BILLING CODE 9110-9M

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

[Docket No.DHS-2015-0076]

Homeland Security Advisory Council – New Tasking

AGENCY: The Office of Intergovernmental Affairs/Partnership and Engagement, DHS.


SUMMARY: The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Jeh Johnson, tasked his Homeland Security Advisory Council to establish a subcommittee entitled Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee on September 28, 2015. The CVE Subcommittee will provide findings and recommendations to the Homeland Security Advisory Council on best practices sourced from the technology and philanthropic sectors, education and mental health professionals, and community leaders. This notice informs the public of the establishment of the CVE Subcommittee and is not a notice for solicitation.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Sarah E. Morgenthau, Executive Director of the Homeland Security Advisory Council, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs/Partnership...
and Engagement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security at (202) 447-3135 or hsac@hq.dhs.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Homeland Security Advisory Council provides organizationally independent, strategic, timely, specific, and actionable advice and recommendations for the consideration of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security on matters related to homeland security. The Council is comprised of leaders of local law enforcement, first responders, state and local government, the private sector, and academia.

**Tasking:** The CVE Subcommittee will develop actionable findings and recommendations for the Department of Homeland Security. The subcommittee will address the following: (1) What opportunities or platforms will be useful for the facilitation of public-private partnerships with both the technology and philanthropic sectors? (2) How can the Department develop new networks and a framework for sustained dialogue and engagement with technology companies, foundations and philanthropic organizations? (3) What other non-government sectors, besides technology and philanthropic, should be leveraged for CVE and how should the Department engage those sectors? (4) How can the Department work with education and mental health professionals on CVE efforts to help parents and schools
understand how they can counter youth radicalization to violence? (5) How can the Department inspire peer-to-peer attempts to challenge violent extremism through public/private partnership?

**Schedule:** The CVE Subcommittee findings and recommendations will be submitted to the Homeland Security Advisory Council for their deliberation and vote during a public meeting. Once the report is voted on by the Homeland Security Advisory Council, it will be sent to the Secretary for his review and acceptance.

Dated: November 19, 2015

Sarah E. Morgenthau,
Executive Director.
On January 11, 2016 (afternoon meeting) the HSAC’s Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee met in-person at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. They met with DHS officials and received an overview on the Office for Community Partnerships, received a domestic terrorism briefing, and a briefing on violent extremist messaging. The Subcommittee also discussed next steps and action items.

On February 19, 2016 the HSAC’s Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee met in person at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. They met with subject matter experts about how the Department can develop new partnerships with non-governmental stakeholders, to include technology and social media companies, philanthropic, education and mental health sectors. They discussed communications and messaging and the significance of pop culture and millennial influences in countering violent extremism.

On April 14, 2016 the HSAC’s Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee met in person at DHS Headquarters. They met with subject matter experts to discuss how the Department can best collaborate with technology and social media companies, philanthropic organizations, and education and mental health sectors to help counter violent extremism. Members also discussed their initial draft report and recommendations.

*The CVE subcommittee is chaired by Farah Pandith, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and Adnan Kifayat, Senior Resident Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States.*
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Homeland Security Advisory Council’s  
Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee  
In-Person Meeting – February 19, 2016

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<td>John Allen</td>
<td>Retired U.S. Marine Corps. General and Former Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition against ISIL (leaving by 4:00)</td>
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Members Calling (3)

| Ali Soufan                  | Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, The Soufan Group LLC (1:30 - ?)              |
| Jeffrey Miller              | Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer, National Football League (1:00-2:00) |
| Russ Deyo                   | Under Secretary for Management, DHS (?)                                             |

SMEs (5)

| Tara Sonenshine             | Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State (10:00 – 10:30) |
| Soraya Chemaly              | Director, Women's Media Center Speech Project (10:00 - ?)                           |
| Hedieh Mirahmadi            | President, World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE) (11:30 – ?) |
James Glassman
Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State (10:00 – 12:00)

Imam Magid
Executive Director, All Dulles Area Muslim Society (3:00 – 3:30)

SMEs Video/Calling In (2)
Sasha Havlicek (video)
CEO, Institute for Strategic Dialogue (from London) (11:00 – 11:30)

Charlotte Beers (call)
Former Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State (10:00 – 11:00)

DHS Attending (5):
Sarah Morgenthau, Homeland Security Advisory Council
Erin Walls, Homeland Security Advisory Council
George Selim, Office of Community Partnerships
Lauren Wenger, Office of Community Partnerships
Katrina Woodhams, Homeland Security Advisory Council

Order of Members/SMEs Arrival
Tara Sonenshine 10:00 – 10:30
Soraya Chemaly 10:00 - ?
James Glassman 10:00 – 12:00
Charlotte Beers (call) 10:00 – 11:00
Sasha Havlcek (video) 11:00 – 11:30 (from London)
Hedieh Mirahmadi 11:30 – ?
Ali Soufan (call) 1:30 – ?
Jeffrey Miller (call) 1:00-2:00
Russ Deyo (call) TBD
Imam Magid 3:00 – 3:30
Homeland Security Advisory Council’s
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<td><strong>DHS Attending (6):</strong></td>
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Lauren Wenger  
Katrina Woodhams  
Office of Community Partnerships  
Office of Community Partnerships  
Homeland Security Advisory Council  

**SMEs In-person (4) (Confirmed)**  
Tara Sonenshine  
Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs  
Soraya Chemaly  
Director, Women's Media Center Speech Project  
Hedieh Mirahmadi  
President, World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE)  
James Glassman  
Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs  

**Invited (6)**  
Judith McHale  
Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs  
Karen Hughes  
Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs  
(checking)  
Michael Davidson  
CEO, Gen Next (checking)  
Jared Cohen  
Director, Google Ideas  
Matthew Bryza  
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council  

**Pending Invitation (1)**  
Monica Bickert  
Head of Global Policy, Facebook
COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
SUBCOMMITTEE AGENDA
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
5th Floor Conference Room
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C.
Friday, February 19th, 2016 – 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

10:00 a.m.  Welcome and Introductions
Sarah E. Morgenthau, Executive Director, Homeland Security Advisory Council

10:05am  Briefing from Former State Department Officials

11:00 a.m.  Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism
Sasha Havlicek, Chief Executive Officer, Institute for Strategic Dialogue
Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, World Organization for Resource Development and Education
Soraya Chemaly, Director, Women’s Media Center Speech Project

12:30 p.m.  WORKING LUNCH

1:30 p.m.  Updates from Subcommittee Focus Area Leads
Ali Soufan (Communications/Messaging)
Seamus Hughes (Funding and Resourcing)
Joel Meyer (Engaging with Tech and Social Media Companies)
Paul Goldenberg (Incorporating the Education and Mental Health Sectors)
Laila Alawa (Pop Culture/Millennials)

2:45 p.m.  BREAK

3:00 p.m.  Perspective on Countering Violent Extremism
Imam Mohamed Magid, Executive Director, All Dulles Area Muslim Society

3:30 p.m.  Presentation on Previous Reports
Sarah E. Morgenthau
4:00 p.m.  Subcommittee Action Items and Next Steps (Subcommittee Members Only)
Farah Pandith, Chair, CVE Subcommittee
Adnan Kifayat, Chair, CVE Subcommittee

5:00 p.m.  Meeting Adjourns
10:00am  Briefing from Former Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
        Tara Sonenshine

11:00 a.m.  SME Briefings
        Soraya Chemaly
        Sasha Havlicek
        Hedieh Mirahmadi

12:30 p.m.  WORKING LUNCH

1:30 p.m.  Discussion on Subcommittee Focus Areas
        Leads will report progress on each area and plan for next steps:
        Ali Soufan
        Matt Olsen and Jeff Miller
        Seamus Hughes
        Joel Meyer
        Paul Goldenberg
        Laila Alawa

3:00 p.m.  HSAC Presentation on Report Formatting
        Sarah Morgenthau, Executive Director, HSAC

4:00 p.m.  Subcommittee Members Only Discussion on Action Items and Next Steps
        Sarah Morgenthau, Executive Director, HSAC
        Farah Pandith, Chair, CVE Subcommittee, HSAC
        Adnan Kifayat, Chair, CVE Subcommittee, HSAC

5:00 p.m.  Meeting Adjourns
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DHS-001-425-008513
Homeland Security Advisory Council
Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee
Biographies
Farah Pandith currently leads numerous efforts designed to counter extremism through new organizations, programs, and initiatives. Ms. Pandith was appointed the first-ever Department of State Special Representative to Muslim Communities in June 2009. From 2004 to 2007, she was the Director for Middle East Initiatives at the National Security Council (NSC). Prior to the NSC, Ms. Pandith was Chief of Staff at the Bureau for Asia and the Near East for the U.S. Agency for International Development. Ms. Pandith is currently an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the Leadership Council of Women and Girls Lead. She also serves on the Board of Overseers at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and on the Smith College President’s Council.
Adnan Kifayat (Co-Chair)
Senior Resident Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Adnan Kifayat is a senior resident fellow at GMF, where he advises the organization on its efforts to strengthen leadership development and Next Generation strategies in the transatlantic region and its joint work in programming the OCP Policy Center Atlantic Fellowship in Europe, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. He also contributes to the continued development of GMF’s Leadership, Diversity and Inclusion Initiative.

Over the last 15 years, Kifayat has held senior positions in public service, including at the White House, State Department, and Treasury Department, where he established partnerships with strategic allies to cooperate in trade, finance, development, counterterrorism and national security. He has helped develop innovative and sustainable mechanisms to counter the spread of violent extremism and prevent the flow of funds to terrorist organizations.

Until recently, Kifayat served as Secretary of State John Kerry’s acting special representative to Muslim communities and was instrumental in creating programs to broaden and deepen U.S. diplomatic engagement through social entrepreneurship, political empowerment, and shared commitments to security. As senior advisor to the Under Secretary of State for public diplomacy, he led the development and deployment of the Public Diplomacy 2.0 Initiative, which helped transform the State Department into a new media-savvy institution. His work at the Treasury Department resulted in initiatives and agreements to promote financial cooperation between the United States and key partners, in the Middle East, G8, and Asia. He served as an alternate executive director of the African Development Bank, shaping Bank activities on the African continent. He served twice on the National Security Council staff to coordinate counterterrorism and economic issues across the Middle East and Africa.

Kifayat’s private sector experience includes creating strategies for Cargill to access Central Asian and Latin American agribusiness markets, and designing programs for Delphi International to promote U.S. economic and civil society engagement on a people-to-people basis around the world.
Laila Alawa is the CEO and Founder of Coming of Faith, a leading digital media company where the world goes to hear the voices and stories of underrepresented women. With more than half a million monthly visitors, the company covers everything from life to humor, entertainment to news through articles, videos, podcasts and mixtapes. She is also the host for The Expose, a Coming of Faith weekly podcast tackling tough topics with snark and wit. Her work and writing has been mentioned in The New York Times, Al-Jazeera America, Yahoo! News, ThinkProgress, The Guardian, NPR, PRI, The Huffington Post, Feministing, Salon, Mashable, Color Lines, Bustle, Mic and Buzzfeed. Her work was recently published in the literary anthology, Faithfully Feminist: Jewish, Christian and Muslim Feminists on Why We Stay. She was recently featured in The New York Times' Women in the World. She’s also appeared on Al-Jazeera America, BBC World News, NPR, and Huffington Post Live. In 2015, Laila was named an Ariane de Rothschild Fellow.

Through her online activism and creative approach to digital issues, she has made it her mission to elevate the voices of those who are often not heard. As the creator of many viral multimedia campaigns, she is eager to work with organizations that both advocate and innovate in the public interest.

Prior to founding Coming of Faith, Laila was a research specialist at Princeton University, studying socio-cognitive processing under the framework of community identity and belonging.

She has a bachelor's degree from Wellesley College, and has studied leadership and social entrepreneurship at the University of Cambridge. A passionate runner, she lives in Washington, D.C.
General John R. Allen is a retired U.S. Marine General who served as the Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and the Commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan from 2011 to 2013, the pivotal point in the war. General Allen recently served as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. He is the first Marine in history to command a theater of war, and is the longest serving commander in that conflict. Concluding a distinguished 38 year career in the spring of 2013, General Allen worked as an advisor to both the Secretaries of Defense and State on Middle East Security, and has affiliations with the Brookings Institution, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the Atlantic Council, and Council on Foreign Relations. He holds numerous U.S. personal and international decorations, including the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, The Leftwich Leadership Trophy, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, the Humanitarian Service Medal, the NATO Meritorious Service Medal, the Afghan Ghazi Mir Bacha Khan Medal, the French Legion d’Honneur, the Commander’s Cross of the Order of Merit of the Polish Republic, the Taiwan Order of the Resplendent Banner with Special Cravat, and the Mongolian Meritorious Service Medal, First Class.
Russell C. Deyo was sworn in as Under Secretary for Management at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on May 11, 2015. In the Department’s number three post, Mr. Deyo exercises leadership authority over all aspects of the Department’s management programs, processes, and workforce of more than 230,000 employees.

Mr. Deyo oversees management of the Department’s nearly $60 billion budget. He also serves as the Chief Acquisition Officer, administering control over the Department’s approximately $16.5 billion in procurements annually, and 72 major acquisition programs that are in development or sustainment with a life cycle cost estimate of more than $300 million.

As Under Secretary, Mr. Deyo leads the Management Directorate’s six lines of business, including financial management, human capital, procurement, information technology, security, and facilities and asset management. The management portfolio touches every aspect of Department operations. Leading with a data-driven focus, Mr. Deyo concentrates efforts on integrating management functions, improving customer service, and sustaining quality financial stewardship.

Mr. Deyo has over 30 years of management experience in both the government and private sector. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Deyo retired from Johnson & Johnson in 2012 after 27 years of service, where he held a number of positions, including Vice President of Administration and General Counsel. For 16 years, he also served as a member of the Executive Committee, the company’s principal management group for global operations.

Prior to Johnson & Johnson, Mr. Deyo was an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey from 1978 to 1985, serving the last three years as Chief of Special Prosecutions. From 1977 to 1978, Mr. Deyo was an attorney at Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler in New York City.

Mr. Deyo is a graduate of Dartmouth College and holds a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center.
Paul Goldenberg is the President and CEO of Cardinal Point Strategies (CPS), LLC, a strategic advisory and business intelligence consulting firm. As President and CEO of Cardinal Point Strategies, Mr. Goldenberg is a trusted advisor with a long history of helping to resolve the highest profile and most confidential matters for governments, businesses, academia and NGOs around the world. Mr. Goldenberg also serves as the National Director of the Secure Community Network, the nation’s first faith-based information sharing analysis center recognized by DHS as the a national model. Mr. Goldenberg’s public career includes more than two decades as the first State Chief of the Office of Bias Crimes and Community Relations in New Jersey leading the nation’s first full time State Attorney General’s effort focusing on hate crimes and ethnic terrorism, Director of the nation’s 6th largest county social service and juvenile justice system, and as a law enforcement official leading investigation efforts for cases in domestic terrorism, political corruption, and organized crime. From 2004-2009, Mr. Goldenberg played a key role in setting policy for the legislation and investigation of ethnic terrorism and hate crimes in his role as senior law enforcement advisor to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In the course of his law enforcement career, Mr. Goldenberg received South Florida’s most distinguished citation for valor, Officer of the Year, an honor presented after serving as lead agent in one of South Florida’s longest term undercover assignments.
Jane Harman
President and CEO, Woodrow Wilson Center

Jane Harman is the head of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, a Washington, D.C. think tank devoted to the ideals of former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. Congresswoman Harman served in Congress from 1993 to 1998 and 2001 to 2011. Following her resignation from Congress on February 28, 2011 she joined the Woodrow Wilson Center as its first female Director, President and CEO. During her time in Congress she represented the Aerospace Center of California during nine terms in Congress; she served on all the major security committees: six years on Armed Services, eight years on Intelligence and four on Homeland Security. Congresswoman Harman has made numerous Congressional fact-finding missions to hotspots around the world including North Korea, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Guantanamo Bay to assess threats against the U.S. Harman received the Defense Department Medal for Distinguished Service in 1998, the CIA Seal Medal in 2007, and both the CIA Director’s Award and the National Intelligence Distinguished Public Service Medal in 2011.
Seamus Hughes is the Deputy Director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University. Hughes previously worked at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), serving as a lead staffer on the U.S. government’s efforts to implement the national countering violent extremism strategy. He regularly led engagements with Muslim American communities across the country, provided counsel to civic leaders after high-profile terror-related incidents, and met with families of individuals who joined terrorist organizations. Hughes created a groundbreaking intervention program to help steer individuals away from violence through non-law enforcement means and worked closely with FBI Joint Terrorism Taskforces, Fusion Centers, and U.S. Attorney Offices. Prior to NCTC, Hughes served as the Senior Counterterrorism Advisor for the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. He has authored numerous legislative bills, including sections of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act and the Special Agent Samuel Hicks Families of Fallen Heroes Act. He is the recipient of National Security Council Outstanding Service and two NCTC Director’s Awards for outstanding service.
Jeffrey “Jeff” Miller

Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer, National Football League

Jeffrey Miller is Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer of the National Football League (NFL) where he oversees all event security, investigative programs and services. Prior to joining the NFL, Mr. Miller spent 24 years with the Pennsylvania State Police, retiring in 2008 after serving six years as Commissioner. In that role, he oversaw a complement of over 6,000 enlisted and civilian personnel and a budget of $800 million dollars. As a Cabinet Secretary, he was responsible for implementing crime- and crash-reduction strategies, anti-terrorism efforts, and general policing practices, including emergency response in all 67 counties in Pennsylvania. Mr. Miller holds an Associate Degree from the University of South Florida, a Bachelor’s of Professional Studies Degree in Criminal Justice from Elizabethtown College, and a Master’s Degree in Public Administration from the Pennsylvania State University. He is a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Academy in Quantico, Virginia, and the FBI National Executive Institute.
Joel Meyer is Senior Vice President at Dataminr, Inc., a real-time information discovery company that analyzes all public tweets and other publicly available data to deliver the earliest signals for breaking news, real-world events, off the radar context and perspective, and emerging trends.

Prior to joining Dataminr in 2013, he served as a Director on the White House National Security Council staff focusing on countering domestic radicalization and at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the Office of the Secretary as Senior Advisor to the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. He previously practiced law at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, and is an inactive member of the California and District of Columbia bars.
Michael A. Nutter served two terms as Mayor of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was first elected in November 2007, and then re-elected to a second term in November 2011. Most recently, while Mayor of Philadelphia he worked closely with the Department of Homeland Security and Secretary Johnson on the operational security and contingency planning for the September 2015 Papal visit which was designated as a National Special Security Event. Before being elected mayor, he served for almost 15 years on the Philadelphia City Council representing the 4th District.

Mr. Nutter holds a B.A. from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.
Matthew Olsen

President of Consulting and Co-Founder, IronNet Cybersecurity

Matthew Olsen is President of Consulting and Co-Founder at IronNet Cybersecurity. Mr. Olsen is responsible for leading IronNet’s consulting services, providing strategic and operational guidance to companies on cybersecurity and cyber threats, and helping to guide IronNet’s business development. Mr. Olsen is also a lecturer at Harvard Law School and a national security analyst for ABC News. Mr. Olsen has worked for over two decades as a top government official on national security, intelligence and law enforcement issues. Appointed by the President to serve as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Mr. Olsen led the government’s efforts to integrate and analyze terrorism information and coordinate counterterrorism activities for three years. Prior to joining the NCTC, Mr. Olsen was the General Counsel for the National Security Agency. Mr. Olsen also served at the Department of Justice in a number of leadership positions, including Special Counselor to the Attorney General, responsible for national security and criminal cases. Mr. Olsen was also a federal prosecutor for over a decade and has served as Special Counsel to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Ali H. Soufan is Chairman & Chief Executive Officer of The Soufan Group LLC and has been a member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council since September 2012. Mr. Soufan is a former FBI Supervisory Special Agent who investigated and supervised highly sensitive and complex international terrorism cases, including the East Africa Embassy Bombings, the attack on the USS Cole, and the events surrounding the 9/11 attacks. Mr. Soufan also served on the Joint Terrorist Task Force, FBI New York Office, where he coordinated both domestic and international counterterrorism operations. He has received numerous awards for his counterterrorism work, including the FBI Director’s Award for Excellence in Investigation and the Respect for Law Enforcement Award. Mr. Soufan is the author of The New York Times Top 10 Bestseller, "The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda" and a recipient of the Ridenhour Book Prize.
Juan Zarate

Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

Juan Zarate is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the senior national security analyst for CBS News, a visiting lecturer at the Harvard Law School, and a national security and financial integrity consultant. Zarate served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism from 2005 to 2009 and was responsible for developing and implementing the U.S. government’s counterterrorism strategy and policies related to transnational security threats. He was the first ever Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, where he led domestic and international efforts to attack terrorist financing, the innovative use of the Treasury Department’s national security–related powers, and the global hunt for Saddam Hussein’s assets. He is also a former federal prosecutor who served on terrorism prosecution teams prior to 9/11, including the investigation of the USS Cole attack.

Zarate is the author of the recently published Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (PublicAffairs, 2013), Forging Democracy (University Press of America, 1994), and a variety of articles in the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, Washington Quarterly, and other publications. He has his own weekly national security program on CBSNews.com called Flash Points. He is a graduate of both Harvard College and Harvard Law School and a former Rotary International Fellow (Universidad de Salamanca, Spain). Zarate sits on several boards of advisers, including for the director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and HSBC’s Financial Services Vulnerabilities Committee.
William H. Webster (HSAC Chair) served as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1987 to 1991. Prior to his service as CIA Director, Judge Webster served as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1978 to 1987, a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from 1973 to 1978, and a United States District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri from 1970 to 1973. In 1991, Judge Webster was presented the Distinguished Intelligence Medal. Judge Webster was also awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom and the National Security Medal. Following his departure from the CIA, Judge Webster joined the law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP in Washington, DC, and is now a retired partner.
Tara Sonenshine

Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Tara D. Sonenshine is a Distinguished Fellow at George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs. She is the former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for the Department of State and previously served as the Executive Vice President of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Prior to joining USIP, she was a strategic communications adviser to many international organizations including USIP, the International Crisis Group, Internews, CARE, The American Academy of Diplomacy, and the International Women’s Media Foundation. Ms. Sonenshine served in various capacities at the White House during the Clinton Administration, including Transition Director, Director of Foreign Policy Planning for the National Security Council, and Special Assistant to the President and Deputy Director of Communications. Prior to serving in the Clinton Administration, Ms. Sonenshine was an Editorial Producer of ABC News’ Nightline, where she worked for more than a decade. She was also an off-air reporter at the Pentagon for ABC’s World News Tonight and is the recipient of 10 News Emmy Awards for coverage of international affairs. She holds a B.A. in Political Science from Tufts University. Tara Sonenshine brings unique skills in public affairs, crisis communications, media training, editorial writing, branding and public outreach including outreach to women and girls, diverse audiences, and online social media.
James K. Glassman
Former Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

Ambassador Glassman served as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs during 2008-09. He focused on using tools of persuasion to thwart violent extremism and on introducing social media to the department. During 2007-08, he was Chairman of the U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors, which oversees Voice of America and other government-sponsored TV, radio, and Internet broadcasting. He was confirmed unanimously by the U.S. Senate for both his government positions.

Currently, he is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington think tank, where he helped launch the Center for Internet, Communications, and Technology Policy. He has held various positions as a scholar at AEI since 1996. He is also a member of the Investor Advisory Committee of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Chairman and CEO of Public Affairs Engagement, a Washington consulting firm.

He is the Founding Executive Director of the George W. Bush Institute, the policy arm of the Bush Presidential Center in Dallas. From 2009 to 2013, he built institute from scratch under the direction of the former president, inaugurating 13 programs in such subject areas as education, global health, and veterans’ services.

Ambassador Glassman’s career in media has included positions as Publisher of two of America’s leading public affairs magazines, the Atlantic Monthly and New Republic; Editor-in-chief and co-owner of Roll Call, the congressional newspaper; and moderator of three weekly public affairs series on PBS and CNN: “TechnoPolitics,” “Ideas in Action,” and “Capital Gang Sunday.” He was chief investment writer for the Washington Post from 1993 to 2004, is the author of three books on personal investing, and for the past 10 years has written a monthly column for Kiplinger’s Personal Finance.

Over the past 15 years, he has written more than 2,000 articles – on economics, finance, technology, and foreign policy -- for such publications as the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Forbes, and Los Angeles Times. He has spoken at some of the world’s most important forums, including the National Press Club (Washington), the Detroit Economic Club, and Chatham House (London).
Ambassador Glassman has served as a senior advisor to AT&T and SAP Corporations and as a member of the Policy Advisory Board of Intel Corp. He is a graduate of Harvard University with a B.A., cum laude, in government and was managing editor of the university daily, The Crimson.

He lives with his wife Beth Ourisman Glassman in Bethesda. His daughter Kate is White House correspondent for IJ Review, and his daughter Zoe is a teacher in New Orleans. He has three grandchildren.
Charlotte Beers
Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Born in Texas, Charlotte Beers brought her math background to the world of ideas, a combination which proved successful in the competitive world of advertising and marketing. Named the "most powerful woman in advertising, she has been featured on the covers of Fortune and Business Week as one of the noted leaders in American business. During the fateful period following 9/11, Charlotte left the world of advertising to become the Undersecretary of State under Colin Powell.

Her advertising career began as an account executive at J. Walter Thompson, becoming the first female S'VP in the firm’s history. She moved to Tatham Laird & Kudner as CEO. The company reversed its decline, attracted major accounts and tripled the billings. Charlotte then became Chairman/CEO of Ogilvy & Mather Worldwide, a $5.4 billion, 8,000-employee, global advertising agency. In her five years with the firm, billings increased by $2 billion. Harvard Business School and many other universities still teach their best-selling case study on leadership titled “Charlotte Beers at Ogilvy.”

While serving as Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy, her department created programs and messages focused on the Middle East. For her service, Charlotte was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, the State Department's highest honor.

Charlotte currently serves on the Board of the AS Roma soccer club and speaks widely on leadership and work relationships. Her recent book, I’d Rather Be in Charge, about how relationships at work create leaders, is taught by her in workshops for WPP throughout the US and Europe.
As co-founder and CEO at independent think tank The Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Sasha leads the organization’s government advisory, research and delivery programmes in the fields of counter-extremism and foreign policy, bringing the private sector to the table with senior policy makers and building transformative networks to respond to the cross-border challenges of conflict, extremism and terrorism.

Sasha chairs the European Policy Planners’ Network on counter-radicalization, which she initiated in 2008 with the participation of nine European governments, and co-chairs the EU’s Internet Radicalization working group. She is co-founder of the Women and Extremism Initiative and has spearheaded the development of Against Violent Extremism (AVE), the world’s largest network of former extremists and victims of extremism. In partnership with Google Ideas, AVE works to counter radicalization on and offline.

Sasha previously served as Senior Director at the US think-tank, the EastWest Institute (EWI), where she headed the organization’s conflict resolution and transition work, rolling-out unique cross-border field operations across the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Russia. She was nominated to serve on a Task Force of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Balkan wars.

Sasha currently serves on the board of Women Without Borders and is a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations. She is a regular commentator on counter-terrorism in the media, having spoken on the BBC, Channel 4, CNN, ABC, Radio 4 and other networks.
Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi, JD currently serves as the President of the World Organization for Resource Development and Education [WORDE], a non-profit organization dedicated to reducing conflict between diverse societies. She is a world renowned expert in community based programming that promotes social cohesion and builds resilience against violent extremism.

In furtherance of that mission, Dr. Mirahmadi established the International Cultural Center (ICC) where people from diverse traditions perform community service, participate in educational programs, and share in artistic expression in order to foster peaceful co-existence and social harmony.

As Co-Chair of the Montgomery County Executive’s Faith Community Working Group, she runs America’s first community led, public-private partnership in promoting social cohesion and public safety, with a particular focus on the intervention and prevention of violent extremism which was awarded the FY15 Community Policing Development Grant to Combat Violent Extremism, by the Department of Justice. As a world renowned expert in countering violent extremism [CVE], she also is an advisor to several US federal agencies including the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the National Counter-Terrorism Center, and the Department of Defense. In addition, Dr. Mirahmadi is a Board Member of Montgomery County Collaboration Council for Children, Youth and Families that provides range of social services and recreational activities for at risk youth and families.

She is also a chapter contributor to the books: *Abraham’s Children: Liberty and Tolerance in an Age of Religious Conflict*, (Yale University Press), *Islam and Civil Society*, (Ingram Publications); and *The Other Muslims: Moderate and Secular*, (Palgrave Publications).

Dr. Mirahmadi earned her Juris Doctorate from the University of Southern California [USC], with a doctoral these in the Constitutional religious freedoms of Muslim prisoners.
Soraya Chemaly is a writer and activist whose work focuses on the role of gender in culture, politics, religion and media. She is the Director of the Women's Media Center Speech Project and is the organizer of the Safety and Free Speech Coalition, both of which seek to curb online abuse, improve diversity in media and technology, and expand women's freedom of expression, political and civic participation.

She started her career in 1988 as an editor and writer before joining the Gannett Corporation as Director of Corporate Marketing in 1990. In 1994, she left Gannett to co-launch the News and Media Division at Claritas, now Nielsen, Inc. The company was an early pioneer in consumer demography, database marketing, geographic information systems and data technologies. In 2001, she left Claritas as Senior Vice President of Corporate Marketing to form her own consulting firm, working for several years in the media and data technology sectors.

Ms. Chemaly returned to writing and activism in 2011. Since then her work has appeared regularly in The Atlantic, TIME, Salon, The Guardian, The Nation, The New Statesman, Quartz and The Huffington Post. She serves as a board member on the executive committees of several organizations dedicated to anti-violence, media and electoral diversity including the Women’s Media Center, Women Action and the Media, In This Together Media, No Bully and VIDA: Women in Literary Arts. She is a former board member of EMERGE America, Secular Woman, FORCE: Upsetting Rape Culture, and Common Sense Media. Ms. Chemaly is also one of the founding organizers of the International Feminist Network, a coalition mapping initiative. She writes and speaks regularly about gender, media, tech, education, women’s rights, sexual violence and free speech. In 2014, she was named one of Elle Magazine’s 25 Inspiring Women to Follow. In 2013, she was the recipient the Donna Allen Award for Feminist Advocacy and the Secular Woman Feminist Activism Award.
Imam Magid

Imam, All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS)
Chairman, International Interfaith Peace Corps (IIPC)

Imam Magid is the Imam of All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS) Center in Sterling, Virginia. He is the chairman of International Interfaith Peace Corps (IIPC). Imam Magid served as the President of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). Under his direction, the ADAMS Center has grown to be one of the largest Muslim community organizations in the Washington Metropolitan Area. He also occupies the Chairmanship of the Fairfax County Faith Communities in Action, and a Chaplin of George Mason University Campus Ministry. He is also the Vice Chairman of Muflehun, a think tank, which focuses on confronting violent extremist thought through research-driven preventative programs within a religious paradigm.

Imam Magid has a long history of commitment to public service through organizations, such as The Peaceful Families Project.

Imam Magid has co-authored three books “Before You Tie the Knot: A Guide for Couples” “Reflections on the Qur’an” “Change from within”. He has helped training and workshops for Imams and religious leaders, domestically and internationally, on the issue of violence against women. Imam Magid is leading an initiative to protect religious minorities in Muslim majority countries, through a series of conferences. He has written for the Washington Post and Huffington Post, and been profiled in Time Magazine and Wall Street Journal. He is the recipient for the Washingtonian of the Year 2009 and the Human Rights Award 2005 from Fairfax County.
### Members Attending (9):

**Farah Pandith (Chair)**  
Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Former Special Representative to Muslim Communities, U.S. Department of State

**Adnan Kifayat (Chair)**  
Senior Resident Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States

**Seamus Hughes**  
Deputy Director, Program on Extremism at George Washington University

**Laila Alawa**  
Chief Executive Officer & Founder, Coming of Faith

**Paul Goldenberg**  
President and Chief Executive Officer, Cardinal Point Strategies

**Joel Meyer**  
SVP, Public Sector at Dataminr

**Michael Nutter**  
Former Mayor of Philadelphia

**Juan Zarate**  
Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Former Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism

**John Allen**  
Retired U.S. Marine Corps. General and Former Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition against ISIL *(leaving by 4:00)*

### Members Calling (3)

**Ali Soufan**  
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, The Soufan Group LLC *(1:30 - ?)*

**Jeffrey Miller**  
Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer, National Football League *(1:00-2:00)*

**Russ Deyo**  
Under Secretary for Management, DHS *(10:00-12:30)*

### SMEs (5)

**Tara Sonenshine**  
Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State *(10:00 – 10:30)*

**Soraya Chemaly**  
Director, Women's Media Center Speech Project *(10:00 - ?)*

**Hedieh Mirahmadi**  
President, World Organization for Resource Development and Education *(WORDE) (11:30 – ?)*
James Glassman
Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State (10:00 – 12:00)

Imam Magid
Executive Director, All Dulles Area Muslim Society (3:00 – 3:30)

SMEs Video/Calling In (2)
Sasha Havlicek (video)
CEO, Institute for Strategic Dialogue (from London) (11:00 – 11:30)

Charlotte Beers (call)
Former Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State (10:00 – 11:00)

Matthew Bryza
TBD

DHS Attending (5):
Sarah Morgenthau,
Erin Walls
George Selim
Lauren Wenger
Katrina Woodhams
Homeland Security Advisory Council
Homeland Security Advisory Council
Office of Community Partnerships
Office of Community Partnerships
Homeland Security Advisory Council

Order of Members/SMEs Arrival
Tara Sonenshine 10:00 – 10:30
Soraya Chemaly 10:00 - ?
James Glassman 10:00 – 12:00
Charlotte Beers (call) 10:00 – 11:00
Russ Deyo 10:00-12:30
Sasha Havlicek (video) 11:00 – 11:30 (from London)
Hedieh Mirahmadi 11:30 – ?
Ali Soufan (call) 1:30 - ?
Matthew Bryza 1:30?
Jeffrey Miller (call) 1:00-2:00
Imam Magid 3:00 – 3:30
Facebook
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(5)
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
SUBCOMMITTEE AGENDA
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
5th Floor Conference Room
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C.
Friday, February 19th, 2016 – 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

10:00 a.m. Welcome and Introductions
Sarah E. Morgenthau, Executive Director, Homeland Security Advisory Council

10:05 a.m. Briefing from Former State Department Officials

11:00 a.m. Perspectives on Countering Violent Extremism
Sasha Havlicek, Chief Executive Officer, Institute for Strategic Dialogue
Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, World Organization for Resource Development and Education
Soraya Chemaly, Director, Women's Media Center Speech Project
Parisa Sabeti Zagat and Peter Stern, Facebook

1:00 p.m. WORKING LUNCH

1:30 p.m. Perspective on Countering Violent Extremism
Matthew Bryza, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council

2:00 p.m. Updates from Subcommittee Focus Area Leads
Ali Soufan (Communications/Messaging)
Seamus Hughes (Funding and Resourcing)
Joel Meyer (Engaging with Tech and Social Media Companies)
Paul Goldenberg (Incorporating the Education and Mental Health Sectors)
Laila Alawa (Pop Culture/Millennials)

2:45 p.m. BREAK

3:00 p.m. Perspective on Countering Violent Extremism
Imam Mohamed Magid, Executive Director, All Dulles Area Muslim Society
3:30 p.m.  **Presentation on Previous Reports**  
Sarah E. Morgenthau

4:00 p.m.  **Subcommittee Action Items and Next Steps (Subcommittee Members Only)**  
Farah Pandith, Chair, CVE Subcommittee  
Adnan Kifayat, Chair, CVE Subcommittee

5:00 p.m.  **Meeting Adjourns**
Homeland Security Advisory Council’s
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee
In-Person Meeting - January 11, 2016

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<td>Seth Rosen</td>
<td>DHS Intelligence &amp; Analysis (I&amp;A)</td>
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<td>Charles Gruber</td>
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<td>Stephanie Maniglia</td>
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12:00 p.m. Welcome and Administrative Remarks
Sarah Morgenthau, Executive Director, Homeland Security Advisory Council

12:15 p.m. WORKING LUNCH

1:00 p.m. Overview of the Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) & Q/A
George Selim, Director, DHS Office for Community Partnerships

1:30 p.m. Briefing on Domestic Terrorism, HVEs, US Fighters in Syria, and Potential CVE Opportunities
Seth Rosen, Homeland Violent Extremism Branch, DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis
Chad Reifler, Homeland Violent Extremism Branch, DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis
Conley Hefley, Homeland Violent Extremism Branch, DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis

2:15 p.m. Briefing on Violent Extremist Messaging
Katherine Altom, Branch Chief, D/REM, National Counterterrorism Center
Brian Marcus, Analyst, DI/REM, National Counterterrorism Center
Patrick Woody, Analyst, DI/TTG, National Counterterrorism Center

3:00 p.m. Subcommittee Discussion on Action Items and Next Steps
Sarah Morgenthau, Executive Director, HSAC
Farah Pandith, Chair, CVE Subcommittee, HSAC
Adnan Kifayat, Chair, CVE Subcommittee, HSAC

5:00 p.m. Meeting Adjourns
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**Subject Matter Experts (Proposed)**

- **Zeenat Rahman**: Former Special Adviser on Global Youth Issues, U.S Department of State
- **Eric Kessler**: Owner, Arabella Advisors
- **Remy Goldsmith**: Senior Community Leadership Officer, Silicon Valley Community Foundation
- **Jonathan Keidan**: Founder, Inside Hook
- **Andrew McLaughlin**: Chief Executive Officer, Digg and Instapaper
- **Jeff Glueck**: Chief Operating Officer, Four Square
- **Nick Beim**: Partner, Venrock
- **David Tisch**: Managing Partner, Box Group
John Wolfe  Founder and Managing Partner, Lux Capital
Brian Forde  Director of Digital Currency, MIT Media Lab
Minerva Tantoco  Chief Technology Officer, New York City
Eugene Chiu  Partner, In-Q-Tel
Adam Sharp  Twitter, Head of News and Government
Sam Altman  President, Y Combinator
Kal Vepuri  Angel investor (attended roundtable)
Saida Abdi  Director, Community Relations, Center for Refugee Trauma and Resilience, Children’s Hospital
Terry Babcock Lumish  President and Founder, Islay Consulting LLC
Reta Jo Lewis  Senior Resident Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States
John Miller  Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism and Intelligence, New York Police Department (NYPD)
TBD  Facebook
TBD  YouTube
TBD  Snapchat
TBD  Concentric Advisors
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PREFACE

In November 2015, Jeh C. Johnson, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (the Department), directed the Homeland Security Advisory Council (“HSAC”), to establish a subcommittee (“Subcommittee”) that is focused on Countering Violent Extremism (“CVE”). The Subcommittee was stood up to act as an incubator of ideas for the new Office for Community Partnerships (DHS/OCP), and has worked to leverage outside expertise and new thinking to support and enhance as well as assist in reframing and re-envisioning, where necessary the Department’s CVE efforts.

