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Institution	Proposal	Cost	Seeks to Answer	Funding	Agency
USYCS Columbia University, with Kenyan NGO "Muslims for Human Rights" (MUHURI)	Evaluation of CVE programming: Random Control Testing (RCT) Model on CVE programming; CSO can identify the programming type that is evaluated and where	(b)(4)	What works and what doesn't in terms of CVE programming	Unfunded	State
IDA	Grassroots Mobilization, Extremism, and (In)stability in Africa - a detailed case study that compares and contrasts Boko Haram to Y'en a Marre, including: the conditions that led to the formation of each group; structure and organization; planning and coordination activities; and public recruitment campaigns. - two additional case studies in order to observe grassroots mobilization in its formation stage: Tanzania and Uganda.	(b)(4)	Why have some groups which mobilized in response to underrepresented and marginalized groups across sub-Saharan Africa's social, political and economic situations in their countries stayed non-violent and some turned to violent extremism? What factors have led to such different motivations and outcomes for these groups? How grassroots collective mobilization can be used to promote stability or instability; to understand the underlying motivation for active political mobilization; to analyze the topology, power structure, productivity, merging, splitting, and overall resilience of change-driven organizations; to understand local communication mechanisms and new media technologies for influence and political mobilization; and to understand the impact of external factors such as sanctions or increased international media attention on mobilization.	Unfunded	State
Mercy Corps	Evaluation of programming	(b)(4)	What works and what doesn't in terms of CVE programming; develop a more rigorous M&E/assumptions testing framework that can be shared with and implemented by other CVE program implementers	Unfunded	State
TBD	Case Studies—identifying the pathway of community and/or group radicalization that took place in historical cases (such as Tuareg in Mali, Shining Path in Peru); or conducting "tale of two cities" analyses that identify why two similar communities (in terms of profiles and grievances) chose different paths with respect to support for or opposition to VE.	(b)(4)	What factors are most salient in radicalization/support for VE or co-optation of local communities by VE actors? What factors should we be looking for to identify where is vulnerable to VE in the future?	Unfunded	State
TBD	Research mapping and gap analysis	(b)(4)	What gaps exist in the body of research on violent extremism, particularly in terms of local-level vulnerabilities and resiliencies, and where should the Workstream on Local Research try to catalyze new research? How can CSO best organize and share the mapping of research efforts?	Unfunded	State
IDA	Violent Extremist Organizations and the Electoral Cycle in Africa: A Framework for Analyzing Contentious Elections Violence Employing a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis will allow researchers to uncover the tactical strategies and rationales behind VEO attacks during the electoral cycle and to create a statistical model for forecasting likely future attacks. Past events in Nigeria and Kenya in particular will be examined alongside a deeper analysis of Tanzania, a country with a recently formed VEO and upcoming elections in late 2015.	(b)(4)	How do violent extremist groups use elections? What is the relation between electoral cycles and violent extremist groups?	Unfunded	State
NYU – CIC	Research on the Causes of, and Responses to, Violent Extremism: Ideas, Governance and the Use of Force 1. Big data analysis of social media in the first year (testing what narratives correlate with trends in violent extremist control of territory and support at the level of foreign fighters and local communities 2. Econometric analysis in the first year of national and community level contextual (governance, economic and social) data, to identify statistically significant factors driving recruitment and incidents of violence. Afghanistan, Mali, Somalia, Lebanon, Tunisia, Foreign Fighters from US and France	(b)(4)	What is the relative significance of global, national and local actors and grievances in driving recruitment into violent extremism in different contexts? Under what conditions do these underlying grievances appear to generate support for violent extremism and under what conditions do opposition groups choose alternatives to violence? What are the links between action in the practical areas of governance and the use of force, and efforts to influence narrative and networks (the development and dissemination of ideas)? What priority should be given to each under different conditions? When considered in combination, what forms of political, security and development actions are likely to offer most possibility of success in reducing violent extremism and under what conditions do combinations produce particularly negative consequences?	Unfunded	State
Al Amana Centre	Survey of Oman's counter-recruitment strategies - Review of national policy and methods of recruitment prevention; - Interviews with government ministers overseeing CVE; - Interviews with Omani youth; - A review of public theological education; - A review of cleric's counter-messaging; - A review of programs and efforts to prevent sectarian division and foster tolerance; - A review of Oman's policies to prevent the marginalization of communities;	(b)(4)		Unfunded	State

Global Center for Cooperative Security	<p>Strengthening Community Engagement and Countering Violent Extremism Efforts: Mapping Sources of Resilience 12-18 month comparative study to identify sources of resilience and better understand how and why extremist groups have not been able to attract notable support in particular areas. Proposed case studies include countries in West Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa regions a comparative study that will focus on three countries. A preliminary suggest list includes Ghana, Bangladesh, and Malaysia; these can be adapted to encompass countries in other regions like MENA. Each case study will be developed in consultation with local partners, and entail a combination of desk research and field-based interviews and research. In each country, the Global Center will work with local partners to organize a consultative workshop and undertake interviews and research; the case studies will then be compiled into a final outcome report to be launched around the 10th anniversary of the adoption of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2016. The report will also provide a research foundation for CVE programming being undertaken by UN and GCTF actors.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Including the development of a regional CVE bibliography • Case studies of aforementioned countries, which will include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o One workshop developed with local partners o Field-based interviews o A multi-sectoral mapping of CVE related and specific activities and capacities • A final report, to be launched around the time of the review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2016. 	(b)(7)		Unfunded	State
MSI	CENTRAL ASIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA AND IRAQ: DRIVERS AND RESPONSES		Drivers of radicalization and scope of the problem.	USAID/Asia	USAID
MSI	SOUTH ASIA INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA AND IRAQ: DRIVERS AND RESPONSES		Drivers of radicalization and scope of the problem.	USAID/Asia	USAID
MSI	SOUTHEAST ASIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA AND IRAQ: DRIVERS AND RESPONSES		Drivers of radicalization and scope of the problem.	USAID/Asia	USAID
University of Arkansas	Identity and Framing Theory, Precursor Activities, and the Radicalization Process		This project examines theories about how violent extremists develop their ideology and move to violence. Using data collected from the United States between 1980 and 2012, the project will assist law enforcement, intelligence and fusion centers, and prosecutorial agencies in determining optimal timeframes for early intervention. The results of this study will advance our understanding of how radicalization does and does not occur, translating into important insights for prevention and countering violent extremism programs.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
Brandeis University	The Role of Social Networks in the Evolution of Al Qaeda-inspired Violent Extremism in the United States, 1993-2013		The study examines the evolution of American Al Qaeda inspired organizations over the past twenty years and will identify the mechanisms that motivate Americans to volunteer for Al Qaeda inspired extremist violence and terrorist actions. The project will focus on over 500 individual violent extremists and will draw data from their online communications. The results of this study will render a picture of how violent extremism has evolved over the past two decades and how useful social network analysis tools are for understanding the evolution of radicalization	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
Children's Hospital of Boston)	Understanding Pathways to and away from Violent Radicalization among Resettled Somali Refugees		The objective of the study is to understand pathways to diverse outcomes among Somali refugees: why do some embrace greater openness to violent extremism, while others with shared life histories move towards gangs, crime, or resilient outcomes such as non-violent activism? To what degree do these outcomes overlap? The project expects to provide empirical evidence of specific modifiable indicators related to changes in openness to violent extremism. The results of the study will aid in the development of more targeted prevention programs	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
Duke University	Community Policing Strategies To Counter Violent Extremism		Little is known about the extent to which police departments around the country have adopted community policing practices, the methods they are using to address the threat of violent extremism, and what they consider to be best practices in the field. This project addresses the current gap in knowledge by using a nationwide survey, in-depth interviews, and focus groups to better understand the extent to which law enforcement agencies are using community policing to combat violent extremism. The results will provide a road-map for rolling out future engagement and prevention programs at the state and local level.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
Indiana State University):	Lone Wolf Terrorism In America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways to Forge Prevention Strategies		The purpose of the research is to create a database on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component and a comparative analysis, in order to distinguish lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group context. The project also explores potential signatures of lone wolves preparing to engage in violent extremism. The results will provide much needed information on the important though contested topic of lone wolf terrorism, as well as render indicators of this form of violent extremism.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
University of Maryland	Empirical Assessment of Domestic Radicalization		This project examines 1,800 individuals in the U.S. associated with violent extremism in order to advance the empirical basis for understanding domestic radicalization. The study focuses on differences of radicals and/or the radicalization processes of those who accept the personal use of violence for political purposes and those who only engage in non-violent criminality, the relationship between radical beliefs and radical behavior, and how strongly the evidence supports theories of radicalization in general. The results of this study will provide evidence-supported conclusions of how radicalization works, allowing for the development of more focused prevention and countering violent extremism program	Funded	NIJ/DOJ

RAND Corporation	Evaluation of the SLATT Program	(b)(7)(F)	Evaluating the effectiveness of the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) program, which is administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance in the Office of Justice Programs. The SLATT program is a prime example of community level programs that have shown promise to prevent or otherwise counter violent radicalization in the U.S.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
University of Illinois-Chicago	Transnational Crimes Among Somali-Americans: Convergences of Radicalization and Trafficking	(b)(7)(F)	This project focuses on the Somali-American diaspora and its involvement in two transnational crimes: radicalization to violent extremism and trafficking in persons. This study aims to build scientific knowledge on these crimes with an emphasis on transnational issues and convergence in contexts of profound community vulnerability and active criminal networks. The co-occurrence of radicalization and trafficking in disadvantaged refugee and immigrant communities warrants an examination to better understand the transnational and convergence issues involved, and how they can inform evidence-based community practices. The results of this project can inform the development of resilient neighborhood as well as specific policies designed to improve responses to radicalization and other transnational issues in vulnerable populations.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
University of Massachusetts-Lowell	Across the Universe? A Comparative Analysis of Violent Radicalization Across Three Offender Types with Implications for Criminal Justice Training and Education	(b)(7)(F)	This award develops a series of studies comparing the behavioral underpinnings of three types of U.S.-based offenders since 1990: solo-terrorists, lone-actor terrorists, and individuals who engage in mass casualty violence but lack an ideological motivation. In particular this research program compares the developmental, antecedent behavioral and ideological factors that crystallize within the offender and are later expressed behaviorally via the offense itself. This program of research seeks to understand whether (dis)similarities are observable across these offender types and what the relevant implications are for law enforcement. The results from this study will help to determine the appropriateness of profiles for these offenders as well as develop indicators and warnings for law enforcement and other community organizations.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
Duke University	Evaluating the Federal CVE Initiative	(b)(7)(F)	This project will collect information on the engagement efforts being conducted by U.S. Attorneys' Offices, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the National Counterterrorism Center. These data collection efforts will include a survey of U.S. Attorneys' Offices and in-depth interviews with key officials to catalogue federal outreach and engagement work. The impact of these efforts will begin to be assessed through focus groups of Muslim American community leaders in three cities. While the study is not a formal evaluation of engagement efforts, the resulting catalogue will provide the basis for future evaluations and the focus groups will provide valuable feedback concerning outreach efforts in the United States.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
Brandeis University	Prisoner Recollections: The Role of Internet Use and Real-Life Networks in the Early Radicalization of Al Qaeda Inspired Terrorist Offenders	(b)(7)(F)	This award will collect the life histories from approximately forty "homegrown" terrorist offenders inspired by Al Qaeda. The project will ascertain the importance of the Internet and online networking in shaping the early stages of radicalization trajectories. Complementing the existing FY 2012 award charting domestic Al Qaeda inspired terrorist networks, the results of this project will improve our understanding of the motivations and processes that moved subjects to become terrorists or to engage in criminal activities in support of terrorism.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
University of Arkansas	Sequencing Terrorists' Precursor Behaviors: A Crime Specific Analysis	(b)(7)(F)	The goal of this project is to identify the temporal dimensions of terrorists' precursor conduct to determine if these behaviors occur in a logical sequenced pattern. The project will particularly focus upon identification of sequenced patterns that vary by group type, group size, and incident type. The project is interested in ascertaining whether characteristics of the planning process associated with these three issues are correlated with the successful completion or prevention of terrorist incidents. The results of this study would again aid in the development of indicators for law enforcement or other community organizations.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
University of Massachusetts-Lowell	Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program	(b)(7)(F)	This award responds to a need both to counter domestic terrorism and to evaluate programs focused on countering such violent extremism. The proposed evaluation will be done in Montgomery County, MD, in collaboration with the community-based, Muslim-led CVE program, The World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), the Montgomery County Department of Police, and the Montgomery County Office of Community Partnerships. The results of this study can provide an evidence-based model for outreach at the community level, as well as explore what works in terms of engagement among communities organizations (including criminal justice agencies)	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
University of Maryland-College Park	A Comparative Study of Violent Extremism and Gangs	(b)(7)(F)	This award will provide an evidence-based assessment of the similarities between violent extremist groups and criminal gangs. Given that criminal justice policy makers have designed and implemented gang prevention and amelioration strategies for decades, there is hope that this study can support the belief that programs developed for gang interventions might have relevance for reducing violent extremism.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
Michigan State University	An Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums, Social Media, and Technology to Enculturate and Radicalize Individuals to Violence	(b)(7)(F)	There is currently limited knowledge of the role of technology and computer mediated communications (CMCs), such as Facebook and Twitter, in the dissemination of messages that promote extremist agendas and radicalize individuals to violence. The proposed study will address this gap through a series of qualitative and quantitative analyses of posts from various forms of CMC used by members of both the far-right and Al Qaeda inspired extremist movements. The project will result in a detailed typology of the ideological content of posts, the value of online messages, the technological skill of those posting to social media, and the matching of posts online to actual terrorist activity.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ

University of Maryland-College Park	Empirical Assessment of Domestic Disengagement and Deradicalization (EAD3)	(b)(4)	This award will provide a more systemic and generalizable understanding of the various equifinite and multifinite processes by which individuals exit extremism. This understanding is a crucial first step in identifying opportunities for effective interventions and evaluating the appropriate programs and initiatives to take advantage of these opportunities.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
Children's Hospital Corporation of Boston	Gang Affiliation and Radicalization to Violent Extremism Within Somali-American Communities	(b)(4)	The overall goal of this project is to conduct in-depth analyses of risk and resiliency in relation to both gang affiliation and radicalization to violent extremism among Somali youth resettled in North America. The project will result in increased understanding of how psychosocial and demographic factors relate to support for violent activism and gang affiliation, and of the role of gang affiliation (or lack thereof) in the radicalization to violent extremism of Somali youth who left Minneapolis to join al-Shabaab. The project will develop a theoretical model of the overlap and divergence of gang affiliation and radicalization to violent extremism among Somali youth in the U.S.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
Arkansas State University	Radicalization on the Internet: Virtual Extremism in the US from 2012-2017	(b)(4)	This award will identify active online extremist groups based in the United States by collecting information about a variety of groups, including extremist religious, nationalist, political, and ethnicity-based groups. The project will create preliminary virtual profiles of predominant extremist groups, resulting in the construction of ideological maps and the identification frame intersections, and will discern the effect online extremist material has on individuals who see it and which types of material is most influential	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
Research Triangle Institute	Research and Evaluation on Domestic Radicalization to Violent Extremism Research to Support Exit USA	(b)(4)	The project will provide a comprehensive understanding of deradicalization processes among domestic violent extremists to inform community level prevention and intervention strategies. The study will include 52 former right-wing extremists and will partner with Life After Hate (LAH) as subject matter experts to study the onset, persistence, and desistance from extremism. This will provide a comprehensive understanding of the relationships between individual-level factors (e.g., identity work, motivations) and structural forces (e.g., community and criminal justice organizations, barriers) with disengagement and deradicalization. The final result will include an "Exit USA" classification instrument for identification of those extremists most likely to disengage and/or deradicalize.	Funded	NIJ/DOJ
TBD	Comprehensive Evidence-Based Evaluation of the "Three Cities" Programs a. The "Three Cities" programs for CVE in Boston, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles are often cited as examples of high value, grassroots CVE programs. However, there is no independent, objective evaluation of the effectiveness of these programs based on their stated objectives as well as detailing how the programs actually work (or do not), and determining whether these activities impart any negative or positive unintended consequences.	(b)(4)	1) Promoting Local Research and Information-Sharing on the Drivers of Violent Extremism	Unfunded	DHS
CREATE	Foreign Fighter Recruitment (ongoing) i. This effort seeks to research and analyze the community-based recruitment strategies used by terrorist groups operating in Iraq and Syria, either to draw foreign fighters or to inspire homegrown terrorism within the United States. ii. The research will identify the components of the recruitment process (including the relationship to the organizational structure and command and control).	(b)(4)	1) Promoting Local Research and Information-Sharing on the Drivers of Violent Extremism	Funded	DHS
START	Profiles of Perpetrators of Terrorism in the U.S. between 1970 and 2013 (2014) i. There is no single "profile" of organizations that target the U.S. homeland with terrorism. Rather, the groups that attacked the United States between 1970 and 2013 had widely varied ideologies, beliefs, and goals.	(b)(4)	1) Promoting Local Research and Information-Sharing on the Drivers of Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
START	Comparing Lone Actor Terrorism, Hate Crimes, and Group Terrorism (2013) i. Examines the characteristics of communities where hate crime, terrorism, and lone actor terrorism occurs. Finds that lone actor terrorism, while its own phenomenon, looks more like hate crime than group terrorism.	(b)(4)	1) Promoting Local Research and Information-Sharing on the Drivers of Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
START	Characteristics of Communities Where Perpetrators Live and Precursor Activity Occurs (2013) i. The goal of this project is to identify the characteristics of communities where persons indicted under terrorism related charges lived, planned, and prepared prior to carrying out terrorist attacks. ii. Over three-fifths of perpetrator residences and over one-half of pre-incident activities are located in counties different from the location of the subsequent terrorist incidents. iii. Perpetrator residential locations and pre-incident activities are distributed across the United States, but concentrated on the East and West coasts.	(b)(4)	1) Promoting Local Research and Information-Sharing on the Drivers of Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
START	Geospatial Patterns of Antecedent Activity among Terrorist Perpetrators (2013) i. The ATS allows examination of a number of different units of analysis. Analyses may examine: (1) characteristics of federal terrorism court cases; (2) the characteristics of persons indicted in each court case or involved in incidents, otherwise referred to as indictees; (3) characteristics of incidents and planned incidents, and (4) antecedent activities that lead up to the incident and are necessary to carry it out and/or achieve the goals of the persons or groups.	(b)(4)	1) Promoting Local Research and Information-Sharing on the Drivers of Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
START	Analysis of Factors Related to Hate Crime and Terrorism (2012) i. Examines the county level characteristics of communities where hate crimes and terrorism occur. ii. Examines timing of hate crimes and terrorism by ideology of terrorist group (level of analysis: week). iii. Hate crimes peak in the 1-4 weeks following a terror attack carried out by terrorist organizations with an Islamic ideology.	(b)(4)	1) Promoting Local Research and Information-Sharing on the Drivers of Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS


START	Hot Spots Of Terrorism and Other Crimes (2012) i. While the overall percentage of terrorist attacks that result in fatalities is low, the geographic distribution of these events remained similar with large urban centers predominating and yet a good deal of activity in smaller areas as well. ii. The majority of extreme left-wing terrorism was concentrated in the 1970s and ethno-national/separatist terrorism was concentrated in the 1970s and 1980s. Religiously motivated attacks occurred predominately in the 1980s, extreme right-wing terrorism was concentrated in the 1990s, and single issue attacks were dispersed across the last three decades (1980s, 1990s, and 2000s).	(b)(4)	1) Promoting Local Research and Information-Sharing on the Drivers of Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
(b)(6) University of Illinois at Chicago	Building Resilience to Violent Extremism among Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul (2012) i. NO ONE RISK FACTOR explained teenage boys' and young men's involvement in violent extremism. Rather it was the interaction of multiple risk factors at multiple levels. ii. RISK FACTORS COMBINED to create an opportunity structure for violent extremism (Table 1). The key opportunities were: 1) youths' unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) perceived social legitimacy for violent radicalization and terrorist recruitment; 3) the presence of recruiters and associates. iii. THE INVERTED PYRAMID in Figure 1 indicates that: 1) involvement in violent extremism depended on all three opportunities; 2) decreasing proportions of teenage boys/young men are exposed to the mid and lower opportunities	(b)(4)	1) Promoting Local Research and Information-Sharing on the Drivers of Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
(b)(6) (Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, Syracuse University)	Leadership, Terrorism, and the Use of Violence (2011) i. Examination of the words of the leaders of al Qa'ida and al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula to help understand what they are like, their leadership styles, and when they are likely to use violence to gain what they want.	(b)(4)	2) Civil Society, Including the Role of Women and Youth in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
START	Case Study of Law Enforcement Countermeasures against FALN (2012) i. Qualitative case study describes how law enforcement intelligence measures were used to counter the FALN. ii. A range of different strategies was used to counter the FALN threat, including judicial and legal, political and governance, and police and prison systems, which may have variously affected the activities and organization of this terrorist group.	(b)(4)	3) Strengthening Community-Police and Community-Security Force Relations as Ingredients for Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
START	Case Study of Operation Backfire (2012) i. Frame Operation Backfire as a terrorism countermeasure and assess what made it effective at dismantling the Family and altering the landscape for actors associated with the REM. ii. Operation Backfire owes its success to an effective organizational framework undertaken by a few, key leaders from various agencies.	(b)(4)	3) Strengthening Community-Police and Community-Security Force Relations as Ingredients for Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
START	Lessons Learned from Law Enforcement Case Studies (2012) i. The purpose of this research was to examine different mechanisms that the United States and other countries have used to counter terrorism beyond high-profile military efforts and to examine the effects and effectiveness of such interventions. ii. While sustained interagency collaboration was an essential innovation in both of these cases, success was also fostered by more traditional police methods. Specifically, in the FALN investigation and in Operation Backfire (the effort to break apart The Family), the recruitment of a key informant represented a pivotal moment that provided engaged law enforcement officials with essential information about the operations, practices, and membership of each of the groups.	(b)(4)	3) Strengthening Community-Police and Community-Security Force Relations as Ingredients for Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
START	Patterns of Intervention in Federal Terrorism Cases Interim (2011) i. Provide an overview of the most significant events that evoked changes in the manner in which terrorists are portrayed, pursued, and prosecuted as well as the way in which terrorists and their defenders have responded to federal prosecutorial efforts.	(b)(4)	3) Strengthening Community-Police and Community-Security Force Relations as Ingredients for Countering and Preventing Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
START	Counter-Narrative Knowledge Tool for CVE Practitioners and Communities Primary Investigators (ongoing) i. This project will entail a literature review for the purpose of distilling these complex analyses into a useful pairing of narratives supporting violence with the many related counter-narratives to violence, to include sources and resources detailing these counter-narratives.	(b)(4)	4) Promoting the Counter-narrative and Weakening the Legitimacy of Violent Extremist Messaging	Funded	DHS
(b)(6) University of Illinois at Chicago (PI); (b)(6) Children's Hospital of Boston (Co-PI); (b)(6) Chief of Police, Dearborn, MI, (Co-PI); Education leader TBN (Co-PI)	Integrating Mental Health and Education Fields into Countering Violent Extremism (ongoing) i. The proposed work conducts a systematic literature review and convenes a targeted workshop with CVE, law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals including representatives from the three CVE "pilot cities." ii. It will produce in a rapid time frame a short conference report and brief, as well as targeted.	(b)(4)	5) Promoting Educational Approaches to Build Resilience to Violent Extremism	Funded	DHS
START	Results from a Four-Wave Survey Report (2014) i. Respondents answered questions gauging their level of concern about terrorism. There was little change in their responses across the four waves, although in wave 3, nine months after the Boston Marathon bombings, there was a significant uptick in the percentage of respondents who indicated they had changed their behavior in the past year because of the possibility of an attack. This effect largely dissipated by wave 4, which occurred 15 months after the bombings.	(b)(4)	5) Promoting Educational Approaches to Build Resilience to Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
START	Attitudes before and after the Boston Marathon Bombings (2013) i. People who completed the survey after the bombings were generally more likely to say they would call the police if they became aware of terrorism-related situations such as a person talking about joining a terrorist group, reading material from a terrorist group, distributing handouts supporting terrorism, traveling overseas to join a terrorist group, or talking about planting explosives in a public place.	(b)(4)	5) Promoting Educational Approaches to Build Resilience to Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS

START	Ethnic Group Differences in the 2007 Pew Poll of Muslim Americans (2010) i. Explores opinions relating to the war on terrorism for seven groups of participants in the 2007 Pew poll of U.S. Muslims: African-American Muslims (self-identified as "Black" and born in the U.S. of U.S.-born parents) and Muslims born in Pakistan, Iran, Arab countries, South Asian countries excluding Pakistan, European countries, and sub-Saharan African countries. ii. Iran-born Muslims were on average less religious than other groups but their opinions about the war on terrorism were strongly related to individual differences in religiosity, perceptions of discrimination, and opposition to government and government policies. iii. African-American Muslims were more negative than other groups about the war on terrorism but their opinions were unrelated to these same individual differences.	(b) (7)(F)	(6) Enhancing Access to Mainstream Religious Knowledge	Complete	DHS
START	Living in America as a Muslim after 9/11 (2009) i. Results from four national polls of Muslim Americans conducted between 2001 and 2007 indicate that Muslim Americans feel increasingly negative about the direction in which America is headed and increasingly see the war on terrorism as a war on Islam		(6) Enhancing Access to Mainstream Religious Knowledge	Complete	DHS
ICST	Analysis of Terrorist Autobiographies (2014) i. Examined 87 English-language memoirs of former terrorists published from 1912 to 2011. ii. Disengagement from terrorism is rarely sudden, clear-cut, or the result of a single event. iii. Disengagement doesn't work the same way for everyone—it is a highly individualized process.		(7) Preventing Radicalization in Prisons and Rehabilitating and Reintegrating Violent Extremists	Complete	DHS
UMASS Lowell	In-depth Analysis of some Disengagement Cases i. Case Study of Ahmed (2014) ii. Case Study of Sarah (2014)		(7) Preventing Radicalization in Prisons and Rehabilitating and Reintegrating Violent Extremists	Complete	DHS
START	Disengagement by Type of Group (2014) i. Members of nationalist terrorist and left-wing terrorist groups tended to be ideological at the outset compared to those who joined right-wing terrorist groups. ii. Voluntary disengagement was slightly more common in right-wing terrorist groups than in other types of terrorist groups. iii. Individuals in right-wing terrorist groups were more likely to re-engage than those in nationalist terrorist or left-wing terrorist groups		(7) Preventing Radicalization in Prisons and Rehabilitating and Reintegrating Violent Extremists	Complete	DHS
START	Disengagement by Roles and Functions Report (2013) i. Consider the relationship between one's role and his or her level of satisfaction in the group, sunk costs, and available alternatives outside of the movement as well as whether individuals in certain roles are more likely to experience certain push/pull factors hypothesized to be associated with disengagement from terrorism.		(7) Preventing Radicalization in Prisons and Rehabilitating and Reintegrating Violent Extremists	Complete	DHS
ICST	Arc of Terrorism Involvement Overview (2012) i. Focuses on the development of terrorist group members, through three stages: becoming involved, engagement, and disengagement. For some, a fourth stage, re-engagement, is present.		(7) Preventing Radicalization in Prisons and Rehabilitating and Reintegrating Violent Extremists	Complete	DHS
START	Assessing the Effectiveness of De-radicalization Programs (2009) i. One-year study of select de-radicalization programs and investigates a series of critical issues surrounding assessment of the effectiveness and outcomes of these programs. ii. Programs collectively referred to as de-radicalization programs are, in practice, rarely focused on achieving 'deradicalization' as a requisite or even desired outcome; instead they are more commonly focused primarily on reducing the risk of re-engagement in terrorism and other illicit activity.		(7) Preventing Radicalization in Prisons and Rehabilitating and Reintegrating Violent Extremists	Complete	DHS
START	County-level Correlates of Terrorism in the U.S. (2014) i. Attacks tended to cluster in specific areas, especially large metropolitan areas, from 1990-2010. Yet, they were also widely dispersed—each of the 48 continental U.S. states experienced at least one attack.		(8) Identifying Political and Economic Opportunities for Communities Vulnerable to Radicalization and Recruitment to Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
START	Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States: Foreign Fighters & Returnees (ongoing) i. This research will create the PIRUS dataset which consists of approximately 1,600 violent and non-violent ideologically motivated criminals from across the extremist ideological spectrum who radicalized in the United States. ii. PIRUS captures over 150 individual-level variables, including radicalization risk factors, mobilization mechanisms, basic demographics and personal backgrounds, and radicalization trajectory lengths and outcomes.		(9) Development Assistance and Stabilization Efforts to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism	Funded	DHS
START	Bombing and Arson Attacks by Environmental and Animal Rights Extremists (2013) a. Overview of the arsons and bombings conducted by perpetrators affiliated with the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and Animal Liberation Front (ALF) between 1995 and 2010, and analyzes the characteristics of the individuals convicted of these crimes.		(9) Development Assistance and Stabilization Efforts to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS
START	Comparing Violent and Nonviolent Far-Right Hate Groups (2011) a. Used the Southern Poverty Law Center's (SPLC) annual Intelligence Report and Klan Watch publications to produce a list of hate groups in the United States. b. The organizational capacity variables, age and size were related to a group's propensity for extreme violence and age was related to group violence. c. Groups that published ideological literature, such as newsletters or pamphlets, were significantly less likely to be involved in violence. d. Groups that were linked to others in various ways did not increase the propensity for violence or extreme violence		(9) Development Assistance and Stabilization Efforts to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism	Complete	DHS


TBD	<p>Rapidly Changing Threats, Rapidly Changing Needs</p> <p>a. Scientific data collection and analysis to systematically understand current CVE perspectives throughout the DHS Enterprise will include systematic collection and analysis activities to understand program, policy, knowledge, practice, technology use, and programmatic gaps in the pursuit of CVE goals. This will include data collection from DHS, Interagency, state, local, and NGO stakeholders in the United States to produce a current, single overview of CVE that is comprehensive and focused on current threats as well as all types of public and private gaps that can be addressed through R&D activities. When combined with the results Understanding the CVE Landscape project, this information will, for the first time, provide independent, comprehensive information that can be used to prioritize CVE research activities to ensure greatest effect and return on government R&D investment.</p>	(b)(4)	All areas, 1-9	Unfunded	DHS
TBD	<p>Understanding the CVE Landscape</p> <p>a. DHS has recently updated a number of strategic documents that will determine the overall DHS strategy. Among these is the DHS S&T R&D Strategy for CVE that includes an R&D framework to address CVE needs. This project will ensure unity of effort by collecting, classifying, describing, and categorizing USG funded on CVE over the last 3 years. When combined with the results Rapidly Changing Threats, Rapidly Changing Needs project, this information will, for the first time, provide independent, comprehensive information that can be used to prioritize CVE research activities to ensure greatest effect and return on government R&D investment.</p>	(b)(4)	All areas, 1-9	Unfunded	DHS
TBD	<p>Commission a report to focus on the role of women in both advancing and preventing recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism. Recent events highlight the growing involvement of women in violent extremism, underscoring the need to better understand women's motivations to join violent extremist groups and the possible development interventions to counter this trend. This need is particularly acute in the Middle East and North Africa, where gender norms and traditions may obscure or lead to inaccurate assumptions about women's roles both in recruitment and radicalization beyond victimization.</p>	(b)(4)		Unfunded	USAID
Mercy Corps	<p>USAID will contract Mercy Corps to commission a report on Community Resilience and Vulnerability to Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) and Foreign Fighters in Iraq. The objective of this study is to fill gaps in understanding of the factors that lead to community resilience or vulnerability to the influence of violent extremist groups—with a particular focus on foreign fighters—within Iraq. The results will be applicable to other countries that are facing a significant threat of external and internal violent extremist movements. The findings will help build USAID and other actors' understanding of what interventions or policies may be able to "pop a wedge" between local populations and foreign fighters and local extremist elements. Primary audiences for this research are the USAID Mission in Iraq, as well as other Missions in the region seeking to develop local level CVE strategies that will lead to stability and resilience to the influence of VEOs. Specific to Iraq, the study could provide valuable insights that can help inform ways in which the current humanitarian response can be coupled with stability and development strategies to counter the spread of violent extremist groups and ensure that liberated areas do not backslide.</p>	(b)(4)		Unfunded	USAID

Dates	Country/ Organization	Host Entity	Location	Proposed Participants	Work-stream Elements	Notes
April 16 12:30-2:00 pm; April 17 8:00- 10:00 am	Singapore	Singapore, U.S. civil society to moderate	Singapore	(b) (5)		
18-Apr	St. Paul Police Department	St. Paul Police Department	St. Paul, MN			
April 21-22	United Nations	President of UNGA, UN Secretary- General, Alliance of Civilizations	New York			
April 28-May 1	Serbia	Serbia	Serbia			
29-Apr	DHS-CRCL	LinCT Conference	Los Angeles, CA			
30-Apr	DOJ	US Attorney's Office - District of Massachusetts	Boston, MA			
7-May	DHS-CRCL	CRCL	New York, NY			
8-May	DHS-CRCL	CRCL	Birmingham, AL			
May 11-13	DHS-CRCL	State Department	London, UK			
May 12-13	DOJ	Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)	Washington, D			
13-May	DHS	Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society	Ottawa, Canada			
19-May	UK Home Office	UK Home Office	Washington, D.C.			
May 19-21 with 3rd "tech workshop" for civil society	Albania	MOI	Tirana			
Late May	Djibouti	MFA and Min. of Islamic and Cultural Affairs	Djibouti			
May 27, 28, 29, 30 with 4th day a civil society training day	Kenya	NCTC	Nairobi (KICC)			
21-May	Jordan	MFA	Amman			
May 21-22	OSCE	OSCE	Vienna			

23-May	St. Paul Police Department	St. Paul Police Department	St. Paul, MN
27-May	DHS-CRCL	CRCL	Longmont, CO
28-May	DOJ	US Attorney's Office - District of Colorado and FBI SAC	Denver, CO
29-May	DHS-CRCL	CRCL/Local PD	Greeley, CO
June 2-4	Bangladesh (civil society focused) *Relocated from Nepal	Global Center on Cooperative Security	Dhaka
June 4-5	Norway	Ministry of Justice and Security	Oslo
6-Jun	DHS-CRCL	CRCL	Scottsdale, AZ
June 11	Council of Europe	COE	Bucharest
June 11-12	Australia	DOJ AND DFAT	Sydney
Week of June 29	Kazakhstan	MFA	Astana
June TBD	DOJ	US Attorney's Office - District of Massachusetts	Boston, MA
June 30-July 1	OSCE	OSCE	Vienna



Late July	Spain or Belgium	MFA	Madrid or Brussels
TBD	Mauritania or other West African country		
July 22-23	Algeria	MFA	
July	European Union	EU	Brussels
July 20-24 (Tentative Dates)	DHS	DHS	Washington, DC
July 28-30	DOJ	National Institute of Justice (NIJ) & Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)	Washington, DC
On the margins of the September CVE Leaders Summit	U.S.	USIP/CSO/USAID	New York City



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**Draft Agenda for Ministerial-Level CVE Summit in Astana, Kazakhstan
29-30 June 2015**

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A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies

INCORPORATING VIOLENT EXTREMISM INTO VIOLENCE PREVENTION EFFORTS

Developed by a collaborative of non-governmental and
governmental stakeholders from the Greater Boston region

For more information about the framework, please contact:

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
A MESSAGE FROM UNITED STATES ATTORNEY CARMEN M. ORTIZ

As U.S. Attorney, I was honored that the Greater Boston region was chosen by the White House to be one of only three pilot locations in the country to develop an approach to enhance our efforts at preventing violent extremism. Our resilience and longstanding history of successful collaborative efforts to combatting violence served as the genesis for this framework and the foundation on which we will build an effective strategy to combat violent extremism locally and enable communities across the country to do the same.

One of my highest priorities has always been reducing violence by promoting safe and healthy alternatives through prevention and intervention strategies. Throughout my tenure, I have worked with nontraditional partners, like schools, service providers and academia, to find ways to reduce gun and gang violence through non-law enforcement methods. I believe that these innovative strategies are not only effective, but necessary in order to develop a framework to counter violent extremism in the Greater Boston region. These innovative approaches are intended to complement, not replace, the traditional tools of law enforcement in protecting the public safety.

From the very day we were chosen as a pilot region, we have actively engaged community representatives, faith-based leaders, educators, mental health experts and local government officials, just to name a few. Known as the "Collaborative" I am most proud of these "local champions" for their commitment to this pilot initiative and their resolve to engage in meaningful dialogue which has resulted in a comprehensive and multidisciplinary solution-based framework.

Through the hard work of so many, and the tenacity of the community, I firmly believe that we are poised to launch a series of compelling and practical solutions to countering violent extremism in the Greater Boston region. I want to thank and commend all involved for their continued commitment to our efforts.



Carmen M. Ortiz
United States Attorney
District of Massachusetts

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INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

In March 2014, the White House National Security Council (NSC) requested assistance from three regions with piloting the development of a comprehensive framework that promotes multi-disciplinary solutions to countering violent extremism. The Greater Boston region was selected because of its existing collaborative efforts and nationally recognized success with developing robust comprehensive violence prevention and intervention strategies. With the support of the Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Homeland Security and National Counterterrorism Center, a range of stakeholders in the Greater Boston region began to develop a locally-driven framework. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Massachusetts has had a coordinating role in this process.

A COLLABORATIVE PROCESS

The locally-driven framework has been developed by a collaborative of non-governmental, governmental and academic stakeholders from the Greater Boston region.¹ (See Appendix A) Contributions were made through in-person meetings, phone conversations, emails and other written correspondence. Working Group meetings were held on a regular basis to work through issues and craft an approach that can be customized based on the local needs.

WHO ARE VIOLENT EXTREMISTS

Violent extremists are individuals who support or commit ideologically-motivated violence to further personal, political or social objectives, sometimes without direction from or influence by a foreign actor.² There are a number of violent extremist ideologies that are based in politics, religion or

economics. The framework developed by the Collaborative in the Greater Boston region does not focus on any one form of violent extremism.

WHAT IS COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Countering Violent Extremism, also known as "CVE", at the very basic level, focuses on using prevention and intervention approaches³ as a way to minimize the risk of individuals being inspired by violent extremist ideologies or recruited by violent extremist groups. In the Greater Boston region, Countering Violent Extremism efforts do not contain a law enforcement suppression component, which is aimed at protecting national security and developed and implemented by law enforcement agencies.⁴ Law enforcement suppression strategies fall under counterterrorism efforts and are focused on activities once an individual has begun to prepare for or engage in ideologically-motivated violence to advance their cause. (This distinction is important to understand.)

Through the initiative, the Collaborative has been working to clarify the meaning of Countering Violent Extremism and to identify language and initiatives that promote resilience, respect and partnership. Both governmental and non-governmental collaborators have demonstrated a commitment to work through an inclusive process that will not polarize communities.

FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT

The framework is intended to serve as a foundation to assist various communities (locally, nationally and internationally) build resilience and capacity to prevent individuals, including young people, from being inspired and recruited by violent extremists.

¹The Collaborative has included numerous City of Boston personnel who have provided guidance and expertise on best practices. The City of Boston has implemented many of the solutions contained in the framework, some through Boston's National Forum on Youth Violence Prevention and Boston's Defending Childhood Initiative.

² Reference: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Countering Violent Extremism Office, Washington, D.C.

³ These approaches involve both universal prevention and individualized interventions. Prevention involves increasing support, building skills and protective factors, and reducing risk factors or stressors. Providing individualized interventions at the earliest sign of concern is key.

⁴ One exception to this may be when programming is included as part of an offender's probation or supervised release plan which could involve an enforcement aspect, particularly in instances of non-compliance.

Having a foundation from which to start is an important step to developing any strategy, particularly one that involves a complex issue like countering violent extremism which, so far, has been poorly defined and understood. Through the pilot initiative, the Collaborative has explored existing prevention and early intervention strategies that can be enhanced as well as new strategies that require resources for implementation. Although the Collaborative was created out of an initiative to counter violent extremism, the solutions are not entirely unique from other prevention related strategies that are currently being implemented (or can be implemented) through broader efforts by public health, mental health, non-profit organizations, private partnerships, government and others. Rather than create a program specifically labeled *Countering Violent Extremism*, a more effective approach might be to expand the capacity and resources of agencies and organizations to ensure that they are able to enhance the work that they are already doing as well as leverage existing successful programs to help address violent extremism.

HOW TO USE THE FRAMEWORK

The framework is designed to allow local communities the flexibility to define their problem areas, create achievable goals and objectives, and develop realistic implementation plans. The suggested solutions provide ample options so that organizations and agencies have a better understanding of the types of issues that can be considered. Some may look to the framework as a starting point to help enhance existing comprehensive programs. Some may read the framework and better understand how their existing efforts can help to prevent individuals from being inspired and recruited by exploitive influences like violent extremists. Communities should not view the framework as a specific endorsement to create and/or brand separate programs labeled CVE which may have a certain stigma. Rather, those decisions are best made by organizations and agencies at the local level given the needs and dynamics within their respective communities.

DELIVERY OF SERVICES/WHO IS VULNERABLE OR AT RISK

Researchers across the globe have made it clear that the path to violent extremism is not linear and there are no valid or reliable indicators to “predict” who is more likely to engage in violent extremism. Defining who is at risk or who is vulnerable to being inspired and recruited by violent extremist groups is challenging without local data to support where resources should be surged. Surging resources to specific communities, who have not directly asked for assistance, may actually stigmatize those communities. This is counterproductive and it may create further isolation, alienation and disenfranchised individuals. Without data and absent a direct request from communities to address issues of recruitment, a more effective approach might be to expand resources of relevant agencies and organizations⁵ to ensure that they are able to provide services to individuals vulnerable to isolation, alienation and becoming disenfranchised; and to empower those who may assist in shepherding individuals, about whom they are concerned, to appropriate service providers.

WHO PLAYS A ROLE

A number of stakeholders play a role in implementing and “receiving” the solutions in the framework. Some solutions are best implemented by non-government, while some may be better implemented by government or through joint partnerships. The solutions have been phrased in a way that provides a snapshot of who implements and who “receives” the solutions.

WHAT ARE THE FOCUS AREAS

The overall project goal identified by the Collaborative is to increase the capacity of community and government as a way to protect vulnerable individuals from engagement in and the nation from violent extremism. The Collaborative thoughtfully explored a variety of areas that have presented particular challenges with accomplishing the goal. The following areas were identified as problem areas:

⁵ Agencies and organizations can be non-governmental or governmental agencies that are offering programs and providing support and services to individuals.

PROBLEM ONE: Some young people may be at greater risk of feeling isolated and alienated, making them more vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists.

PROBLEM TWO: Providing services to individuals before mobilization⁶ toward violent extremism is challenging when there is a lack of understanding regarding violent extremism and limited intervention programs.

PROBLEM THREE: Social media and other media platforms are being used to recruit individuals to join extremist groups and to encourage individuals to engage in violence.

PROBLEM FOUR: U.S. policy and events around the globe can frustrate, anger and, at times, influence some to think that there is no effective alternative other than to express grievances or solidarity through the use of violence.

PROBLEM FIVE: Distrust between government and non-government hinders collaboration and effective decision making and problem solving.

PROBLEM SIX: Lack of knowledge in mainstream society regarding religions, cultures and thought systems which are unfamiliar or are maligned in the media contributes to poor perceptions that fuel and mutually reinforce fear and estrangement.

PROBLEM SEVEN: Individuals convicted of hate crimes and terrorism offenses require specialized support and services before and after release from prison.

so they more appropriately represent the mission of those organizations/agencies. For instance, if a non-profit organization wishes to assist with addressing Problem One, it may be more focused on solutions that will increase support, services and programs to young people which may make them more resilient and *prevent* them from being more vulnerable to recruitment. Similarly, if a government agency wishes to address this same problem, it may be more apt to implement solutions that will *improve access* to services in communities and organizations. Although this too may increase resiliency within the community, it may also improve the delivery of direct services to those already vulnerable.

Implementing agencies should not feel constrained by the structure of the framework. The sample goals and solutions are intended to help implementing agencies more ably and comprehensively address each of the problem areas, but the infrastructure and resources of the implementing organization or agency must be taken into consideration when tailoring a particular response.

WHAT ARE THE SOLUTIONS

In order to ensure that efforts are cohesive, the Collaborative recommends that a multi-disciplinary working group be considered when tailoring the approach to a particular jurisdiction. For each of the areas above, sample goals and solutions have been identified – some of which are broad-based prevention while some are more focused on direct interventions. The goals and solutions should be tailored by the implementing organization/agency

⁶Mobilization is a process by which radicalized individuals take action to prepare for or engage in violence or material support for violence to advance their cause. “*Radicalization dynamics: A primer*” National Counterterrorism Center, September 2010.

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FRAMEWORK

OVERALL PROJECT GOAL

Increase the capacity of community and government as a way to protect vulnerable individuals from engagement in and the nation from violent extremism.

PROBLEM ONE

Some young people⁷ may be at greater risk of feeling isolated and alienated, making them more vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists.

GOAL AREAS

- Reduce isolation by strengthening families and providing positive community connections.
- Provide appropriate support, services and programs to those young people who perceive themselves as being targeted by others or those who have wanted to be a part of a prosocial group, but have been turned away (“failed joiners”).
- Improve access to behavioral health services in communities and organizations.
- Improve systems and training that promote inclusiveness.
- Work collaboratively with current school and community service providers and organizations to increase communication and improve delivery of English Language Learning (ELL) services.
- Provide young people and parents with access to culturally sensitive, appropriate mental health, and substance use services.

SOLUTIONS TO CONSIDER

Skills Development Programs

- Utilize schools, community and faith-based programs and private providers to assist young people with fostering effective interpersonal and self-advocacy skills.⁸
- Utilize schools, community and faith-based programs and private providers to assist young people with developing critical thinking and conflict resolution skills.⁹
- Utilize schools, community and faith-based programs and private providers to offer opportunities to students who are interested in understanding and developing mediation, conflict resolution, bullying prevention and intervention skills and becoming peer leaders and advocates.
- Utilize a range of service providers to provide English Language Learning (ELL) opportunities to families.
- Utilize academics and other experts to develop interactive programs of civic engagement that encourage adolescents¹⁰ and young adults¹¹ to freely debate and constructively work on public issues that matter to them, thus helping them to gain skills, motivation, democratic values and a sense of belonging.

⁷ The World Health Organization defines a young person as someone between the ages of 10 and 24.

⁸ The structure of the programs may vary depending on the age group.

⁹ The structure of the programs may vary depending on the age group.

¹⁰ The World Health Organization defines an adolescent as those between the ages of 10 and 19.

¹¹ For purposes of this document, a young adult is between the age of 20 and 24.

- Utilize subject matter experts, which could include government personnel, to assist populations across the ages with developing and achieving competency with digital literacy skills.
- With the assistance of private businesses, vocational training schools and others, provide job development courses and apprenticeship programs to vulnerable adolescents and young adults.
- Provide young people with skills on how to cope with unwanted and aggressive behavior (e.g. bullying, harassment, intimidation) through programs offered by schools, community and faith-based organizations and private providers.

Awareness/Education /Training

- With the assistance of government, identify existing local mental health/social services, support networks and programs for young people, and educate communities about ways to access those resources, perhaps using resource guides in multiple languages.
- Provide focused workshops and professional development opportunities to parents and caregivers, school personnel, community and faith-based organizations, youth workers, mentors and law enforcement on how to assess and work with young people experiencing conflict, isolation and alienation.
- Ensure that organizations, faith-based groups, communities and schools are equipped to handle (or know how to access information) to become proficient in stress management and self-care skills in both children and families
- With the assistance of existing mental health networks, identify culturally diverse mental health and substance use service providers, and educate the community on how to access those services.
- With the assistance of public health networks, identify and utilize experts to provide technical assistance to communities and organizations on how to design and implement culturally sensitive programs that help young people develop specific social skills.
- With the assistance of public health networks, identify and utilize experts to provide technical assistance to communities and organizations on how to design and implement self-advocacy programs for young people.
- Identify and utilize experts to provide technical assistance to communities and non-governmental organizations on how to design and implement youth development programs that support one's culture.
- Utilize local experts to provide schools with training on best practices for working with immigrant children and children exposed to trauma, which include placement/testing, school climate and student acceptance.
- With the assistance of public health and mental health networks, provide trauma-informed care training to non-governmental organizations and families with a focus on resiliency factors which can lead to positive outcomes.
- Identify and utilize expert trainers to provide interactive cultural sensitivity and awareness training to a range of organizations and individuals, including those in government.
- Provide skills building and bridge building across agencies, educators and community interest groups.
- With the assistance of public health, provide "Building Youth Self-esteem" workshops for NGOs, caregivers, mentors (including peer mentors and immediate peer groups) and advocates (including peer advocates).
- Provide students, families and all school staff with on-going bullying prevention and intervention training as well as resources that are available both in and out of school.
- With the assistance of subject matter experts, including public safety staff, educate families, educators, service providers and organizations about targeted violence, including violent extremism, so they better understand vulnerabilities and how to protect young people from engaging or being recruited to engage in violence.

Engagement/Support

- As initiated by school staff, periodically review lists of students to determine which students appear not to be connected and offer those students and families support.
- Examine existing school systems that connect families and caregivers with forums like Parent Universities, Welcome Centers, community centers and schools, and increase access and utilization of those opportunities.
- Provide advocates (or mentors) through schools and community/faith-based organizations to individuals in need of positive peer development, care and support.
- Identify those who can provide vulnerable individuals with job skills and opportunities for employment, and connect those providers to individuals for follow up.
- Through partnerships, create cross-cultural engagement activities and heavily market those activities within and across communities as a way to enhance understanding.
- With the use of mentors or youth workers, teachers and others, conduct check-ins and engage in dialogues with adolescents and young adults who are disconnected or experiencing conflict to determine interests, hobbies, etc. for further engagement.
- Through collaboration between mental health, community and faith-based organizations, engage in dialogues to identify mental health and social services most needed and develop methods of reducing the stigma of seeking services.
- With government and private support, increase staffing for those organizations and agencies that can provide programming and mental health services to individuals in need of care and support.¹²
- Encourage engagement between the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Attorney General's Office and schools to enhance understanding of federal and state civil rights protections.
- With government support, provide schools with no cost conflict resolution and violence prevention resources.

PROBLEM TWO

Providing services to individuals *before* mobilization¹³ toward violent extremism is challenging when there is a lack of understanding regarding violent extremism and limited intervention programs.

GOAL AREAS

- Improve the understanding regarding violent extremism through education and outreach by trained individuals.
- Improve understanding of concerning behavior across disciplines so that individuals know the threshold of when and how to refer/provide services and support and when behavior becomes a public safety concern.
- Increase public awareness regarding existing resources, services and service providers that can assist individuals with addressing concerns.
- Increase general awareness within the public of who to contact for advice, referrals for care and public safety concerns.
- Increase coordination among existing service providers, organizations and agencies.
- Increase knowledge and skills regarding crisis intervention, trauma-informed care and psychological first aid.

¹² Some organizations may prefer to be funded by private funders or foundations.

¹³ Mobilization is a process by which radicalized individuals take action to prepare for or engage in violence or material support for violence to advance their cause. "Radicalization dynamics: A primer" National Counterterrorism Center, September 2010.

- Surge resources to fund service providers to provide case management, individualized service plans, educational assistance and transitional job opportunities to vulnerable individuals.

SOLUTIONS TO CONSIDER

Awareness/Education/Training

- Through collaborative partnerships between law enforcement and others, organize dialogues or trainings to a wide range of individuals¹⁴ on violent extremism, the difference between radicalization and mobilization to violent extremism, when/how to provide services and, when appropriate, when/how to report concerns to law enforcement.¹⁵
- Conduct a needs assessment of community non-profit and faith-based organizations who are interested in providing care and support to individuals before he or she “mobilizes” to violent extremism to determine infrastructure and support needed.¹⁶
- With the assistance of public health and subject-matter experts, provide or enhance training opportunities on crisis intervention and trauma-informed care to community and faith-based organizations that provide programming and services to vulnerable young people and families.
- With the assistance of public health and mental health providers, provide or enhance training to community and faith-based leaders on psychological first aid so they may provide support to communities in instances when individuals have engaged in violent extremism, domestically or abroad.
- Using subject-matter experts, develop a curriculum and/or protocol for service providers who are working with individuals who may be radicalizing toward violent extremism.
- In coordination with subject-matter experts and at the request of service providers, provide technical assistance and specialized training to existing service providers and emergency mental health providers that are already providing comprehensive wrap-around services¹⁷ to vulnerable individuals, both male and female, so they may enhance existing program models.
- As initiated by schools, enhance awareness within K-12 and higher education regarding behavior assessment and care protocols and how peers can connect individuals to assessment and care teams.
- Provide thorough training among key mental health providers and public safety officials on protocols for sharing information.
- Increase understanding within the community about threat assessment, who does it and how assessment information is maintained and stored.¹⁸

Engagement/Support

- Develop a statewide multidisciplinary team or committee¹⁹ that meets regularly to enhance communication.
- With the assistance of government, create a resource guide with information on who is trained to provide mental health and other specialized services, and how to refer someone for care before he or she “mobilizes” to violent extremism, and market that guide widely to the public.
- Create or enhance “service provider to service provider” dialogues to ensure they are communicating regarding service issues and resources.

¹⁴ A wide range of individuals includes organizations/service providers, government/non-government stakeholders, parents, peers, community leaders, faith-based leaders, educators, private clinicians, emergency mental health providers, multi-disciplinary assessment and care teams, youth/street workers, mentors, hotline operators, etc. It can include prison, probation, parole and community corrections staff.

¹⁵ These dialogues and trainings may cover a range of topics like violent extremism, gang violence, workplace violence, school violence, etc.

¹⁶ A needs assessment can be done independent from government or with the assistance of government.

¹⁷ Comprehensive wrap-around services include screening and assessment, case management, individualized service plans, educational assistance/referral/placement and transitional job opportunities.

¹⁸ Understanding on threat assessment can be increased through dialogue, outreach materials, and other methods.

¹⁹ This team should consider a range of issues as opposed to focusing solely on violent extremism. Federal, state and local government should be included on the team along with non-government representatives.

- Create or enhance a network system among community, non-government organizations, service providers, schools and law enforcement for referrals for services or, when necessary, reporting of public safety concerns.
- Establish (or enhance) local multidisciplinary behavior assessment teams that include schools, Department of Children and Families, crisis intervention staff, law enforcement, public health and others so that behavior may be more effectively assessed for follow-up care.²⁰
- With the assistance of subject-matter experts and with the cooperation of government, enhance dialogues with prison, parole, probation and community corrections staff to discuss ways to increase resiliency factors within prison or community corrections environments.
- Establish (or enhance) formal and informal lines of communications among law enforcement, mental health and social service agencies to improve relationship, communication and understanding.
- Utilize (or create or enhance) existing hotlines for concerned parents, caregivers, family members, peers and others to share concerns and receive assistance and feedback.

PROBLEM THREE

Social media and other media platforms are being used to recruit individuals to join extremist groups and to encourage individuals to engage in violence.

GOAL AREAS

- Educate communities about ways to protect their children from being recruited.
- Develop broad and diverse counter narratives and promote those narratives for wide reach.
- Provide platforms for young people to have answers to questions from reliable sources.

SOLUTIONS TO CONSIDER

Awareness/Education/Training

- Utilize subject matter experts, which could include government personnel, to assist populations across the ages with understanding Internet safety and achieving competency with digital literacy skills.
- With law enforcement assistance, educate community representatives in a controlled setting about existing messages, propaganda and recruitment efforts and the harm this can do their children.
- Through efforts initiated by non-governmental stakeholders, increase awareness regarding the impact of hate speech and network with those working to counter hate speech.
- As developed and initiated by non-government, utilize scholars, community leaders and clergy to assist in public debates over ideological and socio-psychological underpinnings of contemporary violent extremism.
- As developed and initiated by non-government, conduct presentations by prominent academics to frame the issues and objectively explain the history of various movements and the drivers of their evolution.
- Utilize academics to advise on the serious danger presented by certain kinds of materials (e.g. different kinds of materials, sizes of collection).
- With the assistance of subject-matter experts, increase awareness of existing approaches to online dialogue and online organizing.

²⁰Many K-12 schools and universities have Multidisciplinary Behavior Assessment Teams which are also known as Threat Assessment Teams or Student Threat Assessment Teams (STAT). These Teams discuss all forms of concerning behavior.

Engagement/Support

- Develop relationships between non-government and communications experts who can provide education on the basics of media marketing strategies and contextual advertising; assist in creating, producing, editing and delivering a specific public message; and assist with the technical aspect of creating online traffic (i.e. domain names, tagging, search engine optimization/search engine marketing, etc.).
- Through efforts initiated by non-governmental stakeholders, provide safe spaces within the community for young people to express and process frustrations, fears and concerns.
- Increase non-governmental efforts to promote non-violent religious perspectives, which can be geared specifically toward reaching adolescents and young adults.

PROBLEM FOUR

U.S. policy and events around the globe can frustrate, anger and, at times, influence some to think that there is no effective alternative other than to express grievances or solidarity through the use of violence.

GOAL AREAS

- Provide skills to individuals, with a primary focus on young people, to support conflict resolution and constructive advocacy.²¹
- Provide education about effective approaches to activism and political/social impact.
- Provide support for youth engagement/empowerment/activism programs.
- Enhance communication and coordination between community and government.

