


## **Annual Performance Report**

Appendix A: Measure Descriptions, Data Collection Methodologies, and Verification and Validation Information

Fiscal Years 2016-2018

With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values.



### **About this Report**

The *U.S. Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance Report for Fiscal Years (FY) 2016-2018* presents the Department's performance measures and applicable results aligned to our missions, provides the planned performance targets for FY 2017 and FY 2018, and includes information on the Department's Strategic Review and our Agency Priority Goals. In addition, this report presents several FY 2016 Department-wide management initiatives followed by a summary of major management and performance challenges and high-risk areas identified by the DHS Office of Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office. The report is consolidated to incorporate our annual performance plan and annual performance report.

The FY 2016 – 2018 Annual Performance Report is one in a series of three reports which comprise the Department's performance and accountability reports:

- *DHS Agency Financial Report*: Delivery date November 15, 2016.
- *DHS Annual Performance Report*: Delivery date May 22, 2017
- *DHS Summary of Performance and Financial Information:* Delivery date March 29, 2017.

When published, all three reports will be located on our public website at: http://www.dhs.gov/performance-accountability.

For more information, contact:

Department of Homeland Security Office of the Chief Financial Officer Office of Program Analysis & Evaluation 245 Murray Lane, SW Mailstop 200 Washington, DC 20528

Information may also be requested by sending an email to <u>par@hq.dhs.gov</u> or calling (202) 447-0333.





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Appendix A: Measure Descriptions, Data Collection Methodologies, and Verification and Validation Information

Appendix B: Relevant GAO and OIG Reports

#### Introduction

This Appendix provides, in tabular format, a detailed listing of all performance measures in the Annual Performance Report with their respective measure description, scope of data, data source, data collection methodology, reliability index, and explanation of data reliability check. Performance measures and their related data are listed alphabetically by Component. Also included in this appendix are measures supporting the DHS FY 2016-2017 Agency Priority Goals.

#### **Performance Data Verification and Validation Process**

The Department recognizes the importance of collecting complete, accurate, and reliable performance data since this helps determine progress toward achieving program and Department goals. Performance data are considered reliable if transactions and other data that support reported performance measures are properly recorded, processed, and summarized to permit the preparation of performance information in accordance with criteria stated by management. OMB Circular A-136, Financial Reporting Requirements, OMB Circular A-11, and the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000 (P.L. No. 106-531) further delineate this responsibility by requiring agency heads to attest to the completeness and reliability of the performance data they report and put procedures in place to ensure valid data as part of the Management Assurance process.

DHS implemented a multi-pronged approach to effectively mitigate risks and reinforce processes that enhance the Department's ability to report complete and reliable data for GPRAMA performance measure reporting. This approach consists of the: 1) an annual change control process that uses a tool called the Performance Measure Definition Form (PMDF); 2) a central information technology repository for performance measure information; 3) the Performance Measure Checklist for Completeness and Reliability; and 3) annual assessments of the completeness and reliability of a sample of our performance measures by an independent review team.

#### **Performance Measure Definition Form (PMDF)**

CFO/PA&E has used a continuous improvement process annually as a means to work to mature the breadth and scope of our publically reported set of measures. This process employs a tool known as the PMDF that provides a structured format to operationally describe every measure we publicly report in our performance deliverables. The PMDF provides instructions on completing all data fields and includes elements such as the measure name, description, scope of data included and excluded, where the data is collected and stored, a summary of the data collection and computation process, and what processes exist to double-check the accuracy of the data to ensure reliability. These data fields on the form reflect GAO's recommended elements regarding data quality. The PMDF is used as a change management tool to propose and review new measures, make changes to existing measures, and to retire measures we want to remove from our strategic and management measure sets. This information is maintained in a Department central data repository, discussed next, and is published annually as Appendix A to our Annual Performance Report.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Managing for Results: Greater Transparency Needed in Public Reporting Quality of Performance Information for Selected Agencies' Priority Goals (GAO-15-788). GAO cited DHS's thoroughness in collecting and reporting this information in their review of the quality of performance information in their report.

# **Central Information Technology Repository for Performance Measure Information**

All of DHS's approved measures are maintained in the FYHSP system, which is a Department-wide IT system accessible to all relevant parties in DHS. The system is a modular database which allows for the management of the Department's performance plan and the capturing of performance results on a quarterly basis. The FYSHP system stores all historical information about each measure including specific details regarding: scope; data source; data collection methodology; and explanation of data reliability check. The data in the system are then used as the source for all quarterly and annual Performance and Accountability Reporting. Finally, the performance data in the FYHSP system is used to populate the Department's business intelligence tools to provide real-time information.

# **Performance Measure Checklist for Completeness and Reliability**

The Performance Measure Checklist for Completeness and Reliability is a means for Component PIOs to attest to the quality of the information they are providing in our performance and accountability reports. Using the *Checklist*, Components self-evaluate key controls over GPRAMA performance measure planning and reporting actions at the end of each fiscal year. Components describe their control activities and provide a rating regarding their level of compliance and actions taken for each key control. Components also factor the results of any internal or independent measure assessments into their rating. The *Checklist* supports the Component Head assurance statements attesting to the completeness and reliability of performance data. Individual Component Head assurance statements serve as the primary basis for the Secretary's assertion whether or not the Department has effective controls over financial and performance reporting as well as efficiencies of our operations.

# **Independent Assessment of the Completeness and Reliability** of Performance Measure Data

CFO, PA&E conducts an assessment of performance measure data for completeness and reliability on a subset of its performance measures annually using an independent review team. This independent review team assesses selected Component GPRAMA measures using the methodology prescribed in the *DHS Performance Measure Verification and Validation Handbook*, documents their findings, makes recommendations for improvement, and may perform a subsequent follow-up review to observe the implementation of recommendations. Corrective actions are required for performance measures determined that rate low on the scoring factors. The Handbook is made available to all Components to encourage the development and maturation of internal data verification and validation capabilities, increase transparency, and facilitate the review process. The results obtained from the independent assessments are also used to support Component leadership assertions over the reliability of its performance information reported in the Performance Measure Checklist and Component Head Assurance Statement.

# **Management Assurance Process for GPRAMA Performance Measure Information**

The Management Assurance Process requires all Component Heads in DHS to assert that performance measure data reported in the Department's Performance and Accountability Reports are complete and reliable. If a measure is considered unreliable, the Component is directed to report the measure on the Performance Measure Checklist for Completeness and Reliability along with the corrective actions the Component is taking to correct the measure's reliability.

The DHS Office of Risk Management and Assurance, within the Office of the CFO, oversees the management of internal controls and the compilation of many sources of information to consolidate into the Component Head and the Agency Assurance Statements. The <u>Agency Financial Report</u> contains statements attesting to the completeness and reliability of performance measure information in our Performance and Accountability Reports. Any unreliable measures and corrective actions are specifically reported in the Annual Performance Report.

