.

238 WORDE CVE MANUAL, *supra* note 96, at 51.

239 *Id.* at 54.

240 Subaward Agreement for “Countering Domestic Violent Extremism” between WORDE and Montgomery County Maryland 13 (2014), *available at* <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/20-MCPD%20Response.pdf> (obtained by the Brennan Center through Freedom of Information Act request).

241 *Id.*

242 *Id.*

243 INT’L CULTURAL CTR., CROSSROADS PROGRAM: HIPAA NOTICE OF PRIVACY PRACTICES § III(B)(2), III(B)(8) (2014), *available at* <http://www.theicc.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/ICC-Crossroads-HIPAA-Long-form.pdf>; WORLD ORG. FOR RESOURCE DEV. AND EDUC., THE BUILDING RESILIENCE AGAINST VIOLENT EXTREMISM (BRAVE) MODEL: A COLLECTIVE IMPACT INITIATIVE THAT INCREASES PUBLIC SAFETY AND SOCIAL COHESION STRATEGIC PLAN 2016-2019 at 16 (2016), *available at* <http://www.worde.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/WORDE-BRAVE-Model-Strategic-Plan.pdf>.

244 Aaron Miguel Cantu, *In Maryland, Faith Leaders and Law Enforcement Fight Radicalization*, AL JAZEERA AMERICA, Sept. 12, 2015, <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/9/12/in-maryland-a-new-way-of-policing-radical-ideology.html>.

245 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder Announces Pilot Program to Counter Violent Extremists (Sept. 15, 2014), *available at* <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-holder-announces-pilot-program-counter-violent-extremists>.

246 BOSTON CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 99, at 4-5.

247 *Id.* at 2.

248 Email, “Follow-Up/Multidisciplinary Threat Assessment and Intervention Working Group,” from Brandy Donini-Melanson, Law Enforcement Coordinator, U.S. Attorneys’ Office of Mass., to the Greater Boston CVE Multidisciplinary Working Group (Oct. 7, 2014, 9:06:00 PM), *available at* https://d3gn0r3afghep.cloudfront.net/foia_files/2016/03/16/CVE_Email.pdf. Professor John Horgan explained the lack of reliable predictive signs to the group involved in developing the framework. Slides shown at another community event also make the same point. Waqas Mirza, *Boston Finds Muslim Surveillance Program “Flawed and Problematic” But Implements It Anyway*, MUCKROCK (May 13, 2016), <https://www.muckrock.com/news/archives/2016/may/13/boston-cve/>.

- 249 BOSTON CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 99, at 2.
- 250 *Id.* at 6.
- 251 *Id.* at 3.
- 252 *Id.* at 1.
- 253 See e.g., *Upcoming Training Events, District of Massachusetts*, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/trainingevents/upcoming> (last visited Jan. 31, 2017); *Archived Training / Events, District of Massachusetts*, <https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/trainingevents/archived> (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
- 254 BOSTON CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 99, at 7, 15.
- 255 Cooperative Agreement between the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Mass. and Mass. Exec. Office of Health and Human Services for Implementation Strategies to Enhance Resilience to Violent Extremism art. I (F), I (G) (approved Sept. 30, 2015), at 2, *available at* <https://www.scribd.com/document/321906162/CVE-Cooperative-Agreement-of-USAO-for-Massachusetts-with-Massachusetts-EOHHS>.
- 256 *Id.* art. III (C), at 3. The agreement makes clear that while the programs funded under the grant would preferably be evidence-based, it notes that “there is little research available regarding prevention strategies specific to violent extremism” and thus other types of crime prevention models may be used. *Id.* art. III (J), at 5.
- 257 *Id.* art. I (A), I (C), at 1.
- 258 American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., Comments to the Commonwealth of Mass. Exec. Office of Health and Human Services, on Enhancing Resilience to Violent Extremism in Massachusetts Through a Continuum of Prevention and Intervention Strategies (2016); Sue Udry, Exec. Dir., Bill of Rights Defense Comm./Defending Dissent Foundation, Respondent Cover Sheet, Enhancing Resilience to Violent Extremism in Massachusetts Through a Continuum of Prevention and Intervention Strategies (issued March 11, 2016); Shannon Erwin, Exec. Dir., Muslim Justice League, Respondent Cover Sheet, Enhancing Resilience to Violent Extremism in Massachusetts Through a Continuum of Prevention and Intervention Strategies (issued March 11, 2016); Alex Marthews, President, Restore the Fourth – Boston/Campaign for Digital Fourth Amendment Rights, Respondent Cover Sheet, Enhancing Resilience to Violent Extremism in Massachusetts Through a Continuum of Prevention and Intervention Strategies (issued March 11, 2016). All response sheets were obtained by the Muslim Justice League via Freedom of Information Law requests and are on file with the Brennan Center.
- 259 MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DOCUMENT #: 17LCEHSPEACEGRANTAPP, GRANT APPLICATION FOR THE MASSACHUSETTS PROMOTING ENGAGEMENT, ACCEPTANCE AND COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT (PEACE) PROJECT 4 (issued Aug. 8, 2016), *available at* <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/PEACE%20Project%20Grant%20Application080816.pdf>.
- 260 *Id.* at 5.
- 261 *Id.*
- 262 Press Release, Mass. Exec. Office of Health and Human Services, Three Boston-based Organizations Chosen for 210K in PEACE Project Grants (Dec. 1, 2016), *available at* <http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/newsroom/press-releases/eohhs/three-boston-based-orgs-chosen-for-210k-in-peace-grants.html>.
- 263 WHITE HOUSE CVE SUMMIT PRESS POINTS, *supra* note 102.
- 264 LA CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 143, at 3-6.
- 265 *Id.* at 7. The Los Angeles Framework does not explain how individuals will be identified, but notes the need for “credible research-based baselines for indicators of violent extremism.” The Framework provides few specifics

about how interventions will be structured, but does point out the potential conflict of interest in having law enforcement agencies involved in “rehabilitation” programs. Relatedly, the Los Angeles Framework notes the need for law enforcement agencies to maximize alternatives to interdiction so that “individuals are referred out of the interdiction process and into available and viable prevention and intervention components.” *Id.* at 8.

266 RENEW FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 151; Exploring the Use of Health Approaches in Community-Level Strategies to Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization: Session II and Session III Pt. 1, NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING & MEDICINE (Sept. 7, 2016), <https://www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/-/media/Files/Activity%20Files/PublicHealth/MedPrep/2016-SEPT-7/Audio/Sept%207%20Session%20II%20and%20III%20Part%201.MP3>.

267 *See supra* Table 1.

268 *See* Michael Price, *New Counterterrorism Program in Los Angeles: Suspicious Thought Reporting*, JUST SEC. (Dec. 1, 2016, 8: 57 AM), <https://www.justsecurity.org/35054/counterterrorism-program-los-angeles-suspicious-thought-reporting/> (explaining how information about those identified for CVE interventions could become part of LAPD databases).

269 MINNEAPOLIS CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 98, at 4. A diagram adds “difficulties in school”; “lack of ties to broader Minnesota community”; and “generational divide” to the list of “community identified root causes.” *Id.* at 6.

270 Press Release, United States Attorney’s Office, District of Minn., Twin Cities Somali Community Leaders, Government Officials And Private Partners Present Plan To Build Community Resilience (Sept. 9, 2015), *available at* <https://www.justice.gov/usao-mn/pr/twin-cities-somali-community-leaders-government-officials-and-private-partners-present>.

271 For example, several programs seem to be focused on providing training and job opportunities to Somali youth. But a DHS-sponsored qualitative study came to the conclusion that the assumption that poverty and a lack of social mobility were the primary causes for “radicalization and departure” to fight with ISIS was untrue. ERROL SOUTHERS & JUSTIN HEINZ, NAT’L CTR. OF EXCELLENCE FOR RISK AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TERRORISM EVENTS (CREATE), U. SOUTHERN CAL., FOREIGN FIGHTERS: TERRORIST RECRUITMENT & COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE) PROGRAMS IN MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL 1 (Apr. 2015), *available at* <http://securitydebrief.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Foreign-Fighters-Terrorist-Recruitment-and-CVE-in-Minneapolis-St-Paul.pdf>.

272 COMMUNITY OUTREACH OR INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, *supra* note 142, at 5-7.

273 MINNEAPOLIS CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 98, at 5. The Building Community Resilience MOU provides for support teams made up of “parents, imams, teachers, coaches, youth advocates and mental health professionals to collaborate and provide support and resources for young people and families who are struggling.” USAO-SATF MOU, *supra* note 142, at 2.

274 *See White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism*, C-SPAN (Feb. 18, 2015), <https://www.c-span.org/video/?324398-102/white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism> (quoting Courtney Kiernat, former Exec. Dir., External Partnerships for Minneapolis Public Schools, “Well-trained community representatives working in the school systems will help spot identity issues and disaffection . . . Our intervention model will bring trained youth workers together with parents and mental health professionals to address identity issues and disaffection at school, root causes of radicalization.”).

275 Joseph Sabroski, *Video of FBI Visit of Muslim Activist Highlights Disturbing Nature of Federal Counter-Extremism Programs*, ALTERNET (Aug. 28, 2016), <http://www.alternet.org/grayzone-project/video-fbi-visit-muslim-activist-highlights-disturbing-nature-federal-counter>.