Specifically, the Subcommittee was asked to address how the Department can best support non-governmental initiatives that either directly or indirectly counter violent extremism, including:

- Identifying opportunities or platforms useful for the Department’s facilitation of public-private partnerships with both technology and philanthropic sectors
- The development of new networks and a framework for sustained dialogue and engagement with those partners to include non-governmental sectors
- Other non-governmental sectors, besides technology and philanthropic, that should be leveraged for CVE and how the Department should engage them
- How best to work with education and mental health professionals to help parents and schools understand how they can counter youth radicalization to violence
- How the Department can inspire peer-to-peer attempts to challenge violent extremism through public-private partnerships

This report focuses on the spread of violent extremist ideology and the recruitment of American youth to extremist groups, and how the Department can be a platform and an engine to leverage partnerships in the technology, health, education, communications, cultural, philanthropic, financial, and non-governmental sectors to counter such recruitment.

While recognizing previous efforts – from those of the Spring 2010 Countering Violent Extremism Working Group to the more-recent Foreign Fighter Task Force – this report seeks to focus on discrete areas, separate and distinct than those undertaken in other efforts.

Subcommittee Findings

To effectively address and conquer the challenge of violent extremism, our nation requires the full engagement of our whole community, and entities across sectors. Chief among these elements are the American people and the American private, non-governmental and academic sectors, working in partnership with the government. Today, more than ever, we must harness the power of American ingenuity, creativity, and resilience. We must engage, activate, and align the private and non-governmental and academic sectors to address violent extremism, and the threat that it poses – in all its forms, across all communities.

1 Please see Appendix #5 for CVE definition.
Subcommittee Members recommend a range of initiatives to support the Department’s approach to the above focus areas, having solicited a broad array of views from leaders in the non-governmental, technology, philanthropic, public, health, and academic sectors.

Notably, the Subcommittee unanimously recommends significantly increasing staffing funding by as much as $100 million for both grants and program administration for the DHS/OCP — charged with implementing CVE efforts and representing the Department within the newly designated CVE Task Force. This funding would be used to develop a nationwide infrastructure of federal support to local community efforts, continue to spur innovation online and in the social sciences, and provide necessary grant funding to support non-profits and local governments in their CVE work. The current funding level of $10 million in FY16 for grant programs through DHS/OCP is insufficient to effectively counter the spread of violent extremist ideology in the United States, and does not in itself offer the chance to level — much less gain advantage against — increasingly aggressive efforts to recruit and radicalize our youth by violent extremist organizations at home and abroad. Securing additional funding can help mitigate the threat of violent extremist ideologies but will require close and sustained coordination with Congress — potentially to include a new Congressional Liaison within DHS/OCP. This will include dedicated funding spanning all forms of violent extremism and funding for data and metrics such that future programing may be supported based on evidence.

Just as significantly, while many related national security challenges (such as public health or climate change) receive funding for initiatives through private foundations and other non-profits, CVE receives very little. As such, in the immediate term, all of the weight of this challenge is on government to mobilize resources and encourage stronger private sector engagement. Given the credibility of non-government actors to achieve CVE objectives, and adaptive nature of private philanthropy, incentivizing their involvement will be paramount for success. Experts strongly recommend that government act quickly to enable a conducive environment for private sector action.

Many experts expressed concerns that funding is tied to the same agencies that have law enforcement mandates or that CVE stigmatizes some of the very communities it seeks to help, notably the American Muslim communities. As noted in the recommendations, addressing the core of these perceptions and otherwise creating incentives for private foundations to help address this challenge cooperatively is critical if we are to have a lasting impact.

This report seeks to catalyze efforts between the public and private sectors. The Subcommittee notes the need not just for a high volume of activities, but also for more

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2 Consistent with the understanding that $10 million is not sufficient, on May 26, 2016, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported out S. 3001, The Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2017 which provides $50 million for CVE grants for FY17. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/3001

targeted, professional, and comprehensive actions. Of note, better data analysis and use of innovative measures of effectiveness will be important to ensure future efforts are evidence-based.

In addition, a common theme that underlies the majority of recommendations is the need to recognize the cultural and technological trends shaping identities of Millennials and to directly engage them in efforts.

Also notable is what the government should not do, such as to act as the messenger (as opposed to empowering “credible messengers” or “influencers”). Further, government must avoid stigmatizing specific communities or those seeking mental health services and ensure adherence to the privacy restrictions inherent in The Privacy Act and The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).

The use of social media and technology are part of the challenge, the Department must fully understand and leverage social media in its policy and programmatic activities. To generate new ideas and bring additional expertise to the Department’s CVE work in this sector, the Subcommittee spoke with a range of experts in digital marketing and branding, technology, and social media.

The United States Government must take all forms of violent extremism and radicalization seriously, prioritizing those forms that pose the greatest threats to safety and security, most urgently.

Ultimately, the approaches this report recommends for the Department will help it evolve over time and adapt to the changing nature of violent extremism itself, namely, the convergence and alliances of violent extremist groups across the full spectrum of grievances: To include those that espouse and/or undertake violence justified through various ideologies, to include anarchists, sovereign citizens, white-supremacists, and others.

The subcommittee believes that the U.S. Government needs to build mechanisms for animating state, local, civil society, and the private sector as key enablers to adapt to this new era of challenges. This report seeks to assist in that effort. Based on these themes, and in light of the functional areas requested by the Secretary for examination, the Subcommittee respectfully submits the following recommendations.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) engaged with a wide range of experts and leaders to assess the status of efforts to counter violent extremism in the Homeland. Based on their input, the Subcommittee is making recommendations to expand on non-governmental partnership principles referenced in the HSAC Foreign Fighter Task Force Interim Report, Spring 2015. Specifically, the Subcommittee recommends:

➢ Strengthening the Department to Do the Job: The Department is significantly under-resourced to provide the activities and programming to stem online and offline radicalization and recruitment to extremist violence in the United States. A clear-eyed view of the threat before us, which the Subcommittee recognizes, requires an immediate and significant increase in funding and other resources — including possibly new authorities — for the Department to accomplish its goals.

Key Recommendations
• Strengthen the Office for Community Partnerships by immediately increasing funding and authority
• Redesign infrastructure of communications to take into account new technologies and methods being used by the non-governmental sector
• Given the evolving threat and how the process of radicalization itself is evolving, update and change the rules on how government uses lexicon
• Invest in deeper and more deliberate data analysis and more well-trained professionals in government to coordinate efforts efficiently
• Develop partnerships with the Departments of State, Education, and Health and Human Services to build new lines of interaction on CVE programs
• Strengthen partnerships with State, Local, Tribal and Territorial law enforcement stakeholders to ensure connectivity and coordination on CVE efforts.

➢ Focusing on a National Architecture Across All 50 States: Given that we live in an open and democratic system, and regardless of ideological persuasion, the threat of violent extremism does not recognize U.S. jurisdictional boundaries — state and local, national or tribal. The Department must be aggressive about building the necessary networks nationally. Existing efforts that have proven effective must be scaled up. Our approach must be focused on the power of government to encourage and unleash our greatest strengths. The private, non-governmental sector — including the full range of civil society across all communities, working hand-in-hand with leaders in science, faith, and technology — and with the full endorsement of our elected leaders at all levels offers the best chance to counter the threat of violent extremism for future generations.

4 In this report, CVE is defined as actions to counter efforts by extremists to radicalize, recruit or mobilize followers to violence and to address the conditions that allow violent extremist recruitment and radicalization.
Key Recommendations
• Scale existing partnerships with the non-governmental sector that are already funded by government and have proven to be effective
• Establish new strategic partnerships with the private sector
• Catalyze new networks with the philanthropic and financial sectors
• Create and leverage networks and professional associations of mental health and social services organizations to create scalable partnerships with the philanthropic sector
• Partner and expand national networks of mayors and governors.

Prioritizing Attention on the Millennial Generation: Our nation’s youth are at risk of online radicalization and recruitment like never before. They are by far the largest demographic being targeted by extremists, especially online. It is therefore our duty to protect them. Prioritized attention to the generation under 30 years old (digital natives across race, religion, ethnicity, location, socioeconomic levels, ideology, and gender) is required to prevent violent ideologies from influencing this segment of our population.

Key Recommendations
• Prioritize attention on efforts to counter the recruitment of youth to violent ideologies across race, religion, ethnicity, location, socioeconomic levels, and gender
• Establish partnerships for collaboration with the Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Education to address a range of pathways to recruitment, exchange of best practices and lessons learned.
• Scale up platforms (social media, technology, new, and emerging media) to encourage private sector creation of more and more targeted online content and micro-targeted distribution channels
• Partner with public and private colleges and universities across the country

In this report, the Subcommittee lays out a conceptual framework for the Department and offers specific actions that should be taken to leverage its strength, address areas of improvement, and provide a way forward that is measurable and comprehensive. This report offers the Secretary of Homeland Security a clear assessment of what must done in the short and long term. The recommendations herein are paramount to keep the Department appropriately adaptive to the new generation of threats to the Homeland related to the threat of violent extremism.
I. THE DEPARTMENT: SETTING US UP TO DO THE JOB

Background

Based on consultations with a wide range of experts, the Subcommittee recommends that the Department of Homeland Security develop a comprehensive organizational plan to address the issue of the rising appeal and impact of violent extremist ideologies to domestic audiences. This will require significantly scaling the Department’s footprint and capacities to engage civil society and the private sector. Our investment must match our rhetoric and rise to the generational challenge that we face, so that words can translate into concrete and measurable action. In order to do so, the Department must look inward to change the way it speaks to itself and the world and to invest in best practices that catalyze research and harness the full spectrum of American technology and creativity to take on this challenge while, at the same time, looking beyond government to identify partners-as well as resources- who can assist in this effort.

The Subcommittee urges the Department to recognize its strategic strengths as an institution in fulfilling its objective, including acting as convener and facilitator, and as a thought leader and intellectual partner to prioritize what is working. Building the right platforms and networks across U.S. society and facilitating connectivity with nongovernmental partners presents an appropriate role for the Department as it seeks to engage a new generation of change-makers. In order to empower such momentum, the Department must have clear leadership and direction, with a broad footprint to complement nongovernmental actors. With inspiration from a wide variety of experienced organizations and people ranging from non-profits, entrepreneurs, business leaders, and those within government, progress towards defeating violent extremist ideologies is possible.

Recommendation 1: Strengthen the Office for Community Partnerships

Context:

In September 2015, Secretary Johnson established DHS/OCP to “build relationships and promote trust, and, in addition, find innovative ways to support communities that seek to discourage violent extremism and undercut terrorist narratives.” 5 DHS/OCP is charged with leading the Department’s CVE efforts and with serving as the inaugural chair of the interagency CVE Task Force.

Given its central role within both the Department and the interagency, DHS/OCP is well suited to lead the efforts described throughout this document, and will require significant new resources to do so. Despite increased public and policy focus on CVE, federal funding has not matched the scope of this very real and present challenge. The initial national CVE strategy released in 2011, “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States” 6 provided unfunded or under-funded roles and

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responsibilities for federal, state, local, and community partners on prevention. For five years, the Department has been placed in the untenable position of implementing a national strategy with no new funding. In FY16, for the first time, Congress allocated $10 million dollars to the Department for CVE grants, and $3.1M for the establishment of the office; it should move quickly to hire staff for DHS/OCP and efficiently and effectively dispense grant funding, including establishing new mechanisms for moving federal funding immediately to effective partners and programs.

In January 2016, Secretary Johnson announced the creation of the permanent interagency CVE Task Force which is responsible for bringing together personnel from across the executive branch to ensure that the challenge of violent extremism is faced in a unified and coordinated way. The CVE Task Force’s work is important and integral to the success of CVE efforts. To this end, since all of the domestic focused recommendations, particularly those that are operational in nature would be best carried out by DHS/OCP.

**Actions:**

1. Establish DHS/OCP as the Secretary’s CVE office, ensuring its leadership reports directly to the Secretary.
2. Significantly increase funding to DHS/OCP and authorize it to distribute funds to state, local, and non-governmental actors.
   a. Provide DHS/OCP with $100 million per fiscal year in funding. This funding will be used for CVE grants for programs and networks implemented across the nation. This would include office infrastructure, field staff expansion, and program resources.
3. Formalize DHS/OCP’s role as the single CVE coordinator for the Department and a single point of contact to facilitate ease of dialogue between non-governmental entities and the Department.
4. Extend the mandate of the HSAC CVE Subcommittee to serve as a standing partner to DHS/OCP, the Department’s Private Sector Office, and the Department in implementing the recommendations of this report and facilitating input and engagement from outside subject matter experts.
5. Establish regional offices around the country to facilitate DHS/OCP partnerships across state and local jurisdictions.
6. Formalize a partnership for a DHS/OCP Innovation Lab modeled after the State Department and Defense Department’s similar efforts. The Lab should facilitate the full range of efforts related to innovation and partnerships with technology innovators.
7. Task DHS/OCP and the Department’s Private Sector Office to:
   a. Aggressively implement a philanthropic development strategic plan to provide ways for regional philanthropic fundraising for

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7 Pellerin, Cheryl. DoD’s Silicon Valley Innovation Experiment Begins.” U.S. Department of Defense, 29 October 2015, and Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Strategy Lab
community programs, working with the new Philanthropic Advisor to the HSAC (see Section II, Recommendation 2).

b. Build new access points for American companies, social entrepreneurial organizations, and educational institutions to contribute to CVE in-kind and otherwise.

c. Build on what we have done overseas and remodel it for the American context. Seizing the best ideas and content on all aspects of CVE from other agencies and departments—and other countries—requires new lines of interaction with the State Department, USAID, and Voice of America (See further: Section III, Recommendation 2).

**Recommendation 2: Redesign Infrastructure of Communications**

**Context:**

The changing nature of technology and the access it provides to ideas, notably the type and volume of violent extremist content and efforts to recruit youth to violent extremism has created an evolving challenge and opportunity. We are struggling to keep up with its pace and impact. Importantly, the process of radicalization begins at an individual level and relies on a constant feed of reinforcing ideologies that are spread both on and offline. Looking at the way ideas are spread in both domains is vital to our efforts. Local communities are central to understanding not only the origin but also the impact of changes taking place within neighborhoods, among peer groups, and as a result of influencers. In the online space, extremist groups have mastered the facility of integrated systems of communication, globally and at a scale and pace that has surpassed our current efforts to dominate the playing field. Their 24/7 efforts require us to be equally as constant and we must engage on this challenge on a level that is commensurate. With numerous forums wholly dedicated to messaging hate, current counter-narrative efforts are insufficient to keep up in time or volume of content. We must address the challenge of micro-targeting by our adversaries, which puts an onus on communities and the private sector to help confront and counter in creative ways.

In the case of foreign fighters seeking to join groups like ISIL, the Subcommittee sees the potential of a significant chapter ahead. A March 2015 Brookings Institution report suggested that ISIL supporters used approximately 46,000 Twitter accounts worldwide. According to the Department’s Center of Excellence, the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), in 2002, the Internet was a factor contributing to the radicalization of 37% of the foreign fighters and aspirants who attempted travel to conflict zones to fight on behalf of terrorist organizations there. By 2015, the Internet contributed to the radicalization of 86% of those attempting travel since 2005, and 83% of the same in 2015 alone. Half of the individuals used the Internet and other technology tools as their primary source of information about traveling to the conflict zones. Further, approximately half of the

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successful travelers maintained an active presence on social media, most often using social media to encourage others to travel, document experiences, and share tips for evading law enforcement detection. The data indicates that 20% of individuals attempting travel had established relationships with online travel facilitators who helped arrange safe houses and escorts to conflict zones.

American youth are not immune to this and there are increasing efforts to recruit young Americans to violent extremist ideologies. The nature of social media and the way extremists seed their ideas means that our communication system must be specific to the American context. The Department must adapt to this new era while amplifying our knowledge of how extremists lure youth offline in more traditional means. Arguably our nation has extraordinary possibilities of saturating the on and offline space.

**Actions:**

1. Leverage private sector expertise and best practices for deploying technology, communications, and marketing across mediums:
   a. Bring private sector talent into the government through the Department’s Loaned Executive Program to assess and provide recommendations on communications and marketing efforts to support the CVE mission, including how to design measures of effectiveness.
   b. Institute a new exchange program whereby the Department’s professionals can embed with technology, marketing, and communications companies for short periods of time to learn expertise and build relationships; this can be accomplished through the Exemplar Program authorized through the Department’s Private Sector Office.
   c. Appoint “Technology Advisers” who are employed in the private sector but who are able to work with and provide expertise to the Department through the HSAC CVE Subcommittee.
   d. Build mechanisms for the exchange of best practices and lessons learned from the media and technology sectors on the creation of adjacent and native content for persuasion.

2. For the Department to help support the efforts of non-profit programs and organizations working to address messaging, technology, and communications issues by identifying one dedicated point of contact within DHS/OCP to convene non-profit and the private sector stakeholders to further the Department’s and OCP’s work in this field.

3. Appoint a new Member to the HSAC who works for a communications, branding or marketing agency and has a range of relevant experience in media and related industries.
Recommendation 3: Change Our Lexicon by Shifting How We Speak with Each Other and the World

Context:

The term CVE was developed to describe soft power tools focused on countering and defeating the ideology of violent extremists. It encompasses the range of communications, community engagement, mental health, and related practices that may reduce ideological, psychological, or community-driven factors conducive to support for violent extremist ideologies. In recent years, the term has moved into new spaces and has created unintended implications. CVE is not hard power, and it is not an investigative tool for law enforcement. Regardless, there is now a great deal of confusion among a new generation of government officials and civic leaders about what it means, what actual CVE programs do, and how to measure their impact. Recognition of this problem is critical, but it is possible to begin to change the perception and reclaim the original intent.

There are several layers to the issue around lexicon in the context of CVE. On the one hand, it might seem obvious to change the term CVE because there is a perception about its meaning that securitizes relationships between government and — in particular — Muslim communities. This results in credible influencers rejecting work that at all connects them to CVE. On the other hand, reformulating a new term that is agreed upon by the inter-agency and community groups could take years and is unlikely to yield a sustainable consensus. Subcommittee members do not recommend that the Department engage in a process to redefine CVE itself. Instead, the Subcommittee recommends focusing on immediate steps now that can help engage the full range of actors in the private and non-governmental sectors across communities in our nation.

There is a disagreement among scholars, government officials, and activists about the right lexicon to use around the issues of violent extremism. At the same time, report after report has recommended that the U.S. Government be consistent in its language and its meaning, highlighting that tone and word choice matter. Under no circumstance should we be using language that will alienate or be disrespectful of fellow Americans. Thus, we need to be clearer in what we mean and how we say it. Further, we are at a particular moment on the world stage with global events driving fear, political and cultural rhetoric leaning on sharp and divisive language, and deep polarization and distrust across communities. All of this is set against the backdrop of digitally connected recruitment efforts that are actively trying to exploit differences and create divisions across U.S. society. We must speak with honor and respect about all communities within the United States. We should give dignity to the many histories and diversities within our nation and advocate for a consistent whole of government approach that utilizes agreed terms and words. Tone and word choice matter.

Mental health experts and educators connect the environment we live in to emotional and physical well-being, behavior and issues of identity, belonging, and security. Words are part of that environment. Often without knowing it, we have constructed language in daily use that promotes an “us and them” narrative of division. Though it was
within the context of the “War on Terror,” the Department’s 2008 guidance about lexicon is important to review as it has bearing on groups like ISIL. It instructs the Department to ensure terminology is “properly calibrated to diminish the recruitment efforts of extremists who argue that the West is at war with Islam.”

In condemning violent extremism in all forms, we must also be better at communicating with the public and within government. In sum, we are in a complicated and challenging chapter: more people know we need to fight the spread of extremist ideologies but many do not know what we mean when we say we want to do that through CVE programs.

**Actions:**

1. Renew efforts to describe CVE, its origin of soft power, and attempt to re-establish the term to ensure that prevention programs are not inter-mingled with surveillance or intelligence-gathering programs.
2. Bring consistency into government use of language and meaning.
3. Ensure the Department reviews the 2008 directive and uses a vocabulary when discussing extremism that avoids the “us versus them” framing.
4. Reject religiously-charged terminology and problematic positioning by using plain meaning American English.
   a. US v THEM: For example, use “American Muslim” rather than “Muslim American”; “Muslim communities” rather than “Muslim world.”
   b. AMERICAN ENGLISH: For example, on using American English instead of religious, legal and cultural terms like “jihad,” “sharia,” “takfir” or “umma.”

**Recommendation 4: Investing in Deeper Research and Data Analytics**

**Context:**

In the 15 years since 9/11, there has been a significant amount of research in the field of extremism including how extremist groups prey upon young people, what techniques they use, and which types of messages resonate. We must be ahead of the curve and understand these trends. This means we need research and data that will give us the information we need to build a long-term CVE infrastructure that is evolved and adaptive.

We have seen new aspects to the threat emerge, like women radicalizing, and, compared to what we know about foreign populations and radicalization, there is limited data on American youth and their vulnerabilities. Moreover, as important as research focused on the entire scope of the radicalization process is, we do not have complete information around the measurement and evaluation of programs that intend to stop the

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9 Soft power can be defined as the ability to persuade rather than coerce to achieve a desired end. See Nye, Joseph S. "Soft Power." *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (1990): 153-71.
appeal of extremists’ ideologies. As such, we need to construct more effective tools to allow greater access to CVE research, and comprehensive and open source data. The Department must act as a catalyst to promote more aggressive research and analysis and find ways to collaborate with non-governmental experts doing such work.

**Actions:**

1. Catalog all CVE programs within America (see map in Appendix 3) – both government-funded and independent – to create a comprehensive and transparent overview of what exists in America and where gaps might exist. Remarkably none exists anywhere.
2. Assess the scope of work that exists on youth between 7 and 30 years of age regarding education and the process of violent extremist radicalization.
3. Develop clear measurements of impact based on the nature of the threat before us, and utilizing private sector approaches to measurement.
4. Build a practicum of research on the connectivity between other forms of extremism such as hate speech, cults, and other related issues.
5. Ensure there is a research focus on offline efforts to radicalize, including offline efforts that support online recruitment.
6. Catalog communications efforts and strategies currently underway that seek to provide counter, alternative, or proactive narratives by key stakeholders so that there is greater connectivity in the collective research. Stovepipes must be broken down.
7. Reduce redundancy in research and analysis. Facilitate cohesive purpose between the Department and the Department of State and other government entities to have access to and utilize U.S. Government-funded research and knowledge about U.S. Government funded programs abroad, and better understand approaches, lessons-learned and successes from our international partners.
8. Pioneer research around content from diverse communities within America, using this information to design and develop counter-narratives and bespoke programs for specific communities.
9. Redirect more research around gender differences, including child and adolescent behavior.
II. BUILDING AN ARCHITECTURE FOR ALL 50 STATES

Background

No region in the world is immune to the ideology of violent extremists and America has not been immune from terrorist attacks inspired by violent extremist ideologies. Rapid technological evolution and aggressive peddling of extremist ideology of all kinds suggests that extremist groups are exposing America’s children to an unprecedented array of techniques, narratives, and tactics to radicalize. Although the United States has powerful advantages to fortify ourselves against the spread of violent extremist ideology, including our traditions of community activism and awareness on and offline, there has been significant growth in the ability of violent extremists to scale their efforts. In addition to a rise in hate-related crimes and speech reported across the country, there are open investigations by law enforcement agencies on American citizens in all 50 states targeting groups like ISIL.

We must scale up our efforts proportionally to ensure that future generations have the capacity and tools to stem the appeal of violent extremist ideology and thus, diminish the threat of terrorism in our own nation. We do not have the luxury of time. We must help create a new system of awareness, resilience, and understanding around extremism and the violence that comes from it. We must include all aspects of the trajectory to radicalization and develop a comprehensive response to the threat we face. To date, we have not built a nationwide architecture that integrates all that we know about radicalization and its prevention. As a result, efforts are ad hoc, disparate, under-funded, and sometimes redundant or counter-productive.

Efforts to counter extremist violence overseas since 9/11 has cost the United States over $1.6 trillion.\(^\text{10}\) Funding in FY16 represents the first time ever in the Executive Branch that the Department will fund $10M to support and expand locally led efforts to implement CVE programing. There is no guarantee from the Congress that these funds will continue to grow in the FY17 budget request. Such funding is woefully low and has left us with a domestic approach that is segmented and insufficient.

The Subcommittee believes that the U.S. Government needs a national CVE plan that looks at the spread of ideology and its impact, which is distinct from a particular terrorist threat and its intersection with law enforcement. Because we know that cross-border communication and transit are easier than they have ever been, all states and localities must be part of addressing the challenge of violent extremism. In order to do so, the U.S. Government – notably DHS/OCP – must have the platforms to coordinate and communicate with partners locally, and those partners must be viewed as central components of an integrated system of networks. These networks run across all segments of society, from faith leaders to cultural icons, from mental health and science experts to teen entrepreneurs to philanthropists and corporations, to parent-teacher networks.

The U.S. Government’s ability to be the convener and facilitator, catalyze new networks, and pioneer new relationships with the non-governmental sector is essential to the success of creating a new American roadmap to build resilient communities.

Empowering local mayors and governors by giving them the insights, ideas, and information they need, along with linkages to best in class experts and organizations will be a game changer. The Subcommittee urges a nationwide approach to CVE, tailoring particular components in line with the individual cities and towns.

**Recommendation 1: Build and Expand Platforms, Networks and Partnerships:**

**Context:**

In order to expand to a nationwide footprint, we must create partnerships, platforms, and networks across states and localities. Notably we must invigorate non-governmental partners who have the expertise, skills, and credibility to construct a comprehensive approach to national CVE awareness and understanding around radicalization and recruitment. Further, as non-governmental people and systems are often the best practitioners of CVE programs, widening the connectivity across expertise areas will allow for innovation, creativity, sharing of best practices and coordinating efforts. New national platforms, networks and partnerships will allow us to quickly scale up our efforts and impact key areas.

Individuals in the marketing and technology industries have informed the Subcommittee of their interest in contributing time and expertise to this challenge. Many of CVE’s challenges would benefit from this expertise, particularly counter-messaging and empowering communities; but, given restrictions on government accepting gifts or in-kind donations, a new approach must be imagined so that these partners can contribute.

Digital marketing experts have a sophisticated set of tools and methodologies that are proven to work, such as discovering a range of relevant information, creating, branding and marketing compelling content, and tracking real-world metrics to identify the most effective content for further distribution. Therefore, outside entities can be far more effective in leveraging digital marketing best practices than the government and if connected to non-governmental organizations can make a difference to achieving CVE objectives.

Family members, close friends, teachers, and clergy are often the first to notice that their loved one or friend is showing a warning sign of radicalization. According to a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report, in more than fifty percent of terrorist cases, family members see signs of radicalization but few consider a call for help. Finding ways to bring both experts and the general public into the CVE community is paramount for success. In short, we must create mechanisms to allow this critical group of people to both get help for their loved ones and find ways to seek counsel.
State and local government, especially in the prison system, and those who have experience and understanding around these issues have seldom been brought into the larger conversation and lack mechanisms to make that happen. There is an important continuum of law enforcement, the judiciary, and the corrections systems that must be incorporated into CVE efforts. Working in partnership with key departments and agencies, DHS has the capacity to help create a common understanding of the challenges of CVE and the potential opportunities for cooperation.

Finally, educators, schools and networks of parents and teachers, as well as organizations that impact youth, have had little to no connectivity to issues around radicalization and should be brought into the fold.

**Actions:**

1. Create mechanisms for the exchange of ideas and expertise on CVE beyond just the Department and include, potentially, the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services so that their extensive networks can add to our understanding of how violent ideologies are permeating across communities.

2. Create partnerships with cities and states to develop training and toolkits on CVE best practices. Leverage current networks of mayors and governors to develop working partnerships and strategies, and share best practices.
   a. Utilize existing networks such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors and National Governors Association.
   b. Work with the State Department to strengthen the Strong Cities Network for a national network of mayors and Governors in the United States.

3. Partner with public and private colleges and universities across the country. Scale up access to information on CVE by building a comprehensive CVE curriculum and create partnerships with universities nationwide so that “innovation labs” around CVE may be stood up.

4. Facilitate a network of corrections officials and re-entry service providers to identify the prison radicalization risk and spearhead rehabilitation best practices.

5. Develop demonstration programs that partner service-providers, faith-based actors, and local government to other localities. Take best practices from around the world to understand how such partnerships may be created and scaled up.

6. Create an information-sharing network for mental health, faith-based organizations, community centers, social work, and law enforcement actors, ensuring partners with access to sensitive information use separate servers with respect to HIPAA compliance.

**Recommendation 2: Mental Health and Social Services Partnerships**

**Context:**

Remarkably, though we know that understanding the child and adolescent mind is critical to understanding the radicalization and recruitment process, the U.S. Government has not built a formal system of accessing the very best data, research, and experts on a
regular basis. Because developmental experts consider adolescent and young adult brain development and cognition to continue until roughly age 26, adolescence stretches into adulthood.\textsuperscript{11} As recruits to violent extremist groups get younger and younger, and ISIL in particular is curating precise content for youth at specific stages of development, we are woefully behind in bringing the very best our nation has to offer into protecting our youth. Even further, we have not built any substantive outlets for youth to access help as they find themselves being drawn into the ideology, nor have we sufficiently offered America’s parents a way to get help for their children as they perceive a change in their behavior. Consulting with mental health experts seems obvious, but there is no regular system in place to do so nor have we connected the world-class medical expertise in this field to our understanding about radicalization and extremism. We need to “complicate”\textsuperscript{12} the thinking of adolescents around decision making, appeal to their individuality, openly discuss radicalization rather than avoid it, and understand their thinking on and impact of emotional impulses. It is rare to find partnerships between those that work on CVE and these medical and scientific experts who can help build more targeted and effective programs.

The subcommittee believes that the U.S. Government must do far more with our mental health sector. We have reached out to almost every other sector in America and we must execute a new chapter and partnership with the health sector, broadly speaking. Child and adolescent mental health resources must be a part of the architecture to protect our nation’s youth so as emerging adults develop their worldview and subsequent behavior they have the tools needed to be resilient to the appeal of violent extremist ideologies.\textsuperscript{13,14}

\textbf{Actions:}

1. Work with leading hospitals and medical schools nationally to convene a high level group of researchers from psychology/psychiatry whose work specifically addresses violent extremism and those whose work could inform important aspects of CVE.
2. Create a system of ongoing dialogue between mental health sector experts with those in the policy sphere, and support dialogue between those doing research in the field and those designing content and distribution channels to reach our youth.
3. Create a new dynamic and innovative center by using an existing mental health venue (hospital, child-mind institute, research center, etc.) to bring together every element and dimension of the challenge. America needs a place that is the leading

\textsuperscript{11} Interview with subject matter experts from Massachusetts General Hospital.

\textsuperscript{12} Term was presented and explained to the Subcommittee during conversation with subject matter experts from Massachusetts General Hospital.

\textsuperscript{13} Additionally, researchers at World Health Organization (WHO) recently concluded that 27% of the adult population has experienced at least one mental disorder in the past year – the best way to tackle this concerning trend is through prevention early in childhood development. Thus, a national approach that focuses on children and young adults on and offline will provide the best opportunity to help prevent our youth from finding extremist ideology appealing.