SOLUTIONS TO CONSIDER

Skills Development Programs

- Utilize schools, universities, community and faith-based programs and private providers to assist young people with developing critical thinking and conflict resolution skills.
- Utilize schools, community and faith-based programs and private providers to assist young people with developing self-management/youth self-advocacy skills to young people.
- Utilize schools, community and faith-based programs and private providers to assist young people with developing anger management skills.
- Increase opportunities, with the assistance of schools, community and faith-based organizations, for young people to create their own narrative for peace and develop marketing strategies and skills to implement that narrative.

Awareness/Education/Training

- Provide workshops in the community and at schools on non-violent activism/civic engagement with the assistance of subject-matter experts.
- With the assistance of subject-matter experts, provide education to populations across the ages on how to be an advocate.
- With the assistance of public health and mental health providers, provide workshops for parents, NGOs, faith-based organizations, and teachers on helping young people handle anger and frustration.
- Utilize subject matter experts to teach people and communities how to advocate on and to make change in policy (e.g. local, U.S. and foreign policy) through non-violence.

²¹ The structure of the programs may vary depending on the age group.

- Provide training, with the assistance of subject-matter experts, to government/law enforcement on effective ways to interact with individuals who wish to engage in nonviolent activism.
- Increase awareness within communities about the mission and responsibilities of local, state and federal government agencies which will also better educate communities about the limitations of those local agencies.

Engagement/Support

- Through non-governmental organizations, provide safe spaces for young people to express and process frustrations, fears and concerns.
- Engage in regular dialogues and relationship building activities between government and non-government stakeholders.
- Identify successful youth empowerment and activism programs/activities, and widely promote and support them in schools and non-government organizations.
- Create internship programs across all government agencies for young people to understand how government works.
- Create opportunities for government and young people to engage in dialogues through recreational activities, youth advisory councils, presentations at schools and college classes, town halls, afterschool programs, youth academies and other formal or informal channels.
- Develop strategies to foster communication between government and non-government whereby the community can seek aid and assistance when concerns arise within the community or across the globe.

PROBLEM FIVE

Distrust between government and non-government hinders collaboration and effective decision making and problem solving.

GOAL AREAS

- Develop relationships between community and policy-makers to influence policy.
- Identify lessons learned and best practices of successful government/non-government relationships and increase awareness regarding those lessons and practices.
- Increase dialogue between government and non-government through informal and formal dialogues.
- Increase knowledge of laws, systems, policies and procedures and enhance systems when possible.
- Increase diversity of the government workforce to more significantly reflect the community that it serves.

SOLUTIONS TO CONSIDER

Awareness/Education/Training

- Create or enhance engagement among non-government, government and experts on federal and state privacy, civil rights and civil liberties protections through meetings, workshops and other activities.
- Through government-initiated engagement, educate the community about the differences among the various law enforcement agencies and clarify information on law enforcement policies that are poorly and/or inaccurately understood. (e.g. community policing, informant policy, undercover operations)
- Through government-initiated engagement, increase understanding within the community about threat assessment, the range of those using it and how assessment information is maintained and stored.
- Utilize subject matter experts (which includes those in the community) to develop and provide interactive cultural sensitivity and awareness training to government.

- Through government-initiated efforts and with the assistance of non-government, provide training to law enforcement on the do's and don'ts and importance of community outreach.
- Through government-initiated efforts, increase law enforcement understanding using a victim-centered approach/people focused approach vs. an incident focused approach.
- Through government-initiated efforts and with assistance of subject-matter experts, provide or enhance conflict resolution training for government employees.

Engagement/Support

- Create or enhance private sector engagement with law enforcement to discuss ways to protect against becoming victims of violent extremism and how to respond if victimized.
- Through law enforcement-initiated efforts, enhance relationships with communities through community policing.²²
- Create opportunities for non-government to inform government on decisions and policy (e.g. community advisory groups).
- Through partnerships between non-government and government, create opportunities for youth/government engagement through internships, recreation, advisory groups, etc.
- When possible, share unclassified emerging threat information from law enforcement to community representatives.
- Enhance outreach by government and other social services to immigrant and refugee communities as a way to enhance dialogues.
- Encourage law enforcement and community attendance and participation at public housing and neighborhood watch meetings.
- Build connections and enhance communication between community leaders and local politicians/public officials.
- Create joint government and non-government strategies on how to deal with the media to prevent stakeholders from being used against one another.
- Hire culturally diverse individuals for government positions which may require a review of recruiting practices and may involve expanding agency outreach to younger generations.
- Show support to communities by ensuring that the prosecution office promptly engages with those communities who may suffer backlash from certain prosecutions.

PROBLEM SIX

Lack of knowledge in mainstream society regarding religions, cultures and thought systems which are unfamiliar or are maligned in the media, contributes to poor perceptions that fuel and mutually reinforce fear and estrangement.

GOAL AREAS

- Increase knowledge and understanding regarding cultures, religions and thought systems.
- Create a culture of respect, tolerance and inclusiveness.

²² Effective community policing that addresses *all* of the security concerns of various populations creates community resilience, authentic relationships between citizens and their police department, and forges/strengthens the bonds of trust between police and the community it serves. Police departments like the Boston Police Department have been engaged in community policing for many years. The purpose of community policing is not to gather intelligence from the community.

SOLUTIONS TO CONSIDER

Engagement/Support

- Encourage partners to disseminate public statements/press releases to partner media lists.
- Invite media to public debates that are initiated by the community.
- Create ongoing non-government-initiated counter narratives with assistance from experts and students at universities.
- Engage in dialogue between community and government speech writers and leaders to enhance perspective regarding language used to communicate with the public.
- Through partnerships, create cross-cultural engagement activities and heavily market those activities to the public as a way to enhance understanding.
- Engage in dialogues and relationship building activities between government and non-government stakeholders.
- Through partnerships between universities and subject matter experts, encourage free expression on campuses, but counter hate and bigotry.
- Create internship programs across all government agencies for young people to understand how government works.
- Hire culturally diverse individuals for government positions which may require a review of recruiting practices and may involve expanding agency outreach to younger generations.

Awareness/Education/Training

- Provide training, with the assistance of subject-matter experts, to non-governmental/faith-based organizations on strategies for working with the media.
- Utilize subject matter experts (which includes those in the community) to develop and provide interactive cultural sensitivity and awareness training to government.
- As developed and initiated by non-government, issue public statements, op-eds and other messaging that may clarify and enhance perspective within the public.
- As developed and initiated by non-government, utilize scholars, community leaders and clergy to assist in public debates over ideological and socio-psychological underpinnings of contemporary violent extremism.
- As developed and initiated by non-government, conduct presentations by prominent academics to frame the issues and objectively explain the history of various movements and the drivers of their evolution.²³
- Provide training that is initiated by schools and employers and with the assistance of subject matter experts on how to develop school and workplace cultures that promote tolerance and difference (e.g. anti-bullying, anti-hate, anti-bias programs, conflict resolution, cross-cultural conflict resolution).
- With the assistance of subject-matter experts, teach people in schools and within the community about how to counter hate speech in a non-violent way, both on and offline.

²³ This presentation would benefit from multi-party vetting.

PROBLEM SEVEN

Individuals convicted of hate crimes and terrorism offenses require specialized support and services before and after release from prison.

GOAL AREAS

- Increase understanding regarding disengagement from violent extremism within the corrections setting
- Coordinate services between corrections and post-release service providers in an effort to reduce risk of return to violence through sustainable reintegration into the community.

SOLUTIONS TO CONSIDER

Awareness/Education/Training

- Utilize subject matter experts to educate corrections and community corrections personnel²⁴ regarding violent extremism and disengagement from violent extremism.
- Utilize subject matter experts to provide specialized training on disengagement from violent extremism to existing service providers who are providing intensive case management and diversion/reentry-related services.
- In cooperation and coordination with correctional institutions, expose those convicted of hate crimes and terrorist-related charges to former violent extremists ("formers") or, if not feasible, to the stories of "formers" who can provide support and encouragement.

²⁴ Personnel may include correctional program staff, psychologists, investigators, probation and parole personnel and others.

NEXT STEPS IN MASSACHUSETTS

Considerable energy has been devoted to developing a consensus framework that can be customized and implemented broadly. The next immediate steps in the process will be to identify resources for implementation, establish a well-coordinated implementation plan and develop performance measurement tools. Over the coming months, the Collaborative will spend the next year focusing on, among other things, the following:

- **Identification of Public Resources**
In coordination with local, state and federal government, existing public resources (including those dedicated toward violence prevention) will be more fully assessed to determine where resources can be leveraged.
- **City/Town/Regional Implementation**
Efforts will be made to select at least two specific jurisdictions (i.e. cities/towns/regions) in Massachusetts to customize and implement the framework.
- **Technical Assistance/Enhanced Assessment and Screening Protocols**
Subject-matter experts on violent extremism will be secured to provide technical assistance to existing service providers (across the state) who are providing comprehensive wrap-around services to high-risk and court-involved youth. These providers already have programs that include assessment tools, case management, individualized service plans, educational assistance/referral/placement and transitional job opportunities. However, they have not traditionally worked with individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists or those radicalizing to violent extremism. Technical assistance will be provided so they may enhance existing program models.
- **Improved Awareness of Violent Extremism**
There is a great need to properly educate a number of stakeholders about violent extremism. Trainers will be identified and properly trained by subject-matter experts. Non-government will also be included as trainers. Presentations will be customized depending on the format of the presentation (e.g. conference-style, roundtable dialogue) and audience (e.g. schools, community, peers, law enforcement). Priority will be given to training existing school and university assessment and care teams, crisis intervention and response teams and others (including non-government) who directly request the training. The training may not be limited to violent extremism, rather, it may be a presentation merged into a larger conference or event.
- **Controlled Exposure to Violent Extremist Propaganda/Development of Community-initiated Counter Narratives**
Interested community representatives will be educated in a controlled setting about existing messages, propaganda and recruitment efforts and the harm they can do their children. They will be connected with experts who can provide greater understanding on the breadth, scope, and complexities of developing counter narratives. They will be exposed to local university representatives and communication experts who are interested in assisting communities with developing broad and diverse counter narratives
- **Expansion of Youth Dialogue and Civic Engagement Programs**
Some organizations, schools and universities have expressed an interest in developing activities that will engage young people in the discussion about how to prevent individuals from joining violent extremist groups. Subject-matter experts will be included in dialogues so they may assist adolescents and young adults with developing platforms for prevention. Additionally, civic engagement programs for young people will be expanded and offered to others.
- **Trauma-Informed Care and Crisis Intervention Training**
With the assistance of public health and mental health providers, training on trauma-

informed care and crisis intervention will be provided to non-government. Included in this training will be a networking opportunity with existing providers/organizations so they may determine the best process for referring individuals for specialized services using existing networks.

- **Development of Performance Measures**

In order to develop and maintain legitimacy as well as be competitive for grant funding, agencies and organizations must develop ways to measure the success of their efforts. Experts will be consulted to assist with the development of performance metrics for the sample solutions so that success can be measured.

- **Digital Literacy Presentations**

Existing digital literacy presentations will be enhanced and provided as requested, in partnership with government and non-government.

- **Specialized Training and Dialogues on Disengagement**

Dialogues with corrections, probation and parole will be coordinated to expand understanding of violent extremism and disengagement from violent extremism.

- **Technical Assistance on Limited English Proficiency (LEP) Planning**

Some cities with diverse populations struggle to work through the complexities of developing a Limited English Proficiency (LEP) plan that meets the needs of its community members. Subject-matter experts will be identified to train local and state government on how to conduct an LEP assessment so they may develop an effective plan.

- **Enhanced Communication among Law Enforcement /Mental Health/Social Service Agencies**

In coordination with others, existing methods of communications among law enforcement (local, state and federal), mental health and social service agencies will be assessed so that methods can be enhanced.

- **Cultural Awareness Training to Federal Government**

In cooperation with federal agencies, existing cultural awareness training to federal employees will be assessed to determine the trainers that have been used, the format of training, the frequency of training and improvements needed. Assessment information will be shared with local and state government so they may enhance their practices.

- **Development of a Resource Guide**

Individuals cannot access resources if they are unaware of them. After an assessment has been conducted of the programs and services provided by organizations and agencies, the information will be compiled into a user-friendly resource guide and made available to communities.

- **Public Awareness Regarding Roles of Government Agencies**

The public lacks awareness regarding the mission and responsibilities of the various government agencies, which can cause frustration when assistance is needed. In coordination with representatives from local, state and federal government, methods of enhancing awareness will be explored.

- **Increased Awareness Regarding Threat Assessment**

During the development of the framework, it was learned that non-government is unfamiliar with "threat assessment", its purpose, who is doing it, how it is done and how information is maintained and stored. In coordination with other law enforcement, a plan will be established to increase understanding of this practice.

- **Enhanced Training on Community Outreach**

In collaboration with law enforcement and community leaders, a presentation will be developed for delivery to law enforcement on the "do's and don'ts" and importance of community outreach. Once developed, the presentation will be marketed to law enforcement agencies.

APPENDIX A

Greater Boston Regional Collaborative

The locally-driven framework has been developed by a collaborative of non-governmental, governmental and academic stakeholders from the Greater Boston region. Also included in the collaborative were a few representatives from Washington, D.C. The Collaborative was made up of the following individuals:

Non-Government

- Saida M. Abdi, LICSW, Director of Community Relations, Refugee Trauma and Resilience Center at Boston's Children's Hospital
- Imam Basheer Bilaal, Islamic Society of Greater Lowell
- Reverend Jeffrey Brown, Twelfth Baptist Church, Roxbury
- Melissa Garlick, Regional Counsel, Anti-Defamation League
- Andrea Hall, LICSW, Clinical Director, Boston Emergency Services Team, Cambridge Somerville ESP, Department of Psychiatry, Boston Medical Center
- Deeqa M. Jibril, Founder/Executive Director, Somali Community and Cultural Association
- Shahid Ahmed Khan, Pakistani Association
- Dr. Nabeel Khudairi, Islamic Council of New England
- Sulieman Muhammad, Islamic Council of New England
- Robert Trestan, New England Regional Director, Anti-Defamation League
- Abdirahman A. Yusuf, Executive Director, Somali Development Center

Government

- Dr. Lina Alathari, Supervisory Research Psychologist, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center, Washington, D.C.
- Deputy Superintendent Paul Ames, Cambridge Police Department
- Jennifer Ball, Chief of Staff, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)
- Alope Chakravarty, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Massachusetts
- Brandy Donini-Melanson, Law Enforcement Coordinator, U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Massachusetts
- Susan Durkin, Outreach Specialist, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Field Division
- Jodie Elgee, Director, Counseling and Intervention Center, Boston Public Schools
- Superintendent Paul Fitzgerald, Boston Regional Intelligence Center, Boston Police Department
- David Fredette, Assistant District Attorney, Suffolk County District Attorney's Office
- Usra Ghazi, Public Policy Fellow, New Bostonians, City of Boston
- Anne Gilligan, MPH, Safe and Healthy Schools Coordinator, Massachusetts Department of Education
- Michelle Goldman, Policy Advisor, Homeland Security, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security (EOPSS)
- Police Commissioner Robert Haas, Cambridge Police Department
- Scott Hatch, Deputy Chief, Radicalization and Extremist Messages Group, National Counterterrorism Center
- Captain Haseeb Hosein, Boston Police Department
- Eleanor Joseph, Advisor, City of Boston
- Lydia Khalil, Analyst, Boston Police Department
- Diane McLeod, Director, Massachusetts Association of Human Rights and Relations Commission

- Chief Steven Mazzie, Everett Police Department and Former President, Massachusetts Major Cities Chiefs of Police Association
- Tracy Miller, Supervisory Intelligence Analyst, Federal Bureau of Investigation, CVE Office, Washington, D.C.
- Daniel Mulhern, Director of Public Safety, City of Boston
- Sergeant James O'Connor, Boston Police Department
- Superintendent Bernard O'Rourke, Chief, Bureau of Field Services, Boston Police Department
- Dr. Debra Pinals, Assistant Commissioner for Forensic Services, Massachusetts Department of Mental Health
- Kieran L. Ramsey, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Field Division
- Captain Scott Range, Massachusetts State Police, Commonwealth Fusion Center
- Denis Riordan, District Director, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Boston Field Office
- Alejandra St. Guillen, Director, New Bostonians, City of Boston
- Kurt Schwartz, Undersecretary of Homeland Security, Executive Office of Public Safety and Security (EOPSS), and Director of Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)
- Lt. Scott Sencabaugh, Wilmington Police Department/NEMLEC STARS Response Team Coordinator
- Sean Smith, Public Affairs/Border Community Liaison, Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, Boston Field Office
- David Solet, General Counsel, Middlesex County District Attorney's Office
- Darwin Suelen, Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Field Division
- Ehsan Zaffar, Senior Advisor, Department of Homeland Security, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Washington, D.C.

Academic Advisors

- Dr. Heidi Ellis, Director, Refugee Trauma and Resilience Center at Boston's Children's Hospital
- Dr. Robert Fein, Forensic and National Security Psychologist
- Dr. John Horgan, Director, Center for Terrorism and Security Studies, UMass Lowell
- Dr. Peter Levine, Associate Dean for Research and Lincoln Filene, Professor of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Jonathan M. Tisch College of Citizenship and Public Service, Tufts University
- Dr. Eben Weitzman, Director, Graduate Programs in Conflict Resolution, Human Security and Global Governance, UMass Boston, John W. McCormack Graduate School of Policy and Global Studies
- Dr. Michael Williams, Postdoc, Center for Terrorism and Security Studies, UMass Lowell

APPENDIX B

Acknowledgements

A number of individuals have provided support, insight and guidance as the Greater Boston Regional Collaborative worked to develop the framework. The U.S. Attorney's Office would like to thank the following individuals for their assistance throughout the process:

- Brette Steele, Senior Counsel, Department of Justice, Deputy Attorney General's Office
- John Picarelli, Program Manager for Transnational Issues, Department of Justice, National Institute for Justice
- James Farmer, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Massachusetts
- Jennifer Maconochie, Director, Strategic Initiatives & Policies, Boston Police Department
- Kelly Nee, Deputy Superintendent, Boston Regional Intelligence Center, Boston Police Department
- Boston's National Forum for Youth Violence Prevention
- Yusufi Vali, Executive Director, Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center (ISBCC) Muslim American Society – Boston Chapter
- Nichole Mossalam, Executive Director, Islamic Society of Boston –Cambridge
- BRIDGES partners
- Mary Ann Gapinski, Director of School Health, Massachusetts Department of Public Health
- Farah Pandith, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Council on Foreign Relations, Counter Extremism Project
- Brad Davis, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Field Division
- Bradford S. Stewart, Domestic Representative, National Counterterrorism Center
- Stephen Marks, Assistant Special Agent Charge, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Boston Field Office
- Brian Deck, Assistant Special Agent Charge, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Secret Service, Boston Field Office
- Captain Chris Wright, Massachusetts Department of Corrections
- Matthew McCann, Deputy Federal Preparedness Coordinator, Department of Homeland Security, FEMA Region 1
- Sean Gallagher, Field Office Director, Boston Field Division, Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal
- Dan Cooler, Northeast Regional Director, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Department of Homeland Security

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APPENDIX C

Dissenting View – Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center (ISBCC)

I want to begin by thanking U.S. Attorney Carmen Ortiz for her office's sincere efforts in working with the community on this initiative and incorporating many of the community's ideas that could lead to healthier and safe communities. Ultimately, however, I cannot sign on to this document due to the premise of "Countering Violent Extremism" mandated by the National Security Council and other federal actors, which guides this framework.

Many of the services suggested in this report are initiatives that ought to be implemented in any and all communities, particularly those that have been marginalized. Civic engagement is a vitally important tool towards empowering communities. There are Bostonians of all backgrounds, including the Boston Muslim community, that have serious resource needs and face emotional trauma. We have seen the power of responding to gang violence and bullying in schools with interventions and outreach driven by a common faith.

However, at their core, CVE programs are founded on the premise that your faith determines your propensity towards violence. It clearly appears that the CVE initiative is exclusively targeting the American-Muslim community, in spite of the best efforts of the local U.S. Attorney to re-define it expansively.

The data shows that violent extremism is an extremely rare phenomena. Furthermore, the working group concludes that religious and ethnic profiling, including the attendance of a mosque, cannot predict violent threats or extremist individuals. The everyday reality of nearly all American-Muslims is like that of any other American: we simply do not meet or experience individuals interested in violent ideologies. My experience as a leader of an Islamic center is emblematic. In my nearly two and a half years as Executive Director at the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center, my team and I have never personally come across any individual in our congregation seriously considering any fanatical ideology.

As a result, for the government to offer us services based on concerns of violent extremism in our community – as implied by this framework – seems to reinforce the same stereotype that society holds of American-Muslims: that they or Islam are inherently violent. This is unacceptable to our Boston-Muslim community.

A far more appropriate premise to the framework acceptable to the Boston-Muslim community would have been "countering violence". This term does not single out the American-Muslim community and could apply to a number of low-resourced and powerless communities, from immigration populations in the south to those living in poverty in Appalachia.

We at the ISBCC are aware that extremist groups and terrorist organizations seek to recruit susceptible members of our communities through a distorted and false vision of Islam. As we fortify our youth against repugnant ideologies that are not part of our faith, and as we amplify our voices to denounce extremism in all its forms, we believe a two-step methodology will help us achieve these goals.

First, improving outcomes for all marginalized communities, including segments of the Boston Muslim community, will make our congregants even more resilient in the face of repugnant ideologies. Serving marginalized segments of our community and addressing their needs is a core ethos of our religious institution and will continue to be a priority.

Second, we at the ISBCC teach and live a faith that is rooted in Islamic tradition, committed to American ideals, and empowered to serve the common good. This authentic Islam is rooted in the values of compassion, justice, community, and a commitment to America. Delivering on this vision of Islam in more robust, creative, and relevant ways to our young people - and thereby winning in the marketplace of ideas - allows us to be successful in (a) proactively improving the resilience of Boston as a whole and (b) fortifying our community against all harms and dangers, including radicalization. What we need is the support of our neighbors and community members so that we can achieve our mission.

Yusufi Vali, Executive Director
Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center (ISBCC), Muslim American Society – Boston Chapter

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY HOLDS A HEARING ON TERRORISM IN GARLAND, TEXAS

June 03, 2015

SPEAKERS:

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REP. BARRY LOUDERMILK, R-GA.
REP. MARTHA MCSALLY, R-ARIZ.
REP. JOHN RATCLIFFE, R-TEXAS
REP. MARK WALKER, R-N.C.
REP. PATRICK MEEHAN, R-PA.
REP. DANIEL M. DONOVAN JR., R-N.Y.
REP. PETE SESSIONS, R-TEXAS

REP. BENNIE THOMPSON, D-MISS.
RANKING MEMBER

REP. LORETTA SANCHEZ, D-CALIF.
REP. SHEILA JACKSON LEE, D-TEXAS
REP. BRIAN HIGGINS, D-N.Y.
REP. CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, D-LA.
REP. WILLIAM KEATING, D-MASS.
REP. DONALD M. PAYNE JR., D-N.J.
REP. FILEMON VELA, D-TEXAS
REP. BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, D-N.J.
REP. KATHLEEN RICE, D-N.Y.
REP. NORMA J. TORRES, D-CALIF.
REP. JIM LANGEVIN, D-R.I.

WITNESSES:

- ❖ JOHN MULLIGAN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
- ❖ FRANCIS TAYLOR, UNDERSECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
- ❖ MICHAEL STEINBACH, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, COUNTERTERRORISM DIVISION, FBI

MCCAUL: The Committee on Homeland Security will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony regarding the increasing threat from violent Islamic extremists groups, such as ISIS, who use the Internet and social media to recruit fighters, share propaganda and inspire and potentially direct attacks.

And before I recognize myself for an opening statement, I'd like to welcome our newest member of the committee, Congressman Daniel Donovan of New York. We have another -- yet another New Yorker on this committee. Quite a contingency we're building.

But his experience as a district attorney and dedication to public service make him a, I believe, valuable asset to this committee, and we're happy to have you, sir. Appreciate it.

I now recognize -- I yield to the gentleman from New York.

(UNKNOWN): I'd like to join you in welcoming Mr. Donovan. (inaudible) many years. He's an outstanding district attorney, outstanding public servant, and he's going to be able to work across the aisle for the betterment of the country.

So Dan, it's great to have you on board. Thank you.

MCCAUL: Ms. Rice...

RICE: Just to show how bipartisan we are all going to be, as a Democrat, I would like to welcome my former colleague, D.A. -- former D.A. Dan Donovan. Great to have you here, and look forward to working with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MCCAUL: Anybody else -- anybody else like to -- Mr. Richmond?

Onto a more serious topic, just yesterday in Boston, reports are emerging that Mr. Raheem was killed by federal law enforcement officers after lunging at them with a knife. He was being investigated by the Boston Joint Terrorism Task Force after communicating with and spreading ISIS propaganda online.

Known associates of Mr. Raheem are also being arrested as we speak. These cases are a reminder of the dangers posed by individuals radicalized through social media.

In Garland, one month ago, Elton Simpson fired off a series of tweets declaring his loyalty to the Islamic State and urged others to do the same. Simpson included a hashtag, *texasattack*, previewing his decision to terrorize the Prophet Mohammed cartoon contest that Islamists on social media had signalled out as a target.

In his final tweets minutes before the attack, Simpson told his followers to follow Junaid Hussain, also known as al-Britani, a 20-year-old British foreign fighter embedded with ISIS in Syria and one of the group's top recruiters, who has been linked to the CENTCOM Twitter hack in January of this year.

Hussain was quick to praise the Garland attack and issued a warning that same night stating, quote, "The knives have been sharpened. Soon we will come to your streets with death and slaughter."

This attack exemplifies a new era in which terrorism has gone viral. Extremists issued a call to arms to attack an event. A radicalized follower clearly heeded that call, and he took steps to make sure his act of violence would spread and motivate more.

Social-media networks have become an extension of the Islamist terror battlefield overseas, turning home-grown extremists into sleeper operatives and attackers.

The proliferation of jihadist propaganda online has established a new front in our battle against Islamic extremists. We are no longer hunting terrorists living in caves and who only communicate through couriers; we are facing an enemy whose messages and calls to violence are posted and promoted in realtime over the Internet.

For example, last month, the threat level at military bases across the country was elevated after ISIS supporters posted the names of individuals serving in the military online and quickly spread this on social media.

Aspiring fanatics can receive updates from hardcore extremists on the ground in Syria via Twitter, watch ISIS blood lust on YouTube, view jihadi selfies on Instagram, read religious justifications for murder on JustPasteIt and find travel guides to the battlefield on Ask.fm.

Jihadi recruiters are mastering the ability to monitor and prey upon Western youth susceptible to the twisted message of Islamist terror. They seek out curious users who question, -- have questions about Islam or want to know what life is like in the so-called Islamic State. They engage, establish bonds of trust and assess the commitment of their potential recruits.

From there, extremists direct users to continue the conversation on more secure apps, where secure communications hide their messages from our intelligence agencies.

Such communications can include advice for traveling to terror safe havens, contact information for smugglers into Turkey or the membership process for joining ISIS itself.

I know the officials appearing before us here today are disturbed by these trends.

Mobile apps like Kik and WhatsApp as well as data-destroying apps like Wickr and Surespot are allowing extremists to communicate outside of the view of law enforcement. Equally as worrisome are ISIS attempts to use the Dark or Deep Web.

These Web sites hide I.P. addresses and cannot be reached by search engines, giving terrorists another covert means by which they can recruit fighters, share intelligence, raise funds and potentially plot and direct attacks undetected, as we saw yesterday in Boston.

ISIS tailors its message for specific audiences around the globe and in doing so projects power far beyond the safe havens by amplifying its battlefield successes and winning over new converts across the world. Its media sophistication helps legitimize self-proclaimed caliphate in its perverse interpretation of Islam.

This stands in stark contrast to Al Qaeda's past outreach, which relied on tightly controlled, top-down messaging and propaganda more difficult for aspiring jihadists to find.

Today, ISIS is instead taking a grassroots approach to terror, seeding its repressive world view from the ground up. From digital magazines to online videos that glorify barbaric murder, ISIS is using its multi-platform engagement to create a jihadi subculture that supports its violent ideology and encourages attacks against the United States and its allies.

These tactics are a sea change for spreading terror, and they require from us a paradigm shift in our counterterrorism, intelligence and our operations.

For example, we can start doing what FBI Director Comey suggested, shaking the trees more aggressive to quickly identify and engage potential homegrown jihadis.

MCCAUL: But this is a dynamic new front in the war against Islamist terror, and it will require a new approach with a heavy focus on the ideological battlespace.

I'm grateful for the three witnesses we have here today that are dealing first-hand on the front lines with how this terror is going viral. And I look forward to hearing their testimony and recommendations for confronting this new and dangerous challenge.

And with that, I now recognize the ranking member

THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding today's hearing.

I'd like also to thank the witnesses for appearing today.

On May 3rd, the American Freedom Defense Initiative, which is recognized as a hate group by the Southern Poverty Law Center, organized a Mohammed art exhibit and contest event in Garland, Texas. Two violent extremists, armed with assault rifles and body armor, attacked police that were providing security to the event, resulting in the wounding of a dedicated police officer.

According to the FBI, just hours before the Garland attack, a bulletin was issued to state and local police stating that one of the assailants may have an interest in traveling to the event. Unfortunately, the local police stated that the bulletin was not received in time.

Mr. Chairman, by no means am I saying that this bulletin would have changed the outcome of the situation. But I do think that this illustrates that we need to continue looking into information-sharing with state and local police, and also listening to the boots on the ground on how to recognize and prevent acts of home-grown violent extremism.

In the days following the attack in Garland, supporters of the terrorist group ISIL praised the attack. After the attack, it was discovered that one of the gunmen detailed his plans to leave the country and travel to Syria to join ISIL on Twitter. The assailant's plans were disrupted when the FBI arrested some people that planned to travel with him.

It also came to light that he engaged with other ISIL followers from around the world through Twitter.

Mr. Chairman, we know that the threats from foreign and domestic terrorist groups are not going away overnight. Using the Internet and social media to recruit members, plan attacks and spread ideology is not novel. As the director of the National Counterterrorism Center pointed out in a hearing in this committee in February, ISIL's exploitation of social media plays a prominent role in the group's ability to recruit fighters from around the world.

But as we look at social media and how violent extremist propaganda is spread, we must look at ways to counter-message. Both sides of the aisle are engaged in an examination of the president's countering violent extremism strategy. The department has a vital role to play in carrying out that strategy, as evidenced by the fact that there is a dedicated CVE coordinator, David Gernstein (ph), working.

Mr. Chairman, at this time, I request that this committee have an open oversight hearing where we can take testimony from DHS's CVE coordinator about the department's role in implementing the CVE strategy.

Furthermore, we know that more work remains to ensure that our foreign partners are willing to and able to stop and identify foreign fighters at their borders. Last Friday, the U.N. Council issued an unprecedented statement urging countries to enforce border controls that allow suspected terrorists to travel across international borders. The director of the NCTC also stated at our February hearing that there was work to be done in this area.

I know that the committee has a task force that is examining this issue and we should be receiving their recommendations soon.

Mr. Chairman, as I stated in our last hearing on this issue, we all have to -- a stake to prevent terrorist attacks against Americans and on American soil. Accordingly, I encourage this committee to continuous -- continue serious discussions on how to counter violent extremist messages, while protecting constitutional rights.

As we consider this threat, we need to foster greater information sharing among the diverse partners and seek new ways to work together to pursue effective and promising approaches to violent extremism.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

MCCAUL: I thank the ranking member.

First, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Sessions, the chairman of the Rules Committee, also represents Garland, Texas, be allowed to sit on the dais and participate in today's hearing.

Without objection, so ordered.

The gentleman from Texas is recognized.

SMITH: Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask unanimous consent to be recognized out of order for two minutes.

MCCAUL: Without objection.

SMITH: And Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your and the ranking member's indulgence. And I'll yield my two minutes to the gentleman from Texas, the chairman of the Rules Committee, Pete Sessions.

MCCAUL: Mr. Sessions is recognized.

SESSIONS: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And my thanks to Chairman Lamar Smith, my colleague from San Antonio, for kindly yielding time to me. And I also want to thank the young chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, the gentleman from Austin, Michael McCaul, as well as the ranking member, my good friend, Bennie Thompson, and members of the committee.

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing to discuss the ISIS-inspired terrorist attack in Garland, Texas. As the proud representative of the 32nd Congressional District of Texas, I'm pleased to notify each and every one of you that all of North Texas is committed to fighting terrorism. Specifically, the city of Garland, Texas is a diverse, all-American city that continues to attract families and businesses with its thriving economy and growing opportunities.

Since 1891, this city has grown from a small cotton farming community to a thriving metropolitan area outside of Dallas, with almost a quarter-million people that call Garland, Texas home.

The mayor of Garland, Texas, Doug Athas, is a friend of mine and he works closely with his city managers, William Dollar and Brian Bradford, as well as the police chief, Mitch Bates, and local officials including the school board and other community leaders, to ensure that Garland is a great, safe city to live in.

On Sunday, March 3rd -- May 3rd, 2015, a courageous Garland police officer swiftly acted to protect the people of Garland from what could have been a devastating situation. I would like to commend the police officer and all members of local law enforcement who stood in the face of terrorism and protected countless innocent lives.

I remain committed to working with each of my colleagues in the House, local leaders and local law enforcement, to uphold our duty as elected officials to protect the people who we serve. It is my sincere hope that today's hearing that we can learn positive lessons so that other cities and communities can be as prepared as Garland, Texas if an event were to happen in their local community.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I yield back my time.

MCCAUL: I thank the gentleman from Texas.

Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record.

I'm pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. The first, John Mulligan, joined the National Counterterrorism Center in March 2015 as deputy director. Previously, he served as associate deputy director for counterterrorism at the National Security Agency.

Next, we have Mr. Francis Taylor, assumed his post as undersecretary for intelligence and analysis at the Department of Homeland Security in April of 2014. Previously, he served as assistant secretary of state for diplomatic security and director of the Office of Foreign Missions.

And finally, we have Mr. Michael Steinbach, who was appointed by FBI Director James Comey as the assistant director of the Counterterrorism Division in July of 2014. Prior to assuming his current position, he served as deputy assistant director of the Counterterrorism Division and the acting section chief of the FBI's International Terrorism Operations Center.

I want to thank all of you for being here today.

The chair now recognizes Deputy Director Mulligan to testify.

MULLIGAN: Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and members of the committee. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to discuss some of the recent events of interest to the committee and the growing threat of extremists' use of social media to national security.

I'm pleased to join my colleagues from Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. As you already know, we work closely every day as part of the counterterrorism community, and that interagency partnership is one of the keystones of our homeland defense.

This morning, I will speak briefly to you about the recent attempted attack in Garland, Texas and the role of violent extremist social media in that event. Then I will transition to broader remarks on ISIL's use of social media before concluding by sharing some of the efforts NCTC and our partners across the federal government are pursuing to counter that avenue of threat.

MULLIGAN: As has already been described, last month, two U.S. citizens attacked an art exhibit and cartoon contest in Garland, Texas. The attackers arrived on the day of the events, exited their car, and opened fire with semiautomatic rifles, injuring a guard on the scene.

Thankfully, local law enforcement partners in the area were aware of the potential for violence and were able to respond quickly to prevent the attack from injuring or killing others. This event highlights the growing threat our nation faces from a new generation of terrorists, often operating

from afar, who use social media to find like-minded associates within our borders who can be motivated to violence, attacking with little or no warning.

As was indicated in this case, an online ISIL supporter on Twitter posted a link to an article with information about the cartoon contest a few weeks beforehand. This supporter's posting also included a message suggesting extremists should follow in the footsteps of the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris.

Days later, one of the Garland attackers reached out to ISIL supporters and asked to move their communications to private Twitter messaging. This same individual also urged Twitter users to follow the account of a known ISIL member who had been trying to incite ISIL supporters to conduct attacks in the West.

Just hours before the attack, the same attacker posted a message on his Twitter feed indicating he had pledged allegiance to ISIL with the accompanying hashtag, Texas attack.

ISIL did not claim responsibility for directing or managing the attack, but ISIL operators praised the attackers and encouraged others to follow suit. The group also highlighted the attack in the most recent edition of its online magazine, which it publishes in several languages.

As we examine ISIL's broader efforts in social media, like any brand that seeks to target young people, ISIL continually innovates its online marketing to ensure it is developing effectively crafted messages. Using well known U.S.-based platforms such as YouTube, Facebook or Twitter, ISIL works to ensure its media releases reach audiences far and wide through reposting, regeneration of follow-on (ph) links, and translations into multiple languages.

ISIL also employs marketing tradecraft, attaching its messages to trending topics in order to gain additional readership. Consequently, its social media presence is more widespread than any other terrorist group.

Since the beginning of this year, ISIL has published more than 1,700 pieces of terrorist messaging. These include videos, pictorial reports and online magazines. These products are often very professional in their presentation and timely in their delivery, underscoring ISIL's commitment to master multiple social media tools in order to advance their extremist objectives.

As the Committee already knows, ISIL has often shaped its media content to amplify the effect of its violent operations and activities. They do so in an attempt to project an image of power and intimidation. They also employ a complementary approach to enhance recruitment, a projection of the self-described caliphate as an idealized family-friendly environment in which ideological, religious or personal fulfillment can be realized. This narrative has successfully induced large numbers of young people to make their way to the combat zones of Syria and Iraq.

During the past few months, ISIL social media operators have more aggressively pursued a new line of effort. Following statements from senior ISIL leaders encouraging lone-actor attacks against the West, these operators are now practicing online recruitment and provisioning of terrorist instruction intended to precipitate civilian attacks within the U.S. and other nations.

Sadly, as we have seen, some individuals have embraced the messaging and have sought to commit acts of violence on this basis.

When it comes to countering the spread of ISIL's violent messaging, several social media platforms have taken the initiative to close down accounts advocating terrorism and violent acts. They do this upon detection. However, energetic efforts to prohibit the propagation of violent messaging has not been universal. And there is still much work to be done to encourage greater vigilance and a broader sense of corporate responsibility to address this threat to public safety.

For our part, we are employing the knowledge that we have developed -- that has been developed by the U.S. counterterrorism community to refine and expand our prevention efforts. We've seen a steady proliferation of more proactive and more engaged community awareness initiatives across the United States, all working with the goal of giving communities information and tools they need to identify the threats posed by violent extremist online recruitment and to effectively engage it before it manifests in violence.

With our DHS colleagues, we have created and regularly deliver a community resilience exercise program, a tabletop exercise that brings together law enforcement and community leaders to run through a hypothetical scenario and potential responses.

In summary, we need multi-level partnership efforts to enable local U.S. communities to build the dual capabilities of addressing radicalization and ensuring resilient responses when an individual moves from radical ideology to radical violence.

We must continue to develop our knowledge of evolving terrorist online tactics, and we need to communicate that knowledge so that it can be used to minimize the application of terrorist online tactics against our citizens.

I'll stop there, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again for the opportunity to address the community.

MCCAUL: Thank you, Mr. Mulligan.

The chair now recognizes Undersecretary Taylor to testify.

TAYLOR: Chairman -- excuse me -- Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear with my colleagues to discuss the homegrown violent extremist threat to our country.

The terrorist threat today is more decentralized and complex. It is not constrained to one group, race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, or geographic location.

ISIL, Al Qaida and other like-minded terrorist organizations have expanded their efforts to recruit individuals for violent action at home and to continue to be effective -- and continue to be effective in recruiting foreign fighters from Western countries to travel to Syria and Iraq.

Core Al Qaida and its affiliates remain a major concern for DHS. The group and its affiliates maintain the intent, and in some cases, the capability to facilitate and conduct attacks against U.S. citizens and facilities. Their attack planning continues despite our persistent efforts to -- to disrupt them.

Through their sophisticated messaging capability, as Mr. Mulligan has mentioned, ISIL has been able to quickly reach a global audience and encourage acts of violence, inspiring U.S. citizens to travel to Syria, to recruit and radicalize to balance (ph) Western homegrown violent extremists here at home. This is concerning because mobilized lone offenders present law enforcement with limited opportunities for detection and to disrupt their plots.

The recent attack in Garland, Texas reinforced the importance of close collaboration and information sharing between DHS, the FBI, other federal, state, local and private sector partners.

Prior to the attack, the FBI and DHS shared with the Texas fusion center and local law enforcement warnings that the event was at risk of being targeted for violent extremism. These warnings led to the preparation taken by the Garland P.D. that helped thwart the attack.

Our top priority to counter this evolving threat is information and intelligence sharing with our partners. DHS, INA and the National Programs Protection Division field personnel are instrumental in this effort, and anticipate -- to anticipate potential terrorist actions and to propose protective security measures to help build resilience in our communities across the country.

As an example of close coordination intelligence sharing between DHS, INA and our state and local partners was the protests last week in Phoenix, Arizona this past weekend.

We proactively contacted our partners on the ground and shared intelligence from the FBI and DHS sources in real time to help ensure local leadership and law enforcement have the necessary information to protect their communities and their citizens.

Additionally, we reached out to the faith community in Phoenix to provide information regarding the potential violent activities so that they could take preventive actions in their communities.

It is important that we continue to build these partnerships with state and local enforcement in a way that enhanced community relationships and builds resilience to violent extremist recruitment.

DHS now has a senior executive, the DHS Coordinator for Countering Violent Extremism whose sole role is to coordinate and improve the Department's C.V. efforts.

The new DHS CVE strategy emphasizes the strength of local communities and the premise that well informed and well equipped families, communities and front-line personnel represent the best defense against violent extremism.

TAYLOR: DHS will continue to work with our international counterparts and our colleagues within the FBI, NCTC, the State Department and across CIC to identify potential threats to our security, both at home and abroad.

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to your questions.

MCCAUL: Thank you -- thank you, Secretary Terry -- Taylor.

The chair now recognizes Assistant Director Steinbach.

STEINBACH: Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the recent terrorist influence, which transcends geographic boundaries like never before.

Terrorists' use of technology has aided in the dissemination of rhetoric encouraging attacks on U.S. interests in the homeland and abroad.

As the threat to harm Western interests evolves, we must adapt and confront the challenges. This includes working closely with our federal, state, local and international partners since the threat persists in all of our communities.

We continue to identify individuals who seek to join the ranks of foreign fighters traveling in support of ISIL and also those homegrown violent extremists who may aspire to attack the United States from within.

Conflicts in Syria and Iraq continue to entice Western-based extremists who wish to engage in violence. We estimate upwards of 200 Americans have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria to join extremist groups.

We closely analyze and assess the influence groups like ISIL have on individuals located in the United States who are inspired to commit acts of violence. These threats remain among the highest priorities for the FBI and the intelligence community as a whole.

ISIL has proven relentless; through their skillfully crafted messaging, the group continues to attract like-minded extremists, including Westerners. Unlike other groups, ISIL has constructed a narrative that is appealing to individuals from many different walks of life. It is seen by many who click through the Internet every day, receive social media push notifications and participate in social networks.

In recent months, ISIL, via social media, has advocated for attacks against military personnel, law enforcement and intelligence community members. ISIL has gone so far as to post the names, addresses and photos of U.S. military personnel to the Internet, which quickly went viral.

We should also understand community and world events may entice an individual to act. As we've seen recently with highly publicized events, including the attack in Garland, the events will attract media attention and inspire copycat attacks.

The targeting of the Muhammad art exhibit and contest exemplifies the call to arms approach encouraged by ISIL, along with the power of viral messaging.

As I've stated in previous opportunities I've had to testify before this committee, there is no set profile for the consumer of this propaganda.

However, one trend continues to rise: the inspired youth. We've seen children and young adults drawing deeper into the ISIL narrative. These generations are often comfortable with virtual communication platforms, especially social media networks.

Some of these conversations occur in publicly accessed social media networking sites, but others take place via private messaging platforms. As a result, it is imperative the FBI and all law enforcement organizations understand the latest communication tools and are equipped to identify and prevent terror attacks in the homeland.

We live in a technologically driven society. And just as private industry has adapted to modern forms of communication, so, too, have the terrorists.

Social media is yet the latest tool exploited by terrorists. With its widespread distribution model and encrypted communications, it has afforded a free zone by which to recruit, radicalize, plot and plan.

We need to urgently assess the laws applicable in these matters and work with private industry toward technology solutions. To correct the narrative, this is not a conversation about national security at the expense of privacy or about weakening legitimate security of communication products through creation of technological back doors.

We are looking to be fully transparent with legal process showing evidence of a crime to gain access through the front door with full knowledge of those companies. The FBI seeks to ensure no one is above the law. So the bad guys can not walk away leaving victims in search of justice.

There is certainly a balance between security and privacy. We seek that proper balance and one in which security enhances liberty. The FBI in partnership with DHS and NCTC is utilizing all investigative techniques and methods to combat the threats these individuals pose to the United States.

In conjunction with our domestic and foreign partners, we are rigorously collecting and analyzing intelligence information as it pertains to the ongoing threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations and homegrown violent extremists.

In partnership with our many federal, state and local agencies assigned to joint terrorism task forces around the country, we remain vigilant to ensure the safety of the American public.

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson and committee members, I thank you for the opportunity to testify concerning ISIL's persistent threat to the United States. I'm happy to answer any questions you may have.

MCCAUL: Thank you, Director Steinbach.

I now recognize myself for five minutes.

I want to first pull up on the screen what I consider to be an Internet conspiracy to conduct a terrorist attack. I was a federal prosecutor, worked on drug cases, organized crime; there are a lot of similarities.

But this one is conducted completely on the Internet. And let me first commend -- I want to commend the FBI, Homeland Security and the joint terrorism task forces for their textbook model case efforts in both the Garland attack and most recently in Boston. That's the way it's supposed to work.

Unfortunately, you have to get it right every time. And they just have to get it right once. But this kind of shows what we're dealing with, the threat gone viral.

You have this guy, Miskey (ph) the ISIS follower in Somalia, directing attacks against the cartoonist art competition, to Mr. Simpson, who responds. And as the attack is being conducted, we have the infamous Mr. Al Britani, who has become one of the chief ISIS recruiters, hackers, directors for terrorist attacks, congratulating them, basically saying that the knives have been sharpened; soon we will come to your streets with death and slaughter.

And I guess my first question is to Director Steinbach, this is just a microcosm of the conspiracy in the Internet we're looking at and the threat that we're looking at on the Internet.

How many potential recruiters do you think we have sitting in Syria and Somalia and Northern Africa, actively recruiting acts of terrorism globally?

STEINBACH: That's a good question, sir.

So I think you can refer to the Brookings Institute study on terrorist use of social media -- in particular, Twitter -- and gives you an idea of what we're dealing with.

So when you look at the volume of social media and its social -- and its ability to spread horizontally, you probably look at a -- in the neighborhood of a couple thousand core users, propagandists, that are pushing that message out.

And then probably in the neighborhood of 50,000, based on the study that's in open source, of individuals retweeting that message. And then again upwards of 200,000, say, for instance, receiving that message.

So that's our pool with which to start. And those are just, you know, ballpark numbers. So unfortunately, social media is a great tool for the public, but it also allows for this horizontal distribution, which is very difficult to follow. So those are baseline the numbers that we start with.

MCCAUL: Baseline, you start with. You said -- and it's been reported over as many as 200,000 pro-ISIS tweets per day occur on the Internet.

Is that correct?

STEINBACH: So I couldn't give you the exact numbers; it's a large volume.

And that's the trick, right?

What is somebody's individual right to tweet and say what they want to say versus somebody who is going down a different road, a more nefarious road/

So that's our starting point, is those thousands that you talk about and trying to cull through that and to find out who, amongst those individuals, are up to no good, who amongst those individuals are potentially plotting an attack on Western interests?

MCCAUL: And that is the great challenge that the FBI and Homeland has, is to try to, you know, monitor, to the extent you can, these communications.

STEINBACH: It's usually -- it's usually problematic. So the -- social media's great; it's out there. It's open source, but the volume is immense. And that, of course, I'm talking about the open side of social media. I'm not talking about the encrypted direct messaging, which is also a very problematic issue for us.

MCCAUL: And how many of those followers are actually in the United States in your estimate?

STEINBACH: So I think Director Comey stated it last -- there's hundreds, maybe thousands. It's a -- it's a challenge to get a full understanding of just how many of those passive followers are taking action.

MCCAUL: And I've read some of these Twitter accounts and tweets. They have thousands of followers and thousands following, which means they're actively communicating and pinging each other.

And then they go into, "Let's go into messaging." And then they go into a more secure space that if we have coverage, we can pick that communication. But, as you suggested in your testimony, then they have the ability to go into what's called "dark space," to another platform that is securecom that we don't have the ability to monitor these communications. Is that correct?

STEINBACH: That is correct, sir.

MCCAUL: To me, that's one of greatest concerns I have. Do we have any idea how many communications are taking place in the dark space?

STEINBACH: No, we don't. And that's the problem. We're past going dark in certain instances. We are dark. The ability to know what they're saying in these encrypted communication situations is troubling.

MCCAUL: I think it's a tremendous threat to the homeland. And do you have any recommendations for the Congress?

STEINBACH: I think we need to have an honest conversation, get past the rhetoric of what we're talking about. We're not talking about large-scale surveillance techniques. We're talking about going before the court, whether the criminal court or the national security court, with evidence, a burden of proof, probable cause, suggesting a crime has been committed or, in our case, that there's a terrorist. And showing that burden of proof, having the court sign off on it, and then going to those providers and requesting access to either that stored information or that communications that's ongoing.

And so, we're not looking at going through a back door or being nefarious. We're talking about going to the company and asking for their assistance. So, we suggest, and we are imploring, Congress to help us seek legal remedies towards that as well as asking the companies to provide technological solutions to help that.

We understand privacy. Privacy, above all other things, including safety and freedom from terrorism, is not where we want to go.

MCCAUL: Well, and I think this committee should be looking at this very important issue.

Finally, if you can comment on the most recent Boston case, it's been reported that this was a ISIS-inspired event over the Internet. And it took to behead police officers. We know that a lot of their commands and call to arms are to attack military installations and attack police officers. And I know it's an active investigation, but to the extent you can comment on this, would you please do so?

STEINBACH: The investigation's early on, post-event, so there's not a lot I could say on the intelligence side.

You're right, sir, we know that ISIL has put out a message to attack the West, specifically law enforcement, military. We know that they have been looking at those target sets. So we are very careful in where we're at.

The targets that are out there, the counterterrorism subjects, we are monitoring them very closely for any type of action, any type of overt steps, any mobilization factors. And when we see those, we're not taking the chance.

MCCAUL: I appreciate that. And we, again, commend your efforts in this most recent threat.

With that, the chair recognizes the ranking member.

THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Steinbach, you went into great detail, the challenge of social media and other things. Do you, at this point, see the challenge, also resources or the authority to do your job?

STEINBACH: I don't feel we have a challenge resourcewise. We've done an effective job, identifying, prioritizing and working through the JTTFs, the state, locals, to focus the target set.

And so, I would say that, of course, we always have to prioritize resources, but it's more so the challenge for me is the technological challenge, to get over that hurdle.

THOMPSON: When you say technological, is it -- just explain that a little bit for me, please.

STEINBACH: So, when a company, a communications company or a ISP or social media company elects to build in its software encryption, end (ph) encryption, and leaves no ability for even the company to access that, we don't have the means by which to see the content. When we intercept it, we intercept encrypted communications.

So that's the challenge. Working with those companies to build technological solutions to prevent encryption above all else.

THOMPSON: So there's nothing from a congressional standpoint authority you need from us to make that happen?

STEINBACH: Well, I think a number of years ago Congress passed CALEA, which was a law that was put in place that required telecommunication providers to provide assistance to law enforcement. I would suggest that that's a starting point, that we need to expand who is -- who is bound by that law, telecommunication providers is just a small subset of the companies that are out there that provide communication services these days. So I think as a starting point, that would be helpful.

THOMPSON: So, can you provide the committee with -- beyond the starting point -- in terms of where the department think we should be going in this -- in this direction?

STEINBACH: Sir, I could. I think more appropriately, the FBI's OTD, the Operational Technology Division, has the lead on that. And they could -- I'm sure they'd be happy to come here and kind of lay out for you step by step where they need to go.

THOMPSON: I think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to try to make that part of what we do.

MCCAUL: I agree.]

THOMPSON: OK.

Mr. Mulligan, according to your testimony, videos, tweets and messages are probably not enough to radicalize individuals who are beginning to show these tendencies. They serve as discussion points.

Showing interest and having online discussions are not criminal in nature. So what do we do about all of these online portals that kind of start this -- people down this slope, so to speak?

MULLIGAN: Sir, as my colleague mentioned, so it is part of a dialogue. They start out by trying to gain your interest. It's marketing and advertising. And as Michael indicated, a lot of it is there's followers.

And, you know, as you frequently start out as following someone, and following the trail, or you're subscribing to one of their channels, and then it progresses beyond that into a dialogue.

So what we really need to be doing is helping educate a lot of the members of the public about this process. And we've been trying to do that with DHS so that, like, as Michael also said, family members are aware that if their children are spending a lot of time on this, they need to be able to counter that. They need to be able to execute some degree of measures.

These individuals are very savvy in their understanding of the gradual nature of recruitment and operationalization. And so, what they try to do is create a series of images that are attractive and then they try and broaden that into a further discussion. I

So it does require, again, a much more active, interventionist approach.

THOMPSON: General Taylor, can you kind of tell us where the DHS fits in this space, in terms of trying to do the community engagement and some other kinds of things that can help what Mr. Mulligan is talking about?

TAYLOR: Yes, sir, certainly. As my colleagues on both sides had mentioned, it starts with the intelligence to understand the tactics, techniques and procedures that our adversaries are using to reach into our communities.

And we go out with NCTC, with the FBI, with the Department of Justice, to conduct community resilience exercises, to teach communities about the tactics, techniques and procedures, what to look for, how to spot it, who to -- whom they may report to about that activity, so that they can intervene at the earliest possible stage.

And we've done that across the country. Secretary Johnson has done six of them so far this year. He's actually out, doing one this afternoon. It is a clear part of our strategy to ensure that communities understand this threat and how it's being manifested.

And, in my mind, it's almost like what we do with predatory behavior, with child molesters and that. We've got to inform parents of what is happening on the Internet so that they can go and monitor what their children are doing and seeing on a continuous basis.

THOMPSON: Last question: Do parents who are monitoring, do they have enough options out there? You know, I think if a parent suspects that my child might be engaged in this behavior, you know, if -- who do I call? Do I call the local law enforcement? Do I call the FBI? Or have I really put my child in a situation where I'm labeling that child for life?

Do we have anything in between law enforcement and -- and a parent that can help mitigate some of these circumstances?

TAYLOR: Well, certainly, I think the opportunity is to -- for the community to engage, for the schools to engage before it gets to a radical action that requires law enforcement involvement.

So what we try to get communities to understand is that they are part of the solution and it's not just a law enforcement solution that we're looking. We're looking for communities to be engaged, to understand and to intervene when these events occur.

There was a recent case we had where a father in New England -- his -- his daughter went missing, and he went to the airport in his state and said, "I think my daughter's leaving."

And we were able to find his daughter. She wasn't at that airport; she was at another airport before she got on a plane to go to -- overseas.

That happens almost everyday with somebody having that sort of challenge, and it's not a law enforcement response; it's helping parents be good parents and helping their children not make bad mistakes.

THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.

MCCAUL: Mr. King is recognized.

KING: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank all of the witnesses for the testimony today and for the tremendous service they've given our country. Thank you very much.

I'd like to expand on something or maybe slightly disagree with something the ranking member said, and maybe it's more for the point of clarification about whether or not ISIS' use of the social media can, by itself, cause someone to carry out violent action.

I know many cases may be part of a long process, but we had two recent cases in New York where there was a man in Jamaica, Queens who attacked two police officers with a hatchet. It doesn't appear as if there was a long process of radicalization there; he was responding to a -- in effect, a director from ISIS.

And then we had two women -- now, this may -- somewhat longer process -- also in Queens, with IEDs in their apartment. And they both seemed to -- primarily, their means of radicalization was the ISIS use of social media.

Am I correct in that or -- I'm not trying to disagree with the ranking member; I just wanted to add onto that.

MULLIGAN: I would suggest, Congressman, that you are absolutely correct in their -- in their -- they believe they are able to operationalize people solely through social media. They believe that they can enter into the dialogue I referred to earlier and provide the tools, and they're not getting into very complex tools.

What they're telling them is, "Here are tactics and procedures you should use. Here is some easily available, readily available information online that you can exploit."

In other words, they believe that they can provide them everything that they will need to undertake some kind of lone actor attack.

STEINBACH: Let me add to that, sir.

So I think you -- you also hit on an important point, and that's the diversity of the threat. You've got a slow burn, but you also have individuals who are flash to bang, which is very quick. We've seen more of this flash to bang with ISIL and their online efforts.

Again, it's not just going some place on the Internet and looking it up; the social-media push is coming right to your -- your pocket via your smartphone; there's it's a diversity of threat.

So you're right in that it all depends on the individual. But we have to be prepared for both types of situations.

KING: I think you were very, all of you, eloquent as far as some of the dark areas where you just can't go right now. And it would seem to me that, in those instances, it's more important to have human sources on the ground that can fill in those gaps.

I would just say -- maybe this is rhetorical on my part, but with the constant criticism of law enforcement and the constant talk of snooping and spying, for instance, to me, it makes it harder to recruit people on the ground.

Like in Boston, if this had been two days ago and the Associated Press, New York times uncovered the fact that the Boston police were following those alleged terrorists, that would have been snooping and spying. Well, now it turns out after the fact it was effective surveillance.

And I just think that the use of those terms really are doing a tremendous disservice as far as enabling law enforcement to recruit people on the ground. You said you wanted to work with the community, and you do. But at the same time, this onslaught coming from the media and from certain people in politics constantly talking about snooping, spying, harassment, to me, undoes a lot of the good that you're trying to do.