- 276 According to the director of the FBI, since August 2015, the number of people attempting to travel to Syria to join ISIS has dropped from 6-10 per month to one per month on average. Michael Isikoff, *Steep Decline in U.S. Recruits to ISIS, FBI Chief James Comey Says*, YAHOO NEWS (May 11, 2016), <https://www.yahoo.com/news/steep-decline-in-us-recruits-to-isis-fbi-chief-212138680.html>. Between August 2015 and August 2016, official ISIS media output has decreased from 700 items to under 200. Scott Shane, *ISIS Media Output Drops as Pressure Rises, Report Says*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2016, at A7, *available at* http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/11/world/middleeast/islamic-state-media-propaganda-isis.html?_r=0.
- 277 2011 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 11, at 5; 2016 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 13, at 13, 14.
- 278 In 2015, lawmakers twice attempted to impose legal obligations upon social media companies to report, and possibly monitor for, “terrorist activity” on their sites. The Chair of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee added a provision to the 2016 Intelligence Authorization Bill requiring companies to report instances of “terrorist activity” on their sites. *See* Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, S. 1705, 114th Cong. § 603 (a) (2015), *available at* <https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/s/1705/BILLS-114s1705pcs.pdf>; Press Release, Sen. Ron Wyden, Wyden Applauds Win for Free Speech and Common Sense in Revised Intelligence Authorization Bill (Sept. 21, 2015), <https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-applauds-win-for-free-speech-and-common-sense-in-revised-intelligence-authorization-bill>. A similar measure was introduced by Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Sen. Richard Burr (R-NC) in the wake of the San Bernardino attacks. *See* Requiring Reporting of Online Terrorist Activity Act of 2015, S. 2372, 114th Cong. § 2 (a) (2015), *available at* https://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=files.serve&File_id=9BDFE0CAF12-4BEB-B64D-DC9239D93070; *see also* Press Release, Office of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Bill Would Require Tech Companies to Report Online Terrorist Activity (Dec. 8, 2015), <http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/12/bill-would-require-tech-companies-to-report-online-terrorist-activity>. These bills were not adopted; they faced strong opposition from privacy advocates, technology companies, and lawmakers, who argued that they would require companies that do not possess law enforcement expertise to make nuanced judgments about what constituted a terrorist post and to broadly police their users’ speech. *See* Cat Zakrzewski, *Social Media Firms Resist Role of Policing Terror Talk*, WALL ST. J., Jul. 26, 2015, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/social-media-firms-resist-role-of-policing-terror-talk-1437957517>; Emma Llansó, *Intel Authorization Bill Would Turn Online Service Providers into Law Enforcement Watchdogs*, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (July 9, 2015), <https://cdt.org/blog/intel-authorization-bill-would-turn-online-service-providers-into-law-enforcement-watchdogs/>; Letter from the Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. et al. to Chairman Charles Grassley and Ranking Member Patrick Leahy, Comm. on the Judiciary (Dec. 16, 2015), *available at* <https://cdt.org/insight/coalition-letter-opposing-the-requiring-reporting-of-online-terrorist-activity-act/>; Julian Hattem, *Spy Panel Drops Controversial Mandate on Web Firms, Amid Pressure*, HILL (Sept. 21, 2015, 6:12 PM), <http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/254440-spy-panel-drops-controversial-mandate-on-web-firms-amid-pressure>.
- 279 Top counterterrorism officials – including the Attorney General and the directors of the FBI and CIA – met with Silicon Valley executives in late 2015 and early 2016. Ellen Nakashima, *Obama’s Top National Security Officials to Meet with Silicon Valley CEOs*, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obamas-top-national-security-officials-to-meet-with-silicon-valley-ceos/2016/01/07/178d95ca-b586-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d124_story.html; Roberta Rampton & Dustin Volz, *Obama Appeals to Silicon Valley for Help with Online Anti-Extremist Campaign*, REUTERS, Dec. 9, 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/california-shooting-cyber-idUSKBN0TQ0A320151207>. According to a memorandum prepared for the 2015 meeting, government officials sought help in “measur[ing] radicalization” on social media platforms because doing so would be “extremely useful to help shape and target counter-messaging and efforts focused on countering violent extremism.” Jenna McLaughlin, *White House Raises Encryption Threat in Silicon Valley Summit*, INTERCEPT (Jan. 8, 2016, 2:35 PM) [hereinafter “INTERCEPT, *White House Raises Encryption Threat*”], <https://theintercept.com/2016/01/08/white-house-raises-encryption-threat-in-silicon-valley-summit/>. The memorandum also suggested that companies use their expertise in measuring

message resonance to conduct “front-end research on specific drivers of radicalization and themes among violent extremist populations.” *Id.*

280 Twitter at least is known to pro-actively monitor accounts and has significantly increased the personnel allocated to this function over the last year, leading to an 80% increase in suspensions. *An Update on our Efforts to Combat Violent Extremism*, THE OFFICIAL TWITTER BLOG (Aug. 18, 2016, 16:06 UTC), <https://blog.twitter.com/2016/an-update-on-our-efforts-to-combat-violent-extremism>; *Combating Violent Extremism*, THE OFFICIAL TWITTER BLOG (Feb. 5, 2016) [hereinafter “*Twitter Policy on Combating Extremism*”], <https://blog.twitter.com/2016/combating-violent-extremism>.

281 *Id.*; see also Danny Yadron, *Twitter Deletes 125,000 ISIS Accounts and Expands Anti-Terror Teams*, GUARDIAN, Jan. 13, 2016 [hereinafter “*Guardian on Twitter Takedowns*”], <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/05/twitter-deletes-isis-accounts-terrorism-online> (quoting Facebook’s director of strategic communications that there is no “magical algorithm” for flagging terrorism-related content).

282 *Twitter Policy on Combating Extremism*, *supra* note 280.

283 It has been suggested the model used to prevent the dissemination of child pornography could be used for terrorist content as well. To prevent child pornography on their sites, several companies automatically compare images, video and audio on their platforms against a database of materials that have been tagged as child pornography and which have unique “hash” values associated with them. A group called the Counter Extremism Project (CEP), which includes the Dartmouth researcher who developed the child pornography database, claims to have developed an algorithm that can create a “database of known extremist content” that companies can use. Elias Groll, *Suppressing Extremist Speech: There’s an Algorithm for That!*, FOREIGN POL’Y, June 17, 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/17/suppressing-extremist-speech-theres-an-algorithm-for-that/>. Some press reports indicate that companies have not embraced this approach in part because of the difficulty of coming up with “a sufficiently neutral definition of what constitutes ‘extremist’ content.” *Id.*; Ellen Nakashima, *There’s a New Tool to Take Down Terrorism Images Online. But Social-Media Companies are Wary of It*, WASH. POST, June 21, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/new-tool-to-take-down-terrorism-images-online-spurs-debate-on-what-constitutes-extremist-content/2016/06/20/ca4f73a-3492-11e6-8758-d58e76e11b12_story.html (“Some firms also fear that if they collaborated with a third party such as CEP, the organization might try to influence the companies’ guidelines regarding extremist content.”). Others, however, suggest that Google and Facebook are already using a system based on hash values to rapidly take down “Islamic State videos and other similar material.” Joseph Menn & Dustin Volz, *Exclusive: Google, Facebook Quietly Move Toward Automatic Blocking*, REUTERS, June 25, 2016, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-internet-extremism-video-exclusive-idUSKCN0ZB00M>.

284 See *infra* text accompanying notes 294-297.

285 Ellen Nakashima, *Twitter Says It Shut Down More Than 235,000 Accounts Promoting Terrorism Since February*, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/twitter-says-it-shut-down-more-than-235000-accounts-promoting-terrorism-since-february/2016/08/18/7fc5b7b4-653d-11e6-96c0-37533479f3f5_story.html?postshare=1921471540869973&tid=ss_tw. In February 2016, the company reported taking down 125,000 accounts, thus the shutting of an additional 235,000 accounts was a significant increase in the rate of removals. *Guardian on Twitter Takedowns*, *supra* note 281.

286 Madhumita Murgia & Hannah Kuchler, *Social Media: Challenging the Jihadi Narrative*, FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 17, 2016, <https://www.ft.com/content/3b03edde-8992-11e6-8aa5-f79f5696c731>.

287 *Partnering to Help Curb Spread of Online Terrorist Content*, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Dec. 5, 2016), <http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/12/partnering-to-help-curb-spread-of-online-terrorist-content/>.

288 Olivia Solon, *Facebook, Twitter, Google and Microsoft Team Up to Tackle Extremist Content*, GUARDIAN, Dec. 5, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/05/facebook-twitter-google-microsoft-terrorist-ex>

tremist-content (quoting Hany Farid, the computer scientist who helped develop PhotoDNA, a database of images of child pornography, who has advocated for companies to adopt the model for removing terrorist content).

- 289 Emma Llanso, *Takedown Collaboration by Private Companies Creates Troubling Precedent*, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (Dec. 6, 2016) <https://cdt.org/blog/takedown-collaboration-by-private-companies-creates-troubling-precedent/>.
- 290 Sophia Hyatt, *Facebook 'Blocks Accounts' of Palestinian Journalists*, AL JAZEERA, Sept. 25, 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/09/facebook-blocks-accounts-palestinian-journalists-160925095126952.html>.
- 291 Vidhi Doshi, *Facebook Under Fire for 'Censoring' Kashmir-related Posts and Accounts*, GUARDIAN, July 19, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/19/facebook-under-fire-censoring-kashmir-posts-accounts>.
- 292 Mark Scott & Mike Isaac, *Facebook Restores Iconic Vietnam War Photo It Censored for Nudity*, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2016, at B1, *available at* http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/technology/facebook-vietnam-war-photo-nudity.html?_r=0.
- 293 Following complaints about these types of deletions, Facebook announced that it was “going to begin allowing more items that people find newsworthy, significant, or important to the public interest — even if they might otherwise violate our standards.” Joe Kaplan, *Input from Community and Partners on our Community Standards*, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Oct. 21, 2016), <http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/10/input-from-community-and-partners-on-our-community-standards/>.
- 294 *Community Standards*, FACEBOOK (last visited Jan. 31, 2017), <https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards#>.
- 295 *The Twitter Rules*, TWITTER (last visited Jan. 31, 2017), <https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311>.
- 296 *Violent or Graphic Content- YouTube Help*, YOUTUBE (last visited Jan. 31, 2017), <https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802008?hl=en>.
- 297 *Microsoft's Approach to Terrorist Content*, MICROSOFT (May 20, 2016), <http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2016/05/20/microsofts-approach-terrorist-content-online/#sm.0000yv3gmd4y5eewqvn2abbhosjmw>.
- 298 J.M. BERGER & H. PEREZ, *THE ISLAMIC STATE'S DIMINISHING RETURNS ON TWITTER: HOW SUSPENSIONS ARE LIMITING THE SOCIAL NETWORKS OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING ISIS SUPPORTERS* 4 (Feb. 2016), *available at* https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Berger_Occasional%20Paper.pdf; J.M. BERGER & JONATHON MORGAN, *THE ISIS TWITTER CONSENSUS: DEFINING AND DESCRIBING THE POPULATION OF ISIS SUPPORTERS ON TWITTER* 56 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf [hereinafter “BROOKINGS 2015 ISIS TWITTER STUDY”].
- 299 Shaun Wright, et al., *Resurgent Insurgents: Quantitative Research Into Jihadists Who Get Suspended But Return On Twitter*, 7(2) J. TERRORISM RES. 1, 2 (2016); Charles Arthur, *Taking Down ISIS Material from Twitter or Youtube Not As Clear Cut As It Seems*, GUARDIAN, June 23, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/23/taking-down-isis-youtube-twitter-google-video>; RACHEL Levy, *ISIS Tries to Outwit Social Networks*, VOCATIV (June 17, 2014, 3:58 PM ET), <http://www.vocativ.com/world/syria-world/isis-tries-outwit-social-networks/>.
- 300 Nicole Perloth & Mike Isaac, *Terrorists Mock Bids to End Use of Social Media*, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2015, at A1, *available at* http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/technology/terrorists-mock-bids-to-end-use-of-social-media.html?_r=0.
- 301 BROOKINGS 2015 ISIS TWITTER STUDY, *supra* note 298, at 58.

302 *Id.* at 53.

303 One way in which some major companies have sought to counteract the built-in secrecy and exercise of discretion involved in content removal based on community standards is by issuing regular transparency reports. But these only count removal requests from governments based on legal restrictions, not those undertaken on the basis of the company's terms of service. *See, e.g., Removal Requests: January to June 2016*, TWITTER (last visited Feb. 1, 2017), <https://transparency.twitter.com/en/removal-requests.html#removal-requests-jan-jun-2016>; *Government Requests Report: FAQs*, FACEBOOK (last visited Feb. 1, 2017), <https://govtrequests.facebook.com/faq/>. Thus, except where companies like Twitter announce the results of their efforts in order to demonstrate their commitment to fighting terrorism, the extent of removals based on flagging as terrorist content or the like is not known.