\textsuperscript{14} Clinicians have also noted that we should not adopt “the simplistic notion that mental illness could act as a marker for potential assassins, when psychotic illnesses are relatively common and assassins are extraordinarily rare.” That is, we should not regard those who are seeking mental help as a “pool” of potential lone actor terrorists, not only because it is inaccurate, but because it could stigmatize those being in therapy and deter people who need help from seeking it, which could have serious consequences for the individual and his or her environment.
touchstone on how to help teens and young adults by understanding what is happening in the mind and that connects the behavioral, medical and scientific expertise on this issue.

a. Part of this center will use BioPsychoSocial\textsuperscript{15} and Socio-Ecological\textsuperscript{16} frameworks in addition to several critical domains, including social bonds, identity, marginalization, discrimination, trauma, civic engagement/youth voice, individual and community resilience, and community engagement as well as participatory research including in-group and out-group dynamics and online behavior research.

b. In each of these spheres, it is also important to think not only about risk/protective factors but how people have translated this knowledge into interventions that work. The center can be a place that can offer a holistic analysis of what is happening to teens and young adults and ways communities can get help as needed.

4. Create a network of grassroots organizations that counsel and disengage, using health, family, and social work resources, modeled on successful programs in other countries, but tailored to the U.S. context.

5. Create a national hotline for rapid intervention teams in the event of a radicalization concern.

6. Utilize the vast array of programs that already exist for other purposes, such as reducing juvenile crime, countering gangs, and preventing violence. We must develop a keen understanding of the mental health progression from childhood through adulthood with this particular kind of threat, incorporating CVE goals into existing mental health programs rather than having to consider creating new programs from scratch.

**Recommendation 3: Catalyze Efforts in the Philanthropic and Private Sectors**

**Context:**

Non-governmental actors can play a significant role in generating ideas and expertise, networks, momentum, and substantive funds to tackle problems that once were perceived to be the sole responsibility of government. Cause related philanthropy has built momentum among Millennials and interestingly, cultural icons from finance, tech, music and film have championed causes to fight child exploitation, including the plights of child soldiers and child slavery. Despite this fact, the issue of radicalization and recruitment of young people has not yet been a mainstream topic of philanthropy.

\textsuperscript{15} BioPsychoSocial - Psychology/psychiatry often takes a "biopsychosocial approach to understanding health and illness. And more specifically considers how psychological (i.e., emotions, feelings, thoughts, behaviors), social (i.e., socioeconomic status, culture, societal context) and biological (i.e., genetics, basic neuroscience processes, physiology) factors and their complex interactions influence health and behavior.

\textsuperscript{16} The Socio-Ecological model considers the complex interplay between an individual and his/her levels of social ecology (e.g., family, friends, school, neighborhood, nation, culture). This model highlights the range of social contexts/factors that a person lives within and that may make him/her vulnerable or serve to protect him/her. This model emphasizes that each level of one's social ecology influences another and therefore can be an opportunity for invention and will ultimately have impact across levels.
Ironically, it is this very sector that is needed most in order to scale up local ideas to fight the recruitment of youth for several reasons. Through seeding new ideas and creative approaches, increasing the power of ongoing projects or building new momentum, these kinds of private resources are very powerful. To inject alternative spaces and ideas into communities that are vulnerable, it takes organic and local initiatives to resonate because they are trusted.

Unfortunately, despite the seriousness of the threat of extremists, and the increase in fear and awareness in America that extremist ideology is increasing, non-governmental sectors continue to give little funding to organizations or initiatives that deal with this threat. Indeed, we have not seen the non-governmental sector realize its potential in providing funds to protect youth from violent extremists.

Despite the attempts at very high levels, there have been few major foundation initiatives or notable individual philanthropists who have initiated a new wave of philanthropic giving to communities who want to protect youth from the appeal of violent ideologies. The common perception that “government has money” or “it is a government problem” from potential donors has resulted in serious challenges and slowed the scaling up of effective local CVE programs. Local grassroots efforts, which could have the most impact, have difficulty accessing the needed resources to execute their ideas at scale. Organic ideas in the social media sector that beg to be tested require money. Professionalizing the fight against extremists in the ideological space requires more resources and, at present, the American effort at the grassroots is insufficient compared to the significant and growing threat posed by extremists preying on youth. However, while we have seen lots of money flow to other cause related philanthropy, American donors and civic investors have not yet taken on the issue of the spread and impact of extremist ideology.

At the same time, the evolving challenge of micro-targeting by our adversaries puts an onus on communities and the private sector to help confront and counter in creative ways – and these communities require resources to be activated and grow. Government has a role to play in catalyzing private resources and leveraging limited government money to encourage more private resources to focus on this challenge. We also must find mechanisms that can move resources and funding quickly to private sector partners who are working at a pace commensurate with our adversaries to counter the threat in real time. Speed of funding is important and this may require a reexamination of vetting processes to streamline and create momentum where possible.

The new era of this threat requires a proliferation of local programs across the nation in a wide variety of ways to protect our nation’s children, and Americans must be made aware for the need for non-governmental money to achieve this common goal. America has over 120 million youth under age 30. There are less than five small regional U.S. Government funded programs that deal specifically with stopping the appeal of groups like ISIL, a handful of experimental initiatives in the pipeline, and limited private donation to this cause. Things must change.
**Actions:**

*DHS/OCP and the Department's Private Sector Office to carry out and coordinate:*

1. Place personnel within philanthropic organizations, modeled after the USDA supply chain coordinator program.\(^{17}\)
2. Build regional philanthropic plans of action and activate a corps of volunteer, expert fundraisers to help community stakeholders access funds by partnering with experienced philanthropic advisory organizations.
3. Appoint a philanthropic advisor as a new Member of the HSAC and task the HSAC to develop a follow-on report on private philanthropy supporting CVE.
4. Facilitate networks between philanthropic organizations and non-governmental organizations that are seeking funding.
   a. Seek legal guidance on what role is appropriate for the Department in these types of meetings.
   b. Examine vetting processes and funding mechanisms to ensure they are the quickest possible so that momentum and speed are encouraged.
   c. All meetings should be open to the public to ensure transparency in the process.
   d. Encourage non-profits to share best practices for fundraising, development, and building credibility.
5. Convene actors and encourage the creation of philanthropic hubs for funding content creation and distribution channels for online programs. Engage and utilize selected foundations focused on the threat of violent extremism as third-party vehicles for the Department to engage in funding and support of online and offline grassroots efforts directly. Foundations acting as intermediaries for government funding to these organizations can help activate a broad spectrum of technology innovators, local organizations and expertise.
6. Examine federal gift regulations to ensure the government may welcome private sector contributions that may reduce extremism.
7. Incentivize a generation of social entrepreneurs focused on these issues, through tax incentives, seed funding, and rewarding change-maker successes.
8. Explore creating a consortium of technology companies which can partner with the Department on content development, share best practices in the industry, and provide expertise on how best to develop counter extremist messaging, including preventing technology platforms from being used for violence and violent extremist recruitment.

\(^{17}\) Interview with Eric Kessler, Founder, Principal and Senior Managing Director, Arabella Advisors. May 11, 2016.
III. GENERATIONAL THREAT

Background

The Millennial Generation in the United States (those born between 1982 and 2000) now represent a quarter of the nation’s population, exceeding that of the Baby Boomer generation. Millennials are also the most diverse generation compared to any of those that preceded them – 44.2 percent of Millennials are part of a minority race or ethnic group. Notably, the population currently under 5 years of age is a majority-minority generation, illustrating the diversity the next generation of adults represents. The Millennial generation are digital natives, yet they are influenced both on and offline. Their exposure to news, world events, and each other, profoundly affect their ideas, behavior, and worldviews. Naturally, connectivity to their peers globally is an important characteristic of this under 30 generation. Beyond simply recognizing that they are unique in the way they use social media to interact and influence each other, this digitally connected generation is the prime target for extremists. The American Freedom Party (AFP), a white supremacist group, recently established a youth wing, and they are not alone in doing so. Further, youth-focused wings of extremist organizations allow young people to draw in their peers and to facilitate youth-friendly marketing strategies. It is working. In the last few years, we have watched as youth in our country and globally are being radicalized at a concerning rate, crossing lines of race, nationality, socio economic status, ideology, education, and gender.

Researchers confirm that the median age for those recruited and radicalized to become foreign fighters for ISIL is 26 years old, with the Internet playing a primary or contributing role in almost all radicalization processes. Even further, because extremists have developed kid and young adult friendly content, we must focus our attention on the online space. However, because youth are influenced by peers and move along emotionally through one-to-one persuasion, we also need to create an offline approach that is community driven and generational friendly. Effecting change in the environment means that we have to build a 24/7 comprehensive approach to influencing this generation. In order to do so, we must mobilize a range of efforts to protect them from recruitment and radicalization. Together with national networks of experts, peer influencers and credible content producers we can have enormous impact now. Stopping recruitment means expanding our understanding of the threat to this generation from diverse groups. We must restructure our national CVE efforts toward a framework that is attune with this demographic and design a system of influence on and offline that can significantly diminish the appeal of extremist ideology.

Recommendation 1: Protection/Predator Awareness

18 2015 Census Bureau Report.
Context:

The Department’s CVE efforts are an attempt to protect our nation’s young people from extremists who prey upon the Millennial generation. The Department must reframe the conversation to reflect this reality and design a robust program around the protection of our youth, which must include predator awareness and an understanding of radicalization. In doing so, our citizens will be better equipped for this threat. Because family members, close friends, teachers, and clergy are often the first to notice that their loved one or friend may become radicalized, public awareness is a critical first step.

Significant collaborations forged with tech companies and other non-governmental and local community partners over the years have resulted in a willingness to facilitate Internet safety and related educational and awareness efforts. With parents as the first line of defense, we must work with our partners to teach parents how to identify extremist ideological recruitment and also to teach them what to do in the event that they believe their child is radicalizing. Using all aspects of influence, we must find community spearheaded approaches to be responsive to America’s parents and children.

Actions:

1. Develop a curriculum in partnership with the Department of Education and education experts and non-profits to disseminate to schools, teaching children appropriate online etiquette to mitigate online hate.
2. Create an action plan with the Department of Education to provide the training and expertise to school superintendents and others about radicalization.
3. Create a network connecting technology solutions to non-profit organizations and small businesses whose missions or interests overlap with CVE but lack the technical expertise, branding, and marketing, to actualize their full impact potential.
4. Build a network of parents who can collaborate on related issues, such as grassroots organizing to raise awareness of and raise funds for efforts to prevent online predators.
5. Build a network of mothers by partnering with existing organizations to scale up efforts for innovation and awareness.
6. Develop a Peer Mediation and Training Program through the National Crime Prevention Council (NCPC) for peer mediation and training related to violent extremism in all of its forms.

**Recommendation 2: Providing Alternative Outlets and Counter Narrative Content**

Generations, like people, have personalities, and Millennials have begun to forge theirs: confident, self-expressive, liberal, upbeat, and open to change. As optimistic as this is, it is important to note that this generation and the one below it is the demographic that is of interest to extremists and one that ISIL has exploited. They are aware that youth are, among other things, searching for belonging, navigating their identity, and looking for emotional connectivity and purpose. This period of discovery is compounded by adolescence and unique social-contextual factors. It is in this environment that extremist narratives find fertile soil. In the years since 9/11, this generation has experienced a unique set of factors that set them apart not the least of which is their exposure to a 24/7 media storm, instant images, likes, tweets, and sound bites from around the world and their peers. They are taking part in concurrent systems of influence and experiencing global events in new and personal ways. A significant number of violent extremists begin their radicalization process online where social media facilitates access to answers they are seeking and promotes a personal connection to those interested in ideological dialogue. Such connectivity to extremists online can turn to coordination of plans, and the development of both online and offline relationships as well as exposure to messages of opportunity, adventure, and purpose. Speaking of the three sisters radicalized by ISIL, Shiraz Maher describes the roots of radicalization like this: “It’s identity, stupid.”

Regardless of the brand of extremist interested in winning them over, they are positioning their narratives to appeal to a sense of belonging, purpose, and identity. Whether the recruitment is by the Klu Klux Klan or that of ISIL, young people are targeted and persuaded around issues of belonging and identity. William McCants, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, commented, “Our brain may be wired to love our own group and dislike outsiders, but culture is the software that helps us determine who’s in and who’s out.” The cultural context in America is distinct from any other western nation, particularly around issues of identity. We should exploit this advantage in a real way. Beyond the rhetoric about American values, Millennials need to see, experience, and own their unique stories. Just presenting Americans as the most diverse nation in the world does not go far enough. We must help ignite the development of content where peers of different cultural upbringings have the opportunity to influence each other and create their own influential voices – both on and offline. Further, we have a unique opportunity to develop ethnically precise and very specific content marketing to segmented audiences delivered by grassroots partners. However, the involvement of the government is an important factor.

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immediate disqualifying and delegitimizing factor for any messaging campaign government, and will not have recognition by or resonance in the target audience. What does demonstrate success is the utilization of “influencers” with existing credibility and following, who can directly engage in both a broadcast as well as a direct dialogue with volume, tone, and content to which the target demographic will respond.  

Special attention should be focused on the use of “formers” – those who have been disengaged from the path to violent extremism – as credible messengers. Some international coalition partners have been quite successful in reducing recidivism and leveraging the voices and actions of disengaged extremists in countering narratives and working within at-risk communities. The U.S. Government should better understand the use of these voices and how to integrate them into programming.

Reaching Millennials through a variety of constructive, positive, and identity-building approaches will, in turn, encourage community and belonging within the greater American space. As we develop alternative narratives we must learn from mistakes in the past and recommit to finding new ways to offer the target audiences messages delivered through credible influencers (such as activists, peer leaders, actors, comedians, athletes and others). Further, cause-related marketing and initiatives that incorporate Millennials seamlessly and clearly into the greater American space, both online and in-person, offers great promise. This is either undertaken commensurately or followed closely by on-the-ground influences, with personal interaction between individuals, many of whom could be considered social influencers and/or who are positioned within particular networks of individuals who have demonstrated interest and willingness to join violent extremist organizations. These various factors may be determinative in mobilizing individuals to join or adopt to violent extremist groups, their messages, and their efforts. Our best hope to counter negative influence is positive influence, to offer alternatives to the propaganda of extremist groups, through which we may help young people find alternate pathways. In the development of alternative narratives and programs, government can have a role to play, but for a number of reasons, that role must be minimal.

**Actions:**

1. Leverage entrepreneurs from influencer communities, who may act as messengers, change-makers, or inspiration for their cohorts.
2. Facilitate the use of “formers” in CVE programming and messaging.
3. Build out networks of “former” violent extremists nationally from the wide array of groups including far right, anti-government, and other extremists groups seeking to radicalize and recruit.
4. Facilitate credible messenger and similar training of individuals in at-risk populations with social media and related companies, such as YouTube.
5. Work with the technology sector to amplify counter extremist content from diverse communities from across America and build grassroots campaigns to further this effort.

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6. Create and implement a cohesive redesign of discussion around American history to puncture incorrect understanding of American history through partners such the Smithsonian, the Department of State's Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Department of Education, and the Public Broadcasting Service, and other organizations and experts, to normalize cross-community conversation to eradicate ideas that any community is an “other.”

7. Focus on gender diversity of youth through careful attention to the range of push and pull factors that attract individuals of differing gender.

8. Work with Department of State to scale effective programs that have already been funded by the U.S. Government to develop leadership skills and engage diverse youth change-agents and connect them to their American peers.

9. Work with think tanks that run international networks of change-makers and invest in long-term leadership development in key communities to build out American partnerships.

10. Re-examine existing legal and policy architecture to facilitate strategic communications within the United States based on content produced by other departments and agencies, and federally funded efforts.

11. Create a Virtual Department of Homeland Security Corps made up of university students modeled after the Department of State's Virtual Foreign Service.
CONCLUSION

Our nation’s children will grow up in a world we could not have imagined a generation ago — a thriving world where human ingenuity and knowledge continues to expand by leaps and bounds. As that process of human evolution, including the expansion of freedom and liberties across the globe proceeds, our government must remain vigilant, adapt, and evolve to protect them.

We must do so by demonstrating faith in the American people, in their government, and we must be confident in the power of America’s ideas. No new policy area, and no response to a historically unprecedented threat, comes without growing pains — and the Department will need to make difficult choices to adapt.

The recommendations in this report provide an overview of essential areas for countering efforts by extremists to radicalize, recruit, or mobilize followers to violence, including the conditions that allow violent extremist recruitment and radicalization to take hold. Foundational to each recommendation is embedded a belief that by acting as a convener, facilitator, and responsible financial partner, the government can help the American people defeat the threat of violent extremism. By looking clearly at what we need and what we must do to get there, we can build a sustainable architecture of engagement that incorporates all our tools and all the components that will protect our youth and future generations. This report is, by no means, an all-encompassing strategy — all components of the U.S. Government must coordinate their efforts to ensure that authorities are properly exercised. The Homeland is vital and central to all efforts. This report helps provide a basis for how the Department can more effectively organize and operationalize against the threat of violent extremism.

The Subcommittee thanks you for the opportunity to provide our thoughts and recommendations and stand ready to help the Department in any way.

Farah Pandith (Chair)
Adnan Kifayat (Chair)
General (Ret.) John Allen
Paul Goldenberg
Seamus Hughes
Joel T. Meyer
Jeffrey Miller
Michael Nutter
Matthew Olsen
Ali Soufan
Juan Zarate
William Webster (Ex-officio)
Appendix 1: Members of the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee of the Homeland Security Advisory Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title, Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farah Pandith (Chair)</td>
<td>Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Former Special Representative to Muslim Communities, U.S. Department of State</td>
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<td>Deputy Director, Program on Extremism at George Washington University</td>
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<td>Former Mayor of Philadelphia, and David N. Dinkins Professor of Professional Practice of Urban &amp; Public Policy, Columbia University/SIPA</td>
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<td>Juan Zarate</td>
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<td>William Webster</td>
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Members of the Department of Homeland Security Staff: Sarah Morgenthau, Erin Walls, and Lauren Wenger

Special Thanks to: Lila Ghosh, Ryan B. Greer, Michael Masters, Lauren Wenger, Erin Walls, and Alysha Tierney for their advice and assistance in compiling this report.
Appendix 2: Experts Consulted Include:

*Individuals:* 

- Kevin Bearden, VP of Foreign Affairs, Federal Civilian Agencies for General Dynamics
- Gene Beresin, MD, Executive Director, The Clay Center for Young Healthy Minds at Mass General Hospital
- Ambassador Matthew Bryza, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council
- Soraya Chemaly, Director, Women's Media Center Speech Project
- Kathleen Deloughery, Science and Technology Directorate, DHS
- Heidi Ellis, MD, Director, Center for Refugee Trauma and Resilience at Boston Children's Hospital
- Omar Fekeiki (Malunood), Managing Editor, Raise Your Digital Voice at MBN
- Christopher Graves, Global Chair, Ogilvy Public Relations
- Sasha Havlicek, Chief Executive Officer, Institute for Strategic Dialogue
- John Herman, MD, Associate Chief, Department of Psychiatry at Massachusetts General Hospital
- Shelina Janmohamed, Vice President, Ogilvy Noor
- Jonathan Keidan, Co-Founder and President, InsideHook
- Eric Kessler, Founder, Principal and Senior Managing Director, Arabella Advisors
- Imam Mohamed Magid, Executive Director, All Dulles Area Muslim Society
- Alisa Miller, PhD., Research Associate, Refugee Trauma and Resilience Center at Children's Hospital
- Hedieh Mirahmadi, President, World Organization for Resource Development and Education
- William Sabatini, General Manager, Radio Sawa
- Parisa Sabeti Zagat, Policy and Communications, Facebook
- Ron Schouten, MD, Director of the Law and Psychiatry Service, Massachusetts General Hospital
- George Selim, Director, the Office for Community Partnerships, DHS
- Peter Stern, Policy Manager for Risk, Facebook

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26 Individuals consulted did not necessarily speak on behalf of their organizations and their contributions should be viewed as theirs alone.
Appendix 3: Infographics

U.S. Government funded programs that seek to address violent extremism

Millenials' Social Media Use
Percentage of American 18-29 year olds who have accounts on social media platforms.

Source: Harvard University Institute of Politics
Appendix 4: Relevant Reports and Recommendations

Beutel, Alejandro J. Building Bridges to Strengthen America: Forging an Effective Counterterrorism Enterprise between Muslim Americans & Law Enforcement. Executive Summary. Muslim Public Affairs Council. Recommendations:
   a) MPAC argues for a domestic counterterrorism enterprise centered on community-oriented policing.
   b) Law enforcement focuses on criminal behavior while communities address the ideological and social components which lead to violent extremism.
   c) Move away from a “securitized” relationship.

Briggs, Rachel and Sebastien Feve. Policy Briefing: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online. Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Recommendations:
   a) Strengthening digital literacy and critical consumption among young people.
   b) Increasing counter-messaging, counter narrative, and alternative narrative activity. Government communications need to be centralized and coordinated. Governments need to be realistic about their ability to play an active messenger role and make significant investments in funding non-governmental organizations to offer credible alternatives.
   c) Building the capacity of credible messengers: governments should make investments in building skills and expertise of the most effective counter messengers. Governments should use their convening power to bring in private sector.

   a) Identifying the federal agency in charge of administering the U.S. CVE strategy.
   b) Developing a more robust and actionable national CVE framework.
   c) Refocusing the federal government on support and not local engagement of CVE.
   d) Requiring all CVE related terms be defined in every document.
   e) Requiring regular evaluations and updates of the U.S. CVE strategy.

Department of State, and USAID. Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism. Report. May 2016. Recommendations:
   a) Enhance CVE diplomacy.
   b) Focus on CVE strategic communications.
   c) Expand rule of law and develop programs to advance CVE.
   d) Promote research and learning.
   e) Elevate CVE within broader U.S. foreign policy.

   a) Expand community-oriented policing initiatives.
   b) Increase support for research on combating biased policing.
   c) Expand investments in better human capital acquisitions.
d) Highlight citizen contributions to national security.

e) Reform the fusion center process to increase coordination among law enforcement. Adopt MPAC’s “four essential principles” to successful engagement with Muslim American communities.


a) Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts can be strengthened by incorporating travel behaviors of foreign fighters.

b) Relying on a range of international, federal, state, local, community partners, and families is critical for the U.S. to continue focusing on efforts to identify potential foreign fighters as early as possible.


a) If the U.S. government truly wants to engage in robust CVE, it will need to provide sufficient funding.

b) The administration should appoint one department as the lead for CVE efforts to ensure more focused programs and a single point of contact for public advocacy and congressional oversight.

c) Engagement and other trust-building initiatives are useful and should be continued.

d) Build trust in American Muslim communities.

e) Develop accountability for CVE at the federal level.
Appendix 5: Glossary

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): Actions to counter efforts by extremists to radicalize, recruit, or mobilize followers to violence and to address the conditions that allow violent extremist recruitment and radicalization.

Credible Messengers: Individuals or organizations that have the ability and authority to influence audiences. Whether they are religious leaders, teachers, parents, pop culture idols, those who are the best placed to create change are those whom CVE efforts must prioritize.

ISIL: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

Disengagement: The process whereby an individual experiences a change in role or function that is usually associated with a reduction of violent participation. It may not necessarily involve leaving the movement, but is most frequently associated with significant temporary or permanent role change. Additionally, while disengagement may stem from role change, that role change may be influenced by psychological factors such as disillusionment, burnout or the failure to reach the expectations that influenced initial involvement. This can lead to a member seeking out a different role within the movement.\(^{27}\)

Formers: Individuals who have been involved in violent extremism but have become rehabilitated and offered to serve as credible messengers in CVE programming.

Network: Offices; organizations; communities associated based on location, ethnicity, or some other demographic association. Communities of disenfranchised individuals and those who influence them will represent those for whom CVE programming will be scoped and by whom it should be carried out; creating connectivity across these individuals will be paramount for success.

Platform: A technological tool or organizational mechanism to facilitate coordination or communication. Platforms will enable cross-sector and interagency cohesion for efforts.

Radicalization: The social and psychological process of incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology. Radicalization may not necessary lead to violence but it is one of the several risk factors required for this.\(^{28}\)

Violent Extremist: An individual who supports or commits ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals.


\(^{28}\) Ibid.
Appendix 6: Bibliography


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Department of Homeland Security. “Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on DHS’s New


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http://pedsinreview.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/29/5/161


Interview with Chris Graves and Shelina Janmohamed of Ogilvy Noor. May 20, 2016.

Interview with Ron Schouten, MD, Director of the Law and Psychiatry Service, Massachusetts General Hospital


Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(5)
under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
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<tr>
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<td>Retired Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &amp; McCloy LLP</td>
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Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee

In September 2015, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson directed his Homeland Security Advisory Council to establish the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee to provide findings and recommendations for countering violent extremism. The Subcommittee will address opportunities or platforms useful for the Department’s facilitation of public-private partnerships with both technology and philanthropic sectors, and the development of new networks and a framework for sustained dialogue and engagement with those partners to include non-government sectors. The Subcommittee will also consider strategies working with education and mental health professionals to help parents and schools understand how they can counter youth radicalization to violence, and how the Department can inspire peer-to-peer attempts to challenge violent extremism through public-private partnerships.
Here's the section in the action plan for HSAC. Of course it needs to be updated so can ask Lauren if it’s necessary for us to provide new language and update their plan.

Leverage outside expertise through the Homeland Security Advisory Council.

As for the data tracking for the budget, in each of the component line items within their budget tracker has HSAC as –

Leverage outside expertise through the Homeland Security Advisory Council.

This, to me, doesn’t seem like a direct budget need from us but would ask George or Lauren to clarify what or if they need anything from us.

Let me know if there’s anything else you need.
Katrina
FYSA, came across this article, although it doesn’t specify CVE it discusses the familiar concepts:

http://news.yahoo.com/europe-takes-rehab-approach-islamic-extremists-111655984.html

Cheers,

Nawar

Nawar Shora, JD
Senior Advisor
Intelligence Analysis Division
Office of Intelligence & Analysis
Transportation Security Administration
United States Department of Homeland Security
Office:
HSAC CVE SUBCOMITTEE MEETING
Attendance List April 14, 2016

Yes (9)

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<td>University</td>
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All – please see the draft read out from yesterday’s CVE Deputies breakfast.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,
-Nate

**Nate Snyder**
US Department of Homeland Security

*Liaison for Community Partnership & Strategic Engagement*
Counterterrorism Working Group

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DHS-001-425-008616
The Delicate Art of Using Terrorist Dropouts

Governments that try to co-opt radical ideologues are walking a tightrope.

By SUSAN SIM – Feb. 21, 2013 – WSJ

When Yazid Sufaat, an al-Qaeda bioweapons expert who hosted two of the Sept. 11 hijackers in Kuala Lumpur for a pre-attack planning summit, was released from a Malaysian jail after seven years of detention in 2008, he was deemed "rehabilitated" by the Malaysian government. For the next four years, Yazid ran a food stall in a Kuala Lumpur courthouse—until Feb. 8 this year, when he was rearrested and charged with trying to recruit Malaysians for suicide missions in Syria.

Sufaat's rearrest for promoting terrorism raises troubling questions about the effectiveness of terrorist disengagement programs. There are now more than a dozen such programs world-wide, with varying degrees of robustness, objectives and success rates.

Recidivism always gets attention, as it should. But the well-kept secret of counterterrorism is that rehabilitation programs have also produced terrorist dropouts who are speaking out publicly against al-Qaeda and similar groups. Several Southeast Asian governments have found that those who decide voluntarily to leave the region's most deadly terrorist group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), often make the most credible advocates against the use of violence and terror.

The Indonesian Police's counterterrorism unit Detachment 88 has been at the forefront of attempting to use former JI leaders to convince others to renounce violence. They've
encouraged them to write memoirs that reveal dissent within the group, as well as refutations of the theological arguments used to justify violence. Two of Detachment 88's poster boys—Bali bomber Ali Imron, and Nasir Abas, JI's leader in Borneo and the southern Philippines—have been featured in comic books designed to steer children away from extremism.

Malaysia's counterterrorism force, meanwhile, invites select former JI members to counsel detained terrorist suspects—but only after they have passed a polygraph test and are clearly no longer involved in militant activities. Yazid Sufaat would never have been invited to speak at Malaysia's "deradicalization seminars." But JI's former secretary general, Zulkifli Marzuki, has been telling his former colleagues about the "big mistake" he made killing innocents.

Singapore uses its terrorist dropouts more sparingly. Occasionally it will arrange for their participation in anonymous media interviews. These stories serve to enforce the national narrative that the country remains under threat of terrorism but is not at war with Islam.

However, while defectors may renounce terrorism, they have not necessarily abandoned their deep belief in a duty to defend their faith. Many defectors now reject violence directed at civilians, but not violence per se.

Indonesia's Abas and Imron, for instance, candidly admit that they regret tactical errors committed by JI. But they still believe that they have a duty to kill any soldier involved in fighting Muslims. The difference is that now, having learned from their mistakes, they say they will be better prepared and attack only from a position of strength.

The Jemaah Islamiyah doctrine of jihad as battle is still intrinsic to Abas's and Imron's belief system, but they now place constraints on, say, suicide bombing. Ali Imron writes in his memoir: "Suicide bombing is [only] permissible in war and when there is no other option available."

Imron told me that he tells his "friends"—members of JI and its variants—that Islam is a religion of peace. They should work to establish an Islamic state by following the way of the Prophet Mohammad, he says. "[B]ut once we achieve an Islamic state, we can do war in the name of jihad."

In countries that have suffered terrorist attacks, putting terrorist dropouts on a pedestal, even if their statements are carefully calibrated, can be offensive—especially to victims.
Indonesian police believe it is a deal they nevertheless need to make to save lives. They need terrorist dropouts like Ali Imron to do "good counter-propaganda" to amplify the wrongdoings of Jemaah Islamiyah, former Detachment 88 chief Tito Karnavian says. "The police can't debate religion," says Mr. Karnavian. And extremists are not interested in listening to moderates. He therefore needs to co-opt radical ideologues who can re-orient extremist concepts—for example, the concept of "evil oppressors" that is central to how extremists perceive enemies. If Mr. Karnavian can get a former terrorist ideologue to show that the government and police are not evil oppressors, he says, "it's a big problem for the extremist movement, as it'll have to reformulate who the enemy is."

It's clear, though, that governments that use terrorist dropouts in public campaigns are walking a tightrope. Renunciation of violence does not necessarily follow the renunciation of terror—and renunciations of terror themselves can be insincere, as the arrest of Yazid Sufaat in Malaysia shows. What's more, even if a terrorist renounces violence at home, should governments allow their citizens to incite violence elsewhere? Again, Sufaat's arrest suggests not.

Policy makers should be aware of the limitations of terrorist dropouts and use their stories appropriately, as part of wider efforts to prevent ideological extremism at the community level. Religious leaders must continue to speak out against the hijacking of their faith by those seeking to harm innocents.

In addition to former terrorists, many volunteers and mainstream religious leaders work hard to turn extremists away from violence. These are the men Southeast Asian governments should put on a pedestal. The battle for hearts and minds needs genuine heroes, not only co-opted villains.

Ms. Sim, a former Singaporean diplomat and Internal Security Department analyst, is vice president for Asia of the Soufan Group, a strategic security consultancy.
Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (QIASS)

Countering Violent Extremism: Community Engagement Programmes In Europe

February 2012

Phase 2: Volume I

Additional information is available on the QIASS website at www.qiass.org

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WELCOME

We are delighted to present this very impressive research paper by Stephen White and Kieran McEvoy, on Countering Violent Extremism: Community Engagement Programmes in Europe. This is the first paper released as part of Phase II of our study into Countering Violent Extremism, and aptly sets the tone for the quality of reports that will follow.

Phase I, which was unveiled to international claim at Interpol’s 79th General Assembly held in 2010 in Doha, Qatar, investigated strategies that countries have developed to meet the challenges of releasing terrorist suspects back into society. Phase II undertakes further exploration of the issues resulting from Phase I through three research papers, and also undertakes a year-long study investigating how countries can counter the narratives that terrorist groups use to recruit.

While CVE programs have generated a great deal of international interest, very little is known systematically about whether they work, how they work, and how they should be evaluated. There is a critical need for information sharing, cross border and cultural collaboration, and a venue that can explore and assist with strategies that are in the interest of public safety. We’re proud that QIASS has taken a leading role in this field, and we offer ourselves as a resource to countries seeking guidance.

-- The Qatar International Academy for Security Studies,
Doha, February 2012
ABSTRACT

Countering violent extremism (CVE) is likely to be most effective when characterized by a partnership approach involving law enforcement, intelligence agencies, other statutory organizations, and community-based non-governmental organizations with grassroots credibility. The principles of meaningful partnership in this domain must include mutual respect, acknowledgment of respective strengths, skills, and expertise between agencies and community-based organizations, and a willingness, in appropriate circumstances, to take calculated risks to ensure that so-called hard-to-reach groups are approached by those with the required local knowledge and technical capacity.

In Part I, this paper draws on examples of such initiatives from several countries. The key question addressed here is: how have community-oriented policing strategies for CVE evolved throughout Europe to deal with increasingly diverse populations? The intention is to identify methods used and lessons learned in order to determine if certain strategies or practices may be transferrable to other areas.

In Part II, the paper also offers two in-depth case studies from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as examples. The first highlights how community-oriented policing strategies evolved in Northern Ireland to more effectively work with (pro-United Ireland) Republican groups and paramilitary Loyalist groups (pro-British and traditionally opposed to Irish Republicanism). The second demonstrates how community-oriented CVE policing strategies have evolved in England to work with vulnerable Islamic youth.
PART I

INTRODUCTION
During 2010 and 2011 the Qatar International Academy for Security Studies (QIASS) commissioned two separate studies on countering violent extremism. A report on the 2010 research, “Risk Reduction for Countering Violent Extremism,” was presented at the 79th General Assembly of Interpol, held in Doha in November 2010. Findings from the 2011 research will be published in 2012.

The core mission of QIASS’s CVE work is “to develop and disseminate evidence-based practices for (i) preventing terrorist engagement and (ii) facilitating disengagement among individuals, groups, and communities globally.”

The authors of this paper participated in both QIASS studies, which included site visits to various cities around the world—including Belfast, London, Paris, Stockholm, and Oslo. National strategies, multi-agency practices, security service policies, and non-governmental organization (NGO) efforts were examined in an effort to determine the range and effect of various approaches to countering violent extremism and reducing the risk of extremism.

This paper complements the QIASS studies with desk research, professional experience, and field observations focusing on holistic, community-based approaches and the potential role of partners. It focuses on those prevention programmes that could be described as examples of “community policing” in the widest sense. Community policing is defined; its elements explored; and some of the challenges of “reducing risks in partnership” are identified and discussed in theoretical terms.

There then follows analysis of a number of European programmes (including two in-depth case studies in Part II) in order to illustrate the variety of approaches that are and can be taken to address CVE. Finally, some principles and practices are developed which, the authors argue, may be transferable and applicable elsewhere. Acknowledging the wide variety of political, historical, social, cultural, and religious variables that may contribute to young people becoming radicalised and drawn into violence in different parts of the world, the paper nonetheless suggests that there are
some common themes that emerge from the community policing and partnership approaches to CVE examined herein, which are of broader relevance and interest.