## Measure Descriptions, Data Collection Methodologies, and Verification and Validation Information

### **Analysis and Operations**

| Performance Measure         | Number of Intelligence reports shared with the intelligence community  |
|-----------------------------|--|
| ~                           | (New Measure)  |
| Program                     | Analysis and Operations  |
| Description                 | This measure reflects the DHS contribution of raw, unevaluated intelligence, to the intelligence community and the federal government so as to share the unique information obtained from intelligence officers in the field. This intelligence is only that which has been aligned to relevant Homeland Security Intelligence Priorities driven by the Homeland Security Intelligence Council. The measure counts the number of unique intelligence reports that DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has disseminated.                    |
| Scope of Data               | The measure reflects all Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) intelligence information reports that tagged with the relevant Homeland Security priority codes and are available to the entire Intelligence Community. The Department uses an annual process to refine the topics of concern to the enterprise and to create a hierarchy of those priority intelligence requirements and codes by which incoming information can be cataloged and retrieved for analysis later.  |
| Data Source                 | The intelligence information reports are stored and available in the official federal intelligence repository named Chrome. It is accessed through the HUMINT Online Tasking and Reporting (HOT-R) system. These systems are also the same ones used by the rest of the intelligence community to access all intelligence reporting.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | Intelligence officers in the field gather information through their interactions with sources and then they prepare a report that is considered to be raw, unevaluated information. These intelligence reports are cataloged and tagged to priorities as they are entered into the system the HUMINT Online Tasking and Reporting (HOT-R). There is significant training and a review process before reports are made permanent in the system. Once made permanent, they are available to other intelligence officers across the federal government. |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | The repositories are designated as the official repositories for the collection  |
| Reliability Check           | reports across the intelligence community and the data are reviewed at least monthly by I&A performance and operational analysts for completeness and accuracy. In the event that inaccurate data is reported, processes are in place to adjudicate any issues and correct the record to ensure accuracy.  |
|                             |  |
| Performance Measure         | Percent of initial breaking homeland security blast calls initiated between the  |

| Performance Measure | Percent of initial breaking homeland security blast calls initiated between the  |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | National Operations Center and designated homeland security partners within      |
|                     | targeted timeframes  |
|                     | (Retired Measure)  |
| Program             | Analysis and Operations  |
| Description         | This measure assesses the rate at which DHS completes inter- and intra- agency   |
|                     | blast calls to provide executive decision makers inside and outside DHS          |
|                     | immediate verbal situational reports on breaking homeland security situations of |

|                             | national importance. All of the National Operations Center (NOC) duties             |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | following an incident are designed to prepare the Secretary to brief the American   |
|                             | public within 60 minutes of a significant event. If the blast call does not happen  |
|                             | in a timely manner, the NOC will not have the information and situational           |
|                             | awareness necessary to prepare DHS senior leadership for this essential             |
|                             | requirement. The targeted timeframe to initiate the blast call is within 10 minutes |
|                             | of the Senior Watch Officer (SWO) determining that the breaking homeland            |
|                             | security situation is at least a Phase-1 event.                                     |
| Scope of Data               | The data for this measure will include all initial blast calls (conference calls)   |
|                             | made for breaking situations that are at least Phase-1 incidents. The scope does    |
|                             | not include blast calls made about ongoing situations or updates to breaking        |
|                             | situations. The recorded time for the start of the 10 minute period is the moment   |
|                             | the SWO announces that the breaking incident requires at least a Phase-1            |
|                             | designation. The recorded time of the blast call is the moment that the SWO         |
|                             | starts to speak on the blast call. There will be no sampling required, as the       |
|                             | program has access to and maintains records on all blast calls conducted.           |
| Data Source                 | The data source for this measure is contained within the program's tracking logs.   |
|                             | The data logs are entered into an automated database known as the Phase             |
|                             | Notification Report in real time and are maintained by the program office.          |
| Data Collection Methodology | Each blast call is logged into the program's tracking log by the NOC desk officer.  |
|                             | Data is extracted to calculate the percent of time blast calls are initiated within |
|                             | the targeted timeframe.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | Desk officers receive training and guidance on tracking and logging procedures,     |
| Reliability Check           | and supervisors perform regular "spot checks" to ensure that procedures are         |
|                             | being followed appropriately. Additionally, the NOC Director coordinates            |
|                             | random and systematic verification and validation of the data.                      |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of Intelligence and Analysis finished intelligence reports incorporating   |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | DHS and state/local originated data  |
|                             | (New Measure)  |
| Program                     | Analysis and Operations  |
| Description                 | This measure gauges the impact that DHS provides to the intelligence               |
|                             | community by disseminating in finished intelligence reports information            |
|                             | harnessing DHS and state, local, tribal, and territorial data that is unique. The  |
|                             | measures provides an indication of the value that DHS Intelligence is providing    |
|                             | to the larger intelligence community through its ability to collect and leverage   |
|                             | unique data to support analytical judgements and reduce potential overlap with     |
|                             | analysis form other agencies. The measure reflects intelligence that may have      |
|                             | been produced solely by DHS or in a partnership with other agencies.               |
| Scope of Data               | Information that is used to calculate this result is based on all DHS and SLTT     |
|                             | unique information cited in Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) finished intelligence  |
|                             | reports. A finished intelligence report is a product of analytical judgement       |
|                             | applied to address an intelligence question where the analytic conclusions have    |
|                             | been drafted, reviewed, and disseminated outside of I&A.                           |
| Data Source                 | Analysts begin their analysis in the System for Analytic Review and Approval       |
|                             | (SARA) system, and then the finished analytical production and reports are         |
|                             | stored in an internal system named HELIX. All analytic products must include       |
|                             | sources and metadata associated with those sources.                                |
| Data Collection Methodology | Analysts begin work by initiating a project, tracking its flow through the System  |
|                             | for Analytic Review and Approval (SARA), which captures the necessary data         |
|                             | and metadata to analyze the source information. All analytical products must       |
|                             | contain a source citation per Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 206 in the    |
|                             | report. Analysts also capture the source citations and whether or not a particular |
|                             | DHS source was used. Once the analyst completes his/her analysis and produces      |
|                             | a report of conclusions, it then moves through the work flow to leadership review  |