304 INTERCEPT, *White House Raises Encryption Threat*, *supra* note 279.

305 For a history of these efforts, *see* Weston R. Sager, *Apple Pie Propaganda? The Smith-Mundt Act Before and After the Repeal of the Domestic Dissemination Ban*, 109 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 511, 515-522 (2015) [hereinafter "Sager, *Apple Pie Propaganda?*"]; ALLAN M. WINKLER, *THE POLITICS OF PROPAGANDA: THE OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION 1942-1945* (1978); Allen W. Palmer & Edward L. Carter, *The Smith-Mundt Act's Ban on Domestic Propaganda: An Analysis of the Cold War Statute Limiting Access to Public Diplomacy*, 11 COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 5-9 (2006).

306 22 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. II 1948); Pub. L. No. 80-402, § 2, 62 Stat. 6 (1948). The statute is called the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange, but it is commonly known as the Smith-Mundt Act after its sponsors Rep. Karl E. Mundt (R-SD) and Sen. H. Alexander Smith (R-N.J.).

307 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No 112-239, 126 Stat. 1632, 1957-59 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1461-1a (2012)). For the original text of the bill that was incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, *see* H.R. 5736, 112th Cong. (2012) ("Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012"). A predecessor to this bill was introduced on July 13, 2010. H.R. 5729, 111th Cong. (2010) ("The Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2010"). The reasons for repeal included the ubiquity of the Internet, which undermined the enforceability of a ban on the domestic dissemination of propaganda, and the desire to counter the message of terrorist groups like Al Shabaab, at home as well as abroad. *See* Sager, *Apple Pie Propaganda?*, *supra* note 305, at 531-537; Daniel C. Walsh, *The History of the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 and Three Arguments for the Termination of Its Prohibition on Domestic Release of Information*, INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y, (Summer 2011).

308 The restrictions on domestic propaganda that remain are not meaningful. *See* Sager, *Apple Pie Propaganda?*, *supra* note 305, at 528-536.

309 *See supra* text accompanying notes 39.

310 2016 CVE GRANT NOFO, *supra* note 36, at 19; LA CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 132, at 6; BOSTON CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 99, at 9; MINNEAPOLIS CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 98, at 5.

311 Simon Lewis, *Google Looks to Divert Extremists With Anti-Radicalization Ads*, TIME, Feb. 2, 2016, <http://time.com/4205555/google-extremist-searches-radicalization-isis/>.

312 Andy Greenberg, *Google's Clever Plan to Stop Aspiring ISIS Recruits*, WIRED, Sept. 7, 2016, <https://www.wired.com/2016/09/googles-clever-plan-stop-aspiring-isis-recruits/>.

313 Felicia Schwartz, *U.S. Targets Would-Be Terrorists Overseas with New Ad Campaign*, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2016, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-targets-would-be-terrorists-overseas-with-new-ad-campaign-1476973216> [hereinafter "WALL ST. J., *U.S. Target's Would Be Terrorists*"].

314 Alex Johnson, *Senate Republicans Want Face Time With Facebook Over Trending Topics 'Bias'*, NBCNEWS.COM,

May 10, 2016, <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/senate-republicans-want-face-time-facebook-over-trending-topics-bias-n571521>. The criticism elicited a quick response from the company, which released its closely-held internal guidelines for selecting Trending Topics. FACEBOOK INC., TRENDING REVIEW GUIDELINES (n.d.), available at <https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/full-trending-review-guidelines.pdf>. It also organized a meeting between Mark Zuckerberg and conservative leaders to reassure them about the platform's neutrality. Alex Johnson & Matthew Deluca, *Facebook's Mark Zuckerberg Meets Conservatives Amid 'Trending' Furor*, NBCNEWS.COM, May 19, 2016, <http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/facebook-s-mark-zuckerberg-meets-conservatives-amid-trending-furor-n576366>. Similarly, when a Google official told the U.K. parliament that the company was looking into making anti-ISIS messages more easily discoverable on its search engine, the company quickly clarified that it was not making changes to its search algorithms, but providing non-profit groups opportunities to promote their messages through the Google Adwords Grant program. Ben Quinn, *Google to Point Extremist Searches Towards Anti-Radicalisation Websites*, GUARDIAN, Feb. 2, 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/feb/02/google-pilot-extremist-anti-radicalisation-information>; Patrick Kulp, *Google Is Now Showing Anti-ISIS Ads to Potential Extremists*, MASHABLE (Feb. 4, 2016), http://mashable.com/2016/02/04/google-is-now-showing-anti-isis-ads-to-potential-extremists/?utm_cid=mash-com-Tw-main-link#RSQQ2liHIqql.

315 Tyler Cherry, *Conservative Media Freak Out Over Facebook's Plan to Address Fake News Problem*, MEDIA MATTERS FOR AMERICA (Dec. 15, 2016, 4:10 PM EST), <http://mediamatters.org/research/2016/12/15/conservative-media-freak-out-over-facebook-s-plan-address-fake-news-problem/214832>.

316 See, e.g., LA CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 143, at 6; BOSTON CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 99, at 9; MINNEAPOLIS CVE FRAMEWORK, *supra* note 98, at 5.

317 Ian Cobain, Alice Ross, Rob Evans & Mona Mahmood, *Revealed: UK's Covert Propaganda Bid to Stop Muslims Joining ISIS*, GUARDIAN, May 2, 2016, <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/may/02/uk-government-covert-propaganda-stop-muslims-joining-isis>.

318 *Id.*

319 In *Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association*, the Supreme Court held that there is no absolute requirement for attribution where government controls the content of a private actor's speech (which may be the case for the CVE counter-messaging campaigns). *Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association*, 544 U.S. 550, 564 (2005). Justice Souter penned a strong dissent in the case arguing that in order for the political process to work, the people need to know when the government is speaking. *Id.* at 575, 577-579 (Souter, J. dissenting). Justices Kennedy and Stevens also dissented. Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit interpreted *Johanns* narrowly, holding that attribution is required for speech controlled by the government. *ACLU of Tenn. v. Bredesen*, 441 F.3d 370, 375-377 (6th Cir. 2006). See also *Kidwell v. City of Union*, 462 F.3d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 2006). A similar position has also been expressed by the Ninth Circuit. *Charter v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture*, 412 F.3d 1017, 1020 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Sager, *Apple Pie Propaganda?*, *supra* note 305, at 544 n. 224, 225; Caroline Mala Corbin, *Mixed Speech: When Speech is Both Private and Governmental*, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 628-640, 662-71 (2008); Carl G. DeNigris, *When Leviathan Speaks: Reining in the Government-Speech Doctrine Through a New and Restrictive Approach*, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 133, 152-56 (2010).

320 The State Department Facebook campaign reportedly reached 6.9 million people and generated 781,000 visits to external sites. In the Jigsaw program described above, some 300,000 people were drawn to "YouTube channels with videos intended to dissuade would-be fighters by featuring Islamic State defectors and other themes." WALL ST. J., *U.S. Target's Would Be Terrorists*, *supra* note 313.

321 *Id.* Even outside the counterterrorism realm, social marketing is often unsuccessful. For example, anti-smoking and other public safety campaigns, disclaimers, disclosures, product warnings, and other corrective advertising often fail to discourage harmful behavior. Petia K. Petrova & Robert Cialdini, *New Approaches Toward Resistance to Persuasion*, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL MARKETING 107 (Gerard Hastings, et

al. eds., 2011); *see also* *Efforts of the National Institute on Drug Abuse to Prevent and Treat Prescription Drug Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, H. Comm. on Government Reform*, 109th Cong. (2009) (statement for the record of Nora Volkow, Dir., Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse, National Inst. of Health, Dep't of Health and Human Services), *available at* <https://www.drugabuse.gov/about-nida/legislative-activities/testimony-to-congress/2006/07/efforts-national-institute-drug-abuse-to-prevent-treat-prescr>; Sally Caswell & Jia-Fang Zhang, *Impact of Liking for Advertising and Brand Allegiance on Drinking and Alcohol Related Aggression: A Longitudinal Study*, 93(8) *ADDICTION* 1209-17 (1998); Cornelia Pechman & Susan J. Knight, *An Experimental Investigation of the Joint Effects of Advertising and Peers on Adolescents' Beliefs and Intentions About Cigarette Consumption*, 29(1) *J. CONSUMER RESEARCH* 5, 13 (2002).

322 HSS STUDY, *supra* note 127, at 1.

323 *Id.* at 16.

324 *See supra* note 127.

325 The FBI has in place guidelines on community outreach and intelligence gathering, the 2013 version of which was obtained by the Brennan Center via a Freedom of Information Act request. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 0575DPG, COMMUNITY OUTREACH IN FIELD OFFICES CORPORATE POLICY DIRECTIVE AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE (March 4, 2013), *available at* <https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/blog/FBI%202013%20Community%20Outreach%20Guidelines%20combined%20w.o%20redactions.pdf> (obtained by the Brennan Center through Freedom of Information Act request). However, these guidelines appear to apply only to its Community Outreach Program and it is not clear whether that part of the Bureau is the one charged with CVE. Moreover, the guidelines do not meaningfully separate community outreach from investigative activities. *See* Michael Price, *FBI Guidelines Weaken Separation of Community Outreach and Intelligence Gathering Efforts*, JUST SEC. (June 8, 2016, 1:02 PM), <https://www.justsecurity.org/31440/fbi-guidelines-weaken-separation-community-outreach-intelligence-gathering-efforts/>.

326 2016 CVE GRANT NOFO, *supra* note 36, at 5.

327 2016 WHITE HOUSE CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 13, at 3.

328 *See* 2016 CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 13, at 5-6; 2016 DHS CVE STRATEGY, *supra* note 32, at 4.

329 *See* 2016 CVE IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, *supra* note 13, at 6; 2016 DHS CVE STRATEGY, *supra* note 32, at 5.

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*Georgetown University
Center for Security Studies
National Security Critical Issues Task Force*

Countering Violent Extremism

Applying the Public Health Model

October 2016

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DHS-001-425-007488
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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the opinion of any individual author's employer and/or the US Government.

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Countering violent extremism (CVE) has become an increasingly important pillar of national security policy in the United States and was even highlighted in the 2015 National Security Strategy as “more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield”.¹ However, CVE is an evolving concept for both policymakers and practitioners alike.² Part of Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies, the National Security Critical Issues Task Force (NSCITF) produced this report to provide a comprehensive framework to better conceptualize and implement of CVE. The NSCITF’s framework for CVE is based on the public health model, which categorizes prevention into primary, secondary, and tertiary activities.³ Using the public health model for CVE, the United States Government (USG) and its partners would be better able to define the CVE mission, assign responsibilities for its implementation, and engage effectively in combined action for its execution.

Summary of Key Findings

1. CVE has an unclear definition, mission, and leadership structure (see page 7).
2. Violent extremism shares risk factors with other social ills, enabling the use of pre-existing capabilities and resources in its prevention (see page 8).
3. A multi-sector and non-discriminatory approach enables a holistic strategy using multiple capabilities (see page 10).
4. Success remains difficult to quantify; the lack of meaningful metrics to evaluate CVE initiatives complicates evidence-based program design and funding decisions (see page 11).