So I don't know if you want to comment or not. Again, maybe I was just making a rhetorical point. But if anyone wishes to comment, fine. If not, I'll just...

STEINBACH: I agree with you, sir. You have to have a multitude of tripwires, both online and in person. And we try to insert sources in situations where there's a predicated investigation, but it's a challenge.

KING: Thank you.

TAYLOR: Sir, I would add to what Mr. Steinbach had said and indicate that this is a total team fight. It takes (inaudible). It takes (inaudible). It takes what I call transaction and looking at travel patterns and those sort of things to -- to come to this.

And certainly, in communities, communities sometimes feel, well, you're looking at us too much as opposed to another community, and our response is generally, "The bad guys are trying to recruit your kids. That's why we're talking to you. It's not because of your religion, but it's what the bad guys are trying to do, and that's why we're here talking to you about strategies to defend yourself."

KING: My time is running out. Just -- if you can comment on this.

ISIS, one thing they have been doing, it appears, is encouraging use of hoax threats. Are you in a position to say yet whether (inaudible) what happened on Memorial Day, where there was going to be 10 different hoax threats were called in to the airlines and again this weekend when they were called in, if that is any response to ISIS, are these lone wolves, or is it just a person carrying out a hoax?

STEINBACH: So I would say we don't have any credibility information that there are threats to aviation right now. So yes, the ones so far appear to be hoaxes. Tracking those back to an individual or group is still an ongoing process.

KING: But ISIS has said that the use of the hoax itself is an effective means of attack.

STEINBACH: Correct.

KING: Thank you.

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your testimony.

MCCAUL: Mr. Richmond's recognized.

RICHMOND: And I guess I'll start with Mr. Taylor or maybe even Mr. Mulligan.

You mentioned that there were about 1,700 messages sent out by ISIL. How many -- if you had to estimate, about how many people did that reach?

MULLIGAN: Certainly tens of thousands. 1,700 separate publications, be it a video release or an online magazine release but certainly in the thousands to tens of thousands.

RICHMOND: And the people who start to follow and engage in the social media, even if it's on the front, we're not seeing any similarities or any consistent traits across the board in the people that start to engage, or are we?

MULLIGAN: Well, sir, it's partly about what the actual publication is or the video is about or what they're trying to incite.

In some instances, as you know, we're particularly concerned when we see someone who is -- let's say a Twitter feed that's being followed and they are really strongly advocating violence, then I think the FBI is paying particular attention to those.

It's important to also note that in some instances, a lot of the followers are just -- I mean, they're paying attention. The media's paying attention to some entities on a lot of video releases. Obviously, they're tracking and reporting on it.

And I would also like to posit that in many instances, they're also trying to generate buzz themselves. So we've seen multiple instances in which they have, if you will, collaborators who will retweet messages to try to increase the numbers so that it makes it look like they've got a very large number of followers.

The bottom line is they're effective at using social media and they're effective at, if you will, manipulating social media.

RICHMOND: Well, knowing that they're experts at manipulating social media and using social media, are there things that we can do or things that we should encourage others to do or not to do to protect themselves?

And I guess now, I'm going to get into the sensitive area of -- you know, I'm not commenting (ph) whether it's their First Amendment right to have a contest to depict or make fun of Islam, but in my mind, I encourage my mother not to walk down dark streets at night, because it's dangerous. I would get upset if someone drew cartoons of Jesus or called Mary a slut. I mean, that's just my faith.

RICHMOND: So if you know they're social-media experts and they're good at using social media to get their message out, are we inciting some of this with our -- or some people's hatred towards their religion and other things? I mean, are we fueling some of this fire?

TAYLOR: Sir, I think I would answer that question simply by saying, the Constitution of the United States of America and our rights and freedoms are something that stands in the way of our enemies' effort to create a global caliphate.

So I don't think any one event fuels this. I think it's coming at our system of government, our freedoms, is what they're trying to undermine. They are in the news cycle.

RICHMOND: So, you don't see any spike in people following after events look this or any rise in social media conversations when you have a contest like that going on?

TAYLOR: Of course you do. But...

RICHMOND: Well, I guess that's my question, then.

TAYLOR: But again, in America, those kinds of conversations happen every day as a -- as a part of our constitutional rights in this country. And so, saying that we should stop doing something here would cause them to stop doing it there, they'll find somewhere else to look for a reason to, you know, to attack America.

RICHMOND: No, and I agree with that.

But I guess my question is, and I think that a guy that's gonna rob a lady walking down a dark alley is gonna rob somebody, but I'm gonna encourage my mother not to walk down that alley so it won't be her, so that it's not easy prey.

And I -- and I guess, you know, it's our constitutional right to say whatever you want, but I promise you, if you call my mother a bad name, there are going to be some consequences and repercussions. And I just don't think that we're having that honest conversation when we're talking about young people, we're talking about angry people, we're talking about people who feel picked on

If you -- I mean if, you know, there are some words that will trigger a response, but you have the absolute First Amendment right to say it. And then it's up to me whether I want to exercise my discipline or hit you in the mouth.

So, the question becomes, how often are we gonna get hit in the mouth before we realize that we may be playing into it unnecessarily by just being callus and cruel, I think, in some instances.

So thank you for your questions.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MCCAUL: I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Perry's recognized.

PERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. This is a -- I think this is a difficult subject trying to find the line between privacy and security, as we've found out and I think everybody's alluded to.

Let me ask you this. There are folks that might wear their heart on their sleeve regarding this circumstance, radical Islam, attacks and so on and so forth, and they might be having a conversation openly on the -- on social media where they espouse their opinions, which might lead them to be a target for some of these individuals, if you know what I mean, and maybe even

some of the folks in the building, that -- somebody that has a -- somebody that's having this hearing today or somebody that's asking questions like this.

Do you folks have any way or do the platforms have any way of monitoring traffic about those individuals that might have had a conversation with a friend, openly on open source, online, about their disdain for radical Islam, for attacks, and might have been disparaging about it, or, you know, did they become a target? Does that individual become a target? Is there any way that the social platforms have a way of monitoring it? Do any of you folks have a way of monitoring it. Do you collaborate on that? And is that a -- is that a chill, is there a chilling effect for free speech if people feel like they might be targeted because of their thoughts posted openly on social media?

STEINBACH: So I'm not sure that I fully understand the question. So I think that social media platforms usually abide by the terms of service agreement. They've got small compliance departments. So, for the most part, the answer to the first part, no, I don't think social media companies are doing anything along the lines that you speak.

As far as the intelligence community or law enforcement, monitoring those individuals who are exercising expressions of freedom and then become targets, we don't have a mechanism in place to track them. We would track it from the other side, is if we see threats coming toward them but not necessarily -- is that the question you're asking, sir?

PERRY: Essentially, yes. (inaudible)

STEINBACH: We are not tracking it from the other end. Now, if somebody comes to us and says, hey, I feel threatened, of course we will look into that. But, as far as a data pool of some type of large scale to look at that, no.

PERRY: Are there -- is there -- go ahead.

MULLIGAN: If I could offer another bit of context to what Mike said. When you're operating on social media, particularly some of the broadly available public platforms, you're in open space. So you can be monitored by any entity out there, by commercial entities, by educational institutions, by the media, anyone can be looking at that.

That's one of the challenges that I think people are often concerned about, going back to this point that you made. Frequently, within this country, we are trying to -- I mean, trying to encourage credible voices to contest the ideological extremism that is being advocated, and those folks are often reluctant to do so because they're concerned that they will either, as you said, become a potential target of violence, become an intelligence target, become a law enforcement target.

And I think what we've been trying to do collectively as a community is trying to change that environment, at least from the perception of the U.S. government's monitoring of their activities.

But I do believe that, again, it is open space, so any person that enters into that space needs to understand that.

PERRY: So, when you talk about -- several of you talked about encrypted direct messages and dark space, can you give me some examples, is it essentially just texting, would that be considered off-limits to monitoring by the United States government, even in cases where there might be an imminent planning and plotting?

Is there any way -- and if this is classified, that's fine, too, but I'm just wondering from that perspective, you know, if it's not on Facebook, if it's not on Twitter, do we have the capability, other -- the federal -- the federal government, do they have the capability and/or do the providers have the capability, and are there algorithms that pick this type of stuff up, or processes that pick this stuff up ?

STEINBACH: The answer is no. There are -- there are 200-plus social media companies. Some of these companies build their business model around end-to-end encryption. There is no ability currently for us to see that. So, if we intercept the communication, all we see is encrypted communication.

PERRY: Anybody else? Some examples? Are we talking just straight texting? Like I know of a program called Cyber Dust, right? So, once you send it and it's received, it disappears. And that would be -- is that an example of the dark space, or is that just encrypted direct communications? What that is?

STEINBACH: So dark space is a general term. So, yes, there's lots of models out there. There's models, social media that go point to point, and then, once you read it, it disappears, it's not saved.

Some companies can set -- you can set how long a text is saved. Some of them are encrypted from the start. Most of them are text-type direct forms, some of them are photographs that send. There's all kinds of different models. And it's just a -- some of them are more like bulletin board formats. There's lots and lots of formats out there.

PERRY: And all of that is off-limits right now with the federal government as far as -- as far as you're...

STEINBACH: It's not that it's off-limits. It's there are more and more of these companies are building their platforms that don't allow us. We will still seek to go to those companies and serve them legal process, but if the company's built a model that even they can't decrypt, then it doesn't do us any good.

PERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

MCCAUL: Ms. Watson Coleman's recognized.

WATSON COLEMAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you very much, gentlemen, for your information sharing here.

I think I want to tag on a little bit to Congressman Richmond's questions, because I want to get at something that I've not heard a lot about.

I'm reading that there really is no sort of common denominator here, not any religious zealot. Individuals who are being radicalized don't even necessarily know what the Islam religion is all about.

It's not socioeconomic, it's not racial or ethnic, so I'm trying to figure out what exactly is it. What is enticing about beheadings and violence and this just very angry assault that our young people are being exposed to? What is tripping them and their attention to that -- to that kind of radicalization? What is it about ISIL?

MULLIGAN: So, ma'am, if I can just give you a little bit of context on that. You're right to describe, and I think one of my colleagues described earlier, the range of, how can I say it, experiences and, if you will, ideological knowledge, religious knowledge varies incredibly widely.

What there seems to be is, they are appealing in some instances to -- if there is a sense of victimization -- that they are the individuals who are -- those who, you know, will conquer those who have been the victimizers. And so it appeals to that -- to that underdog nature. They really do an effective job in communicating that sense.

And as I said in my remarks, they couple that with an ability to present "Here is the idealized vision of what our religion presents. And if you really want to leave the trappings of all the challenges and troubles you're having in your current life and join us, we will offer you more direction and more means." And so that is how they seem to be succeeding.

COLEMAN: So they seem to be attracting young people. Are we talking about middle school age? Are we talking -- what ages are we talking about? When we say "youth," just how young are these people -- young people being (ph)?

MULLIGAN: I would say any -- I would say we are seeing ages in the teens, probably upper teens into twenties. And it's also important -- you know, we've deemed this a new generation of terrorists because as -- as General Taylor was saying, a lot of them are extremely conversant in a lot of social media. I mean, they've grown up with it.

COLEMAN: Yes.

MULLIGAN: So this is the means by which they use to reach that generation.

COLEMAN: I can understand that. What I don't understand is what is enticing them. I mean, what -- what -- what appeals to you when you see someone beheaded, or you see these nasty threats, or you see this -- this violence? The victimization is something I'd like to just carry on a little bit.

I don't -- one of my favorite programs was about the FBI profiler. And so I'm wondering, is -- was that a real thing? I know that there's police profiling I've got to be concerned about. But do we -- is there such a thing as psychological profiling? Are we looking at those kinds of things? Are we identifying some traits that have nothing to do with ethnicity or socio-economic, or whatever, but other traits? And are we able to, like, identify any sort of red flags in the -- in the children and the young people in school and in college? Because I just wonder whether or not we're expending enough energy and resources in trying to identify early on in intervening.

STEINBACH: So, yes, the FBI does have a behavioral analysis unit. And there is a -- within the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, there is a unit dedicated to terrorists. And it spends a lot of time looking at the parts of radicalization and mobilization. What attracts folks. But like Mr. Mulligan said, it's a very complicated piece. And, quite frankly, what we've seen as far as a profile is the lack of a profile. There's just so many reasons. You know, we don't -- we don't see disaffected, we see some disaffected. We don't see well-to-do, we see some well-to-do. Victimization is certainly a common theme. Younger and younger individuals are drawn into this messaging.

I would say that ISIL has done an effective message versus Al Qaida, and that they have said publicly, "Hey, the caliphate is here today. You can come now to a -- a country where Sharia law rules. Bring your family." And they've really messaged it across a spectrum through -- to a wide walk of individuals.

COLEMAN: Let me just ask this last question, if I might. Should we be engaging the Department of Education -- higher education -- in identifying programs and approaches and sort of learning devices that would be able to anticipate and deal with our younger people who are affected by whatever it is that's turning them on here?

Thank you.

TAYLOR: Yes, ma'am, we should, and we are beginning to work with the Department of Education on these kinds of issues. Because it's a whole of community effort. It's not just the police, not just the churches, but it's education. It's civic organizations, as well.

COLEMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At some point, I really would like for us to explore what more can be done proactively in identifying and sort of intervening at earlier stage.

Thank you for your indulgence.

MCCAUL: Thank you.

Mr. Hurd's recognized.

HURD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member for holding this -- this hearing. I think a number of these issues -- we can talk all day long about that. And so we're packing a lot in in a very short period of time. And my first question is to Mr. Mulligan and Ambassador Taylor.

You know, talk about the community engagement exercises and engaging credible voices throughout these communities. How do we blow that up? How do we -- how do we make it bigger? How do we -- how do we accelerate those projects?

MULLIGAN: So we've been developing a partnership community awareness briefing. And we've just been moving it out fairly slowly initially to ensure that we're having a degree of success. But we have had some success in that. And now we're trying to train the trainer so that we can get into a situation where we're propagating it more broadly across the communities. Because, going back to some of the other observations that have been made, it really is at the community level that we need to have this success. And also, we need to have, I think as the ranking member said, levels between government and local. In a lot of instances, particularly with family members, as you know, people are reluctant to engage any sort of authorities, and we need to try and find that middle ground.

HURD: And I appreciate that, because we need to be thinking about this in terms of weeks, not years. Because that's -- that's the speed at which we need to counter this -- this threat.

Ambassador Taylor, do you have any remarks for that?

TAYLOR: I -- and it's a global phenomenon.

HURD: Mm-hmm.

TAYLOR: So our outreach internationally has been important, as well. I'm leading a delegation to Australia next week to further our communication with our FBI's (ph) partners about this phenomenon and how we can engage communities really across the world to better -- so that they better understand what this risk and threat are.

HURD: Yeah. Because in order to make the FBI's job a lot easier, this lone wolf idea -- the way we're going to stop that is by countering that violent, you know, ideology and extremist ideology. And -- and that's going to take a whole of government effort. Who in the government is responsible for this? The CVE activity?

TAYLOR: Well, it's actually a shared responsibility between Justice, the intelligence community, DHS and the FBI. And our deputies meet regularly to formulate those strategies and to implement those strategies within the -- within the U.S.

HURD: My suggestion there would be looking at unity of commands. Because when you have three people in charge of something, nobody's in charge of it. I think that's something that we're plagued with in the federal government on a number of occasions.

And my next set of questions is to Mr. -- Mr. Steinbach.

The cannon out there on counterterrorism is clear. Terrorists are trying to do two things. They're trying to kill a lot of people and they're trying to elicit counterterrorism responses in a government to upset a population to foment discord, all right? And so with that as -- as the

background -- that's why I'm a little bit nervous when we -- when we start talking about CALEA expansion and all these kinds of things, I get nervous because of the privacy aspect.

So my question -- and not to get too technical -- does end-to-end encryption that's provided by many U.S. companies prevent your ability to do attribution?

STEINBACH: In some cases, yes.

HURD: But not in all cases?

STEINBACH: Not in all cases.

HURD: All right. So are you suggesting that when you have a court order on someone connected to terrorism, that there are companies that aren't cooperating with helping to -- to get as much information as they can about that individual?

STEINBACH: No, what I'm suggesting is, the companies have built a product that doesn't allow them to help.

HURD: But if you're saying it doesn't prevent attribution and -- because the key here is to try to find as much information so that you can -- you know, to exhibit the success that you all had in Boston. You know, you were able to identify someone and use other tools to track him in order -- and, you know -- and stop -- and prevent this from happening. And that's -- you know, it's a difficult task. Don't get me wrong. I know how hard you guys are working. Maintaining the operational pace that you all have maintained since September 11th is unprecedented. And your -- the men and women in the FBI should be patted on the back and heralded. But we also got to make sure that we're protecting our civil liberties and our borders at the same time.

And when you talk about reviewing applicable laws around the technology -- the technology challenges that you are facing in CALEA expansion, I just want to be clear. You're not talking about putting a back door in software, are you?

STEINBACH: No. Like I said in my prepared statements, we are (ph) talking about full transparency. I'm talking about going to the companies who then could help us get the unencrypted information. And the attribution piece -- it's important to understand that, depending on the technology involved, this -- and this requires, quite frankly, a technology discussion -- there are tokens that are used that do not allow for attribution. So it's not quite as simple as just using other techniques or attribution. Sometimes that attribution is not there.

And I'd be happy to discuss in a classified setting in more detail just exactly what we're talking about.

HURD: I would love that. And thank you.

And one of the things -- we've been talking a lot about the use of social media and digital tools and how it's made it easier for ISIS to recruit people. But it also gives us an opportunity to do double-agent operations against them to penetrate, you know, their ability.

When chasing Al Qaida, you know, 10 years ago, if you were anything close to an American, you would have got your throat slit. Now we have these new tools in order to penetrate them.

And, again, I know -- I've run out of time, and I yield back that to the chairman.

HURD: Thank you.

MCCAUL: If I could just briefly -- we led a delegation on investigating foreign fighters to the Middle East and Europe, and we found that there is a counter-narrative out there. This is more not online, but foreign fighters who have left the region. Some return inspired and more radicalized, and some return very disillusioned from the experience.

And I think that narrative, and this may be more of a State Department issue, the more we can get that narrative out there, the better off we're going to be.

So, the chair recognizes Ms. Rice.

RICE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Steinbach, I just want to ask you a couple of questions. How does the intelligence community qualify an elevated threat from online-inspired terrorists? So, you know, we all know how that -- you know, when they raise the threat level. But specifically with this online communications, how do you rate what the -- what level the communication, how it rises to something that you really are worried about?

STEINBACH: So, it's a I think a simple question with a complicated answer. There's lots of pieces -- the volume, the specificity, whether or not they've identified willing sympathizers who will do something. It's a lot of pieces that go into it. And many of those factors are present now.

RICE: So, are there any difficulty -- what's the biggest difficulty in terms of being accurate when you are trying to rate the level of a threat?

STEINBACH: So, as Mr. Hurd stated previously, the social media is great because it's out there -- social media -- it's voluminous, but it's volume. So, there is -- trying to weed through the thousands and thousands of individuals on social media and find the -- all the signals out -- all the noise out there identifying the signal. So it's a volume piece. You know, looking at social media requires a different business process that we do things with in -- in going from there to finding a credible threat.

It's -- it's a very difficult process.

RICE: Yeah, I mean, it seems like it would be.

We've been talking this whole time about online communications, online radicalization. Is there any physical presence of either ISIL or Al Qaida doing face-to-face recruiting here in this country?

STEINBACH: So, I would say we don't -- we have, of course, a number -- a small number of returned foreign fighters. We have individuals who have been overseas and returned to the U.S. Where they are and who they are is probably an intelligence (inaudible). I would say our best estimates are we don't have ISIL sitting in the United States. We've got individuals who have taken up the call to arms based on ISIL's messaging.

RICE: Yeah, but not everyone who has gone and come back becomes a recruiter. So I'm just curious as to whether there are people who don't go anywhere, aren't on the Internet, and are actually in physical -- a physical place actually doing, you know, whether in tandem with the online recruitment, actual face-to-face recruiting.

STEINBACH: So, you're trying -- you're talking about a classical home-grown violent extremist -- the lone wolf. There are a number of factors that would cause somebody to radicalize. It doesn't have to be online. It could be a friend, an associate. Other factors may cause that person to become radicalized. Online just happens to be when you look at the spectrum, the -- by volume, the highest percentage.

RICE: OK.

STEINBACH: If you're asking, do we have core Al Qaida coming to the U.S. and sitting here, or core ISIL, I think we look to that -- look at that intelligence gap all the time. But I would say for the most part, no.

RICE: OK. Thank you.

I yield back my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MCCAUL: Mr. Duncan is recognized.

DUNCAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Al Qaida led the way with Inspire magazine, I think, which was an online publication. Are we still seeing Inspire as prevalent as it was? Has ISIL adopted that -- that media? And is there a way to track? You know, if you've got a website platform like Inspire, is there a way for you guys to track who visits that page? You know, who -- who takes it and forwards that information? If you could answer that for me.

MULLIGAN: Sir, to answer your question, Inspire still comes out periodically. It has been -- that model has been successfully copied by another -- by several of the other affiliates and other terrorist-related entities. They see that whole process of like an online magazine as being an effective model.

It's been -- it's been adapted by ISIL. They have a publication called The Beak (ph). It is a variation on that. They put out their information. They put it out in multiple languages.

To answer your question about our ability to track its propagation, it's not -- we're not really able to do that. They put multiple links to it. It appears -- I mean, as you can imagine, once something starts to propagate on the Internet, it's there. It can be -- it can reside in a number of places.

So, that model does exist. It continues. They're continuing to employ it. And again, it's extremely difficult -- impossible to track.

DUNCAN: For the freshmen members and people that have just started following this issue, I'd recommend you get the Inspire magazine; take a look at what some of the information that's being provided. I've never seen the information you're talking about at ISIL or others. If there's a way to share that with the committee, even if it's a classified setting, we're glad to take a look at that. Personally, I'd like to do that.

I'm very interested in the foreign fighter flow. I went last year to Europe to really delve into these foreign fighters coming off the battlefield from Syria, whether they transited through Turkey. And when I was there, or right before I got to Brussels, a foreign fighter actually came back, shot up the museum there -- the Jewish Museum; killed three or four people, and tried to flee to North Africa through France.

And so, the timeliness of my travels, but this was the very beginning. You didn't hear about ISIS as much in May and June of last year, not like you hear about them now and at least over the last 12 months.

At the time, that foreign fighter that shot up the museum in Brussels, Germany knew, apparently knew about it, and failed to let the Belgians know or the French know because they were suspicious of U.S. intelligence gathering through monitoring phone calls and all that's come out after Snowden.

So, what are some of the challenges of tracking these foreign fighters? You talk about core Al Qaida and core ISIL. I'm talking about the fringe guys that go over and get -- maybe get radicalized on the battlefield and decide, "You know what? I can do this back home."

How do we track those guys? And how successful have we been?

MULLIGAN: So, that's been -- ironically, that's been an incredibly unifying factor among the counterterrorism community across the globe. A lot of our Western partners, so, I mean, they've got substantial foreign fighter flow issues. You know, as Mike indicated, ours are about...

DUNCAN: I mean, Schengen region in Europe. I mean, it's -- you get there...

MULLIGAN: Yes, sir. And that's, again, something that they're trying to confront in Europe with regard to how do they manage this with the Schengen flows right now. We have been sharing a

lot of information back and forth with some of the means and processes that we're trying to employ to track foreign fighters.

What's also very clear to us is it needs to be, particularly with -- with our foreign partners, a whole-of-government approach. We're trying to share with them the benefits that we have experienced by ensuring that the free flow of information among the interagency. In many instances, we'll develop an effective relationship with a foreign partner, only to discover that the partner flow within their own nation is not optimized to try and ensure that appropriate law enforcement authorities have been alerted to that foreign fighter flow.

DUNCAN: Right.

MULLIGAN: But the bottom line is things are trending positively in the information sharing.

DUNCAN: In the bilateral trade...

MULLIGAN: Multilateral -- multilateral, sir.

(CROSSTALK)

MULLIGAN: But the -- but the other challenges, again, so we estimate there have been about 4,000 in total foreign fighters flowing from the West. But what we've seen is, again, there are foreign fighters from over 100 countries. And some of our other partners closer in that region have developed very effective mechanisms for both tracking the foreign fighters and developing rehabilitation programs.

So going back to some points that the gentlemen made earlier, we really need to do a lot of information sharing about their experiences at rehabilitation, their experiences at tracking, and incorporating them into some of our own processes.

DUNCAN: In the interests of time, North Africans are trying to get across the Med into Italy and Spain. And once they do, they've got pretty much free travel throughout Europe. So, how do you target those? I mean, these are migrants that are getting on boats and coming across. We don't know about them.

MULLIGAN: Interestingly, some of the direction that's been given lately by -- lately -- you know, over the last several months -- by ISIL leadership is they're urging a lot of these fighters to remain in place. To -- as you know, they've been trying to establish branches of the caliphate in other countries. And so they are trying to say, "Hey, don't move -- you don't need to move across North Africa; stay in Libya and work with our branch there."

So, that is one other part of their strategy. That's how they're trying to offset that limitation.

TAYLOR: Sir, if I might add, we are working very closely with our European partners on that flow from Italy and into the northern parts of Europe. It is a very big concern for us, not only

from a counterterrorism perspective, because eventually some of these people might end up applying for visas in our country.

So it is a high priority for our intelligence exchanges with our partners in Europe in terms of getting our arms around that particular flow.

DUNCAN: All right. Well, thank you. I'm out of time.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we delve into the effectiveness of JTTFs with regard to some of this, and that might have to be in a classified setting. But I yield back.

MCCAUL: Yes. And let me just say for the benefit of the members, we do have classified briefs with FBI and Homeland, and social media monitoring and on encryption challenges. JTTFs would be right.

The other flaw I noticed in my travels is that European partners don't screen E.U. citizens past any watch list as they fly from, say, Istanbul back into Europe, and I think that's a big security gap. And we urge them to change that. I know the E.U. parliament is addressing a change in their law.

TAYLOR: It's in work. It's not moving as fast as we would like it to move. But there are some glimmers of hope that, based upon the recent activity threats and actions in Europe, that the Europeans understand the importance of PNR and other sorts of data tracking of citizens internal to the E.U. So we have some hope that there will be a light at the end of the tunnel going forward on that.

MCCAUL: Yes. I did, as well.

Mr. Langevin.

LANGEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank our panel for the testimony here today. And I apologize if any of the questions I'm going to touch on have already been asked. I had to leave briefly to take a call from our commanding general in Afghanistan to get an update and a briefing from current status of things over there, in my Armed Services Committee role.

If I could on -- begin with this, as some of you may know, I spent a lot of time and are very concerned about cyber security issues particularly as they relate to critical infrastructure.

Can you tell me, in your role and with respect to seeing this stepped-up effort in using social media, in recruitment and using cyber as a tool, what you're seeing in terms of recruitment or efforts to use cyber weapons to attract -- to attack critical infrastructure?

And can you also describe what measures, if any, that are also different when combating the threat of a homegrown terrorist interested in cyber terrorism rather than more traditional physical attacks?

STEINBACH: So I think it's a great question. I think, first of all, we're seeing more and more a blended threat, the cyber intrusion piece with the counterterrorism piece.

Where we're at now, we do see those same counterterrorist actors -- or terrorist actors, using cyber intrusion as a tool. And they're experimenting with it, seeing how effective they are. We've seen most recently in the last -- less than a year, them becoming more and more adept at cyber intrusion type activities.

TAYLOR: And, sir, I would add to Mr. Steinbach's comments by saying that this is a very high priority concern for the Department of Homeland Security, our national programs and protection division work with the critical infrastructure community every day across this country about the cyber threat in general and specifically about the threat from terrorist actors so that they are prepared for and understand the potential for that threat and have means of mitigating those sorts of attempts within our critical infrastructure.

LANGEVIN: Mr. Mulligan, do you have anything to add?

MULLIGAN: Yes, sir. I mean, I would agree with those points. I would also posit again, it seems that it is inevitable kind of trend they would move into that realm. They would move into that realm because, again, it is a means by which they could effect damage in a very cost-efficient way.

And they are operating largely -- they have a high degree of maneuverability in cyber space. So it seems quite logical that they would attempt to pursue that and we need to be developing mechanisms for detection of those activities, sir.

LANGEVIN: OK.

Have you seen those stepped-up efforts to specifically focus on that as a -- as a tool right now to be used to go operational?

MULLIGAN: Yes, we have seen stepped up efforts.

LANGEVIN: OK. Thank you.

Mr. Mulligan, if I could turn to you, I'm very supportive of efforts to incorporate countermeasuring into CVE strategies and the use of public-private partnerships, such as the peer-to-peer program that you mentioned in your testimony to ensure that these messages are heard.

At the same time, central to any effective countermessaging strategy, though, is the -- is the credibility of the messenger, which can be greatly undermined if government is involved.

So how can we assure that there are independent voices that can counter extremists' messages without compromising the independence that gives their statements weight?

MULLIGAN: Sir, that's exactly some of the outreach efforts that we're trying to make with regard to the community advising piece.

It is also -- I mean, it's a question of establishing processes by which people will be able to feel free that they are able to have the tools to do that kind of countermessaging.

The challenges that we have, again, is there are still trust deficits that need to be overcome. And we all -- as you said, we need to find those intermediaries who are willing to take up that effort.

LANGEVIN: Thank you.

For the panel, and before my time runs out, social media platforms play a prominent role in all of your testimony.

Obviously, can you describe the relationships that each of your agencies has with the private operators of these networks?

And are these relationships institutional or more based on personal relationships?

And what kinds of requests do you make of these companies?

STEINBACH: So, I won't get into specifics, sir. I would say that we have relationships with every company that's in that environment, because we have to. We have to serve them process.

It's based on personal relationships as a starting point, but we develop more than that. But I think each company is different. And I don't think it's appropriate in this setting to talk about those particulars with that company.

TAYLOR: Sir, I would add that homeland security in our cybersecurity role has relationships with all these companies and, as Mr. Steinbach mentioned, we probably want to have that -- this conversation in a classified environment.

LANGEVIN: Well, hopefully we can perhaps follow up on that, Mr. Chairman, at a later date, then.

MCCAUL: Yes. If I could just quickly follow up. A lot of people asked me why don't we conduct a cyber offensive attack to shut down these -- in the social media program. I guess the two problems with that is they, well, you know, once that's done, they'll open up another account rather quickly.

And, number two, I guess our intelligence gathering capability goes down quite a bit.

You don't have to comment on that.

But the chair now recognizes Mr. Ratcliff.

RATCLIFF: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and the ranking member for holding this critically important hearing.

And of course I thank all the witnesses for being here and for all the important work that you do every day to serve our country.

This attack in Garland really seems to underscore and demonstrate the unique challenges that ISIS is posing today. In Garland, we saw two dead terrorists and no civilian casualties, and we saw law enforcement do exactly what they should have done, which is protect the public.

And yet we're living in unprecedented times, where a failed attack by ISIS in that regard is still spun as a win, where a failed attempt still plays into the narrative that they want to sell.

As a former terrorism prosecutor, who handled the number of matters involving Al Qaeda, I've noticed something that appears to me to be an important difference. And I want to ask you about that.

You know, Al Qaeda and ISIS have both been encouraging lone wolf attacks, but Al Qaeda's been doing it for years with very little success. And it would -- it seems to me that ISIS has been very effective in this regard in just a matter of months.

We're at a situation, it appears to me, that ISIS' sophisticated use of social media is essentially having a cascading effect, if you will, where it's become a terrorism multiplier of sorts, one where lone wolf attackers like Mr. Simpson or Mr. Soofi (ph) or Mr. Rahim (ph) can essentially use the ISIS brand without having to join ISIS.

And in that regard, it concerns me that it would appear that ISIS has essentially created a terror franchise. And so I want to very quickly ask you each whether you think I'm accurate in that assessment.

MULLIGAN: Congressman, I think that's an excellent characterization. I would agree with you, that is precisely they have very effectively leveraged that capability. They have exceptional capabilities and they claim they are making maximum use of every opportunity to amplify effect.

You've seen them using it in terms of representing their victories on the battlefield and the way that they have obviously treated our hostages. They attempt to squeeze every bit of, if you will, perceptual power out of social media.

TAYLOR: I would agree with Mr. Mulligan in that regard. I have been doing this for a long time, about 45 years. I've never seen a terrorist organization with the kind of public-relations savvy that I've seen with ISIL globally, and they've been very effective in using it.

STEINBACH: Yeah, I think my colleagues hit the -- the main points.

I would just add to it, in addition to that, it's a focus on a Western audience. When you look at the social-media tweets in English versus Al Qaeda or others, they are at a much higher rate.

So it's a great propaganda message. It's a propaganda message that's focused on a Western English-speaking audience.

RATCLIFFE: So we're talking a lot about the effect of their message. I want to focus a little bit more on the cause.

And Director Steinbach, you and the deputy director both talked about this, this sort of unique narrative that ISIS has created, a false narrative, one that involves a sense of community, a sense of adventure, maybe the ability to find a spouse.

We all know how ridiculous these claims are, but for those that are susceptible to radicalization, it seems to be an increasingly successful narrative from their standpoint.

I'm curious, since ISIS grew out of Al Qaeda in Iraq, why did ISIS suddenly become effective at crafting this -- this message when Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations really hadn't been previously? We have any insight into that?

MULLIGAN: I don't want to oversimplify it, but I would point out the demographic. They have attracted a younger generation of fighters who are much more conversant.

They are in a situation where they have initially occupied territory in which there was fairly advanced infrastructure that could then be leveraged. So, I mean, if you think over time, as you know, Al Qaeda has, in some instances -- they were not occupying optimal areas to leverage that infrastructure, whereas ISIS did position itself very, very well.

And also I think they have a fundamental orientation to action that kind of dominates a lot of their psyche and how they move.

TAYLOR: I think the other difference, sir, is that social media wasn't as robust when Al Qaeda started, as it has been since -- actually since 2010, the Arab Spring, and how social media was used in those events and how it's propagated its use -- use by -- by other groups since that time.

STEINBACH: Just to -- just to further clarify what Frank said, he's absolutely right.

So when you look at the Internet four, five, six years ago, it was anonymous, but you still -- the bad guy, the individual living in the U.S. still had to reach to a forum, identify that forum, go into that forum. With social media, it's pushed to you. It's so far advanced in comparison to the anonymous Internet.

RICHMOND: My time's expired. I hope the chairman'll indulge me to ask one additional question, because I think what's important here is I want to find out what the -- you know, we've talked about their effective messaging and the fact that they've created essentially a winning brand that is a drawing -- that is drawing the disaffected and disenfranchised to them.

What are we doing to counter that message? What can we do besides -- in other words, to create a losing brand for them? And I realize that part of that is kinetic military operations on the ground and -- but from a social-media standpoint, is there a counter strategy?

MULLIGAN: So I would posit to you that there is basically a three-prong strategy.

We're trying to counter them on the battlefield because of the fact that we're trying to negate this image of the caliphate, which they're successfully representing. So if we can -- I mean, that's kind of their center of gravity.

The second piece, as you described, is the whole cyber online media piece. And going back just very quickly to what Frank said, the range of options of over-the-top applications that they are able to employ -- I mean going back -- I mean, what were the options that were available to Al Qaeda? Not so great.

Now we're in -- in another universe of -- of operational activity. But nevertheless, because they are operating in public space, they have vulnerabilities there, and we should move aggressively to counter that.

Finally, the third area is this ideological space that we talked about in terms of finding those voices, those credible voices that can contest the ideological message.

We need to work against all three of those lines of effort.

RICHMOND: Thank you, gentlemen. I yield back. Appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.

MCCAUL: Thank you.

Ms. Torres is recognized.

TORRES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Steinbach, I am looking forward to reading that Brooklyn Institute study on terrorism and social media. I took a sneak peek at it while we were in this session.

I understand that as of October of last year, there were 42,000 identified Twitter accounts, if the report is correct, and thousands have been disabled.

In some ways, I kind of think that, you know, it's good to be able to view, you know, what is being said and what is being planned. It's -- it's one way that we can try to prepare and prevent.

Mr. Taylor, there's been a lot of talk about community outreach programs. There's been a lot of talk of community awareness, community policing. This is nothing new.

We've known that there have been a lot of issues in the past that need to be addressed from a neighborhood level. But somehow we have not been able to translate that want to do neighborhood community awareness to actually doing it.

And we've seen a lot of tensions arise between our local law enforcement groups and -- and our community groups. This is nothing recent; this has been ongoing.

So what have we changed? What does community policing look like, you know, in my neighborhood versus, you know, the northern part of California?

TAYLOR: Ma'am, your -- your -- your question is -- is a good question.

I think community policing is community policing. I don't think it -- it's about relationships with the communities that we serve. It hasn't changed in 20 years that -- that I've been involved in community policing.

It's the outreach that happens with people who are from the community so that you build partnerships. That's what community policing is all about, and I dare say it happens in diverse communities, it happens in majorities, but it has to happen the same way. You have to build a relationship.

And part of...

TORRES: You have to have the trust.

TAYLOR: And the trust.

And part of -- Secretary Johnson has spoken eloquently about this. When he goes out to do these community engagements, he's met with skepticism. He receives complaints about profiling and other sorts of concerns the community has, but you have to have that discussion, too, to build the trust, that we are talking about things the community needs to know that the community can do to protect themselves.

TORRES: Thank you.

Mr. Steinbeck, I know that -- well, I want you to know that I represent the Ontario Airport, which is, you know, to our demise, is controlled and managed by LAX.

I would like to hear more about the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force in Los Angeles and how they are working with my local police department in Ontario to ensure that training is happening, not only for those officers at LAX or LAPD but it is also happening for those officers who would be the first responders, should an incident happen.

STEINBACH: L.A.'s -- the L.A. FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force is a very large task force. It does not just include LAX; it includes all the major airports -- Orange county, Ontario.

And -- and I would suggest that you make an appointment to go out and tour that. I'm sure the office out there -- Dave Bowdich runs that office. He'd be happy to provide a tour view and give you firsthand an understanding of just how robust that task force is.

It is a -- I was just out there a couple of weeks ago discussing with him and -- and meeting some of the folks in his task force. But I would encourage you to go out there and -- and see firsthand.

TORRES: Right. I'd like to continue this discussion with you off the record here to bring to your attention -- my staff recently went on a tour, and I was saddened to have discovered that while training is happening among other agencies, Ontario Police Department has not been invited to participate in many of that -- or much of that.

STEINBACH: I'd be happy to have that conversation with you, and I'd also be happy to bring those concerns to Mr. Bowdich's attention.

TORRES: Thank you.

TAYLOR: Ma'am, if I might as well, in our community outreach role in DHS, we certainly are working very hard with police agencies throughout California.

So if there's a deficit of training and there's something that DHS might be able to help in Ontario, we're more than happy to -- to have that discussion and ensure that the training that is available in counterterrorism is available to Ontario.

TORRES: Thank you.

MCCAUL: Thank you.

Mr. Katko

MORE

XXX secure -- security even on the exterior of the European Union borders, and how that's not moving the way it should as quickly as it should. And even the technical support that we offer as a country to some of these countries as to how to deal with it is not being utilized.

KEATING: So I want to ask on a couple of fronts. Number one, I still think we can work together with countries, even if the European Union isn't moving. I want you to comment on how we're dealing with that information sharing -- local, state, federal -- and with those individuals countries. Because we also found that some countries are more receptive and moving faster than others in terms of information sharing that'll make us all safer, not just here and not just when Americans travel abroad in Europe, but here at home, too.

And the other thing is, the -- the idea that, you know, we're doing a good job swatting mosquitoes here at home when it comes to the Internet, but we're not drying up the swamp as much as we can. And can you comment on what we're doing for counter-messaging? Not just

enforcement or trying to find out what's going on, but in counter-messaging through the Internet to try and have competing messages, and what you think more could be done.

So those are the two questions. And anyone that wants to address those.

MULLIGAN: So I'll jump in on the first piece with regard to -- and, again, my colleagues are more conversant on pushing the information to the locals. But from a national perspective, we are very consciously trying to push the intelligence and the knowledge that has been gleaned from our assessments down to the locals so that they are more fully informed. That is definitely -- and we need to do more and we have to keep pushing that.

On the international piece that you described, it does become at times very unwieldy when you make it a multilateral issue. So we have established a number of very close bilateral relationships in terms of information sharing that's been very, very positive.

But the challenge is, if you really are going to try and address these challenges in a time efficient way, you need to ensure that a broader range is -- that you have the equipment that you can be passing information effectively. So that's a longer-term objective in that regard.

In terms of the overall counter-messaging, the government -- our government -- our federal government has an inter-agency process involved in which we're all moving to do counter-messaging. That counter-messaging works at the speed of government. It is -- well, as you understand, it has constraints in that. I think the real secret is going to be to broaden that overall counter-messaging and include those folks outside of the government so that they can...

KEATING: Oh, yeah.

MULLIGAN: ... participate in that process.

TAYLOR: I would make two comments here. First, this Committee has been very clear to me in my role as the undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis that the core customer for the intelligence that we do is state and locals. And we have worked very hard from last year to try to transform how we approach the dissemination of data and information to our state and local partners, with our I.C. colleagues, with the FBI and with others in NCTC. But specifically focusing on getting relevant information out quickly to our state and local partners.

I -- I don't know how many joint intelligence bulletins we've done this year, but I think it's a record over last year. So that is our commitment to move this information and get into the hands of our first responders at the state, local, federal, travel and private sector -- and private sector.

When we talk about our foreign partners -- you mentioned the E.U. -- the E.U. is, in some cases, reluctant to -- to use PNR (ph) across all the E.U. We do have individual dialogues with members of the E.U. where certain countries are moving forward to do that within their own country.

I think -- I was just on the -- in New York at the U.N. with Secretary Johnson. We talked about U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267. I think there's more pressure on those communities to do that. And we'll continue to press to get those kinds of laws passed in those countries for that kind of information.

I would also emphasize that all of the visa waiver countries -- and that's most of the E.U. -- have independent bilateral agreements with us on information sharing. That may be through the intelligence service, it may be through the FBI or law enforcement. Those are very robust agreements that we're continuing to -- to press for the exchange of that kind of information. So it's not -- it's not a perfect scene (ph) yet, but the information exchange, both within our country to our state and local partners and also with our foreign partners continues to improve on daily basis.

MCCAUL: Now Mr. Loudermilk is recognized.

LOUDERMILK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being here. This is -- of all the hearings that we've had, in my opinion, this has been one of the most productive and informative that I've sat in on.

And one of the things that we're going to be doing in my office in the coming weeks is visiting with local law enforcement, our fusion centers within the district. Because what I'm seeing with these lone -- lone wolf attacks, the cause for attackers that are already in the U.S., is going to be a reliance on local law enforcement.

And with the recent attacks, it is a reminder to me, and I think to all of us, that these attacks are not against us as individuals. They're not against us as citizens. They're attacks -- they're attacks by those who are threatened or diametrically opposed to what we are as a people and what we have, which is freedom. You know, our freedom of thought, freedom of ideas, freedom of religion. And in the case of Garland, Texas was the freedom of speech. That was really what was being attacked.

With -- with that in mind, the American Freedom Defense Initiative and their -- their contest seems to be, as some have said, incited these attacks. And understanding it and knowing what happened with Charlie Hebdo in Paris, with which I was there just a few weeks ago in Paris with this codel (ph) -- it would leave us to believe that this is a potential target.

The first question -- what -- how far in advance of the event did our I.C. or counterterrorism know that this event was happening? And how do we find that out? Was there coordination with them? Or did this come from local law enforcement?

STEINBACH: WE knew about it several weeks in advance. And more specifically, I would say in this event, and the event in Phoenix last Friday, and in every event like this, we do go to those organizers and those individuals and lay out the threat and the potential. We, of course, don't try to talk them out of it, but we explain to them...

LOUDERMILK: Right.

STEINBACH: ... but we explain to them, "Hey, if you do X, this may happen." So we knew several weeks in advance.

LOUDERMILK: OK. So you know that these are coming. And how much interface do you have with the local law enforcement going into these?

STEINBACH: It's multifaceted. So, you know, we put out a -- a joint intelligence bulletin, which lays out, in this case -- Garland -- weeks -- a week in advance, it kind of laid out the event and the threat to the event. And this particular case and in many events like it, we do -- we push out a communication tool called the collection emphasis message. That collection emphasis message asks agencies, federal state and local, to collect intelligence on the event and the threat.

We put out tactical reports. We have, in many cases, depending on the size of the event, we have preparatory meetings with state and local, identifying who's going to have lead for crowd control, emergency response, tactical resources. It's a multilayered approach that we take with every special event.

LOUDERMILK: Now, I know Ms. Rice asked one of the questions I was getting at, which is, we -- we have 15 years of tracking terrorism -- terrorists and their activities, their threats through all the chatter. And so we've -- we've kind of got to where we can filter through what's just chatter and what's a valid threat.

Is how responsive our local law enforcement to the threats that we're laying out -- do -- do they tend to -- to take them seriously?

STEINBACH: Yes, we spend a lot of time, DHS, NCTC and the FBI -- pushing that message at the local level through the field officers, as well as at the executive level. Just two weeks ago, we had a video teleconference that was led by the director of the FBI and the director of Homeland Security, where we laid out again the threat -- the current threat. We do that periodically.

So there's multiple levels of engagement. Today I'm going to be talking to major city chiefs on this same topic.

TAYLOR: I would add, sir, that the -- we've created a network in our fusion centers with JTTFs across this country. Whenever an event occurs, there's someone up on the net saying, "What's the impact in my community?" And that's done over the Homeland Security intelligence network, or it's done over the law enforcement network of the FBI.

Our local law enforcement partners understand their primary responsibility to protect their communities. They understand these risks threaten their communities, and they are hungry for information to help them prepare. And that's -- what we've tried to design is a system that...

LOUDERMILK: Right.

TAYLOR: ... gets that information out to them. And once they get it, as they did in Garland, they take the appropriate action.

LOUDERMILK: Now, the -- and if -- if some of this -- these questions are more of a classified nature, we can -- we can respond to those later. Because I understand and appreciate, being in the intelligence community in the past. But of the -- the communications that we know that happened between the attackers and other bad players, how much of that did we know before the attack versus forensic information, and how much of that played into the -- the warning that -- that we sent to the -- to the local.

STEINBACH: I'd be happy to answer that but not in this setting.

LOUDERMILK: OK. I appreciate that.

And -- and the -- the last one is the reverse flow. Do we have good channels of communications for intelligence gathering from local law enforcement, who are the boots on the ground in the community?

Because, you know, this was a national event, per se, because it's -- it was an organization out of New York. But you may have a local event that could be a high-threat target.

Do we have a flow of information from the locals?

TAYLOR: Sir, it's a great question, and again, under the direction from this committee, we've worked to expand the amount of local intelligence that's gathered and reported into the I.C., that's relevant to the I.C., not only working with the FBI but working independently with our fusion centers in the field.

We've created a new process, what we call field activity reporting, where fusion centers working with DHS and the FBI will do reports from a field -- state-level perspective on threats and risks in the community. So I think we've created that opportunity for the local -- state and local partners to -- to report up, for us to report down and for all of us to share information on a continuous basis.

LOUDERMILK: Are they actively reporting up?

TAYLOR: Absolutely, sir.

STEINBACH: Let me highlight that a little bit more, sir.

So, I mean, the reason we are pushing information out is to make use of the 400,000 state, local and tribal law enforcement officers around the country.

They are our first response. They're the ones doing the car stop. They're the ones going into the house as first responders. They're seeing it well before any of us here see it.

It's incumbent we have the guardian process that allows for reporting -- the -- the eGuardian process that allows for reporting of information quickly into the fusion center and the JTTF model to act on that.

So that's -- that's the crux, and that's really at the foundation of this process.

LOUDERMILK: Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman?

MCCAUL: Ms. McSally's recognized.

MCSALLY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony, and appreciate as part of our Task Force on Combating Terrorism and Foreign Fighter Flow, we've had some other conversations in classified settings. And so I appreciate all the work that you're doing.

The question I have today is about -- the first one is about the recruitment of women and girls from our country. It seems that jihadi women in Syria are actively recruiting or -- not just women -- recruiting Western girls.

I, you know, can't imagine what the draw would be except, of course, they're being lied to, like most of the recruits. But here, we have American girls that are being recruited to potentially flow over there for a life of rape and slavery and so specifically (inaudible) -- I think you said there's 200 that we know of, Americans that have -- have flowed over to the region.

How many of them are women and girls, and are there specific targeting efforts that we're doing community-wide, or others, in order to address specifically what's going on with targeting of women and girls?

STEINBACH: So I won't get into specific numbers, but, you know, when you look five, six years ago, the number of female recruits was almost nil.

So right now, it's -- it's -- 10 percent, I think, is probably a good ballpark. So it's -- it's a minority, but the fact that it went from zero to where it's at now is a significant uptick for us.

So yes, we look at the reasons why individuals are recruited, the specifics, young adult males, young adult females, what's drawing them. That's part of our process to understand it, what the motivations for radicalization.

We find a wide variety. It's not just the classic you see on TV, jihadi; there are other reasons that are motivating these young women to -- to take a chance and go overseas.

MCSALLY: So -- and as part of the countering of it and engaging with communities, actually, do we have messages of, "No, you are going to be in slavery and repeatedly raped when you get over there," and actually countering that and, you know, the graphic realities of what they're going to get recruited into, to include, potentially, testimonies of individuals that have experienced this?

I mean, that -- the way you counter a message is with a stronger message.

STEINBACH: Absolutely.

MCSALLY: And so we're doing some of that?

STEINBACH: Absolutely.

MCSALLY: At the local level as well?

STEINBACH: Yes. Through the JTTF, through the fusion centers, as part of the (inaudible) narrative, we are reaching out, you know, pushing the message out to the communities, to the schools, having conversations about the dangers of being online, not just online because of pedophiles and because of cyber criminals but online for fear of recruitment and enticement.

MCSALLY: Right. OK, great. Thanks.

My next question is about the use of social media for fundraising, and I wonder if you could comment on how ISIS is using social media in order to raise funds through crowdsourcing and other, you know, attempts to raise funds using social media, and are you working with the Department of Treasury, specific, Offices of Asset Forfeiture, FINCEN and -- and OFAC?

Specifically, how successful have they been, and how are we countering fundraising?

MULLIGAN: I would characterize it for you as it's a very arduous process to rebuild -- or build our understanding of the financial processes that ISIS and ISIL is employing currently.

I would also point out, as you're probably very well-aware, that they are -- in their expansion of the caliphate, they are literally taking possession of a number of resources and then exploiting that.

So to a large extent, they've been able to draw on a lot of those resources for a lot of their financing and funding. But nevertheless, it's a long -- because of the fact that they are an extended organization, they have to manage that financial infrastructure.

That's an intelligence effort that's underway. We're working aggressively with the Treasury Department and other states.

MCSALLY: So their online fundraising is minuscule compared to how -- I mean, I know black market and all the stuff they're doing in the region that they have and the ransoms and all the things that we're focusing on, but -- but specifically the online fundraising?

MULLIGAN: I would qualify it by saying I don't think that we're seeing the same degree of online fundraising that we probably have seen in the past by other entities.

(UNKNOWN): I would concur with that.

MCSALLY: Yeah. OK. Great.

And my last question, really quickly, is we know ISIS has been trying to motivate people to attack military bases or attack military members. Obviously, you know, I was in the military. Those are some of our most secure areas. There's, you know, certainly softer targets that they could go after.

But if they would recruit somebody who has access to a base, Major Hasan as an example, you know, we could have a major impact from an insider threat.

Have you seen ISIS attempting to recruit military members or those who have access to bases, and are you working with the Department of Defense in order to counter that threat?

TAYLOR: Well, as the chairman mentioned in his opening remarks, the Department of Defense takes this threat very seriously. They work very closely with the FBI and the I.C. and DHS around how those risks are -- might manifest themselves within the country.

Your point earlier, it's a pretty secure place, but they've even identified people by addresses, and we've worked with the military on strategies for those individuals to protect themselves at this point.

MCSALLY: Good. Any other comments?

MULLIGAN: Wanted to just offer the fact that it's very reasonable to expect a very aggressive effort by ISIS to be trying to derive military targets, because part of their overall narrative is the fact they want to draw linkages, they want to make those correlations.

So we have to be particularly vigilant with regard to military members.

MCSALLY: Great. Thank you. My time's expired.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MCCAUL: Let me thank the witnesses for your testimony and your service to our country.

The members may have additional questions in writing. Pursuant to Committee Rule 7(c), the hearing will be open -- record open for 10 days.

Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.

END

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White House CVE Summit

- Countering violent extremism (CVE) has been a centerpiece of this Administration's counterterrorism strategy. Our CVE approach is premised on the principle that local partners, including local law enforcement and communities, are at the forefront of preventing violent radicalization and recruitment both online and person-to-person. Indeed, protecting the American people from violent extremism is not the work of government alone; our communities are often best positioned to take the lead.
- The threat posed by violent extremism is neither constrained by international borders nor limited to any single ideology. Groups and individuals inspired by a range of religious, political, or other ideological beliefs have promoted and used violence against individuals worldwide.
- Local partners also need support from government—they need to know this is a priority for government action.
- Finally, communities and government are concerned about the efforts of groups like ISIS to recruit people from the United States. The time for partnership is now.
- In order to underscore these points, this fall the White House will host a CVE summit to showcase efforts by Federal and local officials, as well as civic and faith leaders, from several cities across the United States. These innovators have developed a comprehensive approach to the threat of violent extremism within our communities, and the summit will provide an opportunity to spur additional efforts both at home and abroad.
- This summit also will highlight non-traditional, holistic approaches to violence prevention, conflict resolution, and countering violent extremism, as well as community-led initiatives.
- This summit will come on the heels of the President's stewardship of a UN Security Council session on foreign terrorist fighters. Given the ability of foreign terrorist groups to recruit Americans, the time for action to protect our communities from recruitment and prevent future flows is now.
- We will share additional details of the summit as it approaches.

What is this CVE pilot program that AG Holder announced on Monday 9/15?

- The CVE pilot program is a whole of government effort to partner and empower communities to lead on CVE initiatives.

- These programs will bring together community representatives, public safety officials, religious leaders, social service providers, and United States Attorneys, and FBI leadership to improve local engagement; to counter violent extremism; and – ultimately – to build a broad network of community partnerships to keep our nation safe.
- Current initiatives largely focus on engagement between public safety and community leaders. These new pilot strategies will complement and supplement existing efforts by engaging the resources and expertise available from a wide range of social service providers. These include education administrators, mental health professionals, and religious leaders, who—in this context and more broadly— are on the front lines everyday providing robust support and help facilitating community-led interventions.
- These pilot programs will also bring in expertise from the private sector, including creative and communications industries who can help communities build capacity to challenge violent extremist propaganda.
- The hope is that lessons learned in those cities can be adopted, as appropriate, throughout the country. We work closely with state, local, and community leaders in the field and offer our expertise where appropriate.

How is the interagency working together to counter violent extremism?

Who has the lead?

- The U.S. Government uses a multi-pronged approach to countering violent extremism in the Homeland. The National Security Council provides policy guidance for these efforts. Departments and agencies have different yet complementary implementation roles and responsibilities, as outlined in the strategic implementation plan.
- For the past three years FBI, DHS, DOJ and NCTC have been working collaboratively to implement our domestic CVE strategy. Senior staff from these agencies meet weekly to discuss projects of common interest and ensure transparency among agencies regarding our CVE work. This group has implemented activities that incorporate all agencies' distinct missions. More importantly, this group draws on the programs and initiatives developed by our state and local partners, in cities across the United States.
- To help people understand how to prevent violent extremism, they first need to understand the problem. Therefore, we in government need to continue building public awareness about what the indicators are for someone who might be on that path.
- FBI, DHS, DOJ and NCTC have conducted outreach in select cities where we speak with law enforcement, public safety officials, and communities about the threat of violent extremism and terrorist recruitment. When we do, we have historically used the Community Awareness Briefing, as well as the Community Resilience Exercise.

- The Community Awareness Briefing (CAB) is a presentation designed to educate communities and law enforcement about violent extremist recruitment tactics – including recruitment of foreign fighters -- and to explore ways to prevent such public safety threats at the local level. This briefing has been given in cities across the country, and government is redesigning it so that it can reach more people.
- The Community Resilience Exercise (CREX) is a half-day table-top exercise designed to improve trust between law enforcement and communities and to share ideas on how best to build community resilience. The CREX involves an unfolding scenario of possible violent extremist activity and asks participants to create a collaborative plan to respond. The exercise has been implemented in cities across the United States.
- The US government has given this briefing and conducted these exercises throughout the country in places like Chicago, Boston, LA, Minneapolis, Seattle, Austin, TX, Houston, and Baltimore, MD. But as you can see, with a limited number of staff, we are only able to travel to a small number of cities.

What are examples of CVE successes?

- Examples of CVE best practices in action are the United States Attorneys around the country who have hosted or attended more than 1,000 engagement-related events and meetings where they build relationships with communities, dispel myths and misperceptions, and develop locally-based partnerships. Similarly, DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties hosts quarterly roundtables in 13 cities. When communities feel comfortable approaching federal officials for information and assistance, and conversely sharing information from federal officials with other community members, these are signs that community engagement is building trust. Evidence of this is anecdotal only and may be difficult to measure in a systematic way, but capturing some examples will help indicate progress.
- Similarly, law enforcement in cities like Minneapolis, Los Angeles, and Dearborn have developed robust outreach programs for communities and training programs for law enforcement, leading to trusting relationships with communities on everything from civil rights to radicalization.
- Community groups have created very promising intervention programs, such as those lead by WORDE and MPAC. And community leaders are active online. Motivated by the atrocities of ISIL, community groups are working to counter that recruitment narrative on social media sites. Community leaders in Minneapolis have created documentaries like “Broken Dreams” to highlight the misleading narrative of groups like Al-Shabaab.