|                     | for analytic tradecraft which validates judgements contained in the report. If approved, the report is then considered a finished intelligence report, and is disseminated outside the organization depending on classification level. The results for this measure are determined by dividing the total number of finished intelligence reports into the number that contains DHS originated data.  |
|---------------------|--|
| Reliability Index   | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data | The finished intelligence report information and the numbers themselves are  |
| Reliability Check   | validated monthly by the Performance Measurement and Evaluation and  |
|                     | Production staff to ensure completeness and accuracy of the data and metadata in Helix. The information in this check may be cross-referenced with SARA to ensure its accuracy. The numbers of both DHS and SLTT originated data report and the total number of reports are consistently reviewed by senior leadership. In the event that potential errors have been identified in this reliability check, corrections are made to the metadata element in the repository. In the event of differences of opinion, an adjudication process exists to resolve discrepancies over the determination of information that are determined by I&A senior leadership. |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of intelligence reports rated "satisfactory" or higher in customer feedback |
|-----------------------------|---|
| 1 citoffiance weasure       | that enable customers to manage risks to cyberspace                                 |
| Program                     | Analysis and Operations   |
| Description                 | This measure gauges the extent to which the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (DHS        |
| Description                 | IE) is satisfying their customers' needs related to understanding the threat. This  |
|                             | measure encompasses reports produced by all DHS component intelligence              |
|                             | programs and provided to federal, state and local customers.                        |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of this measure is all feedback received from customer satisfaction       |
| Scope of Data               | surveys returned to the DHS IE member (USCG, TSA, etc) that originated the          |
|                             | intelligence report. For this performance measure "intelligence report" is defined  |
|                             | per Component.  |
| Data Source                 | The data source for this performance measure will be customer feedback surveys      |
| Data Source                 | fielded by the DHS IE.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | Members of the DHS IE will attach an electronic survey instrument to each           |
| Data Collection Methodology | intelligence product disseminated to customers. The recipient of the intelligence   |
|                             | completes and then returns the survey to the issuer. The DHS Intelligence           |
|                             | Enterprise will provide Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) with the survey results     |
|                             | on the second Friday following the end of each quarter. Upon receipt of the data,   |
|                             | I&A will average the data across the Intelligence Enterprise for each of DHS        |
|                             | mission area and report the total. For this measure, customer satisfaction is       |
|                             | defined as responsiveness of the product and its value in helping the customer      |
|                             | manage risks to cyberspace. Customers rate their satisfaction on a five point       |
|                             | scale from: very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, |
|                             | somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied. Responses "very satisfied" and         |
|                             | "somewhat satisfied" will be considered to have met the criteria for                |
|                             | "satisfactory."   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | Individuals within the DHS IE are responsible for collecting, storing, and          |
| Reliability Check           | reporting data generated by the source above. I&A Performance Management &          |
| Tiendelini, Check           | Evaluation personnel are responsible for aggregating the data from the DHS IE       |
|                             | and reporting the results quarterly. Once the survey responses are received and     |
|                             | aggregated, I&A PME staff review the results for consistency and look for any       |
|                             | anomalous trends that would signal a data integrity problem. Any issues are         |
|                             | researched and if any erroneous data is found, it is corrected or removed from the  |
|                             | overall calculation.  |
|                             |   |

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of intelligence reports rated "satisfactory" or higher in customer feedback that enable customers to understand the threat   |
|--|--|
| Program                                  | Analysis and Operations  |
| Description                              | This measure gauges the extent to which the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (DHS   |
| Description                              | IE) is satisfying their customers' needs related to anticipating emerging threats.  This measure encompasses reports produced by all DHS component intelligence programs and provided to federal, state and local customers.   |
| Scope of Data                            | The scope of this measure is all feedback received from customer satisfaction surveys returned to the DHS IE member (USCG, TSA, etc) that originated the intelligence report. For this performance measure "intelligence report" is defined per Component.   |
| Data Source                              | The data source for this performance measure will be customer feedback surveys fielded by the DHS IE.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Members of the DHS IE will attach an electronic survey instrument to each intelligence product disseminated to customers. The recipient of the intelligence completes and then returns the survey to the issuer. The DHS IE will provide Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) with the survey results on the second Friday following the end of each quarter. Upon receipt of the data, I&A will average the data across the Intelligence Enterprise for each of DHS mission area and report the total. For this measure, customer satisfaction is defined as responsiveness of the product and its value in helping the customer anticipate emerging threats. Customers rate their satisfaction on a five point scale from: very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied. Responses "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied" will be considered to have met the criteria for "satisfactory." |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Individuals within the DHS IE are responsible for collecting, storing, and reporting data generated by the source above. I&A Performance Management & Evaluation (PME) personnel are responsible for aggregating the data from the DHS IE and reporting the results quarterly. Once the survey responses are received and aggregated, I&A PME staff review the results for consistency and look for any anomalous trends that would signal a data integrity problem. Any issues are researched and if any erroneous data is found, it is corrected or removed from the overall calculation.  |

| Performance Measure | Percent of National Operations Center Incident Reports and Situational           |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | Awareness Products produced and disseminated to the homeland security            |
|                     | enterprise within targeted timeframes  |
|                     | (New Measure)  |
| Program             | Analysis and Operations  |
| Description         | This measure evaluates percent of Situational Awareness (SA) Products            |
|                     | disseminated within targeted timeframes. These products serve as the basis for   |
|                     | senior leader decision-making and SA across the homeland security enterprise.    |
|                     | To augment SA, facilitate coordination, and provide decision support, the NOC    |
|                     | utilizes a near real-time, web-based DHS Common Operating Picture (COP).         |
|                     | The COP can be accessed through various Briefing Display Systems within the      |
|                     | NOC, or through any computer using the Homeland Security Information             |
|                     | Network (HSIN). HSIN allows only authorized users to manipulate information      |
|                     | on the COP. The NOC Watch Team creates a geographically located icon on the      |
|                     | COP and an overall written situation summary to provide SA on the event to       |
|                     | decision makers and the Homeland Security Enterprise. The targeted timeframe     |
|                     | to create and display information on the COP is within 30 minutes of the Senior  |
|                     | Watch Officer determining that an incident requires posting to the COP at the    |
|                     | "monitored" or   |
| Scope of Data       | This measure includes all Incident Reports and situational awareness products at |
|                     | the "monitor" or "higher" incident level as determined by the Senior Watch       |