¹ The White House, “2015 National Security Strategy,” (2015).

² See key finding #1.

³ For public health model, see Green, L. A., et al., “Ecology of medical care,” (2001): 5.

The Public Health Model for CVE

The NSCITF selected the public health model framework for CVE because the model emphasizes proactive engagement to evaluate, address, and mitigate the wide-ranging dynamics of violent extremism. As it relates to CVE, the public health model defines strategies and activities using a framework of primary, secondary and tertiary approaches (see page 19):

Primary Prevention is a broad approach directed toward society as a whole. Success at this level mitigates the root causes of extremist behavior by addressing social grievances that can drive populations to violent extremism. Activities of primary prevention include education, health services, social engagement, cultural awareness, and personal development programs.

Secondary Prevention focuses on individuals and groups identified as at-risk for violent extremism. Success at this level stops any radicalization progression and reduces the potential for future radicalization. Activities of secondary prevention include intervention, community engagement, and counter-messaging.

Tertiary Prevention is a targeted approach directed toward radicalized individuals or groups who are actively planning attacks or recruiting for a violent extremist cause. Success at this level prevents violence and neutralizes the individual or group's ability to carry out violence. Activities of tertiary prevention include disengagement, de-radicalization, isolation, and redirection.

Recommendations

1. Adopt the public health model to define, analyze, and implement CVE (see page 21).
2. Identify and communicate a clear CVE leadership structure (see page 21).
3. Define the roles and responsibilities of government agencies and partners with respect to CVE programs (see page 22).
4. Prioritize and make strategic choices on CVE resources and capabilities (see page 22).

II. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF RESEARCH

The NSCITF developed its findings and recommendations through substantive research on existing CVE literature, applied programs, and interviews with experts. Existing literature surveyed included open-source academic, policy, and media reports on CVE, along with strategic plans from USG agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and foreign government studies. The NSCITF researched formal program evaluations and literature on past and current CVE initiatives in over 18 countries, including the United States. The NSCITF also interviewed over 25 policymakers, experts, and program implementers to understand the current perceptions, practices, and challenges in CVE.

The NSCITF examined current CVE practice and policy to understand the CVE mission, its evaluation metrics, and perceptions of violent radicalization. The NSCITF began by examining the various definitions, concepts, and missions as described by policymakers and practitioners. Further, the NSCITF surveyed the causal factors for individuals' radicalization and examined community responses to CVE programs. Additionally, the NSCITF surveyed evaluation metrics currently used by practitioners and policymakers. Beyond traditional CVE frameworks, the NSCITF also surveyed various public health programs to understand if similar activities could apply to CVE.

Several organizations and individuals were also critical to the success of the project. The NSCITF relied on work by other organizations in the field such as the University of Maryland National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, George Washington University's Program on Extremism, the Department of State's Hedayah Center, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Fordham Law Center on National Security, and Georgetown University's previous work on Lone Wolf Terrorism (see bibliography on page 26). The NSCITF also owes a debt of gratitude to the staff of the *Georgetown Security Studies Review*, specifically Editor-in-Chief Robert Morgan Byrne-Diakun, for editing the manuscript of this report.

III. CVE BACKGROUND AND ISSUES

Although the United States' National Security Strategy (NSS) has only recently focused on CVE, European programs and international law established the groundwork for modern CVE in the late 20th century. An early example was the European EXIT program in Norway, Sweden, and Germany during the 1980s that focused on community and law enforcement efforts to dissuade or disengage right wing violent extremists.⁴ Likewise, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe was the first international body to recognize that “tackling root causes of terrorism” was critical in the wake of 9/11, when the United State’s response primarily focused on conventional counterterrorism.⁵ The United Kingdom created one of the first national-level CVE programs to counter homegrown violent extremism in 2006, with a specific emphasis on Islamic extremism.⁶ Although the United States has extensive experience with violent radicals from the Weather Underground to modern Islamic Terrorism, there have been few unified national efforts to counter violent extremism.

In the last five years, however, the USG has sought to unify domestic CVE approaches into an overarching national policy. The first modern U.S. CVE programs began in the mid-2000s with ad-hoc approaches like the Montgomery County Model, an inter-faith NGO-led program, that sought to develop a community-based approach to intervention and de-radicalization.⁷ In 2011, the White House drew national policy attention to these incipient efforts by releasing a strategy document focused on empowering local communities to prevent violent extremism.⁸ Two years later, the United States established three nationally sponsored pilot programs to test community-based CVE efforts in Boston, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles. In 2015, the White House drew international attention to CVE with a summit of international leaders to build awareness of CVE, counter extremist narratives, and emphasize community-led efforts. However, US strategy on CVE remains embryonic, despite its inclusion in the 2015 NSS and the foundation of a joint CVE Task Force in early 2016.⁹

⁴ Demant, Froukje, et al., “Decline and Disengagement: An Analysis of Processes of Deradicalization,” (2008).

⁵ OSCE, “Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization,” (2014).

⁶ Her Majesty’s Government of the United Kingdom, “The Prevent Strategy,” (2011).

⁷ Evans et. al., “Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program,” (2016).

⁸ The White House, “Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners,” (2011).

⁹ Department of Homeland Security, “Countering Violent Extremism Task Force,” (2016).

The United State's hesitance can be attributed to several challenging issues, foremost, that CVE is difficult to define and distinguish from counterterrorism. In its research, the NSCITF found that the USG does not share a specific definition or vision for CVE.¹⁰ While the scope of this report does not include a unified definition, the NSCITF's working definition is that CVE refers to activities that prevent individuals from radicalizing, adopting violent extremist ideologies, and engaging in terrorist activities.¹¹ However, this definition is not universally accepted.¹² CVE's emerging nature means that most programs are loosely defined, locally based, and understand common CVE activities in diverse ways.¹³ Adding to the challenge is the fact that policy and practice inexorably link counterterrorism and CVE such as in several national programs like the UK's Channel.¹⁴ The challenge in defining and distinguishing CVE from other activities is one of the main obstacles to establishing an effective national policy.

Another central challenge is the fact that CVE activities aim to alter the nearly unknowable in dissimilar groups and individuals. At its core, violent extremism is the beliefs, feelings, and behaviors that individuals or groups use to justify violence to achieve political goals.¹⁵ While behaviors are observable, it is intensely difficult to identify beliefs or feelings that will cause future violent behavior.¹⁶ Further, violent radicalization occurs in the extremes of the political spectrum, and includes both secular and religious movements.¹⁷ In the last 30 years, violent radical groups that identified with right wing, new left, single issue and ethno-separatist ideals have all perpetrated violence in the United States.¹⁸ Additionally, individual adherents vary widely in character. Adherents from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have come from various age, gender, socioeconomic, and educational backgrounds.¹⁹ The myriad challenges associated with recognizing a violent extremist make CVE activities challenging to calibrate, concentrate, and prioritize.

¹⁰ See key finding #1.

¹¹ Mastroe, Caitlin and Susan Szmania, "Surveying CVE Metrics in Prevention, Disengagement, and Deradicalization," (2016).

¹² Department of Homeland Security, *DHS Lexicon: Terms and Definitions*, (2016).

¹³ Fink, Romaniuk and Barakat, "Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Programming," (2013).

¹⁴ Hussain, Ghaffar, "Countering Extremism: Learning from the United Kingdom Model," (2015).

¹⁵ McCauley & Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization," (2008).

¹⁶ Taylor, John and Michael Horgan, "A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Processes," (2006).


¹⁷ Bruce Hoffman, interview by authors, 15 June 2016; and Gumbel, Andrew, "Domestic Terrorism Threat in the US," (2015).

¹⁸ Gumbel, Andrew (Ibid); and Southern Poverty Law Center, "SPLC Database on US Hate Groups," (Accessed 2016).

¹⁹ For examples, see Engel, Richard, "ISIS Files: What Leaked Documents Reveal," (2016); and Center on National Security at Fordham Law, "ISIS Cases in the United States," (2015).

Another challenge is that the process of violent radicalization has few universal indicators or attributes. While some research has attempted to develop a universal variable to aggregate radicalization indicators, the broader academic consensus is that several causal mechanisms contribute to individuals embracing political violence.²⁰ The NSCITF found the multi-variable model used by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to be the most compelling model for understanding radicalization. This model identifies five broad factors for radicalization: personal, group, community, sociopolitical, and ideological.²¹ Further frustration, feelings of relative deprivation, and a desire to catalyze a greater movement translate radicalized sentiments to asymmetric political violence.²² These push and pull factors combine as individuals progress through pre-radicalized, seeking, and radicalized phases prior to an attack or the provision of material support to a violent extremist group (see Figure 1). Post-radicalization, some individuals may also pass through disengagement and de-radicalization phases if they transition away from the group. CVE activities are concerned with each one of these phases, despite the challenges inherent in this space.²³

Figure 1: CVE as related to counterterrorism and radicalization phases



²⁰ For discussion, see King, Michael and Donald Taylor, “The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists,” (2011); Silber, M.D. and A. Bhatt, “Radicalization in the West,” (2007); and McCauley & Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization,” (2008).

²¹ Patel, Faiza, “Rethinking Radicalization,” (2011); and Kumar, Ramakrishna, *Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia*, (2014).

²² For examples, see Gurr, Ted, *Why Men Rebel*, (1970): 3-21; and Gaventa, John, *Power and Powerlessness*, (1980): 3-32.

²³ Mastroe, Caitlin and Susan Szmania, “Surveying CVE Metrics in Prevention, Disengagement, and Deradicalization,” (2016).

IV. KEY FINDINGS

1. CVE Has an Unclear Definition, Mission, and Leadership Structure

CVE has an unclear definition, mission, and leadership structure. First, there is no consensus on how to define the CVE mission in the USG (see Figure 2). For instance, the DHS CVE policy focuses on mitigating or preventing terrorist activities, while the Department of State focuses on alleviating root causes. The NSCITF's research into the term CVE and its mission uncovered no single, authoritative definition that encompassed all of its facets. A common definition would allow for better communication between different organizations and individuals. The lack of a cohesive definition causes counterproductive programs and unclear results.²⁴

Without a coherent mission to provide direction, no USG agency can properly take ownership of CVE activities. The absence of organization can result in confusion, poor coordination, a failure to share ideas, and slow decision-making.²⁵ The Obama Administration sought to provide greater national policy leadership by creating the CVE Task Force in January 2016, but an inadequate structure will likely limit its effectiveness. While DHS administers the task force, DoJ jointly shares the leadership role; the two agencies rotate as the lead for the CVE Task Force on an annual basis.²⁶ In addition to differing opinions on CVE's definition, alternating leadership hampers effective action. Several studies of private sector companies demonstrate that long-term leadership enables innovative approaches and sustainable strategies.²⁷

²⁴ McCants, William, and Clint Watts, "US Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism," (2012).

²⁵ Corkindale, Gill, "The Importance of Organizational Design and Structure," (2011).

²⁶ Department of Homeland Security, "Countering Violent Extremism Task Force," (2016).