- In Minnesota, during trials that involved members of the Somali-American community, members of the Young Somali-American Advisory Council (established by the U.S. Attorney's office), often emailed press releases from the U.S. Attorney to educate community members. This helped diminish potential mistrust and misperception in the community.
- Another example is the exchanges with European government officials and community leaders from the United Kingdom, Germany, and Scandinavia, sponsored by DHS and the Department of State. These meetings provided an opportunity for communities who are targeted by violent extremists to (1) better understand the threat that similar communities face; and (2) develop a better understanding of the role that government officials, including law enforcement, can play in addressing it.

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Community Awareness Briefing: Foreign Fighter Focus

Slide 1: Community Awareness Briefing

Scene Setter: *The presentation's goal is to inform the audience how violent extremists get their message out (including by the internet), and how government and communities can work together to prevent youth from being tricked by this recruitment. We present the information to help communities understand the phenomenon of radicalization and mobilization, but we can only hope to get to a discussion on solutions through audience participation. We encourage the audience to stop the briefer at any point to ask questions, raise points, or do whatever to help the group arrive at the best way to work on this problem before another person is lost to violent extremism.*

Slide 2: Why Are We Here?

Scene Setter: *In this slide, we talk about how we are here to raise awareness of how violent extremist groups ensnare vulnerable individuals to commit violent or illegal acts, thereby negatively impacting the lives of these individuals, their families and communities. The 2011 Domestic Countering Violent Extremism Strategy emphasizes that communities are invaluable partners in prevention, and government's role is to empower and catalyze communities to take action. We have seen there is often a time period, before law enforcement gets involved, in which parents, friends, community/religious leaders, and teachers see signs of someone being radicalized to violence, creating a window of opportunity for them to act to protect their communities.*

Key Points:

We have been invited by (Law Enforcement / Community Leaders) to provide an awareness briefing to enable you to understand the threat from violent extremism

- We want ensure you understand the threat from violent extremism, in all its forms--
- We are going to review case studies to show you how individuals buy into committing violent action
- And we are going to discuss ways we, the U.S. Government, and you, the Community, can work together to truly mitigate against this threat
- We want to emphasize that our intention is definitely not to have you “spy” on your neighbors and report back to us. You are in no means “agents of the government.” Our intention is to empower communities such as yourselves by imparting you all with information in the hopes that it prevents radicalization and mobilization to violence.
- *Overall Pitch:* Often the most vulnerable in our communities, our youth, get ensnared in dangerous groups, which can then destroy families and ultimately, negatively impact our society

We need your help

- The USG has traditional roles it uses to address the threat from VE, but they only go so far and only address so much of the violent extremism spectrum of activity
 - These roles include local U.S. District Attorneys, FBI Field Offices, local police, and representatives from DHS and NCTC
 - However, often these government representatives only get involved after things have gone wrong; i.e. something illegal has occurred. This might include after the individual is recruited and radicalized and takes a step in furtherance of their violent or criminal act—that's when the government plays a role.

Community Awareness Briefing: Foreign Fighter Focus

- Communities, however, have the ability to get involved at a much earlier stage during which there is a window of opportunity to prevent an individual from progressing down the path towards committing illegal acts. In this arena, it is communities who are the most important actors, not the government. And if communities are successful in this prevention phase, then there will no longer even be a need for the government to get involved at all.
- In the end, local communities are the most powerful asset we have in the struggle against violent extremism. We cannot address this threat without your help.
 - We've crunched the data on this. In the more than 80 percent of cases involving homegrown violent extremists, people in the community—whether peers or family members or authority figures or even strangers—had observed warning signs a person was becoming radicalized to violence.¹
 - Many of these warning signs were ignored, however.²
 - Studies have shown that in the vast majority of cases, people who see troubling signs do not act upon this information, becoming passive bystanders.³
 - This happens in a variety of social situations, everything from witnessing bullying to witnessing prejudice, and social science has called this passive witnessing the “Bystander Effect”.⁴
 - However, just like has been done in anti-bullying campaigns, we want to empower you all to become what's called “active bystanders.” This means overcoming the subtle pressures that can cause passive behavior, such as diffusion of responsibility and pluralistic ignorance.⁵
 - With this presentation, we hope to impart to you a personal sense of responsibility for protecting your communities, including your youth, and to empower you with knowledge by raising your awareness of the signs of radicalization and possible responses.
- You, the Community, are in a much better position to see early on when a threat may be materializing
- We hope this presentation will leave with a better understanding of the threat, why it's important, and what **you** can do to help.

Slide 3: Why Are We Here? (video)

Scene Setter: *In this slide, we emphasize that we are here to protect our children, and the video we show of a mother grieving over the attempt of her son to join ISIL is meant to portray how violent extremists are exploiting our communities and our youth.*

Background:

Mohammed's mother Zarine Khan (USPER) made a statement to the media after her son was charged with material support to ISIL.⁶

¹ <http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/04/18/counterterrorism-chief-parents-should-watch-for-sudden-personality-changes-in-children/>

² <http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/04/18/counterterrorism-chief-parents-should-watch-for-sudden-personality-changes-in-children/>

³ http://activebystander.com/?page_id=18

⁴ http://activebystander.com/?page_id=18

⁵ http://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/we_are_all_bystanders

⁶ <http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/bolingbrook/ct-terrorism-parents-speak-out-met-20150113-story.html>

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- "We have a message for ISIS, Mr. Baghdadi and his fellow social media recruiters. Leave our children alone!"⁷

Slide 4: Violent Extremism

Scene Setter: *In this slide, we provide background on violent extremism, which comes in all forms, whether it is neo-Nazis, sovereign citizens, etc. We explain that the absolutist mindset appeals to adolescents searching for meaning and identity. It is very important to demonstrate to the audience that the government understands there is a range of threats and ensure them that our government's concern is not solely on al-Qaeda or ISIL-inspired terrorism. In terms of relating to the audience, it is important to continue to portray, within reason, some of the youth involved as victims of recruiting.*

Key Points:

Definition: Violent extremism refers to violence committed in the name of ideology to further a political agenda

Violent extremism takes many forms

- Violent Extremism takes many forms, from international terrorist organizations to domestic terrorist groups.
- It is important to remember, among others:
 - The 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing;
 - Gangs such as MS- 13, terrorizing communities across the country
 - Neo-Nazis and white supremacists;
 - Issue-driven violent extremists such as the Animal Liberation Front; Earth Liberation Front
- In fact, we recognize that there are a range of threats to our nation including from non- al-Qaeda inspired extremist groups.
- Today we're going to talk briefly about how violent extremism groups use similar techniques to recruit individuals. Then, we're going to discuss one form of violent extremism, inspired by al-Qaeda and recently expanded by ISIL. We do so because there are a concerning number of individuals leaving their homes in countries around the world, including ours, to join ISIL.

Background:

According to studies by the University of Maryland START, between 2000 and 2013, the vast majority of attacks in the homeland were carried out by environmental and animal rights violent extremist groups.⁸

Known Perpetrators Attacks 2000-2013⁹

• Unaffiliated Individual(s)	64
• Earth Liberation Front	60
• Animal Liberation Front	42
• Anti-Abortion Activists	15
• Coalition to Save the Preserves	8
• Al-Qaida	4

⁷ <http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/07/us/who-is-mohammed-hamzah-khan/>

⁸ Erin Miller, START Research Highlight, "Terrorist Attacks in the U.S. Between 1970 and 2013: Data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)," November 2014.

⁹ Erin Miller, START Research Highlight, "Terrorist Attacks in the U.S. Between 1970 and 2013: Data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)," November 2014.

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• Neo-Nazi Group	2
• Revolutionary Cells-Animal Liberation Brigade 2	
• White Extremists	2
• Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula	1
• Anarchists	1
• The Justice Department	1
• Ku Klux Klan	1
• Minutemen American Defense	1
• Revenge of the Trees	1
• Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan	1
• Veterans for Non-Religious Memorials	1

Meanwhile, DHS recently surveyed several hundred police officers, asking them what they perceived to be the biggest terrorist threat. The report, released in July, found that the greatest fear was from "sovereign citizens" - loosely-affiliated individuals who reject most laws at federal, state and local levels.¹⁰

- Individuals belonging to the sovereign citizen movement have been responsible for a spate of cop killings in recent years.
- The DHS report also cites militia groups, racist skinheads, neo-Nazis and both animal rights and environmentalist violent extremists as ranking highly among law enforcement's fears.

Slide 5: Case Study: Robert Talbot Jr. (USPER)

Scene Setter: *With this slide, we provide a case study of a Patriot violent extremist to highlight the similarities between his activities and those we'll review later on that are related to Al-Qaeda and ISIL. We focus on Robert Talbot (USPER) because of his extensive online activity which resembles AQ/ISIL online recruitment and because he was targeting Mosques – which is meant to convey to communities that we also care about this type of threat, which affects them directly. Lastly, if we are asked about FBI's use of informants we can refer back to Talbot to show how the FBI uses such techniques for all types of VEs, not just Islamic extremist ones.*

Key Points:

The case of Robert Talbot Jr. is an example of non-al-Qaeda inspired violent extremism that shares similarities with al-Qaeda in recruitment, use of the internet, and absolutist beliefs. Robert Talbot Jr. was part of a radical group that saw the federal government as their primary enemy.¹¹

- He propagated his views on his Facebook page (called American Insurgent Movement (AIM)) and actively recruited others online to join;
- Wrote a Manifesto in which he described AIM as “a Pre-Constitutionalist Community that offers those who seek True patriotism and are looking for absolute Freedom by doing the Will of God. Who want to restore America Pre-Constitutionally and look forward to stopping the Regime with action by bloodshed”;
- Plotted to use C-4 explosives and weapons to kill police officers, rob banks, and blow up government buildings and mosques;

¹⁰ <http://m.theweek.com/article/index/270443/forget-dirty-bombs-and-cyberwar-here-are-3-threats-that-should-truly-terrify-you>

¹¹ <http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2012/spring/the-year-in-hate-and-extremism>

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- FBI agents swept in and arrested Talbot while he was on his way to the heist that he had desperately hoped would fund his revolution.¹² FBI had been tracking his activities online.¹³

Background:

Internet:

- The FBI opened its investigation into Talbot in August 2013, apparently after finding Talbot's Facebook posts searching for "like-minded" recruits to join his cause.
- After setting up a Facebook page called American Insurgent Movement (AIM), Talbot allegedly sought to recruit five or six like-minded people who wanted "to restore America Pre-Constitutionally and look forward to stopping the Regime with action by bloodshed."
- He described his movement as "a Pre-Constitutionalist Community that offers those who seek True patriotism and are looking for absolute Freedom by doing the Will of God who want to restore America Pre-Constitutionally and look forward to stopping the Regime with action by bloodshed."
- He himself was radicalized partially by watching anti-government videos online.
- After using Facebook to recruit three followers, who really were undercover agents and an informant, Talbot encouraged them to "start watching violent war movies to mentally prepare for killing people."¹⁴

Operational activities:

- He said online that he wanted to rob an armored truck so he could buy the "larger weapons" he needed to launch his movement. Shortly thereafter, Talbot began conducting routine surveillance on a local Bank of America branch in March, watching the cash-carriers come and go, according to court records. This was to be the first phase of his larger scheme to kill police officers and blow up mosques and government buildings.
- Undercover agents claimed he started carrying around a Glock 31 and a fully-loaded 15-round magazine in his backpack when he met with them. In late March Talbot sent \$500 to someone he thought was a black market arms dealer (in reality, the FBI) to buy C-4 explosives. He provided his recruits (in reality, undercover agents) maps of the armored truck route. Talbot planned to blast the truck doors with explosives before jumping inside and executing the guard, according to records. On March 26, Talbot took undercover agents on a three-hour tour to trace the armored truck's path and plan the heist, according to court records.¹⁵
- The next day, undercover agents met him at a Houston storage unit. After again going over his plan to rob the truck and execute the driver, Talbot read them his manifesto: "We must rebel. There is no other option no. Blood and bullets are the only two things that will change this world, short of divine action."¹⁶

¹² Michael Barajas, "American Insurgent Movement Leader Pleads Guilty to Plot to Overthrow Government, Rob Banks and Blow up Mosques," Houston Press, October 3, 2014.

http://blogs.houstonpress.com/news/2014/10/american_insurgent_movement_leader_pleads_guilty_to_plot_to_overthrow_government_rob_banks_and_blow.php

¹³ <http://www.splcenter.org/blog/2014/03/28/fbi-smashes-alleged-radical-right-terror-plot-in-texas/>

¹⁴ <http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2014/fall/Man-Arrested-After-Allegedly-Recruiting>

¹⁵ <http://www.splcenter.org/blog/2014/03/28/fbi-smashes-alleged-radical-right-terror-plot-in-texas/>

¹⁶ <http://www.splcenter.org/blog/2014/03/28/fbi-smashes-alleged-radical-right-terror-plot-in-texas/>

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Slide 6: Screen shot of 'White Pride' Propaganda on YouTube¹⁷

Scene Setter: *This slide is meant to convey how easy it is to find material online for any type of violent extremist messages, including white pride, a term used by white supremacist groups.*

Slide 7: All Violent Extremist Groups

Scene Setter: *This slide is meant to continue the theme about how all forms of violent extremism are similar, but focusing specifically on their tactics of recruitment and how they entice individuals to join their cause.*

Key Points:

Similarities between violent extremist groups

Regardless of ideology, all violent extremism share similar ways of attracting recruits. While these groups may have completely different agendas and beliefs, they all recruit online and target our youth.

- **Recruitment:** Recruitment begins at an early age (indoctrination) and occurs increasingly online.
- **Target youth:** They focus on finding the young, the lost, and the vulnerable.
- **Community of Interest:** They provide a sense of belonging, of being a part of something bigger. They offer a community of interest that responds to their grievances.
- **Violent action:** They sell an absolutist worldview in which violent action is the only effective solution, highlighted as a duty.

Slide 8: Why Would Someone Join a Violent Extremist Group?

Scene Setter: *This slide is meant to inform the audience of the radicalization to violence process.*

Background:¹⁸

The presenter should be familiar with the radicalization and mobilization process when giving this presentation. The following can serve as a baseline foundation from which to speak:

- **Definition:** Radicalization refers to the process by which individuals come to accept a violent extremist narrative and conclude that non state violence and their participation in it is necessary and justified to affect political or societal change.
- **Radicalization** is not a linear process. It involves the interplay of personal, group, community, sociopolitical, and ideological factors. No single factor accounts for why one individual radicalizes while another does not.

¹⁷ Open Source Search, "White Pride", YouTube

¹⁸ NCTC Product, "Radicalization Dynamics: A Primer," June 2012 (UNCLASSIFIED)

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- It's important to note two caveats: (1) no single factor leads to radicalization and (2) a person may have some or all of these factors and not become violent. Violence occurs when the individual mobilizes to action.
- **Definition:** Mobilization refers to the process by which radicalized individuals take action to prepare for or engage in violence or material support for violence to advance their cause.
 - Some of the factors that come into play during the mobilization process are: (1) the individual's willingness and capacity to act, and (2) the perceived availability of likely targets.
 - Action occurs if the mobilized individual does not encounter inhibiting factors. Changes in capacity or opportunity may inhibit action. Some individuals who are inhibited at this stage may remain mobilized and seek alternate opportunities to act, while others may abandon their plans to act.

Slide 9: Forming the Black and White Narrative

Scene Setter: *This slide outlines the six elements of any violent extremist narrative, and highlights how they apply to Al-Qa'ida's narrative. Also highlighted are ways to weaken the narrative by deconstructing one or more of its elements.*

Key Points:

Violent extremist ideologies typically are made up of six core assertions that violent extremists use to rhetorically justify violence and spur people to action. Generally, all six elements are necessary to persuade, radicalize, and mobilize people to become violent extremists: the loss or removal of one or more elements collapses the argument and undercuts the appeal of the ideology.

- The core structural elements of an extremist ideology specify that the world has gone wrong because of the actions of an enemy who hates or threatens what is good. Now is the time when violence is necessary to prevent catastrophe. If we stay true to our righteous course, we will achieve victory.
- This narrative creates and justifies the logic extremists use to continue espousing hatred, and ultimately violence by dehumanizing the Other and positioning them as an "enemy."

One of the goals in prevention is to break down this narrative, which is something both the USG, but most definitely, the Community can do.

- This narrative presents an overly simplified view that can be broken down by adding complexity and highlighting inconsistencies. Weakening any one of the six elements can cause the entire framework of the narrative to fall apart.

Background:

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ELEMENT	MESSAGE	WHAT THE ELEMENT DOES	ELEMENT IS NECESSARY BECAUSE
Decline	<i>The world has gone wrong.</i>	Interprets someone's world as decimated or in jeopardy.	Without <i>Decline</i> , the violent extremist sees no need to rescue their world.
Two Camps	<i>Our enemy hates us and all that is good.</i>	Identifies and demonizes an enemy who is to blame for the decline, and depicts those who resist that enemy as heroic.	Without <i>Two Camps</i> , there is no enemy to combat.
Crisis Point	<i>We must act now.</i>	Creates a sense of panic that action must be taken now to save that world, and says all one holds dear now hangs in the balance.	Without <i>Crisis Point</i> , there is no sense that immediate action is required.
Method	<i>Violence is necessary.</i>	Provides the appropriate—even heroic—way to resist.	Without <i>Method</i> , there is no clearly defined way to resist the enemy.
Danger of Contamination	<i>We must stay true to our course.</i>	Prevents compromise or moderation of extremist views by depicting them as treason or complicity with the enemy, or dangerous to the movement's success, the salvation of the world, or one's own soul.	Without <i>Danger of Contamination</i> , dialogue and compromise with perceived enemies is allowable to reach goals.
Reward	<i>We will defeat our enemy and achieve what we want as a movement and as individuals.</i>	Provides a motivating image of victory or paradise for the movement or individual.	Without <i>Reward</i> , there is no goal to work toward.

Slide 10: Example of the Narrative (video)

Scene Setter: For this slide, we show a video to illustrate Al-Qaeda's black and white narrative and how it calls for violent action. The goal is to reinforce the points made in the previous slide by showing an actual example of the narrative and then discussing its key elements. A key point to emphasis is that these videos are in English which is meant to buttress the argument that this recruiting is coming into their homes and targeting their children here in the U.S. not just overseas. We also emphasize to the audience how easy these videos are to find online. We also discuss commonly-held grievances that AQ exploits to recruit Americans and show how violent extremist groups blur the line between legitimate grievances and illegitimate violent responses to those grievances.

Key Points:

The English language video was created by Al-Qa'ida to attract Westerners to their cause. It presents the United States as a ruthless and aggressive enemy to be fought, and uses the words of an American culture icon—Malcolm X—to justify violent struggle. It is sophisticated both in its media quality as well as in its content.¹⁹

¹⁹ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/al-qaeda/10687163/Al-Qaeda-unveils-new-magazine-aimed-at-Western-jihadis.html>

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- Released in March 2014, this is meant to be a promotional video for a new English language magazine called “Resurgence” created by Al-Qa’ida²⁰
- The video *twists* audio from a 1965 Malcolm X speech – to justifying violence including the quote “talk the language that they understand” — with images of U.S. soldiers, militants, a purported attack on a U.S. base in Afghanistan and the Boston Marathon bombings²¹
- This video represents how much of terrorist media exploits grievances, using compelling images, to convince audiences it is justified in using violence.

Slide 11: Foreign Fighters: Then

Scene Setter: *In this slide, we introduce the fact that the foreign fighter threat is not something new to the US, but in fact this has happened before – specifically with regards to recruiting for Al-Shabaab. We provide background on this occurrence before delving into key case studies to humanize the boys who were tricked into joining Al-Shabaab.²² This is the crux of the Community Awareness Briefing. It’s storytelling. When looking at the homeland threat, Government sometimes talks in the abstract, X number of plots since 9/11, X% focusing on military attacks, etc. Those are all important numbers but we’ve found through presenting throughout the country that numbers may not resonate with communities. Telling a story does. At the end of the day, this presentation is intended to make people aware of the threat so that if the situation arise, they (the bystanders), may be able to intervene. The individuals who have joined violent extremist organizations were at some point in their life, ‘reachable’. The Government’s preference is that we reach these individuals before they make a decision that they can’t come back from. We want to prevent other parents, friends, husbands, wives from ‘losing’ their loved ones. So we tell stories of those who have left, in attempt to better contextualize and humanize a very complicated issue.*

Key Points:

Minnesota Boys: Between 2007 and 2009, twenty young men, several of which are pictured here, left Minneapolis to fight for Al-Shabaab in Somalia, taking the Muslim community in Minnesota by surprise. According to various sources, at least half a dozen have been reported killed while at least ten have been indicted on terrorism-related charges.

1) Mohamoud Ali Hassan: (top left) Voted “most friendly” by graduating seniors at Roosevelt High School in 2006, Hassan went on to study engineering at the University of Minnesota. He would come home between university classes and take care of his 90 year old grandmother in their Cedar-Riverside apartment in Minneapolis. Known as “Bashir” to friends, Hassan left for Somalia in November 2008. Family members learned he was killed in September 2009 in Mogadishu.

²⁰ <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/10/al-qaeda-launch-english-language-web-magazine-resu/>

²¹ <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/mar/10/al-qaeda-launch-english-language-web-magazine-resu/>

²² DOJ Press Release, Terror Charges Unsealed in Minnesota Against Eight Defendants, Justice Department Announces, November 23, 2009 <http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2009/mp112309.htm>

DOJ Press Release, 14 Indicted for Supporting Al-Shabaab, August 5, 2010 <http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/august/al-shabaab>
NYtimes, “A Call to Jihad, Answered in America”, July 11, 2009 -

<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/us/12somalis.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>

CNN, Family Learned over Internet that Son Killed, July 24, 2010 <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/07/24/somalia.americans/>

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2) Mustafa Ali Salat: (top middle) A student at Harding High School in St. Paul, Salat was 17 when he left for Somalia in August 2008. He was indicted in August 2009 on terror-related charges. He is believed to be at large.

3) Burhan Hassan: (top right) A student at Roosevelt High School in Minneapolis, Hassan dreamed of becoming a doctor. He was 17 when he left for Somalia on Nov. 4, 2008. He called his family and said he wanted to come home. He was shot in the head, his family learned of his death by seeing a picture of his body on the internet. He was killed one day before his Roosevelt High School classmates graduated.

4) Abdisalan Hussein Ali: (bottom left) The Edison High School graduate attended the University of Minnesota, where he sold designer sneakers to help support his family. He was 19 when he left for Somalia on Nov. 4, 2008.

5) Jamal Bana: (bottom middle) Bana studied engineering at Minneapolis Community college. He was the only person in his family with a driver's license. He drove his mother to work, siblings to school, and took care of his bed-ridden father. He was 19 when he left for Somalia in November 2008. Family members learned on July 11, 2009, that he was killed in Mogadishu.

6) Troy Kastigar: (bottom right) A Muslim convert, Kastigar was seen at community basketball games and at a Minneapolis mosque where most of the other fighters worshipped. He was 27 when he left for Somalia in November 2008. His family was told in September 2009 that he was dead.

Slide 12: Recent Trends

Scene Setter: *In this slide, we talk about foreign fighters now. We bring up the issue of teenagers (under 18) around the world who have left their homes—including a growing number of girls—and travelled to Iraq and Syria to join terrorism organizations. We'll talk about their stories and the realities of what happened once they get there, including how some regret their decisions but are unable to go back home. We will also talk about the growing threat of these individuals committing acts in their country of origin; if/when they are intercepted.*

Key Points:

List of known minors (to be read out loud for full effect as a list)

Austria	Samra	16
	Sabina	15
Australia	Abdullah	17
Belgium	Younes	13
France	Nora	15
	Sahra	17
	Soukaïna	15
Germany	Sarah	15
UK	Zahra	16
	Salma	16

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US Three girls 15, 15, 17

Austria - Samra Kesinovic, 16, and Sabina Selimovic, 15

Samra and Sabina were two average teenage girls growing up in Austria. You would expect them doing average teenage things — so it might come as a surprise to learn they ran away from home in April to join ISIS.

- Samra and Sabina both come from Bosnia refugee families who settled in Austria during the 1990s. They both converted to Islam and began trying to convert their friends.
- According to the head of their school, they were suspected to be behind vandalism incidents in which tables and walls had the words ‘I love Al Qaeda’ written on them.
- Before they disappeared, the teens informed friends that they were headed for Syria. Soon thereafter, they posted images of themselves holding AK47s surrounded by armed men on social media.
- In September, they relayed a message to loved ones that they wish to escape. However, because of Austria’s laws, once they have left the country, even if they then changed their minds, it is almost impossible to get them back without serious legal repercussions. They have been warned they face up to five years in jail, even as minors, if they return to Vienna.²³²⁴²⁵²⁶

In September, two additional girls from Vienna — ages 16 and 14 — recently were nabbed trying to sneak out of the country and join ISIL. They were caught when the mother of a third friend who was supposed to go with them to Syria grew suspicious when she noticed all the luggage her daughter had packed.²⁷

UK - Zahra and Salma Halane, 16 (twins)

Zahra and Salma are sixteen year old twins who grew up in Manchester. They were planning to become doctors, having just finished their first year of college. In June, they disappeared overnight from their home.²⁸

- Zahra and Salma come from a family of ten, and their parents are of Somali descent.
- It is believed they were radicalized over the internet.
- Zahra is believed to have been married and is active on social media, posting pictures and tweets that support ISIS, such as a tweet that read ‘I support the executions of Syrian soldiers. It’s self defence.’
- Their father Ibrahim and mother Khadra travelled to Syria to try to bring them home, but without success.²⁹

Australia - Abdullah Elmir, 17

²³ <http://nypost.com/2014/09/10/gun-wielding-austrian-teens-trying-to-join-ISIL-recruit-others/>

²⁴ <http://m.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/10/the-teenage-fans-of-ISIL/381736/>

²⁵ <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/522671/Islamic-State-Samra-Kesinovic-Sabina-Selimovic>

²⁶ <http://www.ryot.org/photos-samra-kesinovic-sabina-selimovic-ISIL-poster-girls-runaways/807773>

²⁷ <http://nypost.com/2014/09/10/gun-wielding-austrian-teens-trying-to-join-ISIL-recruit-others/>

²⁸ <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2749939/The-British-jihadi-bride-hell-bent-murder-whining-lost-cat-Terror-twin-tweets-fears-missing-kitten-posting-pictures-holding-AK47.html#ixzz3HSlvpAug>

²⁹ <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2749939/The-British-jihadi-bride-hell-bent-murder-whining-lost-cat-Terror-twin-tweets-fears-missing-kitten-posting-pictures-holding-AK47.html#ixzz3HSlvpAug>

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Seventeen year old Abdullah Elmir went to school at East Hills Boys High School in Western Sydney and was a quiet student who liked video games. He had a job at the butcher shop. In June, Abdullah told his family that he was going on a fishing trip with a friend. Shortly afterwards, he admitted to his family that he was in Turkey and about to "cross the border". He was traveling with another teen, a 16 yr-old named Feiz, but Feiz's family intercepted him in Istanbul and convinced him to travel with him to Lebanon where he was counselled.³⁰³¹³²³³³⁴³⁵

- Abdullah was the son of an Australian-born mother and Lebanese-born father and grew up in Western Sydney. Elmir came from a good Lebanese-Australian family who did not hold extreme religious views.
- Before travelling to the Middle East, Elmir had a love of theatre and last year, wrote about looking forward to more great performances.
- His classmates are shocked by the video and the teen's choice, and saddened by the possibility that he may never come home. He is unlikely to be allowed to return to Australia under the country's new anti-terrorism laws.³⁶³⁷
- Meanwhile, the father of Feiz has said that his son is now back at school and settling back into his life.³⁸³⁹⁴⁰⁴¹

Threat from failed travel

- Lastly, not pictured here, is the disturbing case of a 15-year old from France who wanted to travel to Syria but was intercepted by French authorities. She has since told the authorities that once her recruiters realized she was unlikely to be able to leave the country anytime soon, they began pressing her to strike at home against Jews. She told them she had begun looking for weapons and targets.⁴²

Slide 13: Example of the ISIL Narrative (video)

³⁰ <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/australian-teen-abdullah-elmir-is-new-public-face-of-islamic-state/story-fnpdbcmu-1227097275395?nk=cde078974f2bfa3e39a77714d946e1b0>

³¹ <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/sydney-teen-jihadist-abdullah-elmir-in-second-is-video-as-school-parents-share-concerns-20141028-11cpsg.html#ixzz3HS5jpgna>

³² <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/sydney-teen-jihadist-abdullah-elmir-in-second-is-video-as-school-parents-share-concerns-20141028-11cpsg.html#ixzz3HS6GQgSJ>

³³ <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11179934/Australian-teenager-in-Isil-video-an-idiot-says-family.html>

³⁴ <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/bankstown-butcher-now-a-killer-in-waiting-jihadist-abdullah-elmir-worked-at-a-butcher-in-bankstown/story-fni0cx12-1227100409185?nk=e7bd28a0c9ad18313a529f3957daedf2>

³⁵ <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-22/abdullah-elmir-friends-defend-sydney-teens-decision-to-join-is/5834172>

³⁶ <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/in-depth/terror/australian-teen-abdullah-elmir-is-new-public-face-of-islamic-state/story-fnpdbcmu-1227097275395?nk=cde078974f2bfa3e39a77714d946e1b0>

³⁷ <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/sydney-teen-jihadist-abdullah-elmir-in-second-is-video-as-school-parents-share-concerns-20141028-11cpsg.html#ixzz3HS5jpgna>

³⁸ <http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/bankstown-butcher-now-a-killer-in-waiting-jihadist-abdullah-elmir-worked-at-a-butcher-in-bankstown/story-fni0cx12-1227100409185?nk=e7bd28a0c9ad18313a529f3957daedf2>

³⁹ <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-22/abdullah-elmir-friends-defend-sydney-teens-decision-to-join-is/5834172>

⁴⁰ <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/rescue-mission-to-save-the-ginger-jihadi-thwarted-at-11th-hour-20141025-11bn1t.html#ixzz3K1Ui9PbG>

⁴¹ <http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/rescue-mission-to-save-the-ginger-jihadi-thwarted-at-11th-hour-20141025-11bn1t.html>

⁴² http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/world/europe/a-french-town-reels-after-teenage-girl-vanishes-apparently-to-join-jihadists.html?_r=0

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Scene Setter: *In this slide, we present an ISIL propaganda video that has gone viral and features the Australian teenager from the previous slide, Abdullah Elmir. The intention is to show how ISIL is exploiting Western youth for propaganda because they recognize how they will draw media attention.*

Key Points:

Let's return back to the case of 17-year old Abdullah from Western Sydney. Unlike his friend Feiz who was intercepted on his way to Syria, Abdullah managed to make it to Syria and within the first four months, was featured in an ISIS propaganda video. In it, Abdullah — identified as “Abu Khaled from Australia” — stands clutching an assault rifle while delivering a 90-second speech with between 70 and 100 heavily armed fighters stand behind him.

- He claims the group will eventually take control of the US and UK, and directs a threat to Tony Abbott that Islamic State will also take its fight to Australian shores.
- Since then, Abdullah has appeared in a second video.⁴³⁴⁴

Background:

Some themes to highlight that are in the video:

- Us vs them
- Warped religious overtones
- Sense of belonging, greater cause, heroism
- Using foreign fighters as prop

Slide 14: Attempted Travel to Syria / Iraq

Scene Setter: *In this slide, we shift to focus exclusively on ISIL and how it has become the newest foreign fighter problem. Using case studies of Americans who have traveled abroad, we highlight the similarities and differences between the aforementioned Minneapolis example, and now.*

Key Points:

- More than 150 Americans have tried to travel to Iraq and Syria to fight, along with thousands from other parts of the world—teenagers, young people, those who are most vulnerable.⁴⁵
- The al-Qa'ida linked Al Nusra Front and ISIL are two of the designated terrorist organizations that are actively recruiting foreign fighters using the internet in Syria and Iraq.⁴⁶
- They have a sophisticated, pervasive, targeted recruitment campaign online.⁴⁷

Foreign Fighters from US to Syria/Iraq:

Note: The following individuals are undergoing various stages of prosecution and are all presumed innocent until proven guilty.

Abdella Ahmad Tounisi (18, Chicago, IL – US Citizen): Tounisi was charged with trying to join a terrorist organization. According to the complaint, Tounisi allegedly searched online for the legality of

⁴³ <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-21/australian-is-fighter-threatens-tony-abbott-in-video/5830040>

⁴⁴ <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-21/australian-is-fighter-threatens-tony-abbott-in-video/5830040>

⁴⁵ NCTC Director Matt Olsen testimony to Congress, FBI Comey public statements, DOJ released material support numbers

⁴⁶ NCTC Director Matt Olsen testimony to Congress, FBI Comey public statements, DOJ released material support numbers

⁴⁷ NCTC Director Matt Olsen testimony to Congress, FBI Comey public statements, DOJ released material support numbers

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traveling to Syria, information about travel from Chicago to Syria through Turkey, allegedly obtained a new passport, and, allegedly made online contact with an individual Tounisi believed to be a recruiter for Jabhat al Nusrah. He also allegedly sought advice on travel from Istanbul to the Turkish city of Gaziantep. Tounisi purchased an airline ticket from Chicago to Istanbul and on April 18, the undercover employee provided Tounisi with a bus ticket for travel from Istanbul to Gaziantep.⁴⁸

Basit Javed Sheikh (29, Raleigh, NC – Permanent Resident): Sheikh was charged with allegedly attempting to provide material support and resources to Jabhat al-Nusrah. According to the complaint, Sheikh wanted to provide al Nusrah “logistics, media, fight too, God willing.” Sheikh purchased a one-way ticket with a final destination of Lebanon.⁴⁹

Shannon Conley (19, Denver, CO – US Citizen): Conley was charged with allegedly attempting to provide material support to a terrorist organization.⁵⁰

Mohammad Hassan Hamdan (22, Dearborn, MI – US Citizen): Federal agents arrested and charged a Detroit-area man who had intentions of traveling to the Middle East to fight Syrian rebels with Hezbollah. Mohammad, 22, of Dearborn was taken into custody at Detroit Metropolitan Airport after passing through security but before boarding his flight. An agent with the FBI Detroit Joint Terrorism Task Force said in a criminal complaint a source recorded multiple conversations with Hamdan, in which he allegedly spoke candidly about his desires and plans to assist Hezbollah in the war in Syria.⁵¹

Nicholas Teasant (20, Lodi, CA – US Citizen): Teasant was charged with attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. According to the complaint, Teasant allegedly traveled to the Canadian border with the intent of continuing to travel to Syria to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.⁵²

Akbar Jihad Jordan and Avin Marsalis Brown (Both 21, Raleigh, NC – US Citizens): A Federal criminal complaint says Jordan and Avin Marsalis Brown allegedly had plans to kill non-Muslims in Syria or Yemen. The federal documents show a year’s worth of conversations between the two men and FBI informants. The informant says Jordan allegedly possessed an AK-47, a bullet proof vest, swords and other weapons - some of which were seized from his apartment.^{53,54}

Slide 15: Exploitation of the Humanitarian Crisis (Pictures)

⁴⁸ FBI, “FBI Arrests Suburban Chicago Man on Charge of Supporting Terrorism Overseas” <http://www.fbi.gov/chicago/press-releases/2013/fbi-arrests-suburban-chicago-man-on-charge-of-supporting-terrorism-overseas>

⁴⁹ FBI, “Individual Charged with Attempt to Provide Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization” <http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2013/individual-charged-with-attempt-to-provide-material-support-to-a-foreign-terrorist-organization>

⁵⁰ http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/local-news/19-year-old-colorado-woman-shannon-maureen-conley-charged-with-aiding-terrorist-group-fbi-says07022014_ <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/colo-teen-attempted-syria-jihad-fbi-article-1.1852873#ixzz37fc53Per>

⁵¹ <http://www.myfoxdetroit.com/story/24999980/detroit-area-man-accused-of-supporting-hezbollah>

⁵² http://www.justice.gov/usao/cae/news/docs/2014/2014_03/03-17-14Teasant.html

⁵³ http://www.justice.gov/usao/cae/news/docs/2014/2014_03/Teasant%20Complaint%20.pdf

⁵⁴ <http://ftpcontent5.worldnow.com/wncn/pdf/raid.pdf>

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Scene Setter: *In this slide, we focus on another motivation of individuals enticed to travel to Syria/Iraq to fight, that of aiding in the humanitarian crisis. This crisis in Syria continues to mobilize huge swathes of individuals who want to take action to help the aggrieved Syrian population.*⁵⁵

Key Points:

- Especially in the beginning when the majority of foreign fighters were going to Syria, the main motivator was the desire to take action against the atrocities committed by the Assad regime. Many individuals felt a sense of duty to support the Syrian opposition, which was exploited by violent extremist groups such as the Al-Nusra Front and ISIL.
- Now, although the mainstream Western media no longer focuses so much on the humanitarian crisis in Syria, the images of the atrocities being committed continue to dominate on social media and motivate individuals to take action.^{56,57}

Pictures:

- *Devastation of barrel-bombing Aleppo [Reuters]*
- *Zaatari, now Jordan's 4th largest city with approximately 145,000 people, according to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UN]*
- *Refugees from the Yarmouk Camp, in Syria, waiting in a line to receive essentials [Reuters]*

Slide 16: Exploitation of Thrill Seeking (Pictures)

Scene Setter: *In this slide, we focus on thrill seeking as a motivation for individuals who go abroad to fight in Syria/Iraq. We show how this is being pushed out through social media, especially through the phenomenon of "selfies" that promote the message of adventure, action, and thrills in Syria/Iraq.*

Key Points:

- Thrill seeking is a big motivator for individuals going abroad. There is a growing number of individuals who are going to Syria/Iraq looking for an adventure, to fight and be a warrior/hero, or simply to engage in violence, and do not necessarily do so for ideological reasons. This message of the "fun" of fighting is being propagated through selfies individuals on the ground are sending and posting on their online accounts.⁵⁸

Slide 17: The Media as a Weapon

Scene Setter: *This slide and the picture⁵⁹ it shows are meant to reinforce that terrorist organizations, like ISIL, see media as important as actual weapons. During the next couple slides we explore this theme extensively, focusing on the ubiquitous nature of violent extremist propaganda and information online. We talk about sophisticated strategy and techniques used by these groups to rapidly expand the reach of their messages through common social media sites, messaging groups, common hashtags and other specific techniques of dissemination—taking advantage of young people's reliance on the Internet for*

⁵⁵ These are the various themes identified in DOJ Indictments and Criminal complaints of HVEs (Harroun, Sheikh, Tounsii, Teausant) who attempted or did travel to Syria/Iraq.

⁵⁶ <http://apps.washingtonpost.com/page/world/timeline-unrest-in-syria/207/>

⁵⁷ <http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/20/world/syria-torture-photos-amanpour/index.html?sr=tw012014syria2p>

⁵⁸ http://www.vice.com/en_uk/read/syrian-jihadist-selfies-tell-us-a-lot-about-their-war

⁵⁹ <http://chechclear.tumblr.com/>

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information and socialization. We also discuss how groups use the same means of communication to distribute advice and guidance for travel, bomb recipes, and other operational and tactical details. This demonstrates that the online environment goes beyond rhetoric and into actual facilitation and operational activities. The most important part of this section is to demonstrate how easy it is, though simple searches and common internet practices, to be drawn in to the world of the extremist narrative.

Key Points:

Democratization of social media

- Recently there has been a marked shift in online recruitment and radicalization. Previously, terrorist web sites were primarily restricted from the general public. Al-Qa'ida propaganda was limited to select web forums and pre-approved web videos. As a result, a potential recruit had to search out and befriend members of radical forums in order to be accepted and subsequently gain access to the full functionality of the sites.
- Today, however, with the popularization of social networking sites, individuals who are becoming radicalized have the ability to find like-minded individuals more easily. In addition, these social networking sites allow for a level of interaction and information sharing that was not feasible even a few years ago.
- Incendiary materials – including videos and lectures – are increasingly found not only on obscure web sites but also on some of the most widely accessed sites in the world – including Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. The result has been a pronounced increase in the volume of extremist material online, and a corresponding increase in the number of individuals who are viewing this material.⁶⁰

Slide 18: ISIL: Evolution of Messaging

Scene Setter: *In this slide, we transition to focus on ISIL for the rest of the presentation. We highlight the main similarities and differences between the AQ and ISIL narratives/worldviews and use of media. We want to convey why ISIL's specific message and use of social media is more compelling to an even wider breadth of audiences than even Al-Qa'ida was.*

Key Points:

- Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates such as Al-Shabaab had compelling narratives and were packaging their beliefs using innovative uses of media and English language. At the time, they were cutting edge.
- However, in some ways, ISIL's narrative is even more compelling. They exploit new grievances, especially those held by younger Sunni audiences, and contain different strategic objectives. They urge individuals of all backgrounds—including increasing females—to come be a part of a larger cause, which we assess is attractive to US-based violent extremists, who often seek belonging, validation, identity, or a sense of purpose.⁶¹

⁶⁰ U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. Zachary Chesser: A Case Study in Online Islamist Radicalization and Its Meaning for the Threat of Homegrown Terrorism
[www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CHESSER%20FINAL%20REPORT\(1\)2.pdf](http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CHESSER%20FINAL%20REPORT(1)2.pdf)

⁶¹ “What are ISIL's Narratives and how do they diverge from al-Qaeda?” Monitor 360, November 12, 2014. <http://monitor-360.com/blog/what-are-isils-narratives-and-how-do-they-diverge-from-al-qaeda/>

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- They have also used social media to a much more sophisticated degree than Al-Qa'ida ever has, including more diversified platforms and the use of crowd-sourced propaganda.⁶²

Background

Main themes of ISIL's Narrative and how they differ from Al-Qa'ida: ⁶³

- **“Fighting the Enemy at Home”** — identifies the primary enemy of pious Sunni Muslims as incumbent Arab regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. In their perception, all regimes—whether Sunni or Shia—are considered apostate and fair targets for military action.
- **“Fighting the Far Enemy”** — identifies Western powers, such as the United States and the European Union, as villains that oppress Muslims worldwide. From a tactical perspective, however, experts noted that this narrative is primarily used by ISIL as a rhetorical instrument—potentially to boost recruitment—and that the primary targets of its current military aggression are regional rulers.
- **“Glorifying the Caliphate”** — depicts current territory held by Islamic State fighters as an Islamic Caliphate. This narrative differentiates ISIL from other violent extremist groups, such as al-Qaeda, which never aimed to establish a caliphate immediately. Most groups have been conflicted on its necessity. This narrative leverages feelings of economic disenfranchisement and social exclusion of Muslim communities in the West to promote the caliphate as a place where they have a purpose and are part of a broader transnational movement. This narrative appears to be much more effective in driving recruitment than, for example, al-Qaeda's call for suicide bombers.
- **“Determining Who is a Real Muslim”** — ISIL advances the notion that its caliph, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, has vast religious authority and can decide who is a Muslim. Those with ISIL are Muslims and those against are considered kafir, or non-believers, and therefore subject to a variety of penalties, even death.

Slide 19: ISIL's Use of Social Media

Scene Setter: *This slide provides an overview of how ISIL uses social media to propagate their message.*

Key Points:

The use of social media by violent extremists has intensified in the past year with the rise of ISIL. ISIL has a keen sense of how to attract their target demographics, keep them engaged, and spread their messaging and news via social media to highly interested individuals.^{64,65,66,67}

⁶² <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11208796/How-social-media-is-helping-Islamic-State-to-spread-its-poison.html>

⁶⁴ International Centre for the Study of Radicalism, <http://icsr.info/2014/04/icsr-insight-inspires-syrian-foreign-fighters/>

⁶⁵ http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/a-dutch-jihadist-in-syria-speaks-and-blogs/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1

⁶⁶ EUR2014041645611269 London *BBC Online* in English 15 Apr 14 Middle East

⁶⁷ <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/06/ISIS-iraq-twitter-social-media-strategy/372856/>

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- **Official media:** the ISIS official media account, which publishes all its video releases, ISIS province accounts, which publish live feed info and pictures, the ISIS mujahideen accounts, where fighters talk about their experience and daily life, and ISIS supporters, who counter Western, Shia, and tyrants' propaganda and lies," says ISIS supporter. "Social media is good for building a network of connections and recruitment," he added. "Fighters talk about experiences in battle and encourage people to rise, and supporters defend and translate ISIS statements." This approach-- a controlled central message, but a diversity of voices — seems to have worked well.
- **Crowd sourced / DIY:** For the first time ever, foreign fighters are using social media to document their activities in real time. The official Twitter accounts of FTOs are less important as sources of info than "disseminator accounts" run by sympathetic individuals who lend moral and political support to those involved in the conflict. These accounts spread real-time information from the battlefield, publish links to new videos and official statements, and share photographs of battles, equipment and meetings.
- **Variety of platforms:** There are question-and-answer sessions, chats, pictures and videos on Twitter®, Facebook®, Tumblr®, AskFM®, and apps such as Whatsapp® and Kik®.
- **Selfies:** Youngsters post pictures of themselves in the desert or in hotel courtyards in Syria, in shades, brandishing Kalashnikovs and inviting friends to join them.
- **English language:** ISIL posted its first English-language violent extremist messaging on Twitter® in October and November 2013; these were simple posters and graphics showing ISIL fighters with quotes emphasizing the "virtues" of seeking martyrdom. Since then, its English language content has proliferated.
- **Hashtag campaigns:** Following the start of US military air strikes last month, ISIL supporters launched a Twitter® campaign threatening retaliation against the Homeland and US interests overseas. Thousands of tweets in support of ISIL appeared on Twitter® in both English and Arabic in response to the US bombing campaign. When ISIS fighters stormed Mosul and the ISIL supporters put out almost 40,000 tweets in one day. Several featured original and creative use of graphics—including a photo of the ISIL flag in front of the White House—and images depicting desecration of US monuments and landmarks.

Slide 20: "Dawn of Glad Tidings" App

Scene Setter: *This slide is meant to emphasize the innovative way ISIL is using social media to create hype online and build up its image.*

Key Points:

Proliferation of popularity

Back in August, a study found 27,000 Twitter accounts that mentioned ISIL positively. They also found ISIL had succeeded in creating hype — a total of 700,000 accounts discussed the terrorist group. One way they create such a huge amount of online activity is through the use of bots, or automatic programs that create tweets, as well as apps.⁶⁸

- ISIL has created an app called "The Dawn of Glad Tidings," or "The Dawn," for short. Users of the app consent to allowing ISIS to post to their social-media accounts. To avoid Twitter's®

⁶⁸ <http://techcrunch.com/2014/10/15/isis-tactics-illustrate-social-medias-new-place-in-modern-war/>

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spam-detection algorithms, the app even spaces out its posts. This allows a proliferation of postings online in support of ISIL that make it seem as though more people support it than actually do.

- Twitter® has tried to counter ISIS, suspending more than 1,000 accounts it suspected of terrorist links. But that hasn't been too successful; because the ISIS propaganda arm isn't rigorously structured, it can be very flexible. When one account gets shut down, another is immediately created, and ISIL uses other guys to promote the new account.⁶⁹

Slide 21: Operational Instructions Online

Scene Setter: *This slide is meant to highlight the ease of getting travel/operational info on how to get to Iraq and Syria. Operational instructions are available online and in English. It's important to relay to the audience that ISIL and its supporters are actively trying to recruit our youth to join their cause. The bar for a youth to understand how to get to a conflict zone is much lower than in previous years. It is also increasingly interactive process, which is not just one-sided.*

Key Points:

One of the chief concerns regarding fighters travelling to Syria is the ease of which they can get there. Unlike perhaps some other countries that have had foreign fighters, entry into Syria has been made easier due to the unrest in Iraq and the numerous facilitators in Turkey.⁷⁰ Another big driver has been the dissemination of travel and operational instructions online.⁷¹

- Blog showing operational instructions for how to get through Turkish security and answer their questions, how to look inconspicuous, how to cross into Syria by foot, what to pack to remain unsuspecting and also be prepared to fight, how to get in shape before the journey, etc.
- Also provides quotes from religious texts to justify fighting.
- Also says that ISIL, unlike Al Qaeda, is not a terrorist group, but rather a group fighting for an Islamic caliphate.

Slide 22: Ask FM (picture)

Scene Setter: *This slide is meant to show ease of talking to someone on ground, show ease of getting travel/operational info.*

Key Points:

Ex's of postings on Ask.fm⁷²

- Is it possible to do jihad half a year?" asks one would-be recruit, apparently seeking to join a rebel group in Syria on a short-stay basis. The question is directed at a man on the Ask.fm website who describes himself as "a stranger currently fighting in Syria." He advises that it is

⁶⁹ <http://techerunch.com/2014/10/15/isis-tactics-illustrate-social-medias-new-place-in-modern-war/>

⁷⁰ Soufan Group, <http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/TSG-Foreign-Fighters-in-Syria.pdf>

⁷¹ <http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/FBI-Terror-plot-suspect-planned-mosque-attack-to-5367722.php>

⁷² "The Facebook jihadis seeking action in Syria," by Ewen MacAskill and Leila Haddou The Guardian,

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/15/facebook-jihadis-action-syria-terror>

Guardian article links to the ask.fm site. <http://ask.fm/Fulan2weet>

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still possible to cross the border from Turkey "but tougher than earlier". He deals, too, with a proposal of marriage, saying he is not looking for a wife.

- Other questioners seek advice on how easy it is to cross the border into Syria from Turkey and the best way to persuade parents to allow them to go.
- They also want to know: "How much is a Glock pistol?" "Which is the best rebel group to join?" "Is there training in jujitsu?"
- One of the key questions is his motivation. "What keeps you motivated to fight and go on?" Referring to barrel bombs widely used in Syria, he replies: "When you see a little girl killed by barrels or an old man crying cuz his house was bombed."

Slide 23: Moner Mohammad Abusalha (USPER)

Scene Setter: We discuss Moner Mohammad Abusalha (USPER) who at 22, became the first American to be a suicide bomber in Syria. We discuss the progression from adolescent angst, identity issues, and loss of his previous social network to his exposure to extremist propaganda, talk about Syria, and eventual travel and death as a suicide bomber. Three key themes pervade the discussion. First, that Moner's situation and development as a young person made him exploitable by unscrupulous recruiters. Second, we emphasize that there were several points along his path from confused teen to suicide bomber where he could have been diverted from the process. Third, al-Nusrah used his short life and death as a propaganda tool to recruit more youth.

Key Points:

Moner Abu-u-Salla "Mo"⁷³⁷⁴

- Grew up in Vero Beach, FL, outside Miami in a gated-community.
- Went to Sebastian River HS and played basketball, where his teammates described him as "funny" and "outgoing".
- His Facebook® page stated he liked basketball, football, the Miami Heat, and Eggo waffles.
- His mom worked with him to get him through high school.
- He told his family he was traveling to Jordan to study nursing.
- A video of him was later released online which showed him blowing up 16 tons of explosives at a regime checkpoint, killing a number of soldiers.
- His video was used for recruitment, specifically targeting English speakers.

Slide 24: Moner's Last Words (video)

Scene Setter: In this slide we show Moner's video to highlight, using his own words, why he went to Syria to join ISIL. The intention is to emphasize how normal he seems – he talks about his time back in Florida and living in the suburbs – and humanize him by including him crying when talking about his mom.

Key Points:

Here are clips from a video of American citizen Moner discussing why he left America and joined a terrorist group.⁷⁵

⁷³ http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/us/friends-of-moner-mohammad-abusalha-saw-no-indications.html?_r=0

⁷⁴ <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/Moner-Mohammad-Abusalha-Vero-Beach-Florida-Syria.html>

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Slide 25: How does this happen?

Scene Setter: *At this point in the briefing, we remind the group that we came seeking their help to solve a problem that was threatening their children. We revisit the stages of the previously discussed case(s) and ask, "What could have been done at this point?" We try to get the audience to offer potential solutions or discuss their thought on how to address the problem. If the discussion begins to lag, we offer examples of intervention programs being piloted by American Muslim groups (which demonstrate some possible approaches to fill the space between parenting and law enforcement where the possibility of successful intervention is the highest.*

Key Points:

In his martyrdom video just prior to his suicide operation, Moner described the US as no place for a Muslim and never a place for him, and state he felt at home with other foreign fighters fighting in Syria for ISIL. How did this happen? And what, if anything, could have prevented this?⁷⁶

Let's go through his trajectory, from the time he was a young angsty teenager, like any other kid, growing up in Florida, to the point where he decided to travel to Syria and join ISIL. In that timeframe, he showcased numerous vulnerabilities that could have been addressed by a variety of peers, authority figures, school counselors, and others.

1) Adolescent Angst: He was a normal teen, who liked playing basketball and video games. He also experienced normal adolescent angst, all pretty normal developmental challenges for teenagers. This is usually a time when all teens experience a heightened drive for a distinct identity, meaning, adventure, and belonging. If not addressed, they can increase one's vulnerability to violent extremism as a possible solution to these questions.

- Ask the audience to brainstorm what kind of intervention, and who, could have stepped in here (Ex. exposure to positive role models, access to civic engagement groups, positive peer groups and social activities, sports)⁷⁷⁷⁸

2) Identity Issues: Moner was a second generation immigrant, born in Florida to a Palestinian father from Jordan and an American mother who converted. Immigrants are particularly susceptible to recruitment probably because of their heightened struggle with identity issues, integration, and feelings of exclusion and marginalization. He was once thrown out of school for fighting, spurred on by kids making fun of his mother's hijab. It appears Moner tried to fit in, but eventually grew tired of life in America and started to want to live in an Arabic-speaking country.

- Ask the audience to brainstorm what kind of intervention, and who, could have stepped in here (Ex. Peers, positive role models, school counseling, civic engagement)⁷⁹

⁷⁵ <http://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000003029549/video-of-us-bomber-moner-mohammad-abusalha-in-syria.html>

⁷⁶ <http://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000003029549/video-of-us-bomber-moner-mohammad-abusalha-in-syria.html>

⁷⁷ http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/us/friends-of-moner-mohammad-abusalha-saw-no-indications.html?_r=0

⁷⁸ <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/Moner-Mohammad-Abusalha-Vero-Beach-Florida-Syria.html>

⁷⁹ http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/us/friends-of-moner-mohammad-abusalha-saw-no-indications.html?_r=0 and <http://www.businessinsider.com/an-american-suicide-bomber-describes-his-journey-to-syria-2014-8>

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3) **Loss of old social network:** Moner dropped out of high school during his junior year and lost touch with school social groups and friends. He also couldn't hold a job. His mother kept forcing him to go back to school, but he kept dropping out again.

- Ask the audience to brainstorm what kind of intervention, and who, could have stepped in here (Ex. parents, teacher, school counselor, peers)⁸⁰

4) **Exposure to extremist propaganda:** He moved in to live with a new friend, who held extremist views. During this time, friends say he also dramatically changed his dress and behavior, becoming more conservative. He also started watching extremist videos by Awlaki and others with his friend online.

- Ask the audience to brainstorm what kind of intervention, and who, could have stepped in here (Ex. parents, brother, religious cleric)⁸¹

5) **Talk about Syria:** Moner talked about what was going on in Syria with his family and friends. He was always reading on the latest news, very engrossed on social media. He watched a lot of videos of the atrocities in Syria and expressed sympathy for the victims of the Assad regime.

- Ask the audience to brainstorm what kind of intervention, and who, could have stepped in here (Ex. parents, positive role model, friends, religious cleric)⁸²

Shortly thereafter, Moner left for Syria. He became the first American to be a suicide bomber in Syria. He was 22.⁸³

Slide 26: Community Responses

Scene Setter: *For this section we discuss some of the ways communities are organizing prevention programs in the hopes of stopping youth like Moner from radicalizing to violence. The article pictured describes the efforts in Minneapolis of law enforcement and communities who have come together to create intervention programs.*

Key Points:

We can learn from intervention approaches in other situations, such as gang prevention. CVE intervention aims to use the same principles and we can make real progress by adapting the kinds of programs we are using in non-counterterrorism areas for our needs. Some examples of successful programs include:

- Montgomery County, MD, where communities and law enforcement are collaborating to bring together faith-based leaders, as well as education and mental health officials to help at-risk youth.

⁸⁰ http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/us/friends-of-moner-mohammad-abusalha-saw-no-indications.html?_r=0

⁸¹ http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/american-suicide-bomber-in-syria-raises-fears-for-us/2014/06/02/30a6ab8a-ca82-11e3-93d2-edd4belf5d9e_story.html and <http://www.ibtimes.com/moner-mohammad-abu-salha-american-suicide-bomber-says-he-was-being-watched-fbi-us-1671912>

and <http://www.businessinsider.com/an-american-suicide-bomber-describes-his-journey-to-syria-2014-8>

and <http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-what-made-4-americans-become-jihadists-2014-9>

⁸² <http://www.businessinsider.com/an-american-suicide-bomber-describes-his-journey-to-syria-2014-8>

and <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/world/middleeast/fear-of-trend-after-bombing-by-a-us-man.html>

⁸³ http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/04/us/friends-of-moner-mohammad-abusalha-saw-no-indications.html?_r=0

Community Awareness Briefing: Foreign Fighter Focus

- Also, the Muslim Public Affairs Council released their Safe Spaces Initiative, which is essentially a guide for community centers on how to deal with violent extremism in their communities using a phased approach of prevention, intervention, and ejection.