|                             | Officer. The NOC Standard and Operating Procedures (SOP) promulgate the           |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | type of report and timeline requirements for incident reporting. Type of          |
|                             | reportable events can include initial breaking, pre-planned, weather, and current |
|                             | reports updates. Incident reports are at the Monitored, Awareness, Guarded        |
|                             | (Phase 1), Concern (Phase 2), or Urgent (Phase 3) level                           |
| Data Source                 | Primary source for the required data is the Phase Notification Log which is an    |
|                             | electronic data base with controlled access on the DHS shared network drive.      |
|                             | During an event, a designated desk position on the NOC Watch Team captures        |
|                             | and manually enters the data into the electronic data base which provides the     |
|                             | detailed report timing information.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | The data for this measure will include the creation of an icon and summary on     |
|                             | the DHS Common Operating Picture (COP) for all "monitored" and "higher"           |
|                             | level Homeland Security situations. The targeted timeframe for this measure       |
|                             | starts when the SWO announces designation of an incident at the "monitored" or    |
|                             | higher level. The time stops when the incident has been added to the COP, thus    |
|                             | informing the Homeland Security Enterprise. The Notification Log (monitored       |
|                             | and higher) will be used to provide the times for this measure as it maintains a  |
|                             | detailed incident timeline summary. The manually captured data is entered into    |
|                             | the notification log for management review.                                       |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | Data is entered into the program as the incident/event is being reported. Data in |
| Reliability Check           | the system is reviewed by the Knowledge Management Officer desk supervisor        |
|                             | and Operations Officer to ensure standardization is maintained.                   |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of risk assessments for federal security support of large public/<br>community special events completed within the targeted time frame  |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | (New Measure)   |
| Program                     | Analysis and Operations   |
| Description                 | This measure indicates the percent of Special Event Assessment Ratings (SEAR) completed within the targeted timeframe. State and local authorities voluntarily submit events taking place within their jurisdictions to the National Special Events Data Call. These events are assessed using the SEAR methodology, resulting in the National Special Events List, providing a SEAR that defines 5   |
|                             | levels of risk, with SEAR 1 being the highest. SEAR levels are used by federal agencies as criteria to determine their level of support to state and local events. The list is the primary federal awareness mechanism for special events occurring across the nation.  |
| Scope of Data               | This measure includes all events submitted for review in the SEAR process. Events are collected one of two ways; either during the National Special Events Data Call period, or on an ad hoc basis throughout the calendar year. Submitted events receive a final adjudication by either November 25th for events submitted to the annual data call, or 5 business days for submitted short-notice events.  |
| Data Source                 | The Homeland Security Information Network Special Events Working Group Community of Interest (HSIN COI). It is accessible on HTTPS://hsin.dhs.gov. Users must be nominated and provided access to the COI to view the material. It is available in Microsoft EXCEL format upon request.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | This measure is currently tracked utilizing the Homeland Security Information Network Special Events Working Group Community of Interest (HSIN SWEG COI). The HSIN COI sends a notification email to the Special Events Program when a new item is received, the date of this email establishes the start time for the assessment. The new event is then adjudicated with the proper SEAR rating by the Special Events Program; the corresponding SEAR rating is then entered into the SEWG COI. The date the adjudicated SEAR rating is entered into the SEWG COI represents the end time for the measure. |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |

| Explanation of Data | The Special Events Program (SEP) manages the adjudication of submitted       |
|---------------------|--|
| Reliability Check   | events, and provides a weekly report summarizing adjudicated events. The SEP |
|                     | has a full time program analyst responsible for event database management.   |

### **Domestic Nuclear Detection Office**

| Performance Measure                   | Number of people covered by Securing the Cities program preventive   |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1 criormance weasure                  | radiological and nuclear (rad/nuc) detection capabilities (in millions)  |
| Program                               | Rad/Nuc Detection, Forensics and Prevention Capability   |
| Description                           | The Securing The Cities (STC) program provides financial assistance to state,  |
| Description                           | local, and tribal organizations to develop a robust regional radiological/nuclear  |
|                                       | detection program. For the STC program to count the population as covered by   |
|                                       | a robust radiological/nuclear detection capability, the region must demonstrate  |
|                                       | that 10% or more of its standing law enforcement are trained and equipped to   |
|                                       | conduct primary screening and patrolling as part of their daily routine duties and   |
|                                       | there are equipped and trained personnel to conduct secondary screening and  |
|                                       | alarm adjudication. In addition, the region must conduct at least one multi-   |
|                                       | jurisdictional exercise a year, and allow the exchange of information among  |
|                                       | , ,  |
|                                       | regional partners and with federal agencies, and mutually assist each other in performing the radiological/nuclear detection mission. If the measure is met, the |
|                                       |  |
| Coops of Data                         | entire population from the statistical area is counted as covered.   |
| Scope of Data                         | The measure includes data for the rad/nuc detection capability coverage within   |
|                                       | STC regions and the population data (Resident Population) for the applicable   |
|                                       | regions. The population data range is calculated using the U.S. Census Bureau  |
|                                       | Population of Combined Statistical Areas in the United States and Puerto Rico  |
|                                       | 2010 (as defined in February 2013). Census numbers are rounded to the nearest  |
|                                       | 500,000. The rad/nuc detection capability coverage within STC regions will   |
|                                       | calculate the percentage of standing law enforcement trained and equipped to   |
|                                       | conduct primary screening and patrolling as part of their daily routine duties and   |
|                                       | personnel trained and equipped to conduct secondary screening and alarm  |
| D                                     | adjudication.  |
| Data Source                           | Data for this measure are collected from the STC program, and population data  |
|                                       | will be sourced from the U.S. Census Bureau information from the 2010 census   |
|                                       | (Resident Population) which provides the Population of Combined Statistical  |
|                                       | Areas. The measure includes all communities and capabilities within the  |
|                                       | supported STC-eligible highest-risk metropolitan regions that exist to protect the   |
|                                       | population of the United States against the possession, transportation, or use of  |
| Date Calle of an Marke 1ale           | nuclear or other radioactive material outside of regulatory control.   |
| Data Collection Methodology           | Quarterly reports required of the STC grant recipients provide the operational,  |
|                                       | deployed capabilities, indicating the coverage of rad/nuc detection capabilities.  |
|                                       | Additionally, regional Multi-Year Training and Exercise Programs validate the  |
|                                       | status of readiness to include information exchange and regional coordination  |
|                                       | between State, local, county, tribal, and Federal agencies. The program  |
|                                       | threshold of 10% or greater of law enforcement personnel trained and equipped  |
|                                       | to cover the population provides the minimum detection architecture when   |
|                                       | deployed in 24 hour "steady state" operations creating a random, overlapping,  |
|                                       | mobile detection network. Achievement of the 10% training criterion is   |
|                                       | determined by reviewing the training numbers included in the quarterly reporting   |
|                                       | by the recipient. Population data are based on the U.S. Census Bureau 2010   |
|                                       | census data (Resident Population). Census numbers are rounded to the nearest   |
| Daliability Inday                     | 500,000.   |
| Reliability Index Explanation of Data | Reliable Programmatic completion with the quarterly reporting mechanisms; major  |
| Explanation of Data                   |  |
| Reliability Check                     | training and exercise performance outlined within the program to validate the  |

| overall capability readiness; and long-term sustainment plans to maintain the      |
|--|
| program's capabilities are the key indicators of the population's security against |
| nuclear or other radioactive material outside of regulatory control.               |

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of cargo conveyances that pass through radiation portal monitors upon   |
|--|---|
| Terrormance weasure                      | entering the nation via land border and international rail ports of entry   |
| Program                                  | Rad/Nuc Detection, Forensics and Prevention Capability  |
| Description                              | This measure gauges the proportion of cargo scanned by radiation detection equipment deployed to the Nation's land border crossing ports of entry and international rail ports of entry. It is expressed in terms of the percent of cargo conveyances scanned by radiation portal monitors (RPM) which enter the Nation through land ports of entry and by international rail. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) procures and/or installs RPMs at ports of entry, and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducts the cargo scanning using RPMs to prevent nuclear and other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control from entering the country via cargo conveyances.   |
| Scope of Data                            | The measure is based on the total number of cargo conveyances entering the Nation through CBP land ports of entry and railroad cars entering through international rail ports of entry. The portion of cargo conveyances that are scanned using RPMs is reported.   |
| Data Source                              | This data is jointly managed, reviewed, and provided by the CBP and DNDO Radiation Detection Equipment (RDE) Integrated Product Acquisition and Deployment Directorate. Bi-weekly progress reports of completed RPM installations are provided by the installation agent, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), to CBP and DNDO. Baseline land border cargo data are maintained by CBP, and baseline rail cargo data are maintained by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, and are published in their on-line database. They maintain monthly and annual data on the amount of cargo arriving at U.S. land border and rail crossing sites. Current detector coverage is tabulated by the DNDO Product Acquisition and Deployment Directorate (PADD) on the Land Border Cargo Analysis spreadsheet. |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Bi-weekly progress reports are provided to CBP and DNDO by PNNL and represent the number of RPM installations completed to date. DNDO calculates the percent of conveyances passing through RPMs, using baseline cargo data from 2013 and the number of deployed RPMs, to determine the percent of scanned conveyances and rail containers out of the total entering through U.S. land and rail ports of entry.   |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Portal monitor installation and system availability information is monitored and verified by CBP and DNDO, and validated by annual system recalibrations in the field. Data generated by the Department of Transportation is integrated and reviewed by DNDO PADD.  |