²⁷ Wesser, Maxwell, "The Most Innovative Companies Have Long-Term Leadership," (2014).

Figure 2: Various USG Agency Descriptions of CVE^{28 29 30 31}

Organization	Description of CVE
Department of Homeland Security	Approach to mitigating or preventing potential terrorist activity; emphasizes the strength of local communities via engagement with a broad range of partners to gain a better understanding of the behaviors, tactics, and other indicators associated with terrorist activity.
Department of Justice	A realm of policy, programs, and interventions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical political, social, cultural, and religious ideologies and groups
Department of State	Conducting proactive actions to address the conditions that enable violent extremist recruitment and radicalization
The White House	The preventative aspects of counterterrorism as well as interventions to undermine the attraction of extremist movements and ideologies that seek to promote violence; efforts address the root causes of extremism through community engagement
US Agency for International Development	Proactive actions to address the conditions that enable violent extremist recruitment and radicalization

2. Violent Extremism Shares Causes and Risk Factors with Other Social Ills


Violent extremism shares risk factors with other social ills, enabling the use of pre-existing capabilities and resources. While individuals embrace political violence for a variety of reasons, complex social issues, such as economic inequality or racial discrimination, increase risk factors for violent extremism.³² Several radicalization models highlight the relative deprivation between an individual’s aspirations and capabilities as significant to violent radicalization.³³ While macro-level factors in society are not the sole reason for feelings of relative deprivation, even individuals who do not directly experience them can have a sympathetic reaction or use the circumstance as justification for violence.³⁴ For instance, Muslim youth in Europe often describe themselves as victims of prejudice in the workplace and in society.³⁵ These attitudes are rooted in reality; a 2006 study by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights found that minorities and immigrants experienced greater levels of unemployment, representation in the least desirable

²⁸ Department of Homeland Security, *DHS Lexicon: Terms and Definitions*, (2016).
²⁹ Weine, Stevan and William Braniff, “Report on the National Summit on Empowering Communities,” (2015).
³⁰ The White House, “Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism,” (2015).
³¹ The Department of State and USAID, “Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism,” (2016).
³² Horgan, John, “From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes,” (2008).
³³ Bjørge, Tore, “Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality, and Ways Forward,” (2005).
³⁴ Denoeux, Guilain and Lynn Carter, “Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism,” (2009): 63-67.
³⁵ Stern, Jessica, “Mind Over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists,” (2010).

jobs, and received disproportionately low wages.³⁶ While structural social issues can simply increase gang participation, criminal activity, and drug abuse, in some cases these causes can be motivations for violent radicalization.³⁷

Since violent extremism shares some risk factors with other social ills, opportunities exist to use pre-existing capabilities and resources. Violent extremism originates in part from basic human needs and well-established prevention programs that target other social ills can be effective for CVE efforts.³⁸ For example, working to reduce unemployment will modify the risk for participation in both gangs and violent extremist organizations in a particular community.³⁹ While such cause and effect relationships require scrutiny, the similarity in causal factors between violent extremism and other social ills suggests existing social prevention work influences CVE.⁴⁰ The primary and secondary levels of prevention across these social ills have overlapping and mutually reinforcing prevention methods that can limit the impact of violent extremism. The tertiary prevention methods diverge as the social ills become more acute (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Other social ills as related to public health model for CVE



³⁶ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Report on Racism and Xenophobia,” (2007).

³⁷ World Health Organization, “Global Status Report on Violence Prevention,” (2014); Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, “Violence in the Community,” (1998); and Laila Alwala, interview by the authors, July 11, 2016.

³⁸ Horgan, John, Paul Gill, et al., “A Comparative Analysis of Violent Behavior and Radicalization,” (2016).

³⁹ Branz, Barbara, “Europe’s Muslim Youth: An Inquiry Into the Politics of Discrimination,” (2007).

⁴⁰ Laila Alwala, interview by authors, July 11, 2016.

3. A Multi-Sector and Non-Discriminatory Approach is Necessary

A collaborative, multi-sector approach to CVE enables a holistic strategy that uses multiple capabilities to counter violent extremism from different approaches. As no single cause has been proven to drive violent extremist behavior, effective CVE approaches must account for numerous risk factors, such as poverty, low education, and social exclusion.⁴¹ For example, the Luta Pela Paz (Fight for Peace) program in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil utilizes a multi-sector approach that addresses and alleviates causes for extremist violence. The program serves as a vehicle for prevention measures such as education, social events, job training, and job placement services. Importantly, Luta Pela Paz thrives on multi-sector support from the community, government, and local businesses.

The program's holistic approach has had a positive effect.⁴² Formerly at-risk for gang-involvement, participants are graduating secondary school, taking jobs, and contributing positively to the community. Despite differences between gang participation and violent extremism, Luta Pela Paz's multi-sector approach demonstrates an approach that can be applied almost directly to CVE. Communities with high risk factors for radicalization will benefit greatly from the social network, conflict resolution, physical activity, and educational opportunities afforded by similar programs.

CVE efforts must be non-discriminatory; programs directed at specific communities and populations can increase an individual's inclination to turn to radical ideologies by reinforcing an insider-outsider mentality.⁴³ In many cases, extremists conceptualize their violence as a means to address grievances against the government, society, or a competing worldview.⁴⁴ As such, discriminatory approaches can increase the risk for radicalization for at-risk individuals.⁴⁵ Additionally, discriminatory approaches can miss real threats that do not fit a standard profile. Shannon Conley, a young white woman and recent convert to Islam, was arrested after attempting to join ISIL in Syria.⁴⁶ Since US CVE efforts often focus primarily on Muslim communities, individuals like Shannon Conley are often overlooked.

⁴¹ Shader, Michael, "Risk Factors for Delinquency," (2004).

⁴² Sport for Development and Peace International Working Group, "From the Field," (2007).

⁴³ Mandel, David R., "Radicalization What Does it Mean?" (2009).

⁴⁴ Bandura, Albert, "The Origins and Consequences of Moral Disengagement," (2004): 121.

⁴⁵ Gurr, Ted, *Why Men Rebel*, (1970).

⁴⁶ Morrison, Aaron, "Islamic State Recruit Shannon Conley," (2015).

The World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE) in Montgomery County, Maryland is another example of a successful multi-sector, non-discriminatory approach. WORDE developed a community-based initiative known as Build Resistance Against Violent Extremism (BRAVE). The model seeks to engage a broad range of community stakeholders; provide education about violent extremism; connect vulnerable individuals with necessary resources; and establish a framework for successful crisis intervention.⁴⁷ A broad network of individuals and organizations participate in BRAVE, regardless of their race, gender, and religious backgrounds. An empirical program evaluation found that the BRAVE model has a positive effect on 12 of 14 CVE-related indicators in individuals and reduced some barriers to intervention among peer groups and the community.⁴⁸

4. Success is Difficult to Quantify

It remains difficult to correlate inputs with outputs to demonstrate the success of CVE programs to policymakers. As CVE focuses on prevention, success is a “non-event.” Also, most prevention methods are only loosely tied to CVE because the primary and secondary levels of prevention affect other social programs along with CVE.⁴⁹ Without meaningful data or metrics, it is difficult to justify funding and political support for CVE.

Despite the difficulties associated with quantifying CVE outcomes, NSCITF interviews and panel discussions repeatedly echoed the need for evidence-based approaches to CVE programming.⁵⁰ Measures of success are also critical for securing taxpayer funding and the necessary resources for program development or implementation.⁵¹ This consideration is especially time-sensitive as community organizations are already ‘re-branding’ current development work as CVE without tailoring programs to achieve positive CVE outcomes.⁵² While many primary prevention strategies are general purpose, simply changing language in grant requests for existing programs is unlikely to produce effective efforts. NSCITF interviews with CVE practitioners also revealed concerns over unclear definitions of the CVE mission and

⁴⁷ Manger, Thomas and Hedieh Mirahmadi, “The Montgomery County Model,” (2013).

⁴⁸ Evans, William P., et. al., “Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, US Community Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program,” (2016).

⁴⁹ Ryan Greer, interview by authors, July 12, 2016; and Bruce Hoffman, interview by authors, 15 June 2016.

⁵⁰ Ryan Greer, interview by the authors, July 12, 2016; and Amy Pope, interview with authors, June 24, 2016.

⁵¹ Mastroe, Caitlin and Susan Szmania, “Surveying CVE Metrics in Prevention, Disengagement, and Deradicalization,” (2016).

⁵² See key finding #1.

associated activities because it could result in misspent resources. As an example, a practitioner in a prominent international development organization was concerned that as interest and funding for CVE increases, the international development community will simply rebrand on-going projects to fit the CVE mission.⁵³

As evidenced by other social development fields that share causal factors with CVE, systematic empirical studies can uncover meaningful metrics to enable incremental program improvements.⁵⁴ Successful programs that seek to alleviate other social violence issues have been implemented, researched, and improved.⁵⁵ Practitioners and policymakers alike will benefit from clearly identifying best practices social health metrics, applying those principles in CVE pilot programs, and then scaling successful practices from pilot programs to broader CVE efforts. CVE stakeholders should gradually institutionalize and expand upon lessons learned from other social health programs as a public health approach is adopted for CVE.

⁵³ Hal Ferguson, interview by authors, June 25, 2016.

⁵⁴ See key finding #2.

⁵⁵ Mastroe, Caitlin and Susan Szmania, "Surveying CVE Metrics in Prevention, Disengagement, and Deradicalization," (2016): 4-12.

V. PUBLIC HEALTH MODEL FRAMEWORK FOR CVE

Framing CVE programs within the public health prevention model is a useful structure for evaluating and addressing the wide-ranging dynamics of violent extremism.⁵⁶ This model is a proven and proactive approach in the health sector than can be applied to violent extremism to clarify the mission and evaluate methods throughout the radicalization process.⁵⁷ The primary, secondary, and tertiary levels of prevention within the public health model categorize the programs and services employed to prevent violent extremism and mitigate its impact on a community, while also treating the victims and perpetrators to mitigate the problem comprehensively.

Normally, healthcare professionals apply the public health model to prevent and mitigate medical issues. For example, primary prevention for heart disease includes education about healthy eating habits; encouraging regular exercise; and discouraging smoking for the general populace. Secondary prevention identifies at-risk individuals with high blood pressure, family history, and previous strokes or heart attacks for stricter diet and exercise programs combined with medication. For individuals diagnosed with heart disease, tertiary prevention implements tailored cardiac or stroke rehabilitation programs to manage associated long-term health issues.⁵⁸

Similar to the public health model, the NSCITF model defines strategies using a framework of primary, secondary and tertiary approaches. It seeks to address the radicalization process progressively with joint programs that organize multiple efforts in time and space. The model is most concerned with the radicalization factors highlighted by the NCTC/FBI model.⁵⁹ This framework also supports clarifying the CVE mission and leadership through synchronization while using a multi-sector and non-discriminatory approach to include more stakeholders.⁶⁰ When de-conflicting by mission and purpose as proscribed in the public health model, increasing the number of stakeholders can be done without obscuring the central purpose.⁶¹ Much as in the traditional public health model, overall success is reduction in the

⁵⁶ See key finding #2 and key finding #3.