COMMUNITY POLICING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Many police and law enforcement agencies around the world aspire to deliver services that are based on the principles of community policing. Although there are multiple definitions, common principles of community policing usually include: problem solving; organizational reorganisation or decentralization of the police; and crime prevention by the police and community working in partnership (see, for example, Bratton 1997, Adams, Rohe, & Arcury 2002; Skogan 2004, Chappell 2009).

Problem solving is based upon the premise that the police respond to real concerns expressed by neighbourhood residents rather than police priorities. Organisational changes such as decentralization of authority and attendance at community meetings should encourage a closer relationship between police officers and the neighbourhoods they service. Community engagement means real partnership with the community, designed to stimulate and empower residents in preventing crime and disorder (Miller and Hess 2008). As Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990:5) have suggested, community policing is a view of policing that

... is based on the concept that police officers and private citizens working together in creative ways can help solve contemporary community problems. . . . The philosophy is predicated on the belief that achieving these goals requires that police departments develop new relationships with law-abiding people in the community, allowing them a greater voice in setting local police priorities and involving them in efforts to improve the overall quality of life in their neighbourhoods. It shifts the focus of police work from handling random calls to solving community problems.

In short, it is an approach to policing that emphasises the role of police from a force that "does policing to the people" to a service that "works for and with the people." Over the past two decades perhaps the key element that has come to the fore, in assessing how exactly the police work for and with people, is the notion of partnership (Wilson and
Bennet 1994, Palmiotto 2011). We believe that is the theme most relevant in assessing where community policing, radicalisation, and countering violent extremism intersect.

Not surprisingly, some of the main findings and observations that were highlighted by the QIASS researchers and considered by interested parties related to community policing and forms of multi-agency partnerships that adopted a more comprehensive approach to the prevention of terrorism in the widest sense. This is no surprise, as the challenges of reducing risks and countering violent extremism are too complex and wide-ranging to be left to law enforcement alone. Around Europe in particular, police and politicians have, it seems, realised that the security services cannot simply “arrest their way out” of the current threats and must employ community policing practices.

As national CVE strategies become more comprehensive and pay more attention to prevention (as well as protection from and preparation against terrorism and the pursuit of those engaged in its commission), many “prevent” strategies are becoming more sophisticated in terms of community engagement and involvement. Consequently, partnerships and community engagements have become key components of long-term, comprehensive strategies aimed at countering violent extremism.

QIASS reported the following in its first (2010) report:

- Systems and interagency relationships are critical to the effective delivery of prevention programmes aimed at CVE.
- It is essential to follow sound principles and good practices of community policing, as there is a real risk of failure if community support and engagement is not maintained.
- Principles that underpin best practice include partnership formation, dialogue, and collaboration.
- Success depends on trust, mutual understanding, and respect—within broader society and within the world of policing.
- Approaches should be “context-specific,” taking into account prevailing culture, threats, legislation, and other local factors. Local knowledge (a cornerstone of community policing) is of fundamental importance.
• Intelligence-led approaches and community policing strategies are not mutually exclusive. However, if intelligence gathering is perceived by the community as the state’s primary objective, barriers may occur.

• The more comprehensive and multi-faceted the partnership(s), the more potential for success exists. Many disciplines and perspective can, and do, contribute to CVE efforts.

• Partnerships can be institutional and organizational (for example, government agencies such as police departments, security services, corrections/prison officials, and probation/parole boards—as well as non-governmental organisations such as community organizations—can be involved). Partnerships can also be comprised of individuals within families and societies—for instance, religious leaders, community representatives, former combatants, and prisoners.

• Partnerships exist in many forms: formal and informal; pre-offence, during detention, after release; and personally tailored or more generic.

A key lesson identified by the first QIASS study is the importance of understanding, valuing, and supporting others’ contributions to CVE efforts and of recognising the potential side effects of actions. An ill-thought-out intervention can damage relations with community, partners, and individuals.

None of the above findings should be surprising, as community policing practices for several decades have been recognised as the “new orthodoxy for policing” (Grinc 1994). For example, in 1995 Brogden and Nijhar reported that “support for community policing has been clearly expressed by governments, police leaders and communities in the UK and in places as disparate as South Africa and Canada, Holland and Singapore, USA and Sweden.”

Community policing has become the recognised approach for preventing crime, and, as this paper will demonstrate, it is becoming increasingly recognised as a critical method of preventing radicalisation, which can lead to engagement or re-engagement in violent extremism. However, the nature and extent of the challenges should not be underestimated with regard to using community policing approaches to counter violent extremism in so-called hard-to-reach communities. Often in such contexts there may be traditions of distrust of and hostility toward the police among the community and
parallel barriers within the police themselves (not to mention parallel criminal justice systems). In particular, while the gathering and use of intelligence will always be a vital part of counter-terrorism, there are real dangers if intelligence becomes the main or only priority for police. Certainly in such a context, effective partnerships are unlikely to develop.

The two principal challenges identified by police practitioners and scholars with regard to partnership and community policing are: (1) the impact that such an approach has on power relations between the police and the policed and (2) the acceptance by the police of the “warts and all” realities of community life. In terms of power relations, broadly, community policing requires a shift of power away from the police and toward the community itself. Police officers are required to respond to community needs and wants rather than simply following institutional priorities (Skogan 2004). Communities are no longer simply passive recipients in the relationship but sometimes difficult and demanding consumers of police services; indeed, they may wish to have a say in the setting of police strategy and the operational delivery of police services. In addition, with regard to the police understanding of the community, the well-established tendency of police officers to distinguish between “rough” and “respectable” citizens (Chan 1996)—what Reiner (2000:179) terms “those who challenge and those who accept the middle-class values of decency which police most revere”—is directly questioned by the partnership aspects of community policing.

Partnering with the community may require the local police to accept that the realities of community life may not map readily onto such neat bifurcations between the righteous and the wicked. In concrete terms, in the case of CVE, community policing will require the police to do business with people and organised groups who have been previously involved in violent extremism and terrorism. As the Northern Ireland case study (discussed later) demonstrates, this has been one key element of the development of policing arrangements and partnership approaches in that country.

As all the strategies and programmes highlighted in this paper demonstrate, the relationships among the police, the public and key individuals within the community can be critical to identifying causes of and methods of preventing violent extremism. This is extremely important at the local, neighbourhood level because community policing, by definition, concentrates on local issues. The recent QIASS research has shown that the initial extremist recruiting factors (for those vulnerable to radicalisation)
are often local, not global. The implication is clear: local police, working with local communities, have a key role to play in detecting and addressing local factors that may contribute to violent extremism. Therefore it is important to support efforts being made at a grassroots, local level within the host community.

All of the above leads to some clear conclusions about what must be borne in mind when promoting, implementing, and evaluating partnership-style CVE efforts. Namely:

- Community policing is not a soft option; it is difficult, challenging work that tackles the most serious issues, including terrorism prevention and protecting life.

- Police will be able to do their jobs more effectively if real police-community partnership is achieved.

- Effective partnerships are built on mutual trust and respect. They require a ceding of power from the police both strategically and operationally and a willingness to accept the "warts and all" realities of community life.

- Effective strategies engage communities in more proactive ways than simply asking them to act as the "eyes and ears" of the police and to pass on information. Often communities have antipathy to such a passive role and can feel that they are being exploited for intelligence.

- Community policing encompasses a complete range of police activities that affect methods of patrolling, community engagement, the conduct of investigations, personnel and training policies, accountability forums—and much more. While effective public relations are undoubtedly part of this broader package, PR is no substitute for substantive delivery.

All these issues are critical to success. In the following section, which analyses CVE strategies in various parts of Europe, it is made clear that they are being widely addressed to various degrees in most countries.
COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN EUROPE

As was noted above, members of a QIASS CVE research team visited a number of European countries as part of the study. They included the UK, France, and Sweden, which are members of the European Union (EU), and Norway, which is not. This section discusses some of the schemes and projects from several different European jurisdictions. However, before discussing some specific practices in individual countries, it might be useful at this juncture to note developments in terms of countering violent extremism in the EU as a whole.

CVE AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Following the Madrid train bombings in 2004, the EU adopted the Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union. It emphasised the EU’s opposition to racism, and the benefits of lawful immigration into the EU. More important, for current purposes, it also spelled out the need to develop a counter-terrorism strategy across the EU. In 2005 the EU outlined its Counter-Terrorism Strategy, outlining a framework for a broad and proportionate response to combat terrorism. It noted that “radicalization and recruitment to terrorism are not confined to one belief system or political persuasion. . . . But the terrorism perpetrated by Al-Qa’ida and extremists inspired by Al-Qa’ida has become the main terrorist threat to the Union.”

The strategy covers four strands of work, which fall under its commitment “to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice” (European Commission, 2005). The four elements of the framework were: prevent (individuals from turning to terrorism), protect (citizens and infrastructure by reducing vulnerability to attack), pursue (investigate terrorists and disrupt support networks) and respond (manage and minimize the consequences of attack). While primary responsibility for combating terrorism lies with individual member states, the EU outlined four “cross-cutting contributions” through which it could add value to such individual in-country efforts (EC, 2005). These include strengthening national capabilities of EU member states (by sharing knowledge and using best practice), facilitating European cooperation (by working together in sharing information), developing collective capability (by making collective policy responses to the terrorist threat) and promoting international
partnership (by working together with international organizations and key third countries). The EU also agreed on the importance of a structural assessment of its numerous counter-terrorism measures. As a result, an EU Counter-Terrorism Action Plan on Combating Terrorism is published annually.

In order to disrupt the activities of networks and individuals radicalizing and recruiting people, the EU recognizes the need to monitor the Internet and travel to conflict areas as well as to counter "those playing a role in radicalization including in prisons, places of education or religious training, and worship." The EU also commits to empowering moderate voices, encouraging the emergence of European imams, and enhancing language and other training for foreign imams in Europe (to promote non-radical ideas). Most importantly, the EU plans to "co-ordinate and enhance our efforts to change the perceptions of European and Western policies particularly among Muslim communities, and to correct unfair or inaccurate perceptions of Islam and Muslims" by avoiding linkages of Islam to terrorism. Last, the EU states its commitment to ameliorate the conditions that encourage radicalisation, including tackling inequality and discrimination, promoting intercultural dialogue and "... where appropriate, long-term integration." In February 2007, the Council of the EU approved the revised "Radicalization and Recruitment Action Plan," which added a few minor points but essentially did not change the key elements of the strategy.

As Zimmerman (2007), Tansey (2009), and others have identified, the key challenge for the EU as an entity with regard to its response to terrorism is that while it can offer guidance, resources, and a framework for co-ordination, the primacy of national sovereignty in this area means that it is the individual member states that determine the implementation of policy at the local level. Whether variations in membership practices across the EU enhance or inhibit efforts to counter radicalisation at the local level is difficult to discern. In the sections below, we review a sample of different practices in a number of member states.
THE UNITED KINGDOM (OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND)

The UK is a member state of the EU and as such it contributed to the development of, and works within, the EU Counter-Terrorist Strategy.

The UK counter-terrorism strategy (called CONTEST) predates the EU’s and was the first to introduce the four-track approach now favoured by the EU and individual member states (even if the terminology used is slightly different).

The stated aim of CONTEST is “to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence.”

The scope of the CONTEST strategy has recently been revised and broadened to cover all forms of terrorism, including Irish terrorism (although Northern Ireland has a bespoke approach to CONTEST, which recognises the particular context and specific aspects of the threats that exist in that part of the UK).

CONTEST is a comprehensive and wide-ranging counter-terrorism strategy organised around four work-streams, each comprising a number of key objectives. They are:

- Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks
- Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism
- Protect: to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack
- Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack

For the purposes of this paper, research has concentrated on prevention strategy.

Following the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001 and London in 2005 (7/7), the UK government established, within its counter-terrorism (CONTEST) strategy, a programme of preventative activity known as PREVENT. The scale of the problem in the UK is significant. Between 2001 and early 2011, 237 people were convicted of terrorism-related offences, and a further 48 individuals were placed under control orders (which monitor and restrict certain activities). In addition, 228 individuals have been referred to intervention programmes. These programmes are designed for those who are deemed to be at risk of engaging in violent behaviour.
In that period at least 2,000 individuals were deemed to have been or are “of concern” to the security services (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011:vi). In response to the problem, the PREVENT strategy was particularly concerned with the risk of “home-grown” terrorism and viewed the building of partnerships and alliances with British Muslims as a key element of CT work (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009, Briggs 2010). The strategy recognised that partnerships at home and abroad were essential to success and that these “depended upon openness and trust” (HMG 2009:11). It also indicated that PREVENT would include “a community-led programme to tackling violent extremism” (HMG 2009:13). The PREVENT strategy was delivered by a number of different central government departments (Kundnani 2009) and a multi-layered police response involving a range of different forces and departments (Spalek et al. 2008).

Significant resources have been allocated to this work. The sum of £45 million was committed for the Preventing Violent Extremism strategy through the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) between 2008 and 2011. Across all departments, including the Home Office, the Foreign Office, and the Department for Children, Schools and Families, the figure for prevention-related work was £140 million in 2008–09 (HMG 2009:16).

Much of PREVENT’s CVE effort focuses on identifying and helping persons deemed “at risk” rather than engaging with those who are convicted or detained. Broadly speaking, the original approach was to “win hearts and minds in Muslim communities” (Department for Communities and Local Government 2007). The programme sought to counter ideological support for violent extremism, disrupt those who promote the ideology, support persons vulnerable to recruitment, enhance community resilience, and address extremist-related grievances (HMG 2009). However, the current government reviewed the strategy between November 2010 and June 2011 and concluded that the previous programme was flawed. “It confused the delivery of government policy to promote integration with government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face” (HMG 2011). It has more tightly constructed PREVENT efforts claiming to now make a clearer distinction between counter-terrorist work and integration strategy. Its explanation for doing so includes a warning that points out that “failure to appreciate the distinction risks securitizing integration and reducing the chances of our success.”
The new (June 2011) PREVENT strategy has three objectives as opposed to the five contained in the previous strategy (see Part II). These are to:

- respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it
- prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support
- work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that need to be addressed

In terms of who actually conducts them, it can be seen that the aim is to adopt a multi-strand approach that combines government sponsorship and funding with NGO and other agency activities.

Over the past ten years, community-oriented policing strategies in England have evolved and adapted to address vulnerable Islamic youth in order to counter violent extremism. The strategies are similar to those used in Northern Ireland for a much longer period to prevent young people from becoming involved with paramilitary groups. With both, however, there have been some tensions: between anti-terrorist policing and community policing, for example, and in enforcing some government policies with community-based groups (the need to “sign up” to British values is one problem area). The UK programmes will be explored in detail in the case studies that follow, but at this point it is necessary to identify some issues that are proving to be problematic in other parts of Europe.

A range of commentators have been critical of different aspects of the PREVENT strategy. Human rights lawyers, criminologists, community activists, and others have argued that the strategy was part of a broader securitisation process that demonised and alienated Muslim communities in general and young male Muslims in particular through excessive use of police surveillance, stop-and-search powers, and other draconian counter-terrorism measures. Control orders have proved to be particularly contentious.

Northern Ireland experienced a particularly violent thirty-year period between 1969 and the political agreements and developments of the late 1990s. Since then, there remains the threat and reality of violent extremism, but at a diminished scale. For more
than forty years, therefore, the UK central government and the local (i.e. devolved) institutions have been developing and implementing a CVE strategy that uses community policing and partnership practices. This has not been without difficulty—especially around the roles played by former combatants—but, as will be explored in the following case study, some major lessons have been learned and practices refined that may be applicable elsewhere.

**THE NETHERLANDS**

With a Muslim population of approximately nine hundred thousand (6 per cent of the population), centred largely in the four cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht, Holland has developed some interesting and novel approaches to counter-radicalisation. Dutch-born young Muslims belonging to the so-called Hofstad network spread their radical ideology and planned attacks as early as 2002. The murder of film director Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a Dutch-born Muslim of Moroccan descent provoked a national and international outcry and appeared to many a direct assault on Dutch traditions of tolerance and multiculturalism (Buruma and Myers 2006). Van Gogh was a controversial director and social commentator whose works included a film criticising the treatment of women in Muslim societies.

The Dutch counter-radicalisation strategy was designed primarily for al Qaeda-type inspired extremism but is also applicable to right-wing and fascistic groups. Introduced in 2004, the two key elements of the Dutch national plan are an emphasis on *localism* and an emphasis on multi-agency co-operation (Vidino 2008). The Dutch view of the problem of radicalisation is borne of social and political exclusion rather than of religion. While the national government provides the general framework, training, and parts of the funding, local authorities have high levels of independence in deciding how to implement counter-radicalisation strategies on the ground. Central government does acknowledge its responsibilities in terms of tackling some of the macro issues that lead to radicalisation—discrimination, social exclusion, unemployment, housing, and so forth—but the emphasis on implementation of micro—counter radicalisation measures is local (Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2007). The Dutch *Polarisation and Radicalisation Action Plan* of 2007–2011 is thus viewed primarily as the responsibility of the local governmental authorities.
The Plan contains a three-track approach. The first track involves “prevention, signalling, and intervention” (Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 2007). These elements are implemented by youth workers, the police, truancy officials, and other municipal or local government security policy. Much of the emphasis is upon early intervention with those in the process of being radicalised, encouraging debates on Muslim television programmes and Muslim websites funded by the government, organising public gatherings to discuss differing opinions, offering support to those excluded or marginalised at school, and trying to facilitate entry into the labour market (Rabasa et al. 2010). The second track refers to specific policies at the national level in support of local counter-radicalization policy. In addition to progressive efforts to counter exclusion, the Dutch government has expanded police and enforcement powers, introduced tougher laws for those further along the radicalisation spectrum (for example, planning or carrying out attacks), and expanded the General Intelligence and Security Service (Demant and De Graaf 2010). The third strand concerns the international level, focusing on where radicalisation, polarisation, and foreign policy intersect, in terms of the Dutch government and its partners inside the European Union and beyond.

Each large Dutch city has created its own programme, with unique characteristics, although most have been heavily influenced by Amsterdam’s programme. The Amsterdam approach has become synonymous with complex multi-agency cooperation involving government agencies, local authorities, social services, schools and colleges, religious institutions, and freelance consultants. Openness, information sharing, and constant input from all possible sources seem to be the guiding principles. As is discussed further by Rabasa et al. (2010), one project in particular is of interest for current purposes.

The Slotervaart Action Plan emerged from a particular area of Amsterdam with a significant Muslim population, a borough with high crime and unemployment rates where several members of the radical Hofstad group grew up, including Theo Van Gogh’s assassin, Mohammed Bouyeri. Following riots in 2006, local authorities developed a series of programmes—driven in large part by one charismatic leader, Ahmed Marcouch (a former police officer and Dutch MP), who in 2006 became the first Muslim council chairman of Slotervaart. The group employed an anti-radicalization professional, an expert on Islam who functions as a mediator between Muslim citizens
and the authorities. The project developed relations with a range of partners, with a remit to "... receive and respond to signals" that young people were in danger of radicalisation. It sought to encourage and foster resilience and resistance among young people through the development of relations with local mosques and associated organisations. According to a 2008 progress report, meetings and discussions were held with imams to generate support for the project. Several imams acknowledged that they needed radicalisation-related training, and the borough also organized gatherings (called the Religious-Secular Circle) to bring people of faith (or no faith) together to foster greater mutual understanding and tolerance. Marcouch also works on trying to assist with the reintegration of young offenders back into society, providing job training to those in prison and incentivising those who complete training courses by offering more generous remission rates (in partnership with the Justice authorities).

As in other contexts, evaluating the effectiveness of such programmes appears difficult. The 2008 progress report discussed above was written by the project staff themselves. As Rabasa et al. (2010) note, the project has been controversial in some circles, with Marcouch being accused by some commentators and politicians of pursuing an Islamisation agenda, lacking transparency in the operation of the project, and being resistant to outside evaluation against agreed-to benchmarks. As elsewhere, the difficulties of assessing the quality of the work and the need for charismatic local leaders with grassroots credibility appear to be universal challenges.

**SPAIN**

Along with the United Kingdom, Spain is the only other major EU country to have suffered a major internal attack by terrorists of the al Qaeda-type or affiliated since 9/11. Carried out by Moroccan nationals with links to Al Qaeda, the Madrid bombings of 2004 killed 191 people and injured almost 1,800 others. Although Spain has historically had relatively low numbers of non-EU immigrants (2.7 per cent of the population in 2000, compared to an average of 6 per cent in the EU as a whole), numbers have increased quite dramatically in the past decade (Corcoran 2006). Muslims now constitute the second largest religious grouping in Spain. The number of attacks against Muslims has risen. As in France, a public debate has emerged concerning the wearing of women's headscarves (hijabs). The rightist Partido Popular, which won the general
election in 2011, suggested in 2008 that it planned to ban the wearing of headscarves in schools, require Muslim girls to attend gymnastic classes, and allow male doctors to examine Muslim women (Expatia News, February 11, 2008). A proposed ban on the wearing of the burqa in 2010 was proposed by the Partido Popular in June 2010 and passed in the Senate but was defeated by the standing government in the Congress of Deputies (Spain’s lower house of parliament). Nevertheless, some local governments in Spain have moved to ban the wearing of burqas in public buildings. This theme, of national values clashing with minority traditions and the tensions that arise, is something that CVE strategists need to address.

Obviously Spain has a long history of, and experience dealing with, Basque terrorism. In that context, its existing panoply of anti-terrorist legislation was extended in the wake of 9/11. Interestingly, however, these laws were not extended again after the Madrid bombings, as it was considered unnecessary given the authorities’ existing powers but also because the standing government was concerned that such a move might appear anti-Islamic (Beckman 2007, ch. 4). The government also made a number of important institutional changes to deal with the changing threat of terrorism. While specialist anti-terrorist units to deal with al Qaeda-type terrorism were established, the government also moved Immigration Affairs from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs—signalling a view of immigration as one of integration into the labour market rather than an exclusively policing issue (Corcoran 2006). In May 2005, large-scale regularisation took place; it was designed to provide legal residency for approximately 800,000 people who had previously worked illegally, in part because of the view that illegal immigration and the drug trade provide large recruiting bases and financing for terrorism (Celso 2005). Given that Muslims of Moroccan origin make up the largest illegal immigrant population (about 120,000), the process was designed to integrate them into mainstream Spanish society and, in the process, render such individuals much more visible from a monitoring perspective.

Over the period 2007–2010, the Ministry’s Strategic Plan for Citizenship and Integration was allocated about €2 billion (approximately $2.64 billion) for programmes related to immigrant education, employment, housing, social services, health, women, and youth-related work. The Spanish government has worked with Spain’s two major Islamic groups in order to facilitate Muslim integration. The Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI) and the Union of Islamic Communities in Spain (UCIDE) joined
together as the Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE) (Tansey 2009). However, due to disagreements within the group, smaller Islamic federations broke away from the CIE and formed the Spanish Islamic Council in April 2011. As elsewhere, some commentators have asked whether or not the CIE, as the voice of “respectable Muslims,” is the most appropriate partner agency to be leading the civil-society aspects of countering violent extremism.

The Spanish government also funds Islamic cultural, education, and social programmes through its Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence, including the creation and printing of the first Spanish textbook on Islam for use by first-grade students. Efforts to seek and promote home-grown imams and to register the many “garage mosques” in Spain (and garner information on the nature of their teaching) have met significant resistance from the Muslim community since they were begun in 2005 (Leiken 2005). One of the key actors in the Madrid bombings, Sarhane Ben Abdelmajid Farkhet (known as “the Tunisian”), led prayers in one such informal mosque (Archick et al. 2011).

DENMARK

There are some 200,000 Muslims in Denmark, accounting for 3.7 per cent of the total Danish population of 5.4 million. Most are first-generation immigrants. Historically, Klausen (2005:41) has suggested that Denmark was “the country with the least official interest in developing a dialogue with its Muslim residents.” However, as elsewhere in Europe, the need for such a dialogue and manifestation of tensions between the host community and Danish Muslims have come to the fore around one critical juncture, in this case the controversy over the publication by the newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad. Following the controversy, the Danish prime minister began a number of high-profile meetings with Muslim community leaders. However, Denmark has also seen an increase in anti-immigrant political discourse and political advances by some vehemently anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim activists associated with the Danish People’s Party. Although the more rightist coalition that the DPP had supported in the Danish parliament lost the elections in 2011, it (the DPP) remains the third largest party with 12.3 per cent of the vote.
In 2009, the Danish government published a counter-radicalization document, *A Common and Safe Future: An Action Plan to Prevent Extremist Views and Radicalisation Among Young People*. As elsewhere, the strategy seeks to focus not just on extremists claiming to be Muslims but on “all forms of extremism”—defined as “totalitarian and antidemocratic ideologies, intolerance to the views of others, hostile imagery and a division into ‘them’ and ‘us.’”

As in Holland, radical extremism in Denmark is largely viewed as primarily a failure of social integration (Rabassa et al. 2009). The *Action Plan* speaks of the need to strengthen liberal democracy by educating and socializing citizens to accept democratic norms and responsibilities. It includes provisions for establishing direct contact with at-risk young people through mentoring programmes and other interventions aimed at redirecting youths away from violent extremism; facilitating inter-cultural dialogue; enhancing civil society; and developing community resilience to counter violent extremism (Government of Denmark 2009). In addition to the *Action Plan*, in coordination with the European Union, the Danish Ministry of Refugee Immigration and Integration Affairs has partnered with the municipalities of Aarhus and Copenhagen, the East Jutland Police District, and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) to create a pilot deradicalisation programme called “Deradicalisation—Targeted Intervention” (Rabassa et al. 2009). These programmes are voluntary and apply tactics used in crime prevention to counter violent extremism. They emphasise the need for interagency co-operation among schools, social services, the police, and youth agencies.

The Danish deradicalisation programme has two components. The Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET) directs one of these and the second is managed by the Ministry of Integration Affairs, the municipalities of Aarhus and Copenhagen, and the East Jutland Police District. As part of its responsibilities, the PET has identified five categories of individuals deemed at risk of becoming involved in violent extremism (Centre for Terrorism Analysis 2008). The first group consists of those who have sought asylum in Denmark who may have already trained in terrorist camps. The second category is composed of second- and third-generation immigrants who may be socially excluded, have failed at school, or been in trouble with the authorities. The third category consists of young individuals who appear well integrated into society but are nonetheless attracted to radical, militant versions of Islam. The fourth category consists
of ethnic Danes who have converted to Islam. The final refers to “ideologists”—those deemed as recruiters and radicalisers.

PET co-ordinates the first diversionary aspect of the programme. Despite its intelligence role, PET has adopted what amounts to a community policing model in seeking to develop partnership arrangements with Muslim community groups. The second element of the programme (the element co-ordinated by the Ministry of Integration Affairs, etc.) comes into action if it appears that a young person appears in the process of being radicalised toward violent extremism. If individuals respond positively to intervention, the programme assigns a mentor to provide emotional support and guidance, trying to dissuade them from joining the violent extremist group or assisting them to leave if they are already members and find alternative routes. Again, there is a lack of information evaluating the effectiveness of these programmes—although an independent evaluation of the Action Plan has been commissioned and will report in 2013. According to some of the research that has been conducted on these projects, many Danish Muslims had either never heard of the projects or viewed them in a negative way as stigmatising Muslims (Kühle and Lindelkilde 2010).

SWEDEN

A range of community policing principles, procedures, and practices lie at the heart of strategies promoted by official authorities, including the Swedish Security Police (Sakerhetspolisen) and Swedish Government ministries, as well as NGOs and community programmes such as the “Fryshuset” project and Swedish Muslim programmes (in particular SENSUS, Swedish Peace Agents, and Swedish Muslims for Truth and Justice).

The Swedish government’s counter-terrorist strategy, currently being reviewed, was published in February 2008. Its four-strand approach is summarised under the headings pursue, prevent, protect and manage. Although the document, from its first paragraph, identifies “the new threat” characterised by strong links to religious extremism—“the most serious terrorist threat to Europe as well as globally now consists of groups who seek to legitimise the use of violence by reference to extreme interpretations of Islam”—it also makes clear that all violent extremism will be treated in the same way. There is a
deliberate policy to avoid singling out, and thereby risk alienating, the Swedish Muslim population.

Although incidents in Sweden have been few, the country is making deliberate efforts to learn from other countries how best to combat terrorism, particularly in the aftermath of a suicide bomb in December 2010. Under its Counter-Terrorism Cooperative Council, led by the Swedish Security Service, its stated aim is to develop and strengthen Sweden's collective ability to combat terrorism.

The main threat is from extremists inspired by al Qaeda, or other similar groups, but there are also fears of right-wing extremism. In November 2010 the Director General of the Swedish Security Service published a public document reporting on “violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden, the radicalisation processes discernible in violence-promoting circles in Sweden and the tools and strategies which can be used to counter radicalisation.” Some have commented that the timing was poor—or very good—as a few weeks later the first (and only) terrorist suicide bomb attack of this nature took place on Swedish soil. The 112-page document (“Violence-promoting Islamist extremism in Sweden”) is an example of Swedish authorities’ efforts to be open about the threat to Swedish interests at home and abroad, its origins, processes of radicalisation, and how it intends (with all of society’s assistance) to counter the threat. Its focus is on mainly proactive, preventive measures.

Sweden has an espoused respect for liberal attitudes and multi-culturalism but recognises that more could have been done back in the 1970s when the Muslim community was beginning to establish itself. Government has responded to the fact that until recently, police had little to no training in dealing with minority groups, different cultures, and different values and thus lacked an appropriate knowledge base in this area. The key point was that there needs to be an integral knowledge of Islam to avoid culture clashes and the potential for violence. Efforts are now being made to link up with Stockholm mosques and their representatives to promote mutual understanding between state actors and the Muslim community. This policy of consultation and involvement is a classic community policing process.

One source of “culture clash” identified was between the Swedish judicial system and Muslims who believed in forcing the introduction of sharia law in Sweden. Another potential threat was from Swedish Muslim youth, particularly intellectual youth, who
feel that they are not totally valued as assets to the Swedish community. Such feelings can drive them into becoming ostracised, alienated, discontent, and held in suspicion. The impetus is now to address the spread of such feelings, for example by reforms to police training, to prevent young Muslims being treated by society and the state as if they were all some sort of a problem.

Within local Muslim communities the issue of the credibility of those involved in CVE presents a challenge. Interviewees for this study claim that mainstream groups in the Islamic mosques have little influence because their leaders have no local credibility with or respect from those whom they need to challenge. It was said that they also have no training to deal with complex issues.

The Swedish authorities have endorsed (and funded) a number of community-based CVE programmes. These include the "Fryshuset" project and the "Swedish Muslims for Peace and Justice" group both of which have credibility and, according to interviewees, are well led and capable of reaching young men deemed "in the risk zone." Encouraged by state agencies, these organisations are attempting to counter narratives that might draw vulnerable individuals into violent extremism and provide support to those trying to leave extremist organisations.

The Swedish strategy places emphasis on involving all of society in efforts to prevent the types of radicalisation signalled by increased interest in terrorist activities or violent tendencies. It places great emphasis on measures that target and research "the breeding grounds of terrorism." It includes initiatives to overcome exclusion (local causes of grievance) by promoting an integration policy and democracy. It espouses the wider use of dialogue as a means of creating more opportunities for representatives of civil society to give their views of threat pictures and possible measures. It also highlights the need for closer study of possible ways to provide support to individuals who want to leave extremist violence-promoting environments. The country has significant experience dealing with white power groups, and it is clear that the state recognizes that similar (but bespoke) programmes may have merit in preventing or disrupting other types of terrorism.

The most viable programme (as a model for future work) is EXIT, run by Fryshuset (Swedish for "Freeze House," as it was first located in an old meat warehouse in the suburbs of Stockholm), an NGO that focuses primarily on young people on the margins
of society. It is from this population that potential extremists may be recruited either as actual members or as sympathizers. Fryshuset is a programme now located in Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo. It was the brainchild of Anders Carlberg, who identified a variety of factors that led young men to join gangs and wished to do something to prevent it. By providing a range of outlets for young people, including sports, recreation, music, and education, and also by providing role models and mentoring, it works with criminal gangs, skinheads and neo-Nazis, and other marginalized youths.

It could be described as an enabling programme for youth inspired by a vision that believes knowledge, encouragement, confidence-building and acceptance of responsibility are necessary for the positive and healthy growth of young people.

Currently there are thirty different programmes and activities (including a school) with, overall, eight hundred students/participants. Fryshuset employs over four hundred full-time staff plus volunteers at its three urban locations.

A particular programme that Fryshuset runs is EXIT, developed in 1998 to prevent young people from engaging with extremist groups (specifically white power environments) by offering positive alternatives, educating them about the perils of such groups, and helping them leave these groups if they so desire. EXIT identifies causes of and steps in recruitment (often local and personal; politics and ideology come later); “benefits” of belonging; common factors within sects; how those who belong come to think and act; strategies for leaving; and methods of preventing “relapse,” or recidivism. The interventions are personal, intensive, and require role models and mentoring.

PASSUS is a similar, related programme, designed specifically to help youths leave organized criminal gangs. Both EXIT and PASSUS handle about twenty young people per year. Programmes for each essentially utilize the same methodology, but participants are kept separated, partly in deference to the participants themselves, who do not want to mix with members of other groups. This model is itself based on a 1996 programme developed by the Norwegian Police Academy to help members disengage from white power groups.

EXIT has dealt mostly with youth involved in right-wing extremist groups and some left-wing movements. However, they recognize that globally and particularly in
Scandinavia, there has been an increase in other extremism along with increased immigration of Muslims. Young Swedish men have been detected attending Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab training camps abroad and then returning to Sweden. There is some transferability of principles and practices from EXIT and PASSUS models into other counter-narrative and preventive programmes — such as those that tackle religious extremism. EXIT is now dealing with this type of extremism with a new programme called “Together for Sweden,” designed “to promote religious dialogue and tolerance.” They hired a moderate Imam, a move that has invoked criticism from many in the Swedish community ignorant of Islam. Consequently they hired a Christian priest and Jewish rabbi to prevent allegations of sectarian stereotyping.

EXIT’s main activities involve individual programming based on a participant’s personality, relationship with his/her parents, extent of involvement in extremist groups, and a range of other factors. The emphasis is on providing adequate support, which is customized and can range from motivational talks for participants to daily contact with them for several years.

Parents of participants are often sought out by staff to ensure there is adequate communication between them and their offspring and to explain the programme itself. Staff will often work with families to help them understand why their children became involved with an extremist group. Participation is voluntary and free. Referrals often come from the police but may also come from schools, therapists, neighbours, social workers, or by word of mouth.

To promote its message, EXIT has been conducting lectures in schools and has produced a movie, entitled “The Voice of Hate,” which preaches against prejudice of all varieties. They often rely on volunteers to spread positive information about the importance of cultural awareness, tolerance, and inclusion.

The approach involves the NGO working within local communities and supported by formal agencies—for example, the local police deploy officers to Fryshuset to build bridges and promote mutual understanding. Some former extremists have become involved in these initiatives. EXIT, for instance, is run by a mixed group of staff, including professional therapists and social workers—but also former gang members and extremists. According to organisers and police interviewees, the presence of these former extremists gives the programme a high degree of credibility. The police are not
part of the formal programme team but meet and interact with young people, who often complain they had no dialogue with them.