| Performance Measure | Percent of containerized cargo conveyances that pass through radiation portal monitors at sea ports of entry   |
|---------------------|--|
| Program             | Rad/Nuc Detection, Forensics and Prevention Capability   |
| Description         | This measure gauges the amount of containerized cargo scanned by the radiation detection equipment deployed to the Nation's sea ports of entry. It is expressed in terms of the percent of containerized cargo conveyances that are scanned by radiation portal monitors (RPM) entering the nation through sea ports of entry. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) procures and/or installs RPMs at sea ports of entry and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) conducts the cargo scanning using the RPMs to prevent nuclear and other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control from entering into the country via cargo containers at sea ports of entry. |

| Scope of Data                            | The measure is based on the total number of containerized cargo entering the Nation through CBP sea ports of entry. It identifies the portion that is scanned using RPMs. This measure does not include roll-on/roll-off (for example, vehicles) and bulk cargo.   |
|--|--|
| Data Source                              | Sea port cargo data for conveyances entering the U.S. is provided by CBP through their Operations Management Reporting (OMR) database. Bi-weekly reports of RPM installations are provided by the installation agent, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). These reports represent the number of RPM installations completed to date. The DNDO Product Acquisition and Deployment Directorate (PADD) calculates the percent coverage from that data using the Sea Port Cargo Analysis spreadsheet.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Sea port cargo data for containerized cargo entering the United States is provided by CBP. Additionally, PNNL provides CBP and DNDO bi-weekly reports indicating RPM installations completed. The percent of containerized cargo passing through RPMs is calculated by DNDO, based on the number of deployed RPMs and the OMR baseline (FY 2013) containerized cargo data for sea ports. The number of containers scanned is divided by the total number of containers incoming. DNDO PADD calculates the final percent coverage from that data using the Sea Port Cargo Analysis spreadsheet. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Portal monitor installation and system availability information is monitored and verified by DNDO and CBP, and validated by annual system recalibrations in the field. Data generated by the Department of Transportation is integrated and reviewed by DNDO PADD.   |

## **Federal Emergency Management Agency**

| Performance Measure         | Benefit to cost ratio of the Hazard Mitigation Grants   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Program                     | Mitigation  |
| Description                 | This measure reports the estimated annual benefit to cost ratio of grants provided by the FEMA Hazard Mitigation Assistance program to lessen the impact of disasters. A value greater than one indicates more benefit was reaped than cost expended. The program works with state, tribal, territorial, and local (STTL) governments engage in hazard mitigation planning to identify natural hazards that impact them, identify strategies and activities to reduce any losses from those hazards, and establish a coordinated approach to implementing the plan. These plans are the basis for STTL grant requests. Once grants are provided, program staff evaluate the benefit to cost ratio of the implementation of the plan |
| Scope of Data               | to ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent effectively.  The range of data that will be utilized includes, the total project cost and the benefits calculated by the applicant for each of the projects. There is minimal margin of error in the HMA dollars obligated as these values are collected from the HMA grants management systems. The estimated benefits derived for each project is provided by the applicant, based on BCA methodologies developed by FEMA and has been in use for the past 10 years.   |
| Data Source                 | The systems primarily used for the data collection includes FEMA's Enterprise Data Warehouse (EDW) which consolidates data from Hazard Mitigation Grant Program - National Emergency Management Information System (HMGP-NEMIS) and Mitigation Electronic Grants Management System (MT-eGrants) systems. Data is collected and consolidated into an Excel spreadsheet where the calculations for aggregate BCR will be performed.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | To determine the cost effectiveness of a HMA project, FEMA utilizes a benefit-cost ratio (BCR), which is derived from the project's total net benefits divided by its total project cost. Each sub-grant obligation and total project cost is   |

|  | captured in the HMGP-NEMIS or MT-eGrants system by FEMA HMA staff. Quarterly reports will be generated utilizing FEMA's EDW which will be utilized for the data reporting.   |
|--|--|
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Each sub-grant obligation and total project cost is captured in the HMGP-NEMIS or MT-eGrants system. This information is electronically consolidated in FEMA's Enterprise Data Warehouse (EDW). FEMA HMA staff download relevant data from the EDW, and after making the calculations for an aggregate BCR generate Quarterly excel based reports. These calculations go through a series of staff reviews before being reported on FEMA's performance system of record – the Performance Hub. |

| Performance Measure                      | Operational readiness rating of FEMA's specialized incident workforce cadres  |
|--|---|
| Program                                  | Response and Recovery   |
| Description                              | This measure gauges the overall readiness of 23 cadres in the Incident Management Workforce (IMW) by examining staffing, training, and equipping variables of qualified personnel. The IMW are the primary first responders that provide services to disaster survivors immediately after an event and support Response and Recovery operations. The ability to gauge readiness provides key information for ensuring that qualified and equipped personnel are available to respond to a disaster examining the below variables:  1. Staffing Category Variable: % of Force Structure currently on board; % of force strength available; % of force strength deployed  2. Training Category Variable: % of force strength qualified; % of qualified personnel currently available; % of all trainees who have completed their qualification sheets but still need to demonstrate performance.  3. 3. Equipping Category Variable: Percent of Reservists 1-1-1* ready  * The Reservist has a laptop, RSA token, and a phone |
| Scope of Data                            | The results are based on all available data and not a sample of data. The data included in this performance measure are an aggregate of measures of staffing, training, and equipping readiness categories.   |
| Data Source                              | The data source is the Cadre Operational Readiness and Deployability Status (CORDS) Report that measures the overall readiness of the incident management workforce for all 23 cadres. The Response Directorate's Incident Management Workforce Division (IWMD) pulls this data bi-weekly from the Deployment Tracking System.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | IWMD pulls data from the Deployment Tracking System. The CORDS report algorithm measures 3 readiness categories and assigns an overall Cadre Readiness metric called its Deployability Rating (D-Rating of 1-5) to each cadre and the organization as a whole. The D-Rating applies a weight to each individual factor used to determine the final score: 50% Staffing, 35% Training, 15% Equipping. This weighting recognizes staffing as the critical element of an expeditionary workforce. Training and Equipping are instrumental to success and efficiency, but in an emergency, having people on-hand and available is most important. The formula for measuring the D-Rating is: [(Force Strength * .5) + (Availability of Force Strength * .15) + (Inverse of Deployed * .35)] * .5 = Staffing [(Qualified &Available * .35) + (Trainees with Academics Complete * .15) + (Qualified Force Strength * .5)] * .35 = Training (Equipment Ready * .15) = Equipping Staffing + Training + Equipping = Weighted Average |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | IWMD conducts quality assurance/quality management reviews of DTS data to ensure the system accurately reflects deployment and qualifications related data reflected in the system is accurate. If deployment or qualifications data is incorrect, IWMD works with the Cadre or Program Office to change the data   |