⁵⁷ Weine, Stevan and David Eisenman, "How Public Health Can Improve Initiatives to Counter Violent Extremism," (2016).

⁵⁸ Institute for Work and Health, "What Researchers Mean By Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary Prevention," (2016).

⁵⁹ Patel, Faiza, "Rethinking Radicalization," (2011); and Ramakrishna, Kumar, *Islamist Terror and Militancy in Indonesia*, (2014).

⁶⁰ See key finding #1 and key finding #3.

⁶¹ Rainey, Hal and Paula Steinbauer, "Developing Element of a Theory of Effective Government Organizations," (1999).

number of incidents rather than eliminating the disease.⁶² Reducing the magnitude of the problem with success in primary and secondary prevention reduces the risk and resource burden from counterterrorism approaches. For example, after local officials in Aarhus, Denmark implemented a CVE program, the number of foreign fighters dropped from 34 in 2012 to one in 2015.⁶³

CVE Primary Prevention

CVE primary prevention is a broad approach directed toward society as a whole. Activities in primary prevention include education, health services, social engagement, cultural awareness, and personal development programs that seek to address sociopolitical, group, and community factors for violent radicalization.⁶⁴ This level of prevention is effective because its holistic approach has a low risk of stigmatizing communities since it avoids targeting specific groups of people.⁶⁵ Success at this level mitigates the root causes of violent extremism before groups or individuals become at-risk often through implementing programs that address basic human needs (see Figure 4).

Examples of primary preventions tools for CVE:

- *Education*: Critical thinking courses, extracurricular programs, scholarships, ethics and civic engagement courses.
- *Health services*: Mental healthcare, improved access to care, and affordable healthcare options.
- *Social engagement*: Democracy-building, local governance initiatives, and criminal justice reform.
- *Cultural awareness*: Sensitivity training, interfaith dialogues, and cross-cultural engagement.
- *Personal development*: Job training, counseling services, and language skill development.

⁶² Center for Disease Control, “The Public Health Approach to Violence Prevention,” (2016).

⁶³ Agerschou, Toke, “Preventing Radicalization and Discrimination in Aarhus,” (2014); and Rosin, Hannah, “How a Danish Town Helped Young Muslims Turn Away from ISIS,” (2016).

⁶⁴ See Section III.

⁶⁵ Weine, Stevan and David Eisenman, “How Public Health Can Improve Initiatives to Counter Violent Extremism,” (2016).

CVE Secondary Prevention

CVE secondary prevention is a focused approach directed toward individuals and groups identified as at-risk for violent extremism. Activities in secondary prevention include intervention, community engagement, and counter-messaging programs. Typically, individuals and groups in this category have exposure to extremist ideologies or radical social networks.⁶⁶ At-risk individuals may be in the searching phase in the radicalization continuum and can exhibit noticeable behavioral changes.⁶⁷ Bystanders with close personal connections to the individual—often family, friends, or teachers—are those most likely to notice relevant changes in the individual’s behavior; observation and reporting from these bystanders remains critical.⁶⁸ Law enforcement agencies can most sustainably access critical bystander observations by creating partnerships that build trust in communities while limiting intrusive searches for radicalization indications.⁶⁹ These partnerships can increase community resilience and potentially build community-led intervention forces that include law enforcement.⁷⁰ Bystander education and access to trained specialists also increases the chances for success at this level.⁷¹ Success at the secondary level stops the radicalization progression and reduces future radicalization potential (see Figure 4).

Examples of secondary prevention tools for CVE:

- *Intervention:* Mentorship, counseling, training on warning signs, mediation, and off-ramps.
- *Community Engagement:* Trust-building between communities and law enforcement, CVE education centers, CVE support hotlines, and community resilience programs.
- *Counter-messaging:* Real-time campaigns against extremist messages, nodal messaging to key influencers, and undermining the appeal of violent extremist messages.

⁶⁶ Weine, Stevan and David Eisenman, “How Public Health Can Improve Initiatives to Counter Violent Extremism,” (2016).

⁶⁷ Smith, Brent, Kelly Dampousse, and Paxton Roberts, “Pre-Incident Indicators of Terrorist Incidents,” (2006).

⁶⁸ Malik, Mohammed, “I Reported Oman Mateen to the FBI,” (2016); and Mazzetti, Mark, Eric Lichtbalu, and Alan Blinder, “Omar Mateen: Twice Scrutinized by the FBI, Shows Threats of Lone Terrorists,” (2016).

⁶⁹ Schanzer, David, Charles Kurzman, Jessica Toliver, and Elizabeth Miller, “The Challenge and Promise of Using Community Policing Strategies,” (2016).

⁷⁰ U.S-Islamic World Forum, “Annual Report: 2014,” (2014).

⁷¹ Weine, Stevan and David Eisenman, “How Public Health Can Improve Initiatives to Counter Violent Extremism,” (2016).

CVE Tertiary Prevention

CVE tertiary prevention is a targeted approach directed toward radicalized individuals or groups who may be actively committing, planning, or recruiting for a violent extremist cause.⁷² In this radicalization phase, some individuals may no longer be susceptible to CVE methods; counterterrorism approaches may be more applicable for those who have already radicalized.⁷³ For individuals that are susceptible to CVE, early intervention is critical to enable non-judicial approaches before the radicalized individual can commit criminal actions.⁷⁴ After the individual commits criminal acts, decision makers must balance CVE activities like disengagement and de-radicalization with the need to enforce laws. At the tertiary level, significant law enforcement, community and intelligence assets must be committed to each individual extremist to ensure success. Employing tailored resources—such as de-radicalized former extremists, psychologists, religious authorities, and skilled community members—should also aid in disengagement or support prosecution, if necessary.⁷⁵ Tertiary prevention methods are tailored specifically to CVE and include disengagement, de-radicalization, isolation, and redirection. Activities in the tertiary level are not multi-purpose and they cannot be applied to other social ills as is possible in the primary and secondary levels. Since risks and resource costs are highest at this level, emphasizing primary and secondary prevention could be more effective.⁷⁶ Success at the tertiary level prevents violence and neutralizes the individual or group’s ability to carry out violence in the future (see Figure 4).

Examples of tertiary prevention tools for CVE:

- *Disengagement and De-radicalization*: Abandoning radical groups, altering extremist beliefs, emphasizing mitigation efforts, and using the threat of imprisonment as leverage to convince radicalized people to pursue de-radicalization programs.
- *Isolation and Redirection*: Exiling individuals and preventing individuals from carrying-out attacks and influencing others.

⁷² Weine, Stevan and David Eisenman, “How Public Health Can Improve Initiatives to Counter Violent Extremism,” (2016).


⁷³ Bruce Hoffman, interview by authors, June 15, 2016.

⁷⁴ Vidino, Lorenzo, and Seamus Hughes, “Countering Violent Extremism in America,” (2015); Rosand, Eric, “Taking the Off-Ramp,” (2016).

⁷⁵ Andrews, D.A. et al., “Does Correctional Treatment Work?” (1990); Gendreau, Paul, et al., “A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism,” (1996); and Boghani, Priyanka, “De-Radicalization is Coming to America,” (2016).

⁷⁶ Weine, Stevan and David Eisenman, “How Public Health Can Improve Initiatives to Counter Violent Extremism,” (2016).

Figure 4: Public health model for CVE



VI. APPLYING THE PUBLIC HEALTH MODEL TO CVE

Applying the public health model can help policymakers and implementers direct research and analysis to improve CVE programs and initiatives. The United States government is currently sponsoring three CVE pilot programs in Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis.⁷⁷ All three programs individually emphasize different levels of prevention for CVE and therefore they each have gaps that are highlighted by the public health model for CVE. Since the programs are new, no formal evaluations have yet assessed their success or failure. The model provides a framework to further study these efforts, while suggesting ways to expand programming and better synchronize multiple efforts.

Boston Framework⁷⁸

The Boston Framework functions as a foundation to help communities identify problems and develop solutions to prevent individuals from committing violent extremist acts. Among the three pilot programs, the Boston Framework places the strongest emphasis on primary prevention. Four of the seven problems and solutions proposed by the framework are primary prevention activities. The community identified the potential isolation of youth, grievances with US foreign policy, distrust in local government, and a lack of individual cultural sensitivity as the potential risk factors for their program. Boston's primary prevention initiatives sought to address these root problems by focusing on developing personal and interpersonal skills; increasing access to mental health services; developing engagement networks through mentorship; and training law enforcement, teachers, and parents.

Though emphasized to a lesser extent, the Boston Framework encourages communities to consider secondary and tertiary prevention measures. For secondary prevention, the Boston Framework advocates community education and media engagement on violent racial and religious narratives. Finally, Boston's tertiary prevention activities emphasize disengagement through intervention and crisis management planning as well as de-radicalization through comprehensive resources and better understanding.

⁷⁷ See Section II.

⁷⁸ United States Attorney's Office, "A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies," (2015).

Los Angeles Framework⁷⁹

In contrast to the Boston Framework, which provides guidelines on CVE program implementation, the Los Angeles Framework for CVE is an action plan that focuses heavily on tertiary efforts, though it does include some secondary prevention strategies. The three pillars of the Los Angeles Framework are *Prevention*, *Intervention*, and *Interdiction*.

Most *Prevention* measures in the Los Angeles Framework are secondary CVE efforts that focus on targeting at-risk individuals and groups through community engagement. Specific secondary prevention activities include hosting public forums, town halls, interfaith events, as well as forming community advisory boards to address community needs. Few actions described in Los Angeles' *Prevention* pillar—such as plans to improve social service delivery—could be classified as primary prevention activities within the public health model for CVE.

The Los Angeles Framework has also developed tertiary prevention strategies for how to deal with individuals once they have radicalized but before they have committed violence. Los Angeles' *Intervention* pillar focuses on off-ramps—described as the process of deflecting a radicalizing individual away from violence through a full-scope application of community resources.⁸⁰ The ultimate goal of the program is to rehabilitate individuals to full social participation. Finally, the Los Angeles Framework also includes the *Interdiction* pillar, which focuses on efforts to arrest and potentially prosecute unrepentant individuals when other prevention efforts have failed.

Minneapolis Framework⁸¹

The Minneapolis Framework focuses specifically on countering radicalization in the Somali community. The framework identifies potential root causes of radicalization as the disaffection of youth; disconnects between youth and religious leaders; internal identity crises; community isolation; and a lack of economic opportunity. Solutions to these problems include community engagement between law enforcement and Somali Minnesotans; prevention programs targeted to at-risk Somali youth; and school and community-led intervention programs.

⁷⁹ Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group, “The Los Angeles Framework for Countering Violent Extremism,” (2015).

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ United States Attorney's Office, “Building Community Resilience Minneapolis-St. Paul Pilot Program,” (2015).

Within the framework, the majority of initiatives are secondary prevention measures aimed at building better law enforcement and community engagement. The strategy does not contain many tertiary or primary prevention efforts and focuses more narrowly on engaging at-risk populations. However, some intervention components, specifically those targeted at radicalized individuals, could overlap into tertiary prevention. While primary prevention is not the framework's focus, some measures could be considered primary prevention such as after-school activities, education scholarships, and mentoring programs.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Adopt the Public Health Model for CVE to Define, Analyze and Implement CVE.