Community policing principles and practices are also to be found within other two groups, known as Swedish Peace Agents and Swedish Muslims for Peace and Justice. They are comprised of Swedish Muslims whose initial aim to spread the message of peace within their own Muslim culture and community was prompted by the question: What does it mean to be a European Muslim in 2000? The idea of Swedish Peace Agents came about after 9/11. The definition of a Muslim Peace Agent is an “active citizen who promotes positive interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim communities. They subscribe to the Islamic peace culture and counteract mutual prejudices such as phobia toward Islam and phobia toward the west and non-Muslims (Westo-phobia).” The programme, funded by a number of Swedish agencies, has already trained one hundred Muslim Peace Agents in Sweden and produced a book called Salam, which is aimed at a multicultural audience and explains to the world that Islam is not about terrorism. The book also addresses the feelings of young Islamic people who feel lost and isolated, and it offers support and suggestions to those who want to do some good. The programme’s objective is to “counter the internal identity crises before radicalisation takes over.” The aim is to educate Muslim youth about the flawed messages and perils of violent jihad so that they can disseminate a positive image and message about their faith and culture.

There is an intensive training course on “Islamology” which all the project staff have to go through before they can start training others. Staff members include ten trainers (five men and five women). Participants travel to Cairo to observe the society and culture of the city and are challenged about their identity by being asked to consider whether they are Swedish or Muslim. They discuss identity, roles, the media, and other topics and are taught presentation techniques. In the aftermath of the December 2010 suicide bombing, the peace agents took a proactive stance. Future strategy is to focus on being Swedish Muslims who play a part in the wider European community and beyond. The organisers claim that, after the Arab Spring, there has been a growing interest in their work, and that others are copying their approach. In an interesting development, Egyptians are now coming to Sweden to learn from the Swedish Muslim groups.

When describing the relationship that Swedish Muslim organisations had with Swedish police, an interviewee said, “We help the police but we are not part of the police”—repeating almost verbatim what other community-based actors had stated in Belfast.
and London (see case studies below). Representatives of community-based programmes in Sweden make it clear that although the state plays a part by funding and supporting their work, credible local role models have much more chance of success than civil servants and other professionals. The commitment of charismatic individuals within society should not be underestimated, and in Sweden it is clear that the state is attempting to remove obstacles, not place obstacles in their way. Examples are the commitment to open dialogue and a new element of police training—and, more broadly, a new understanding of Islam.

Sweden has adopted a sensitive, thoughtful approach to the challenge presented by violent extremism and is planning state actions based on research and learning from elsewhere. In fact, learning on a constant basis is a central theme in Sweden’s rather thoughtful approach to CT. The dangers of adopting an overzealous and more draconian approach were cited as justification for a more intelligent (and intelligence-led) approach. It has adopted a multi-dimensional approach to CVE that includes efforts to change legislation; the promotion of open dialogue (prevention diplomacy); and support to individuals and community-based programmes engaged in a variety of activities that counter the narrative of the violent extremists (right-wing, left-wing, and religious). As seen elsewhere in Europe, the role played by these community-based groups and the charismatic individuals who staff them cannot be underestimated.

Some key themes have emerged following examination of Sweden’s multi-strand, community-based CVE strategies. These include: the openness with which the Swedish authorities approach the issue of violent extremism and their focus on open dialogue and “preventive diplomacy”; the importance and impact of NGOs and key individuals working within the community; and the important requirement from police and other statutory agencies to respond to these efforts in appropriate ways. Of particular note is the importance the state gives to the avoidance of overreaction, which could lead to the alienation of one section of the community, and Sweden’s “cerebral” approach to prevention—by which it prioritises learning from others.
SUMMARY

All of the themes identified above can, to some degree, be found in most European countries’ approaches to CVE.

Part I of this paper has demonstrated that, in those European countries whose strategies were examined, community engagement plays an important role in countering violent extremism. Despite differing contexts, there is consensus that CVE is likely to be most effective when characterized by a partnership approach involving statutory organizations and community-based non-governmental organizations with grassroots credibility. The examples presented show that meaningful partnerships have been created based on mutual respect and acknowledgment of respective strengths and expertise between agencies and community-based organizations. In certain circumstances there has been a willingness to take calculated risks (for example, by employing former activists with criminal and terrorist backgrounds) to ensure that hard-to-reach groups are approached by those with the required local knowledge, credibility, and technical capacity.

Some common themes and practices have been highlighted by describing the CVE approaches taken by the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, Spain, and Sweden. These include:

• The multi-strand approach to countering terrorism and the emphasis placed on prevention—especially efforts to reduce the recruitment of vulnerable persons into violent extremism.

• The importance of partnerships between formal state institutions and community-based organizations.

• The role that individuals within communities can play, including former activists who now wish to contribute positively to the situation.

• The importance of sharing lessons learned from other countries, strategies, and individual programmes.

As the 2010 QIASS report also disclosed, the strategies examined in this paper show that relationships are critical to the effective delivery of prevention programmes. The principles and good practices of community policing are followed to minimise the risk of failing to maintain community support. Each country has adopted approaches that
take into account the specific culture, threats, legislation, and other local factors therein, and some are more developed, comprehensive, and multi-faceted than others. This is due largely to the duration and types of threats the country is dealing with.

Through study of these and other European national CVE strategies—their priorities and methods, and lessons learned from them—policymakers and strategists can more readily determine if these strategies and practices may be applicable to other areas.

To assist this process further, Part II of the paper now presents two in-depth case studies from the UK. Details of community based programmes in Northern Ireland (that deal with the threat of a return to the violence of the past) and similar programmes in England (that address the threat of al Qaeda-type inspired extremism) are presented and discussed. The paper outlines their origins; development; methodologies employed; and, indicates lessons to be learned. It concludes that principles and practices developed over a lengthy period in UK are worth considering for transfer and remodelling elsewhere.
PART II: TWO UK CASE STUDIES

CASE STUDY 1: NORTHERN IRELAND

All of the issues identified in the previous section are critical to success when a partnership approach to CVE is adopted. This is particularly so when a society is emerging from conflict; contains many divisions and grievances; expects its police service to demonstrate reform and community policing priorities; and is comprised of a sizable number of ex-prisoners. Northern Ireland is a case study that falls into this category. This section considers how community-oriented policing strategies have evolved and been adapted in Northern Ireland to enable prevention efforts to be more effective when one is working with former loyalist and republican paramilitaries.

It is important to note that Northern Ireland’s CVE efforts can only be understood in the context of a peace process that has been ongoing for almost two decades. This has involved the development of a negotiated political settlement overseen by the British and Irish governments (with significant international assistance) and several periods during which the political institutions collapsed only to be patiently rebuilt with yet further political negotiations (Elliot 2007, Edwards 2011). The Belfast Agreement of 1998 (also known as the Good Friday Agreement), which was subsequently endorsed simultaneously by referenda on both sides of the border in Ireland (that is, in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland), heralded significant social and political reform across Northern Ireland. It saw the creation of a power-sharing (coalition) executive, cross-border bodies, the early release of politically motivated prisoners, police and criminal justice reforms, and a series of guaranteed human rights and equality measures (Cox et al. 2006, Bew 2007). As is widely discussed in the writings on the conflict transformation process, the completion of the “policing deal” that saw the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) transformed into the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was among the most challenging elements of the transition.

The Agreement provided for the establishment of an independent commission on policing. That commission was tasked with developing a blueprint for policing in the jurisdiction appropriate to the new political accord. Commission chairman Chris (now Lord) Patten, a former Conservative minister and governor of Hong Kong, was clear from the outset about the difficulties associated with the task set for him and his fellow commissioners.
Since 1922 and the establishment of the Royal Ulster Constabulary the composition of the police has been disproportionately Protestant and Unionist. Both in the past, when the police were subject to political control by the Unionist government at Stormont, and more recently in the period of direct rule from Westminster, they have been identified by one section of the population not primarily as upholders of the law but as defenders of the state, and the nature of the state itself has remained the central issue of political argument. In one political language they are the custodians of nationhood. In its rhetorical opposite they are the symbols of oppression. Policing therefore goes right to the heart of the sense of security and identity of both communities and, because of the differences between them, this seriously hampers the effectiveness of the police service in Northern Ireland. (Patten 1999:2)

At the heart of the vision intended to transform the RUC into the PSNI was the notion of community policing. The Patten Report (1999) was the result of a lengthy and comprehensive research and consultation process that ultimately contained 175 separate recommendations for policing. At the core of the reform programme was the aspiration to take politics out of policing and to create a service with a community ethos. The aim was to deliver a police service that was:

- representative of the community it served
- accountable to the law and the community
- open, transparent, and impartial
- protective of human rights
- effective and efficient in its operations.

Symbolic changes in terms of the name, ethos, and culture of the organisation were accompanied by significant changes designed to improve police accountability to the community—the creation of an overseeing Policing Board with significant powers, the independent Office of the Police Ombudsman to investigate allegations of police misconduct, and District Policing Partnerships to govern local neighbourhood policing arrangements. As the report made clear, “Policing with the Community should be the core function of the police service . . .” (Patten Report 1999: para. 7.9). The legislation
that was introduced to enact the recommendations contained in the Patten report, including the renaming of the RUC as the PSNI, specifically charged all its officers with community policing obligations. Section 32 (5) of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 states: “Police officers shall, so far as practicable, carry out their functions in cooperation with, and with the aim of securing the support of the local community.”

Since then, despite episodic violent extremism and occurrences of terrorism—notably characterised by the emergence of several “residual” terrorist groups, such as the Real IRA (RIRA) and the Continuity IRA (CIRA)—the “peace process” is widely acknowledged to be successful and increasingly embedded in Northern Ireland. While Loyalism remains fractious and tensions within that constituency do manifest sporadically, no serious political commentator suggests there is any prospect of a return to violence by either mainstream Republicanism or organised Loyalism. Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA, and the Democratic Unionist Party (for years the party most associated with sectarian and intransigent Unionism) now share power. Martin McGuinness, a former IRA commander, and the Reverend Ian Paisley, who also served jail time for politically motivated offences, led their respective constituencies into the new power-sharing arrangement in 2007. In 2010, after further intense negotiations, policing and justice powers were devolved and handed over to the local assembly. For the first time since the foundation of the state in 1921, Republicans and Unionists now share responsibility for the governance of a state that Republicans had heretofore sought to overthrow through armed struggle.

Neither constituency has altered its political allegiance or identity, merely its views on whether violence is justifiable in defence or promotion of that identity. Most pertinently for current purposes, when two British soldiers and a police officer were killed by Republican dissidents in 2009, Martin McGuinness stood shoulder to shoulder with his Unionist counterpart, Peter Robinson (who replaced Ian Paisley as First Minister), and the PSNI Chief Constable Matt Bagott, and condemned those responsible for the murders as “traitors to Ireland.”

At the grassroots level, much of CVE work carried out in Northern Ireland, against dissident Republicans or indeed more militant Loyalists, is done by local community organisations, many of which are directed and staffed by former combatants. The panoply of youth diversionary organisations, community safety projects, restorative justice programmes (some of which are discussed below), and neighbourhood renewal
projects almost all have partnership working arrangements with the PSNI. The police role in such contexts is to develop partnership but often not as the lead agency. The "new beginning to policing" (as the Independent Commission named their report) laid out a template for bespoke styles of police engagement that are adaptable to conditions on the ground. Thus, for example, it is widely accepted among community restorative justice projects in Northern Ireland (which are the most prominent of the former IRA and Loyalist combatant-led programmes) that the most sensitive of the state actors in developing effective working arrangements at the grassroots level were "pragmatic and sensible cops" (McEvoy and Shirlow 2012). Developing relations between the police and particularly historically estranged communities has been difficult and challenging for all of the actors involved, and the effort is still evolving. Such relations are, however, at the very core of the ongoing CVE efforts to thwart those who promote violent opposition to the status quo.

THE COUNTER-TERRORISM CONTEXT IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Northern Ireland, as part of the UK, is covered by its national counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST). The scope of the CONTEST strategy has recently been revised and been broadened to cover all forms of terrorism (including Irish terrorism). However, Northern Ireland has a bespoke approach that recognises some of the particular social, political, and contextual aspects of the threats and is recognised by the UK PREVENT strategy.

The PREVENT strategy notes that Republican groups have long recognised the political and propaganda value of mounting an attack in Great Britain. In September 2010, the Northern Ireland–related terrorist threat to Great Britain was raised from moderate to substantial, meaning that an attack is a strong possibility. That said, it is unclear whether the dissident Republican groups have anything like the required logistical sophistication, personnel, and community support to mount sustained attacks in Britain in the same way that the mainstream IRA did throughout the conflict. The last actual attack by Northern Ireland–related groups in Great Britain was in 2001. Locally, however, the threat in Northern Ireland itself is described as severe, which means an attack is highly likely.
Although there have been a number of arrests in Northern Ireland of individuals allegedly linked to violent jihadist activities, the current primary threat is assessed as coming from the dissident Republican sector. These groups include the Real IRA, Óglaigh na hÉirinn, and the Continuity IRA. There are few concrete ideological distinctions among these groups in practice. All are opposed to the Good Friday Agreement and the PSNI, and in particular all are opposed to the Sinn Féin leadership’s endorsement of policing change. These groups, known locally as "the dissidents," continue to carry out sporadic attacks on the security forces, bomb civilian and military targets, and engage in acts of rough justice by meting out punishment violence within their own communities against alleged anti-social offenders.

For the above reasons (that is, the level and type of threat), the UK strategy differentiates between the implementation of PREVENT in Northern Ireland and the UK:

Under the Northern Ireland constitutional settlement, national security remains the sole responsibility of the UK Government. For the most part, UK-wide counter-terrorism legislation applies in Northern Ireland and remains the responsibility of the UK Government. However, following the devolution of policing and justice matters in April 2010, the Northern Ireland Minister of Justice is responsible for policing and criminal justice policy matters. In addition, most of the levers which are relevant to the work of PREVENT are devolved and are the responsibility of the Northern Ireland Assembly. In Northern Ireland, unlike the rest of the United Kingdom, the principal threat from terrorism comes from Northern Ireland–related terrorist groups. While the PREVENT strategy does not directly apply to Northern Ireland–related terrorism, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland works closely with Ministers in the Northern Ireland Executive to counter the threat posed by these groups. (HMG 2011)

PREVENT also notes a range of factors that drive recruitment to terrorist groups in Northern Ireland. Dissident Republicans regard the compromises made by mainstream Republicanism as a “sell-out” of the traditional goal of a united Ireland (Tong 2004, Sanders 2011, Horgan and Morrison 2011). As the PREVENT strategy sums up, at a political level these dissidents are motivated by what they regard as “the ongoing British presence in Ireland.” However, as the document goes on to note, “... as
elsewhere, ideology is rarely the only factor in the process of radicalisation and recruitment. Recruitment is often personality-driven or dependent on family or local allegiances. The promises of status, excitement and in some cases financial reward are all relevant.” There has apparently been some limited movement by former mainstream IRA activists toward the dissident groups, including provision of technical and logistical support. However, there is some local evidence in Northern Ireland that recruitment of skilled personnel remains a problem. Certainly some of those imprisoned and arrested for dissident-related offences include individuals with significant “ordinary” criminal records, which might suggest that the dissident republican groups are struggling to attract the more genuinely politically motivated terrorists who tended to be a feature of their mainstream predecessors. Among the groups established by the British and Irish governments to monitor terrorist activities is the International Monitoring Commission. The commission noted, in 2010, that while some groups—in particular the Real IRA and especially Ógláigh na hÉireann (ONH)—remain active and dangerous, members were heavily involved in a wide range of serious crime (as well as terrorism). The commission also made clear that “. . . [i]t is however essential to keep things in perspective. It remains our view, as we said in our report six months ago, that in terms of weapons, money, personnel and support the present dissident campaign in no way matches the range and tempo of the PIRA campaign of the Troubles” (International Monitoring Commission 2010:6).

The Loyalist sector, within which the threat level is assessed as lower, has struggled with the transition out of conflict. As the International Monitoring Commission (2011:14) noted, “In contrast to PIRA [mainstream IRA], loyalist groups are finding it very difficult to contemplate going out of business. Indeed, one striking feature of the changes we have described has been how PIRA[,] however slowly, transformed itself under firm leadership and has gone out of business as a paramilitary group while loyalist groups, lacking comparable direction, have struggled to adapt.” In particular, there are significant tensions manifest in one of the major groupings, the Ulster Volunteer Force. These tensions are linked, in part, to leadership tussles, current police investigations into past violence, and an ongoing “supergrass” (informant) trial of Loyalist suspects. They have resulted in one very public murder of a former UVF affiliate in 2010, serious rioting in the summer of 2011 when firearms were used, and the re-emergence of militaristic wall murals—developments that continue to be monitored
closely by the police not least in terms of how Loyalism might re-emerge in the context of a sustained threat posed by dissident Republicans.

COMMUNITY BASED CVE PROGRAMMES IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Northern Ireland is in transition from a thirty-year conflict. Unlike those involved in or supportive of Al Qaeda or like-minded jihadist organisations in the UK and elsewhere, for many of the principal protagonists in Northern Ireland the war is over. Much of the work discussed below is directed at maintaining the stability of the transition. That said, there may be themes and ways of working in the Northern Ireland context that may be relevant or of interest elsewhere. Certainly in terms of the political, security, and peace-making lessons to be learned from the Northern Ireland experience, these have become a major source of interest and inquiry internationally over the past decade (Ellison and Reilly 2008, Ben Porat 2008, Williams 2010). We would therefore advocate for a cautious, analytical, but open-minded approach to the transferability of that local experience.

There are a number of programmes operating throughout Northern Ireland which contain elements of community policing and which highlight the challenges inherent to police and community partnerships in such a transitional context. The PSNI and district policing partnerships lead some of the least contentious programmes—for example, neighbourhood policing, crime prevention, and outreach efforts to strengthen community relationships. However, as noted above, particularly in working-class communities and in areas in which relations with the police have historically been difficult and in which dissident and Loyalist paramilitarists would continue to draw the bulk of their support and recruits, it is politically motivated former prisoners and ex-combatants in favour of the peace process who do much of the heavy lifting in such work. In some instances, this CVE work dovetails with more generic preventative programmes designed to divert young people from ordinary crime. Many NGOs, including some that work on a cross-border/all-Ireland basis, are engaged in efforts to prevent young people from becoming involved in “ordinary” crime, gang membership, and sectarianism. As was noted above, given that both dissident Republican and Loyalist extremists recruit people involved in criminality into their ranks—when the
alternatives to joining up may mean a punishment shooting or a beating at the hands of such groups—ordinary criminality may serve as an obvious gateway into sectarian and politically motivated violent extremism.

In examining various programmes involving ex-prisoners and combatants in Northern Ireland, we will not postulate simplistic or mechanistic transposition from one quite specific setting to other very different social, political, or cultural contexts. However, from the details recorded, it is possible to identify principles and key practices that may apply elsewhere.

A ROLE FOR EX-COMBATANTS

We have seen that community policing provides for significant involvement by grassroots organisations in contemporary Northern Ireland, including those led and staffed by former combatants (Topping 2008). In addition to the usual counter-terrorism strategies and tactics deployed against violent extremism, there are local variants. In this section we focus in particular on the work of three programmes of particular interest for current purposes—(i) Coiste na N-Iarchimi ex-prisoners network (or “Coiste,” as it is known locally), (ii) Community-based Restorative Justice, and (iii) the Prisoners to Peace initiative. Before exploring the work of those projects, we explain how former combatants became so prominently involved in such work.

A key element of the Northern Ireland peace process was the early release of politically motivated prisoners (McEvoy 1998, 2001). None of the principal paramilitary organisations engaged in conflict could have delivered their respective constituencies without such early releases, a fact either implicitly or explicitly acknowledged by the signatories to the Belfast Agreement. That accord provided for the release, within two years of the signing of the Agreement, of all politically motivated prisoners in groups that supported the peace process. Those early releases were a conspicuous success. Between the signing of the Agreement in 1998 and May 2010, 453 prisoners were released early under the Northern Ireland Sentences Act, which implemented the prisoner release elements of the Agreement (Northern Ireland Prison Service 2011). Prisoners are released on license (a parole) until the end of the sentence that they would otherwise have served. Since 1998, only 23 have been recalled to prison for breach of
their licences, 10 for alleged involvement in terrorist activities and the remaining 13 for ordinary offences (Northern Ireland Prison Service 2011)—an overall recidivism rate of 5 per cent after thirteen years. By way of comparison, the recidivism rate for “ordinary” adult prisoners in Northern Ireland within two years of the offence is 48 per cent (Northern Ireland Prison Service 2003). Those individuals who were released early joined thousands of others released during the conflict itself (estimates usually are around 15,000 Republicans and 5,000–10,000 Loyalists). As we will detail below, they have become crucial voices in “countering the narrative”—among either disaffected former comrades or a new, younger generation of potential terrorists who continue to believe in the efficacy and morality of political violence.

As well as the provisions relating to the early releases, the Agreement also stated:

The Governments continue to recognise the importance of measures to facilitate the reintegration of prisoners into the community by providing support both prior to and after release, including assistance directed towards availing of employment opportunities, re-training and/or re-skilling, and further education.

(Belfast Agreement, 1998: 26)

Despite this reference to its importance in the Agreement, the practice of prisoner reintegration in Northern Ireland remained controversial. For some, the allocation of any resources toward those who had been involved in violence constituted a “reward to the ‘men of violence’” (Gormally 2001). For others, the process has been characterised by a lack of political will on the part of government to properly support the work of ex-prisoners and to remove the obstacles faced by them in reconstructing their post conflict lives (Rolston 2007). In addition, many politically motivated ex-prisoners themselves bridle at the term “reintegration,” suggesting that it undermines their “hard-earned” status as political rather than ordinary offenders; that it denotes a failure to acknowledge the structural causes of violence and their continued exclusion from full citizenship entitlements; and that it implies a basic misunderstanding of the relationship between them and the communities from which they come—implying that they are somehow “other” or apart from such communities or are required to change in order to “fit back” into society (Coiste, 2003a, 2003b).
In any case, between 1995 and 2003, 61 former prisoner groups and a further 29 affiliated projects received a total of £9.2 million in funding from the Community Foundation for Northern Ireland (CFNI) and the European Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation (Peace I and II). Ex-prisoner projects are currently awaiting a further application for funding under Peace III, which will be decided in January 2013.

The re-integrative model developed for ex-prisoners was essentially a self-help model. Monies were distributed through CFNI (a highly respected independent community funding agency), but the actual management and staffing of the reintegration programmes were left largely to the ex-prisoners themselves. The projects were organised on a factional basis, broadly mirroring the various paramilitary organisations to which they had previously belonged. Thus Coiste na n-Iarchimí (discussed further below) became the umbrella organisation for former IRA prisoners, and four other organisations serviced different Republican and Loyalist factions. While undoubtedly this model resulted in some duplication of effort, it is difficult to see how any other method would have been feasible with these former sworn enemies in the early days of the transition.

The practical work of the projects has encompassed a broad spectrum of activities, only a snapshot of which can be discussed here. The range of work in which politically motivated former prisoners are or have been involved includes: direct service such as counselling and training for ex-prisoners and their families; capacity building in local communities; ex-prisoner self-help initiatives including conflict-related tourist programmes delivered by former combatants; community-based anti-poverty and anti-racist work; resolving disputes at interface areas and concerning contested marches; community-based restorative justice as alternatives to punishment violence (discussed below); youth diversionary work; initiatives on dealing with the past, including truth recovery, developing relations with former enemies (including former soldiers, police officers, and ex-combatants from different factions) and victims of violence; devising forms of memorialisation and commemoration; equality and human rights campaigning; and a host of other related activities (see Shirlow and McEvoy 2008 for an overview). The three projects showcased below speak to different styles of counter-violent extremism work led by ex-combatants.
COISTE NA N-IARCHIMÍ: SAFE SPACES FOR CRITICAL DIALOGUE.

Coiste na n-Iarchimí is the umbrella organisation for former Provisional IRA–affiliated political ex-prisoners throughout Ireland. At its height it represented 24 groups and employed 95 staff (Rolston 2007). Its stated aims from its inception were to secure the full integration of Republican former prisoners through recognition of the contribution they have made to the community and the contribution they can make in the future; to facilitate former prisoners in contributing to peace and justice in Ireland; and to deepen the links with community organisations, employers, and others (Coiste na n-Iarchimí 2002). Coiste’s work has thus ranged from counselling through job- and training-related activity to lobbying and advocacy on behalf of the Republican ex-prisoner constituency in relation to what they regard as unwarranted discrimination in access to jobs, goods, and services (Ritchie 2002). While the organisation is engaged in a broad range of activities, the two most relevant for current purposes are (a) those related to working with the police and (b) efforts to counter violent narratives promoted by dissidents. All of the interviews cited below were conducted with former IRA prisoners and ex-combatants.

The resolution of long-held antipathies between Republican communities and the police on both sides of the border has been one of the most difficult aspects of the peace process. Following the historical decision by Sinn Féin to support policing structures in Northern Ireland in January 2007, Republican ex-prisoners have been at the forefront of efforts to develop relations with the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Two of the Sinn Féin members of the Policing Board are prominent former IRA prisoners, and other Republican ex-prisoners are active members of local District Police Partnership Boards. In recent interviews conducted by one of the authors with Coiste members, ex-prisoners stressed that while there was still “some way to go” in terms of the relationship between Republicans and the police in general (with several suggesting that too often relations were particularly shaped for good and ill by the personalities and abilities of local police commanders), no one interviewed suggested that relations had remained unmoved since 2007. As the following former IRA prisoners noted:

The relationship with the PSNI is a huge issue. The decision taken to engage with the police by Sinn Féin has moved the goal posts but it is still an uphill battle in our community because we are fighting against years of never...
having a police force. The perception is that they were never there to fight crime. The PSNI are changing slightly but they have a huge mountain to climb. They haven’t yet the capacity to do proper policing because they have 30 years history of political policing.

We were at a training day for new PSNI recruits—a senior police officer gave the address and spoke about partition and a sectarian police force and the equality agenda. That would never happen down South. The RUC have been dragged to this position and it is paying off. They are not perfect but no police force is.

In a focus group discussion facilitated by one of the authors in North Belfast, much of the discussion focused upon the developing relationship between the political ex-prisoner project and the PSNI.

People were asking what should they do in relation to the police—this was both organisations and individuals—and we felt we had to take a lead. The process of engagement would have taken a lot longer if it was not us with a republican background taking the lead. Most of the issues with the police boil down to quality of life issues—the social situation, low paid jobs, overcrowding in housing and a community hemmed in by territoriality. It is amazing that there is not more negativity. It is a testament to the work done here that this area is still holding together. What people see is not just the high politics but also who is doing the work.

Our view is that the police are another group like the Housing Executive who are accountable to this community. The old police were very defensive—the new ones acknowledge problems. We criticised the behaviour of police at the interfaces. We see the community police who want to build relationships, then the response teams who actually come out when called. We have done sessions with the police about community linkages and their need for communication skills. . . . Unfortunately it is the parades that catch their attention. They should not come in with Territorial Support Groups—they shouldn’t bring in strangers—it should be community based policing. Things are progressing but it could be going much faster. This process is all about putting in all the small pieces of the jigsaw—you’ve got the perimeter
done in the form of overall political support for the police but we are now filling in the middle pieces.

There is interesting stuff going on in relation to community safety—bottom up linkages with police and other statutory agencies. It could work but it needs resourced. The government should view it as saving of money not an expenditure.

The consequences for Republican ex-prisoners in taking a lead on developing relations with the PSNI should not be underestimated. Many of the most prominent Republican ex-prisoners involved in these kinds of efforts have received death threats from anti-agreement Republican armed groups. Another former prisoner interviewed also noted that threats and attacks came not only from “dissident” Republicans but also from criminals in the local community.

We should remember that there is actual risk involved—death threats and houses attacked—there have been 13 attacks in 18 months. It is anti-social elements carrying out these attacks, not dissidents. A small criminal group—8 or 9 people recently attacked a leading member’s house. But we have big support from the community—at a public demonstration in protest against the attack we had 200 people including four UDA representatives.

Such discussions demonstrate the valuable work being done by political ex-prisoners to build positive relations between the PSNI and Republican communities at the grassroots level in Northern Ireland. While obviously the development of contemporary and indeed future relationships with the police remains paramount, a number of the political ex-prisoners interviewed also highlighted a number of important engagements in which they were involved with former RUC officers and British soldiers as part of their work “dealing with the past.” Such work has included arranging hosted visits by former police and army personnel into areas in which they were previously based and perceived by the community as part of a hostile occupying force, invitations to talks and seminars about past related issues, and other below-the-radar encounters.

The Coiste network has also reached out to elements of the Republican community who do not support Sinn Féin or the peace process. In some instances this work focuses upon young people, many of whom will have direct experience of their own parents, family
members, and neighbours being involved in conflict, imprisonment, police raids, and so forth. As two ex-prisoners stated explicitly:

Young people who are children of ex-combatants were brought up in the context of the conflict. They see that their parent did something for their country but they may not see anything there for them. We need to show those people that there is something tangible for them—if that is not there they may become cannon fodder for people who are against the process.

We feel a real sense of responsibility for the next generation. A big reason for people to come to these projects is to make sure that the next generation doesn’t have to follow them. The young people do listen but we need to do a lot more—there is a lot of intense debate amongst them. They are looking at dissident websites and are taking simplistic arguments—“the Brits are still here,” for example. We need to continue the conversation for a long time. We also need to talk about what it was actually like—what it was like to live through a military conflict. If we don’t talk about it, the vocal minority will gain the ear of the young people. There are young people in the North who are being influenced by dissidents who talk about the great conviviality in gaol as though it were a party, which is nonsense.

All of those who work for the network insist that they operate under an open-door policy. Coiste has been involved in efforts to diffuse a “dirty protest” and has threatened hunger strike among dissident Republican prisoners held at Maghaberry Prison.

We have an open door policy—if you were an ex-prisoner it doesn’t matter where their heads are at politically now. We would not in any way discriminate—we helped an ex-CIRA person recently.

We have bought into the peace process wholly. But no-one who is an ex-prisoner is refused assistance for any reason. Even those who are now in prison will be supported because of what they were—not what they are in for now.

One respondent explained at some length that giving service to ex-prisoners might also have a political impact.
It is more than just being fair—where we prove ourselves prepared to help people whatever their views it has softened the attitudes of some of those people. When we can actually deliver for someone it demonstrates that the idea that nothing has changed is weak. There was some criticism of us and attempts to mobilise around ex-prisoner issues but our position reduced their ability to use the issue negatively. Even a critic who writes to the papers accusing us of giving jobs for the boys actually uses the advice service. There are also public interest issues which arise out of our work which have broader implications—compensation issues, those imprisoned or wrongly convicted who were not activists. We have been successful in being of relevance to the individual ex-prisoner.

Another consideration is seen as the importance of maintaining channels of communication in the ex-prisoner community:

It is important first that whatever political disagreements exist in the ex-prisoner community we don’t want it to reach breakdown. For example we ensured that people involved in [one non-mainstream group] got personal invites to an event and some came along—it is important that relationships are kept open. We are not an adjunct of Sinn Féin and we need to keep channels open—a leading critic has participated in our events. Having said that, the dissidents will not get any succour from us at all—there is no ambiguity about our rejection of them.

One person was explicit about the role of the projects in reducing dissent:

One of our roles is to continue holding the hands of those who are not happy with the peace process—we are able to talk out problems with the peace process. If groups like us didn’t exist you would see a greater drift towards dissident groups—we have held that process back.

In short, the work engaged in by ex-prisoners and former combatants in the Coiste network, both in terms of their outreach to the police and their efforts to counter violent extremism within the Republican community, is an example par excellence of the ability of former combatants to help resolve conflict. One of the significant achievements of the peace process within Republicanism, as was repeatedly acknowledged by the International Monitoring Commission, among other commentators, was the
movement’s capacity to keep the bulk of its constituency “on board” as they moved toward significant compromises such as taking seats at Stormont, the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, the dismantling of IRA structures, and of course the acceptance of policing arrangements. Many ex-prisoners we spoke with were keenly aware that the comradely bonds among veterans, including those who remained highly sceptical of the direction taken by Sinn Féin, were hugely important in minimising drift toward the dissidents. They did not regard their role as “disciplinary” or as the exercise of “political control.” Rather, interviewees characterised ex-prisoner projects within the Coiste network as providing safe space for often heated discussion and debate on strategy and tactics. If “keeping people on board” and reaching out to those who most definitely are not on board are the goals (through comradely relations that may supersede points of political or ideological difference), then this is a hugely significant contribution by such networks as Coiste. In Northern Ireland this has been recognised. Ex-prisoners have contributed to CVE by embedding the transition away from armed violence among former prisoners and combatants in a way no state agency could possibly do.

Loyalist ex-combatants, too, have worked hard to try to keep the bulk of their constituency on board with the transition. However, as was discussed above, with a less disciplined and organised constituency and fewer stand-out leaders spread thinly on the ground, their progress has been more uneven. They have also enjoyed fewer obvious tangible political gains than their Republican counterparts. Sinn Féin is now the largest political party within the nationalist community in Northern Ireland, while there are no political representatives affiliated to the Loyalist groupings in the local assembly. (See Shirlow and McEvoy 2008.) In both constituencies there is an evident sense of responsibility among the former combatants interviewed about what they perceive as their responsibility to provide leadership in embedding the peace process in the communities in which they live and work and within their own constituency. That impetus toward leadership is also evident in the work of former combatants in community-based restorative justice in Northern Ireland.
COMMUNITY RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CHALLENGING CULTURES OF VIOLENCE

The background to community-based restorative justice in Northern Ireland has been discussed extensively elsewhere (McEvoy and Mika 2001, 2002, McEvoy and Eriksson 2008, Eriksson 2009). Broadly speaking, these projects grew out of efforts to supplant violent systems of paramilitary vigilantism with lawful, non-violent, and human rights-compliant community-based mediation drawn from the theory and practice of restorative justice. From the outset, in both Republican and Loyalist areas, the role of ex-combatants in challenging deeply embedded cultures of violence was central.

The background to the projects in Republican areas is that in 1996 a number of human rights and peace activists (including one of the authors—McEvoy) were approached by an intermediary to begin dialogue with the IRA concerning their continued use of punishment violence. A six-week training programme was devised and a discussion document was drafted outlining the potential for a non-violent community-based justice system based on the principles of restorative justice (Auld et al. 1997). After lengthy discussions, that document was endorsed by the IRA and Sinn Féin. Four pilot projects were established in Republican areas, since expanded to twelve. While the projects refused to work with an unreformed RUC at that juncture, they made it clear that partnership with all other aspects of the criminal justice system was desirable and held out the possibility of working relationships with the police in the context of an overarching political “deal” on policing. The projects in Republican areas became known as Community Restorative Justice Ireland. Since their establishment, many of the staff and volunteers involved are former IRA combatants.