| 11                          |  |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | based upon internal data management processes. Once verified, reliable data will   |
|                             | be made in the system immediately.   |
|                             |  |
| Performance Measure         | Percent of adults that participated in a preparedness exercise or drill at their   |
|                             | workplace, school, home or other community location in the past year   |
| -                           | (Retired Measure)  |
| Program                     | Preparedness and Protection  |
| Description                 | This measure calculates the percent of adults responding to a survey who   |
|                             | indicate that they have participated in a preparedness exercise or drill in their  |
|                             | workplace, school, home, or community in the past year. The survey collects  |
|                             | individual disaster preparedness data from a random sample of households across  |
|                             | the nation. Improving the public's knowledge and ability to take effective   |
|                             | protective actions for hazards is a key objective of preparing the public to act   |
| Commercial                  | quickly and effectively in emergency situations.   |
| Scope of Data               | As part of the Nationwide Household Survey, a total of about 3,000 or more   |
|                             | telephone interviews are conducted during the summer each year on individual   |
|                             | and household preparedness. The survey contacts individuals throughout the United States and the six territories.  |
| Data Source                 | As part of the FEMA National Survey, a total of about 3,000 or more telephone  |
| Data Source                 | interviews are conducted yearly on individual and household preparedness. The  |
|                             | survey, which is conducted by National Preparedness Directorate (NPD)  |
|                             | contractors, collects the data in the statistical analysis program SPSS and then   |
|                             | provides a report to NPD on the survey responses.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | The measure calculates the percent of households surveyed via landline or  |
| Data Concetion Methodology  | cellular phone who responded affirmatively to the question that asked whether  |
|                             | they have participated in a disaster preparedness exercise or drill in their   |
|                             | workplace, school, home or another community location in the past year. Survey   |
|                             | data is collected using a Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI)  |
|                             | system and results from the survey are analyzed in SPSS and SAS. When  |
|                             | processing the data from the random digit dialing surveys, results are weighted to   |
|                             | correct for unequal probabilities of selection. The sample data are also post-   |
|                             | stratified according to geography, age, gender and race to account for potential   |
|                             | biases such as over- and under-representation of certain population segments.  |
|                             | This will adjust the sample's demographic distributions to match the distribution  |
|                             | derived from the latest available Current Population Survey estimates.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | There is currently no way to independently verify the accuracy of participants'  |
| Reliability Check           | responses or the responses recorded by the survey administrator. But, each   |
|                             | programmed survey instrument goes through a rigorous quality control process.  |
|                             | When the instrument is in the field, this rigorous quality assurance process   |
|                             | continues. The overall process includes, but is not limited to, program testing, a   |
|                             | pre-test and cognitive testing to determine the effectiveness of the survey and  |
|                             | questions, monitoring of in-progress calls, recording of all interviews, and the   |
|                             | production of tabulations of every question and variables to detect any missing  |
|                             | data or errors. Additional quality measures include the checking of survey skip  |
|                             | patterns and data accuracy and consistency checks.   |
| De eferme a M               | Demand of adults that to the annual description of the least 1 and |
| Performance Measure         | Percent of adults that took a preparedness action at their workplace, school, home   |
|                             | or other community location in the past year (New Measure)   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of adults that took a preparedness action at their workplace, school, home or other community location in the past year (New Measure)   |
|---------------------|---|
| Program             | Preparedness and Protection   |
| Description         | This measure represents the percent of adults responding to a survey who that took a preparedness action at their workplace, school, home, or communityincluding drills. Improving the public's knowledge and ability to take effective protective actions for hazards is a key objective of preparing the public. Research indicates that drills and exercises are an effective method for |

| Scope of Data                            | increasing both knowledge and the ability to act quickly and effectively in emergency situations. Research indicates that, in addition to preparing those that are direct participants, drills and exercises provide a visible action that promotes discussion and motivates others to take action.  As part of the national survey, a total of about 5,000 or more telephone interviews are conducted yearly on individual and household preparedness. The survey contacts individuals throughout the United States. Results include adults who answer in the affirmative that they have taken any preparedness actions, which include seeking information on preparing for disasters, talking with others in the community about preparedness, attending a preparedness meeting/training,   |
|--|---|
|  | practicing a drill/exercise, developing a household emergency plan, or storing supplies specifically for a disaster in their workplace, school, home or another community location in the past year.  |
| Data Source                              | The data source for this measure is the Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system.   |
| Data Collection Methodology              | The measure calculates the percent of adults surveyed via landline or cellular phone who responded affirmatively to the question re whether they have taken any preparedness actions. Survey data is collected using a Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system and results from the survey are analyzed in SPSS and SAS. When processing the data from the random digit dialing surveys, results are weighted to correct for unequal probabilities of selection. The sample data are also post-stratified according to geography, age, gender and race to account for potential biases such as over- and under-representation of certain population segments. This will adjust the sample's demographic distributions to match the distribution derived from the latest available Current Population Survey estimates. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | There is currently no way to independently verify the accuracy of participants' responses or the responses recorded by survey administrator. But, each programmed survey instrument goes through a rigorous quality control process. When the instrument is in the field, this rigorous quality assurance process continues. The overall process includes, but is not limited to, program testing, a pre-test and cognitive testing to determine the effectiveness of the survey and questions, monitoring of in-progress calls, recording of all interviews, and the production of tabulations of every question and variables to detect any missing data or errors. Additional quality measures include the checking of survey skip patterns and data accuracy and consistency checks.  |

| Performance Measure | Percent of communities in high earthquake, flood, and wind-prone areas         |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | adopting disaster-resistant building codes                                     |
| Program             | Mitigation   |
| Description         | This measure assesses the number of communities adopting building codes        |
|                     | containing provisions that adequately address earthquake, flood, and wind      |
|                     | hazards. FEMA works with code adoption and enforcement organizations to        |
|                     | support community implementation of disaster resistant building codes, defined |
|                     | as being in compliance with the National Flood Insurance Program regulations,  |
|                     | equivalent to the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program                |
|                     | recommended provisions, and in compliance with the provisions of the           |
|                     | International Codes as designated by the International Codes Council. FEMA     |
|                     | also works with the Insurance Services Office (ISO) Building Code              |
|                     | Effectiveness Grading Schedule (BCEGS) data to track the number of high-risk   |
|                     | communities subject to flood, wind, earthquake, and combined perils that have  |
|                     | adopted disaster resistant building codes over time.                           |
| Scope of Data       | The scope of this measure includes all communities in high earthquake, flood,  |
|                     | and wind-prone areas as determined by ISO through their BCEGS database.        |