A lack of consensus on CVE's definition and activities creates a less than ideal organizing construct for the mission of countering violent extremism. The USG can clarify roles and responsibilities by adopting the public health model, leading to a more direct mission set and precise chain of command. Outside the USG, the public health model can encourage non-discriminatory support from interested parties in a way that bolsters government efforts.⁸²

The model identifies who should be involved at various phases in the radicalization process and encourages the application and use of pre-existing prevention efforts. Decision makers can also utilize the model to determine where their organization fits within the CVE prevention spectrum. Once established, stakeholders reduce redundancy by redirecting resources from already-saturated CVE areas to achieve maximum efficiency.

The model would also help identify existing resources for CVE and support decision-making.⁸³ Analyzing and communicating the CVE problem as a public health issue also helps avoid managing incident response with exclusively law enforcement mechanisms. Once an individual or group is identified along the spectrum, decision makers can determine appropriate courses of action to prevent violent radicalization that balances risk with preserving critical assets in other prevention areas such as community support for CVE efforts.

2. Identify and Communicate a Clear Leadership for CVE.

Since CVE involves stakeholders across the USG and private sector, and is difficult to quantify, identifying leadership in various functional areas will aid in synchronizing cross-societal efforts.⁸⁴ Once identified, a shared understanding of leadership enables stakeholders to vigorously pursue strategies within their respective areas. Despite recent efforts to impose more structure on CVE at the national policy level, the NSCITF's research and interviews suggest that synchronized effort is currently lacking.⁸⁵ Within the USG and NGOs, confusion over the

⁸² See key finding #3.

⁸³ See key finding #3.

⁸⁴ See key finding #1 and key finding #4.

⁸⁵ See Section II.

definition of CVE has led to reluctance to participate. Some NGOs are reluctant to engage in CVE due to concern over legal protections and unclear government policy.⁸⁶ Some community leaders likewise cite unclear policy and legal protections as reasons to limit involvement with CVE.⁸⁷ Adopting the public health model for CVE can alleviate some confusion, but clear leadership and policy will allow stakeholders to engage in synchronized CVE.

Further, having a clear leadership and accountability structure will help maintain the critical relationship between the community and law enforcement. NSCITF research indicates that the community relationship with law enforcement is a critical variable in preventing violence.⁸⁸ While law enforcement capabilities can complement CVE at all levels, overutilization can exacerbate the leading triggers for radical behavior while undermining community trust and willingness to cooperate with CVE.⁸⁹

3. Define the Roles and Responsibilities of Government Agencies and Partners.

Defining the roles and responsibilities of government agencies and partners enables increased participation by non-government stakeholders as CVE expands. Delineating legal and policy frameworks provides space for multiple stakeholder participation. With clearly delineated lines of effort, local communities with intimate knowledge of at-risk individuals in their area can better marshal resources and pursue prevention activities. Failing to clearly define roles and responsibilities can cause redundant efforts and gaps throughout CVE. Using the public health model for CVE supports visualizing the balance between top-down synchronization at the national level, and community bottom-up refinement based on local knowledge.⁹⁰

4. Prioritize and Make Strategic Choices About CVE Resources and Strategies

Stakeholders should use CVE activities as a strategic means to maximize the impact of scarce resources. After the attacks of 9/11, the USG increased spending on domestic

⁸⁶ Thompson, Rep. Bennie G., “FBI Shared Responsibility Committees Must Pass Privacy Test,” (2016).

⁸⁷ Stern, Jessica, “Mind Over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists,” (2010); Currier, Cora and Murtaza Hussain, “Letters Details FBI Plan,” (2016); and Hoffman, Bruce et al., “The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century,” (2015).

⁸⁸ Bruce Hoffman, interview by authors, June 15, 2016; and Mastroe, Caitlin, “Evaluating CVE: Understanding Recent Changes,” (2016).

⁸⁹ Boorstein, Michelle, “Muslim Activists Alarmed by the FBI,” (2015); and Goldman, Adam, “An American Family Saved Their Son From Joining the Islamic State,” (2015).

⁹⁰ Mastroe, Caitlin, “Evaluating CVE: Understanding Recent Changes,” (2016).

counterterrorism by an estimated \$75 billion per year.⁹¹ With uncertain but potentially high costs and risks for a terrorist, this spending would seem to be justified.⁹² However, most of this spending is associated with monitoring and preventing threats that may never come to fruition.⁹³ Further, the profusion of threats makes it difficult to allocate scarce resources. Former CIA Director George Tenet noted in his memoir that, “you could drive yourself crazy believing all or even half,” of the thousands of threats that were cataloged on a daily basis.⁹⁴ Successfully executed CVE provides the opportunity to reduce the volume of credible threats and burden on scarce counterterrorism resources. Even if CVE only limits the number of easily dissuaded extremists, this enables stakeholders to focus greater effort on fewer cases.

While CVE’s benefits will often be uncertain, there are several instances where they have had appreciable effect. Resources devoted to primary and secondary prevention methods can reduce ‘push factors’ towards violent extremism.⁹⁵ The Danish CVE model supplements tertiary approaches using intelligence and law enforcement with primary and secondary measures such as youth counseling, mentorship, and community outreach.⁹⁶ Aarhus’ local program has treated over 330 pre-radicalized individuals and 18 returned foreign fighters, and is associated with a significant drop in Danish foreign fighters in the past few years. While the Danish program has not been formally evaluated, other secondary CVE programs like the Montgomery County Model have had a quantifiably positive effect on individual behaviors and norms.⁹⁷ Supplementing tertiary approaches with effective secondary and primary activities can be an effective means to reduce the scope of the problem.

⁹¹ Mueller, John and Mark Stewart, “Evaluating Counterterrorism Spending,” (2014).

⁹² Zycher, Benjamin, “A Preliminary Benefit/Cost Framework for Counterterrorism Public Expenditures,” (2003).

⁹³ Bjelopera, Jerome, *Countering Violent Extremism in the United States*, (2014).

⁹⁴ Tenet, George, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years At the CIA*, (2007).

⁹⁵ United States Agency for International Development, “Guide to Drivers of Violent Extremism,” (2009).

⁹⁶ Hemmingsen, Ann-Sophie, “The Danish Approach to Countering and Preventing Extremists and Radicalization,” (2015).

⁹⁷ Evans, William P., et. al., “Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, US Community Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program,” (2016).

APPENDIX A — TERMS AND ACRONYMS

Acronym / Term	Meaning
BRAVE	Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism CVE generally refers to policies and programs that seek to prevent individuals from radicalizing, adopting violent extremist ideologies, and engaging in terrorist activities. However, the NSCITF found no authoritative, unified definition of the term CVE in its research.
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
DoS	Department of State
EDU	Department of Education
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
MCM	Montgomery County Model
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NCTC/FBI radicalization model	Identifies five broad factors for radicalization: personal, group, community, sociopolitical, and ideological
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSS	United States National Security Strategy
NSCITF	National Security Critical Issues Task Force, part of Georgetown University' Center for Security Studies
Public health model for CVE	Divides CVE activities into <i>primary</i> , <i>secondary</i> , and <i>tertiary</i> categories based on the public health model for categorizing preventative treatment.
OSCE	Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe
Public health model for CVE Primary Prevention	A broad CVE approach directed toward society as a whole.
Public health model for CVE Secondary Prevention	A focused approach directed toward individuals and groups identified as at-risk for violent extremism.
Public health model for CVE Tertiary Prevention	A targeted approach directed toward radicalized individuals or groups who are actively committing to and recruiting for a violent extremist cause or planning an attack.
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

USG	United States Government
Violent extremism	Violent extremism is the beliefs and behaviors of individuals or groups that use violence to achieve political goals. It is distinct from criminal violence, nonpolitical violence, and non-violent activity.
WORDE	World Organizations for Resource Development and Education

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**Compiled by The Office of the CVE Coordinator
February 20, 2015**



DHS Office of the CVE Coordinator

MEDIA REPORT

White House Countering Violent Extremism Summit

Coverage: Events on February 17-18, 2015

**Compiled by The Office of the CVE Coordinator
February 20, 2015**

**Compiled by The Office of the CVE Coordinator
February 20, 2015**



The White House
February 19, 2015

TEXT: [Remarks by the President at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism | Feb 19.](#)

VIDEO: [President Obama Speaks at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.](#)

TWITTER: @WhiteHouse: "When people are oppressed and human rights are denied...when dissent is silenced, it feeds violent extremism" —President Obama #CVESummit



The White House
February 18, 2015

TEXT: [Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism | Feb 18.](#)

VIDEO: [President Obama Speaks at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.](#)

BLOG: [President Obama on the Causes and Antidotes to Violent Extremism.](#)

BLOG: [RE: LA Times Op-Ed: President Obama: "Our Fight Against Violent Extremism".](#)

FACT SHEET: [The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.](#)

Los Angeles Times

[President Obama: Our fight against violent extremism](#)

February 17, 2015, 11:03 p.m.

“In the face of this challenge, we must stand united internationally and here at home. We know that military force alone cannot solve this problem. Nor can we simply take out terrorists who kill innocent civilians. We also have to confront the violent extremists — the propagandists, recruiters and enablers — who may not directly engage in terrorist acts themselves, but who radicalize, recruit and incite others to do so.”



February 18, 2015

VIDEO: [Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, Secretary Jeh Johnson Remarks](#)

**Compiled by The Office of the CVE Coordinator
February 20, 2015**

The New York Times

[U.S. Muslims Take On ISIS' Recruiting Machine](#)

February 19, 2015

“Imam Magid, speaking upstairs at his Muslim center while a team of Muslim girls pounded out a basketball game below, said that real prevention meant programs that give young people as much purpose and inspiration as extremists promise. Once young Muslims buy into the ideology, he said, it is very hard to pry them loose. “You have to reach them before it happens,” he said.”



[Obama proclaims: 'We are not at war with Islam'](#)

February 19, 2015

““We are not at war with Islam. We are at war with people who have perverted Islam,” Obama said during his remarks, adding later that Muslim leaders “need to do more to discredit the notion that our nations are determined to suppress Islam.”



[LA's Counter-Extremism Efforts Highlighted at CVE Summit](#)

February 19, 2015

“In Los Angeles, groups like the Muslim Public Affairs Counsel have already implemented programs namely, the Safe Spaces Initiative - aimed at reaching at-risk young people. The Department of Homeland Security and the FBI have also been working with LAPD to deter radicalization since the Fall of 2014.”



[Twin Cities Delegation Attends Washington Summit to Discuss Terror Recruiting](#)

February 19, 2015

“Richard Thornton, head of the Minnesota FBI, spoke at the summit and put it plainly: Minnesota has a problem. Young Somali men and women are leaving the state to join two specific terrorist groups: al-Shabaab or the Islamic State. He said he’s not trying to scare anyone but that this is a fact.”