The project activities have been focused upon the normal restorative justice activities of preparation of victims and offenders, mediation, family group conferencing, and the monitoring of agreements (Mika 2006). In effect, the work of the projects appears very similar to what would be commonly known as community or neighbourhood mediation. In general, a “case” is referred to a local office by aggrieved parties or perhaps by another local organisation. Community members are encouraged to approach restorative justice, where they would previously have approached the IRA seeking punishment violence or threats. After an initial determination by project staff that indeed the matter is within the remit of the service—some types of conflict, such as domestic assault and child abuse, are routinely referred to other community or
statutory resources—the conflict is assigned to two-person teams of trained volunteers. They most often visit with affected parties directly at their homes, and where issues are not resolved in simple “shuttle” diplomacy between parties to the dispute, arrangements are made to formally conduct a mediation or conference at some neutral venue. When agreements materialise from these conferences, the local service attempts to monitor compliance and seeks to intervene in situations where agreements must be revisited.

Generally, cases (of both crime and anti-social behaviour) involve individuals, entire families, or groups of households in matters that are relational in character. They range from supposedly minor types of disputes (noise, property damage) to matters that are significantly more severe in their consequences, including paramilitary threat. In addition to this more conventional fare, however, the Community Restorative Justice programmes become intimately involved in their local areas with a range of what might be characterized as community safety activities. Drinking by young people, graffiti on local buildings, trouble in parks or the city centre on the weekends, stoning of fire brigades, taxis, buses, and ambulances, desecration of a local church or shrine, vandalism of local shops and businesses, fighting at delicate interface areas, joyriding, and the like represent important community-wide trouble in which Community Restorative Justice has intervened, at the request of local residents, to devise collective local responses.

Given the presence of former paramilitaries among their staff and volunteers, the government and statutory agencies initially approached the issue of community justice projects with understandable suspicion. A key objective from the outset has been to bring the schemes into the remit of the formal justice system and to ensure that the rights of those who came into contact with the schemes were protected. In 2000 a government protocol was developed that requires community-based programmes to become accredited and audited in order to be recognised as legitimate and receive funding. Participants in restorative justice initiatives on both sides of the community agreed to comply with the protocol, and this remains the case today. There is also official oversight of the programmes—inspection by the NI Criminal Justice Inspectorate (NICJI). Despite those initial suspicions, common ground was found over a prolonged period of consultation and negotiation (McEvoy and Eriksson 2008). The key objective was for partnership with the state agencies to be “real,” based upon mutual
respect: business would be conducted in ways that did not undermine the organic relations of the community in which the projects operated. In practice, particularly in the Republican communities, the projects had to develop partnerships with the police and other agencies at a pace that was acceptable to those communities, with project leaders being keen to not “outstrip their constituency.”

Extensive analysis and evaluations of the projects over the past thirteen years have been very positive. The external evaluator (Mika) calculated that at the eight sites he evaluated between 1999 and 2005 (the number did not include all of the projects ultimately established), the projects were involved in almost 500 documented cases which, without their intervention, would almost certainly have led to a punishment attack by paramilitaries. Lord Clyde, the Justice Oversight Commissioner, argued in 2004 that the projects were “engaged in valuable and effective work” and that “they share a common intention and motivation to make a positive and peaceful contribution to the welfare of the communities in which they serve” (JOC, 2004: 101). The most definitive statement on the impact of the projects occurred in 2007 and 2008, in inspections by CJINI. In recommending formal government accreditation and mainstream statutory funding, CJINI said of the initiatives in Belfast (CJINI 2008:32): “They are well run... Inspectors were astonished at the commitment shown by many of those who they interviewed, and there could be no question about their motivation being to help their communities, not in any sense to control them. Training was good, and paid due attention to human rights and child protection.”

Since the policing deal was concluded in 2007, the projects have become perhaps the key bridge between the police and historically estranged Republican communities. Prominent restorative justice activists, whose previous histories with the IRA are locally well known, have been among the most active in Republican communities in visibly reaching out to PSNI, assisting victims who remain reluctant to engage with the police, appearing on public platforms with the police, and developing “on the ground” relations with local commanders and officers, including “dividing up” those cases that are most appropriately dealt with by the police and those best handled by a community restorative justice intervention. The police clearly value these relationships. As CJINI reported in 2011: “Inspectors were told by senior police officers in West Belfast and Derry/Londonderry that they regard CRJI as the single most important relationship
they have in reaching out to the previously estranged or hard to reach republican/nationalist communities living in those areas.” (CJINI 2011:11)

The numbers processed by these projects are high. In the past six years, the projects have worked with over 10,000 people. In the year 2010 in the various offices, CRJI dealt with 1,866 new cases, ranging from neighbour disputes to more serious “under threat” cases. Some were resolved by mediation, some required other agency support, and some had to be “referred out”—including to PSNI (a very positive development in police and community relationships).

Community Restorative Justice Ireland has also been at the forefront of efforts to reach out to dissident Republicans, arguing against punishment violence and other armed actions and supporting individuals and community members who wish to engage with the police but who may be threatened or intimidated by dissidents. As a result of those actions, several prominent restorative justice activists (all of them former IRA prisoners) have been issued death threats, have been labelled as “touts” and “informers,” and have had their homes and offices attacked and daubed with paint and graffiti. A hoax bomb was left outside the organisation’s headquarters in West Belfast. As one senior manager told one of the authors,

> We try to practice what we preach in terms of restorative values and reaching out to dissidents, attempting to persuade them against violence, either military stuff or punishment violence. It isn’t easy, however; they are very disparate, disorganised and unpredictable groups. While we have been trying to work with them, they have simultaneously issued death threats against us. Some people argue within the Republican movement that we should not give these micro-groups any legitimacy by talking to them, starve them of oxygen, since they have no support. My own view is the opposite. No matter how difficult they are, we have to keep trying to talk to them because if they are only talking to each other, no one is going to ask them the hard questions about their strategy and where they are going with continued violence. We have to keep talking to them.

Despite their different political allegiances, similar developments in working-class Loyalist communities share many attributes of their Republican counterparts. Interventions on punishment violence have been on a smaller scale, though no less
interesting. In 1996, a former Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) prisoner, once sentenced to life imprisonment, conducted a piece of research in the Shankill area of West Belfast on the viability of non-violent interventions on punishment attacks (Winston 1997). The subsequent report, based upon interviews with paramilitary, statutory, and other community actors, suggested that such interventions were possible with one faction—the Ulster Volunteer Force. While the UVF stipulated that they would not countenance restorative justice–style interventions concerning internal paramilitary discipline, disputes between paramilitary organisations, offences related to sexual offences, or disputes regarding the sale of drugs, interventions regarding punishments on other matters were possible.

That research was followed by two intense residential sessions, and a project called the Greater Shankill Alternatives programme was created. Operating within the limitations imposed by the paramilitaries, Alternatives originally limited itself to a narrow focus within its local area, namely, to provide an alternative to punishment violence for young offenders in that community. Participants in the programme are normally between 13 and 22 years of age. While the range and extent of work have expanded, the basic practice model remains the same. Staff members work with the individual young person and his or her family to explain the programme and invite participation. Participants are assigned a caseworker, and a contract is drafted that specifies actions on offending behaviour, victim restitution, and community reparation.

The young person also makes a presentation to a community panel, which judges the adequacy of the contract and makes sure that regular contact among the panel, the caseworker, and the young person is maintained. After what is usually several months, the young person again appears before the panel to certify that the contract is completed. If all is satisfactory, the young person is discharged, normally with some provision of monitoring or aftercare services. Like their Republican counterpart, significant numbers of the staff and volunteers in the project are former combatants. There are five community-based restorative justice schemes operating in mainly Loyalist areas in and around Belfast, now under the name Northern Ireland Alternatives. This project has 30 staff and 100 volunteers and 25 cases at the “tip of the triangle”—that is, more serious cases that involve the police. The project also does preventative work in schools. While the same US-based philanthropy organisation (Atlantic Philanthropies) originally funded both the Republican and Loyalist initiatives,
there are now many funders, including the EU, the Belfast City Council, and the police; but, according to one interviewee, “they all want something different in terms of outcomes.” Again, this project has been the subject of extensive and highly positive external evaluation (Mika 2006, Criminal Justice Inspectorate 2007, 2009).

In addition to preventative and diversionary work with young people, the Alternatives programme is designed to hold offenders accountable, support victims, and contribute to community development in areas where it operates. This is seen to be a vital issue in the peace process and contributes toward undermining the narrative of violent extremism. The initiative plays a role in mediation and talks between police and communities—for example during, and in the aftermath of, riots. One prominent staff member interviewed for this research drew a historical connection between the current work of the project and his own and his colleagues’ prison experience. He suggested that dialogue in the prisons was “. . . crucial in encouraging Loyalist inmates to explore alternative ways of resolving problems.” Some of those negotiation skills, developed in the prisons, have been crucial at both the macro and micro level in resolving disputes.

In terms of the current threat to the stability of the transition, he identified the danger associated with Loyalist disaffection as a key challenge and one in which their work in countering the narrative is crucial.

It is primarily a class issue. Young, disaffected youth—often with no real memory of the realities of violence—are vulnerable to those elements of Loyalism that would still wish to promote violence or social disorder in their own narrow interest.

In both constituencies, the working relations with the police are crucial. The judgement calls to be made by the police regarding the most appropriate response to events on the ground are finely balanced. Political pressure to “crack down” on either Republican dissidents or Loyalist militarists is often mitigated by relations with individuals and organisations involved with the restorative justice and other programmes warning of the dangers associated with “overreaction.” In interviews for this research, those pro-peace process Republican ex-prisoners in particular who run the programmes warn that there are real dangers if the PSNI responds to dissident violence with heavy-handed tactics against Republican communities more generally. Such actions, reminiscent of the worst days of the conflict, would of course feed the dissident line that “nothing has
changed” in terms of policing, and would undermine the credibility of those who advocate non-violence and cooperation with the police.

In Northern Ireland the relationship between the PSNI and community-based programmes (in particular those run by former prisoners) is not “cosy.” It demands a very different style of policing, and acceptance by enlightened police commanders that the local communities and their representatives are no longer passive. The programme managers expect the police to listen when the community tell the police how to best police an area, and organisers are keen to point out that they hold the police to account. As noted above, organizers of the projects are well aware that their organic legitimacy in the community is a key variable in altering the relations with the police. As one interviewee closely associated with a restorative justice programme described the situation, police now have to accept that “the community is not just the eyes and ears of the police; they are also the muscle and brains.”

To recapitulate, the restorative justice programmes led and staffed by former Republican and Loyalist combatants have been key agencies both in challenging deeply embedded cultures of violence and in developing more effective partnerships with the police in working-class areas of Northern Ireland’s main cities and towns. The challenge was particularly significant because at these sites violence had become routinized, euphemised, and sometimes eulogised as a way of “doing business.” Effecting change in a context where, particularly in Republican areas, the police are the practical and symbolic strong arm of the state, with which few have any affinity, is even more complex. However, it is precisely because the participants had been historically involved in violence on behalf of their community—and indeed had often been on the receiving end of violence from either the state or “the other side”—that they had the credibility to promote a non-violent message as part of the transition out of conflict.

FROM PRISON TO PEACE: EX-COMBATANTS AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN SCHOOLS

The final example of former combatants’ involvement in CVE activities we wish to focus upon is an initiative involving a diverse group of ex-prisoners, a local sponsor
In 2009, CFNI, together with a number of politically motivated former prisoner organisations, submitted a successful application for EU PEACE III funding. Those involved included Coiste (discussed above) but also ex-prisoner groups associated with the other factions, including the INLA, Official IRA, UVF, and UDA. This latter collective bid became known as the Prison to Peace Partnership Consortium. In addition to providing financial support for the individual groups and their respective centres and offices, the programme also contained provisions for work on collective themes around which the groups would work together, including Conflict Transformation and Peace-building, Social Change in the Community, and Youth Development and Citizenship (Kilmurray 2010).

In 2009, as part of the commitment to the latter theme, the Prison to Peace Partnership Consortium began working with Lesley Emerson, a citizenship education specialist at the School of Education at Queens University. Emerson, a former teacher and educational board adviser and now an academic specialising in citizenship education, worked closely with the various ex-prisoner groups to develop a teaching resource on the prison and conflict transformation process to be delivered in Northern Ireland secondary (high) schools (Emerson 2011). As noted earlier, a key element of the mobilisation efforts of former prisoner groups in Northern Ireland has been their assertion that they should be entitled to enjoy the rights and responsibilities associated with “full citizenship” in the changed polity (Shirlow and McEvoy 2008). Interestingly, those traditional mobilisation efforts mapped onto themes contained in the Northern Ireland Curriculum. The local citizenship curriculum focuses on four themes: Human Rights and Social Responsibility, Diversity and Inclusion, Equality and Social Justice, Democracy and Active Participation (Education Curriculum Minimum Content Order Northern Ireland 2007). All of these themes have featured prominently in the practical work and lobbying efforts of the former prisoner groups.

That resonance was institutionalised when representatives from the five groups worked over a period of months with the educational specialist to produce an educational resource and accompanying DVD. With a total of nine lessons, the resource provides
teachers with advice, activities, and guidance that are designed to assist the students to explore a number of themes. Former prisoners from the different groups are interviewed on the DVD about their reasons for becoming involved in political violence, the prison experiences, and conflict transformation.

Notes within the educational resource explain:

It is a very honest sharing of experience by a number of individual ex-combatants/political ex-prisoners from very different backgrounds... What motivated the participation of the political ex-prisoners in this project was a determination that their experiences should be shared with young people. There is no sense of glamour in their stories or any sense of self-aggrandisement. They are an honest portrayal of how individuals can become caught up in violence; inflict and suffer pain; endure often long prison sentences and still hold a commitment to make society a more just and inclusive place. This is the essence of where we have come from; hopefully it can contribute to, and inform, a future sense of citizenship that can avoid these circumstances and work to create a more inclusive, welcoming and equal society.

A further key element of the project is that, if the school desires it, suitably trained Republican and Loyalist ex-combatants share a panel, discuss their experiences of imprisonment and involvement in violence, and answer the students' questions. Over the course of their studies, students are expected to;

• develop an understanding of the term "political ex-prisoner";

• consider the factors which influenced individuals' decision to become involved in the conflict;

• explore the reality of the prison experience and its impact on political ex-prisoners, their families and their communities;

• become familiar with the post-conflict work of political ex-prisoners in conflict transformation and community development;
• determine how young people could make a positive contribution in their own communities (CFNI 2010: 9)

As in other conflicted societies, it is a significant challenge to deliver a curriculum about past violence which is balanced and critical but which also does not seek to sanitise events that, while they may have occurred in the recent historical past, nonetheless often took place before the children were born (see e.g. Warshauer-Friedmann et al 2004a, 2004b). In the Northern Ireland context, where only 5 percent of children are formally educated in the “Integrated” sector, the reality for the vast majority of children is that they must be educated about such events in either predominantly Catholic or State (Protestant) schools (Gallagher 2004).

The From Prison to Peace resource was launched in June 2010 by then Sinn Féin Minister for Education Catriona Ruane, who publicly committed her department to write to all schools encouraging them to utilise it in the delivery of the citizenship curriculum. Its potential importance is well captured by Bruce Robinson, Head of the Northern Ireland Civil Service, who states:

What strikes me most about these materials is their reality. The real stories of the real lives of real people are reflected time and time again throughout the resource and I believe this is its key strength as an educational tool. In bridging the gap between yesterday, today and tomorrow, I believe this resource can only enrich the educational experiences of many young people throughout our society and encourage them to play a positive role in their community.

Since its launch in 2010, over 100 teachers have been trained in the delivery of this resource, it has been distributed to 200 schools, and five schools have participated in a pilot project involving the ex-prisoner panels (Emerson 2011). It is of course too early to tell what the overall impact of this resource will be in the schools of Northern Ireland or with the children who are taught about the past through its various learning initiatives. Even by virtue of its development, it captures the practical potential of ex-combatants as
agents of conflict transformation. As Harold Good, former President of the Methodist Church in Ireland, stated in his endorsement of the resource:

As young people growing up in a much more peaceful Northern Ireland, it is difficult for you to imagine what it was like to grow up in the very violent years of the not-so-distant past. This is why this resource is so important, not least in helping you to understand how young people like yourselves were affected by the conflict and how so many, on both sides of our sadly divided community, became involved in the conflict and in violence. . . . This is why it is so important for you to hear their stories—so that you may be spared what they went through and that together with you we will now build a happy, fair and safe community for us all to share.

**CONCLUSION—LESSONS AND TRANSFERABILITY OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND EXPERIENCE**

The central theme to emerge from the Northern Ireland experience is the potential for former combatants to become key agents of countering violent extremism. Though we caution against overly simplistic generalization to other contexts, several themes merit further exploration:

- If individuals are a part of organised and disciplined armed groups or political movements that commit themselves in a genuine fashion to ending violence, then the Northern Ireland experience suggests that at least some will have the credibility, leadership, and organisational skills to become bulwarks against further violence.

- Ex-combatants may have personal relationships (often based on the prison experience or at least the shared “veteran” experience of being a member of an armed group) which could supersede political and ideological differences with those who still believe in the use of terrorism. That history and experience may in turn allow them to engage in critical conversations on the use of violence, whereas other mediators or interlocutors would struggle to gain such access or purchase.

- As with the restorative justice project, ex-combatants may be ideally located to provide the grassroots leadership in building relationships with historically
estranged organisations such as the police—even though such relations will undoubtedly be difficult, challenging, and demanding for all the parties concerned.

- On the part of the police and other statutory organisations, such relationships require sensitivity, subtlety, and a willingness to accept the “warts and all” realities of community life. Briefly stated, if the police or other statutory organisations believe in the quality of the work being done by ex-combatants in countering violent extremism, and make informed judgements as to the local community legitimacy and credibility of such organisations, then acceptance that police/community power relations will be routinely challenged and a willingness to take on board a certain “spikiness” to the relationship may be the price worth paying for real partnership in hard-to-reach communities. Certainly, the experience of police community relations in Northern Ireland in Republican areas shows that, while there may be a gravitational pull toward working with “nice” or “respectable” organisations (for example, ones that do not involve ex-combatants), the grassroots credibility of such work will be correspondingly muted.

- One obvious entry point for engagement with ex-combatants is that many of them do not want their own children or grandchildren to live through the violent experiences that have shaped their lives. Projects such as the Prisoner to Peace initiative can harness that desire to reach the next generation. As long as they are suitably trained, their lived experience of violence may provide an antidote to those “violence entrepreneurs” who would seek to glamorise terrorism to impressionable or vulnerable young people.

**CASE STUDY 2: COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN BRITAIN**

Drawing directly from the experiences of the Irish community in Britain (Hillyard 1993), some commentators have pointed to the risk of radicalisation of Muslims by police attitudes and behaviours toward a particular community (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009, Mylonaki and Burton, 2011). Mythen et al. (2009) carried out focus groups with 32 British Pakistanis aged 18–26 in northwest England and identified concerns about racial victimization and “excessive police stop and searching.” Haberfeld et al. (2009:57) also report confusion about the division of authority between local police and the security services in counter-terrorism and also a “disconnect between the law enforcement and
the community” (Haberfeld et al. 2009, 57).” In contrast, an eleven-city European survey, which included the English city of Leicester and the London borough of Waltham Forest, found similar levels of trust in police among Muslims and non-Muslims (OSI 2010, 169-70). That study, which also included focus groups, suggested that trust in the police is actually high among European Muslims because of favourable comparisons between European police and police in the country of emigration (OSI 2010: 172)—a finding replicated in some older work (Loader and Mulcahy 2003: 162) and repeated to us (admittedly by police sources themselves) during the QIASS site visit. Significantly, Innes et al. (2011:7) have found that among Muslims, “community perceptions of the police have been remarkably stable and largely positive.” They concluded: “Prevent policing does not appear to be causing widespread damage to police and Muslim community relations.”

Overall, while the methodology deployed in some of these studies has sparked an interesting debate (Greer 2010, Pantazis and Pemberton 2011), and while Lakhani (2011) and Innes et al. (2011) and others would suggest quite sophisticated judgements and distinctions made by Muslim communities (for example, between different forces or indeed different elements of different forces), the broader point concerning the risks of heavily armed police and security tactics are self-evident.

Finally, with regard to police-community relations, and of interest to the current study, Tom Tyler and colleagues have suggested that views of and cooperation with the police among British Muslims are shaped not only by how they are treated but also by the extent of their involvement in policy formulation before strategy and tactics are implemented (Huq et al. 2011:32). They caution that meaningful prior consultation, as well as the nature of the police service that is actually delivered, is an important component of the policing elements of the PREVENT strategy and should be borne in mind.

Other criticisms have been advanced about the ways in which policies were implemented and strategies developed. For example, the House of Commons Select Committee on Preventing Violent Extremism argued that PREVENT was putting at risk positive cohesion work by “blurring the boundaries” between security and social policy and stigmatising British Muslims in the process (HC Select Committee 2010). Indeed,
others have suggested that labelling projects that traditionally would have been considered social programmes as part of a new securitised prevention agenda has led to a number of organisations in the UK boycotting the programme entirely or “splitting” community organisations on how they should respond. As one interviewee suggested to Kundani (2009), “. . . those who take the money are seen as complicit in the government agenda and are sell-outs. Those who don’t are seen as borderline extremists.”

Another difficulty, which also featured prominently in the interviews with officials for this study and which has been indentified in other contexts (see, for example, Horgan and Braddock 2010), was the difficulty in assessing the impact of the PREVENT Strategy. As Bartlett et al. (2010) have suggested, the problem in assessing the effectiveness of prevention work is that linkages between the programmes and countering terrorism are often weak.

An official review of PREVENT activities in 2007–8 found that in nearly two-thirds of local authorities’ CVE projects, only 20 per cent worked with individuals considered at risk, and only 3 per cent with those glorifying or justifying acts of terrorism (cited in Briggs 2010). In a small but interesting qualitative study of the views of both officials and Muslim community leaders in different parts of the UK on attitudes toward the PREVENT strategy, Lakhani (2011) argues that many of his interviewees thought that the money invested through the strategy was being “wasted.” In particular, they tended to highlight that funds allocated to local authorities were far removed from the overarching aims of PREVENT and were more concerned with general community-cohesion-type work. Lakhani (2011:6) also suggests that one of the reasons for the misdirection of funds was that local authorities were tending to play it safe in funding terms, allocating resources to groups with whom they already had a relationship rather than those who might be better placed to have a real impact in preventative work.

Not altogether surprising is the fact that those CVE programmes and practices that were assessed (by police and community leaders interviewed for this study) as being most effective were those that involved local groups and individuals with grassroots credibility. In particular, the multi-agency Channel programme was highlighted as something positive to be built on. Channel identifies and provides support for people at
risk of radicalisation. This approach is not police-led, but police (and other state agencies) can refer vulnerable individuals to local groups (such as the STREET programme) that provide a range of interventions, such as challenging beliefs and offering alternatives. Examples of community-based initiatives will be discussed later, but a key fact is that many of them have been dogged by the antecedents and affiliations of the main protagonists.

Partly in response to the criticisms mentioned above and other factors (for instance, political viewpoints about “British standards”), the current UK government conducted a complete review of the PREVENT strand of its counter-terrorism strategy in 2010–11. As the new strategy document notes, the previous version “confused the delivery of government policy to promote integration with government policy to prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology at the heart of the threat we face.” The review, conducted by Lord Carlile (2011), resulted in a reduction from the original five objectives to three. The three objectives that remain are:

- respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it;
- prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support;
- work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that need to be addressed.

These objectives have been abbreviated to “ideology, individuals and institutions.” In practice, however, the strategy remains quite complex, with twenty-five areas in England identified for attention and a range of priority activities listed. Most require significant multi-agency co-operation and co-ordination. While there is no one single objective or priority labelled as “community policing,” in practice much of the overall approach resonates strongly with the key themes in community policing discussed above. Certainly from our perspective, community policing is actually required in order to give effect to the strategy.

The new PREVENT strategy was introduced in June 2011, and its impact has yet to be evaluated. The strategy document notes that the principal terrorist threat continues to
be the continued risk of attack from Al Qaeda, its affiliates, and like-minded organizations, with appropriate attention given to the threat from far-right groups and Irish dissident Republican terrorists. The threat is viewed as emanating from both international and "home-grown" terrorists. The threat level is currently adjudged as substantial (reduced from severe in 2011).

The key principles that guide the new strategy include:

- PREVENT will address all forms of terrorism, including the extreme right wing, but will be targeted against those forms of terrorism that pose the greatest risk to national security. PREVENT will tackle non-violent extremism where it creates an environment conducive to terrorism and popularizes ideas that are espoused by terrorist groups.
- PREVENT will make a clearer distinction between counter-terrorist work and the government's integration strategy. The UK government recognizes that PREVENT depends on the success of that strategy but believes that the two cannot be confused or merged together. The new document specifically points out that "failure to appreciate the distinction risks securitizing integration and reducing the chances of our success.
- PREVENT must do much better at evaluating and monitoring progress against a common set of objectives.

The strategy makes a clear distinction between what it terms the ideology of extremism and terrorism and legitimate religious belief. In seeking to make those distinctions clearer, the strategy's first stated aim is to tackle those extremist organisations that oppose the values of universal human rights, equality before the law, democracy, and full participation in society.

In its efforts to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and to ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support, the strategy's second aim is stated as building on the successful multi-agency Channel programme. As discussed earlier, Channel identifies and provides support for people at risk of radicalisation, challenges beliefs, and offers alternatives.
The third aim of the approach is to work with sectors and institutions in which there are risks of radicalisation. These include education and health care providers, faith groups, charities, and the wider criminal justice system. The approach also works to tackle the challenge of radicalisation on the Internet.

The initiatives are specifically aimed at those at risk of becoming involved in violent extremism. It includes those already involved and seeking a way out. Support is also provided to the parents, friends, and families of those at risk of involvement. A London-based community initiative, visited by the QIASS team, provided persuasive evidence of the need for support tailored to specific individuals looking for advice and support.

One interviewee (a part-time imam who has worked with the state at strategy development and mentored vulnerable individuals at the community level) outlined his beliefs regarding how young people are drawn into the path toward radicalisation. He talked about "supply meeting demand in a fertile breeding ground where issues of identity were important to young British Muslims actively seeking (demanding) knowledge about Islam." He talked about gaps between the generations that caused them to look elsewhere, beyond the local imam. He identified the supply of violent extremist ideologies, actively spread through the Internet, CDs, DVDs, and face-to-face engagements, and he noted how radicalisers are adept at "... seeking youths who have no theological resilience." Breeding grounds for radicalisation are created when young Muslims in the UK react to real and perceived negative imagery, discrimination, polarisation, humiliation, international conflicts (brought close by satellite TV and the Internet), poor political representation, low socio-economic prospects, perceived national and international injustice, and hypocrisy and double standards. In that context, radicalisers seek out a "cognitive opening"—sometimes prompted by some form of personal, social, theological, or political crisis. His view is that countering the narrative in such a context requires (1) the ability to identify when a crisis is about to break through or has broken through the natural resilience toward violence; and (2) a bespoke tailored intervention to suit the needs of the person identified.

As in the Northern Ireland context, interventions require interlocutors with credibility. In some instances these may be charismatic imams, skilled youth or community workers, or indeed former combatants or prisoners (see further below)—depending on
the background, community, and personality of the targeted individual. The intervention also needs to be tailored around the interests of the targeted individual.

As noted above, the Home Office has acknowledged that the evaluation and the monitoring of performance was weak during the previous iteration of the PREVENT strategy. They have indicated that, in the future, before funding is granted, any proposed PREVENT project will be more rigorously assessed against its ability and likelihood to deliver against PREVENT objectives. These assessments must take into account the extent to which the project can reach people who are vulnerable to radicalisation, and clear agreement must also be reached about the programme’s intended outcome. To justify funding for particular PREVENT projects, decision makers will consider their likely effect and compare this against cost and impact of different interventions achieving the same end.

The UK is developing input and impact indicators across the whole of CONTEST to assess the effect of what is being done to reduce vulnerability to terrorist attack. In an attempt to reduce reporting burdens, indicators will be based wherever possible on data that is already collected and used by contributing organisations. To our knowledge, the new indicators and methods of evaluation have not been agreed upon. The need for such monitoring and evaluation of all aspects of the strategy for countering violent extremism was universally accepted among interviewees for this project (a wide range of individual practitioners from state agencies and NGOs). However, when pressed, few (including funders) could provide details of instances to show that it was being done systematically. Indeed, neither could they identify the benchmarks that will inform such an evaluation process. Those interviewed who staffed the projects expressed concern that they were likely to face bureaucratic demands reducing their ability to “get on with the job.” Despite some divided and ambivalent opinions on why and how it should be carried out, and the problems anticipated with it, evaluation is definitely on the PREVENT agenda.
THE ROLE OF FORMER COMBATANTS

As in the Northern Ireland context, there is a role for former extremists in the initiatives. The PREVENT strategy does enable former extremists (or perhaps those who could more sensitively described as combatants, fighters, activists—since language is such a crucial area) to play a role. The authors met members of an organization established by a “former jihadist” (of British Pakistani background) which has now established itself as an important and credible programme identifying and supporting those deemed at risk of radicalisation. The project is supported by the local police, although organisers of the initiative made clear that this did not inhibit them from criticising police behaviour when warranted, an attitude they felt was crucial to their own grassroots credibility. The researchers’ view is that those working and managing the programme appeared to be committed and charismatic individuals who have had to stand up to physical and verbal attacks from some in their own community for “siding with the Crusaders.”

In meeting with representatives (such as an imam and community-based project leaders in London), we were persuaded that the heavy lifting of preventative work is best placed in local projects within the communities from which potential radicals come. As is explicit in the PREVENT strategy, government’s role should be to select and facilitate appropriate partnerships, to support dialogue, and to stimulate communities. However, as one senior police officer frankly told the research team, “. . . . this isn’t the kind of work the state is particularly good at—it should be left as much as possible to trusted interlocutors in whom both we and the community have confidence.”

'SIGNING UP' TO BRITISH STANDARDS AND VALUES

In interviews with officials and community workers, the difficulties facing the new PREVENT strategy to counter violent extremism was related most often to “British values.” Community representatives we interviewed claim that, in response to concerns raised by the British tabloid press that the government was “funding terrorists,” a new requirement has been introduced to funding regulations. This requires all community programmes that access PREVENT-related monies to sign up to a set of “British values.” The principle is expressed as an intention that public money will not be provided to extremist organizations that do not support the values of
democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and mutual respect and tolerance of different faith groups. While in theory such values might appear unproblematic, in practice both funders and community projects admitted that these have proved highly challenging.

As Jarvis and Lister (2011) suggest, in response to their focus-group research with British Muslims on the issue:

... the discussion of "mainstream British values" that runs throughout the new Prevent is both conceptually flawed and potentially dangerous. Bluntly, what it means to be British, and which values are to be associated with this identity, is always, necessarily, open and changing. Simplistic listings of the sort: 'democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs' (p.34) are, simply[,] myths. They are efforts to capture or stabilise this dynamic, collective, entity that work to camouflage the huge variability with which people understand (and perhaps even value) such abstract concerns. What it means to be British both is and should be a product of ceaseless dialogue, debate, and competition: a product, put otherwise, of politics.

The development of this requirement, albeit for understandable political reasons, does run the risk of creating unnecessary hurdles for projects that are otherwise doing excellent work but which may resist signing up to such standards. Had such requirements ever been introduced in Northern Ireland, it is inconceivable that the above-mentioned work in the Republican community would have been carried out during the transition. It would have been (and still is) unthinkable for Irish Republicans to sign up to a requirement embracing "British values." It is a potentially significant error to think that it will be any easier for British Muslims. As one interviewee told this research team:

Does supporting “British values” mean I have to agree with what my government has done in Iraq or Afghanistan? Rule of Law? As far as I am concerned, these are illegal wars. Or do I have to agree with what is happening in West Bank or Gaza. Is what the Israelis are doing legal? Of course it’s not. It’s a bloody joke this stuff. ... The problem is that if you try to force this on people then in all conscience they may not feel able to
sign up to it and then the work won’t get done and that’s in no one’s interest, least of all the government who need people like us to do this work.

The question of signing up to British values speaks directly to the issues of credibility and legitimacy. Is it possible to work with groups that might support political violence in some arenas (for example, in the Palestinian context) but which are completely opposed to violent jihadism in Britain? In many Western countries, networks and organizations close to the Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaat-e-Islami, or to the nonjihadist/political Salafists have gained influence, particularly among second-generation Western Muslims. While these and similar groups may espouse tenets of an ideology that make them radical in the eyes of most Western observers (for example, on religious freedom or women’s rights), they may also oppose and condemn violence in the West. As Vidino puts it, could these “nonviolent Islamists” become partners of the government against violent radicalization? Although Western observers might baulk at some of their views, and these almost certainly would fail the British values test, those who genuinely oppose violence may be exactly those who have the credibility to reach young people in danger of being radicalised.

As Robert Lambert, the former head of the Muslim Contact Unit in the London Metropolitan Police, has argued, “ideal yes-saying” Muslim leaders may lack credibility in their communities and have no knowledge of radicalism (Lambert 2008, Mazer and Lambert 2010). Lambert has argued in particular that projects such as STREET (Strategy to Re-Empower and Educate Teenagers), run by strict Salafists in the Brixton area of London, have the combination of “street skills and religious integrity” required to counteract the recruitment efforts of Al Qaeda–linked preachers in the area. STREET is one of the projects deemed too radical to support under the new PREVENT strategy. Lambert (2011) has argued (persuasively, in our view), based on his experience of the quality of STREET’s work, that the decision to no longer support that project represents an example of “neo-conservative ideology trumping academic research and practitioner experience.” From our perspective, the view that only pacifists or people with progressive views on women’s rights or religious freedoms will have suitable credibility to counter radical narratives is misplaced. It appears Great Britain is still struggling with issues that have, albeit with difficulty, been resolved in Northern Ireland.
CONCLUSIONS

As this paper has demonstrated, community policing and partnership approaches are now commonly used throughout Europe—not just to tackle problems stemming from crime and disorder but to address the causes and effects of violent extremism.

It is very clear that European CVE efforts are predicated on the belief that they are likely to be most effective when meaningful partnerships are agreed to and implemented by law enforcement agencies, other statutory organizations, and community-based, non-governmental organizations with grassroots credibility. Real partnerships in this area of work require relationships based upon mutual respect and recognition of respective strengths, skills, and expertise of various stakeholders.

Community policing principles and practices are expected to produce better results than traditional police forces or any other statutory agency acting in isolation. Some of the activities and issues highlighted in this paper are likely to be of wider relevance than to the single national or European setting they are to be found in. Relationships—building and maintenance—are critical to success, not just between institutions and organizations but also between individuals. This is especially true of those with disparate or divergent cultures and those who are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Of particular note is the positive role to be played by former combatants, ex-prisoners, and "reformed" extremists. There is need for an open-minded and pragmatic attitude to the benefits that accrue when they are permitted to identify causes of extremism, those at risk, and methods of prevention. Such attitudes are required not only at local levels but at national, strategic levels, and they should be incorporated into prevention plans.