| Data Source                              | The source of data for this measure is ISO's BCEGS database which tracks the number of communities subject to flood, wind, earthquake, and combined perils and those communities that have adopted disaster-resistant building codes. ISO provides data on building codes adopted by participating jurisdictions from the BCEGS questionnaire. The BCEGS data includes building code data from 44 of the 50 states. The six states not included are Kansas and the five Bureau states (Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Washington). The BCEGS database is updated daily to include the latest surveys taken. ISO surveys each participating jurisdiction every 5 years. |
|--|--|
| Data Collection Methodology              | The Mitigation program receives data from ISO through their BCEGS database which provides the number of communities subject to flood, wind, earthquake, and combined perils and those communities that have adopted disaster-resistant building codes. This data is used to calculate the percent of communities in high earthquake, flood, and wind-prone areas adopting disaster-resistant building codes.   |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | FEMA relies on ISO to manage the completeness and reliability of the data provided thought their BCEGS database to the program; however, the data are reviewed by FEMA's Mitigation program to ensure results are consistent over time. If significant fluctuations in quarterly and annual results occur, the program will work with ISO to address issues with data reliability.   |

| Performance Measure                   | Percent of federal agencies ready to initialize continuity of essential functions   |
|---------------------------------------|---|
|                                       | and services in the event of a catastrophic disaster  |
| Program                               | Preparedness and Protection   |
| Description                           | This measure assesses the percent of federal agencies ready to respond  |
| _                                     | immediately to a continuity of operations event. This measure encompasses   |
|                                       | Category I through IV Federal agencies that respond to Department and Agency  |
|                                       | (D/A) monthly notification tests and real-world incidents within four hours.  |
| Scope of Data                         | The scope of this measure includes Category I, II, III, IV Departments and  |
|                                       | Agencies (D/As), as defined by HSPD-20/NSPD-51.   |
| Data Source                           | The D/As determine which individuals and entities (i.e. Emergency Operations  |
|                                       | Centers) within their agency will receive the alert and provide their contact   |
|                                       | information to to the National Continuity Programs Directorate (NCP). NCP   |
|                                       | maintains a hard copy roster in Microsoft Word that contains the contact data;  |
|                                       | NCP uses this roster to update the FEMA Emergency Notification System (ENS)   |
|                                       | and verify test results and D/A contact information. The ENS stores the D/A   |
|                                       | contact data within its database and uses that contact data to conduct drills and   |
|                                       | real world notifications. The ENS compiles notification results.  |
| Data Collection Methodology           | The FEMA Emergency Notification System (ENS) stores the D/A contact data  |
|                                       | within its database and uses that contact data to notify Category I and IV  |
|                                       | agencies during drills and real world notifications. The system tracks whether  |
|                                       | each D/A was successfully contacted and whether the notification was  |
|                                       | acknowledged. NCP receives this information from the system in a  |
|                                       | Qualifications and Exception report. NCP reviews the report and compares it to  |
|                                       | the D/A roster that NCP maintains to determine the percent of Category I and IV   |
| Dallahilian Indan                     | D/As that were successfully notified.   |
| Reliability Index                     | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data Reliability Check | NCP reviews each ENS Qualification and Exception report to determine which agencies were successfully notified and acknowledged alert receipt. On a |
| Renability Check                      | quarterly basis, NCP asks all Federal executive branch D/As to review their   |
|                                       | listed points-of-contact and contact information and update, if needed. On a  |
|                                       | quarterly basis, NCP briefs the results of tests and real world events to the   |
|                                       | Continuity Advisory Group, an Assistant Secretary-level forum attended by the   |
|                                       | National Security Council Staff, to inform leadership on results.   |
|                                       | readonal Security Council Start, to inform leadership on results.   |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of high-priority core planning capabilities rated as proficient by states   |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | and territories   |
|                             | (Retired Measure)   |
| Program                     | Preparedness and Protection   |
| Description                 | This measure reports the percent of high-priority core capabilities related to  |
|                             | planning that states and territories rate as proficient. Planning is a key indicator  |
|                             | of their overall level of preparedness. This information is gathered from the State   |
|                             | Preparedness Report (SPR), which is an annual self-assessment by states and   |
|                             | territories of their levels of preparedness in nationally established capabilities to   |
|                             | prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from   |
|                             |   |
| C CD                        | those threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.  |
| Scope of Data               | The National Preparedness Goal establishes 31 core capabilities to prevent,   |
|                             | protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats  |
|                             | and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation. The SPR  |
|                             | tool allows states and territories to assess each core capability in terms of the   |
|                             | planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises (POETE framework)  |
|                             | elements on a nominal 1-5 scale. Proficient, for the purposes of this measure, is   |
|                             | defined by a rating of a 4 or 5 on the nominal scale for the planning element of  |
|                             | the POETE framework. This measure considers only the planning element in the  |
|                             | core capabilities rated as a high priority by states and territories.   |
| Data Source                 | The data are collected from the official states' and territories' responses to the  |
|                             | annual SPR capability assessment that is submitted to the National Preparedness   |
|                             | Assessment Division (FEMA\NPD\NPAD).  |
| Data Collection Methodology | This measure is the fraction of high-priority capabilities for which states and   |
|                             | territories are proficient for planning. For this metric, the numerator is calculated   |
|                             | by finding the total number of high-priority core capability planning elements  |
|                             | rated as proficient (4 or 5). The denominator is calculated by determining the  |
|                             | total number of high-priority core capability planning elements rated as 1, 2, 3, 4,  |
|                             | or 5 for all states and territories.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | FEMA NPAD reviews the states' and territories' self-assessments. Final SPR  |
| Reliability Check           | responses represent an informed estimate by states and territories. NPAD reviews  |
|                             | all SPR data for inconsistencies, missing/invalid data, and outliers that do not  |
|                             | pass the logic test. Any inconsistencies, outliers or missing/invalid data are  |
|                             | flagged and then reviewed with the state, in coordination with the FEMA   |
|                             | regions, for accuracy. The data is contained on a spreadsheet that automatically  |
|                             | calculates the percentages; this data is then verified by NPAD staff for accuracy.  |
|                             | calculates the percentages, and data is then verified by 141115 stail for accuracy.   |
| Performance Measure         | Percent of incident management and support actions taken that are necessary to  |
| 1 criormance ivicusure      | stabilize an incident that are performed within 72 hours or by the agreed upon  |
|                             | time  |
| Program                     | Response and Recovery   |
| Description                 |   |
| Description                 | This measure reflects FEMA's role in effectively responding to any threat or  |
|                             | hazard, with an emphasis on saving and sustaining lives within 72 hours, in   |
|                             | support of state, local, tribal and territorial governments. "Actions necessary to stabilize an incident" are defined as those functions that must be initiated |
|                             |   |
|                             | immediately following an incident in order to ensure the best outcomes for  |
|                             | survivors. These actions include establishing joint federal/state incident  |
|                             | objectives and interoperable communications between FEMA-supported incident   |
|                             | sites, deploying urban search and rescue resources, rapidly activating response   |
|                             | coordination centers, and issuing timely alerts, warnings, operations orders, and   |
|                             | situation reports.  |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of this measure includes all incidents—defined as all significant   |
|                             | events, exercises, or activities—that require execution of the critical response  |
|                             |   |
|                             | functions described above. These functions must be performed within   |