Slide 27: What can you do?

Scene Setter: *For this section we discuss the recently completed study on the role of bystanders (family, peers, authority figures, and strangers) in the process of intervention. We place particular emphasis on the high percentages of those who were in a position to see something. Our goal is to demonstrate the importance of those who are most likely to see behavior that indicates the beginnings of a problem, and their opportunity to help. We stress that by the time a youth makes it to the point where his behavior attracts the attention of government or law enforcement, he/she is often too far go in their radicalization to violence process to be easily dissuaded. We emphasize the opportunities of communities to protect their children. We acknowledge the community's reluctance to involve law enforcement or "official" channels stressing that the most effective intervention may come from the community-led networks, or other informal networks of parents, schools and communities to solve these problems before young people approach the line of criminal activity.*

LEARNING AND ADAPTING

THE USE OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION
IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

A handbook
for practitioners

Laura Dawson, Charlie Edwards and Calum Jeff

DHS-001-425-001204

Page 1 of 127

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The Kanishka Project's primary focus is on research, but it also supports other activities necessary to build knowledge and create a network of researchers and students that spans disciplines and universities. The research funded by the project will improve Canada's ability to counter terrorism and violent extremism at home and abroad.

LEARNING AND ADAPTING

The Use of Monitoring and Evaluation in
Countering Violent Extremism

A Handbook for Practitioners

LAURA DAWSON, CHARLIE EDWARDS
AND CALUM JEFFRAY



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Akili ni Mali
[Knowledge is wealth]

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Laura Dawson, Charlie Edwards and Calum Jeffray

May 2014

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
CGCC	Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation
CVE	Counter violent extremism
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
GCTF	Global Counter Terrorism Forum
IACP	International Association of Chiefs of Police
KTI	Kenya Transition Initiative
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
NCPC	National Crime Prevention Centre (Canada)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PCIA	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
REA	Rapid evidence assessment
SWOT	Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development

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INTRODUCTION

Overview: This chapter will familiarise readers with the purpose of the handbook. It first discusses the aim of the project and the methodology employed, and then provides instructions on using the handbook.

Aim of the Handbook

IN 2013, the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) was awarded a grant under the Kanishka Project to develop a handbook for monitoring and evaluating counter violent extremism (CVE) policies and programmes. The aim of this handbook is to support CVE policy-makers and practitioners (those who design, manage and evaluate CVE programmes), by providing them with key terms regarding violent extremism and radicalisation, describing the purpose of evaluation, and providing examples of key methodologies they can employ to conduct monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in this emerging policy field. The handbook will enable readers to understand why, when and how to conduct an evaluation of a CVE policy, programme or project.

Policy-makers and practitioners understand there is a need to reach beyond security and intelligence measures to tackle the threat posed by violent extremism. Such an approach can be complemented with policies and initiatives focused on responding

to the ideological challenge of terrorism; stopping people from being drawn into terrorism; and working with institutions and communities where individuals are at risk of radicalisation to violence. CVE programmes in the preventive space offer the potential to reduce the risk of increasing numbers of individuals resorting to violence and of creating harm within communities.

As an emerging policy field and a sensitive area for government action, CVE activities are widely scrutinised by parliaments, civil-society organisations and the media. The reason for this scrutiny, according to the widespread view we heard from practitioners in the course of our research, is that it is extremely difficult to demonstrate success in CVE. Good M&E systems are crucial in order for CVE programmes to be implemented effectively, to ensure accountability, and to enhance the effectiveness of successor programmes. In particular, some governments have struggled to justify public money being spent on CVE or to make informed investment decisions based on the demonstrable success or failure of CVE programmes. Our research for this project (of which this handbook is the key output) highlights the lack of work undertaken to evaluate CVE programming.

To date, very few evaluations of the effectiveness and impact of CVE policies and programmes have been conducted either domestically or overseas. Even fewer have been made publicly available. This lack of activity is emphasised as it demonstrates that the current baseline of M&E activity across the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) is low. There are only a handful of examples in the public domain of CVE activities with M&E components – the majority of which are featured in this handbook. To this end, the handbook is designed as an introduction to this policy area, and it describes the benefits of evaluation.

The handbook is one of a number of initiatives the Government of Canada is supporting as part of its role within the GCTF, which

is an informal, multilateral platform that supports the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy worldwide. Within the GCTF's Working Group on CVE, the Government of Canada leads the 'Measurement and Evaluation' workstream, and as part of this work it is developing a compendium of good practices and lessons learned on CVE programme metrics and evaluations to be shared with the GCTF on completion.

The handbook examines the latest literature on useful practices in M&E, reflects current thinking in those governments conducting evaluation exercises, and provides a set of basic tools for policy-makers and practitioners working on CVE.

How to Use this Handbook

The handbook provides readers with guidance on different aspects of undertaking M&E in CVE programming for the purpose of measuring effectiveness and impact. It outlines the key frameworks that will help policy-makers and practitioners understand the context in which M&E takes place, and the theories and frameworks employed to support specific M&E activities. The document also explains the methodologies readers can use when monitoring and/or evaluating a policy area, programme of work or specific project.

The content is divided into short chapters to assist readers in addressing a particular issue. For example, those who are unsure of the development of the CVE field and the main issues within it may wish to consult Chapter I. Those who wish to understand how evaluation has been used in other relevant fields and to look for crossovers with their own work can read Chapter IV.

Chapter I provides an overview of the issue of violent extremism and discusses the key terms of 'radicalisation' and 'countering violent extremism'. It is not meant to denote the extensive research agenda in terrorism studies but rather to

provide information regarding context, definitions and useful practices in different countries.

Chapter II describes the concept and basic tenets of evaluation in order to familiarise readers with the basics of M&E. It describes the purpose of evaluation in the public sector, and particularly CVE. Key challenges relating to evaluation are highlighted by CVE experts from around the world. Finally, the chapter outlines practical issues surrounding the application of evaluation in the CVE field.

Chapter III outlines key evaluation types, tools and technologies to support policy-makers and practitioners with a baseline understanding of what can help them in their work. The types put forward reflect key evaluation terms prevalent in the public sector and which practitioners may wish to consider. The list of tools proposed is not exhaustive, but represents a starting point. The technologies suggested are also promising avenues to pursue.

Chapter IV addresses what can be learned about evaluation from four other social-policy fields: crime prevention, gang prevention, overseas development and peacebuilding projects. One of the most useful areas to examine for comparative purposes in CVE evaluation is crime prevention, given that both sectors focus on 'Prevent' activities, typically involve community-based initiatives, and encounter similar challenges in carrying out M&E. While there are important differences between CVE and crime prevention, useful lessons can be applied from the broad body of existing literature on M&E for crime-prevention programmes.

Chapter V outlines some of the CVE initiatives implemented in different countries, and the M&E lessons that can be learned from these programmes. Although most countries' CVE efforts are in their early stages, there are notable instances of both shortcomings and good practice that can be applied to future CVE initiatives elsewhere.

Some Key Terms Related to CVE

These are some key terms used throughout this handbook that readers should be familiar with:

- **Impact:** the measurable effect a programme has on its target audience, to help assess an intervention's success; can be qualitative or quantitative.
- **Effectiveness:** the extent to which a CVE programme's objectives were achieved.
- **Monitoring:** the capturing of data throughout the cycle of a programme as a means of indicating how well a programme is performing.
- **Evaluation:** the methodological assessment of a process in order to gauge its value towards a certain cause or aim.
- **Outputs:** the direct and measurable products of a program's activities or services, often expressed in terms of units (hours, number of people or completed actions).
- **Outcomes:** the results or impact of these activities or services, often expressed in terms of an increase in understanding, and improvements in desired behaviors or attitudes of participants.

Methodology

The project team applied a structured methodology broken down into three phases to achieve both granular analysis and high-level findings regarding the use of evaluation in CVE policy and practice. The broad aims of the methodology were to collect data to enhance the team's understanding of CVE, identify key debates on M&E and explore specific approaches to evaluation in CVE. The research team gathered evidence through three phases:

- A workshop of key GCTF stakeholders (March 2013)
- A rapid evidence assessment (REA) (March–October 2013)

- Structured bilateral engagement with a range of international subject-matter experts in CVE and evaluation fields (May–November 2013).

Phase 1: Workshop of Key GCTF Stakeholders

Working with Public Safety Canada, the research team identified fifty experts, policy-makers and practitioners in GCTF countries with an interest and expertise in applying evaluation methods to the CVE policy area or analogous fields.

The workshop enabled the research team to achieve multiple aims: enhance their understanding of the main issues in CVE; open up avenues of enquiry as to lessons from related social-policy areas; identify the needs of policy-makers and practitioners; and validate the purpose of the handbook in outlining basic guidance on CVE and offering examples of evaluation models that had been, or could be, applied to this field.

Phase 2: REA to Scope the Evaluation Approaches and Methods Used

The project team also initiated an REA to scope M&E in the CVE field. The REA focused on answering the overarching question: what are the key terms in CVE and what evaluation techniques are or could be applied to the field? The methodology consisted of a rigorous and systematic search and review of the literature.

The evidence collation involved an examination of existing research, including academic journals and reports by governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which allowed us to extract information on evaluation approaches in CVE and analogous social policy fields. The research team selected GCTF governments' information portals as key sources because of their comprehensive scope, relevance and usability in outlining CVE

policy – in concert with a targeted search of relevant websites (of overseas development NGOs, for example).

Phase 3: Structured Bilateral Engagement with a Range of International Subject-Matter Experts

The team engaged subject-matter experts to identify current developments in policy formulation and practice, and the key issues facing practitioners in the CVE field. These experts were chosen following dialogue with GCTF member states' government departments, NGOs and law-enforcement agencies. These engagements consisted of semi-structured interviews and the application of a consistent set of questions to interviewees. In some cases a dialogue ensued, which further enriched the evidence base.

The interviews allowed us to focus our review of the literature on CVE through the identification of guidance that may not have been publicly available. They were also instrumental in helping us better understand the specificities of CVE evaluation, as well as similarities and differences in relation to other fields of social policy.

M&E in any area of government is a challenge. In countering violent extremism it is also highly sensitive and at the embryonic stage. As CVE evolves, so too will the way we evaluate success and failure in policy, programming and individual projects. This handbook should be treated as a guide for policy-makers and practitioners as they weave their way through this maze of complexity. There are many pitfalls along the way. Rarely is something as straightforward as it first seems. This handbook will not solve the inherent challenge of demonstrating the impact of a specific initiative, but it will answer many of the questions that are frequently raised when conducting such crucial work at home and abroad.

Introduction: Key Points

- Effective CVE programmes offer the potential to reduce the risk of individuals resorting to violence.
- Monitoring and evaluating these programmes is vital in order to demonstrate the impact and effectiveness of CVE activities (helping to justify the allocation of resources to CVE programmes).
- Very few evaluations of CVE policies and programmes have ever been conducted.
- This handbook provides readers with guidance on the purpose and principles of evaluation, types of evaluation and lessons learned from other fields.
- These lessons learned will highlight key issues that policy-makers and practitioners need to take into consideration, and enable readers to choose the most appropriate M&E methodology for their programme.

I. VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND RADICALISATION

Overview: This chapter provides an overview of violent extremism and discusses key terms such as ‘radicalisation’, ‘radicalisation to violence’ and ‘countering violent extremism’. It does not summarise the extensive research agenda in terrorism studies, but provides background information on context, definitions and debates. The chapter identifies the challenges of M&E in an area of policy that remains ill-defined.

1.1 Violent Extremism

The terrorist threats we face today are more diverse than before, dispersed across a wider geographical area, and often emanate from countries without effective governance.¹ The GCTF’s framework document states that ‘the growing list of victims of terrorism and their families’ acts as a reminder of the terrible toll of terrorism in terms of human lives.²

Left unchecked, terrorism can spread fear and alarm, and increase social tensions. Continual terrorist attacks (both successful and attempted) demonstrate the global and

1. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, ‘Global Counterterrorism Forum Political Declaration’, US Department of State, 22 September 2011, <<http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/gctf/173353.htm>>, accessed 20 May 2014.
2. *Ibid.*

increasingly geographically diverse terrorist threat that confronts all societies. Terrorism can originate from far-left and far-right extremist groups, lone actors,³ and nationalist and separatist entities. Today, Al-Qa'ida, its affiliates and those groups inspired by its ideology, pose the greatest terrorist threat. What these groups and individuals share is a desire to attract and recruit supporters and participants to their cause.

In assessing drivers of and pathways to violent radicalisation, the line between extremism and terrorism is often blurred. Terrorist groups of all kinds very often draw on ideologies which have been developed, disseminated and popularised by extremist organisations that appear to be non-violent (such as groups that neither use violence nor specifically and openly endorse its use by others).⁴

The term 'radicalisation' is used widely, but a consensus on its definition and drivers has yet to be achieved and past research has proved of little explanatory value.⁵ Following the terrorist attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005), politicians and policy-makers began to use the term 'radicalisation' or 'violent radicalisation' to describe the attitudes and/or behaviours of predominantly young individuals who subscribe to extreme violent beliefs.

-
3. The term 'lone actor' is potentially misleading, as there is expert consensus that the radicalisation process always involves another person with some influence over the individual in question. It is generally agreed that 'self-radicalisation' is a relatively rare phenomenon and that individuals are usually radicalised by an external agent – whether in person or through Internet sources.
 4. HM Government, *Prevent Strategy*, Cm 8092 (London: The Stationery Office, June 2011).
 5. Alex P Schmid, 'Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review', International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, The Hague, March 2013.

A respected academic notes that violent radicalisation ‘has become a political shibboleth despite its lack of precision’.⁶ ‘Radicalisation’ remains a highly contested term; although widely understood as a process, it is context-dependent with no single agreed definition of what constitutes the ‘end point’ of the process. Moreover, what may be deemed ‘radical’ in one setting is ‘mainstream’ in another, according to the political and cultural environment.⁷

Two principal schools within the contemporary debate tend to stress either ‘cognitive radicalisation’, emphasising a person’s beliefs, or ‘behavioural radicalisation’, which emphasises a person’s actions, as the measurable criteria. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), for example, views radicalisation as a largely cognitive development that witnesses the ‘process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate mainstream beliefs toward extreme views’, and can lead to violent criminal behaviour.⁸

This definition takes into account context when assessing levels of radicalisation leading to violent criminal behaviour. While acknowledging potential positive outcomes of ‘radicalisation’, the RCMP’s definition places radicalisation as a concern when the ‘radical thoughts lead to violence, [and] society can be put at risk’.⁹ This idea of radicalisation to violence is the basis of Canada’s

6. *Ibid.*

7. Peter R Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’, *International Affairs* (Vol. 89, No. 4, July 2013).

8. Royal Canadian Mounted Police, ‘Radicalization to Violence’, <<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/nsci-ecsn/rad/internet/p2-eng.htm>>, accessed 20 May 2014.

9. *Ibid.*

policing approach, and the process with which this handbook is concerned.

Not all those who hold extremist political, ideological or religious views within a society act on those views in a violent manner, and others argue that not all those who commit acts of violent extremism have deeply radical political views.¹⁰ Many factors must be accounted for when attempting to understand the reasoning behind an act of violent extremism. These are often classified as ‘push’ factors, such as the denial of civil liberties or socioeconomic pressures, and ‘pull’ factors, such as the appeal of a particular leader or the social or material benefits of joining a violent extremist group.¹¹ Cognitive radicalisation also emphasises the importance of a ‘cognitive opening’ (an experience of trauma or realisation), which often creates the impetus for radicalisation and makes individuals more receptive to radical ideologies, narratives and leaders.¹²

Some definitions take a less cognitive-based and more action-based view of radicalisation. For example, the British government’s definition of radicalisation does not refer to cognitive preconditions, instead defining it as ‘the process by which people come to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then to participate in terrorist groups’.¹³ This addresses the idea of ‘action pathways’ into terrorism.

10. Neumann, ‘The Trouble with Radicalization’.

11. Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter, *Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism* (Washington, DC: USAID, February 2009).

12. Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, ‘EU Workshop on Effective Programming for Countering Violent Extremism’, summary report from workshop held 26–27 November 2012, Brussels, <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news/documents/20121217_eu_cve_workshop_summary_report.pdf>, accessed 20 May 2014.

13. HM Government, *The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism* (London: Home Office, June 2009), p. 11.

Definition of radicalisation: The precursor to violent extremism; a process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extremist views. This becomes a threat to national security when individuals or groups espouse or engage in violence as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious objectives.

As the Canadian definition indicates, radicalisation can be viewed as a process of change, a personal and political transformation from one condition to another. Recent scholarship argues that becoming radicalised is, for most people, a gradual process and one that requires a progression through distinct stages and happens neither quickly nor easily.¹⁴ A person may not become radical overnight, although the influence of an incident may act as a 'catalytic event' (such as an experienced act of discrimination, a perceived attack on Islam such as the 2003 Iraq War, or a 'moral crisis' with the death of a loved one), thus accelerating the process.¹⁵

14. John Horgan, *The Psychology of Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2005), ch. 3; Mitchell D Silber and Arvin Bhatt, 'Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat', NYPD Intelligence Division, 2007, ch. 3.

15. Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, 'Process Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes for Young People', 2012.

Lessons from the front line: If defining ‘radicalisation’, ‘radicalisation to violence’ and even ‘violent radicalisation’ is a challenge, and there is widespread sensitivity around using such terminology, then how do policy-makers and practitioners develop appropriate responses?

As one interviewee said:

We know we’re trying to prevent terrorist activity, but what does that mean? There is no one factor. No one target. It is hard to define what we are measuring. There is no one pathway, no one cause. It can include educational factors, socioeconomic factors, identity factors, boredom factors, political factors, grievances. How do you develop a programme that will tackle all of those factors? You can’t. How do we know we’re even developing a programme that’s of value to any of those factors?

1.2 How CVE Policy has Evolved since 2001

CVE focuses on countering the pull of terrorist recruitment and influence by building resilience among populations vulnerable to violent radicalisation. Over the last decade, government initiatives on CVE have developed from being a reflexive response to terrorist events and become an integrated part or workstream of a co-ordinated national policy to tackle terrorism and address radicalisation to violence.

CVE projects that are conducted abroad must align with the work of the host government. Considerable policy effort and research has been devoted to understanding and crafting both bottom-up and top-down responses to terrorism and violent extremism. Within most counter-terrorism strategies, ‘countering violent extremism’ has become a central area of work, not only under the Prevent pillar but as part of wider law-enforcement efforts. Intelligence operations, law-enforcement investigations, community engagement, police research and government strategic communications all increasingly feature elements of CVE.

Figure 1: Evolution of CVE Policies and Strategies.

Figure 1 shows the evolution of CVE strategy and policies over the past eight years (to September 2013). CVE remains a Western policy tool but is now becoming more commonplace elsewhere, although it is poorly funded in comparison with other areas of counter-terrorism spending.

As previously mentioned, the GCTF is an informal, multilateral platform that supports the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy worldwide. Its CVE working group, set up in 2012 and co-chaired by the United Arab Emirates and the UK, aims to strengthen measures to counter all forms of violent extremism that pose a threat to members' interests.

The working group meets regularly to discuss good practice on issues such as multi-sectoral approaches to CVE, community-oriented policing and community engagement. The working group's publications on CVE evaluation are invaluable resources for policy-makers and practitioners, including such documents as the summary of its practical seminar on M&E techniques for CVE communication programmes,¹⁶ the final report of its symposium on measuring the effectiveness of CVE programming¹⁷ and the Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to CVE.¹⁸

The Ankara Memorandum, adopted at the fourth GCTF ministerial meeting in September 2013, addresses the role of government institutions, agencies and civil society in CVE, and

16. Global Counterterrorism Forum, 'Meeting Summary', report from Practical Seminar on Monitoring and Evaluation Techniques for CVE Communication Programs, Abu Dhabi, UAE, 10–11 February 2013.

17. Naureen Chowdhury Fink, Peter Romaniuk and Rafia Barakat, *Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Programming: Practice and Progress*, Final Report of Symposium on Measuring the Effectiveness of CVE Programming, Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2013.

18. Global Counterterrorism Forum, 'Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism', 2013..

specifically outlines good practices that countries can use to facilitate this multi-sectoral approach.

Chapter I: Key Points

- In assessing drivers of and pathways to radicalisation to violence, the line between extremism and terrorism is often blurred.
- 'Radicalisation' is a highly contested term, and while understood as a process, it is context-dependent with no universally recognised end point.
- The Canadian definition of radicalisation to violence recognises it as follows: 'The precursor to violent extremism; a process by which individuals are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extremist views. This becomes a threat to national security when individuals or groups espouse or engage in violence as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious objectives'. (Government of Canada, *Building Resilience against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-terrorism Strategy* [Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2012]).
- CVE has become a central area of work under the Prevent pillar within most counter-terrorism strategies, and has rapidly evolved since 2001.

Policy Overview: GCTF Ankara Memorandum on Good Practice in CVE (September 2013)**Core Principles**

- Each state initially needs to understand the nature of violent extremism. States should identify the conditions conducive to violent extremism and assess their own needs.
- Strategies on CVE should be based on scientific analyses.
- Any CVE programme should avoid the identification of violent extremism with any religion, culture, ethnic group, nationality or race.
- Each violent extremist group should be evaluated separately, since a 'one-size-fits-all' approach does not work when dealing with violent extremism.
- Considering violent extremism to be a mere security issue can be misleading. It is a multi-faceted problem that requires multidisciplinary and multi-institutional responses.

Multi-Agency Approaches within the State

- Developing shared understandings of the nature of violent extremism among governmental agencies and non-governmental actors is a critical element of any successful CVE programme.
- States are encouraged to consider comprehensive action in preventing and countering violent extremism, in co-operation with governmental and non-governmental actors.
- Although the role of the government is crucial, a strategy that involves a 'whole-of-society' approach in addition to a 'whole-of-government' one can be effective.
- For a successful CVE strategy to be implemented, an operational co-ordination mechanism is of vital importance.

Public–Private Partnerships

- Civil society can contribute to CVE efforts by providing narratives and messages against violence; presenting alternative and non-violent means to reach shared goals; and promoting institutional diversity.
- It is crucial for states to build trust while working with communities. States should ensure meaningful community participation in order to mobilise the resources of the community.
- States can help civil society in CVE activities.
- States should promote tolerance and facilitate dialogue in society to build communities, to appreciate the differences between them and to understand each other.
- States and society can work together to amplify voices that oppose exploitation of religion by violent extremist groups.

Socio-Economic Approaches

- CVE programming should prioritise youth at risk of radicalisation and recruitment.
- Educational institutions can serve as an important platform in countering violent extremism.
- Promoting economic opportunity among at-risk populations can address a condition conducive to violent extremism.
- Women can be particularly critical actors in local CVE efforts.

The Role of Law-Enforcement Agencies

- Law-enforcement agencies should acknowledge that one of the most vital rules of CVE is building trust with those particularly at risk.
- States should provide training to law-enforcement officers in CVE-related matters.

II. EVALUATING CVE: PURPOSE, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE

Overview: This chapter first describes the purpose of M&E in public policy, and specifically CVE policy, outlining the benefits which may be achieved and key components to be employed. It then presents four fundamental challenges that have been highlighted by CVE experts from around the world and explores how a number of governments are approaching CVE and, critically, M&E within their programmes.

2.1 Defining Monitoring and Evaluation

It is recognised that M&E are defined in different ways, according to context. For the purposes of this handbook we define M&E in practical and inter-related terms:

- **Monitoring** is the capturing of data throughout the cycle of a programme as a means of indicating how well it is performing at the activity and output levels.
- **Evaluation** is the systematic assessment of a programme (using the monitoring data) to establish how well it is performing when measured against the standards and goals set out in policy or strategy documents.¹

1. Robert Lahey, 'A Framework for Developing an Effective Monitoring and Evaluation System in the Public Sector: Key Considerations from International Experience', undated, <www.ideas-int.org/documents/Document.cfm?docID=160>, accessed 20 May 2014.

2.2 Why Monitor?

Establishing a clear monitoring system is critical to a sound methodological approach to evaluation. Ensuring that all partners know what the intervention is trying to achieve, what the baseline is, what needs to be measured and at what intervals, helps to build understanding of and confidence in the project. Clear criteria and indicators need to be defined from the outset in order to assess progress and performance objectively.

An effective monitoring system does more than solely track the deliverables of a programme or policy; it offers accurate and in-depth information on the suitability of activities, the input from stakeholders and the allocation of resources. A monitoring system can also capture unintended consequences of programmes and so be helpful in reviewing any necessary changes in direction of a project, as well as providing an opportunity for lesson-learning. Regular reporting can further ensure that the project donor has confidence in the progress of the work.

In addition to producing reports, a comprehensive monitoring approach maintains a balance between the provision of data and technical documents, independent confirmation of the accuracy of results, and regular feedback from participants and stakeholders:²

- **Data and analysis:** obtaining and analysing documentation from projects that provides information on progress (examples include delivery reports, and substantive and technical documents).
- **Validation:** checking or verifying whether or not the reported progress is accurate (through field visits, spot checks and contributor surveys).

2. United Nations Development Programme, 'Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results' New York, 2009.

- **Participation:** obtaining feedback from partners and beneficiaries on progress and proposed actions (through convening steering-committee, stakeholder and focus-group meetings).

Monitoring should not be viewed in the same vein as evaluation. These two processes should work in a complementary fashion. Monitoring should provide regular information and data for the evaluation process to address larger policy-implementation issues.

2.3 Why Evaluate?

Evaluation systems assist government departments and those NGOs receiving government support in ensuring that CVE programmes remain efficient and relevant, and achieve the desired results. Another aim of evaluation in public-policy areas like CVE is transparency, and holding public servants and recipients of public funds to account by ensuring that resources such as money and staff are used appropriately and effectively. These findings are then disclosed to stakeholders and used to inform resource allocation and other decisions. Thus, the twin aims of evaluation are to improve effectiveness and ensure accountability to stakeholders. They require different indicators and metrics.

Accountability also requires comparing performance to *ex-ante* commitments and targets, using methods that obtain internal validity of measurement, ensuring credibility of analysis, and disclosing findings to as broad a range of stakeholders as possible. A requirement in any accountability exercise is ensuring that the evaluation is proportionate to the programme's size and objective.

Evaluation of projects can systematically generate knowledge about the magnitude and determinants of project performance, permitting those who develop projects and strategies to refine the design and introduce improvements into future efforts. In

addition to addressing issues of accountability and learning, M&E therefore also serve as an essential aspect of good management.

Good evaluation systems³ are needed for CVE programmes to be implemented effectively, and for successor programmes to be made more effective. M&E also track involvement of key stakeholders in all stages of the activity cycle, which is necessary to ensure that CVE programmes deliver results. Partnerships with stakeholders should ideally start at the identification stage and continue right through to evaluation. Unless local stakeholders have strong ownership of the CVE programme, the potential benefits are unlikely to be achieved.

It is essential to develop a series of basic questions to understand the overall approach and intended impact of any evaluation. In 2009, the UK Home Office designed a nine-step approach to evaluation which illustrated key questions and considerations (see opposite).⁴ Using this approach, the questions that should be considered from the outset of the M&E process include:

- What is the intended outcome?
- What are we trying to evaluate?
- How is this being achieved?
- What outputs result from this process?
- What effects do these outputs have?
- What worked well and what did not? Why or why not?
- How do we demonstrate success?
- What would we change in future as a result?
- What implications does this have for other programmes and/or activities?⁵

3. For examples of successful, more mature evaluation models from other related sectors, see Chapter IV.

4. Home Office, *Passport to Evaluation 2.0*, London, May 2009.

5. Scottish Government, 'Safer Communities Programme: Evaluation: A Basic Guide to Evaluation', Community Safety Unit, Edinburgh, February 2010.

UK Home Office: Nine Stages of an Evaluation

The following stages are important for carrying out an evaluation. One approach to evaluation sees it as a project-management process. When carrying out an evaluation of a project, you can approach it as a project in its own right, ensuring it is planned and organised properly. These steps are useful to act as prompts:

1. **Identify why you are carrying out the evaluation and establish what the research question should be** (for example, how much impact does the CVE programme under review have on terrorist recruitment?)
2. **Decide how you will measure the impact of the project or initiative.** It is important to have some idea of what success looks like.
3. **Identify what data you will need for the evaluation and for setting up the processes for collecting that data.** This will also help to establish what the gaps are.
4. **Decide how you will analyse the data.** What is the timescale? How long does it take to see the results of CVE programmes?
5. **Look at the logistics.** Consider issues such as the control of the outputs of the project, the importance of leadership and partnership working, and the resources of the partners in terms of time, human-resources and financial input.
6. **Identify who is responsible for making the evaluation.** Engagement with CVE experts has highlighted the importance of understanding how the profile of the evaluator contributes different elements to an evaluation. An insider can offer understanding of a project's key drivers and be focused on lesson learning, but an outsider can offer challenging and new perspectives, and focus minds on impact. One approach may be to conduct a peer review where evaluators have subject-specific knowledge but also are independent and so free to challenge effectively.
7. **Carry out the evaluation** – collecting and analysing the data and arriving at your conclusions.
8. **Publish your findings.** Consider robustness of evidence and sharing new ideas. Develop best practice and share lessons learnt.
9. **Understand how the findings will be acted on.** Consider the level of detail and the required audience (it is usually beneficial to produce reports at several different levels).

2.4 Creating a Feedback Loop in Policy and Practice

While feeding into the policy cycle is an essential feature of evaluation, ensuring something is done with your evidence is a further challenge. How can the programme be improved? Following evaluation, how should the programme or elements of the programme change?


Working with the project team is an important step. Stakeholders said this was crucial to think about when designing the evaluation and integrating it into the project. Interviewees also emphasised that clients and those responsible for M&E need to allocate time for this dialogue and it needs to be viewed as a key project deliverable (rather than an accessory to the project). It is also important to consider what parts of the evaluation can be shared with, for instance, those associated with the work and in some cases the wider community of stakeholders. Figure 2 shows how evaluation can form an integral of the programme cycle.

Interviewees stressed that too often there is a disconnect between a programme's or project's aims, which have been designed by policy-makers at the centre, and the realities on the ground where NGOs and community groups are operating.

2.5 What is being Evaluated?

From the very outset of programme design, it is necessary to consider what the intended outcome of the programme is in order to provide the basis of the evaluation process. What is the expected outcome and what needs to be measured to gauge whether or not this has been achieved? For example, it might be a change in attitudes, the increase or reduction in a particular activity, or altered patterns of behaviour. Determining an appropriate research question allows for the formulation of suitable targets and indicators.

Figure 2: The Programme Evaluation Cycle.



Source: Integrity Research and Consultancy.

2.6 The Role of Performance Indicators

Setting targets is a crucial step in developing indicators for the programme which tell stakeholders whether a specific programme has been successful and what factors did or did not contribute to this result. Multiple performance indicators ensure that the effectiveness and impact of a programme can be measured and causal links established between the activity and the observed outcome.

The World Health Organization has conducted extensive research to refine the indicators used to monitor and evaluate drug policies, identifying four categories of drug-policy indicators: background information (national contextual data); structural

indicators (assessing the pharmaceutical system's capacity to achieve its policy objectives); process indicators (the degree to which activities necessary to attain the objectives are carried out, and their progress over time); and outcome indicators (measuring the results achieved and the changes that can be attributed to the implementation of the national drug policy). It is possible to use selected subsets of these indicators to meet the needs of those designing and evaluating programmes.⁶

SMART Principles to Apply When Thinking about Indicators

The principles should be:

Specific: all targets should have specific outcomes – for example, to reduce violent crime.

Measurable: the outcome should be capable of being measured – for example, to reduce instances of violent behaviour in a given district.

Achievable: reaching the target can be challenging, but it must be possible to reach it within the established timescales, as well as with the resources and skills available.

Realistic: targets should not be set too high and should be physically possible to achieve.

Timebound: a timescale should be set with a fixed deadline for achieving the target.

An ideal evaluation framework incorporates quantitative and qualitative data and methods, but if at all possible mixed

6. World Health Organization, *How to Develop and Implement a National Drug Policy*, 2nd ed. (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2001).

methods should be used, including, for example, surveys and/or questionnaires, supplemented by more detailed informant interviews, which verify the quantitative findings. In recent years there has been a push by funders for impact evaluations,⁷ often problematic for CVE interventions. The specific methodology depends on the scope and shape of the intervention, what the person responsible is trying to find out, and who they are engaging. In carrying out such an evaluation study, it is important to make its limitations in relation to CVE clear.

Creating categories of indicators of which subsets can be used depends on the context of each country's CVE programme. However, there are disadvantages to using indicators: they may be poorly defined, limiting their utility in measuring effectiveness and impact; there may be a tendency to define too many indicators, or those without accessible data sources, making systems costly, impractical and likely to be underused; and there is often a trade-off between picking the optimal or desired indicators and having to accept the indicators that can be measured using existing data.⁸

When measuring the effectiveness of CVE programmes, it is important to consider the longer-term outcomes and impacts of the various programmes, as results are generally seen on a longer timescale. It is also important to put in place a benchmark

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7. According to the World Bank, 'An impact evaluation assesses changes in the well-being of individuals, households, communities or firms that can be attributed to a particular project, program or policy. The central impact evaluation question is what would have happened to those receiving the intervention if they had not in fact received the program'. See World Bank, 'Impact Evaluation', <bit.ly/1jKBADn>, accessed 20 May 2014.
 8. World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, 'Monitoring and Evaluation: Some Tools, Methods and Approaches', 2004, <bit.ly/1gJ5KcM>, accessed 20 May 2014.

to determine whether the outcomes are attributable to the programme rather than to an external causal factor.

Evaluation in Practice: The Experience from De-Radicalisation Programmes

De-radicalisation programmes have been established in a number of countries. In a review of how evaluation processes have been applied, two prominent academics have noted that 'no program has formally identified valid and reliable indicators of successful de-radicalisation or even disengagement, whether couched in cultural, psychological, or other terms. Consequently, any attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of any such program is beset with a myriad of challenges that are as much conceptual as they are practical'.*

Many national programmes are consequently setting up more stringent M&E structures throughout a programme lifecycle, including more effective monitoring of individuals after they have left the programme, and evaluating post-programme management. At a recent GCTF working group it was noted that M&E need to be incorporated 'at inception as part of an active feedback cycle as opposed to being used only to generate end-state documents'. It is also necessary to increase transparency and to disseminate data from other countries programmes to establish best practice.

* John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, 'Rehabilitating the Terrorists?: Challenges in Assessing the Effectiveness of De-Radicalization Programs', *Terrorism and Political Violence* (Vol. 22, pp. 267–91, 2010).

When measuring the impact of a programme it is important to know what would happen if such a programme were not in place, in order to establish whether desired outcomes were met. Where

possible, measure the counterfactual – the hypothetical situation that would have occurred had the programme not existed.⁹

To determine whether a policy programme has had any impact we must collect and analyse the data gathered during the monitoring period. To do this it is necessary to identify what data is needed to measure the programme's impact, when it should be collected and in what format. It is also necessary to ask whether the data needed for the selected indicators is readily available, reliable and sufficiently accurate so as not to distort results.¹⁰

2.7 Challenges in Measuring Effectiveness

Many practitioners described evaluating domestic and international CVE work as an extremely challenging process. Principal difficulties include the length of time taken for outcomes to emerge, and building trust with individuals and communities who are partners of CVE interventions. Individuals participating in CVE activities may be hard to reach and reluctant to engage in evaluation. It is also worth emphasising that there are very few CVE programmes to draw from. Moreover, and crucially, there are no validated scales to measure the levels of support for violent extremism among individuals; therefore, understanding context, using proxies such as behaviours, and making the most of expert judgement are important.

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9. Susan Purdon, Carli Lessof, Kandy Woodfield and Caroline Bryson, *Research Methods for Policy Evaluation*, Department for Work and Pensions Research Working Paper No. 2, National Centre for Social Research, 2001, <<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100303161939/http://statistics.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/WP2.pdf>>.
 10. Home Office, Passport to Evaluation 2.0; Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 'Supporting Effective Evaluations: A Guide to Developing Performance Measurement Strategies', <<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/cee/dpms-esmr/dpms-esmr00-eng.asp>>, accessed 20 May 2014.

In the course of our research, interviewees identified the main challenges when measuring effectiveness as being causality attribution and indicators, and the collection of data and the perceptions of citizens where an evaluation took place. Identifying causality means being able to confidently attribute any alignment of behaviour toward programme goals by programme participants as a direct result of the programme processes and not any confounding factor.

The difficulty of attributing any changes to a programme is why developing accurate indicators of CVE and/or radicalisation is so important. General indicators such as a decrease in terrorist incidents in the country can be fairly useful, but they do not demonstrate the level of extremism in a country nor the intent and capability of a potential terrorist cell or lone actor. They may be attributable to a multitude of other factors, including better intelligence and law-enforcement activity, and not the result of less violent action by the radicalised individuals targeted by programmes.

This section describes four key issues that will help policy-makers and practitioners to frame their evaluation and ensure that the impact and effectiveness of programmes are measured successfully (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Challenges in Measuring Impact and Effectiveness.



Challenge 1: The Problem of Agency – Identifying the Actor(s) Responsible for Decision-Making

The issue of agency – identifying who was or is responsible for a policy or programme, how decisions are made and their intended purpose – is fundamental to the evaluation of programmes and projects. It addresses the question ‘Who makes the key decisions?’ or ‘In what setting and through what processes are these decisions taken?’ The problem of agency is difficult to determine in CVE where the interface between the state, local authorities, police and community is complex.

As agency becomes more dispersed among multiple decision-makers, this creates problems for those designing

evaluations. For example, CVE programmes can often involve collaboration between multiple policy-makers and practitioners at the international, regional and local levels with various law-enforcement officials and practitioners on the ground. On the macro level, this was identified as the ‘problem of many hands’. The academic Nicoletta Stame develops this idea into horizontal and vertical complexities by arguing that policy-makers are now in the habit of combining services such as healthcare and employment, transport and urban regeneration into one unit.¹¹

In some countries this is the case for CVE, as it bridges social-cohesion and counter-terrorism departmental mandates. In other countries, CVE is the responsibility of military actors and of the police and government (for example, the African Union Mission in Somalia – AMISOM – has sponsored de-radicalisation projects in Somalia). Moreover, the multi-level systems of government that now exist – such as European, national, regional and local governments – have created a dynamic decision-making structure. The ‘problem of many hands’ means that those designing programmes and undertaking evaluations need to engage not just one decision-maker, but rather understand a potentially long chain of interactions – namely, feedback loops – which culminate in actions and particular outcomes.

Addressing the Problem of Agency in CVE

Evaluation in CVE requires an appreciation of an increase in the number of actors and the impact of their decision-making on a programme. For CVE, the problem of agency can be better tackled by using evaluation techniques outlined in Chapter III, such as:

- Logic models (outlining assumptions and actors).
- Process mapping (outlining key activities and linkages between actors).
- Interactive exchange and early consultation in programme design through interviews, focus groups and the Delphi method.

Challenge 2: The Problem of Attribution – Determining the Causality between Inputs and Outcomes

Understanding attribution – what was causally necessary for an outcome to be achieved – is a key issue in evaluation, particularly when applying an impact-evaluation framework. The question is: To what extent can changes in outcomes of interest be attributed to a particular intervention? Attribution involves isolating and estimating accurately the particular contribution of an intervention and ensuring that causality runs from the intervention to the outcome.

The changes in welfare for a particular group of people can be observed by undertaking ‘before and after’ studies, but these rarely measure impact accurately. Baseline data (collated before the intervention) and end-line data (collated after the intervention) give facts about the programme over time and describe ‘the factual’ for the treatment group (not the counterfactual). But changes observed by comparing before/after (or pre/post) data are rarely caused by the intervention alone, as other interventions and processes influence developments in time and space.

There are some exceptions in which ‘before’ versus ‘after’ will suffice to determine impact. For example, in the development context, supplying village water pumps reduces time spent fetching water. If nothing else of importance happened during the period under study, attribution is so clear that there is no need to resort to anything other than ‘before’ versus ‘after’ to determine this impact.¹²

Experts in CVE have noted this issue as a key conceptual problem in CVE evaluation, particularly as most programmes lack the tools (such as randomised, controlled trials) required

12. Frans Leeuw and Jos Vaessen, *Impact Evaluations and Development: NONIE Guidance on Impact Evaluation* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2009), ch. 4.

to overcome it. That said, some experts believed that some lessons from the development arena, for instance US Agency for International Development (USAID) programmes, could be enlightening (see Chapter IV).

Addressing the Problem of Attribution in CVE

Overcoming the attribution problem in CVE evaluation is no easy task without access to experimental and quasi-experimental designs embedded in a theory-based evaluation framework:

- Randomised controlled trials are closest to the gold standard and are the safest way to avoid selection effects.
- Judgement-matching is a less precise method for selecting control groups using descriptive information from survey data; for example, to construct comparison groups.
- Benchmarking is a rough way to compare the value of a programme against another programme.

Challenge 3: The Problem of Measurement – Many Factors are Difficult to Measure Accurately

The two problem areas of agency and attribution have made measurement more difficult. This in turn has fed a view that what cannot be measured cannot be managed. The issue of measurement has many aspects. We focus on three that are important within the realm of CVE: measuring players' contributions; timing of measurement; and what to measure.

- **Who to 'measure':** because CVE projects involve multiple bodies, measurement can be difficult. The involvement of statutory, voluntary, corporate and community bodies in delivering an intervention or service makes it difficult to account for and to measure outcomes, particularly as it is

unclear what these bodies might have done in the absence of public money or public-sector steering.

- **When to 'measure':** counter-terrorism strategies involve committing to goals over a long period of time. Often there is not the appetite to wait until the completion of a long-term project before asking review questions. Arriving at an *ex-ante* evaluation judgement requires evaluators to take a view on decisions that relate to an uncertain future.
- **What to 'measure':** outcomes can be very difficult to measure, particularly where they are intangible (for example, trust, social capital and confidence).

A further perspective on measurement put forward by Canadian programme evaluation advisor John Mayne is that the key to evaluation is measuring with the aim of reducing uncertainty about the particular contributions made to an outcome.¹³ This improves focus and enables the identification of intended actions resulting in unintended consequences.

Understanding contribution, as opposed to providing attribution, is the essence of good evaluation. Understanding contribution has an element of the subjective, but this can be overcome by process models and logic models that probe the level of contribution of individual actions in a rigorous way. It is also important to consider context, as this often impacts on the outcomes of CVE programmes.

A final consideration when looking at measurement is the interpretation of data. Interpretation is subjective and the same information or data may be interpreted differently by different analysts, impacting measurement.

13. John Mayne, 'Contribution Analysis: An Approach to Exploring Cause and Effect', Institutional Learning and Change (ILAC) Brief 16, May 2008.

Addressing the Problem of Measurement in CVE

Some tools can assist in remedying these problems of measurement. However, in addressing issues such as ‘when’ to measure, thought must also be given to wider issues such as scope and principles of project planning and management:

- Logic models and contribution analyses can provide structured ways to identify what is important to measure.
- Economic evaluations can be useful where there are clear costs and benefits that can be monetised.
- ‘Futures thinking’ can help when considering what long-term future impacts to measure.
- Theory of change can help to break programmes down into measurable sections.
- Impact assessments provide a helpful way to think through an array of measurable outcomes.

Challenge 4: The Problem of Benefit – Dealing with Situations of Uneven Distribution of Costs and Benefits

It is important to understand who is benefiting (and to what degree) from a programme among the array of stakeholders, as well as who may be losing out. While this should be possible from the methodology employed (for example, from a logic model), it is rarely that simple, especially with projects that are operating in difficult or challenging environments.

Moreover, projects must consider that costs and benefits may be unevenly distributed: those who contribute most to a project may not be the beneficiaries, while benefits may also be incommensurate (for instance, an increase in security for one may result in a loss of privacy for another). Different groups might well value the same outcomes differently. The challenge is

to ensure the integrity of the evaluation so that any findings can be presented in a balanced way and are not biased towards one group over another.

Addressing the Problem of Uneven Benefit

There are methods to understand how different service users value different types of outcomes:

- Stakeholder analyses review the needs and concerns of the different actors involved in a programme, and can help to clarify stakeholders' values and priorities.
- Discrete choice models describe, explain and predict choices between two or more alternatives, helping researchers to understand how individual service users value different packages of options.
- Delphi surveys are exercises to collect large amounts of expert information and can help to identify future risks.
- Futures thinking can help to identify the dimensions and categories of future costs and benefits.

As a final note, it is worth considering the limitations to evaluation, particularly within the CVE field:

- **Lack of a comparison group:** the impact of CVE interventions is usually a challenge because of the absence of a control group against which the effects of a programme can be benchmarked.
- **Sample size:** individuals participating in CVE activities may be hard to reach and reluctant to engage in evaluation, limiting the size of data sets and making it hard to draw conclusions on the impact of the programme.

- **Inconsistency of data:** despite best practice, weaknesses in data collection such as sampling methods and human error can frequently lead to inaccuracies and inconsistencies.
- **Reporting bias:** interpretation of data is necessarily subjective and not all evaluators draw the same conclusions on the effectiveness and impact that a programme has had.

The tools available to assist in overcoming problems in evaluation are outlined in Chapter III. They can be used separately or in conjunction to create a richer evaluation of a CVE programme.

Chapter II: Key Points

- Good M&E systems are needed in order for CVE programmes to be implemented effectively, to ensure accountability, and to enhance the effectiveness of successor programmes.
- Establishing what should be evaluated and setting clear targets are crucial steps in developing well-defined indicators for the programme, which tell us whether or not it has been a success, and what factors did or did not contribute to this result.
- An ideal evaluation framework incorporates quantitative and qualitative data and methods, taking into account the context, using proxies such as behaviours, and making the most of expert judgement.
- Different tools and methods are needed to combat the challenges of agency, attribution, measurement and benefit in evaluating CVE effectiveness.

III. EVALUATION: TYPES, TOOLS AND TECHNOLOGY

Overview: This chapter outlines key evaluation methodologies, tools and technologies to provide readers with a baseline understanding of what can help them in their work. The evaluation methodologies reflect key frameworks used in the public and NGO sectors, which practitioners may wish to consider in relation to measuring impact and effectiveness. The list of tools proposed is not exhaustive but are intended as a starting point.

3.1 Evaluation Types

3.1.1 Identifying the Right Type of Evaluation

Evaluations can be carried out at different levels of CVE programming. In a report from its symposium on measuring the effectiveness of CVE programming, the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC) recognises three levels based on whether the focus of the evaluation is on a particular project (a vertical evaluation); a policy theme or strategy – for example, CVE efforts through multiple agencies (a horizontal evaluation); or a broad range of programming that collectively contributes to CVE activities (a multidimensional evaluation).¹

1. Peter Romaniuk and Naureen Chowdhury Fink, *Evaluating Countering Violent Extremism Programming: Practice and Progress* (Washington, DC:

Evaluations can be designed to answer many questions on topics such as how the policy was delivered, what difference it made, whether it could be improved and whether the benefits justified the costs. Below we explore key evaluation types used in the literature, which help those undertaking the evaluation to address the question that is most pressing for them.

The principal two evaluation types (formative and summative) are described below, followed by the subset of evaluation types:

- **Formative evaluations** tend to be ongoing evaluations, examining programme delivery and quality of implementation. The evaluation itself acts as a learning experience and is intended as a basis for improvement, by identifying any weaknesses or obstacles to achieving the programme's objectives. Assessments typically examine factors such as the progress of participants towards achieving the intended outcome, the efficiency of processes and examples of good practice.
- **Summative evaluations** tend to be undertaken at a programme's closing stages, assessing a programme's level of success. The evaluation examines the outcomes of the programme and compares them to pre-existing standards or benchmarks. This type of evaluation also helps to determine whether the programme can be said to have caused the outcome, to estimate the relative costs associated with the project, and to ascertain whether the programme should be repeated or replicated.²

Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2013).

2. See Research Methods Knowledge Base, 'Introduction to Evaluation', 2006, <<http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/intreval.php>>, accessed 21 May 2014.

The choice of evaluation approach should be based on a consideration of a number of factors: a statement of the policy's underlying theory or logic; the stated objectives; and a consideration of how the policy was supposed to have an effect. Having a clear idea about the questions that need to be addressed and the required type of evaluation at an early stage helps to inform the design of the CVE project and the expertise required.

The most suitable form of evaluation primarily depends on the core question being asked. If it is broad in scope it would benefit from a process evaluation,³ whereas if it is geared towards finding specific measures then an impact evaluation⁴ would be more successful. The choice of evaluation approach will therefore depend on issues such as:

- How complex the relationship between the intervention and the intended outcome is and how important it is to control for other drivers influencing the achievement of this outcome. If control is important, this might point towards an impact evaluation approach. Simple relationships can often be investigated just as robustly by process evaluations. More complex relationships often require impact evaluation.
- The 'significance' of potential outcomes to overall policy objectives. More limited, intermediate outcomes might be more readily evaluated robustly, but might not give a close or direct measure of the benefits of the policy.
- How significant the intervention is in identifying changes to processes and practices. This affects the extent to which the

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3. Process evaluations measure the quality of a programme or policy's performance by analysing its activities and operations in order to identify strengths and weaknesses.
 4. Impact evaluations focus on outputs and assess both the intended and, ideally, unintended changes that can be attributed to a particular intervention, comparing the results to its original objectives.

intervention could be expected to generate sufficient effect to show up amid other factors and drivers. The distinction between projects, policies and programmes, strategy and 'best-practice' initiatives is relevant, since these can vary significantly in terms of how much they represent distinct and identifiable interventions. Best-practice audits usually involve process evaluation, whereas strategic policies benefit from impact evaluation.

Stakeholders noted that there are a number of strands to CVE work, and that it is important from the start to be clear about which aspects of a programme you are interested in evaluating. It is rarely possible to evaluate everything when resources are limited. Practitioners suggested that there is a need to prioritise in the following areas:

- The success of activities and organisations that have been funded and whether they offer value for money.
- How CVE activities have contributed to other agendas; for example, women's empowerment, educational outcomes and wider community safety.
- Providing policy-makers with evidence on what types of projects are effective and the resources required to support them.
- Providing practitioners with evidence on what works and what does not, and how they can best implement their projects or programmes.

It is important to provide project and programme teams with training on how to evaluate, and a toolkit with which to do so. They must be involved in evaluation design and have the skills to carry out evaluations of their programmes for learning and accountability reasons. Stakeholders also advised fostering the

creation of an evaluation hub to centralise this process in the design, development and implementation of the project.

When developing an evaluation culture, only long-term investment in people and skills has a substantive impact. In the short term, embedding evaluation into programme development from the beginning reminds policy-makers and practitioners of the importance of evaluation.

3.2 Evaluation Tools

This section examines several examples of tools that can be used to measure the effectiveness and impact of interventions. Each model has different strengths in demonstrating particular aspects of a programme, depending on the purpose and object of the evaluation. It is important to note from the outset that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' model of evaluation, and CVE programmes should use a typology of common models.

3.2.1 Logic Model

What is it?

A logic model uses visual illustration to show how a programme is expected to work to mitigate a problem, as shown in Figure 4. Logic models are widely used in the planning and design of new interventions, in the management and, increasingly, in the evaluation of interventions post implementation. There are a number of different types of logic models including those focusing on activities, outcomes and theories. In order to achieve this, logic mapping requires you to identify and describe a number of key elements of your intervention. These typically include:

- The issues being addressed and the context within which the intervention takes place.

- The inputs (resources and activities) required in order to achieve the intervention's objectives.
- Outputs (for example, target groups to be engaged, roads built and products developed).
- Outcomes (short- and medium-term results, such as changes in traffic flow levels and modal shifts).
- Impacts (long-term results such as a better quality of life, improved health, environmental benefits, and so forth).⁵

Figure 4: Example of a logic model.





Figure 5 is an example of a logic model for a crime prevention programme from Canada. It is a visual representation that links what the programme is funded to do (activities) with what the

5. Dione Hills, 'Logic Mapping: Hints and Tips', Tavistock Institute, London, October 2010, <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/3817/logicmapping.pdf>, accessed 21 May 2014.

Figure 5: Logic Model for the Crime-Prevention Programme.



programme produces (outputs) and what the programme intends to achieve (outcomes).⁶

How is it Used?

Logic models are widely used by government and non-government actors to demonstrate the causal relationship between investments, activities and outcomes of a particular programme. They do so by outlining a logical sequence of inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes and impacts.

What are the Advantages?

Logic models provide a clear framework and point of reference for participants to determine whether a programme is moving in the intended direction. They are useful for bringing together areas of planning, execution and evaluation under a shared approach.

What are the Disadvantages?

Although logic models can illustrate a logical pathway of events towards expected outcomes and impact, this does not necessarily end up being the case, especially if the intended outcomes are too ambitious. Thus, logic models are helpful for explaining intentions, but may not address the reality on the ground to the same degree of clarity. Logic models for CVE evaluation fall short when they become over-complicated and do not reveal resource use, reach or support other 'oversight' requirements. Finally, logic models are limited in providing robust evaluations in the short term and are best suited to long-term evaluations; this has limitations for evaluations intended for ministers who would

6. There are more details of this evaluation in Public Safety Canada, '2012-2013 Evaluation of the Crime Prevention Program: Final Report', October 2013, <<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrccs/pblctns/2013-vltn-crm-prvntn-prgrm/index-eng.aspx>>, accessed 21 May 2014.

prefer to show deliverables in the relatively short timelines of government cycles.

3.2.2 Theory of Change

What is it?

Many evaluations of intervention programmes use theory of change (ToC). Definitions of ToC vary and it may be best to consider ToC as an approach rather than a methodology, in that its successful delivery requires harnessing a range of methodologies.

ToC and logic models are frequently used interchangeably but there are subtle differences (Figure 6). Logic models graphically illustrate programme components, and creating one helps stakeholders to clearly identify outcomes, inputs and activities. In contrast, ToC links outcomes and activities to explain *how* and *why* the desired change is expected to come about.⁷

The aim of ToC is to identify individual ‘interventions’ or changes that bring about specific outcome(s). This aim is often represented in a chart format that lays out all of the inputs, processes and outputs relevant to a programme.

Figure 6: Summary of Differences between Logic Models and ToC.

Logic Models	Theory of Change
Representation	Pathway of Change
List of Components	Critical Thinking
Descriptive	Explanatory

7. Helène Clark and Andrea A Anderson, *Theories of Change and Logic Models: Telling Them Apart* (Atlanta, GA: American Evaluation Association, 2004).

How is it Used?

ToC works essentially as a series of critical-thinking exercises that provide a comprehensive picture of the short- and medium-term changes in a given programme that are needed to reach its long-term goals. ToCs differ from other evaluation models by starting with the result or end vision and working backwards in order to identify the steps required to achieve the end result, and then find the indicators for each precondition which can be used to measure success.

In the CVE context, in its best-practice guide for local practitioners implementing CVE, the Tavistock Institute has endorsed ToC as providing a useful framework,⁸ while the UK Home Office considers it to be a useful approach for regional Prevent co-ordinators.

What are the Advantages?

ToC evaluations are specific, and break programmes down into measurable compartments in order to identify best practice. They are able to specify the individual requirements needed to bring about a certain result, and are quantifiable and useful to measure specific goals and targets.

ToC requires users to identify underlying assumptions, which can be tested and measured, and encourages participation through being a 'living' framework. It is highly useful for identifying and measuring the success of a general strategy, rather than of short-term goals. Developing and reviewing ToC helps to clarify purpose, understand results and derive lessons learned.

8. HM Government, *Evaluating Local PREVENT Projects and Programmes: Guidelines for Local Authorities and their Partners* (London: Department for Communities and Local Government, August 2009).

What are the Disadvantages?

ToC can be seen as overly progressive and simplistic in its emphasis on end results. It does not look at structural imbalances, problems encountered or negative inputs that affect the causal nature of a process. It can be seen as overly inclusive and complex in its incorporation of external factors. The method is often regarded as being of greater use to programme managers than to programme designers and implementers, who may prefer to use logic models as they attempt to depict programme components so that activities match outcomes.⁹

*3.2.3 Peer-Group Review**What is it?*

Peer-group review is a method using two or more project groups to review each others' projects or programming with the objective of learning from the experience of others. The idea is to provide a collective learning process based on the experiences of another group, with the aim of improving quality and identifying key strengths. The process is widely used in medical and academic communities and is gaining prominence in policy fields. Peer-group review has been undertaken in Denmark by provincial authorities and in the UK by local authorities.¹⁰ Both examples resulted in local bodies combining the best practice of the other.

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9. Further information on ToC and logic models is available from the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 'Theory-Based Approaches to Evaluation: Concepts and Practices', <<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/cee/tbae-aeat/tbae-aeatb-eng.asp>>, accessed 21 May 2014.
 10. Tavistock Institute, 'A Peer Review of the Prevent Programme', 2011, <<http://www.tavistockinstitute.org/projects/a-peer-review-of-the-prevent-programme/>>, accessed 21 May 2014.

Lessons from the Front Line: Kenya Transition Initiative and its CVE Programme

The evaluation of the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) programme offers a good example of employing ToC to undertake a CVE programme evaluation. The KTI programme was a pilot of the new USAID CVE concept, operating through flexible funding mechanisms that support individuals, organisations and networks, often with small grants implemented over a short duration. The approach of the study was to begin by examining the outcome and end result of the initiative, before outlining a series of questions to determine how and why this result was achieved. Specific questions asked by the study included the following:

- Were the key programme concepts such as 'extremism' and 'identity' suitably defined and understood?
- To what extent were local drivers of violent extremism understood before the project began? Was sufficient research undertaken?
- Were some identified 'pull' and 'push' factors more influential than others?
- Was this research consistent with the USAID Guide to Drivers report? Should other candidate 'pull' and 'push' factors have been the subject of research? Was the planned focus on 'pull' factors achieved?
- To what extent was the KTI goal statement suitable in light of the above drivers?
- To what extent was the KTI goal statement achieved?