Community policing initiatives need to take into account the fact that ex-prisoners and former activists are part of the community—and in some cases the most influential parts of it when it comes to CVE. Perhaps this is one of the main points to be drawn from the research offered in this paper: that CVE requires a wider definition of "community," a broader understanding of "policing," and, by implication, a much more comprehensive view of what "community policing" encompasses when countering violent extremism. If community policing can be (and often is) caricatured by the terms "consult" and "involve," (White 2011) one would need a very inclusive list of all those who could be and should be consulted about, and involved in, the development, implementation, and evaluation of any CVE strategy.
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BIOGRAPHIES

STEPHEN WHITE is a Vice President for Europe of The Soufan Group. He joined TSG after serving for five years as a Special Adviser to the European Union’s Secretary General and as the Head of Mission for the EU’s Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq. Before his diplomatic career with the EU, Mr. White served for 26 years as a senior UK police officer. In 2004 Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth appointed Mr. White an Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (OBE) for his services to policing.

KIERAN MCEVOY is Professor of Law and Transitional Justice at the School of Law and former Director of the Institute of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Queens University Belfast. He has been a visiting scholar on the New York University, University of Cambridge, London School of Economics, School of Law at Berkeley CA, and spent a year as a Fulbright Distinguished Scholar at Harvard Law School in 2001-2002. He has extensive experience in researching ex-combatants in Northern Ireland.
Torture, Lies and Hollywood

By ALI H. SOUFAN

I WATCHED "Zero Dark Thirty" not as a former F.B.I. special agent who spent a decade chasing, interrogating and prosecuting top members of Al Qaeda but as someone who enjoys Hollywood movies. As a movie, I enjoyed it. As history, it's bunk.

The film opens with the words "Based on Firsthand Accounts of Actual Events." But the filmmakers immediately pass fiction off as history, when a character named Ammar is tortured and afterward, it's implied, gives up information that leads to Osama bin Laden.

Ammar is a composite character who bears a strong resemblance to a real-life terrorist, Ammar al-Baluchi. In both the film and real life he was a relative of Bin Laden's lieutenant, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. But the C.I.A. has repeatedly said that only three detainees were ever waterboarded. The real Mr. Baluchi was not among them, and he didn't give up information that led to Bin Laden.

In fact, torture led us away from Bin Laden. After Mr. Mohammed was waterboarded 183 times, he actually played down the importance of the courier who ultimately led us to Bin Laden. Numerous investigations, most recently a 6,300-page classified report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, have reached the same conclusion: enhanced interrogation didn't work. Portraying torture as effective risks misleading the next generation of Americans that one of our government's greatest successes came about because of the efficacy of torture. It's a disservice both to our history and our national security.

While filmmakers have the right to say what they want, government officials don't have the right to covertly provide filmmakers with false information to promote their own interests. Providing selective information about a classified program means there is no free market of ideas, but a controlled market subject to manipulation. That's an abuse of power.
John O. Brennan, a former C.I.A. official and now President Obama’s nominee to head the agency, recently testified that the classified report raised “serious questions” about information he received when he was the agency’s deputy executive director. Mr. Brennan said publicly what many of us — who were in interrogation rooms when the program was devised — have been warning about for years: senior officials, right up to the president himself, were misled about the enhanced interrogation program.

For instance, a 2005 Justice Department memo claimed that waterboarding led to the capture of the American-born Qaeda member Jose Padilla in 2003. Actually, he was arrested in 2002, months before waterboarding began, after an F.B.I. colleague and I got details about him from a terrorist named Abu Zubaydah. Because no one checked the dates, the canard about Mr. Padilla was repeated as truth.

When agents heard senior officials citing information we knew was false, we were barred from speaking out. After President George W. Bush gave a speech containing falsehoods in 2006 — I believe his subordinates lied to him — I was told by one of my superiors: “This is still classified. Just because the president is talking about it doesn’t mean that we can.”

Some of these memos, and reports pointing out their inaccuracies, have been declassified, but they are also heavily redacted. So are books on the subject, including my own.

Meanwhile, promoters of torture get to hoodwink journalists, authors and Hollywood producers while selectively declassifying material and providing false information that fits their narrative.

The creators of “Zero Dark Thirty” attempted to document the greatest global manhunt of our generation. But they did so without acknowledging that their “history” was based on dubious sources.

The filmmakers took the “firsthand accounts” of a few current and former officials with an agenda and amplified their message worldwide — suggesting to Americans in cinemas around the country, and regimes overseas, that torture is effective and helped lead to Bin Laden. There is no suggestion in the movie that another narrative exists.
Hollywood is primarily about entertainment. The moral responsibility for setting history straight, ensuring the public isn't misled, and making sure mistakes aren't repeated falls to Congress and the president. Yet the Senate report remains classified, and only those with security clearances, like Mr. Brennan, can read how the public was misled.

It's the duty of the president and Congress to responsibly declassify the report — and the other documents that advocates of torture don't want released.

That's the only way to ensure that future generations won't ever go down that dark and dangerous path again. As Senator John McCain has said, the Senate report “has the potential to set the record straight once and for all” and end “a stain on our country's conscience.”

Once that's done, it won't be long before another Hollywood movie comes along to tell the real story about how America killed Bin Laden.

Ali H. Soufan is a former F.B.I. special agent who interrogated Qaeda detainees and the author of "The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda."
All-

Attached are documents for your visibility and comments:

- CVE Training Framework: Please provide comments to Caroline (caroline.simmons) by COB Tuesday, July 3rd.

- FEMA Correctional CVE Curriculum Review Matrix: Attached is a matrix compiling the top line comments received regarding the FEMA/NCCU modules. Please review and make sure your comments were incorporated. Please send any additional comments to me at (Peter.Hause).

- NCR CVE Workshop: Below is the save the date for the National Capital Region CVE Workshop. If you wish to attend please contact Ms. whose contact information is contained in the “To RSVP:” section below.

Thanks and have a great holiday,

Peter

The National Capital Region
Countering Violent Extremism Workshop
Wednesday, July 11th and Thursday, July 12th, 2012
Hosted by:

CIA Threat Management Unit in partnership with the Department

| **Sender:** | Hause, Peter |
| **Recipient:** | "CVE Working Group" |
| **Sent Date:** | 2012/07/02 15:16:29 |
| **Delivered Date:** | 2012/07/02 15:16:32 |
| **Message Flags:** | Unread |

DHS-001-425-008706
All,

Please see the attached CVE Engagement Best Practices document from CRCL for your review. Please provide any edits/comments to Irfan.saeed (6) <mailto:Irfan.saeed (6) > by COB Thursday, December 20, 2012.

Thank you,
Caroline

Caroline Simmons
Director of Special Projects
Counterterrorism Working Group
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
MEMORANDUM
To: Deputy Secretary Mayorkas
From: Jeff Rezmovic
Subject: $39 Million Grant for Complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attacks
Date: March 3, 2016

Issue
The FY 2016 Appropriations Act provides $50 million for “emergent threats from violent extremism and from complex, coordinated terrorist attacks.” Pursuant to the Explanatory Statement, of that $50 million, not more than $10 million is for CVE grants; $1 million is to expand the Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series; and no less than $39 million is to enhance preparedness for “complex, coordinated terrorist attacks.” The issue here is the extent to which — if at all — the $39 million can be used to fund CVE “prevention” frameworks. This issue is timely given briefings to OMB on Thursday (today) and Approps staff on Monday.

OCP’s Perspective
OCP has developed a plan that could use the entire $39 million for the development and sustainment of at least 25 or more local prevention CVE frameworks, akin to the efforts developed in the pilots that led to the White House CVE summit. FEMA’s plan could be modified to require that a portion of the efforts in each city focus on developing a prevention CVE framework. OCP’s overarching concern is moving forward the Secretary’s vision for prevention in a post-Paris and post-San Bernardino threat environment. This is an opportunity for the Department’s CVE efforts to partner with the larger planning activities FEMA envisions to conduct planning for prevention of radicalization. The Secretary has been supportive of expanding the aperture of FEMA’s grants to be more inclusive of preventing radicalization, and this is a perfect opportunity to do so. It also does not constitute a major departure from congressional intent.

FEMA’s Perspective
The legislative language is clear that “not more than” $10 million be used for CVE grants. The accompanying Joint Explanatory Statement also expresses congressional intent that the $39 million be used to prepare state and local responders to prevent and respond to a Paris-style complex coordinated terrorist attack. Using part of the $39 million for CVE and labeling it “prevention” would contravene congressional intent, and would undermine our relationships with appropriators and our ability to secure future CVE funding. FEMA has offered to infuse CVE concepts into the guidelines for the planning, training, and exercises for complex coordinated terrorist attacks.

CFO Perspective
CFO agrees with FEMA that congressional intent is clear, limiting CVE efforts to $10 million. Using part of the $39 million for CVE would jeopardize our FY17 request. Congress was initially going to provide all $50 million for planning and exercising, and we convinced them to provide $10 million for CVE, per S1’s vision. The best course of action is to execute as per the intent of Congress, show measured outcomes, and defend the CVE money for FY17.

Attachments
1) Legislative Text (Relevant Language)
2) Joint Explanatory Statement to Legislative Text (Relevant Language)
1) Legislative Text (Relevant Language)

SEC. 543.
(a) For an additional amount for emergent threats from violent extremism and from complex, coordinated terrorist attacks, $50,000,000 to remain available until September 30, 2017.

(b) Funds made available in subsection (a) for emergent threats may be transferred by the Secretary of Homeland Security between appropriations for the same purpose, notwithstanding section 503 of this Act.

(c) No transfer described in subsection (b) shall occur until 15 days after the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives are notified of such transfer.
2) Joint Explanatory Statement to Legislative Text (Relevant Section)

Responding to Emergent Threats from Violent Extremism

A general provision in title V of this Act provides $50,000,000 for emergent threats from violent extremism and from complex, coordinated terrorist attacks, and allows the Secretary to transfer such funds between appropriations after notifying the Committees 15 days in advance. Within these funds, not more than $10,000,000 is for a countering violent extremism (CVE) initiative to help states and local communities prepare for, prevent, and respond to emergent threats from violent extremism; not less than $39,000,000 is for an initiative to help states and local governments prepare for, prevent, and respond to complex, coordinated terrorist attacks with the potential for mass casualties and infrastructure damage; and not less than $1,000,000 shall be for expanding or enhancing the Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series, which brings together federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector to help regions improve their counterterrorism preparedness posture, including the ability to address the threat of complex terrorist attacks.

All funds under the CVE initiative shall be provided on a competitive basis directly to states, local governments, tribal governments, nonprofit organizations, or institutions of higher education. Eligible activities for the CVE initiative shall include, but not be limited to, planning, developing, implementing, or expanding educational outreach, community engagement, social service programs, training, and exercises, as well as other activities as the Secretary determines appropriate. Existing programs should be utilized wherever practical. Eligible activities for the initiative related to complex coordinated terrorist attacks shall include, but not be limited to, planning, training and exercises to support plans, and other activities the Secretary determines appropriate, consistent with this statement.

Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Department shall brief the Committees on plans for execution of the initiatives, to include timelines, goals, metrics, and how the Whole of Community will be included.
Transcript: March 16, 2016 House Committee on Homeland Security Hearing on the DHS Budget (Relevant Language)

**Rep. Norma Torres (D-CA)**

TORRES: Nice to see you again. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, the Office of Community Partnership was appropriated $10 million for grants to extend to outside stakeholders to further its mission to counter violent extremists.

Last week, Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, along with my police departments, fire departments, all got together with key communities stakeholders. Is $10 million a -- enough money to ensure that these grants are available for all communities across the U.S.?

And if not, I wanna know how I can get my community in the front of the line.

JOHNSON: Frankly, no, it's not. We originally thought we had $50 million. And we when we looked at the report language, we saw that it was $10 million for CVE and $39 million for preparedness for complex tax situations. But the same language, which I have read myself, says that if you wanna make a reprogramming request, make a reprogramming request.

So I would like to see us fund our grants across the country. $10 million doesn't go very far, given where -- given where I think the needs are. So I can make a reprogramming request, which I hope Congress would honor, if I believe I need more, and I may need more.

TORRES: I hope that you would ask for more. Communities like San Bernardino -- they have suffered so much. It hasn't been because of the lack of interest from the community to want to work and participate in being the solution to threats to our homeland.

But currently, this funding -- I don't think it's enough. On the issue of interoperability, within the radio system, you heard the tape -- the radio conversations with our first responders as they were responding to San Bernardino -- to the incident in -- in San Bernardino.

**Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA)**

SANCHEZ: Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being with us today. I have a question about the accounting -- countering violent extremism. So in the Consolidated Appropriation Act of Fiscal Year 2016, the Office of Community Partnerships was appropriated $10 million for grants to extend to outside stakeholders to further the CVE mission.
It's still unclear how those grants are gonna be administered. Can you fill us in on -- if any of the nuts and bolts of that...

JOHNSON: My -- my vision for that, Congresswoman, is that we have a grant application process where community organizations have the opportunity to come forward, apply for a grant, we scrub it carefully like we do lots of other grants, and the money be used for messaging in communities at a local level for programs at the local level to prevent people from heading in the direction of violence, to give people an alternative way to channel their energy.

I -- in my numerous CVE engagements around the country in placed like Minneapolis, California, Texas, I've heard over and over again from communities, we need help ourselves in dealing with this issue -- dealing with the problem. And I think it's a -- it should be a national, federal government effort to -- to support that. So...

SANCHEZ: I ask this...

JOHNSON: ... I -- I wanna see a competitive, efficient process for evaluating grant applications in supporting that.

SANCHEZ: Well, again, it's only $10 million, so I would hope it would be efficient. And who knows who will... 

JOHNSON: As I said earlier, I'd like to see more.

SANCHEZ: ... ask for it. My biggest concern is, you know, there -- there are two types of things going on, at least in my arena back in California, for example. I have a very large Muslim population in Orange County.

So what -- what would you see -- when you say -- let's say somebody wins a grant. What kind of programs would you see would help that, that is -- that is a place maybe people will come and get to, you know, 'cause there's bigger numbers and possibilities, for example, of something happening, versus something like this whole, you know, lone wolf kind of radicalization coming from the internet thing that happened to us in San Bernardino, which is also just, like, 30 minutes away from me.

JOHNSON: Right.

SANCHEZ: So when you say non-profits, competitive, let's say they get a grant. What -- what -- what kind of programs to steer people in a different direction. What would that look like, in your opinion?

JOHNSON: Could be some form of counseling program. Could be some form of competition, like we're supporting now in colleges, for counter-messages where you
encourage people to develop counter-messages to focus on young people, to steer them away from the appeal of the Islamic states' messages.

Could be a variety of things. So I wanna encourage a certain level of creativity. As the federal government, I don't necessarily have all the answers, so I wanna see these applications and see what kind of ideas we generate.

SANCHEZ: And can you give me -- what's the timeline that you would see for something like that? Timeline of where in grant applications might be how...

JOHNSON: Well, we have money this fiscal year, 2016, so I wanna see applications this fiscal year.

SANCHEZ: OK.

JOHNSON: And hopefully this is a program that will continue in '17 and '18 and beyond.

**Rep. Mark Walker (R-NC)**

WALKER: Thank you, Secretary Johnson. And it's (fair) hope that administration continues to augment that clear message there.

I -- in -- for this fiscal year, the budget requests $49 million for countering violent extremism, including grants and efforts to prevent, prepare for and respond to emergent threats from violent extremism and complex, coordinated terrorist attacks.

Specifically looking at the San Bernardino, can you draw a distinct line as far as how that $49 million would impact these communities in making sure they're more properly prepared for such attacks?

JOHNSON: We're in the implementation phase now, but I think that the intent of Congress was that communities be better prepared for -- for complex attacks of -- of the San Bernardino type. And so we're in the implementation phase.

I'm sure that -- I mean, it's a -- it's a worthwhile mission. As I mentioned to Congresswoman Torres, I also think that the CDE grant money is important for even earlier in the process, in case somebody's heading in the wrong direction. To encourage communities to let law enforcement know.

And so between the 10 and the 39, I think those are two very good objectives. I wish we had a little more to work with.
Removal of Sanctions on Person on Whom Sanctions Have Been Imposed Under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as Amended

AGENCY: Department of State.
ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The Secretary of State has decided to terminate sanctions imposed under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) (“ISA”), as amended, on Dettin S.p.A. (a.k.a. Dettin) on the basis that the company is no longer engaging in sanctionable activity described in section 5(a) of ISA, and that this person has provided reliable assurances that it will not knowingly engage in sanctionable activities in the future.

Therefore, certain sanctions that were imposed on Dettin on August 29, 2014 are no longer in effect.

DATES: Effective date: The sanctions on Dettin are lifted effective November 2, 2015.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: On general issues: Office of Sanctions Policy and Implementation, Department of State, Telephone: (202) 647-7469.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August 29, 2014, the Secretary of State made a determination to impose certain sanctions on, inter alia, Dettin S.p.A. (a.k.a. Dettin) under the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended (P.L. 104-172) (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) (Pub. L. 104-172). See 79 FR 59890 (October 3, 2014). Additional information regarding the basis for imposing sanctions and the specific sanctions imposed on Dettin is contained in the Federal Register notice cited above. Pursuant to section 9(b)(2) of ISA and the authority delegated to the Secretary of State in the September 28, 2012 Memorandum to relevant agency heads, “Delegation of Certain Functions and Authorities Under the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012,” (“Delegation Memorandum”), the Secretary now has decided to terminate sanctions on Dettin on the basis that the company is no longer engaging in sanctionable activity described in section 5(a) of ISA, and that this person has provided reliable assurances that they will not knowingly engage in sanctionable activities in the future. The sanctions on Dettin, therefore, are no longer in effect.

Pursuant to the authority delegated to the Secretary of State in the Delegation Memorandum, relevant agencies and instrumentalities of the United States Government shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the provisions of this notice.

The following constitutes a current, as of this date, list of persons on whom sanctions are imposed under ISA. The particular sanctions imposed on an individual person are identified in the relevant Federal Register Notice.

-Bimeh Markazi-Central Insurance of Iran (See Public Notice 8268, 78 FR 21183, April 9, 2013)
-Cambis, Dimitris (See Public Notice 8268, 78 FR 21183, April 9, 2013)
-FAL Oil Company Limited (see Public Notice 7776, 77 FR 4389, January 27, 2012)
-Ferland Company Limited (See Public Notice 8352, 78 FR 35351, June 12, 2013)
-Goldentex FZE (see Public Notice 8897, 79 FR 59890, October 8, 2014)
-Impire Shipping (See Public Notice 8268, 78 FR 21183, April 9, 2013)
-Jam Petrochemical Company (See Public Notice 8352 78 FR 35351, June 12, 2013)
-Kish Protection and Indemnity (a.k.a. Kish P&I) (See Public Notice 8268, 78 FR 21183, April 9, 2013)
-Kuo Oil (S) Pte. Ltd. (see Public Notice 7776, 77 FR 4389, January 27, 2012)
-Naftiran Intertrade Company (see Public Notice 7197, 75 FR 62916, October 13, 2010)
-Niksima Food and Beverage JLT (See Public Notice 8352, 78 FR 35351, June 12, 2013)
-Petrochemical Commercial Company International (a.k.a. PCCI) (see Public Notice 7585, 76 FR 56866, September 14, 2011)
-Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (a.k.a. PDVSA) (see Public Notice 7585, 76 FR 56866, September 14, 2011)
-Royal Oyster Group (see Public Notice 7585, 76 FR 56866, September 14, 2011)
-Speedy Ship (a.k.a. SPD) (See Public Notice 8040, 77 FR 50934, September 25, 2012)
-Sytrol (see Public Notice 8040, 77 FR 50934, September 25, 2012)
-Zhuhai Zhenrong Company (see Public Notice 7776, 77 FR 4389, January 27, 2012)

Dated: November 5, 2015.

Kurt W. Tong,
Acting Assistant, Secretary for Economic, and Business Affairs.
[FR Doc. 2015-30062 Filed 11-24-15; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-07-P
education and mental health professionals on CVE efforts to help parents and schools understand how they can counter youth radicalization to violence? (5) How can the Department inspire peer-to-peer attempts to challenge violent extremism through public/private partnership?

Schedule: The CVE Subcommittee findings and recommendations will be submitted to the Homeland Security Advisory Council for their deliberation and vote during a public meeting. Once the report is voted on by the Homeland Security Advisory Council, it will be sent to the Secretary for his review and acceptance.

Dated: November 19, 2015.

Sarah E. Morgenthau,
Executive Director.

[PR Doc. 2015-30094 Filed 11-24-15; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 9110-W-P

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice: 9359]

60-Day Notice of Proposed Information Collection: Reporting Requirements for Responsible Investment in Burma

ACTION: Notice of request for public comment.

SUMMARY: The Department of State is seeking Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approval for the information collection described below. In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, we are requesting comments on this collection from all interested individuals and organizations. The purpose of this notice is to allow 60 days for public comment preceding submission of the collection to OMB.

DATES: The Department will accept comments from the public up to January 25, 2016.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any of the following methods:

• Web: Persons with access to the Internet may comment on this notice by going to www.Regulations.gov. You can search for the document by entering “Docket Number: DOS-2015-0070” in the Search field. Then click the “Comment Now” button and complete the comment form.

• Email: steinJL@state.gov

• Regular Mail: Send written comments to: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; C/O Jennifer Stein, Rm 7822; U.S. Department of State, 2201 C Street NW.

You must include the DS form number (if applicable), information collection title, and the OMB control number in any correspondence.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Direct requests for additional information regarding the collection listed in this notice, including requests for copies of the proposed collection instrument and supporting documents, to Jennifer Stein, who may be reached on 202-647-1211 or at SteinJL@state.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

• Title of Information Collection: Reporting Requirements for Responsible Investment in Burma.

• OMB Control Number: 1405-0209.

• Type of Request: Extension of a Currently Approved Collection.

• Originating Office: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, DRL/EAP.

• Form Number: No form.

• Respondents: U.S. persons and entities engaged in new investment in Burma in an amount over $500,000 in aggregate, per OFAC General License 17, which authorizes new investment in Burma.

• Estimated Number of Respondents: 30.

• Estimated Number of Responses: 30.

• Average Time per Response: 31 hours.

• Total Estimated Burden Time: 930 hours.

• Frequency: Within 180 days of new investment in Burma over $500,000, annually thereafter.

• Obligation to Respond: Mandatory.

We are soliciting public comments to permit the Department to:

• Evaluate whether the proposed information collection is necessary for the proper functions of the Department.

• Evaluate the accuracy of our estimate of the time and cost burden for this proposed collection, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used.

• Enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected.

• Minimize the reporting burden on those who are to respond, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology.

Please note that comments submitted in response to this Notice are public record. Before including any detailed personal information, you should be aware that your comments as submitted, including your personal information, will be available for public review.

Abstract of proposed collection: Section 203(a)(3)(B) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) grants the President authority to, inter alia, prevent or prohibit any acquisition or transaction involving any property, in which a foreign country or a national thereof has any interest, by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. See 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.

In Executive Order 13047 of May 20, 1997, the President determined that the actions and policies of the Government of Burma, including its large-scale repression of the democratic opposition in Burma, constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, declared a national emergency to deal with that threat, and prohibited new investment in Burma. In subsequent Executive Orders, the President modified the scope of the national emergency to address additional concerns with the actions and policies of the Government of Burma. In Executive Order 13446 of October 18, 2007, the President modified the emergency to address the continued repression of the democratic opposition in Burma, manifesting in part through the commission of human rights abuses and pervasive public corruption. In Executive Order 13619 of July 11, 2012, the President further modified the emergency to address, inter alia, human rights abuses particularly in ethnic areas.

In response to several political reforms by the Government of Burma and pursuant to authority granted by IEEPA, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a general license (GL 17) on July 11, 2012 authorizing new investment in Burma, subject to certain restrictions and conditions. In order to support the Department of State’s efforts to assess the extent to which new U.S. investment authorized by GL 17 furthers U.S. foreign policy goals of, inter alia, improving human rights protections and facilitating political reform in Burma, GL 17 requires U.S. persons engaging in new investment in Burma to report to the Department of State information related to such investment, as laid out in the “Reporting Requirements on Responsible Investment in Burma,” (hereafter referred to as the “collection”). This collection is authorized by section 203(a)(2) of
# Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee
## In-Person Meeting - January 11, 2016

### Members Attending (4):
- **Farah Pandith (Chair)**: Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, former Special Representative to Muslim Communities
- **Adnan Kifayat (Chair)**: Senior Resident Fellow, German Marshall Fund of the United States
- **Seamus Hughes**: Deputy Director, Program on Extremism at George Washington University
- **Laila Alawa**: Chief Executive Officer & Founder, Coming of Faith

### DHS Attending (7):
- **Sarah Morgenthaus**: Homeland Security Advisory Council
- **Erin Walls**: Homeland Security Advisory Council
- **George Selim**: Office of Community Partnerships (OCP)
- **Lauren Wenger**: Office of Community Partnerships (OCP)
- **Seth Rosen**: DHS Intelligence & Analysis (I&A)
- **Charles Gruber**: DHS I&A
- **Stephanie Maniglia**: DHS I&A

### Waiting for Response (6):
- **Matthew Olsen**: Former Director, National Counterterrorism Center
- **Ali Soufan**: Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, The Soufan Group LLC
- **Paul Goldenberg**: President and Chief Executive Officer, Cardinal Point Strategies
- **Jane Harman**: President and Chief Executive Officer, Woodrow Wilson Center
- **Joel Meyer**: SVP, Public Sector at Dataminr
- **William Webster (Ex-officio)**: Retired Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP

### Not attending (1):
- **Jeffrey Miller**: Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer, National Football League
All – I wanted to share this with you all. Please see below, it was the top story in S1's clips.

TO: THE SECRETARY AND SENIOR STAFF
DATE: MONDAY, MAY 6, 2013 7:00 AM EDT

Leading DHS News

Boston Bombings Prompt DHS Review of Community Policing Tactics. The Boston Globe <http://www.boston.com/news/nation/2013/05/04/homeland-security-officials-examining-boston-marathon-bombings-improve-community-policing-tactics/hr5gWYlx7UKA1XFeGLWRNJ/story.html> (5/4, Bender, 250K) highlights the Department of Homeland Security's Countering Violent Extremists program, which is "seeking to use lessons from" the Boston Marathon bombings "to enhance community policing and more effectively prepare religious and civic leaders to spot warning signs of homegrown terrorism." DHS principal deputy counterterrorism coordinator John Cohen explained the effort, stating, "How do we take the knowledge that we have acquired looking at these events and incorporate that into our community-policing effor
All – as you may know NSC (P.K.A. NSS) held a CVE IPC yesterday. It was the first CVE IPC in approximately 2 years.

We are currently working on a write up of the meeting that will be distributed, and there will be discussions on how best to proceed with the summary of conclusions (SOC) that is attached.

Also, for your reference please see the attached agenda.

Thanks and please let me know if you have any questions.

-Nate

Nate Snyder
US Department of Homeland Security
Office of the Secretary
Liaison for Community Partnership & Strategic Engagement
Counterterrorism Working Group
Summary of Conclusions

The Interagency Policy Committee agreed that:

1. Departments and Agencies will meet to collectively agree upon an analytic intelligence assessment framework to guide the implementation of CVE programs nationwide. This should also include models for program evaluation and effectiveness. (Action: NCTC to lead working with DHS and FBI by January 24, 2014)

2. Departments and Agencies will develop a comprehensive model for preventing violent extremism domestically by building upon the collection of best-practices from cities previously studied. This blueprint should include efforts of existing law enforcement agencies and include a mechanism for engaging the resources and expertise available from a range of social service providers, but particularly including education administrators, mental health professionals, and religious leaders. The goal of this approach will be to test the comprehensive model and eventually expand to multiple cities nationally. (Action: NCTC to lead working with DHS, FBI, and DOJ by January 24, 2014)

3. Departments and Agencies will assess potential cities or U.S. Attorney districts for the application of comprehensive CVE strategies that are customized at the local level. The IPC should select three to five cities with strong municipal infrastructures at the State and Local level that could implement these customized comprehensive plans. (Action: Departments and Agencies by January 24, 2014)

4. DHS and DOJ will conduct a comprehensive review of grant funding opportunities available to State and Local officials, as well as for nongovernmental organizations for programs and efforts related to preventing violent extremism in the homeland. (Action: DHS and DOJ by January 24, 2014)

5. NCTC DSOP will compile a comprehensive list of CVE resources to make available to DHS, DOJ, and FBI officials. This list should include potential USG speakers on a range of CVE topics, such as airport screening, traveler redress, and foreign policy as well as a compilation of relevant academic literature and congressional reports. NCTC should also consider a CVE resource request mechanism for DOJ, FBI, and DHS officials to submit.
requests that can then be coordinated with the appropriate interagency partner. (Action: NCTC by January 24, 2014)

6. NCTC REM will organize and implement a regular analytic roundtable meeting for analysts at NCTC, FBI, and DHS who work on issues related to homegrown violent extremism and radicalization. These meetings should serve as a venue to engage policy makers, academics, law enforcement professionals, and other relevant professions their agency mission. (Action: NCTC REM to hold first meeting by January 24, 2014)
NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF
TRANSBORDER SECURITY DIRECTORATE
INTERAGENCY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING
ON
PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE U.S.

DATE: December 17, 2013
LOCATION: Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Room 445
TIME: 1 p.m. – 2:30 p.m.

AGENDA

1. Welcome and opening remarks by Amy Pope (NSS)

2. Discussion on the implications of the 13 December arrest of the Wichita-Based Homegrown Violent Extremist (FBI/ALL)

3. Discussion on moving towards a more comprehensive approach on domestic CVE efforts (NSS)

4. Discussion of Intelligence Community framework for CVE program application and measurement (ALL)

5. Discussion on grants and funding opportunities for domestic CVE programs (ALL)

6. Update on CVE table-top exercises (NCTC)

7. Update on IACP CVE program work (DHS/DOJ)

8. Feedback from U.S. Attorney meetings (NSS/DOJ)

9. IPC posture and frequency (NSS)
All – for everyone’s awareness, there has been a CVE IPC called for this Friday. The agenda is below and attached.

Materials are in the process of being assembled and will be coordinated appropriately.

Please let me know if you have any questions, thanks.

-Nate

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF
TRANSBORDER SECURITY DIRECTORATE
INTERAGENCY POLICY COMMITTEE MEETING
ON
PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE U.S.

DATE: May 23, 2014
LOCATION: Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Room 445
TIME: 10:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

AGENDA

1. Welcome and opening remarks by Amy Pope (NSC)
2. Briefing on agency plans to implement action plan in three selected cities (ALL)
3. DHS update on Boston CVE position (DHS)
4. Update on progress from Rand Beers tasking on public service campaign (ALL)
5. Intelligence updates (NCTC/REM)
Colleagues, please mark your calendars for a CVE IPC next week on **Friday, May 23rd 1030am-12noon**. I'll follow up with an agenda by the end of the week.

Thanks,

George

George Selim  
Director for Community Partnerships  
National Security Council  
The White House

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All – please see the following attached documents, they are in response to the IPC deliverables from the SOC; there has been an extension given:

- DHS Stakeholder Outreach Template – here is a strategic list of DHS stakeholders that were identified by offices and components for initial outreach
- DRAFT Process Goals – here is a PROPOSED process for outreach, coordination, timing, and stakeholder development
- Questions to the Field – this is based off of feedback regarding the earlier version that was sent to the CVEWG for review; it has been 100% overhauled
- Potential CVE Model – this is a proposed model framework that could be applied to assist with better supporting local efforts, now with full DHS resources applied

We are working with the interagency to build a unified and coordinated approach; however we want to make sure that our equities and approaches are strongly represented and accurately communicated first.

Please send any comments and/or edits back by COB Tuesday 3/19.

IGA, CRCL, I&A, OSLLE, FEMA, NPPD, PLCY, and HSAC you all probably the most equities in these efforts given your relationships with stakeholders.

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thanks,
-Nate

Nate Snyder
US Department of Homeland Security
Office of the Secretary
Liaison for Community Partnership & Strategic Engagement
Counterterrorism Working Group
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The Interagency Policy Committee agreed that:

1. Departments and Agencies should meet to formalize the comprehensive approach model as spelled out in the NCTC white paper by (1) establishing measureable goals for each of the lines of effort; (2) mapping out department and agency programs and activities to ensure accountability and deconfliction; and (3) formulating assessments focused on outcomes and specifically designed to address programs, training, and our return on investment (e.g. impact). As agreed in the IPC, this effort should be focused on the cities of LA, Minneapolis, and Boston.  
   **(Action: ALL by March 12, 2014)**

2. Departments and Agencies should finalize pilot city selection by engaging State and Local states holders to assess interest, viability, and coordination level with Federal officials.  
   **(Action: ALL by March 12, 2014)**
Basic Questions to the Field

Since the December 2011 release of the community/state and local informed Strategic Implementation Plan to Empower Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, and based on crucial feedback and guidance from partners like you, we have developed a number of resources to support federal, state, local, and tribal partner efforts to counter violent extremism and prevent violent attacks. While our efforts at the federal level may have been useful over the years; we are still challenged with getting these resources directly into the hands of people who need them. We want to address this issue head on and work with you to determine how we can best support and strengthen your initiatives to counter violent extremism and prevent violent attacks.

As a result, we at DHS, in partnership with the White House, DOJ, FBI, NCTC and other federal partners, are working with a few regions in the country – Los Angeles, Boston and Minneapolis/St. Paul – to bring resources to the table, build greater synergy, strengthen partnerships, and deliver the needed support to your locally driven efforts.

The long term goal is to attain an integrated national model that facilitates the creation of and support of pre-existing sustainable grassroots efforts to counter violent extremism and prevent violent attacks while keeping partners like you in the driver's seat — ultimately, we want to better support you.

In order to further understand how we can support your efforts and learn of your successes, we would like to ask you a few questions. We see this as the beginning of a dialogue that will continue over the next few months and perhaps years.

Do you have any questions?

Let's get started:

Support Network
- Does your organization maintain a network of individuals who could include federal, state, local government officials, law enforcement, education officials, mental health officials, community, and faith-based leaders to support or advise on countering violent extremism or violence prevention efforts?
- Would you be interested in connecting with other local practitioners from around the country?

Engagement
- How does your organization conduct regular, sustained engagement with communities, and how often? (For instance, does your organization hold regular town halls, roundtables, re-occurring events?)
- Who is invited to participate?
- How does engagement benefit your efforts, how do you know it’s successful?

Information Sharing
- Do you share information regarding public safety, violence prevention, and/or violent extremism?
- If so, how do you share information with other organizations and what kind of information do you share; what kind of information is shared with your organization?
- Have you identified any barriers to receiving information, either due to classification level or lack of an effective dissemination method?

**Training**
- Does your organization receive or deliver training related to CVE and/or preventing violent attacks?
- If so who delivers it and who is the audience?
- How have you benefited?
- DHS (along with other federal partners) has developed threat awareness briefings, workshop materials, research on drivers of radicalization to violence, training on differentiating between constitutionally protected cultural behavioral norms versus behaviors and indicators that may be indicative of violent extremist behavior. Would more information about trainings like these be useful?

**Models**
- Do you or your organization regularly engage with and/or hold dialogues between public organizations, communities, and law enforcement to mitigate potential incidents concerning public safety or violence prevention?
- Is there a formal group that addresses these or similar issues?
- What are some success stories?
- Would your organization be interested in learning about existing models or best practices such as local intervention models?