The New York Times

[Obama: Countering Violent Extremism Depends on Muslim Support](#)

February 18, 2015

“Muslim leaders need to do more to discredit the notion that our nations are determined to suppress Islam,” Obama said, referring to the narrative from Islamic militants that Western nations are in a war against Islam.”

The New York Times

[Obama: US at War With Those Who Have Perverted Islam](#)

February 18, 2015

“While putting the blame on IS and similar groups — Obama said the militants masquerade as religious leaders but are really terrorists — the president also appealed directly to prominent Muslims to do more to distance themselves from brutal ideologies. He said all have a duty to “speak up very clearly” in opposition to violence against innocent people.”

The New York Times

[Faulted for Avoiding ‘Islamic’ Labels to Describe Terrorism, White House Cites a Strategic Logic](#)

February 18, 2015

“But Mr. Obama said that “we must never accept the premise that they put forward, because it is a lie.” The operatives of Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, “are not religious leaders — they’re terrorists,” he said.”



RONAN FARROW DAILY

February 18, 2015

VIDEO: [Battling Hometown Terror](#)

“As the White House takes on terror with a new counter-extremism summit, two attendees join us - including one Somali-American City Council Member from Minneapolis who’s seen homegrown radicalization firsthand.”

**Compiled by The Office of the CVE Coordinator
February 20, 2015**



[Obama: We're Fighting Violent Extremism, Not a Religion](#)

February 18, 2015

““Groups like al Qaeda and ISIL promote a twisted interpretation of religion that is rejected by the overwhelming majority of the world’s Muslims. The world must continue to lift up the voices of Muslim clerics and scholars who teach the true peaceful nature of Islam,” he wrote. “We can echo the testimonies of former extremists who know how terrorists betray Islam. We can help Muslim entrepreneurs and youths work with the private sector to develop social media tools to counter extremist narratives on the Internet.””



[Minnesota Officials, Imams Talk up Community Outreach at White House](#)

February 18, 2015

“Minnesota law enforcement, politicians and Muslim leaders gathered Wednesday at the White House to tout a nascent, community-backed program as a model for attempts to prevent youths from being swept away to fight with jihadist groups abroad. Sharing a stage with authorities from Paris, Boston and Los Angeles at the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, the Minnesota leaders stressed the early successes of the new pilot project.”



[Minnesota's Anti-terror Efforts Draw White House Interest](#)

February 18, 2015

““What my community, the Somali-American community, needs today is no less than a Marshall Plan tailor-made to the community's employment challenges," Minneapolis City Council Member Abdi Warsame said as he described the poverty and lack of upward mobility that help drive radicalization.”



[Obama: We are not at war with Islam](#)

February 18, 2015

“Obama also painted the campaign against radicalization and extremism as "ultimately a battle for hearts and minds" in an opinion piece published Wednesday in the Los Angeles Times. He added that the focus of the summit would be on ways to empower local communities.”

**Compiled by The Office of the CVE Coordinator
February 20, 2015**

**Compiled by The Office of the CVE Coordinator
February 20, 2015**



VIDEO: [Obama Counters 'Violent Extremism' in Speech](#)

February 18, 2015

“Speaking at his summit on countering violent extremism Wednesday, Obama sought to strike a balance between appealing for more acceptance of Muslim-Americans while emphasizing the need to remain vigilant against radicals who could turn violent.”



VIDEO: [White House has Summit to Stop Violent Extremism](#)

February 18, 2015

“CNN's Wolf Blitzer talks with Nabil Elaraby, Arab League Secretary-General about the White House summit to stop violent extremism.”



[Obama: Countering Violent Extremism Depends on Muslim Support](#)

February 18, 2015

“President Barack Obama on Wednesday called on American Muslim communities to do more to counter what he called "violent extremism," speaking at a three-day White House summit on the issue.”



[Boston Civic Leaders In Washington To Discuss Violent Extremism](#)

February 18, 2015

“It’s a summit drawing people from around the country, including Boston, to look at ways to counter violent extremism: to ask, what compels young people to join violent causes? And how can we prevent them from attacking the U.S. or going overseas to fight?”

**Compiled by The Office of the CVE Coordinator
February 20, 2015**

**Compiled by The Office of the CVE Coordinator
February 20, 2015**

The Washington Post

[Obama: US at War With Those Who Have Perverted Islam](#)

February 18, 2015

“Yet the argument over terminology has increasingly become a distraction, including this week as Obama gathered law enforcement officials, Muslim leaders and lawmakers for a three-day summit on violent extremism. In his remarks Wednesday, Obama acknowledged it was a touchy subject but insisted it was critical to tackle the issue “head-on.””

The Washington Post

[Obama Announces Initiatives to Curb Recruitment of Terrorist Groups](#)

February 18, 2015

“Even as the country wages this fight, Obama concluded that Americans should not lose sight of the fact that Muslims are an integral part of U.S. society. He recalled how he recently received a Valentine’s Day card from an 11-year-old named Sabrina who wrote to him, “I am worried about people hating Muslims. If some Muslims do bad things, that doesn’t mean all of them do.””



[Obama: Don’t Grant Terrorists Legitimacy by Labeling Them Islamic](#)

February 18, 2015

““Of course the terrorists do not speak for a billion Muslims who reject their hateful ideology,” he said. “They no more represent Islam than any madman who kills innocents in the name of God represents Christianity or Judaism or Buddhism or Hinduism. No religion is responsible for terrorism. People are responsible for violence and terrorism.””

Los Angeles Times

[Obama Calls for Global Effort Against Spread of Extremist Ideas](#)

February 18, 2015

“In his remarks, Obama also talked up programs in Los Angeles, Minneapolis and Boston as models for reaching what officials describe as “vulnerable communities” in the U.S. “These are partnerships that bring people together in the spirit of mutual respect,” he said.”

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[Barack Obama says US 'at War With Those Perverting Islam'](#)

February 18, 2015

“Prevention is the focus of the conference. It's mobilised people from the trenches in the battle for hearts and minds to share best practices: everyone from teachers to entrepreneurs to Silicon Valley executives have been talking about community outreach to marginalised youth and counter-messaging Islamists on social media.”



[Obama: We Must Confront 'Twisted Ideologies' That Spawn Violence](#)

February 18, 2015

“Obama said that parents, teachers and faith leaders play a key role in preventing terrorist groups from penetrating into local communities. They are usually the first to notice signs that someone is beginning to adopt radical religious beliefs.”



[By The Numbers: White House Takes On Violent Extremism](#)

February 18, 2015

“Wednesday's schedule features a presidential keynote speech and sessions focused largely on domestic issues, highlighting programs in three American cities designed to combat recruiting by radical groups.”



[U.S. Communities Called On To Prevent Homegrown Terrorism](#)

February 18, 2015

“Participants in the summit will hear about pilot programs in Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis, where local officials have tried to combat radicalization. Those efforts have included law enforcement, but also the business community, teachers, families, churches and mosques.”

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VIDEO: [White House Convenes Summit on Violent Extremism](#)

February 18, 2015

“...today the White House brought together community leaders law enforcement officials religious leaders and politicians, to share the ways they've approached the threat of violent extremism so other communities can learn.”



[The Note: Countering Extremism](#)

February 18, 2015

“Officials say the focus is on bolstering domestic efforts to address extremists’ propaganda machine and engage young, minority (predominantly Muslim) immigrant communities with alternative opportunities and a sense of inclusion. The administration is highlighting three cities: Los Angeles, Boston and Minneapolis.”



[Obama: No Religion Responsible for Terrorism](#)

February 18, 2015

““No religion is responsible for terrorism — people are responsible for violence and terrorism,” Obama told delegates at the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism.”



[Obama: Extremism Fight is 'Battle for Hearts and Minds'](#)

February 18, 2015

““Our campaign to prevent people around the world from being radicalized to violence is ultimately a battle for hearts and minds,” Obama writes.””

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[Obama to Call for Joint Efforts Against Violent Extremism at Summit](#)

February 18, 2015

“With that threat in mind, Obama is hoping to concentrate the world’s focus on the need to combat the underlying ideologies that entice otherwise modern individuals — including many disaffected youth — to behead a non-believer, kidnap a schoolgirl or shoot up a synagogue. During the three-day conference, Obama is working to highlight local models for preventing radicalization that could be replicated in other communities.”



[A Beaming White House Summit on 'Extremism'](#)

February 17, 2015

“Most of the summit’s work is focused on positive alternatives for potential IS recruits while also exposing the emptiness of the group’s vision and the likelihood of it collapsing from within.”



[Biden Kicks off White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism](#)

February 17, 2015

““We have to ... engage our communities and engage those who might be susceptible to being radicalized because they are marginalized,” Biden said.”

The New York Times

[Biden: Including Immigrants Key to Stopping Extremism in US](#)

February 17, 2015

“Biden, in his remarks, held up Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis as examples of communities moving ahead with programs to counter extremism locally. He said the goal was to bring together broad coalitions of community leaders so that all Americans — and particularly Muslims — would feel like “we see them.””



[Biden Opens White House Summit on Violent Extremism](#)

February 17, 2015

“Biden took part in a round-table discussion with local leaders from Boston, Los Angeles and Minneapolis. The three cities have programs to counter extremism that the White House wants to promote as examples.”

The Washington Post

[Muslim NGOs Could Help Counter Violent Extremism](#)

February 17, 2015

“The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism is an excellent moment for stakeholders to rise to the challenge and develop a sustainable, long-term solution to violent extremism by engaging and empowering Muslim NGOs as strategic partners in a shared fight.”

The Washington Post

[Biden: Including Immigrants Key to Stopping Extremism in US](#)

February 17, 2015

“Joining local elected officials, community leaders and religious figures, Biden portrayed the U.S. as far better positioned than Europe, thanks to what he called America’s successful record at cultural integration. He said societies must offer immigrants an “affirmative alternative” to extremism, cautioning that military force alone could not address the threat.”



[Joe Biden: Societies Must Offer "Affirmative Alternative" to Extremism](#)

February 17, 2015

“He praised the efforts of cities like Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis-St Paul that have been working to develop prevention programs. He reserved particular praise for Boston, saying the city "did not turn its venom, its anger, its frustration against any community" in the wake of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings that killed three and injured hundreds.”

**Compiled by The Office of the CVE Coordinator
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[Hennepin County Sheriff at White House Highlighting Anti-Extremism Efforts](#)

February 17, 2015

“Violent extremism is a local threat, so local law enforcement agencies should be on the front lines helping educate and strengthen our communities to prevent or disrupt these threats. The key is to overcome barriers by building trusting and lasting relationships; this creates resiliency,” Stanek said.”



[Minnesota tries softer approach in battling Islamic State](#)

February 17, 2015

“Sheriff Rich Stanek of Hennepin County said he’s already built something akin to the “community intervention team” Luger envisions. The department has a community advisory board of religious and business leaders, both from within the Somali community and outside it, who people can call about their concerns without immediately involving law enforcement. “They get calls, day and night, every day,” Stanek said. “That’s building those long-term communities of trust.””



50 PHOTOS: [Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson Delivers Opening Remarks At The White House Summit On Countering Violent Extremism](#)

February 18, 2015



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VIDEO: [Los Angeles ICG Prevention, Intervention, Interdiction Framework Presentation](#)



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