- To what extent was the results framework suitable in light of the project goal? Were suitable 'pull' and 'push' factors targeted through the intermediate results?
- To what extent were the intermediate results achieved? To what extent did individual grants achieve their objectives?
- To what extent were grants suitable in light of the project's objectives and results framework?
- Did the grants target vulnerable, or the most vulnerable, individuals?
- Was the project as innovative as was expected? Was the programme suitably flexible to changing contexts and ongoing lessons learned?

The KTI programme advised the evaluator about the methodological approach. These methods included a review of the KTI and related documents, spanning the programme phases; a series of key informant interviews with KTI staff, grantees and other stakeholders; and a set of focus group discussions with grant beneficiaries and observations of grantees.

The research team collected substantial qualitative evidence that the KTI contributed to its CVE goal, and the subordinate intermediate results. Other key successes of the programme were the flexibility provided by the grant mechanism, and its intentional emphasis on countering the 'pull' factors that drive violent extremism.

Source: James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen, 'Qualitative Study on Countering Violent Extremism Programming under the KTI', USAID, 2014.

How is it Used?

Peer review is a deliberative process, where an arranged meeting of core groups leads to the exchange of information with peer groups, who provide a critical yet collaborative function. Reflection over approaches and experiences takes place between the peers, where a number of outsider participants are also able to make an input.

In meetings, the focus is on probing the group's different experiences to identify strengths and weaknesses. An agreed set of themes is used to measure exactly what has been achieved among the individual groups in different areas. Through the collection of information via 'peers', a 'sense-making workshop' is then held to draw together all of the emerging strands of thinking.

What are the Advantages?

The peer-review process is ideal for identifying forms of best practice from a range of experiences. This is particularly valuable for CVE where various factors and differing environments can have an impact on identifying the causality behind any success or failure. The method is also useful for the cross-sectional evaluation of CVE programmes across local or state boundaries where the impact of decisions needs to be evaluated.

What are the Disadvantages?

The process is suited to programmes that have similar backgrounds. There is a risk of mirror-imaging by applying a 'one-case-fits-all' solution to a diverse and multifaceted problem. The method lacks in-depth study so often needs to be used in conjunction with another process such as ToC in order to gather background information and provide narratives to the groups involved. The method focuses on improving quality as opposed to overall results, so there is a risk of abstraction.

Lessons from the Front Line: Peer Review of CVE Activities in London and Lancashire, UK

During 2010–11, Tower Hamlets Council, the Lancashire Prevent Forum and the Local Government Group worked with a facilitator to create and conduct a Prevent peer-evaluation process, which consisted of a preparatory phase, three workshops and a dissemination event.

Preparatory phase: the initial phase involved developing local narratives to allow peers to begin articulating their local approach to delivering Prevent using a ToC framework. The exercise therefore entailed identifying the participating authorities' respective local contexts, the key assumptions on which the design of the programme was built, and their organisational capacity to handle CVE-related issues. The narratives also included the objectives that peers hoped to achieve and how.

Workshops: workshops involved senior stakeholders from the host local authority and police force, as well as peers from other areas. The sessions aimed to look in particular at the impact of the authorities' work in:

- Reducing the likelihood of individuals engaging in violent extremism.
- Contributing to the delivery of the national counter-terrorism agenda.
- Local partnerships between local authorities, the police, and statutory and community partners.

Peers worked in small groups. Within each of the three themes they explored their narratives in detail, testing assumptions and approaches, and where possible developing a simple ToC map, using it as an organising principle. The third and final session consisted

of a 'sense-making workshop', involving all peers. Stakeholders developed 'working hypotheses' on the basis of the learning and main themes that emerged from the discussions of the two workshops held in Tower Hamlets and Lancashire.

Impact: The participating authorities found the peer-review process to be a valuable experience. It provided the time and space for peers to be able to reflect on the CVE work undertaken to date in their own and partner authorities. These are some practical examples of how the peer-review process impacted peers' work:

- The challenging questions raised by peers enabled the authorities to think about new ways to strengthen information-sharing mechanisms.
- The process proved to be helpful in strengthening links and collective thinking, which fostered a positive group dynamic, built confidence and initiated a partnership-setting process.
- It allowed useful thinking to emerge around what the right balance is between a community-led and statutory-led approach to delivery.

3.2.4 Process Mapping

What is it?

Process mapping is a tool for graphically representing a series of tasks or activities that constitute a process.¹¹ It enables better understanding of the process examined, and identifies gaps, bottlenecks and other problems.

A process map in evaluation involves flowcharting inputs, processes and outputs in diagrammatic form in order to describe

11. Tom Ling and Lidia Villalba van Dijk (eds), 'Performance Audit Handbook: Routes to Effective Evaluation', RAND Europe, 2009, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR788.html>, accessed 21 May 2014.

the necessary tools, the range of required tasks and the key decisions to be made in bringing about a result. These can be used to identify structures, loops and actors that are essential to achieving outcomes.

How is it Used?

Having selected and recorded key processes, the next stage is to examine them critically and develop new processes where necessary. In many instances, the thoughts and discussions required to chart existing processes lead to easy identification of improvements. Analysing process maps in a structured way, known as critical examination, can identify process improvements. This basically involves the use of primary questions – what, how, when, where and who. Once established, creation of the new and improved process can begin. Figure 7 gives an example of process mapping.

What are the Advantages?

Flowcharting can be used to establish what is currently happening, how predictably and why. Process mapping can also measure how efficiently the process is working, and gather information to understand where waste and inefficiency exists. It is useful for developing new improved processes to reduce or eliminate inefficiency.

What are the Disadvantages?

Process mapping is weak at identifying assumptions and does not attribute specific goals towards a measurement of success. It is therefore unsuitable for measuring specific goals and outcomes of a process, but instead only identifies problematic areas.

Figure 7: An Example of Process Mapping.

	Description	Questions	Advantages	Disadvantages
Flowchart	Breaks down a process into sequential steps and decision points; depending on level of analysis, high-level, activity-level or task-level flowcharts are used	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What are the steps of the process? In which order do they occur? When are decisions taken? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Intuitive way of presenting a process, thus easy to conduct Provides a very good overview of a process Allows identification of redundant process steps 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Can become very tedious if high level of detail Requires very high level of process knowledge
Swimlane	Breaks down a process into sequential steps and decision points; highlights the role of different actors in a process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What are the steps of the process? In which order do they occur? When are decisions taken? Who is involved in the process? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Makes it easier to suggest the department which needs to make changes Allows identification of responsibilities Easy to produce when flowchart is already available 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> May lose focus on problematic tasks or decisions
Process Definition Chart	Focuses attention on the context of a process by looking at inputs and outputs, resources and controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What are the inputs of the process? What are the outputs of the process? What resources are needed? How is the process controlled? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Achieves breadth of subject matter, also discusses resources and constraints Includes information about resources and controls; integrates the context into the process 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Approach is less intuitive Difficult to pinpoint what is driving down value in a system

3.2.5 Cost–Benefit Analysis

What is it?

A cost–benefit analysis is a method for assessing the value of a project by comparing its costs to measures of its performance, or more generally to the value of benefits it produces. The analysis requires accurate cost data, as well as measures of performance in appropriate units and overall benefits. Cost–performance measurement is narrower in that it deals only with measures of performance as the basis for comparison.¹²

How is it Used?

Cost and performance data can be obtained from operational records, direct observation, surveys or group meetings at which those who perform the operations report and discuss costs and performance measures. Both one-time costs and ongoing costs should be included.¹³

What are the Advantages?

Cost–benefit analyses are an effective means to assess the value of a project or the value of the benefits it produces. Over both the short and longer term, such analyses can be used to determine whether or not the resources allocated to a programme are appropriate for achieving the intended outcome, as well as to determine the (primarily financial) implications of continued

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12. See ‘Appendix A: Tools for Identifying and Evaluating Options’, in Anthony Cresswell et al., ‘And Justice for All: Designing Your Business Case for Integrating Justice Information’, Center for Technology in Government, University at Albany, 2000.
 13. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, ‘Assessing Program Resource Utilization When Evaluating Federal Programs’, <<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/cee/pubs/ci5-qf5/ci5-qf5tb-eng.asp>>, accessed 21 May 2014.

implementation. They can also be used to identify key risks that may prevent the goals and objectives of the programme being reached.

Cost-benefit analyses are highly quantifiable and results can be interpreted without difficulty, allowing readers and analysts to see the benefits of a particular process easily.

What are the Disadvantages?

The method places too much emphasis on cost and overlooks the efficiency and overall impact of a programme, as many benefits may not come directly from the cost. It is therefore not entirely suitable for looking at processes in the short term.

3.2.6 Delphi Survey

What is it?

Delphi exercises are a structured way to collect large amounts of qualitative information from experts in fields relevant to the issue being examined. Delphi surveys use ranking, scoring and feedback to arrive at consensus on an issue or a set of issues. They can assist with anticipating problems in achieving outcomes and building consensus on the direction and purpose of a programme.

In its conventional, 'pencil and paper' form, the Delphi method involves issuing questionnaires to participants in which they are asked to rank a series of items (in order of importance, likelihood of occurrence, and so on) over a number of rounds, interspersed with feedback collection. The exercise can be conducted remotely; there is no requirement for participants to be brought together in one place.¹⁴

14. Ling and Villalba van Dijk (eds), 'Performance Audit Handbook'.

How is it Used?

Participants usually remain anonymous so as to protect the authority, personality and reputation of the individuals involved. This remains so until the production of the final report. The experts begin by answering questionnaires, which are then used by the facilitator to direct the survey and filter out any irrelevant information resulting from the experts' responses. Regular feedback on their own and each others' comments is provided by the experts to inform debate and prevent pre-held conceptions or groupthink. The areas of conflict are identified and deliberated until a consensus is reached. Figure 8 shows the steps taken in a Delphi survey.

What are the Advantages?

Typically used in business forecasting, this method allows scope for depth and rich descriptions of possible best outcomes. It enables incorporation of specialists in order to inform best practice. It also encourages feedback and all aspects of the process can be reviewed by participants.

In the context of performance evaluations, the Delphi method has a number of particularly advantageous features. First, it provides a structured means of collecting large bodies of qualitative and quantitative data in areas in which other forms of evidence may be thin on the ground. This can be particularly useful when scoping potential performance indicators in an unfamiliar setting. Second, by helping to bring participants towards consensus, it enables users to prioritise lists of possible evaluation options in a structured manner. This could be applied at both the early stages of a project, to identify key audit questions, and at the concluding stages, to help prioritise recommendations.

What are the Disadvantages?

The efficacy and impact of the process depends largely on the experts used in the process and the role of the facilitator in recording results. There are the usual risks of groupthink, consensus and confirmation bias, which can be mitigated by anonymity.

Figure 8: Example of steps taken in a Delphi survey.



3.2.7 SWOT Analysis

What is it?

SWOT analysis is a four-part system that aims to identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of a process (Figure 9). Strengths include characteristics of the project that give it an advantage over others. The weaknesses are characteristics that place the team at a disadvantage relative to others. Opportunities are elements that the project could exploit to its advantage. Threats are elements in the environment that could cause trouble for the project.

How is it Used?

A single quadrant chart can be used to note down ideas from a group; this process is useful because it operates in a uniform format. It involves specifying the objective of the business venture or project and identifying the internal and external factors that are favourable and unfavourable to achieving that objective.

What are the Advantages?

The process quickly and efficiently identifies both the positive and negative attributes of a programme and its scope for the future and improvement. As a method of analysis it also clearly distinguishes between internal (SW – strengths and weaknesses) and external (OT – opportunities and threats) factors. Unlike most processes of evaluation, it is not designed with the sole purpose of evaluating profit-making processes.

What are the Disadvantages?

It overlooks individual processes involved in bringing about change, and is unquantifiable. It can be seen as being geared

towards confirming the benefits of a particular process because it fails to identify other alternatives.

Figure 9: Example SWOT Analysis.

	Helpful to Programme Outcome	Harmful to Programme Outcome
Internal Factors (Organisational Attributes)	Strengths	Weaknesses
External Factors (Environmental Attributes)	Opportunities	Threats

3.2.8 Contribution Analysis

What is it?

Contribution analysis is an approach for assessing causal questions and inferring causality in real-life programme evaluations; it does not allow for comprehensive evaluation. It offers a step-by-step approach designed to help managers, researchers and policy-makers arrive at conclusions about the contribution their programme has made (or is currently making) to particular outcomes (see the example in Figure 10). The essential value of contribution analysis is that it offers an approach designed to reduce uncertainty about the contribution the intervention is making to the observed results through an increased understanding of why the observed results have occurred (or not) and the roles played by the intervention and other internal and external factors.¹⁵

15. See Better Evaluation, 'Contribution Analysis', <http://betterevaluation.org/plan/approach/contribution_analysis>, accessed 22 May 2014.

What are the Advantages?

Contribution stories are beneficial to programmes that have a detailed ToC and a well-defined direction. Alongside ToC, a contribution analysis can provide evidence and a line of reasoning demonstrating that the programme has made a significant contribution towards the desired result. There are six steps to this method:

- **Set out the attribution problem:** determine the specific questions being addressed, such as 'Has the programme caused the outcome?'
- **Develop a ToC and the risks to it:** develop the programme logic and results chain describing how the programme is supposed to work. Identify the main external factors at play that might account for the outcomes observed.
- **Gather existing evidence on the ToC:** use existing evidence – such as from past related evaluations or research, and from previous monitoring – to test the ToC.
- **Assemble and assess the contribution analysis, and challenges to it:** you will then be able to determine if it is reasonable to assume that the actions of the programme have contributed to the observed outcomes.
- **Seek out more evidence:** having identified where the contribution analysis is less credible, gather additional evidence to augment the analysis based on the results that have occurred.
- **Revise and strengthen the contribution story:** you should now be able to build a more substantive and thus more credible analysis, one that a reasonable person will be more likely to agree with.

What are the Disadvantages?

Contribution analysis is not an approach for comprehensive evaluation.

Figure 10: An example of a contribution analysis.




Figure 11: Summary of Evaluation Tools and their Uses.

Evaluation Tool	Advantages	Disadvantages	Use to...
Logic Model	Provides clear point of reference for participants on programme performance	Often over-complicated and does not clearly illustrate problems encountered	Demonstrate a causal relationship between investments, activities and outcomes
Theory of Change	Evaluations are specific and break programmes down into measurable compartments	Overlooks negative inputs, problems encountered and structural imbalances that affect the causal nature of a process	Measure the success of a general strategy over short-term goals
Peer-Group Review	Ideal for identifying best practice, especially across different sectors and regions	May not take into account local contexts or impose a basic solution for a complex problem	Improve quality of programme rather than achieve overall results
Process Mapping	Measures efficiency of programme and where waste or inefficiency exists	Unsuitable for measuring specific goals and outcomes, identifying only problem areas	Identify structures, loops and actors essential to achieving outcomes
Cost-Benefit Analysis	Results can be easily interpreted and risks easily identified	Overlooks the impact of programme and benefit of short-term processes	Assess the value of a project or the value of the benefits it produces
Delphi Survey	Can generate large bodies of data, encourages feedback and identifies priorities	Can have low efficacy; risks of 'groupthink', consensus and confirmation bias	Anticipate problems and build consensus on direction and purpose of programme
SWOT Analysis	Quickly and efficiently identifies positive programme attributes and scope for improvement	Unquantifiable; overlooks individual processes and fails to identify alternatives	Identify the internal and external factors in achieving the programme's objective
Contribution Analysis	Provides evidence and line of reasoning showing the extent of programme input towards the desired result	Cannot be used for comprehensive evaluation	Assess the contribution the intervention is making to observed results

3.3 Online Technologies

Using technology for M&E has increased in importance in recent years following a rise in the use of such media by large parts of the population globally. Authorities and local NGO actors can use new technology – such as social media – as part of the CVE programme-evaluation toolbox. For example, the US Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications aims to reduce radicalisation and extremist violence online by identifying in a timely manner extremist propaganda on the Internet and responding swiftly with counter-narratives. It has put in place diagnostic, Internet-based tools to support it in monitoring its effectiveness.

Social-media platforms can be used to disseminate counter-narratives to violent extremist beliefs online either through engaging in debate, sharing pictures and videos, or simply forming online communities opposed to violent extremism.¹⁶ Use of such platforms presents those evaluating projects with potential tools to record Internet traffic or understand impact through measures such as ‘retweets’.

The work carried out by researchers at the UK-based International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence is a further example of the use of social-media analysis to measure influence and impact.¹⁷ Specific methodologies include the monitoring and analysis of Twitter accounts and postings through:

- Examining links and ‘hashtags’ tweeted by users.
- Analysing the followers of anarchist accounts.

16. See, for example, the work of the Demos Centre for the Analysis of Social Media, <<http://www.demos.co.uk/projects/casm>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

17. See, for example, J M Berger and Bill Strathearn, ‘Who Matters Online: Measuring Influence, Evaluating Content and Countering Violent Extremism in Online Social Networks’, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, King’s College London, March 2013.

- Conducting a ‘gross impressions’ analysis, which counts the number of times tweets from a user have appeared in other users’ timelines.¹⁸

Lessons from the Front Line: Using Facebook ‘Likes’

Other examples where online social media has been used in this way include EXIT-Deutschland’s use of the Internet to spread information about the success of the Trojan T-shirt campaign. The CVE group disseminated T-shirts at a neo-Nazi convention bearing a far-right slogan that washed off to reveal the slogan ‘If your T-shirt can do it, so can you’. The use of YouTube, Twitter and Facebook to share the impact of the event not only increased the number of voluntary participants joining the CVE programme, but also spread awareness of the growing far-right movement in Germany. CVE programmes and police authorities can use social media to inform the public and gain support, ‘followers’ or ‘likes’ for activities similar to EXIT-Deutschland’s ideas around branding.

3.3.1 Advancing Data Collection

Other uses of technology to aid CVE efforts include the use of software to monitor and respond to potential violent acts being planned online.¹⁹ Advances in computer technology

18. See, for example, Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Shiraz Maher and James Sheehan, ‘Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy’, International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, King’s College London, 2012.

19. Todd C Helmus, Erin York and Peter Chalk, *Promoting Online Voices for Countering Violent Extremism* (Cambridge: RAND Corporation, 2013), <<https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/245/promoting-online-voices-for-countering-violent-extremism>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

have created the opportunity to store vast quantities of data previously unimaginable to earlier computer models. Also, advances in software and analytical capabilities have created new opportunities to input and process criminal data. Areas for application include geo-mapping of crime trends, monitoring online media, facial recognition technology used to analyse individual movements, and test-simulations of group behaviour.

Another area of advance in data collection is the use of data to identify crime hotspots, before cross-referencing the results with those of similar regions in order to test best practice. Some of these practices are in early stages of progress and require further development. New technology also enables the capacity to 'data mine' (for example, information gathered from online chat rooms) simultaneously across a broader spectrum of social-media platforms, crime databases and historical reports, and then to analyse all data rapidly. Gathering the right amount of data is crucial for sampling and conducting effective analysis.

3.3.2 CVE in the Local Community

Online technology has created a window of opportunity to improve the relationship between members of the public and law enforcement and help to build trust.²⁰ For example, many police forces and local authorities use Twitter to describe local issues, to outline initiatives to counter extremism, and to build up a relationship with community residents. Such use of media establishes trust and improves public confidence.

Online surveys can provide an efficient way of collecting information from different stakeholder groups, anonymously if

20. United Nations, *The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes* (New York, NY: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012), <http://www.unodc.org/documents/frontpage/Use_of_Internet_for_Terrorist_Purposes.pdf>, accessed 22 May 2014.

necessary. Best results are achieved if the evaluators and those implementing the online survey collaborate in developing the survey from an early stage. Online surveys:

- Can be used to target specific stakeholder groups.
- Are widely used in the public and private sectors, and local communities may therefore feel 'comfortable' with them.
- Need to be carefully designed through a partnership between the researchers and web-survey implementers.

Defining Online Surveys

Online tools have become an extremely cost-effective method of conducting fieldwork for scientific and policy research and evaluation. Tools include web-surveys, opinion surveys, stated-preference surveys, online exercises and more open-ended forms of e-consultations.²¹

In the consumer area, these tools are frequently used by market-research companies to study likely markets for certain products and services through opinion surveys or general omnibus studies. Although it is difficult to characterise from a theoretical point of view, various types of stakeholder may be considered as relevant targets for this form of evidence gathering. For example:

- Civil servants and members of administrative departments.
- Members of local communities.
- Experts.
- Academics.
- Civil society stakeholders.

When to Use Online Surveys

In the policy-evaluation context, online survey tools are especially useful for gathering the honest views of experts, implementers

21. Ling and Villalba van Dijk (eds), 'Performance Audit Handbook'.

and programme participants, as respondents may feel that they are talking to a computer rather than a person. The successful use of online data-gathering techniques is a compromise among a number of factors, as are many methodologies.

The main consideration is that of understanding the implications of more complex instruments, given the specificities of using more traditional forms of data collection. Online surveys are particularly suitable in the following circumstances:

- **When the boundaries and characteristics of a topic or subject can be easily determined in advance:** it should be easier for those developing the survey instrument to identify questions with clear alternative answers, such as 'important/not important' or 'agree/disagree', thereby permitting extensive question sets. This method is particularly useful when trying to simplify questions that could be answered qualitatively (for example, 'What do you think about...?') so that they are presented quantitatively (for instance, 'Please indicate the extent to which you agree/disagree with the following...').
- **When there is a large or unbounded sample:** online survey tools may be appropriate when considerations of robustness of sample size to population are of lesser importance.
- **When fast turnaround is necessary:** surveys can be developed extremely quickly, especially when an existing survey platform is established. Furthermore, some tools permit automated data extraction.
- **When budget is limited:** online tools may be a cost-effective alternative to more expensive forms of data collection (such as via telephone surveys), as they are relatively cheap to implement.

Chapter III: Key Points

- Formative evaluations strengthen or improve the object being evaluated; summative evaluations examine the effects or outcomes of the object.
- The choice of evaluation approach should be based on the policy's underlying theory or logic, the stated objectives, and a consideration of how the policy is supposed to have an effect.
- It is important to provide programme teams with training and a toolkit on how to monitor and evaluate their activities.
- Each evaluation tool has advantages and disadvantages, and should be chosen on the basis of the purpose of the evaluation.
- Online technologies can increase the reach of CVE programmes into local communities, and make a significant contribution to M&E through advanced data collection and online surveys.

IV. LEARNING FROM OTHER FIELDS

Overview: This chapter addresses what can be learned about evaluation from other social-policy fields: crime prevention, gang prevention, overseas development and peace-building.

CVE is not the only policy area that encounters challenges in policy and programme evaluation. In this chapter, we examine evaluation practices in the criminal-justice and overseas-development sectors. While these fields are very different from CVE, their evaluation systems are more mature and elements of their programmes can help to inform the approaches and methodologies used in CVE evaluation. The aim is to identify instances of good practice and lessons that can be applied to future CVE programmes.

4.1 The Criminal-Justice Sector

4.1.1 *Crime Prevention*

One of the most useful areas to examine for comparative purposes in CVE evaluation is crime prevention. CVE programmes can look to crime-prevention programmes as a key source of experience and best practice as the two fields face similar challenges. There is already a broad body of literature on the M&E of crime-prevention programmes (or lack thereof) and the challenges in

carrying out M&E in this field. These programmes are generally community-based; while this is not always the case for CVE, there are countries that incorporate a strong community presence in carrying out CVE activities.

As with crime-prevention evaluation models, effective models of evaluation for CVE need to be able to address the following issues:

- The causal links between a programme's assumptions and the outcomes desired: are CVE programmes based on a sound theoretical underpinning? Do community-based programmes reduce the incidence of radicalisation? Do they have other unintended impacts?
- The effectiveness of the processes involved in implementing the programmes: who should be funded? How and to what level? Who should drive the programmes? How can agencies best work together? Understanding what happens and why in a programme can determine why particular objectives were or were not achieved.¹
- The effectiveness of individual initiatives: how successful are different approaches? Which are most successful? Why? What long-term effects do they have on prevention? How appropriate are they to different contexts?
- The contribution of initiatives to wider community goals: health and wellbeing of the community and the government policy objectives of a 'safer community'.
- The cost-benefit of individual community-based initiatives and an overall assessment of a programme's multiple initiatives.²

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1. John M Owen and Patricia J Rogers, *Program Evaluation: Forms and Approaches* (St Leonards, Australia: Sage, 1999).
 2. Anona Armstrong and Ronald Francis, 'Difficulties in Evaluating Crime Prevention Programmes: What Are Some Lessons for Evaluators and

Overarching Lessons Learned in Crime Prevention

In order to develop models of evaluation that take into account longer-term results:

- Evaluations should not be limited to measuring outputs or even outcomes, but examine the underlying assumptions on which programmes are based.
- Evaluations should not be undertaken on an ad hoc basis once every few years, because there is no basis for comparative evaluation of the value of alternatives.
- The most useful evaluations are those that are planned and receive support from all involved.
- M&E should be built into the planning phase of each programme, not added on at the end.
- Indicators to measure outcomes should be agreed on by the stakeholders, as should be commitment to data-gathering.
- The evaluation designs need to take account of milestones and steps that signify progress towards achievement of goals and objectives.
- The designs also need to be flexible – should progress evaluations indicate a need for change, so too should the target of the evaluation change.
- Evaluations need to be both internal and external.
- The internal evaluations should focus on monitoring the key indicators and maintaining the documentation that will give substance to an external evaluation.
- External evaluations should meet the need for summative and formative purposes, for the assessment of efficiency, effectiveness and quality.

It is noted that there is no 'one-size-fits-all' model of evaluation for crime-prevention programmes; instead, a typology of common models is used. Many evaluation models in crime prevention, as with CVE, fall prey to the need for government departments to assess the narrow questions that policy planners need to answer – the implementation of the programme and achievement of specified outputs. Few models attempt to achieve any kind of examination of long-term programme results (which are important when evaluating CVE).

NCPC Programmes: Evaluation Planning of Crime-Prevention Programmes


Canada's National Crime Prevention Centre (NCPC) provides national leadership on effective and cost-effective ways to prevent and reduce crime by intervening on the risk factors before crime happens.³

The NCPC views evaluation as contributing in a variety of ways, including providing accountability and strategic structure, benchmarking, supporting results, and feeding into best practice and effective interventions in crime prevention. Evaluating crime-prevention programmes requires setting realistic outcomes to measure. The impact of a programme may not be visible for several years, therefore setting short- and medium-term outcomes to measure is important to determine whether the programme is on track to achieve its goals.⁴

Community-Based Programs', paper presented at the Evaluation in Crime and Justice: Trends and Methods conference, Canberra, 24–25 March 2003, <http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/conferences/evaluation/francis.pdf>, accessed 22 May 2014.

3. Public Safety Canada, 'Project Planning and Evaluation', <http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/crm-prvntn/tls-rsrcs/prjct-plnng-eng.aspx>, accessed 22 May 2014.

4. *Ibid.*

Figure 12: Project Lifecycle.

Source: Public Safety Canada, 'Project Planning and Evaluation', <<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/cntrng-crm/crm-prvntn/tls-rsrcs/prjct-plnng-eng.aspx>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

4.1.2 Gang Prevention: Evaluation in Practice

The NCPC funded the Gang Prevention Strategy (GPS) between April 2007 and March 2011. The programme was implemented by Living Rock Ministries (a non-profit Christian organisation) in the Hamilton area, near Toronto; it targeted people aged between thirteen and twenty-five who were deemed either to be at risk of gang involvement or to be already involved in it. The programme aimed to:

- Increase awareness of the consequences of gang involvement.
- Encourage youths to adopt a less positive attitude toward gangs.
- Increase motivation to participate in pro-social behaviours.
- Decrease risk factors that contribute to interest in gang activity.
- Increase protective factors that contribute to youth's interest in pro-social activity.

The programme aimed to achieve these results by assigning each participant a coach with whom they have regular sessions, and participation in a range of programme activities. The programme recruited participants through outreach, financial incentives and word of mouth; they were then required to complete a quiz to determine eligibility. Of the group of applicants, 230 were considered eligible, but 10 per cent were not interested and 3 per cent did not provide consent. Ultimately, 201 carried on to participate in the programme.

There were high drop-out rates (43 per cent) for various reasons including moving location of residence, incarceration and full-time employment. Only eighty-six youths completed

the six-month programme. Similar issues can be expected in CVE programmes.⁵

Evaluation of GPS

Initially a quasi-experimental design⁶ was chosen to evaluate the GPS programme. 'Pre' and 'post' surveys were planned for the treatment and comparison groups but as a comparison group could not be established, the design was changed to a single group (repeated measure) design.

The methodology involved comparing pre-surveys with post-surveys, which were conducted six months after the end of treatment through the programme. Those participants who were still available received follow-up surveys every six months. Availability of participants after a programme is a major challenge that occurs in evaluating the impact of both crime prevention and CVE work.

The evaluation consisted of quantitative and qualitative data. Evaluators collected qualitative survey, quiz and interview responses, and quantitative data gathered through ongoing programme monitoring on case management, programme activities, youth-crime statistics and other hard numerical evidence. They then compared sample groups in order to understand the differences between subset groups in terms of risk levels and 'dosage' (hours spent with coaches and in programme activities, with 242 hours of case management

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5. Public Safety Canada, *Gang Prevention Strategy: Building the Evidence – Evaluation Summaries*, 2012-ES-23 (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2014), <<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcls/pblctns/gng-prvntn-strtgyl/index-eng.aspx>>, accessed 22 May 2014.
 6. A 'quasi-experiment' can be defined as a study to estimate the causal impact of an intervention on its target population; unlike 'true' experiments, quasi-experimental design features a controlled, rather than a random, process of sampling.

deemed to be the threshold between 'low' and 'high' dosage). As is common, qualitative data was used to support and provide depth to quantitative results.⁷

Evaluation Findings

There were numerous implementation challenges that CVE programmes can and should learn from, including:

- Issues over inconsistent data entry.
- Data collection.
- Quality of training.

The programme was originally designed to target only those at risk of becoming involved in gangs. However, during the course of the programme some youths who were already involved in gangs began to participate, and coaches felt unprepared to deal with these higher-risk participants during the early stages. The possibility of similar situations occurring in a CVE programme is high, as a programme may be designed to target those at risk of radicalisation but attract those who are already radicalised. Preparing for these eventualities is important.

Developing accurate risk factors relevant to youth in the Hamilton area was a further challenge. That said, determining unique and individual risk factors is less important than determining whether the risk factor identified is evidence-based.⁸

Evaluation Limitations

Many of the limitations of evaluation are shared between CVE and crime and gang prevention. These include the lack of a control group, small sample size, inconsistencies of data and

7. Public Safety Canada, *Gang Prevention Strategy*.

8. *Ibid.*

reporting bias. In particular, the lack of a comparison group makes programme causality-attribution challenging and therefore positive results relating to gang involvement cannot definitively be attributed to the programme.

Relatively low numbers of participants are available to complete post-surveys, which limits quantitative insight and understanding into programme effectiveness. The recording and collection of data is always a challenge, and relationships between participants and programme officers are likely to result in interviewer bias. An awareness of these limitations is necessary, and a number of tests to deal with low participant numbers and to determine statistical significance can be found in the evaluation literature.⁹

4.2 Peace-Building and Overseas Development

4.2.1 *Evaluation in Peace-Building*

Evaluating peace-building and conflict-resolution programmes is similar to CVE evaluation in that there are very few formalised procedures or methods to refer to. Similarly, it is also difficult to ascertain which factors have contributed to the improvement or deterioration of a situation when evaluating. However, the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) methodology¹⁰ from this area is a useful and relevant source for those engaging in CVE evaluation and monitoring.

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9. For guidance on the principles of statistical significance, see Creative Research Systems, 'Significance in Statistics and Surveys', <<http://www.surveysystem.com/signif.htm>>, accessed 22 May 2014; StatPac, 'Statistical Significance', <<http://www.statpac.com/surveys/statistical-significance.htm>>, accessed 22 May 2014.
 10. Mark Hoffman, 'Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Methodology', Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin, 2004.

Evaluating peace-building initiatives in situations defined by conflict requires a flexible, case-by-case approach according to what the specific scenario allows for and restricts. The PCIA approach looks beyond questions of success or failure of the intended outputs, outcomes, goals and objectives, and considers a broader base for assessment.

For instance, when trying to determine the impact – negative and positive, direct or indirect, and intentional or not – of a particular peace-building or conflict-resolution project, the PCIA approach will analyse a wide spectrum of criteria to gauge project impact: the institutional capacity to manage or resolve violent conflict and to promote tolerance and build peace; military and human security; political structures and processes; economic structures and processes; and social reconstruction and empowerment.

When measuring the impact of CVE interventions, therefore, the PCIA approach teaches us to take into consideration broader social, political and economic factors that may have an influence on the planned programme or initiative.

4.2.2 Overseas Development

There are many lessons that evaluators of CVE can learn from overseas evaluation of development projects. The overseas development sector has developed tools to monitor complex interventions more effectively. Moreover, the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) standards have motivated those in the sector to reflect on the importance of evaluation and to ensure evaluations ask the right questions of the right people.

DAC guidelines also note that providing training to local partners on evaluation methodologies and techniques is a necessary part of ensuring accurate data. If the data-collection process is outsourced to local partners, evaluators need to have

confidence in the data collected; training therefore supports the accuracy of fieldwork and empowers local partners. Embedding evaluation into the project or programme from the beginning is also key to adjusting the programme, as lessons are learned and processes develop.¹¹

USAID's evaluation of CVE projects in East and West Africa provides a useful example of how to embed evaluation into projects from the outset, as outlined in the box below.¹²

USAID's Evaluation of a CVE Project in East and West Africa

USAID's work on CVE overseas provides an excellent case study to assess the use of evaluation methods and distil best practice. USAID developed CVE programmes in East and West Africa, which used a risk assessment for violent extremism to help identify key drivers, before then working with local partners to identify at-risk populations around which to focus their programme activities. The programme had a multilayered approach, promoting non-violence, training for community leaders and community engagement. USAID conducted mid-term evaluations of their CVE programmes in West Africa (in 2011) and East Africa (in 2013) using a mixed-method approach incorporating quantitative and qualitative methods.

The quantitative part of the evaluation involved the use of a fifteen-question survey looking at predetermined drivers of violent extremism. The survey was given to the treatment group and a comparison group in order to compare results. During analysis of the data, it was found that the programme had a more significant impact on correlated indicators such as civic engagement than

11. *Ibid.*

12. USAID, 'Evaluating USAID's CVE Projects in East and West Africa Methodologies and Best Practices June 2013.

priority indicators such as opposition to violence.

Lessons learned in carrying out the survey including the training of local partners and data collectors (as above) and the importance of local language skills. Of high importance was the identification of comparison clusters. In West Africa, the clusters were chosen where there had been 'minimum' programme activity – however, a result of the programme was regional radio outreach, and so therefore no cluster was completely untouched by programming. In East Africa, the evaluation identified three different groups. The first included training-programme graduates; the second, those who entered the programme but did not complete it fully; and the third, those who had no contact with USAID programmes at all. The distinction between those who completed the programme and those who did not is important to note when conducting an impact assessment based on an individual's experience.

The qualitative aspects of the evaluation included desk reviews, key-informant interviews and focus groups. The qualitative work was used to verify the findings of the survey and add credibility to the final results. The use of qualitative methods in combination with the survey also allowed for greater depth and understanding of survey responses.

For example, the focus groups uncovered drivers of conflict unrelated to violent extremism and demonstrated the influence that current news stories have on perceptions, which work to influence the survey responses of participants in this context. Taking into account external causal factors, considering demographics, and ensuring accurate knowledge of cultural and political norms within a community is essential when carrying out a study that should be controlled for; it and is also essential to fully understand results.

When evaluating CVE, we need to keep in mind what can be measured with any credible level of accuracy. For example, it is nearly impossible to measure how many individuals did not join or support a terrorist group solely as a result of a programme intervention, as the programme does not target those who are so far along the process of radicalisation that this could be identified. However, the individual or community perceptions of key drivers to violent extremism can be measured, such as community engagement and economic opportunities. Identifying the right indicators is one of the most important steps in developing a CVE programme and accurately evaluating its impact.

Chapter IV: Key Points

- Crime prevention is a more mature field where lessons can be learned and applied to CVE, particularly in relation to community-based programmes.
- Challenges relating to inconsistent data entry, data collection and quality of training have been identified from gang-prevention programmes that should be considered for CVE.
- Evaluating peace-building and conflict-resolution programmes is similar to CVE in that both require a flexible, case-by-case approach.
- Analysing the lessons of overseas-development evaluation can help CVE evaluators to learn lessons about providing training and embedding evaluation into programmes from the very beginning.

V. LEARNING FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Overview: In this chapter, we briefly outline a number of different CVE programmes in a selection of GCTF states, in order to provide policy-makers and practitioners with a sense of the current state of play and a ready reference. While CVE initiatives within many of these countries are in their early stages, important lessons can be drawn from these examples.

As demonstrated by the evolution of CVE policies and strategies outlined in Chapter I, many countries are beginning to focus on CVE programming and initiatives. Many of these efforts are still in their early stages and attempts to evaluate them have been limited. Nonetheless, instances of good practice are identifiable in many countries' experiences and there are important early lessons that can be adapted for future programmes.

5.1 Canada

Canada's 2012 counter-terrorism strategy, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism*, was the country's first such strategy.¹ It focuses on four areas to deter the terrorist threat: preventing people from becoming involved in terrorism; detecting and investigating those involved in terrorist operations; denying

1. Government of Canada, *Building Resilience Against Terrorism*.

terrorists the means to pursue terrorist activities; and responding effectively to any attacks that occur. Canadian government efforts on CVE are multipronged and cut across the counter-terrorism strategy's framework. The government approach aims to address social aspects of radical violence and security aspects of violent extremism. Most initiatives to date have focused on the challenging area of prevention.

For example, public engagement activities led by the Canadian government aim to develop mutual trust and understanding with the numerous communities it serves in order to address local concerns. Specific programming related to building awareness and providing education to address the threat of radicalisation to violence is conducted in partnership with various influencers, including NGOs and community leaders.

Both programmes have an evaluative component with the RCMP, in partnership with the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, developing a model for determining a pathway of community engagement. The RCMP's review of its community-engagement strategy and its collaboration with the IACP on a set of core CVE community-engagement principles² signal Canada's focus on understanding how evaluation can be applied effectively. The RCMP's approach is simple (but rigorous), which can be helpful for practitioners on the ground to understand how successful they have been in their community-outreach efforts.

2. International Association of Chiefs of Police CVE Working Group, 'Community Outreach and Engagement Principles', August 2012, <http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/IACP-COT_CommPolicingPrinciples_FINALAug12.pdf>, accessed 22 May 2014.

5.2 Denmark

Denmark has a longstanding programme in CVE focused on supporting local governments and actors in preventing and acting on radicalisation and extremism through the following strands of activity: counselling; supplementary training – both intensive and short introductory presentations; tools and methods for practitioners; and information material (for example the Handbook Series in CVE³).

Evaluating Intervention Programmes in Denmark

Practitioners in Denmark have made significant effort to evaluate their CVE programming, particularly on interventions targeted at individuals who were deemed to be vulnerable to radicalisation. These are their key lessons:

- **Data validation:** ask the participants as well as the professionals in order to get a more complete picture.
- **Engage:** ask the participants as soon as possible after the intervention – try to integrate a concise questionnaire into the effort.
- **Repeated engagement:** continue evaluation after the effort, making this an iterated, repeatable process if possible.

Additionally, Denmark has sought to integrate an awareness and preventive effort in its general crime-prevention activities and social-welfare system, and considers CVE a preventive, social agenda, rather than a security agenda.

Evaluation experts in CVE from Denmark have highlighted to practitioners the importance of evaluation, using a 'hierarchy of

3. See Danish Ministry of Children, Gender Equality, Integration and Social Affairs website, <<http://sm.dk/en/responsibilities/integration-and-democracy/preventing-extremism/the-booklet-series-2018preventing-extremism2019>>

evidence'. Usefully, this hierarchy not only noted what evidence is desirable, but also acknowledged the difficulties of obtaining such information.

5.3 Germany

The German government has funded a range of programmes for fighting and preventing right-wing extremism, including various de-radicalisation programmes. Principal among these is EXIT-Deutschland, an NGO undertaking CVE work.⁴ For each individual case, EXIT aims to identify the appropriate form of intervention.

EXIT is a good example of the importance of considering the proportionality required for an evaluation. The organisation has a 'networked' nature and little contact with its clients, so an overly systematic evaluation may not capture the positive outcomes that are being generated over an extended period.

For example, a mid-term evaluation of EXIT's activities by the German government suggested that although there are higher drop-out rates in EXIT-Deutschland (because its interventions are voluntary), there was a considerable rate of overall success in de-radicalising participants. EXIT was judged to be rigorous and effective.

EXIT feedback on the evaluation process was that evaluation in the NGO context (and in dealing with right-wing extremists) could be challenging for three reasons:

- NGOs have inadequate resources to support the evaluation process.
- Building trust between clients and EXIT staff takes time.
- The process of de-radicalisation is not linear.

4. See EXIT-Deutschland's website, <http://www.exit-deutschland.de/>.

5.4 Norway

CVE policy is undergoing significant change in Norway in the wake of the July 2011 terrorist attack by Anders Behring Breivik.⁵ The model of CVE activity has been established in many Norwegian municipalities drawing on existing, co-ordinated local services in crime-prevention activity.

Parental Network Groups in Norway

One example of an evaluation in Norway at the project level is a parental-network group, which has successfully intervened to help youth disengage from neo-Nazi and other racist groups. Between 1995 and mid-2000, some 130 parents of 100 youths participated in parental-network groups targeting disengagement. By the end of that period, 90 per cent of the youths were no longer involved in a right-wing group. An evaluation of the project found that 'parental involvement played a decisive role in many cases, although numerous other factors were also important in the decision to leave the group'.*

*. Hilgunn Olsen, 'Å være foreldre til en nynazist [To Be Parents of a Neo-Nazi]', Department of Criminology, Oslo, 2001. The original Norwegian version of the report is available at <<https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/22529/2983.pdf?sequence=1>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

Local authorities and local police management have established police councils for co-operation and co-ordination of local crime-prevention measures, a local-authority model that brings together those public authorities, professional groups and

5. On 22 July 2011, Breivik bombed government buildings in Oslo, killing eight people, before shooting sixty-nine people at a Workers' Youth League camp on the island of Utoya.

voluntary organisations working together. The model provides arenas for various parties to meet and exchange information and assessments – increasing knowledge on crime prevention and providing the opportunity to co-ordinate measures in different sectors that can positively strengthen each other. Knowledge-based crime prevention, early intervention, and strengthened and co-ordinated local crime prevention work are key elements in the Norwegian approach.⁶

5.5 Sweden

The Swedish CVE strategy emphasises involving all of society in efforts to prevent the types of radicalisation signalled by increased interest in terrorist activities or violent tendencies, especially measures that target and research ‘the breeding grounds of terrorism’.⁷ It includes initiatives to overcome exclusion (local causes of grievance) by promoting an integration policy and democracy. It espouses the wider use of dialogue as a means of creating more opportunities for representatives of civil society to give their views of threat pictures and possible measures.

The strategy highlights the need for closer study of possible ways to provide support to individuals who want to leave extremist, violence-promoting environments. The country has significant experience in dealing with white-power groups, and it is clear that the state recognises that similar (but bespoke)

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6. See Politiet, ‘National Crime Prevention Policies’, <http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Evenements/10th_ICPC_Colloquium/Proceedings/Ingvild_Hoel.pdf>, accessed 22 May 2014.
 7. Qatar International Academy for Security Studies, ‘Countering Violent Extremism: Community Engagement in Programmes in Europe: Phase 2, Vol. I’, February 2012, p. 25, <<http://www.niacro.co.uk/filestore/documents/Countering%20Violent%20Extremism-%20QIASS-%202012.pdf>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

programmes may have merit in preventing or disrupting other types of terrorism.⁸

The Swedish authorities have endorsed (and funded) a number of community-based CVE programmes. These include the project Fryshuset and the group Swedish Muslims for Peace and Justice. Encouraged by state agencies, these organisations are attempting to counter narratives that might draw vulnerable individuals into violent extremism, and provide support to those trying to leave extremist organisations.

Sweden's EXIT programme was established in 1998 to offer a way out for members of white-supremacist groups. The Swedish programme rests on the notion that people do not become members of the groups through ideology, but because they feel socially excluded, lack acceptance, and have a strong desire to acquire power, status and identity. The programme has a strong psychological focus and is very therapy-oriented, including a range of cognitive and behavioural techniques in order to help integrate those who have severed ties with regular society.

Although the programme has not been officially evaluated, the high-profile nature of EXIT within Sweden has gained widespread recognition and increased public awareness, and is now seen as an important response to far-right extremism within Sweden.

The Swedish Ministry of Justice launched a pan-European, two-year project in 2013, which aims to enhance our understanding of what works in preventing and countering right-wing extremism. It is funded by the European Commission, and involves ten European countries pooling and sharing their knowledge and understanding of the extreme right-wing threat.⁹

8. *Ibid.*

9. For further details, see Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 'Preventing and Countering Far-Right Extremism and Radicalisation: European Cooperation',

5.6 United Kingdom

In 2010–11, the UK government reviewed the Prevent policy.¹⁰ Although many of the efforts by the Home Office and Department for Communities and Local Government were judged to be valuable, the Prevent review suggested that the M&E of Prevent projects had not been sufficiently robust to justify the sums of public money spent on them.

The government said that evidence of effectiveness and value for money would be required for projects to maintain funding. Improvements in the evaluation architecture in the UK included situating evaluation specialists at the heart of the unit undertaking Prevent policy to provide on-the-spot advice and to help build an evaluation culture.

A senior lawyer, Lord Carlile of Berriew QC, was appointed to provide expert, independent oversight of the review. The objectives of the government's review of Prevent were as follows:

- Ensure Prevent is proportionate and focused.
- Look at the purpose and scope of the Prevent strategy, its overlap and links with other areas of government policy, and its delivery at local level.
- Examine the role of institutions – such as prisons, higher- and further-education institutions, schools and mosques – in the delivery of Prevent.
- Consider the role of other Prevent delivery partners, including the police and other statutory bodies.
- Consider how activity in the UK can be better co-ordinated with work overseas.

<<http://www.strategicdialogue.org/sweden-actionresearch/>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

10. HM Government, 'Prevent Review: Summary of Responses to the Consultation', London, June 2011.

- Examine M&E structures to ensure effectiveness and value for money.

While much of the review process is not in the public domain, the government stated that, as part of the review, a consultation process began on 10 November 2010 and ran for three months. A web-based questionnaire sought views on specific aspects of Prevent: over 400 responses were received. There were eleven consultation events held around the country, which attracted approximately 600 attendants. A series of focus groups were also held.

Channel Programme Development of 'Vulnerability' Indicators

The Channel programme benefits from an evaluation framework, which has recently been strengthened with the development of twenty-two 'vulnerability' indicators.* Channel assesses the vulnerability of an individual using a consistently applied assessment framework built around three dimensions: engagement with a group, cause or ideology; intent to cause harm; and capability to cause harm.

The dimensions are considered separately as experience has shown that it is possible to be engaged without intending to cause harm and that it is possible to intend to cause harm without being particularly engaged. Experience has also shown that it is possible to desist (to no longer intend to cause harm) without fully disengaging (remaining sympathetic to the cause); though losing sympathy with the cause (disengaging) will invariably result in desistance (loss of intent).

* The full list of vulnerability indicators is contained in HM Government, Channel: Vulnerability Assessment Framework (London: The Stationery Office, October 2012), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118187/vul-assessment.pdf, accessed 22 May 2014.

5.7 United States

The Department of Homeland Security announced a CVE strategy in 2011 entitled 'Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States'. This was the first to have targeted domestic-grown terrorism in the US at the local level.

The strategy elaborates on the federal government's existing efforts and emphasises the need to work together with diverse communities to protect the civil rights and civil liberties of all individuals at local level – a key facet of the work undertaken by the Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties since its inception. The three priority challenges that the strategy identified are:

- To enhance federal engagement with and support local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists.
- To build government and law-enforcement expertise in preventing violent extremism.
- To counter violent, extremist propaganda while promoting US ideals.

Domestically, the US uses a number of programme-evaluation frameworks and in recognition of the developmental nature of the CVE-evaluation field, the National Institute of Justice (part of the Department of Justice) has commissioned a number of research studies to identify promising practices of evaluation, having noted that very few studies have scientifically evaluated community-level efforts to prevent radicalisation.¹¹

Overseas, USAID has harnessed its significant experience and expertise in evaluation in the development domain and applied it

11. US Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 'Research and Evaluation on Radicalization to Violent Extremism in the United States – FY 2013, Notice for Tender 2013', CFDA No. 15.560, <<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/sl001061.pdf>>, accessed 22 May 2014.

to its CVE programming, producing guidance and toolkits (this is explored further in Chapter IV).

Chapter V: Key Points

- Analysing case studies from overseas enables us to adopt best practice and lessons learned, which can then be used in choosing the optimal evaluation method for a particular context.
- The review of different countries' programmes demonstrates the increasing complexity and sophistication of CVE initiatives, frequently overlapping with other policy areas and incorporating a wide range of actors and stakeholders.
- Countries have little experience in this area and evaluation systems are immature, but many are increasing their evaluation efforts in order to justify the resources that are allocated to them.
- Cases of good evaluation practice show that evaluation needs to be integrated from the outset, as part of the planning stage of any CVE programme.

FINAL WORD

THIS HANDBOOK is one of a number of outputs contributing to the Government of Canada-led workstream, providing guidance on good practice and lessons learned for evaluating the effectiveness of CVE programming.

This initiative is being led under the auspices of the GCTF Working Group on CVE. The GCTF is an informal, multilateral platform focused on supporting the UN's Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy efforts. The GCTF has now become a key body in shaping CVE policy and practice internationally.

The GCTF has emphasised that CVE requires a multifaceted approach, as various factors can drive violent extremism. The prerequisite of an effective, results-oriented CVE policy is to comprehend the complexity of violent extremism; this requires a joint effort at local, national, regional and international levels and a focus on evaluation.

CVE is a growing and evolving realm of policy and practice. Stakeholders acknowledge that evaluation in CVE is still an emerging field and that part of this can be attributed to the lack of evaluation of projects and understanding of what constitutes a successful intervention. The latter is particularly challenging, as CVE is a field in which governments and practitioners are faced with measuring a 'negative' or a 'non-event'. It is important to be

able to assess whether and when a programme is ‘successful’ or ‘effective’.

The continued endurance of CVE depends on it demonstrating that the projects conducted under its auspices deliver impact, insights and return on investment. Undertaking effective evaluation for accountability and learning purposes is crucial to ensuring that CVE can continue to be sustained as a viable policy approach.

Harnessing technology and learning from other fields are important in the development of CVE and in applying effective evaluation. Long-versed in the challenges of conflict prevention and violence reduction, areas such as peace-building and crime prevention – and their related methods and practices – can help to develop a more expansive understanding of violent extremism and its causes, as well as a more localised, measurable and sustainable approach to countering it.

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ONLINE ACTIVITIES TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM:
TALKING POINTS

- The U.S. Government encourages independent, local efforts to prevent violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence.
- That includes encouraging the countering of violent extremist propaganda through online and in-person dialogue.
- With respect to confronting violent extremism online, in particular, some members of the public have asked for guidance, especially on the application of statutes criminalizing the provision of material support or resources to terrorists.
- This guidance should make clear: the material support statutes **do not prohibit legitimate independent efforts to counter violent extremism.**
- In fact, despite having charged individuals with violations of the material support statutes in more than a hundred cases over the past decade, the Department of Justice **has never prosecuted an individual or group for a legitimate effort to persuade others not to engage in violence.**
- Further, parameters set forth in the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, and agency policies help ensure that individuals who communicate with suspected extremists or terrorists online in an effort to persuade them not to engage in violence, or to prevent others from being recruited to their cause, will not become the subject of a criminal or terrorism investigation, absent independent indicia of unlawful activity.
- This guidance should underscore the Government's continuing commitment to encouraging independent efforts to challenge violent extremist narratives.
- And the guidance should also show that the Government **would not want to take steps to discourage those efforts**, which can be vital to protecting individuals—especially vulnerable youth—in this country from those promoting violent extremism.
- Thus, we hope that this guidance will extend our continuing efforts to encourage credible community voices to speak out against violent extremism.

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Department of Homeland Security

Departmental Management and Operations

Office of the Secretary and Executive Management



Fiscal Year 2014
Congressional Justification

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BUDGET REQUEST AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Departmental Management and Operations Office of the Secretary and Executive Management

I. Appropriation Overview

A. Mission Statement:

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of the Secretary and Executive Management (OSEM) provides leadership, direction, and management to the Department and all of its Components. OSEM establishes and implements policy and provides various support functions and oversight to all entities within the Department. OSEM oversees the Department's ongoing efforts to integrate and consolidate its resources and operations to create a seamless organization that shares services, information, and best practices across previously stove-piped organizations.

B. Budget Activities:

OSEM is a separate appropriation within Departmental Management and Operations (DMO) that provides resources for 15 separate Programs, Projects and Activities (PPAs) including: Immediate Office of the Secretary, Immediate Office of the Deputy Secretary, Chief of Staff, Office of the Executive Secretary (ESEC), Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA), Office of Policy, Office of Public Affairs (OPA), Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA), Office of the General Counsel (OGC), Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Ombudsman (CISOMB), Privacy Office, the Private Sector Office (PSO), the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE), and the Office of International Affairs (OIA). As in the 2013 Budget, the Department proposes establishing the Private Sector Office, the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement, and the Office of International Affairs as new PPAs. Below are brief descriptive summaries of the PPAs.

Immediate Office of the Secretary: The Office of the Secretary's role is to provide executive leadership, management, direction, and oversight for the Department's Components. The Secretary represents the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to the President, Congress, State, local, tribal and territorial partners, and the general public.

Immediate Office of the Deputy Secretary: The Office of the Deputy Secretary supports the Secretary by providing leadership to the Department, especially regarding internal management and direction.

Chief of Staff: The Chief of Staff is responsible for coordinating policy initiatives and other actions of the Department's Components, directorates, and offices.

Office of the Executive Secretary: ESEC supports the Offices of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary with management of their correspondence, decision documents, and other written communications, including briefing books, Congressional questions for the record, and testimony for all Departmental

hearings. ESEC is charged with ensuring that all materials presented to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for signature has been thoroughly cleared with all relevant Components.

Office of the General Counsel: The General Counsel is the chief legal officer for DHS and oversees and integrates more than 1,800 attorneys throughout the Department. OGC is responsible for ensuring that Departmental activities comply with applicable legal requirements, as well as establishing that the Department's efforts to secure the Nation are consistent with the civil rights and civil liberties of the public and observe the rule of law. OGC provides legal advice on areas such as national security, immigration, litigation, international law, maritime safety and security, transportation security, border security law, cyber security, fiscal and appropriations law, environmental law, and many others. OGC also provides legal services in several areas where the law intersects with the achievement of mission goals, such as the coordination of the Department's rulemaking activities, managing interdepartmental clearance of proposed legislation, and providing legal training for law enforcement officers. OGC provides legal counsel for all DHS offices (except those specifically excluded by statute).

Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: CRCL supports the Department as it secures the Nation while preserving individual liberty, fairness, and equality under the law. CRCL performs four key functions to integrate civil rights and civil liberties into Departmental activities:

- Advising Department leadership, personnel, and partners about civil rights and civil liberties issues; ensuring respect for civil rights and civil liberties in policy decisions and in the implementation of those decisions.
- Communicating with individuals and communities whose civil rights and civil liberties may be affected by DHS activities, informing them about policies and avenues of redress, and promoting appropriate attention within the Department to their experiences and concerns.
- Investigating and resolving civil rights and civil liberties complaints filed by the public.
- Leading the Department's equal employment opportunity programs and promoting personnel diversity and merit system principles.

Office of Public Affairs: OPA is responsible for managing external and internal communications. The office responds to national media inquiries, maintains and updates the Department's website, writes speeches for senior department officials, and coordinates speaking events for Department officials. OPA fosters strategic communication throughout the Department and with external stakeholders through development and coordination of major DHS announcements and rollouts as well as setting common goals to promote "One DHS" objectives. OPA manages the expansion of the "If You See Something, Say Something"™ campaign, which is a simple and effective program to engage the public and key frontline law enforcement personnel to identify and report indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crime to the proper transportation and law enforcement authorities. The office manages the Department's organizational identity program, which includes usage of the DHS seal and related guidelines. Also, the office oversees the Department's employee communication activities, which include coordinating communications for Department-wide initiatives, town hall meetings between management and employees, and the operation and management of an intranet site. Per Presidential directive, OPA's incident communications program guides overall Federal incident communication activity and coordinates with State, local, and international partners to ensure accurate and timely information is provided to the public during a crisis.

Office of Legislative Affairs: OLA serves as the Department's primary liaison to Congress. OLA advocates for the policy interests of the Administration and the Secretary. OLA also ensures that all DHS Components are actively engaged with Congress in their specific areas of responsibility. OLA articulates views on behalf of DHS Components and their legislative initiatives. OLA responds to requests and inquiries from congressional committees, individual Members of Congress, and their staffs. OLA also participates in the Senate confirmation process for all DHS Presidential nominees.