**Funding/Grants**
- Have you or your organization applied for (or been awarded)* grants for CVE related purposes?
- If you applied for a CVE related grant, were you awarded the funds?
- Are you aware that DHS has grant guidance that can be specifically used to apply for CVE related efforts?

**Wrap Up**
- Now that you've gone through these questions, do you have ideas how we can better support your efforts or provide more information on resources?

---

* If you are speaking to an SSA or HSA please ask if they have awarded funding AND if they have applied
POTENTIAL MODEL CVE PROGRAM
BOSTON/LA/MINNEAPOLIS

Strategic Implementation Plan Objectives

1. Enhance Engagement
   - Develop CVE network
   - HSIN Portal
   - Community Engagement Online Resource Center
   - FBI LEEP SIG Portal
   - Community Outreach Coordination
   - Mental Health Providers
   - Education Providers

2. Build Expertise
   - Increase engagements to targeted communities
   - U.S. Attorney Roundtables
   - DHS CRCL Roundtables
   - FBI Office of Public Affairs/Community Outreach
   - DoE Education Anti-Bullying Campaign
   - NCTC Community Awareness Briefing
   - FBI Internet Safety Awareness
   - Treasury Charitable Giving Briefing
   - State Dept. Information Sessions
   - DHS/NCTC CVE Exercise
   - Local PD Outreach

3. Counter Propaganda
   - Continue to improve and expand CVE Training
   - DHS I&A Awareness Briefing
   - NCTC/DHS Threat Awareness Briefing
   - IACP Training
   - NCTC CVE Training
   - NCTC Radicalization Primer
   - DOJ CRS Training
   - DHS S&T Research
   - NIJ Research
   - SLATT
   - DHS CRCL CVE Training
   - TSA Cultural Demystification Training
   - HHS Mental Health and Violence Prevention programs
   - DHS Houses of Worship Guide Training (active)
   - Local PD Outreach

4. Lines of Effort
   - Identify and share successful CVE models
   - Local Government Model (based on LA, Minneapolis, and Lewiston)
   - Community-led Disengagement Model (based on Montgomery County, MD model)

5. Better use existing funding and find additional resources to support community efforts
   - FEMA Grants
   - NIJ Grants
   - DOJ COPS
   - Private Sector
     - MPAC CVE Toolkit
     - AMM Anti-Jihad Primer
     - Ahmadiyya Community Muslims for Peace Campaign
   - Charitable Sector

Problems in the Field

Gray = does not yet exist
Jeff,

I am attaching a copy of the appropriation and the joint explanatory statement. They are big documents, so here are the excerpts you need.

The Appropriation Language

SEC. 543. (a) For an additional amount for emergent threats from violent extremism and from complex, coordinated terrorist attacks, $50,000,000 to remain available until September 30, 2017.

(b) Funds made available in subsection (a) for emergent threats may be transferred by the Secretary of Homeland Security between appropriations for the same purpose, notwithstanding section 503 of this Act.

(c) No transfer described in subsection (b) shall occur until 15 days after the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives are notified of such transfer.

The Joint Explanatory Statement

Responding to Emergent Threats from Violent Extremism

A general provision in title V of this Act provides $50,000,000 for emergent threats from violent
Pat,

Welcome back. I received these from Michael Downing last night. He told me these are draft and they are still working on them.

I wonder if HSAC member Sheriff Baca has been involved with this effort or has one of his own going on?

Mike
Withheld pursuant to exemption
(b)(5)
of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

DHS-001-425-008739
Withheld pursuant to exemption (b)(5) of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act
March 15, 2016

Secretary Jeh Johnson
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Secretary Johnson:

This is an official letter from the Homeland Security Advisory Council (Council) to express our support for your recent statements on the vital importance of outreach to Muslim communities across the country. The Council is grateful for the opportunity to amplify your message of fairness and tolerance for all Americans.

On January 13, 2016, you spoke at the University of Michigan Dearborn Campus about how we are facing a new age of global terrorism with an ever-increasing number of "terrorist directed and terrorist inspired attacks." During your remarks, you emphasized that today’s challenge "requires a whole new approach to counterterrorism and homeland security" and addressed the importance of reaching out to all Muslims across the country. Your message that day was clear: "we must not throw a net of suspicion over American Muslims and an entire religion."

The Council applauds your efforts to speak out against the discrimination and vilification of American Muslims, and affirms the need to engage them to help prevent the recruitment and radicalization to violence perpetrated by terrorist organizations that are targeting the youth in their communities.

We commend you and the Department for your service to this country and the ongoing efforts to counter violent extremism.

Sincerely,

William H. Webster
Chair, Homeland Security Advisory Council
From: Walls, Erin (b)(6)

To: *Morgenthau, Sarah (b)(6)

Subject: CVE Letter

Date: 2016/04/15 09:43:46

Priority: Normal

Type: Note

Sent Date: 2016/04/15 09:43:45

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**Subject:** CVE Letter of Support to S1  
**Date:** 2016/02/22 10:39:55  
**Importance:** High  
**Priority:** Urgent  
**Type:** Note

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March 15, 2016

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Chair, Homeland Security Advisory Council
Withheld pursuant to exemption (b)(5) of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act.
Farah Pandith currently leads numerous efforts designed to counter extremism through new organizations, programs, and initiatives. Ms. Pandith was appointed the first-ever Department of State Special Representative to Muslim Communities in June 2009. From 2004 to 2007, she was the Director for Middle East Initiatives at the National Security Council (NSC). Prior to the NSC, Ms. Pandith was chief of staff at the Bureau for Asia and the Near East for the U.S. Agency for International Development. Ms. Pandith is currently an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the Leadership Council of Women and Girls Lead. She also serves on the Board of Overseers at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and on the Smith College President’s Council.
Adnan Kifayat (Co-Chair)
Senior Resident Fellow, The German Marshall Fund of the United States

Adnan Kifayat is a senior resident fellow at GMF, where he advises the organization on its efforts to strengthen leadership development and Next Generation strategies in the transatlantic region and its joint work in programming the OCP Policy Center Atlantic Fellowship in Europe, North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. He also contributes to the continued development of GMF’s Leadership, Diversity and Inclusion Initiative.

Over the last 15 years, Kifayat has held senior positions in public service, including at the White House, State Department, and Treasury Department, where he established partnerships with strategic allies to cooperate in trade, finance, development, counterterrorism and national security. He has helped develop innovative and sustainable mechanisms to counter the spread of violent extremism and prevent the flow of funds to terrorist organizations.

Until recently, Kifayat served as Secretary of State John Kerry’s acting special representative to Muslim communities and was instrumental in creating programs to broaden and deepen U.S. diplomatic engagement through social entrepreneurship, political empowerment, and shared commitments to security. As senior advisor to the under secretary of state for public diplomacy, he led the development and deployment of the Public Diplomacy 2.0 Initiative, which helped transform the State Department into a new media-savvy institution. His work at the Treasury Department resulted in initiatives and agreements to promote financial cooperation between the United States and key partners, in the Middle East, G8, and Asia. He served as an alternate executive director of the African Development Bank, shaping Bank activities on the African continent. He served twice on the National Security Council staff to coordinate counterterrorism and economic issues across the Middle East and Africa.

Kifayat’s private sector experience includes creating strategies for Cargill to access Central Asian and Latin American agribusiness markets, and designing programs for Delphi International to promote U.S. economic and civil society engagement on a people-to-people basis around the world.
Laila Alawa is the CEO and Founder of Coming of Faith, a leading digital media company where the world goes to hear the voices and stories of underrepresented women. With more than half a million monthly visitors, the company covers everything from life to humor, entertainment to news through articles, videos, podcasts and mixtapes. She is also the host for The Expose, a Coming of Faith weekly podcast tackling tough topics with snark and wit. Her work and writing has been mentioned in The New York Times, Al-Jazeera America, Yahoo! News, ThinkProgress, The Guardian, NPR, PRI, The Huffington Post, Feministing, Salon, Mashable, Color Lines, Bustle, Mic and Buzzfeed. Her work was recently published in the literary anthology, Faithfully Feminist: Jewish, Christian and Muslim Feminists on Why We Stay. She was recently featured in The New York Times' Women in the World. She's also appeared on Al-Jazeera America, BBC World News, NPR, and Huffington Post Live. In 2015, Laila was named an Ariane de Rothschild Fellow.

Through her online activism and creative approach to digital issues, she has made it her mission to elevate the voices of those who are often not heard. As the creator of many viral multimedia campaigns, she is eager to work with organizations that both advocate and innovate in the public interest.

Prior to founding Coming of Faith, Laila was a research specialist at Princeton University, studying socio-cognitive processing under the framework of community identity and belonging.

She has a bachelor's degree from Wellesley College, and has studied leadership and social entrepreneurship at the University of Cambridge. A passionate runner, she lives in Washington, D.C.
General John R. Allen is a retired four-star U.S. Marine General who served as the Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and the Commander of U.S. Forces Afghanistan from 2011 to 2013, the pivotal point in the war. General Allen recently served as Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. He is the first Marine in history to command a theater of war, and is the longest serving commander in that conflict. Concluding a distinguished 38 year career in the spring of 2013, General Allen worked as an advisor to both the Secretaries of Defense and State on Middle East Security, and has affiliations with the Brookings Institution, the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the Atlantic Council, and Council on Foreign Relations. He holds numerous U.S. personal and international decorations, including the Defense Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit, The Leftwich Leadership Trophy, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, the Humanitarian Service Medal, the NATO Meritorious Service Medal, the Afghan Ghazi Mir Bacha Khan Medal, the French Legion d’Honneur, the Commander’s Cross of the Order of Merit of the Polish Republic, the Taiwan Order of the Resplendent Banner with Special Cravat, and the Mongolian Meritorious Service Medal, First Class.
Russell C. Deyo was sworn in as Under Secretary for Management at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on May 11, 2015. In the Department’s number three post, Mr. Deyo exercises leadership authority over all aspects of the Department’s management programs, processes, and workforce of more than 230,000 employees.

Mr. Deyo oversees management of the Department’s nearly $60 billion budget. He also serves as the Chief Acquisition Officer, administering control over the Department’s approximately $16.5 billion in procurements annually, and 72 major acquisition programs that are in development or sustainment with a life cycle cost estimate of more than $300 million.

As Under Secretary, Mr. Deyo leads the Management Directorate’s six lines of business, including financial management, human capital, procurement, information technology, security, and facilities and asset management. The management portfolio touches every aspect of Department operations. Leading with a data-driven focus, Mr. Deyo concentrates efforts on integrating management functions, improving customer service, and sustaining quality financial stewardship.

Mr. Deyo has over 30 years of management experience in both the government and private sector. Prior to his appointment, Mr. Deyo retired from Johnson & Johnson in 2012 after 27 years of service, where he held a number of positions, including Vice President of Administration and General Counsel. For 16 years, he also served as a member of the Executive Committee, the company’s principal management group for global operations.

Prior to Johnson & Johnson, Mr. Deyo was an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey from 1978 to 1985, serving the last three years as Chief of Special Prosecutions. From 1977 to 1978, Mr. Deyo was an attorney at Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler in New York City.

Mr. Deyo is a graduate of Dartmouth College and holds a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center.
Paul Goldenberg
President and CEO, Cardinal Point Strategies, LLC

Paul Goldenberg is the President and CEO of Cardinal Point Strategies (CPS), LLC, a strategic advisory and business intelligence consulting firm. As President and CEO of Cardinal Point Strategies, Mr. Goldenberg is a trusted advisor with a long history of helping to resolve the highest profile and most confidential matters for governments, businesses, academia and NGOs around the world. Mr. Goldenberg also serves as the National Director of the Secure Community Network, the nation’s first faith-based information sharing analysis center recognized by DHS as the a national model. Mr. Goldenberg’s public career includes more than two decades as the first State Chief of the Office of Bias Crimes and Community Relations in New Jersey leading the nation’s first full time State Attorney General’s effort focusing on hate crimes and ethnic terrorism, Director of the nation’s 6th largest county social service and juvenile justice system, and as a law enforcement official leading investigation efforts for cases in domestic terrorism, political corruption, and organized crime. From 2004-2009, Mr. Goldenberg played a key role in setting policy for the legislation and investigation of ethnic terrorism and hate crimes in his role as senior law enforcement advisor to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In the course of his law enforcement career, Mr. Goldenberg received South Florida’s most distinguished citation for valor, Officer of the Year, an honor presented after serving as lead agent in one of South Florida’s longest term undercover assignments.
Jane Harman is the head of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, a Washington, D.C. think tank devoted to the ideals of former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson. Congresswoman Harman served in Congress from 1993 to 1998 and 2001 to 2011. Following her resignation from Congress on February 28, 2011 she joined the Woodrow Wilson Center as its first female Director, President and CEO. During her time in Congress she represented the Aerospace Center of California during nine terms in Congress; she served on all the major security committees: six years on Armed Services, eight years on Intelligence and four on Homeland Security. Congresswoman Harman has made numerous Congressional fact-finding missions to hotspots around the world including North Korea, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Guantanamo Bay to assess threats against the U.S. Harman received the Defense Department Medal for Distinguished Service in 1998, the CIA Seal Medal in 2007, and both the CIA Director’s Award and the National Intelligence Distinguished Public Service Medal in 2011.
Seamus Hughes
Deputy Director of the Program on Extremism, George Washington University

Seamus Hughes is the Deputy Director of the Program on Extremism at George Washington University. Hughes previously worked at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), serving as a lead staffer on the U.S. government’s efforts to implement the national countering violent extremism strategy. He regularly led engagements with Muslim American communities across the country, provided counsel to civic leaders after high-profile terror-related incidents, and met with families of individuals who joined terrorist organizations. Hughes created a groundbreaking intervention program to help steer individuals away from violence through non-law enforcement means and worked closely with FBI Joint Terrorism Taskforces, Fusion Centers, and U.S. Attorney Offices. Prior to NCTC, Hughes served as the Senior Counterterrorism Advisor for the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. He has authored numerous legislative bills, including sections of the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act and the Special Agent Samuel Hicks Families of Fallen Heroes Act. He is the recipient of National Security Council Outstanding Service and two NCTC Director’s Awards for outstanding service.
Jeffrey “Jeff” Miller
Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer, National Football League

Jeffrey Miller is Senior Vice President and Chief Security Officer of the National Football League (NFL) where he oversees all event security, investigative programs and services. Prior to joining the NFL, Mr. Miller spent 24 years with the Pennsylvania State Police, retiring in 2008 after serving six years as Commissioner. In that role, he oversaw a complement of over 6,000 enlisted and civilian personnel and a budget of $800 million dollars. As a cabinet secretary, he was responsible for implementing crime- and crash-reduction strategies, anti-terrorism efforts, and general policing practices, including emergency response in all 67 counties in Pennsylvania.

Mr. Miller holds an Associate Degree from the University of South Florida, a Bachelor’s of Professional Studies Degree in Criminal Justice from Elizabethtown College, and a Master’s Degree in Public Administration from the Pennsylvania State University. He is a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Academy in Quantico, Virginia, and the FBI National Executive Institute.
Joel Meyer
Senior Vice President, Public Sector Dataminr

Joel Meyer is Senior Vice President at Dataminr, Inc., a real-time information discovery company that analyzes all public tweets and other publicly available data to deliver the earliest signals for breaking news, real-world events, off the radar context and perspective, and emerging trends.

Prior to joining Dataminr in 2013, he served as a Director on the White House National Security Council staff focusing on countering domestic radicalization and at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the Office of the Secretary as Senior Advisor to the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. He previously practiced law at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, and is an inactive member of the California and District of Columbia bars.
Michael A. Nutter served two terms as Mayor of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He was first elected in November 2007, and then re-elected to a second term in November 2011. Most recently, while Mayor of Philadelphia he worked closely with the Department of Homeland Security and Secretary Johnson on the operational security and contingency planning for the September 2015 Papal visit which was designated as a National Special Security Event. Before being elected mayor, he served for almost 15 years on the Philadelphia City Council representing the 4th District.

Mr. Nutter holds a B.A. from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.
Matthew Olsen is President of Consulting and Co-Founder at IronNet Cybersecurity. Mr. Olsen is responsible for leading IronNet’s consulting services, providing strategic and operational guidance to companies on cybersecurity and cyber threats, and helping to guide IronNet’s business development. Mr. Olsen is also a lecturer at Harvard Law School and a national security analyst for ABC News. Mr. Olsen has worked for over two decades as a top government official on national security, intelligence and law enforcement issues. Appointed by the President to serve as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Mr. Olsen led the government’s efforts to integrate and analyze terrorism information and coordinate counterterrorism activities for three years. Prior to joining the NCTC, Mr. Olsen was the General Counsel for the National Security Agency. Mr. Olsen also served at the Department of Justice in a number of leadership positions, including Special Counselor to the Attorney General, responsible for national security and criminal cases. Mr. Olsen was also a federal prosecutor for over a decade and has served as Special Counsel to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Ali H. Soufan
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, The Soufan Group LLC

Ali H. Soufan is Chairman & Chief Executive Officer of The Soufan Group LLC and has been a member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council since September 2012. Mr. Soufan is a former FBI Supervisory Special Agent who investigated and supervised highly sensitive and complex international terrorism cases, including the East Africa Embassy Bombings, the attack on the USS Cole, and the events surrounding the 9/11 attacks. Mr. Soufan also served on the Joint Terrorist Task Force, FBI New York Office, where he coordinated both domestic and international counterterrorism operations. He has received numerous awards for his counterterrorism work, including the FBI Director’s Award for Excellence in Investigation and the Respect for Law Enforcement Award. Mr. Soufan is the author of The New York Times Top 10 Bestseller, "The Black Banners: The Inside Story of 9/11 and the War Against al-Qaeda" and a recipient of the Ridenhour Book Prize.
Juan Zarate is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the senior national security analyst for CBS News, a visiting lecturer at the Harvard Law School, and a national security and financial integrity consultant. Zarate served as deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism from 2005 to 2009 and was responsible for developing and implementing the U.S. government’s counterterrorism strategy and policies related to transnational security threats. He was the first ever assistant secretary of the treasury for terrorist financing and financial crimes, where he led domestic and international efforts to attack terrorist financing, the innovative use of the Treasury Department’s national security–related powers, and the global hunt for Saddam Hussein’s assets. He is also a former federal prosecutor who served on terrorism prosecution teams prior to 9/11, including the investigation of the USS Cole attack.

Zarate is the author of the recently published Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (PublicAffairs, 2013), Forging Democracy (University Press of America, 1994), and a variety of articles in the New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Los Angeles Times, Washington Quarterly, and other publications. He has his own weekly national security program on CBSNews.com called Flash Points. He is a graduate of both Harvard College and Harvard Law School and a former Rotary International Fellow (Universidad de Salamanca, Spain). Zarate sits on several boards of advisers, including for the director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and HSBC’s Financial Services Vulnerabilities Committee.
William H. Webster (HSAC Chair) served as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from 1987 to 1991. Prior to his service as CIA Director, Judge Webster served as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation from 1978 to 1987, a Judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit from 1973 to 1978, and a United States District Court Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri from 1970 to 1973. In 1991, Judge Webster was presented the Distinguished Intelligence Medal. Judge Webster was also awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom and the National Security Medal. Following his departure from the CIA, Judge Webster joined the law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP in Washington, DC, and is now a retired partner.
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Homeland Security Advisory Council
Subject Matter Experts Biographies
Tara Sonenshine

Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Tara D. Sonenshine is a Distinguished Fellow at The George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs. She is the former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for the Department of State and previously served as the Executive Vice President of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

Prior to joining USIP, she was a strategic communications adviser to many international organizations including USIP, the International Crisis Group, Internews, CARE, The American Academy of Diplomacy, and the International Women’s Media Foundation. Ms. Sonenshine served in various capacities at the White House during the Clinton Administration, including Transition Director, Director of Foreign Policy Planning for the National Security Council, Special Assistant to the President, and Deputy Director of Communications.

Prior to serving in the Clinton Administration, Ms. Sonenshine was an Editorial Producer of ABC News’ Nightline, where she worked for more than a decade. She was also an off-air reporter at the Pentagon for ABC’s World News Tonight and is the recipient of 10 News Emmy Awards for coverage of international affairs. She holds a B.A. in Political Science from Tufts University. Tara Sonenshine brings unique skills in public affairs, crisis communications, media training, editorial writing, branding and public outreach including outreach to women and girls, diverse audiences, and online social media.
James K. Glassman
Former Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Ambassador Glassman served as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs during 2008-09. He focused on using tools of persuasion to thwart violent extremism and on introducing social media to the department. During 2007-08, he was Chairman of the U.S. Broadcasting Board of Governors, which oversees Voice of America and other government-sponsored TV, radio, and Internet broadcasting. He was confirmed unanimously by the U.S. Senate for both his government positions.

Currently, he is a Visiting Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington think-tank, where he helped launch the Center for Internet, Communications, and Technology Policy. He has held various positions as a scholar at AEI since 1996. He is also a member of the Investor Advisory Committee of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Chairman and CEO of Public Affairs Engagement, a Washington consulting firm.

He is the Founding Executive Director of the George W. Bush Institute, the policy arm of the Bush Presidential Center in Dallas. From 2009 to 2013, he built the institute from scratch under the direction of the former President, inaugurating 13 programs in such subject areas as education, global health, and veterans’ services.

Ambassador Glassman’s career in media has included positions as Publisher of two of America’s leading public affairs magazines, the Atlantic Monthly and New Republic; Editor-in-chief and co-owner of Roll Call, the congressional newspaper; and moderator of three weekly public affairs series on PBS and CNN: “TechnoPolitics,” “Ideas in Action,” and “Capital Gang Sunday.” He was chief investment writer for the Washington Post from 1993 to 2004, is the author of three books on personal investing, and for the past 10 years has written a monthly column for Kiplinger’s Personal Finance.

Over the past 15 years, he has written more than 2,000 articles – on economics, finance, technology, and foreign policy -- for such publications as the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Forbes, and Los Angeles Times. He has spoken at some of the world’s most important forums, including the National Press Club (Washington), the Detroit Economic Club, and Chatham House (London).
Ambassador Glassman has served as a senior advisor to AT&T and SAP Corporations and as a member of the Policy Advisory Board of Intel Corp. He is a graduate of Harvard University with a B.A., cum laude, in government and was managing editor of the university daily, The Crimson.

He lives with his wife Beth Ourisman Glassman in Bethesda. His daughter Kate is White House correspondent for IJ Review, and his daughter Zoe is a teacher in New Orleans. He has three grandchildren.
Born in Texas, Charlotte Beers brought her math background to the world of ideas, a combination which proved successful in the competitive world of advertising and marketing. Named the “most powerful woman in advertising”, she has been featured on the covers of Fortune and Business Week as one of the noted leaders in American business. During the fateful period following 9/11, Charlotte left the world of advertising to become the Undersecretary of State under Colin Powell.

Her advertising career began as an account executive at J. Walter Thompson, becoming the first female SVP in the firm’s history. She moved to Tatham Laird & Kudner as CEO. The company reversed its decline, attracted major accounts, and tripled the billings. Charlotte then became Chairman/CEO of Ogilvy & Mather Worldwide, a $5.4 billion, 8,000-employee, global advertising agency. In her five years with the firm, billings increased by $2 billion. Harvard Business School and many other universities still teach their best-selling case study on leadership titled “Charlotte Beers at Ogilvy.”

While serving as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, her department created programs and messages focused on the Middle East. For her service, Charlotte was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, the State Department’s highest honor.

Charlotte currently serves on the Board of the AS Roma soccer club and speaks widely on leadership and work relationships. Her recent book, *I’d Rather Be in Charge*, about how relationships at work create leaders, is taught by her in workshops for WPP throughout the U.S. and Europe.
As co-founder and CEO at an independent think tank, The Institute for Strategic Dialogue, Sasha leads the organization’s government advisory, research and delivery programs in the fields of counter-extremism and foreign policy, bringing the private sector to the table with senior policy makers and building transformative networks to respond to the cross-border challenges of conflict, extremism and terrorism.

Sasha chairs the European Policy Planners’ Network on counter-radicalization, which she initiated in 2008 with the participation of nine European governments, and co-chairs the EU’s Internet Radicalization working group. She is co-founder of the Women and Extremism Initiative and has spearheaded the development of Against Violent Extremism (AVE), the world’s largest network of former extremists and victims of extremism. In partnership with Google Ideas, AVE works to counter radicalization on and offline.

Sasha previously served as Senior Director at the U.S. think-tank, the EastWest Institute (EWI), where she headed the organization’s conflict resolution and transition work, rolling-out unique cross-border field operations across the Balkans, Eastern Europe and Russia. She was nominated to serve on a Task Force of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Balkan wars.

Sasha currently serves on the board of Women Without Borders and is a member of the European Council on Foreign Relations. She is a regular commentator on counter-terrorism in the media, having spoken on the BBC, Channel 4, CNN, ABC, Radio 4 and other networks.
Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi
President, World Organization for Resource Development and Education

Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi, JD currently serves as the President of the World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), a non-profit organization dedicated to reducing conflict between diverse societies. She is a world renowned expert in community based programming that promotes social cohesion and builds resilience against violent extremism.

In furtherance of that mission, Dr. Mirahmadi established the International Cultural Center (ICC) where people from diverse traditions perform community service, participate in educational programs, and share in artistic expression in order to foster peaceful co-existence and social harmony.

As Co-Chair of the Montgomery County Executive’s Faith Community Working Group, she runs America’s first community led, public-private partnership in promoting social cohesion and public safety, with a particular focus on the intervention and prevention of violent extremism which was awarded the FY15 Community Policing Development Grant to Combat Violent Extremism, by the Department of Justice. As a world renowned expert in countering violent extremism (CVE), she also is an advisor to several U.S. federal agencies including the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the National Counter-Terrorism Center, and the Department of Defense. In addition, Dr. Mirahmadi is a Board Member of Montgomery County Collaboration Council for Children, Youth and Families that provides a range of social services and recreational activities for at risk youth and families.

She is also a chapter contributor to the books: *Abraham’s Children: Liberty and Tolerance in an Age of Religious Conflict*, (Yale University Press), *Islam and Civil Society*, (Ingram Publications); and *The Other Muslims: Moderate and Secular*, (Palgrave Publications).

Dr. Mirahmadi earned her Juris Doctorate from the University of Southern California (USC), with a doctoral thesis in the Constitutional religious freedoms of Muslim prisoners.
Soraya Chemaly
Director Women’s Media Center Speech Project

Soraya Chemaly is a writer and activist whose work focuses on the role of gender in culture, politics, religion and media. She is the Director of the Women’s Media Center Speech Project and is the organizer of the Safety and Free Speech Coalition, both of which seek to curb online abuse, improve diversity in media and technology, and expand women's freedom of expression, political and civic participation.

She started her career in 1988 as an editor and writer before joining the Gannett Corporation as Director of Corporate Marketing in 1990. In 1994, she left Gannett to co-launch the News and Media Division at Claritas, now Nielsen, Inc. The company was an early pioneer in consumer demography, database marketing, geographic information systems and data technologies. In 2001, she left Claritas as Senior Vice President of Corporate Marketing to form her own consulting firm, working for several years in the media and data technology sectors.

Ms. Chemaly returned to writing and activism in 2011. Since then her work has appeared regularly in The Atlantic, TIME, Salon, The Guardian, The Nation, The New Statesman, Quartz and The Huffington Post. She serves as a board member on the executive committees of several organizations dedicated to anti-violence, media and electoral diversity including the Women’s Media Center, Women Action and the Media, In This Together Media, No Bully and VIDA: Women in Literary Arts. She is a former board member of EMERGE America, Secular Woman, FORCE: Upsetting Rape Culture, and Common Sense Media. Ms. Chemaly is also one of the founding organizers of the International Feminist Network, a coalition mapping initiative. She writes and speaks regularly about gender, media, tech, education, women's rights, sexual violence and free speech. In 2014, she was named one of Elle Magazine's 25 Inspiring Women to Follow. In 2013, she was the recipient of the Donna Allen Award for Feminist Advocacy and the Secular Woman Feminist Activism Award.
Peter Stern  
Product Policy Team Facebook

Peter Stern is on the product policy team at Facebook, which is responsible for writing and interpreting global policies governing what users can share on Facebook, and how advertisers and developers interact with the site. Peter leads a team within this group that seeks to ensure Facebook has the proper policies and enforcement practices in place, and is aligned with key external stakeholders such as NGOs and governments. Peter’s work puts him at the center of many current Internet policy issues -- including the scope of free expression, anti-bullying and hate speech, safety in cyberspace, and user trust. Prior to joining Facebook in 2014, Peter was a litigation partner at the San Francisco law firm of Morrison & Foerster, where he specialized in intellectual property matters and spent 11 years in his firm’s Tokyo office. His practice also included human rights litigation and counseling in the area of corporate social responsibility; from 2012-14 he served as Co-Chair of the International Bar Association's CSR Committee. He holds a B.A., summa cum laude, from Amherst College and an M.A. (History) and J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley.

Parisa Zagat  
Policy Programs Team Facebook

Parisa Zagat is on the Policy Programs team at Facebook, where she develops and oversees proactive efforts around key policy issue areas as well as external engagement with a variety of stakeholders. A large part of her focus is working closely with the policy team that develops Facebook’s content policies on issues like the promotion of expression and safety on Facebook’s platform. She is also leading up Facebook’s programmatic efforts in counter-speech. Prior to coming to Facebook, Parisa was the Director of the the William J. Clinton Foundation’s domestic economic development initiative. She has also worked on national and state level political campaigns and practiced corporate law in New York City. She attended Colombia University School of Law and Brown University.
Matthew Bryza
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council

Matthew Bryza is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council's Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center.

He is the Director of the International Center for Defence studies in Tallinn, Estonia. He resides in Istanbul, where he also works as a business consultant and board member of several private companies.

Ambassador Bryza just completed a twenty-three-year career as a U.S. diplomat. His most recent assignment was as U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan from February 2011 to January 2012. From 2005 to 2009, Ambassador Bryza served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, with responsibility for the South Caucasus, Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, and Eurasian energy. Ambassador Bryza simultaneously served as the U.S. Co-Chair of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) Minsk Group, mediating the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and as U.S. Mediator of the Cyprus, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia conflicts.

During 2001 to 2005, Ambassador Bryza served in the White House as Director for European and European Affairs on the National Security Council staff. His responsibilities included the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Eurasian energy, and political Islam in Eurasia.

Previous assignments include Deputy to the Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State on Caspian Energy, and Political Officer at the U.S. Missions to Russia (1995-97) and Poland (1989-91).
Imam Mohamed Magid

Imam, All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS)
Chairman, International Interfaith Peace Corps (IIPC)

Imam Magid is the Imam of All Dulles Area Muslim Society (ADAMS) Center in Sterling, Virginia. He is the Chairman of International Interfaith Peace Corps (IIPC). Imam Magid served as the President of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA). Under his direction, the ADAMS Center has grown to be one of the largest Muslim community organizations in the Washington Metropolitan Area. He also occupies the Chairmanship of the Fairfax County Faith Communities in Action, and a Chaplin of George Mason University Campus Ministry. He is also the Vice Chairman of Muflehun, a think tank, which focuses on confronting violent extremist thought through research-driven preventative programs within a religious paradigm.

Imam Magid has a long history of commitment to public service through organizations, such as The Peaceful Families Project.

Imam Magid has co-authored three books “Before You Tie the Knot: A Guide for Couples”, “Reflections on the Qur’an”, “Change from within”. He has helped training and workshops for Imams and religious leaders, domestically and internationally, on the issue of violence against women. Imam Magid is leading an initiative to protect religious minorities in Muslim majority countries, through a series of conferences. He has written for the Washington Post and Huffington Post, and been profiled in Time Magazine and The Wall Street Journal. He is the recipient for the Washingtonian of the Year 2009 and the Human Rights Award 2005 from Fairfax County.
Hello- please see below for updated language for the CVE web page, edits from OCP and OGC incorporated. Jen MacDonald has also cleared.

Any concerns or comments on the below? If none, we will publish today.

Countering Violent Extremism

Violent extremist threats come from a range of groups and individuals, including domestic terrorists and homegrown violent extremists in the United States, as well as international terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIL. Lone offenders or small groups may be radicalized to commit violence at home or attempt to travel overseas to become foreign fighters. The use of the Internet and social media to recruit and radicalize individuals to violence means that conventional approaches are unlikely to identify and disrupt all terrorist plots.

Here in the United States, acts perpetrated by violent extremists can have far-reaching consequences. Countering violent extremism (CVE) has therefore become a key focus of DHS’s work to secure the homeland. CVE aims to address the root causes of violent extremism by providing resources to communities to build and sustain local prevention efforts and promote the use of counter-narratives to confront violent extremist messaging online. Building relationships based on trust with communities is essential to this effort.

Office for Community Partnerships

On September 28, 2015, Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson announced the creation of the Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) to streamline and head the Department’s efforts to counter violent extremism domestically. OCP is the primary source of leadership, innovation, and support for the improved effectiveness of partners at federal, state, local, tribal and territorial levels. The Office also leverages the resources and relationships of the Department of Homeland Security and applies the personal leadership of the Secretary to empower leaders in both the public and private sectors to spur societal change to counter violent extremism.

CVE Lines of Effort

OCP implements a full-range of partnerships to support and enhance efforts by faith leaders, local government officials, and community to prevent radicalization and recruitment by terrorist organizations. OCP also
provides these stakeholders with training and technical assistance to develop CVE prevention programs in support of resilient communities. OCP leads the Department’s CVE mission with the following objectives:

- **Community Engagement.** OCP works with the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to facilitate community engagements to build awareness and promote dialogue with community partners, which includes engagements with DHS senior leadership;
- **Field Support Expansion and Training.** OCP supports DHS field staff across the country to develop and strengthen local partnerships and to provide training opportunities;
- **Grant Support.** OCP is working closely with FEMA to issue of notice of funding opportunity for community-based programs this summer. More information will be available on this website.
- **Philanthropic Engagement.** OCP works with the philanthropic community to maximize support for local communities, and encourage long-term partnerships;
- **Tech Sector Engagement.** OCP engages the tech sector to identify and amplify credible voices online and promote counter-narratives against violent extremist messaging.

**CVE Resources**

OCP maintains a list of current resources about violent extremism as well as examples of effective tools and programs to build strong and safe communities. This information will be updated as it is published and produced.

**Office for Community Partnerships Leadership**

OCP is led by the Director for Community Partnerships, Mr. George Selim, who reports directly to the Secretary, and a Deputy Director, Mr. David Gersten. Mr. Selim was the Director for Community Partnerships for the National Security Council from 2012 until returning to the Department in November to lead OCP. Mr. Gersten served as the DHS Coordinator of Countering Violent Extremism before joining OCP. Prior to their current roles, both had extensive experience in DHS’s Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.

**Contact the Office for Community Partnerships**

Please direct all CVE inquiries to CommunityPartnerships@hq.dhs.gov.
Still not sure if it's right but played around with it a little. Let me know your thoughts.
Here is some good CVE Q&A:

IF ASKED:
Dear Sarah,

Please find attached a continuing draft form of the CVE report. It is still in the works but Farah and Adnan wanted to be sure you all were able to take a peak at it.

Do let us know what input you have and if there are any large gaps.

Thank you for your patience!

Alysha
Homeland Security Advisory Council

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee

Report and Recommendations
Summer 2016
Withheld pursuant to exemption
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