Privacy Office: The Privacy Office protects the collection, use, and disclosure of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and Departmental information. It ensures that appropriate access to information is consistent with the vision, strategic mission, and core values of the Department; and implements the policies of the Department to defend and protect individual rights, liberties, and information interests of the public. The Privacy Office has oversight of all privacy and disclosure policy matters, including compliance with the *Privacy Act of 1974*, the *Freedom of Information Act*, and the completion of privacy impact statements on all new programs and systems, as required by the *E-Government Act of 2002* and Section 222 of the *Homeland Security Act*. The DHS Privacy Office is the first statutorily-mandated Privacy Office within the Federal Government.

Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman: CISOMB assists individuals and employers in resolving problems connected with pending United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) cases. In addition, as required by statute, CISOMB identifies common problems experienced by individuals and employers when seeking USCIS services, and proposes changes to mitigate such problems and improve the delivery of immigration services. In accomplishing each of these missions, the CISOMB works impartially, soliciting information and feedback from USCIS, other government agencies, immigration benefits applicants, and the immigration stakeholder community.

Office of Policy: The Office of Policy (PLCY) serves as a central resource to the Secretary and other Department leaders for policy development and review, strategic planning and analysis, and facilitation of decision-making on the full breadth of issues that may arise across the dynamic homeland security enterprise.

PLCY is responsible for strengthening our Nation's homeland security by developing DHS-wide policies, programs, and planning to promote and ensure the highest level of performance, quality, consistency, and integration in the execution of all homeland security missions. PLCY represents and coordinates the consolidated DHS position at White House interagency committee meetings. The Office develops and articulates the long-term strategic view of the Department and translates the Secretary's strategic priorities into the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, DHS Strategic Plan, and other planning products that drive increased operational effectiveness through integration, prioritization, and resource allocation. The Department proposes establishing independent offices for the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement, the Office of International Affairs (OIA), and Private Sector Office. While OIA will coordinate the Department's international operations and engagement, the Office of Policy will continue to work with OIA to coordinate and develop international policy.

Office of International Affairs: The Office of International Affairs (OIA) leads, coordinates, and integrates the Department's interaction with its international partners, while developing and overseeing the implementation of the Department's international engagement strategy. The Office of International

Affairs provides oversight on visa waiver negotiations through its Visa Waiver Program Office. The Department proposes to establish OIA as an independent office and PPA in FY 2014.

Private Sector Office: The Private Sector Office (PSO) fosters strategic communications with businesses, trade associations, and other non-governmental organizations to build stronger relationships between them and the Department. The office advises Departmental leadership on prospective policies and regulations, informs the Secretary about the economic impact of DHS policies, promote public-private partnerships and best practices to improve the Nation's homeland security, and serve as the primary point of entry for the private sector into DHS. The Department proposes to establish PSO as an independent office and PPA in FY 2014.

Office for State and Local Law Enforcement: The Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) is the Department's principal liaison with non-Federal law enforcement partners. OSLLE formulates and coordinates national-level policy relating to law enforcement's role in preventing acts of terrorism, and serves as the primary Department liaison with State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. The Department proposes to establish OSLLE as an independent office and PPA in FY 2014.

Office of Intergovernmental Affairs: IGA is responsible for communicating and coordinating State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) government interactions throughout and across the Department. IGA promotes an integrated national approach to homeland security by coordinating and advancing Federal interaction with SLTT governments. IGA is responsible for continuing the homeland security dialogue with our SLTT partners, along with the national associations that represent them. IGA serves as the Secretary's primary point of contact for SLTT elected and appointed officials and their associations to ensure there are open lines of communications between the Department and its homeland security partners.

In FY 2014, OSEM is requesting the break out of the Office of International Affairs, the Private Sector Office, and the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement from the Office of Policy. The creation of these standalone offices will provide greater visibility for international, private sector, and state and local law enforcement stakeholders. Strategic communication and coordination with international partners, businesses, trade associations, other non-governmental organizations, and state and local law enforcement enables the Department to strengthen its efforts toward achieving its mission.

C. Budget Request Summary:

The Office of the Secretary and Executive Management requests 628 positions, 628 FTE, and \$126,554,000 for FY 2014. This includes the transfer of 10 positions, 10 FTE, and \$2,990,000 from National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) in FY 2012 for Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) and the termination of the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE), per Public Law 112-74. The FY 2014 request results in a net decrease of 62 positions, 60 FTE, and \$7,856,000 from the FY 2012 base. Total base adjustments of (\$12,318,000) include:

- Transfer of RMA from NPPD (\$2,990,000, 10 positions, 10 FTE)
- Transfer of 4 positions from OCIO to OPA for Web Communications, to provide oversight and operations and maintenance support for www.dhs.gov (\$545,000, 4 positions, 4 FTE)

- Transfer from OCRSO for Shared Services items transferred to the Working Capital Fund (\$388,000)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$894,000)
- Increase – Annualization of prior year funding for 287(g) and Secure Communities (\$373,000, 2.5 FTE)
- Decrease – Right-Sizing of Personnel (40 Positions, 40 FTE)
- Decrease – Efficiencies described in Section D. – (\$15,708,000, 41 Positions, 41 FTE)
- Decrease – Termination of CNE – (\$1,800,000)
- Net zero change – Realignment from Office of Policy for OIA, PSO, and OSLE
 - Increase – Office of International Affairs (\$7,988,000, 44 Positions, 44 FTE)
 - Increase – Private Sector Office (\$1,761,000, 11 Positions, 11 FTE)
 - Increase – Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (\$891,000, 5 Positions, 5 FTE)
 - Decrease – Office of Policy – (\$10,640,000, 60 positions, 60 FTE)

The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has two program changes that include 1 position, 0.5 FTE, and \$135,000 to support the Department’s role in countering domestic violent extremism, and \$1,327,000 in oversight support of ICE’s 287(g)/Secure Communities programs. The Office of Public Affairs includes one program change that includes \$3,000,000 for the continuation and expansion of the “If You See Something, Say Something TM” campaign. These changes are described in greater detail in Section IV.

D. Efficiencies: **\$15.708 million**

Mission Support and Personnel Efficiencies **\$7.348 million**

Mission Support Staffing (\$7.348 million) – This request includes a savings of \$7.348 million, which will be realized by reducing mission support activities by 41 FTE.

Printing Efficiencies **\$0.302 million**

Print Shop services (\$0.302 million) – This request reflects a \$0.302 million savings for the elimination of printing services for discretionary products which are not required by law or are not considered mission critical.

Supplies and Materials Efficiencies **\$0.161 million**

Supplies and Materials (\$0.161 million)–This request reflects a \$0.161 million savings due to a reduction in ordering supplies and materials. With a reduction of 41 FTE, less supplies and materials will be needed.

Travel Efficiencies **\$1.77 million**

Travel (\$1.77 million) – This request reflects a savings of \$1.77 million which will be realized by reducing travel for conferences and non-local training, combining site visits, and increasing the use of technology such as video teleconferencing.

Advisory and Assistance Contracts Efficiencies

\$4.238 million

Advisory and Assistance Contracts (\$4.238 million) – This request reflects a savings of \$4.238 million which will be realized by the use of strategic sourcing and reducing the scope of contracts.

Other Services Efficiencies

\$0.208 million

Other Services (\$0.208 million) – This request reflects a savings of \$0.208 million which will be realized by reducing the operations and maintenance of facilities and equipment.

Rent Efficiencies

\$1.681 million

Rent (\$1.681 million) – This request reflects a savings of \$1.681 million which will be realized by reducing space requirements.

II. Summary of FY 2014 Budget Estimates by Program/Project Activity (PPA)

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
 Summary of FY 2014 Budget Estimates by Program Project Activity

FY 2014 Request

(Dollars in Thousands)

Program Project Activity	FY 2012			FY 2013			FY 2014			Increase(+) or Decrease(-) for FY 2014 from FY 2012								
	Revised Enacted			Annualized CR			Request			Total Changes			Program Changes			Adjustments-to-Base		
	POS	FTE	Amount	POS	FTE	Amount	POS	FTE	Amount	POS	FTE	Amount	POS	FTE	Amount	POS	FTE	Amount
Immediate Office of the Secretary	6	6	4,605	12	12	5,031	6	6	4,128	-	-	-477	-	-	-	-	-	-477
Immediate Office of the Deputy Secretary	7	7	2,110	8	8	1,930	5	5	1,822	-2	-2	-288	-	-	-	-2	-2	-288
Chief of Staff	14	14	2,397	18	18	2,314	13	13	2,200	-1	-1	-197	-	-	-	-1	-1	-197
Executive Secretary	64	64	8,748	58	58	8,150	55	55	7,603	-9	-9	-1,145	-	-	-	-9	-9	-1,145
Office of General Counsel	131	131	22,370	131	131	22,537	108	108	21,000	-23	-23	-1,370	-	-	-	-23	-23	-1,370
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties	101	99	22,011	113	111	22,638	97	97	21,678	-4	-2	-333	1	0.5	1,462	-5	-2.5	-1,795
Office of Public Affairs	29	29	6,288	32	32	5,835	26	26	8,661	-3	-3	2,373	-	-	3,000	-3	-3	-627
Office of Legislative Affairs	32	32	5,925	35	35	6,037	28	28	5,498	-4	-4	-427	-	-	-	-4	-4	-427
Privacy Officer	43	43	8,328	45	45	8,543	45	45	8,143	2	2	-185	-	-	-	2	2	-185
Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman	30	30	6,160	35	35	6,238	30	30	5,344	0	0	-816	-	-	-	-	-	-816
Office of Policy	218	218	41,666	194	194	40,245	146	146	27,815	-72	-72	-13,851	-	-	-	-72	-72	-13,851
Office of International Affairs	-	-	-	-	-	-	41	41	7,626	41	41	7,626	-	-	-	41	41	7,626
Private Sector Office	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	10	1,666	10	10	1,666	-	-	-	10	10	1,666
Office of State and Local Law Enforcement	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	852	4	4	852	-	-	-	4	4	852
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs	15	15	2,625	20	20	2,666	14	14	2,518	-1	-1	-107	-	-	-	-1	-1	-107
Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement	-	-	1,177	-	-	1,811	-	-	-	-	-	-1,177	-	-	-	-	-	-1,177
Subtotal, Discretionary	690	688	134,410	701	699	133,975	628	628	126,554	-62	-60	-7,856	1	0.5	4,462	-63	-60.5	-12,318
Total, Office of the Secretary and Executive Management (OSEM):	690	688	134,410	701	699	133,975	628	628	126,554	-62	-60	-7,856	1	0.5	4,462	-63	-60.5	-12,318
Subtotal, Enacted Appropriations and Budget Estimates	690	688	134,410	701	699	133,975	628	628	126,554	-62	-60	-7,856	1	0.5	4,462	-63	-60.5	-12,318
Less: Adjustments for Other Funding Sources	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Net, Enacted Appropriations and Budget	690	688	134,410	701	699	133,975	628	628	126,554	-62	-60	-7,856	1	0.5	4,462	-63	-60.5	-12,318

III. Current Services Program Description by PPA

**Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Immediate Office of the Secretary
Program Performance Justification**
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Immediate Office of the Secretary

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	6	6	4,605
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	-	-	(477)
2014 Current Services	6	6	4,128
2014 Total Request	6	6	4,128
Total Change 2012 to 2014	-	-	(477)

OSEM requests 6 positions, 6 FTE, and \$4,128,000 in FY 2014 for the Immediate Office of the Secretary. Base adjustments include:

- Increase – Transfer from OCRSO for Shared Services (\$67,000)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$17,000)
- Increase – Realignment between offices (\$395,000)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$956,000)
 - Decrease – Travel (\$922,000)
 - Decrease – Supplies and materials (\$34,000)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

The Secretary is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to lead DHS and act as the principal adviser to the President on homeland security matters. The Secretary ensures a coordinated national effort for the accomplishment of all DHS mission requirements, which include but are not limited to the prevention of terrorist attacks in the United States, the reduction of vulnerability to and minimization of impacts from catastrophic events, and the recovery from damage that may occur. The Secretary is a member of the Homeland Security Council, and serves as the principal spokesperson on homeland security issues for the Administration when testifying before the House Homeland Security Committee, the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Immediate Office of the Deputy Secretary
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Immediate Office of the Deputy Secretary

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	7	7	2,110
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	(2)	(2)	(288)
2014 Current Services	5	5	1,822
2014 Total Request	5	5	1,822
Total Change 2012 to 2014	(2)	(2)	(288)

OSEM requests 5 positions, 5 FTE, and \$1,822,000 in FY 2014 for the Immediate Office of the Deputy Secretary. Base adjustments include:

- Increase – Transfer from OCRSO for Shared Services (\$10,000)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$13,000)
- Decrease – Realignment between offices (\$192,000)
- Decrease – Right-Sizing Personnel (2 Positions, 2 FTE)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$119,000)
 - Decrease – Travel (\$119,000)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

The Immediate Office of the Deputy Secretary supports the Secretary by providing leadership with a focus on the internal management and direction of the Department to ensure its efficient and effective operation. The Deputy Secretary's role is to provide internal oversight of all Departmental operations, which allows the Secretary to focus on external matters concerning homeland security and DHS.

**Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Chief of Staff
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)**

PPA: Chief of Staff

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	14	14	2,397
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	(1)	(1)	(197)
2014 Current Services	13	13	2,200
2014 Total Request	13	13	2,200
Total Change 2012 to 2014	(1)	(1)	(197)

OSEM requests 13 positions, 13 FTE, and \$2,200,000 in FY 2014 for the Chief of Staff. Base adjustments include:

- Increase – Transfer from OCRSO for Shared Services (\$9,000)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$16,000)
- Decrease – Realignment between offices (\$97,000)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$125,000, 1 position, 1 FTE)
 - Decrease – Mission support staffing (\$125,000, 1 position, 1 FTE)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

The Chief of Staff oversees DHS activities, assists the Deputy in managing DHS operations, and supports the Secretary. The Office of the Chief of Staff has direct oversight of all administrative functions that relate to the Immediate Office of the Secretary, and assists the Secretary by coordinating continuity of operations activities for Department Headquarters, directing the Department's resources, and in the Department's goal to Mature and Strengthen the Homeland Security Enterprise.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Executive Secretary
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Executive Secretary

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	64	64	8,748
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	(9)	(9)	(1,145)
2014 Current Services	55	55	7,603
2014 Total Request	55	55	7,603
Total Change 2012 to 2014	(9)	(9)	(1,145)

OSEM requests 55 positions, 55 FTE, and \$7,603,000 in FY 2014 for the Office of the Executive Secretary. Base adjustments include:

- Increase – Transfer from OCRSO for Shared Services (\$25,000)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$62,000)
- Decrease – Realignment between offices (\$648,000)
- Decrease – Right-Sizing Personnel (6 Positions, 6 FTE)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$584,000, 3 Positions, 3 FTE)
 - Decrease – Mission support staffing (\$577,000, 3 position, 3 FTE)
 - Decrease – Supplies and materials (\$7,000)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

ESEC establishes effective and efficient protocols for processing all internal communications, decision management briefings, Congressional questions for the record and reports, and Department-wide testimony. ESEC is the principal liaison between the Department and its Components, and coordinates all external correspondence for the Immediate Office of the Secretary and all directorates. ESEC establishes and maintains budget and personnel activities for the Office of the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, the Chief of Staff, as well as the Executive Secretariat.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of General Counsel
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Office of General Counsel

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	131	131	22,370
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	(23)	(23)	(1,370)
2014 Current Services	108	108	21,000
2014 Total Request	108	108	21,000
Total Change 2012 to 2014	(23)	(23)	(1,370)

OSEM requests 108 positions, 108 FTE, and \$21,000,000 in FY 2014 for the Office of General Counsel. Base adjustments include:

- Increase – Transfer from OCRSO for Shared Services (\$52,000)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$159,000)
- Increase – Realignment between offices (\$30,000)
- Decrease – Right-Sizing Personnel (17 Positions, 17 FTE)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$1,611,000, 6 Positions, 6 FTE)
 - Decrease – Mission support staffing (\$1,095,000, 6 Positions, 6 FTE)
 - Decrease – Printing and reproduction (\$5,000)
 - Decrease – Supplies and materials (\$28,000)
 - Decrease – Travel (\$91,000)
 - Decrease – Advisory and assistance contracts (\$310,000)
 - Decrease – Other services (\$82,000)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

OGC provides legal counsel for all DHS offices except those specifically excluded by statute. OGC's legal services cover several areas including national security, immigration, litigation, international law; maritime safety and security, transportation security, border security law; cyber security, fiscal and appropriations law; environmental law; labor and employment, intellectual property law; emergency rescue, recovery and response authorities; civil, criminal and administrative law; civil rights and civil liberties, privacy, legislative and regulatory actions, intelligence; information sharing, safeguarding, and disclosure; Congressional response; procurement; and the regulation of infrastructure security.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	101	99	22,011
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	(5)	(2.5)	(1,795)
2014 Current Services	96	96.5	20,216
2014 Program Change	1	0.5	1,462
2014 Total Request	97	97	21,678
Total Change 2013 to 2014	(4)	(2)	(333)

OSEM requests 97 positions, 97 FTE, and \$21,678,000 in FY 2014 for the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. Base adjustments include:

- Increase – Transfer from OCRSO for Shared Services (\$35,000)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$154,000)
- Increase – Annualization of prior year funding for 287(g) and Secure Communities (\$373,000, 2.5 FTE)
- Increase – Realignment between offices (\$489,000)
- Decrease – Right-Sizing Personnel (5 Positions, 5 FTE)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$2,846,000)
 - Decrease – Printing and reproduction (\$100,000)
 - Decrease – Supplies and materials (\$46,000)
 - Decrease – Travel (\$65,000)
 - Decrease – Advisory and assistance contracts (\$2,635,000)

Program changes include:

- Increase – Oversight of 287(g) and Secure Communities (\$1,327,000)
- Increase – Countering Domestic Violent Extremism (\$135,000, 1 Position, 0.5 FTE)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

CRCL provides DHS with advice on the full range of civil rights and civil liberties issues, investigates complaints by the public about civil rights and civil liberties violations, and offers recommendations to solve problems uncovered by those investigations. CRCL provides training and technical assistance to DHS personnel and SLTT partners; and conducts outreach and engagement with communities whose civil rights and civil liberties are affected by DHS activities. CRCL is specifically involved in the oversight of ICE's 287(g) and Secure Communities programs by providing policy advice, investigations, and training to SLTT partners. CRCL also works on countering domestic violent extremism through community engagement initiatives and training for SLTT partners. The Office acts as the DHS-designated single point of contact for human rights treaties and complaints. CRCL also facilitates U.S. Government-wide communication to community leaders after a security or other incident, through its Incident Community Coordination Teams. CRCL makes information available to the public on the responsibilities and functions of, and how to contact, the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, including how to file civil rights and civil liberties complaints. It conducts administrative adjudication of disability discrimination claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. CRCL leads the Department's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) and diversity programs and is responsible for DHS-wide policies, training, and complaint adjudication processes to promote EEO and diversity for all employees and applicants.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of Public Affairs
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Office of Public Affairs

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	29	29	6,288
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	(3)	(3)	(627)
2014 Current Services	26	26	5,661
2014 Program Change	-	-	3,000
2014 Total Request	26	26	8,661
Total Change 2012 to 2014	(3)	(3)	2,373

OSEM requests 26 positions, 26 FTE, and \$8,661,000 in FY 2014 for the Office of Public Affairs.

Base adjustments include:

- Transfer of 4 positions from OCIO to OPA for Web Communications, to provide oversight and operations and maintenance support of www.dhs.gov (\$545,000, 4 Positions, 4 FTE)
- Increase – Transfer from OCRSO for Shared Services (\$16,000)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$36,000)
- Decrease – Realignment between offices (\$488,000)
- Decrease – Right-Sizing Personnel (2 Positions, 2 FTE)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$736,000, 5 Positions, 5 FTE)
 - Decrease – Mission support staffing (\$648,000, 5 Positions, 5 FTE)
 - Decrease – Supplies and materials (\$25,000)
 - Decrease – Travel (\$33,000)
 - Decrease – Other services (\$30,000)

Program changes include:

- Increase – “If You See Something, Say Something TM” Campaign (\$3,000,000)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

The Office of Public Affairs (OPA) is responsible for oversight and management of all external and internal communications. On a daily basis, OPA responds to national media inquiries, maintains and updates the Department's website, writes speeches for principals and reviews and coordinates speaking events for Department officials. OPA fosters strategic communication throughout DHS and with external stakeholders. For the "If You See Something, Say Something TM" campaign, OPA works with a variety of cities, states, and private sector partners, including universities, major sports leagues and entertainment venues to raise public awareness on indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crimes, and to emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activity to the proper state and local law enforcement authorities. OPA manages the DHS Organizational Identity Program, which provides guidelines for the proper use of the DHS seal and related identities. OPA oversees DHS employee communication activities which include Connect, and town hall meetings between management and employees. The Incident Communications Team coordinates incident communications with the White House, Federal departments and agencies, and state, local and international partners to ensure accurate and timely information is provided to the public during an incident. Communicating emergency public information is mandated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5 to ensure that potentially life-saving information is provided to the public in a timely manner.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of Legislative Affairs
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Office of Legislative Affairs

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	32	32	5,925
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	(4)	(4)	(427)
2014 Current Services	28	28	5,498
2014 Total Request	28	28	5,498
Total Change 2012 to 2014	(4)	(4)	(427)

OSEM requests 28 positions, 28 FTE, and \$5,498,000 in FY 2014 for the Office of Legislative Affairs. Base adjustments include:

- Increase – Transfer from OCRSO for Shared Services (\$36,000)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$48,000)
- Increase –Realignment between offices (\$75,000)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$586,000, 4 Positions, 4 FTE)
 - Decrease – Mission support staffing (\$533,000, 4 Positions, 4 FTE)
 - Decrease – Travel (\$13,000)
 - Decrease – Advisory and assistance contracts (\$24,000)
 - Decrease – Other services (\$16,000)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

OLA serves as the Department's primary liaison to Congress and advocates for the policy interests of the Administration and the Secretary. OLA ensures that all DHS Components are actively engaged with Congress in their specific areas of responsibility.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Privacy Officer
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Privacy Officer

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	43	43	8,328
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	2	2	(185)
2014 Current Services	45	45	8,143
2014 Total Request	45	45	8,143
Total Change 2012 to 2014	2	2	(185)

OSEM requests 45 positions, 45 FTE, and \$8,143,000 in FY 2014 for the Privacy Office. Base adjustments include:

- Increase – Transfer from OCRSO for Shared Services (\$28,000)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$61,000)
- Increase – Realignment between offices (\$163,000)
- Increase – Right-Sizing Personnel (2 Positions, 2 FTE)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$437,000)
 - Decrease – Travel (\$48,000)
 - Decrease – Advisory and assistance contracts (\$365,000)
 - Decrease – Other services (\$24,000)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

The Privacy Officer is responsible for protecting the Department's collection, use, and disclosure of Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and other departmental information. These responsibilities include coordinating and implementing policy development and compliance Department-wide for the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and for the Privacy Act. The office adjudicates all appeals from denials by any Department Component of access to information under these two Acts. The Office has oversight of all privacy and disclosure policy matters, including the completion of privacy impact statements on all new programs and systems, as required by the E-Government Act of 2002 and Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act.

**Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)**

PPA: Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	30	30	6,160
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	-	-	(816)
2014 Current Services	30	30	5,344
2014 Total Request	30	30	5,344
Total Change 2012 to 2014	-	-	(816)

OSEM requests 30 positions, 30 FTE, and \$5,344,000 in FY 2014 for the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman. Base adjustments include:

- Increase – Transfer from OCRSO for Shared Services (\$18,000)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$41,000)
- Increase – Realignment between offices (\$40,000)
- Increase – Right-Sizing Personnel (2 Positions, 2 FTE)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$915,000, 2 Positions, 2 FTE)
 - Decrease – Mission support staffing (\$338,000, 2 Positions, 2 FTE)
 - Decrease – Printing and reproduction (\$12,000)
 - Decrease – Supplies and materials (\$20,000)
 - Decrease – Travel (\$78,000)
 - Decrease – Advisory and assistance contracts (\$467,000)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

The statutory mission of CISOMB is to assist individuals and employers in resolving immigration benefits problems, propose changes in its practices to improve customer service, and directly provide Congress and the Department with substantive analysis on the quality of immigration services. CISOMB accomplishes this mission through individual case assistance, public outreach geared toward unrepresented and underrepresented immigrant communities; the diligent study of important issues across the spectrum of immigration benefits and services; identifying best practices and forward-looking business models that will meet future challenges for DHS; proposing impartial, operationally

sound, and credible solutions to customer-service barriers; and working cooperatively with government partners to benefit the public. Throughout the year, CISOMB publishes recommendations, updates, and other advisories focused on improving the receipt, processing, review, and adjudication of immigration benefits. CISOMB provides Congress with a comprehensive annual report analyzing serious and pervasive problems affecting the delivery of immigration services.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of Policy
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Office of Policy

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	218	218	41,666
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	(72)	(72)	(13,851)
2014 Current Services	146	146	27,815
2014 Total Request	146	146	27,815
Total Change 2012 to 2014	(72)	(72)	(13,851)

OSEM requests 146 positions, 146 FTE, and \$27,815,000 in FY 2014 for the Office of Policy. Base adjustments include:

- Transfer of RMA from NPPD (\$2,990,000, 10 positions, 10 FTE)
- Increase – Transfer from OCRSO for Shared Services (\$84,000)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$200,000)
- Realignment (decrease) – Office of International Affairs (\$7,988,000, 44 positions, 44 FTE)
- Realignment (decrease) – Private Sector Office (\$1,761,000, 11 positions, 11 FTE)
- Realignment (decrease) – Office of State and Local Law Enforcement (\$891,000, 5 positions, 5 FTE)
- Decrease – Realignment between offices (\$415,000)
- Decrease – Right Size Personnel (6 positions, 6 FTE)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$6,070,000, 16 Position, 16 FTE)
 - Decrease – Mission support staffing (\$3,411,000, 16 Positions, 16 FTE)
 - Decrease – Printing and reproduction (\$185,000)
 - Decrease – Travel (\$309,000)
 - Decrease – Advisory and assistance contracts (\$428,000)
 - Decrease – Other services (\$56,000)
 - Decrease – Rent (\$1,681,000)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

The Office of Policy serves as the Department's principal source of thought leadership, policy development, and decision analysis for DHS senior leadership, Secretarial initiatives, and for other critical matters that may arise in a dynamic threat environment. This office leads the coordination, integration, and development of DHS-wide policies, programs, strategies, and plans across the Department's mission portfolios, including: counterterrorism; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN); transborder security; immigration; resilience; and screening. Further, the office facilitates decision-making by providing timely advice and analysis to the Secretary and other Departmental leaders.

PLCY also represents the Department at White House interagency policy committee meetings on the areas in the mission portfolios and also represents DHS on strategic planning efforts and major interagency strategy reviews. The office develops long-term strategic priorities to increase operational effectiveness and mission execution. Furthermore, PLCY is charged with and provides the Department with an integrated and DHS-wide capability for strategy development, strategic planning, long-term assessment, and decision analysis, including statistical and economic analysis and risk assessment and modeling.

The office also leads the charge on several Congressionally mandated and authorized programs and responsibilities to include: the development and execution of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR); work with states to move forward on the security standards of the REAL ID Act; work and interagency review concerning cases brought before the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States; and the delivery of several reporting requirements on immigration and certain border security statistics.

The 2010 QHSR set a vision for and definition of homeland security, and set the mission structure that has since driven DHS strategy, management, and performance planning and activities. The second QHSR, due for delivery in FY2014, will preserve the existing vision statement and the five homeland security missions. The final report of the second QHSR will describe and communicate: (1) changes in the overall security environment that have occurred since the 2010 QHSR; (2) updates to certain goals within the five missions to reflect those changes; and (3) the specific *strategic shifts* necessary in certain key areas to address the changing security environment.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of International Affairs
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Office of International Affairs

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	-	-	-
2013 Base	-	-	-
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	41	41	7,626
2014 Current Services	41	41	7,626
2014 Total Request	41	41	7,626
Total Change 2013 to 2014	41	41	7,626

OSEM requests 41 positions, 41 FTE, and \$7,626,000 in FY 2014 for the Office of International Affairs. Base adjustments include:

- Realignment (increase) – From the Office of Policy (\$7,988,000, 44 positions, 44 FTE)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$47,000)
- Decrease – Right-Sizing Personnel (1 Position, 1 FTE)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$409,000, 2 Positions, 2 FTE)
 - Decrease – Mission support staffing (\$409,000, 2 Position, 2 FTE)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

The Office of International Affairs (OIA) leads, coordinates, and integrates the Department's interaction with its international partners, while developing and overseeing the implementation of the Department's international engagement strategy. Serving as the principal liaison with foreign governments, international stakeholders, and the interagency community in matters concerning DHS engagement, OIA also reviews international agreements and manages the DHS Attachés. OIA also provides oversight and recommendations on visa waiver negotiations through its Visa Waiver Program Office.

OIA was established in the 2002 Homeland Security Act (Public Law 107-296) as an office within the Office of the Secretary (Sec. 879). In 2005, however, then-Secretary Chertoff consolidated OIA into the Office of Policy as part of the Second Stage Review. In 2008, the DHS Inspector General recommended that DHS "Clearly define the Office of International Affairs' purview and provide it

with some authorities vis-à-vis DHS component international programs and offices...”¹. In 2010, addressing another recommendation of the Inspector General, OIA wrote the first DHS International Strategy. In 2011, Secretary Napolitano directed that OIA undertake a series of reforms to address problems and challenges in DHS’s international engagement, which also addressed all remaining Inspector General recommendations. Those reforms, all of which OIA carried out, included the first DHS global footprint review, the issuing of an International Affairs Management Directive concerning the coordination of DHS’s international engagement, the establishment of the first DHS-wide international pre-deployment training program, and the naming of DHS Attachés in more than 50 U.S. Missions around the world. As an independent office, OIA will be able to carry out its new responsibilities and prioritize resources in order to more effectively and efficiently achieve its mission. Reporting to the Secretary, OIA can provide decision-making, coordination, review, and dissemination of international information Department-wide more efficiently. Furthermore, the position of OIA within the Department would be more akin to that of other cabinet level agencies.

The creation of OIA as an independent office would not result in increased costs. Dedicated resources for finance, acquisitions, and human capital are already in place that currently support OIA as a division within the Office of Policy. As an independent office, OIA’s business support resources will be able to more effectively focus on the challenging, specialized processes and procedures of working in the international realm. Below is an object class breakout to depict prior year funding levels for OIA.

Office of International Affairs
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits				
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	2,612	2,900	2,949	337
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	337	374	0	(337)
11.5 Other personnel compensation	53	59	0	(53)
12.1 Benefits	1,101	1,222	1,241	140
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	4,103	4,555	4,190	87
				-
Other Object Classes				-
				-
21.0 Travel	430	315	451	21
22.0 Transportation of Things	207	90	0	(207)
23.1 GSA rent	461	461	520	59
25.1 Advisory and Assistance Services	0	60	585	585
25.2 Other Services	79	23	0	(79)
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	1,892	2,510	1,751	(141)
25.4 Operation and maintenance of facilities	13	0	10	(3)
25.6 Medical Care	0	0	4	4
26.0 Supplies and materials	10	20	80	70
31.0 Equipment	0	16	35	35
Total, Other Object Classes	3,092	3,495	3,436	344
				-
				-
Total Requirements	7,195	8,050	7,626	431
Full Time Equivalents	32	44	41	9

Note 1: FY2012 does not include the Visa Waiver Program, but it is included in FY2013 and FY2014.

¹ Recommendation #5, “Management of Department of Homeland Security International Activities and Interests”

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Private Sector Office
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Private Sector Office

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	-	-	-
2013 Base	-	-	-
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	10	10	1,666
2014 Current Services	10	10	1,666
2014 Total Request	10	10	1,666
Total Change 2013 to 2014	10	10	1,666

OSEM requests 10 positions, 10 FTE, and \$1,666,000 in FY 2014 for the Private Sector Office. Base adjustments include:

- Realignment (increase) – From the Office of Policy (\$1,761,000, 11 positions, 11 FTE)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$13,000)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$108,000, 1 Position, 1 FTE)
 - Decrease – Mission support staffing (\$88,000, 1 Position, 1 FTE)
 - Decrease – Travel (\$20,000)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

The mission of the Private Sector Office (PSO) is to foster strategic communications with leaders of businesses, trade associations, and other non-governmental organizations to create stronger relationships with DHS. As a direct report to the Secretary, PSO will be the lead office and point of contact for advising the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, and Component heads on prospective programs, initiatives, and regulations which relate to the private sector. PSO informs the senior DHS leadership on the economic impact to the private sector from DHS activities across all five QHSR mission areas. In addition, PSO leads DHS in the promotion of public-private partnerships and best practices to improve the Nation's homeland security and aid in both economic and national security.

PSO coordinates active engagement between DHS and the private sector to build strong partnerships, shape policy, and enhance internal and external dialog. In times of heightened threat/crisis and emergency response, the Private Sector Office serves as an advisor as well as a resource for the

Secretary, Deputy Secretary and Component Heads with key strategic links to the private sector community.

In FY 2014, the Department proposes establishing PSO as an independent office as directed in the original Homeland Security Act of 2002. The current organizational structure of PSO has misrepresented the office as a policy office and not an outreach office. By identifying PSO as an outreach and external engagement organization, the office can better achieve its role as identified by the Homeland Security Act of 2002.

Reporting to the Secretary, PSO can provide more efficient and effective decision-making, coordination, and communication with both internal and external stakeholders. PSO has the required support infrastructure (financial, acquisition and human capital resources) within its current office to operate as an independent office. As such, there will be no additional costs or personnel required to support this new office.

Private Sector Office
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits				
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	1,087	1,066	1,010	(77)
11.5 Other personnel compensation	36	35	33	(3)
12.1 Benefits	175	168	161	(14)
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	1,298	1,269	1,204	(94)
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	82	110	37	(45)
23.1 GSA rent	141	141	179	38
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	334	237	236	(98)
26.0 Supplies and materials	6	10	10	4
31.0 Equipment	5	5	-	(5)
Total, Other Object Classes	568	503	462	(106)
Adjustments		-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year		-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year		-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations		-	-	-
Total Requirements	1,866	1,772	1,666	(200)
Full Time Equivalents	11	11	10	(1)

**Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of State and Local Law Enforcement
Program Performance Justification**
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Office of State and Local Law Enforcement

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	-	-	-
2013 Base	-	-	-
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	4	4	852
2014 Current Services	4	4	852
2014 Total Request	4	4	852
Total Change 2013 to 2014	4	4	852

OSEM requests 4 positions, 4 FTE, and \$852,000 in FY 2014 for the Office of State and Local Law Enforcement. Base adjustments include:

- Realignment (increase) – From the Office of Policy (\$891,000, 5 positions, 5 FTE)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$7,000)
- Decrease – Right-Sizing Personnel (1 Position, 1 FTE)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$46,000)
 - Decrease – Supplies and materials (\$2,000)
 - Decrease – Travel (\$35,000)
 - Decrease – Advisory and assistance contracts (\$9,000)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

The Office for State and Local Law Enforcement (OSLLE) is the Department's principal liaison to the non-Federal law enforcement community. As such, OSLLE is responsible for coordinating national-level policies related to non-Federal law enforcement's role in preventing, preparing for, protecting against, and responding to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other hazards within the United States.

In the FY 2014, the Department proposes to establish OSLLE as an independent office. OSLLE responsibilities are similar to other DHS stand-alone offices that have primary liaison responsibilities with external stakeholders. State, local, and tribal law enforcement are vital partners in the Department's efforts to keep our communities safe, secure, and resilient. Therefore, a clearly identified and highly visible point-of-contact within the Department is essential to ensure that the

homeland security and terrorism prevention needs of State, local, and tribal law enforcement are being addressed during policy development, grant allocation, and strategy formation.

As a standalone office, the OSLLE would be better positioned to coordinate activities with and between other DHS offices and Components to ensure that intelligence and information sharing requirements of non-Federal law enforcement agencies are being addressed, as well as to ensure that law enforcement and terrorism-focused grants to state, local, and tribal government agencies are appropriately focused on terrorism prevention activities.

Below is an object class breakout to reflect prior year funding levels for OSLLE.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office for State and Local Law Enforcement
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	273	460	464	191
11.5 Other personnel compensation	-	-	-	-
12.1 Benefits	134	198	199	65
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	407	658	663	256
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	79	72	52	(27)
23.1 GSA rent	25	25	33	8
25.1 Advisory and Assistance Services	41	79	55	14
25.2 Other Services	8	3	0	(8)
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	49	49	43	(6)
25.4 Operation and maintenance of facilities	1	1	-	(1)
25.6 Medical Care	1	2	2	1
26.0 Supplies and materials	5	8	4	(1)
31.0 Equipment	-	-	-	-
Total, Other Object Classes	209	239	189	(20)
Adjustments		-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year		-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year		-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations		-	-	-
Total Requirements	616	897	852	236
Full Time Equivalents	5	5	4	(1)

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Office of Intergovernmental Affairs

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	15	15	2,625
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	(1)	(1)	(107)
2014 Current Services	14	14	2,518
2014 Total Request	14	14	2,518
Total Change 2012 to 2014	(1)	(1)	(107)

OSEM requests 14 positions, 14 FTE, and \$2,518,000 in FY 2014 for the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs. Base adjustments include:

- Increase – Transfer from OCRSO for Shared Services (\$8,000)
- Increase – Pay Raise (\$20,000)
- Increase – Realignment between offices (\$25,000)
- Decrease – Efficiencies (\$160,000, 1 Position, 1 FTE)
 - Decrease – Mission support staffing (\$123,000, 1 Position, 1 FTE)
 - Decrease – Travel (\$37,000)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

IGA serves as the voice and advocate for the State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) elected and appointed officials within the Department as well as the primary liaison between those officials and DHS leadership and senior officials.

IGA's stakeholder community consists of the Nation's more than 500,000 elected and appointed officials. These officials include governors, state homeland security advisors (HSAs), mayors, county executives, city and county appointed officials, leadership of the 566 federally recognized Native American and Native Alaskan tribes, emergency managers, and the various national associations that represent these officials. On a daily basis, IGA coordinates and consults with the Department's stakeholders in the homeland security enterprise as they develop and implement policy and budget decisions that impact SLTT homeland security efforts as well as the Department and our operations.

IGA manages communications with SLTT officials and coordinates outreach activities across the spectrum of Departmental issues, initiatives, and programs confronting all agencies and Components of the Department. IGA also coordinates with counterpart Intergovernmental Affairs Offices within other Executive Branch agencies and the White House. IGA strives to ensure that elected and appointed government officials across the nation at the state, local, tribal and territorial levels are informed of DHS policies programs, and priorities. IGA coordinates messaging and activities with the other DHS stakeholder offices—including Private Sector Office, State and Local Law Enforcement, Public Affairs, and Legislative Affairs—to ensure that the full spectrum of our partners are engaged in the homeland security process.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement
Program Performance Justification
(Dollars in Thousands)

PPA: Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement

	Perm. Pos	FTE	Amount
2012 Revised Enacted	-	-	1,177
2014 Adjustments-to-Base	-	-	(1,177)
2014 Current Services	-	-	-
2014 Total Request	-	-	-
Total Change 2012 to 2014	-	-	(1,177)

OSEM requests 0 positions, 0 FTE, and \$0 in FY 2014 for the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement. Base adjustments include:

- Increase –Realignment between offices (\$623,000)
- Decrease – Termination of one-time costs (\$1,800,000)

CURRENT SERVICES PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:

The Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE) was terminated in Fiscal Year 2012 per Public Law 112-74. The FY 2012 funding remaining after CNE was terminated was transferred to the Office of Policy, which assumed policy development and coordination responsibilities previously assigned to CNE.

IV. Program Justification Changes

**Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Justification of Program Changes
(Dollars in Thousands)**

Program Increase 1: CRCL- Oversight of 287(g) and Secure Communities
PPA: Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Program Increase: Positions 0, FTE 0, Dollars \$1,327

Funding Profile

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted			FY 2013 Annualized CR			FY 2014 Request		
	Pos	FTE	Dollars (\$000)	Pos	FTE	Dollars (\$000)	Pos	FTE	Dollars (\$000)
Current Services Level							5	5	1,067
Program Increase							-	-	1,327
Total Request	-	-	-	5	2.5	694	5	5	2,394

Description of Item

The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) requests a program increase of \$1.327 million to ensure that the Department's immigration efforts comply with all applicable civil rights statutes and constitutional requirements. In FY 2012, CRCL received a program increase of 5 positions, 2.5 FTE, and \$694K. The remaining 2.5 FTE are included as an adjustment-to-base in FY 2014 at \$373K.

The program increase of \$1.327 million will enable CRCL to further provide policy advice, investigations, and training relating to Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Secure Communities and 287(g) programs. CRCL will continue to participate in ICE's 287(g) advisory committee, improve ICE's site audits of 287(g) jail model programs, conduct sole and joint investigations, improve data-based and statistical oversight, review policies and procedures to ensure respect for civil rights and civil liberties, and provide training and awareness briefing materials and roll call videos for State and local law enforcement.

Justification

Secure Communities has grown rapidly since the program first began in 2009. It reached nationwide activation in FY 2013. As such, CRCL's oversight is needed to ensure that the program complies with all applicable civil rights statutes and constitutional requirements.

CRCL is statutorily responsible for providing civil rights oversight for the Secure Communities and 287(g) programs, but as Secure Communities has rapidly expanded across the country, additional funding is required. In particular, funding will assist CRCL in establishing a robust ability to perform the following activities:

- Investigate broad civil rights complaints against such programs;
- Work with 287(g) jail model programs on systematic reporting and other compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (which bans race and national origin discrimination);
- Support Secure Communities program training to assist compliance with civil rights requirements while identifying, detaining and processing individuals who have been identified as potentially removable immigration offenders, or to engage with affected communities to educate them about the program;
- Conduct outreach to ensure that local communities are aware of civil rights complaint procedures.

Moreover, funds will enable CRCL to:

- Conduct statistical analysis of Secure Communities to produce quarterly reports that will be made public and guide oversight analysis and investigation;
- Provide assistance to ICE on its 287(g) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) audit process;
- Work with ICE on training for 287(g) officers working in the jail model program; and
- Prepare a series of awareness briefings for front-line state and local law enforcement personnel on civil rights issues related to Secure Communities.

CRCL staff will conduct investigations involving systematic or consistent discriminatory practices, augment training (both live and web-based) provided to state and local law enforcement personnel that participate in the programs, conduct sophisticated special and routine statistical analysis, provide civil rights and civil liberties policy advice, and engage with affected communities. CRCL will also be able to increase collaboration efforts with both ICE and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). ICE collaboration will include assistance in program development and evolution of policies, procedures, and activities to ensure appropriate protection for civil rights and civil liberties, to assist ICE's OPR in its audits of 287(g) jurisdictions both through on-site participation and recommendations for better incorporation of civil rights and civil liberties issues into its standardized audit procedures, and to provide civil rights and civil liberties training to ICE OPR auditors and to ICE 287(g) program managers. CRCL will also further collaboration with ICE's Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) to better survey and monitor the exercise of immigration authority by state and local law enforcement.

Impact on Performance (Relationship of Increase to Strategic Goals)

The performance of this program will directly support DHS's mission of Enforcing and Administering Our Immigration Laws, which is enhanced by the Secure Communities and 287(g) jail model programs. It is crucial that these programs proceed with sufficient regard for civil rights requirements.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Justification of Program Changes
(Dollars in Thousands)

Program Increase 2: CRCL- Countering Domestic Violent Extremism
PPA: Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Program Increase: Positions 1, FTE 0.5, Dollars \$135

Funding Profile

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted			FY 2013 Annualized CR			FY 2014 Request		
	Pos	FTE	Dollars (\$000)	Pos	FTE	Dollars (\$000)	Pos	FTE	Dollars (\$000)
Current Services Level							-	-	-
Program Increase							1	0.5	135
Total Request	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.5	135

Description of Item

The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) requests 1 positions, 0.5 FTE, and \$135,000 to ensure the continuation of the CRCL “Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) through Community Partnerships” community engagement initiative and training program for state, local, and federal law enforcement. CRCL supports the implementation of the White House’s *National Strategy on Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* and the DHS CVE strategy through enhanced community engagement initiatives, as well as comprehensive CVE training programs for law enforcement stakeholders. CRCL conducts community engagement workshops, in partnership with FBI, NCTC, and local law enforcement officials, to educate and inform community members of issues related to countering violent extremism. Additionally, CRCL’s CVE program trains thousands of law enforcement personnel annually to effectively use community partnerships to counter violent extremism. The CRCL CVE training curriculum includes three components of on-site instruction: understanding radicalization to violence; cultural awareness; and community engagement. Participants receive a how-to guide for community interaction and effective policing without the use of ethnic profiling. The course orients law enforcement personnel to key cultural issues involving the American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, Somali, and South Asian communities. Since October 2010, DHS CRCL trained over 3,500 law enforcement officials on CVE and cultural awareness at over 60 separate events.

Justification

With the requested funding, CRCL will be able to appoint a fully dedicated employee to provide continuous program support of CRCL’s CVE strategy. CRCL’s continuation of the enhanced community engagement and the CVE training program is necessary to conduct several of the activities designated under the White House’s *Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (SIP), released on December 8, 2011. The SIP is the

blueprint for how the U.S. Government will implement the Domestic Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism, its first strategy to address violent extremism in the Homeland. The SIP lists the current and future actions the U.S. Government will take in support of a locally-focused, community-based approach, in three broad areas: (1) enhancing engagement with and support to local communities; (2) building government and law enforcement expertise; and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals. This is the first U.S. Government strategy and implementation plan to address ideologically-inspired violent extremism in the homeland.

CRCL's CVE engagement and training project is listed as one of the key initiatives in the DHS role in the implementation for the White House Strategy.

CRCL served as a critical resource for the development of the DHS-FLETC effort in furtherance of the SIP to develop a CVE curriculum to be integrated into existing training programs for federal law enforcement. The curriculum gives federal law enforcement a better understanding of CVE and how to more effectively leverage existing local partnerships.

In addition, DHS, in partnership with the Los Angeles Police Department and the National Consortium for Advanced Policing, developed a CVE curriculum that includes a 16-hour continuing education module for executive and front line officers.

CRCL has been instrumental in empowering community based efforts to counter violent extremism. CRCL is working closely with Somali American communities, in Minneapolis, Minnesota and Columbus, Ohio, among others, to develop grassroots CVE efforts. Examples include: Day long community retreats with law enforcement, summit meetings with Somali youth on CVE strategies, and training programs to encourage community oriented policing.

In 2013, CRCL is working to integrate its training efforts into the Department's overall CVE training effort to support federal, state, and local law enforcement by making more resources available on the DHS/FBI CVE Training Resources Web portal that is hosted on the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). Further CRCL also co-chairs the NSS Sub-IPC the National Engagement Taskforce (NETF) with DOJ. The NETF has been tasked by NSS and the SIP to support federal, state, and local partners with best practices and resources regarding engagement and how best to partner with communities to prevent violent crime and violent crime that may be ideologically motivated.

Impact on Performance (Relationship of Increase to Strategic Goals)

The performance of the CVE project will directly support DHS's mission of *Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security*. CRCL will be able to dedicate full time support to continue to:

Meet the current and future DHS planned participation in the White House SIP implementation;

- Enhance community engagement initiatives to develop and promote grassroots efforts to counter violent extremism; and
- Improve the development of and use of standardized training based on the latest intelligence and academic research, which conveys information about violent extremism; improves cultural competency; and imparts best practices and lessons learned for effective community engagement and partnerships.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Justification of Program Changes
(Dollars in Thousands)

Program Increase 3: OPA- See Something, Say Something- Mass Casualty Shooting
PPA: Office of Public Affairs
Program Increase: Positions 0, FTE 0, Dollars \$3,000

Funding Profile

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted			FY 2013 Annualized CR			FY 2014 Request		
	Pos	FTE	Dollars ² (\$000)	Pos	FTE	Dollars (\$000)	Pos	FTE	Dollars (\$000)
Current Services Level							-	-	-
Program Increase							-	-	3,000
Total Request	-	-	40	-	-	-	-	-	3,000

Description of Item

The Office of Public Affairs requests \$3 million to support the expansion of the “If You See Something, Say Something™” public awareness campaign. Originally implemented by New York's Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), and later licensed to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “If You See Something, Say Something™” is a simple and effective program to engage the public and key frontline employees to identify and report indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crime to the proper transportation and law enforcement authorities. Although the campaign has primarily focused on anti-terrorism efforts, it will continue to expand to include the prevention, preparation, mitigation, and response to violent incidents such as active shooter and mass casualty scenarios. This work will be done in coordination with the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and our State, local, and private sector partners. The funding will allow DHS to expand this campaign to additional cities, states, law enforcement partners, the private sector and the academic community and create educational materials, videos and other training tools. The funding will also facilitate the production and distribution of public service announcements (PSAs), advertisements, printing and translation of educational/informational material, and travel to briefings/trainings that are critical to increasing the reach of this successful campaign.

² The “If You See Something, Say Something™” campaign is a Department-wide initiative receiving contributions from other DHS components for total obligations of \$3 million in FY 2012.

Justification

The Department launched the “If You See Something, Say Something™” campaign in conjunction with the Department of Justice’s Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative—an Administration effort to train state and local law enforcement to recognize behaviors and indicators related to terrorism and terrorism-related crime; standardize how those observations are documented and analyzed; and ensure the sharing of those reports with the Federal Bureau of Investigation-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces for further investigation and fusion centers for analysis. The campaign underscores the Department’s message that homeland security begins with hometown security, in which an alert public plays a critical role in keeping our nation safe.

Since its launch in July 2010, “If You See Something, Say Something™” has expanded to include more than 215 partnerships with cities, states and the private sector, including universities, sports leagues and the transportation industry. Through these collaborations, DHS provides employees, volunteers and the general public with tailored DHS suspicious activity reporting materials including information on behaviors and indicators of terrorism and terrorism related crime, and how to report suspicious activities. The Department creates unique materials for each partnership, such as posters, digital materials for video boards or jumbotrons, tri-folds, and online assets among others, at no placement cost to the Department. Promotional materials and PSAs shown at past events—including the past three NFL Super Bowls, past two MLB World Series, the last three NBA All-Star Game and Jam Sessions and last three U.S. Opens— have been displayed at no cost to DHS.

As part of the Administration’s comprehensive efforts to prevent gun violence, DHS will continue to work with Federal and State and local law enforcement on expanding nationwide public awareness efforts such as the “If You See Something, Say Something™” campaign. The funding would enable DHS to better work with law enforcement and support new partnerships for educational and public awareness efforts, in order to further the Department’s ongoing efforts to prevent mass casualty shootings, as well as other acts of terrorism. With this funding, the Department will be able to proactively develop and provide materials to schools and local law enforcement, in order to better educate the public on active shooter activities.

The request funds advertisements for 15 to 20 cities, 10 Public Service Announcements geared towards colleges/universities, religious organizations and private sector groups, 7 to 10 in-person briefings/trainings and printing and translation of materials (posters, brochures, tri-folds, paystub inserts, etc.).

Impact on Performance (Relationship of Increase to Strategic Goals)

The “If You See Something, Say Something™” program is a top priority for the Department, aligning to its mission of *Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security*. Citizens play an active role in their communities in reporting suspicious activity to law enforcement and have helped foil numerous plots including a planned attack against a Martin Luther King Jr. Day parade route in Washington State in 2011. Separately in 2011, a gun store owner contacted authorities when a customer made unusual inquiries and a large ammunition purchase, helping to prevent a likely attack in Killeen, Texas. More recently, an alert construction worker helped to prevent the 2012 shooting in front of the Empire State Building from becoming an even worse tragedy by quickly finding police officers, who then acted to take down the shooter.

V. Exhibits and Other Supporting Material

A. Justification of Proposed Legislative Language

For necessary expenses of the Office of the Secretary of Homeland Security, as authorized by section 102 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 112), and executive management of the Department of Homeland Security, as authorized by law, [\$134,150,000] \$126,554,000: Provided, That not to exceed \$51,000 shall be for official reception and representation expenses, of which \$17,000 shall be made available to the Office of International Affairs for Visa Waiver Program negotiations in Washington, DC, and for other international activities: Provided further, That all official costs associated with the use of government aircraft by Department of Homeland Security personnel to support official travel of the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary shall be paid from amounts made available for the Immediate Office of the Secretary and the Immediate Office of the Deputy Secretary.

Language Provision	Explanation
1 ... [\$134,150,000] \$126,554,000 ...	Dollar change only. No substantial change proposed.

B. FY 2012 to FY 2014 Budget Change

Department of Homeland Security Office of the Secretary and Executive Management

FY 2012 to FY 2014 Budget Change
(Dollars in Thousands)

	Pos.	FTE	Amount
FY 2012 Revised Enacted	690	688	134,410
Adjustments-to-Base			
Transfers to and from other accounts:			
NPPD/RMA to Office of Policy	10	10	2,990
OCIO to Office of Public Affairs	4	4	545
USM CRSO for Shared Services	-	-	388
Total Transfers	14	14	3,923
Increases			
Realignment between offices	-	-	1,840
2014 Pay Raise	-	-	894
Annualization of Prior Year Part Year Funding for CRCL	-	2.5	373
Creation of Stand-alone Offices for OIA, PSO, OSLLE in from Policy	60	60	10,640
Right Size FTE	4	4	-
Total, Increases	64	66.5	13,747
Decreases			
Realignment between offices	-	-	(1,840)
Creation of Stand-alone Offices for OIA, PSO, OSLLE out of Policy	(60)	(60)	(10,640)
Efficiencies and Reductions	(41)	(41)	(15,708)
Non recur: CNE	-	-	(1,800)
Right Sizing FTE	(40)	(40)	-
Total, Decreases	(141)	(141)	(29,988)
Total Other Adjustments	(71)	(68.5)	(16,241)
Total Adjustments-to-Base	(63)	(60.5)	(12,318)
2014 Current Services	627	627.5	122,092
Program Changes			
Increases			
CRCL- Oversight of 287(g) and Secure Communities	-	-	1,327
CRCL- Countering Domestic Violent Extremism	1	0.5	135
OPA- See Something, Say Something- Mass Casualty Shooting	-	-	3,000
Total, Increases	1	0.5	4,462
Total Program Changes	1	0.5	4,462
2014 Request	628	628	126,554
2012 to 2014 Change	(62)	(60)	(7,856)

C. Summary of Requirements

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Summary of Requirements
(Dollars in Thousands)

	Pos.	FTE	Amount
FY 2012 Revised Enacted	690	688	134,410
FY 2013 Annualized CR	701	699	133,975
Adjustments-to-Base	-	-	-
Transfers	14	14	3,923
Increases	64	66.5	13,747
Decreases	(141)	(141)	(29,988)
Total, Adjustments-to-Base	(63)	(60.5)	(12,318)
FY 2014 Current Services	627	627.5	122,092
Program Changes	-	-	-
Increases	1	0.5	4,462
Total, Program Changes	1	0.5	4,462
FY 2014 Request	628	628	126,554
FY 2012 to FY 2014 Total Change	(62)	(60)	(7,856)

Estimates by Program Project Activity	FY 2012			FY 2014			FY 2014			FY 2014			FY 2012 to FY 2014		
	Revised Enacted			Adjustments-to-Base			Program Change			Request			Total Change		
	Pos	FTE	Amount	Pos	FTE	Amount	Pos	FTE	Amount	Pos	FTE	Amount	Pos	FTE	Amount
Immediate Office of the Secretary	6	6	4,605	-	-	(477)	-	-	-	6	6	4,128	-	-	(477)
Immediate Office of the Deputy Secretary	7	7	2,110	(2)	(2)	(288)	-	-	-	5	5	1,822	(2)	(2)	(288)
Chief of Staff	14	14	2,397	(1)	(1)	(197)	-	-	-	13	13	2,200	(1)	(1)	(197)
Executive Secretary	64	64	8,748	(9)	(9)	(1,145)	-	-	-	55	55	7,603	(9)	(9)	(1,145)
Office of General Counsel	131	131	22,370	(23)	(23)	(1,370)	-	-	-	108	108	21,000	(23)	(23)	(1,370)
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties	101	99	22,011	(5)	(2.5)	(1,795)	1	0.5	1,462	97	97	21,678	(4)	(2)	(333)
Office of Public Affairs	29	29	6,288	(3)	(3)	(627)	-	-	3,000	26	26	8,661	(3)	(3)	2,373
Office of Legislative Affairs	32	32	5,925	(4)	(4)	(427)	-	-	-	28	28	5,498	(4)	(4)	(427)
Privacy Officer	43	43	8,328	2	2	(185)	-	-	-	45	45	8,143	2	2	(185)
Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman	30	30	6,160	-	-	(816)	-	-	-	30	30	5,344	-	-	(816)
Office of Policy	218	218	41,666	(72)	(72)	(13,851)	-	-	-	146	146	27,815	(72)	(72)	(13,851)
Office of International Affairs	0	0	-	41	41	7,626	-	-	-	41	41	7,626	41	41	7,626
Private Sector Office	0	0	-	10	10	1,666	-	-	-	10	10	1,666	10	10	1,666
Office of State and Local Law Enforcement	0	0	-	4	4	852	-	-	-	4	4	852	4	4	852
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs	15	15	2,625	(1)	(1)	(107)	-	-	-	14	14	2,518	(1)	(1)	(107)
Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement	0	0	1,177	-	-	(1,177)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(1,177)
Total	690	688	134,410	(63)	(60.5)	(12,318)	1	0.5	4,462	628	628	126,554	(62)	(60)	(7,856)

D. Summary of Reimbursable Resources

Department of Homeland Security
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Summary of Reimbursable Resources
(Dollars in Thousands)

Collections by Source:	FY 2012 Revised Enacted			FY 2013 Annualized CR			FY 2014 Request			Increase/Decrease		
	Pos	FTE	Amount	Pos	FTE	Amount	Pos	FTE	Amount	Pos	FTE	Amount
Department of Justice	-	-	-	1	1	\$156	-	-	-	-1	-1	-\$156
Office of Director of National Intelligence	1	1	\$111	1	1	103	-	-	-	-1	-1	-103
Intelligence and Analysis	4	4	686	6	6	1,030	6	6	\$1,110	-	-	80
Operations Coordination	2	2	356	2	2	310	2	2	400	-	-	90
United States Coast Guard	1	-	66	2	1	100	1	-	50	-1	-1	-50
National Protection and Programs Directorate	20	20	3,234	20	20	3,350	23	23	4,911	3	3	1,561
FEMA	1	-	45	2	1	110	1	-	50	-1	-1	-60
Immigration & Customs Enforcement	6	5	786	30	15	1,411	6	3	525	-24	-12	-886
Other	1	1	119	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Department of Defense	1	1	222	-	-	-	1	1	222	1	1	222
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center	-	-	134	-	-	-	-	-	134	-	-	134
US VISIT	1	1	207	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Customs and Border Protection	2	2	97	4	2	200	5	3	465	1	1	265
FPS	1	-	125	-	-	-	1	-	125	1	-	125
Transportation Security Administration	2	2	254	2	1	100	3	2	365	1	1	265
United States Secret Service	1	-	69	2	1	120	-	-	-	-2	-1	-120
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services	-	-	6	-	-	-	2	1	100	2	1	100
Science and Technology	5	5	541	6	6	907	6	6	1,172	-	-	265
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office	1	1	197	1	1	175	1	1	225	-	-	50
Office of Health Affairs	2	2	374	2	2	330	3	3	600	1	1	270
Department of State	2	2	905	2	2	1,937	40	30	31,249	38	28	29,312
Department of Treasury	1	1	25	1	-	17	-	-	-	-1	-	-17
Total Budgetary Resources	55	50	8,559	84	62	10,356	101	81	41,703	17	19	31,347

Obligations by Program/Project Activity:	FY 2012 Revised Enacted			FY 2013 Annualized CR			FY 2014 Request			Increase/Decrease		
	Pos	FTE	Amount	Pos	FTE	Amount	Pos	FTE	Amount	Pos	FTE	Amount
Executive Secretary	1	1	161	1	1	167	1	1	172	-	-	5
Office of Policy	3	3	1,010	3	3	2,092	44	34	32,157	41	31	30,065
Office of General Counsel	43	39	5,943	56	46	6,796	54	45	8,810	-2	-1	2,014
Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman	1	1	118	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Office of Civil Rights and Liberties	7	6	1,327	24	12	1,301	2	1	564	-22	-11	-737
Total Obligations	55	50	8,559	84	62	10,356	101	81	41,703	17	19	31,347

E. Summary of Requirements By Object Class

Department of Homeland Security Office of the Secretary and Executive Management Summary of Requirements by Object Class (Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	2012 Revised Enacted	2013 Annualized CR	2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Other Compensation Benefits				
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	\$60,480	\$62,399	\$56,433	(4,047)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	6,657	6,371	6,596	(61)
11.5 Other personnel compensation	2,022	1,710	1,851	(171)
11.6 Pay Diff (Sun/Night)	-	-	-	-
11.7 Military personnel/Awards	-	-	-	-
11.8 Special Service Pay	346	437	348	2
12.1 Benefits	19,430	19,301	18,580	(850)
12.4 Allowances	-	-	-	-
12.6 Temp Quarters	-	-	-	-
12.6 Temporary Quarters	-	-	-	-
13.0 Unemployment Compensation	-	-	-	-
Total, Personnel and Other Compensation Benefits	88,935	90,218	83,808	(5,127)
Other Object Classes				
21.0 Travel	5,336	5,190	3,561	(1,775)
22.0 Transportation of things	90	43	95	5
23.1 GSA rent	10,932	10,932	9,836	(1,096)
23.2 Other rent	58	58	58	-
23.3 Communications, utilities, and misc. charges	1	15	1	-
24.0 Printing	783	861	304	(479)
25.0 Other services	-	-	-	-
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	3,763	3,310	6,273	2,510
25.2 Other services	1,779	1,668	951	(828)
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	20,762	19,845	19,910	(852)
25.4 O&M of facilities	478	442	455	(23)
25.5 R&D of contracts	-	2	-	-
25.6 Medical care	50	41	56	6
25.7 Operation and maintenance of equipment	349	349	293	(56)
25.8 Subsistence & Support of persons	-	-	-	-
26.0 Supplies and materials	807	805	707	(100)
31.0 Equipment	276	196	234	(42)
32.0 Land & structures	12	-	12	-
Total, Other Object Classes	45,475	43,757	42,746	(2,730)
Total, Direct Obligations	134,410	133,975	126,554	(7,856)
Adjustments				
Net Offsetting Collections	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Offsetting Collections	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	134,410	133,975	126,554	(7,856)
Full Time Equivalents	688	699	628	(60)

F. Permanent Positions by Grade

Department of Homeland Security Office of the Secretary and Executive Management

Permanent Positions by Grade

Grades and Salary Range	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014	FY 2012 to
	Revised Enacted	Annualized CR	Request	FY 2014 Change
	Pos.	Pos.	Pos.	Total
Total, SES	59	60	57	(2)
GS-15	187	191	173	(14)
GS-14	156	158	132	(24)
GS-13	94	95	88	(6)
GS-12	73	74	63	(10)
GS-11	56	57	51	(5)
GS-9	29	30	31	2
GS-8	10	10	6	(4)
GS-7	17	17	19	2
GS-5	1	1	1	-
GS-4	8	8	7	(1)
Total Permanent Positions	690	701	628	(62)
Unfilled Positions EOY	57	66	-	(57)
Total Permanent Employment EOY	633	635	628	(5)
Full Time Equivalents	688	699	628	(60)
Average ES Salary	160,989	160,989	161,794	805
Average GS Salary	103,443	103,443	103,960	517
Average Grade	13	13	13	-

G. Capital Investment and Construction Initiative Listing
N/A

H. PPA Budget Justifications

**Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Immediate Office of the Secretary
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)**

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	623	662	630	7
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	342	509	347	5
11.5 Other personnel compensation	10	14	12	2
11.8 Special Service Pay	-	246	-	-
12.1 Benefits	225	274	228	3
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	1,200	1,705	1,217	17
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	2,427	2,568	1,515	(912)
23.1 GSA rent	328	328	371	43
24.0 Printing	7	7	7	-
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	1	1	1	-
25.2 Other services	236	38	202	(34)
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	292	292	735	443
25.4 O&M of facilities	22	-	22	-
25.6 Medical care	3	3	3	-
26.0 Supplies and materials	78	78	44	(34)
31.0 Equipment	11	11	11	-
Total, Other Object Classes	3,405	3,326	2,911	(494)
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	4,605	5,031	4,128	(477)
Full Time Equivalents	6	12	6	-

Immediate Office of the Secretary Mission Statement

The Office of the Secretary provides central leadership, management and direction for the entire Department of Homeland Security. This office provides oversight for all offices within the Departmental Operations function as well as all other entities of the Department. It is the Secretary's role to serve as the top representative of Homeland Security to the President, Congress and the general public.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	623	662	630	7
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	342	509	347	5
11.5 Other personnel compensation	10	14	12	2
11.8 Special Service Pay	-	246	-	-
12.1 Benefits	225	274	228	3
Total, Salaries & Benefits	1,200	1,705	1,217	17

Salaries and Benefits fund compensation directly related to duties performed by Federal civilian employees. The FY 2014 request reflects a 1% pay inflation increase of \$17,000.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	\$2,427	\$2,568	\$1,515	-\$912

Travel includes all costs of transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$395,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices, a decrease of \$385,000 to offset an increase to the Working Capital Fund, and a decrease of \$922,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	\$328	\$328	\$371	\$43

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request includes an increase of \$43,000 due to an increase in GSA rent funded through the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.2 Other services	\$236	\$38	\$202	-\$34

Other services include contractual services with non-Federal sources that are not otherwise classified under object class 25. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$34,000 to offset increases to the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	\$292	\$292	\$735	\$443

Purchases from government accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from DHS WCF, DHS Shared Services, and other government agencies including interagency service requirements. The FY 2014 request includes an increase of \$376,000 for a realignment to the Working Capital Fund, and an increase of \$67,000 for the Shared Services transfer from OCRSO.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
26.0 Supplies and materials	\$78	\$78	\$44	-\$34

Supplies and materials are defined as commodities that are (a) ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use, (b) converted in the process of construction or manufacture, (c) used to form a minor part of equipment or property, or other property of little monetary value that does not meet any of the three criteria listed above, at the option of the agency. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$34,000 in efficiencies.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Immediate Office of the Deputy Secretary
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	489	489	302	(187)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	426	380	430	4
11.5 Other personnel compensation	75	75	76	1
12.1 Benefits	253	253	256	3
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	1,243	1,197	1,064	(179)
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	518	384	339	(179)
23.1 GSA rent	112	112	127	15
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	26	26	26	-
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	168	168	223	55
25.4 O&M of facilities	6	6	6	-
25.6 Medical care	1	1	1	-
26.0 Supplies and materials	33	33	33	-
31.0 Equipment	3	3	3	-
Total, Other Object Classes	867	733	758	(109)
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	2,110	1,930	1,822	(288)
Full Time Equivalents	7	8	5	(2)

Immediate Office of the Deputy Secretary Mission Statement

The Office of the Deputy Secretary directly supports the Office of the Secretary by providing leadership to the Department. This focuses on internal management and direction, which ensures that the Department will continue to operate efficiently and effectively in carrying out its mission. It is the Deputy Secretary's role to provide internal oversight to all Departmental Operations, which allows the Secretary to focus more on external matters concerning DHS.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	489	489	302	(187)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	426	380	430	4
11.5 Other personnel compensation	75	75	76	1
12.1 Benefits	253	253	256	3
Total, Salaries & Benefits	1,243	1,197	1,064	(179)

Salaries and Benefits fund compensation directly related to duties performed by Federal civilian employees. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$13,000 for a pay inflation of 1% and a decrease of \$192,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	\$518	\$384	\$339	-\$179

Travel includes all costs of transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$60,000 to offset an increase to the Working Capital Fund, and an efficiency decrease of \$119,000.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	\$112	\$112	\$127	\$15

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request includes an increase of \$15,000 due to an increase in GSA rent funded through the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	\$168	\$168	\$223	\$55

Purchases from government accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from DHS WCF, DHS Shared Services, and other government agencies including interagency service requirements. The FY 2014 request includes a total increase of \$55,000 due to an increase of \$45,000 for a realignment to the Working Capital Fund and an increase of \$10,000 for the Shared Services transfer from OCRSO.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Chief of Staff
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	411	411	415	4
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	791	791	674	(117)
11.5 Other personnel compensation	20	20	20	-
12.1 Benefits	420	420	424	4
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	1,642	1,642	1,533	(109)
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	
21.0 Travel	339	258	226	(113)
23.1 GSA rent	73	73	82	9
25.2 Other services	21	19	17	(4)
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	301	301	321	20
25.4 O&M of facilities	1	1	1	-
25.6 Medical care	1	1	1	-
26.0 Supplies and materials	17	17	17	-
31.0 Equipment	2	2	2	-
Total, Other Object Classes	755	672	667	(88)
Adjustments	-	-	-	
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	
Total Requirements	2,397	2,314	2,200	(197)
Full Time Equivalents	14	18	13	(1)

Chief of Staff Mission Statement

The Office of the Chief of Staff promotes the coordination of the agencies and directorates that have been consolidated into the Department of Homeland Security. The Office of the Chief of Staff is responsible for all operational functions that relate to the Immediate Office of the Secretary (budget, information technology, and personnel), and coordinates activities with the Department Headquarters continuity of operations. With the inherent challenges of a concurrent creation of a new department, reorganization, consolidation, and several new offices, the Office of the Chief of Staff seeks to streamline, coordinate, and deliver highly effective initiatives and policies that will ensure our safety, response capacity, and our freedoms.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	411	411	415	4
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	791	791	674	(117)
11.5 Other personnel compensation	20	20	20	-
12.1 Benefits	420	420	424	4
Total, Salaries & Benefits	1,642	1,642	1,533	(109)

Salaries and Benefits funds compensation directly related to duties performed by Federal civilian employees. The FY 2014 request includes a net decrease of \$109,000 which includes an increase of \$16,000 for 1% pay inflation and a decrease of \$125,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	\$339	\$258	\$226	-\$113

Travel includes all costs of transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$16,000 to offset increases to the Working Capital Fund and a decrease of \$97,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	\$73	\$73	\$82	\$9

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request includes an increase of \$9,000 due to an increase in GSA rent funded through the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.2 Other services	\$21	\$19	\$17	-\$4

Other services include contractual services with non-Federal sources that are not otherwise classified under object class 25. The FY 2014 request includes a decrease of \$4,000 to offset an increase to the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	\$301	\$301	\$321	\$20

Purchases from government accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from DHS WCF, DHS Shared Services, and other government agencies including interagency service requirements. The FY 2014 request includes an increase of \$20,000 for a realignment to the Working Capital Fund.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Executive Secretary
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	4,499	4,044	3,398	(1,101)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	140	140	141	1
11.5 Other personnel compensation	206	206	30	(176)
11.8 Special Service Pay	191	191	193	2
12.1 Benefits	1,353	1,295	1,319	(34)
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	6,389	5,876	5,081	(1,308)
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	2	2	2	-
23.1 GSA rent	596	596	673	77
24.0 Printing	14	-	14	-
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	25	-	25	-
25.2 Other services	67	67	67	-
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	1,437	1,437	1,530	93
25.4 O&M of facilities	67	67	67	-
25.6 Medical care	5	5	5	-
26.0 Supplies and materials	103	100	96	(7)
31.0 Equipment	43	-	43	-
Total, Other Object Classes	2,359	2,274	2,522	163
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	8,748	8,150	7,603	(1,145)
Full Time Equivalents	64	58	55	(9)

Executive Secretary Mission Statement

The mission of the Office of the Executive Secretary is to establish effective and proficient protocols in the processing of all internal communication, decision management, briefings, liaison activity between the Department and its components, and external correspondence for the Immediate Office of the Secretary and all directorates.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	4,499	4,044	3,398	(1,101)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	140	140	141	1
11.5 Other personnel compensation	206	206	30	(176)
11.8 Special Service Pay	191	191	193	2
12.1 Benefits	1,353	1,295	1,319	(34)
Total, Salaries & Benefits	6,389	5,876	5,081	(1,308)

Salaries and Benefits funds compensation directly related to duties performed by Federal civilian employees. The FY 2014 request reflects a net decrease of \$1,173,000 which includes an increase of \$62,000 for 1% pay inflation, a decrease of \$145,000 to offset an increase to the Working Capital Fund, a decrease of \$648,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices, and an efficiency decrease of \$577,000.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	\$596	\$596	\$673	\$77

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request includes an increase of \$77,000 due to an increase in GSA rent funded through the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	\$1,437	\$1,437	\$1,530	\$93

Purchases from government accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from DHS WCF, DHS Shared Services, and other government agencies including interagency service requirements. The FY 2014 request includes a net increase of \$93,000, which includes an increase of \$68,000 for a realignment to the Working Capital Fund and an increase of \$25,000 for the Shared Services transfer from OCRSO.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
26.0 Supplies and materials	\$103	\$100	\$96	-\$7

Supplies and materials are defined as commodities that are (a) ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use, (b) converted in the process of construction or manufacture, (c) used to form a minor part of equipment or property, or other property of little monetary value that does not meet any of the three criteria listed above, at the option of the agency. The FY 2014 request includes a decrease of \$7,000 due to efficiencies.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of General Counsel
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	12,163	12,163	10,805	(1,358)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	735	735	742	7
11.5 Other personnel compensation	317	317	319	2
12.1 Benefits	3,304	3,304	2,846	(458)
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	16,519	16,519	14,712	(1,807)
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	183	183	92	(91)
23.1 GSA rent	1,660	1,660	2,125	465
24.0 Printing	13	13	8	(5)
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	320	643	164	(156)
25.2 Other services	125	125	55	(70)
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	3,343	3,187	3,757	414
25.6 Medical care	7	7	7	-
26.0 Supplies and materials	100	100	62	(38)
31.0 Equipment	100	100	18	(82)
Total, Other Object Classes	5,851	6,018	6,288	437
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	22,370	22,537	21,000	(1,370)
Full Time Equivalents	131	131	108	(23)

Office of General Counsel Mission Statement

The Office of the General Counsel (OGC) provides legal counsel for all DHS offices (except those specifically excluded by regulation or directive), determines the Department's position in order to provide effective legal services dealing with claims, with protests, with litigation, and with alternative dispute resolution, and represents the Department in all legal forums.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	12,163	12,163	10,775	(1,358)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	735	735	742	7
11.5 Other personnel compensation	317	317	319	2
12.1 Benefits	3,304	3,304	2,846	(458)
Total, Salaries & Benefits	16,519	16,519	14,682	(1,807)

Salaries and Benefits fund compensation directly related to duties performed for the Office of General Counsel by Federal civilian employees. The FY 2014 request includes a net decrease of \$1,807,000 which includes an increase of \$159,000 for 1% pay

inflation, an increase of \$30,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices, a decrease of \$901,000 to offset the increase to the Working Capital Fund, and \$1,095,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	\$183	\$183	\$92	-\$91

Travel includes all costs of transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request includes a decrease of \$91,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	\$1,660	\$1,660	\$2,125	\$465

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$465,000 due to an increase in GSA rent funded through the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
24.0 Printing	\$13	\$13	\$8	-\$5

Printing includes all costs for printing and reproduction obtained from the private sector or from other Federal entities. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$5,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	\$320	\$643	\$164	-\$156

Advisory and assistance services include services acquired by contract from non-Federal sources (that is the private sector, foreign governments, State and local governments, tribes, etc.) as well as from other units within the Federal Government. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$142,000 in efficiencies, and a decrease of \$14,000 due to a realignment to the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.2 Other services	\$125	\$125	\$55	-\$70

Other services include contractual services with non-Federal sources that are not otherwise classified under Object Class 25. The FY 2014 request includes a decrease of \$70,000 for efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	\$3,343	\$3,187	\$3,757	\$414

Purchases from Government Accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from the DHS WCF. The FY 2014 request reflects a net increase of \$414,000 due to an increase of \$460,000 due to the realignment of the Working Capital Fund, an increase of \$52,000 for the Shared Services transfer from OCRSO, and a decrease of \$98,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
26.0 Supplies and materials	\$100	\$100	\$62	-\$38

Supplies and materials are defined as commodities that are (a) ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use, (b) converted in the process of construction or manufacture, (c) used to form a minor part of equipment or property, or (d) other property of little monetary value that does not meet any of the three criteria listed above, at the option of the agency. The FY 2014 includes a decrease of \$28,000 in efficiencies and a decrease of \$10,000 to offset an increase to the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
31.0 Equipment	\$100	\$100	\$18	-\$82

Equipment includes all costs for the purchases of personal property of a durable nature or the initial installation of equipment when performed under contract. The FY 2014 request includes a decrease of \$82,000 in efficiencies.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	11,498	11,498	12,105	607
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	71	71	72	1
11.5 Other personnel compensation	297	297	300	3
12.1 Benefits	3,346	3,346	3,381	35
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	15,212	15,212	15,858	646
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	362	362	297	(65)
23.1 GSA rent	2,449	2,449	2,529	80
23.2 Other rent	35	35	35	-
24.0 Printing	157	203	57	(100)
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	75	75	75	-
25.2 Other services	173	173	173	-
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	3,277	3,758	2,394	(883)
25.4 O&M of facilities	94	144	129	35
25.6 Medical care	7	7	7	-
26.0 Supplies and materials	152	202	106	(46)
31.0 Equipment	18	18	18	-
Total, Other Object Classes	6,799	7,426	5,820	(979)
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	22,011	22,638	21,678	(333)
Full Time Equivalents	99	111	97	(2)

Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Mission Statement

The mission of the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) is to protect civil rights and civil liberties, to support DHS by providing policy advice on the full range of civil rights and civil liberties issues, and to serve as an information and communication channel with the public regarding all aspects of these issues. Section 705 of the Homeland Security Act provides that the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties shall: Review and assess information alleging abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, and racial and ethnic profiling by employees and officials of the Department; and make public through the internet, radio, television, or newspaper advertisements information on the responsibility and function of, and how to contact, the Officer. Submit to the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the appropriate committees and subcommittees of Congress through the Secretary on an annual basis a report on the implementation of this section, including the use of funds appropriated to carry out this section, and allegations of abuses described under subsection (a)(1) and any actions taken by the Department in response to such allegations.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	11,498	11,498	12,105	607
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	71	71	72	1
11.5 Other personnel compensation	297	297	300	3
12.1 Benefits	3,346	3,346	3,381	35
Total, Salaries & Benefits	15,212	15,212	15,858	646

Salaries and Benefits fund compensation directly related to duties performed for the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties by Federal civilian employees. The FY 2014 request includes an increase of \$154,000 for pay inflation of 1%, an increase of \$489,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices, a pay annualization of \$373,000 for 2.5 FTE for Secure Communities and 287(g) programs, and a program increase of \$135,000 for 1 FTP for Countering Domestic Violent Extremism. There is a decrease of \$505,000 to offset increases in the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	\$362	\$362	\$297	-\$65

Travel includes all costs of transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request includes a decrease of \$65,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.J GSA rent	\$2,449	\$2,449	\$2,529	\$80

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$80,000 due to an increase in GSA rent funded through the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
24.0 Printing	\$157	\$203	\$57	-\$100

Printing includes all costs for printing and reproduction obtained from the private sector or from other Federal entities. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$100,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	\$3,277	\$3,758	\$2,394	-\$883

Purchases from Government Accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from the DHS WCF. The FY 2014 request includes an increase of \$425,000 for a realignment to the WCF, a decrease of \$2,635,000 in efficiencies, and an increase of \$1,327,000 for the Secure Communities and 287(g) programs.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.4 O&M of facilities	\$94	\$144	\$129	\$35

Operation and maintenance of facilities include all payments for the operation and maintenance of facilities when done by contract with the private sector or another Federal Government account. FY 2014 includes an increase of \$35,000 for the shared services transfer from OCRSO.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
26.0 Supplies and materials	\$152	\$202	\$106	-\$46

Supplies and materials are defined as commodities that are (a) ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use, (b) converted in the process of construction or manufacture, (c) used to form a minor part of equipment or property, or (c) other property of little monetary value that does not meet any of the three criteria listed above, at the option of the agency. FY 2014 includes a decrease of \$46,000 for efficiencies.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of Public Affairs
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	2,236	1,917	1,875	(361)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	821	821	829	8
11.5 Other personnel compensation	52	52	53	1
12.1 Benefits	857	764	832	(25)
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	3,966	3,554	3,589	(377)
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	80	95	222	142
23.1 GSA rent	735	735	830	95
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	346	358	3,171	2,825
25.2 Other services	3	-	3	-
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	1,058	986	801	(257)
25.4 O&M of facilities	50	46	20	(30)
25.5 R&D of contracts	-	2	-	-
25.6 Medical care	2	4	2	-
26.0 Supplies and materials	40	55	15	(25)
31.0 Equipment	8	-	8	-
Total, Other Object Classes	2,322	2,281	5,072	2,750
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	6,288	5,835	8,661	2,373
Full Time Equivalents	29	32	26	(3)

Office of Public Affairs Mission Statement

The Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs oversees all external and internal communications for Homeland Security. On a daily basis, the Office of Public Affairs (OPA) responds to national media inquiries, maintains and updates the Department's web site, and coordinates speaking events for Department officials across the country. OPA also develops and manages various public education programs. The Office of Public Liaison, within OPA, fosters strategic communication with the Department's external stakeholders. The Department's organizational identity, including the Homeland Security seal and word mark, was designed and implemented by the Office of Public Affairs. OPA directs the Department's Incident Communications program that guides overall Federal incident communication activity and coordinates with state, local, and international partners to ensure accuracy and timely information to the public during a crisis.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	2,236	1,917	1,876	(361)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	821	821	829	8
11.5 Other personnel compensation	52	52	53	1
12.1 Benefits	857	764	831	(25)
Total, Salaries & Benefits	3,966	3,554	3,589	(377)

Salaries and Benefits compensation directly related to duties performed by Federal civilian employees. The FY 2014 request reflects a net decrease of \$377,000 which includes an increase of \$36,000 for a pay inflation of 1%, a decrease of \$648,000 for efficiencies, a decrease of \$101,000 to offset an increase in the Working Capital Fund, a decrease of \$225,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices, an increase for the transfer in of 4 FTE from CIO for \$545,000, and \$16,000 for the Shared Services transfer from OCRSO.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	\$80	\$95	\$230	\$142

Travel includes all costs of transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request includes an increase of \$175,000 for travel related to the "If You See Something, Say SomethingTM" Campaign and a decrease of \$33,000 for efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	\$735	\$735	\$830	\$95

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$95,000 due to an increase in GSA rent funded through the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	\$346	\$358	\$3,171	\$2,825

Advisory and assistance services include services acquired by contract from non-Federal sources (that is the private sector, foreign governments, State and local governments, tribes, etc.) as well as from other units within the Federal Government. The FY 2014 request includes an increase of \$2,825,000 to fund advertisement buys, Public Service Announces (PSAs), printing, and translation services through the "If You See Something, Say SomethingTM" contract.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	\$1,058	\$986	\$801	-\$257

Purchases from Government Accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from the DHS WCF and DHS Shared Services. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$6,000 for realignment to the Working Capital Fund and a decrease of \$263,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.4 O&M of facilities	\$50	\$46	\$20	-\$30

Operation and maintenance of facilities include all payments for the operation and maintenance of facilities when performed by contract with the private sector or another Federal Government account. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$30,000 for efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
26.0 Supplies and materials	\$40	\$55	\$15	-\$25

Supplies and materials are defined as commodities that are (a) ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use, (b) converted in the process of construction or manufacture, (c) used to form a minor part of equipment or property, or (c) other property of little monetary value that does not meet any of the three criteria listed above, at the option of the agency. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$25,000 for efficiencies.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of Legislative Affairs
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	2,959	3,074	2,556	(403)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	472	472	477	5
11.5 Other personnel compensation	68	68	69	1
12.1 Benefits	1,040	1,040	1,050	10
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	4,539	4,654	4,152	(387)
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	15	15	2	(13)
23.1 GSA rent	416	416	444	28
23.2 Other rent	3	3	3	-
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	4	4	4	-
25.2 Other services	187	187	39	(148)
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	710	710	840	130
25.4 O&M of facilities	35	32	8	(27)
25.6 Medical care	4	4	4	-
26.0 Supplies and materials	12	12	2	(10)
Total, Other Object Classes	1,386	1,383	1,346	(40)
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	5,925	6,037	5,498	(427)
Full Time Equivalents	32	35	28	(4)

Office of Legislative Affairs Mission Statement

The Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) is responsible for the development and advancement of the Department's legislative agenda. This includes the establishment and maintenance of constructive congressional relations, the development of Departmental protocols for interaction with Congress and contributing to the distribution and communication of the Department's strategic message.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	2,959	3,074	2,556	(403)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	472	472	477	5
11.5 Other personnel compensation	68	68	69	1
12.1 Benefits	1,040	1,040	1,050	10
Total, Salaries & Benefits	4,539	4,654	4,152	(387)

Salaries and Benefits fund compensation directly related to duties performed for the Office of Legislative Affairs by Federal civilian employees. The FY 2014 request includes a net decrease of \$387,000 which includes an increase of \$48,000 for pay inflation of 1%, an increase of \$75,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices, an increase of \$23,000 for realignment to the Working Capital Fund, and \$533,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	\$15	\$15	\$2	-\$13

Travel includes all costs of transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request includes a \$13,000 decrease in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	\$416	\$416	\$444	\$28

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$28,000 due to an increase in GSA rent funded through the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.2 Other services	\$187	\$187	\$39	-\$148

Other services include contractual services with non-Federal sources that are not otherwise classified under Object Class 25. The FY 2014 request includes a decrease of \$124,000 to offset an increase to the Working Capital Fund and a decrease of \$24,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	\$710	\$710	\$840	\$130

Purchases from Government Accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from the DHS WCF. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$130,000 for realignment to the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.4 O&M of facilities	\$35	\$32	\$8	-\$27

Operation and maintenance of facilities include all payments for the operation and maintenance of facilities when performed by contract with the private sector of another Federal Government account. The FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$11,000 to the Working Capital Fund and a decrease of \$16,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
26.0 Supplies and materials	\$12	\$12	\$2	-\$10

Supplies and materials are defined as commodities that are (a) ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use, (b) converted in the process of construction or manufacture, (c) used to form a minor part of equipment or property, or (d) other property of little monetary value that does not meet any of the three criteria listed above, at the option of the agency. FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$10,000 to the Working Capital Fund.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Privacy Officer
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	4,108	4,231	4,296	188
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	227	227	230	3
11.5 Other personnel compensation	151	151	152	1
12.1 Benefits	1,346	1,346	1,359	13
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	5,832	5,995	6,037	205
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	97	96	49	(48)
23.1 GSA rent	1,009	1,009	593	(416)
24.0 Printing	13	13	13	-
25.2 Other services	323	376	236	(87)
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	908	948	1,073	165
25.4 O&M of facilities	48	48	48	-
25.6 Medical care	4	4	4	-
26.0 Supplies and materials	37	37	48	11
31.0 Equipment	57	57	42	(15)
Total, Other Object Classes	2,496	2,588	2,106	(390)
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	8,328	8,543	8,143	(185)
Full Time Equivalents	43	45	45	2

Privacy Officer Mission Statement

The Department of Homeland Security's Privacy Office protects the collection, use, and disclosure of personal and Departmental information. The Privacy Office ensures that appropriate access to information is consistent with the vision, mission, and core values of DHS, and implements the policies of the Department to defend and to protect the individual rights, liberties, and information interests of our citizens. Through internal education outreach and the establishment of internal clearance procedures and milestones for program development, the Privacy Office is helping DHS components to consider privacy whenever developing new programs or revising existing ones. The Privacy Office is evaluating the use of new technologies to ensure that privacy protections are given primary consideration in the development and implementation of these new systems. In this process, DHS professionals have become educated about the need to consider and the framework for considering the privacy impact of their technology decisions. The Chief Privacy Officer and the staff review Privacy Act system notices before they are sent forward and ensure that they collect only those records that are necessary to support DHS mission. The Privacy Office also guides DHS agencies in developing appropriate privacy policies for their programs and serves as a resource for any questions that may arise concerning privacy, information collection or disclosure.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	4,108	4,231	4,296	188
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	227	227	230	3
11.5 Other personnel compensation	151	151	152	1
12.1 Benefits	1,346	1,346	1,359	13
Total, Salaries & Benefits	5,832	5,995	6,037	205

Salaries and Benefits fund compensation directly related to duties performed for the Privacy Officer by Federal civilian employees. The net increase of \$205,000 is due to an increase of \$61,000 for pay inflation of 1%, an increase of \$44,000 due to a Working Capital Fund adjustment, and an increase of \$100,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	\$97	\$96	\$49	-\$48

Travel includes all costs of transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$48,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	\$1,009	\$1,009	\$593	-\$416

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$416,000 due to a decrease in GSA rent funded through the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.2 Other services	\$323	\$376	\$236	-\$87

Other Services include contractual services with non-Federal sources that are not otherwise classified under Object Class 25. The FY 2014 request includes an increase of \$60,000 for a realignment to the Working Capital Fund, an increase of \$53,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices, and \$200,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	\$908	\$948	\$1,073	\$165

Purchases from Government Accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from DHS WCF. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$292,000 for the Working Capital Fund, an increase of \$28,000 for the transfer from CRSO, an increase of \$10,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices, and \$165,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
26.0 Supplies and materials	\$37	\$37	\$48	\$11

Supplies and materials are defined as commodities that are (a) ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use, (b) converted in the process of construction or manufacture, (c) used to form a minor part of equipment or property, or (d) other property of little monetary value that does not meet any of the three criteria listed above, at the option of the agency. FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$11,000 to the WCF account.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
31.0 Equipment	\$57	\$57	\$42	-\$15

Equipment includes all costs for the purchases of personal property of a durable nature or the initial installation of equipment when performed under contract. The FY 2014 request includes an increase of \$10,000 for realignment to the Working Capital Fund and a \$25,000 decrease for efficiencies.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	2,794	3,083	2,529	(265)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	11	15	11	-
11.5 Other personnel compensation	112	115	113	1
12.1 Benefits	877	900	784	(93)
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	3,794	4,113	3,437	(357)
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	175	150	115	(60)
23.1 GSA rent	432	432	450	18
23.2 Other rent	8	8	8	-
23.3 Communications, utilities, and misc. charges	-	15	-	-
24.0 Printing	24	31	12	(12)
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	32	-	32	-
25.2 Other services	140	110	140	-
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	1,404	1,210	1,019	(385)
25.4 O&M of facilities	51	86	51	-
25.6 Medical care	-	3	-	-
26.0 Supplies and materials	100	80	80	(20)
Total, Other Object Classes	2,366	2,125	1,907	(459)
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	6,160	6,238	5,344	(816)
Full Time Equivalents	30	35	30	-

Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman Mission Statement

The mission of the Citizenship and Immigration Service Ombudsman (CISOMB) is to assist individuals and employers in resolving problems with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS). Section 452 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires that CISOMB assist individuals and employers in resolving problems with the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigrations Service, identify areas in which individuals and employers have problems in dealing with USCIS, and to the extent possible, propose changes in the administrative practices of the USCIS to mitigate problems.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	2,794	3,083	2,529	(265)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	11	15	11	-
11.5 Other personnel compensation	112	115	113	1
12.1 Benefits	877	900	784	(93)
Total, Salaries & Benefits	3,794	4,113	3,437	(357)

Salaries and Benefits funds compensation directly related to duties performed for the Office of Citizenship & Immigration Ombudsman by Federal civilian employees. The FY 2014 request reflects a net decrease of \$357,000 which includes an increase of \$41,000 for pay inflation of 1%, an increase of \$40,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices, a decrease of \$338,000 due to efficiencies, and a decrease of \$100,000 to offset an increase in the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	\$175	\$150	\$115	-\$60

Travel includes all costs for transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$78,000 due to efficiencies and an increase of \$18,000 for the Shared Services transfer from OCRSO.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	\$432	\$432	\$450	\$18

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$18,000 due to an increase in GSA rent funded through the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
24.0 Printing	\$24	\$31	\$12	-\$12

Printing includes all costs for printing and reproduction obtained from the private sector or from other Federal entities. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$12,000 for efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	\$1,404	\$1,210	\$1,019	-\$385

Purchases from Government Accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from the DHS WCF and DHS Shared Services. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$82,000 for realignment to the Working Capital Fund and a decrease of \$467,000 for efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
26.0 Supplies and materials	\$100	\$80	\$80	-\$20

Supplies and materials are defined as commodities that are (a) ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use, (b) converted in the process of construction or manufacture, (c) used to form a minor part of equipment or property, or (c) other property of little monetary value that does not meet any of the three criteria listed above, at the option of the agency. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$20,000 for efficiencies.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of Policy
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	17,147	18,546	12,350	(4,797)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	2,335	1,935	2,354	19
11.5 Other personnel compensation	655	338	625	(30)
11.8 Special Service Pay	155	-	155	-
12.1 Benefits	5,684	5,650	3,660	(2,024)
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	25,976	26,469	19,144	(6,832)
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	995	920	233	(762)
22.0 Transportation of things	90	43	95	5
23.1 GSA rent	2,755	2,755	698	(2,057)
23.2 Other rent	12	12	12	-
24.0 Printing	548	587	193	(355)
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	2,934	2,203	1,960	(974)
25.2 Other services	442	501	-	(442)
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	7,359	6,341	4,999	(2,360)
25.4 O&M of facilities	76	-	76	-
25.6 Medical care	14	-	-	(14)
25.7 Operation and maintenance of equipment	349	349	293	(56)
26.0 Supplies and materials	75	65	46	(29)
31.0 Equipment	29	-	54	25
32.0 Land & structures	12	-	12	-
Total, Other Object Classes	15,690	13,776	8,671	(7,019)
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	41,666	40,245	27,815	(13,851)
Full Time Equivalents	218	194	146	(72)

Office of Policy Mission Statement

The Office of Policy is the primary coordinator of Department-wide policies, programs, and planning to ensure consistency and integration of missions throughout the entire Department. It provides the Department with a central office to develop and communicate policies across multiple components of the homeland security network and strengthens the Department's ability to maintain policy and operational readiness needed to protect the homeland. It also provides the foundation and direction for Department-wide strategic planning and budget priorities. A central DHS policy office that bridges Headquarters, Components, and operating agencies improves communication among DHS entities, eliminates duplication of effort, and translates policies into timely action. The Office of Policy also serves as a single point of contact for internal and external stakeholders that will allow for streamlined policy management across the Department.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	17,147	18,546	12,350	(4,797)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	2,335	1,935	2,354	19
11.5 Other personnel compensation	655	338	625	(30)
11.8 Special Service Pay	155	-	155	-
12.1 Benefits	5,684	5,650	3,660	(2,024)
Total, Salaries & Benefits	25,976	26,469	19,144	(6,832)

Salaries and Benefits fund compensation directly related to duties performed for the Office of Policy by Federal civilian employees. The FY 2014 request reflects a net decrease of \$6,832,000 which includes an increase of \$200,000 for 1% pay inflation, a decrease of \$125,000 to offset an increase in the Working Capital Fund, a decrease of \$6,486,000 due to the realignment of 60 FTE to the Private Sector Office (PSO), the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement, and the Office of International Affairs out of the Office of Policy, a transfer in of \$2,990,000 for RMA, and a decrease of \$3,411,000 for efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	\$995	\$920	\$233	-\$762

Travel includes all costs of transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request includes a total decrease of \$594,000 due to the realignment of the Office of International Affairs, Private Sector Office, and the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement, an increase of \$87,000 for realignment to the Working Capital Fund, an increase of \$54,000 for the Shared Services transfer from OCRSO, and a decrease of \$309,000 for efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
22.0 Transportation of things	\$90	\$43	\$95	\$5

Transportation of things includes all costs of the care of such things while in process of being transported, and other services incident to the transportation of things. Funding primarily supports the shipment of furniture and other household goods. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$5,000 for realignment to the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	\$2,755	\$2,755	\$698	-\$2,057

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$732,000 for the realignment of the Office of International Affairs, Private Sector Office, and Office for State and Local Law Enforcement, an increase of \$356,000 due to an increase in GSA rent funded through the Working Capital Fund, and \$1,681,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
24.0 Printing	\$586	\$587	\$193	-\$355

Printing includes all costs for printing and reproduction obtained from the private sector or from other Federal entities. The FY 2014 realigns \$355,000 for GSA Rent and the realignment of the Office of International Affairs, Private Sector Office, and Office for State and Local Law Enforcement.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	\$2,934	\$2,203	\$1,960	-\$974

Advisory and assistance services include services acquired by contract from non-Federal sources (that is the private sector, foreign governments, State and local governments, tribes, etc.) as well as from other units within the Federal Government. The FY 2014 request includes a decrease of \$640,000 in to transfer for the Office of International Affairs, Private Sector Office, and Office of State and Local Law Enforcement, a decrease of \$364,000 due to an increase in the Working Capital Fund, and an increase of \$30,000 for Shared Services transfer from OCRSO.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.2 Other services	\$442	\$501	\$0	-\$442

Other services include contractual services with non-Federal sources that are not otherwise classified under Object Class 25. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$4,000 due to an increase in the Working Capital Fund, a \$10,000 realignment, and a decrease of \$428,000 for efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	\$7,359	\$6,341	\$4,999	-\$2,360

Purchases from Government Accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from the DHS WCF, DHS Shared Services, and other government agencies including intra-agency service requirements. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$85,000 for realignment to the Working Capital Fund, a decrease of \$415,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices, and a decrease of \$2,030,000 in a transfer for the Office of International Affairs, Private Sector Office, and Office of State and Local Law Enforcement.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.7 Operation and maintenance of equipment	\$349	\$349	\$293	-\$56

Operation and maintenance of equipment includes costs for operation, maintenance, repair, and storage of equipment, when performed by contract with the private sector or another Federal Government account. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$56,000 to offset increases to the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
26.0 Supplies and materials	\$75	\$65	\$46	-\$29

Supplies and materials are defined as commodities that are (a) ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use, (b) converted in the process of construction or manufacture, (c) used to form a minor part of equipment or property, or (d) other property of little monetary value that does not meet any of the three criteria listed above, at the option of the agency. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$29,000 as a result of the transfer out of OIA, PSO, and OSLLE.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
31.0 Equipment	\$29	0	\$54	\$25

Equipment includes all costs for the purchases of personal property of a durable nature or the initial installation of equipment when performed under contract. The FY 2014 request includes an increase of \$25,000.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of International Affairs
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	-	-	2,949	2,949
12.1 Benefits	-	-	1,241	1,241
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	4,190	4,190
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	-	-	451	451
23.1 GSA rent	-	-	520	520
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	-	-	585	585
25.3 Purchases from Gov't aects.	-	-	1,751	1,751
25.4 O&M of facilities	-	-	10	10
25.6 Medical care	-	-	4	4
26.0 Supplies and materials	-	-	80	80
31.0 Equipment	-	-	35	35
Total, Other Object Classes	-	-	3,436	3,436
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	-	-	7,626	7,626
Full Time Equivalents	-	-	41	41

Office of International Affairs Mission Statement

The Office of International Affairs (OIA) will report directly to the Secretary and will lead, coordinate, and integrate the Department's interaction with its international partners, and develop and oversee implementation of the Department's international engagement strategy. In FY 2014, OIA will be established as an independent office in order to improve visibility into ongoing international negotiations and other activities for the Secretary and the various other U.S Government departments, and to ensure immediate access by the international security community. The Office of International Affairs will be the Department's primary representative to the National Security Staff's regionally focused Interagency Planning Committees (IPC) and will oversee visa waiver negotiations via the Visa Waiver Program Office.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	-	-	2,949	2,949
12.1 Benefits	-	-	1,241	1,241
Total, Salaries & Benefits	-	-	4,190	4,190

Salaries and Benefits fund compensation directly related to duties performed for the Office of International Affairs by Federal civilian employees. The FY2014 request reflects a net increase of \$4,190,000 which includes a realignment of \$4,552,000 from the

Office of Policy to establish the Office of International Affairs as a standalone office, an increase of \$47,000 for pay inflation of 1%, and a decrease of \$409,000 for efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	0	0	\$451	\$451

Travel includes all costs of transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$451,000 from the Office of Policy to cover travel expenses.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	0	0	\$520	\$520

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$520,000 from the Office of Policy.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	0	0	\$585	\$585

Advisory and assistance services include services acquired by contract from non-Federal sources (that is the private sector, foreign governments, State and local governments, tribes, etc.) as well as from other units within the Federal Government. The FY2014 request reflects a realignment of \$585,000 from the Office of Policy for advisory and assistance services.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	0	0	\$1,751	\$1,751

Purchases from Government Accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from the DHS WCF and other government agencies including intra-agency service requirements. The FY2014 request reflects a realignment of \$1,751,000 from the Office of Policy for these services.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.4 O&M of facilities	0	0	\$10	\$10

Operation and maintenance of facilities include all payments for the operation and maintenance of facilities when performed by contract with the private sector of another Federal Government account. The FY2014 request reflects a realignment of \$10,000 from the Office of Policy for these services.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.6 Medical care	0	0	\$4	\$4

Medical care includes payments to contracts for medical services, but excludes contracts with individuals who are reportable under OPM regulations as federal employees or payments to compensate casual workers and patient help. The FY2014 request reflects a realignment of \$4,000 from the Office of Policy for these services.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
26.0 Supplies and materials	0	0	\$80	\$80

Supplies and materials are defined as commodities that are (a) ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use, (b) converted in the process of construction or manufacture, (c) used to form a minor part of equipment or property, or other property of little monetary value that does not meet any of the three criteria listed above, at the option of the agency. The FY2014 request reflects a realignment of \$80,000 from the Office of Policy for supplies and materials.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
31.0 Equipment	0	0	\$35	\$35

Equipment includes all costs for the purchases of personal property of a durable nature or the initial installation of equipment when performed under contract. The FY2014 request reflects a realignment of \$35,000 from the Office of Policy for equipment purchases.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Private Sector Office
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	-	-	1,010	1,010
11.5 Other personnel compensation	-	-	33	33
12.1 Benefits	-	-	161	161
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	1,204	1,204
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	-	-	37	37
23.1 GSA rent	-	-	179	179
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	-	-	236	236
26.0 Supplies and materials	-	-	10	10
Total, Other Object Classes	-	-	462	462
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	-	-	1,666	1,666
Full Time Equivalents	-	-	10	10

Private Sector Office Mission Statement

The Private Sector Office (PSO) is charged with providing America's private sector with a direct line of communication to the Department. PSO works directly with individual businesses and through trade associations and other non-governmental organizations to foster dialogue between the private sector and DHS. PSO functions include: advising the Secretary on the impact of DHS policies, regulations, processes, and actions on the private sector and promoting public private partnerships to address homeland security challenges. In FY 2014, PSO will be established as an independent office.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	-	-	1,010	1,010
11.5 Other personnel compensation	-	-	33	33
12.1 Benefits	-	-	161	161
Total, Salaries & Benefits	-	-	1,204	1,204

Salaries and Benefits fund compensation directly related to duties performed for the Private Sector Office by Federal civilian employees. The FY 2014 request reflects a net increase of \$1,204,000 which includes a realignment of \$1,279,000 from the Office of Policy to establish the Private Sector Office as a standalone office, an increase of \$13,000 due to a 1% pay inflation, and a decrease of \$88,000 for efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	0	0	\$37	\$37

Travel includes all costs of transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$37,000 that includes a realignment of \$57,000 from the Office of Policy and a decrease of \$20,000 for efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	0	0	\$179	\$179

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$179,000 from the Office of Policy for rental payments to GSA.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	0	0	\$236	\$236

Purchases from Government Accounts include costs from purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. The FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$236,000 from the Office of Policy for these services.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
26.0 Supplies and materials	0	0	\$10	\$10

Supplies and materials are defined as commodities that are (a) ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use, (b) converted in the process of construction or manufacture, (c) used to form a minor part of equipment or property, or (c) other property of little monetary value that does not meet any of the three criteria listed above, at the option of the agency. The FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$10,000 from the Office of Policy for supplies and materials.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of State and Local Law Enforcement
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	-	-	464	464
12.1 Benefits	-	-	199	199
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	663	663
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	-	-	52	52
23.1 GSA rent	-	-	33	33
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	-	-	55	55
25.3 Purchases from Gov't aucts.	-	-	43	43
25.6 Medical care	-	-	2	2
26.0 Supplies and materials	-	-	4	4
Total, Other Object Classes	-	-	189	189
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	-	-	852	852
Full Time Equivalents	-	-	4	4

Office of State and Local Law Enforcement Mission Statement

The mission of OSLE, on an all-crimes/all-hazards approach, is to formulate and coordinate national-level policy relating to law enforcement's role in preventing acts of terrorism, and serve as the primary Department liaison with state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. FY 2014, OSLE will be established as an independent office.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	-	-	464	464
12.1 Benefits	-	-	199	199
Total, Salaries & Benefits	-	-	663	663

Salaries and Benefits fund compensation directly related to duties performed for the Private Sector Office by Federal civilian employees. The FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$655,000 from the Office of Policy to establish the Office for State and Local Law Enforcement as a standalone office, and \$7,000 for pay inflation of 1%, and a \$1,000 adjustment increase.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	0	0	\$52	\$52

Travel includes all costs of transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$87,000 from the Office of Policy to cover travel expenses and a decrease of \$35,000 in efficiencies.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	0	0	\$33	\$33

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$33,000 from the Office of Policy for rental payments to GSA.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.1 Advisory and assistance services	0	0	\$55	\$55

Advisory and assistance services include services acquired by contract from non-Federal sources (that is the private sector, foreign governments, State and local governments, tribes, etc.) as well as from other units within the Federal Government. The FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$55,000 from the Office of Policy for advisory and assistance services.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	0	0	\$43	\$43

Purchases from Government Accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from the DHS WCF, DHS Shared Services, and other government agencies including intra-agency service requirements. The FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$43,000 from the Office of Policy for these services.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.6 Medical care	0	0	\$2	\$2

Medical care includes payments to contracts for medical services, but excludes contracts with individuals who are reportable under OPM regulations as federal employees or payments to compensate casual workers and patient help. The FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$2,000 from the Office of Policy for these services.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
26.0 Supplies and materials	0	0	\$4	\$4

Supplies and materials are defined as commodities that are (a) ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use, (b) converted in the process of construction or manufacture, (c) used to form a minor part of equipment or property, or (c) other property of little monetary value that does not meet any of the three criteria listed above, at the option of the agency. The FY 2014 request reflects a realignment of \$6,000 and a decrease of \$2,000 in efficiencies.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	1,141	1,296	1,163	22
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	286	275	289	3
11.5 Other personnel compensation	49	47	49	0
12.1 Benefits	451	435	428	(23)
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	1,927	2,053	1,929	2
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	108	65	118	10
23.1 GSA rent	161	161	182	21
23.3 Communications, utilities, and misc. charges	1	-	1	0
25.2 Other services	19	19	19	0
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	340	338	187	(153)
25.4 O&M of facilities	17	12	17	0
25.6 Medical care	2	2	2	0
26.0 Supplies and materials	50	16	63	13
Total, Other Object Classes	698	613	589	(109)
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	2,625	2,666	2,518	(107)
Full Time Equivalents	15	20	14	(1)

Office of Intergovernmental Affairs Mission Statement

The mission of the office of Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA) is to act as an advocate for the State, local, tribal and territorial officials within DHS and to operate as the primary liaison between those officials and the secretary and senior DHS leadership. IGA facilitates an integrated national approach to homeland security across a broad spectrum of issues confronting DHS by ensuring, coordinating and advancing Federal interaction with State, local, tribal and territorial governments.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	1,141	1,296	1,163	22
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	286	275	289	3
11.5 Other personnel compensation	49	47	49	0
12.1 Benefits	451	435	428	(23)
Total, Salaries & Benefits	1,927	2,053	1,929	2

Salaries and Benefits fund compensation directly related to duties performed for the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs (IGA) by Federal civilian employees. The FY 2014 request reflects a net decrease of \$2,000 which includes an increase of \$20,000 for pay inflation of 1%, an increase of \$24,000 for a realignment of funds between OSEM offices, an increase of \$72,000 for realignment to the Working Capital Fund, a decrease of \$122,000 for efficiencies, and an increase of \$8,000 for the Shared Services transfer from OCRSO.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	\$108	\$65	\$118	\$10

Travel includes all costs of transportation of persons, subsistence of travelers, and incidental travel expenses in accordance with Federal travel regulations. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$10,000.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	\$161	\$161	\$182	\$21

GSA Rent includes all payments to General Services Administration (GSA) for rental of space and rent related services. The FY 2014 request reflects an increase of \$21,000 due to an increase in GSA rent funded through the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	\$340	\$338	\$187	-\$153

Purchases from government accounts include costs for purchases from other Federal Government agencies or accounts that are not otherwise classified. Specifically, funds support the purchase of goods and services from DHS WCF, DHS Shared Services, and other government agencies including interagency service requirements. The FY 2014 request reflects a decrease of \$153,000 to offset an increase to the Working Capital Fund.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
26.0 Supplies and materials	\$50	\$16	\$63	\$13

Supplies and materials are defined as commodities that are (a) ordinarily consumed or expended within one year after they are put into use, (b) converted in the process of construction or manufacture, (c) used to form a minor part of equipment or property, or (d) other property of little monetary value that does not meet any of the three criteria listed above, at the option of the agency. The FY 2014 includes an increase of \$13,000 for realignment to the Working Capital Fund.

Department of Homeland Security
Departmental Management and Operations
Office of the Secretary and Executive Management
Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement
Summary of Requirements by Object Class
(Dollars in Thousands)

Object Classes	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
Personnel and Compensation Benefits	-	-	-	-
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	412	996	-	(412)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	10	-	-	(10)
11.5 Other personnel compensation	-	10	-	-
12.1 Benefits	35	274	-	(35)
Total, Personnel and Compensation Benefits	696	1,280	-	(696)
Other Object Classes	-	-	-	-
21.0 Travel	35	81	-	(35)
23.1 GSA rent	206	206	-	(206)
23.3 Communications, utilities, and misc. charges	7	-	-	(7)
24.0 Printing	-	7	-	-
25.2 Other services	43	53	-	(43)
25.3 Purchases from Gov't aects.	165	169	-	(165)
25.4 O&M of facilities	11	-	-	(11)
25.6 Medical care	10	-	-	(10)
26.0 Supplies and materials	-	10	-	-
31.0 Equipment	5	5	-	(5)
Total, Other Object Classes	481	531	-	(481)
Adjustments	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, start of year	-	-	-	-
Unobligated Balance, end of year	-	-	-	-
Recoveries of Prior Year Obligations	-	-	-	-
Total Requirements	1,177	1,811	-	(1,177)
Full Time Equivalents	-	-	-	-

Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement Mission Statement

In FY2012, The Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE) was terminated, per P.L. 112-74.

Summary Justification and Explanation of Changes

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
11.1 Total FTE & personnel compensation	412	996	-	(412)
11.3 Other than full-time permanent	10	-	-	(10)
11.5 Other personnel compensation	-	10	-	-
12.1 Benefits	35	274	-	(35)
Total, Salaries & Benefits	696	1,280	-	(696)

In FY 2012 the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement was terminated.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
21.0 Travel	\$35	\$81	0	-\$35

In FY 2012 the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement was terminated.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
23.1 GSA rent	\$206	\$206	0	-\$206

In FY 2012 the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement was terminated.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.2 Other services	\$43	\$53	0	-\$43

In FY 2012 the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement was terminated.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
25.3 Purchases from Gov't accts.	\$165	\$169	0	-\$165

In FY 2012 the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement was terminated.

	FY 2012 Revised Enacted	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request	FY 2012 to FY 2014 Change
31.0 Equipment	\$5	\$5	0	-\$5

In FY 2012 the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement was terminated.

I. Changes In Full Time Employment

	FY 2012	FY 2013	FY 2014
BASE: Year End Actual from Prior Year	706	699	699
Increases			
Office of the Secretary	-	6	-
Office for State and Local Law Enforcement	-	-	4
Privacy Officer	9	2	-
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties	-	12	-
Executive Secretary	6	-	-
Chief of Staff	-	4	-
Office of Legislative Affairs	1	3	-
Citizenship and Immigration Ombudsman	-	5	-
Office of the Deputy Secretary	1	1	-
Private Sector Office	-	-	10
Office of Public Affairs	-	3	-
Office of Policy	14	-	-
Intergovernmental Affairs	-	-	-
Office of International Affairs	-	5	41
Subtotal, Increases	31	41	25
Decreases			
Intergovernmental Affairs	(12)	-	(6)
Chief of Staff	(4)	-	(5)
Office of the Secretary	(2)	-	(6)
Executive Secretary	-	(6)	(3)
Citizenship and Immigration Ombudsman	(6)	-	(5)
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties	(1)	-	(14)
Counternarcotics Enforcement	(15)	-	-
Office of Legislative Affairs	-	-	(7)
Office of Public Affairs	(9)	-	(6)
Office of the General Counsel	-	-	(23)
Office of Policy	-	(24)	(48)
Office of the Deputy Secretary	-	-	(3)
Subtotal, Decreases	(49)	30	(126)
Year End Actuals/Estimated FTEs:	688	699	628
Net Change from prior year base to Budget Year Estimate:	-18	0	71

J. FY 2014 Schedule of Working Capital Fund by Program/Project Activity

FY 2014 Schedule of Working Capital Fund by Program/Project Activity
(Dollars in Thousands)

Program/Project/Activity	FY 2012 Revised Enacted Amount	FY 2013 Annualized CR	FY 2014 Request Amount	Increase/Decrease for FY 2014 Amount
Chief of Staff	\$374	\$374	\$394	\$20
Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman	1,075	1,075	1,176	101
Executive Secretary	2,033	2,033	2,178	145
Immediate Office of the Deputy Secretary	280	280	339	59
Immediate Office of the Secretary	620	620	1,039	419
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties	4,556	4,556	5,061	505
Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement	371	371	0	-371
Office of General Counsel	4,684	4,684	5,661	977
Office of Intergovernmental Affairs	501	501	550	49
Office of International Affairs	0	0	1,480	1,480
Office of Legislative Affairs	1,126	1,126	1,285	159
Office of State and Local Law Enforcement	0	0	144	144
Office of Policy	6,769	6,769	3,591	-3,178
Office of Public Affairs	1,530	1,530	1,631	101
Privacy Officer	1,817	1,817	1,682	-135
Private Sector Office	0	0	361	361
Total Working Capital Fund	\$25,736	\$25,736	\$26,572	\$836

K. DHS Balanced Workforce Strategy

N/A