|                             | (IMATs) establishing joint federal/state incident objectives; (2) disaster         |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | communication capabilities linking FEMA-supported incident sites; (3) national     |
|                             | Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) resources arriving on-scene; (4) response           |
|                             | coordination centers activating to directed levels; (5) watch centers transmitting |
|                             | operations orders and situation reports; and (6) the FEMA Operations Center        |
|                             | issuing alerts, warnings, and notifications.                                       |
| Data Source                 | National and Regional IMAT deployment data are submitted to the National           |
|                             | Watch Center (NWC), which provides it to the Field Operations Support Branch       |
|                             | for management and tracking. The Disaster Emergency Communications                 |
|                             | Division manages a database of Mobile Emergency Response Support-related           |
|                             | deployment and response data. FEMA's US&R Branch manages deployment and            |
|                             | response data associated with the National US&R Response System. National          |
|                             | US&R statuses are updated every two hours during deployment, which is              |
|                             | captured through National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) and NWC              |
|                             | reporting and is tracked by the US&R Branch. Situation reports and operations      |
|                             | orders are tracked by both the National and Regionals watch centers,               |
|                             | electronically and on paper. NRCC and Regional Response Coordination Centers       |
|                             | (RRCC) data are tracked through the manual comparison of operations orders         |
|                             | and NRCC/RRCC activation logs. FEMA Operations Center data are managed             |
|                             | and tracked through the Emergency Notification System.                             |
| Data Collection Methodology | For each quarter, FEMA tracks when an incident requires one or more of the six     |
|                             | activities described above and whether or not the activity is accomplished in the  |
|                             | time required. Each activity is scored quarterly based on percent of times         |
|                             | completed within required timeframe (i.e. if the NRCC is activated 5 times in      |
|                             | one quarter and activates to the directed level 4 of those times, the activity is  |
|                             | scored as 80%). These six activity-level scores are then equally averaged for a    |
|                             | total composite score each quarter.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | Each supporting activity mentioned above is responsible for reporting on the       |
| Reliability Check           | timeliness of the response for each incident requiring FEMA assistance. For        |
|                             | each incident a score is determined based on the data collection methodology.      |
|                             | Each quarter the sum of these scores is additive and divided by the number of      |
|                             | incidents occurring during the quarter, resulting in an equally weighted average.  |
|                             |  |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of Incident Management Assistance Teams establishing joint federal and state response objectives within 18 hours  |
|-----------------------------|---|
| D                           |   |
| Program                     | Response and Recovery   |
| Description                 | This measure gauges the percent of time that Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs) have deployed and have established initial joint federal and state response objectives within 18 hours of a request from a state or jurisdiction. IMATs rapidly deploy to an incident, provide leadership for federal assistance, and coordinate and integrate inter-jurisdictional response in support of an affected state or territory.  |
| Scope of Data               | FEMA is responsible for three National and thirteen Regional Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs). The scope of this measure includes all significant activities or events that require the deployment of one or more IMATs. This measure is restricted to IMATs that are deployed within the continental United States.  |
| Data Source                 | IMAT notification and arrival times are tracked by the National Watch Center (NWC) and the NRCC. The NWC maintains this information on a shared drive.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | The teams are notified of deployment and FEMA's NWC documents the notification. Once the team arrives on scene, the team chief contacts the NRCC to update their status in the NWC shared drive. This tool is used during declared disasters and for other emergency incidents or exercises. FEMAs Response staff at HQ extract data from the database related to on-scene arrival times of any (or all) teams deployed to one or more incidents and compares to when teams were notified of deployment for corresponding incidents. This data is analyzed by |

|  | comparing team arrival times to the times teams were initially notified of deployment. The data is based on the total number of actual real-world or exercise deployments, rather than a specific number of deployments throughout the year.  |
|--|---|
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | FEMA's National Watch Center (NWC) database is used as the system of record to report and archive data for historical reference. Program personnel review the data after each deployment to ensure accuracy of data entered. Any anomalies are researched against other data records to confirm time of notification. |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of incident management planned workforce currently on board (New         |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | Measure)   |
| Program                     | Response and Recovery  |
| Description                 | This measures tracks FEMA's progress towards achieving an optimal incident       |
|                             | management force strength. FEMA's Incident Management Force Structure            |
|                             | establishes the total number of personnel required, by position and employee     |
|                             | type, for FEMA to respond to a variety of concurrent events and scenarios. It is |
|                             | updated every three years.   |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of this measure includes planned workforce employees within the        |
|                             | Cadres (23 total) positions. The Cadre positions include represented are         |
|                             | Acquisition, Alternate Dispute Resolution, Disaster Emergency                    |
|                             | Communications, Training, Disability Integration, Disaster Survivor Assistance,  |
|                             | External Affairs, Environmental and Historic Preservation, Equal Rights, Federal |
|                             | Coordinating Officer, Financial Management, Hazard Mitigation, Human             |
|                             | Resources, Individual Assistance, Information Technology, Logistics, National    |
|                             | Disaster Recovery, Office of Chief Counsel, Operations, Public Assistance,       |
|                             | Planning, Safety and Security.   |
| Data Source                 | Data for this measure is maintained in the Deployment Tracking System.           |
| Data Collection Methodology | This data is available at any time in the Deployment Tracking System, which is   |
|                             | integrated with FEMA's Human Capital systems to ensure real-time tracking on     |
|                             | employee on-boarding, promotions, organizational alignment, and separations.     |
|                             | FEMA, in coordination with the Office of Policy & Program Analysis has           |
|                             | developed a dashboard to assist in the assessment of the data at any given point |
| 5 11 1 11 2 1               | in time.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | The System of record for this measure (DTS) is regularly updated and monitored   |
| Reliability Check           | by the Field Operations Division, and results reviewed for quality by senior     |
|                             | managers in the Office of Response and Recovery.                                 |

| Performance Measure | Percent of recovery services through Individual Assistance delivered to disaster survivors gauging the quality of program services, supporting infrastructure, and customer satisfaction following a disaster  |
|---------------------|--|
| Program             | Response and Recovery  |
| Description         | This is a weighted percent that reflects FEMA's role in delivering quality services to disaster survivors. This measure is based upon three categories: program services, supporting infrastructure, and customer satisfaction. Subelements within these three categories include providing temporary housing assistance and case management; having available grant management and internet and telephone registration systems; ensuring call centers respond quickly and business staff are in place; and, delivering these services to enhance customer satisfaction of those receiving individual assistance from FEMA following a disaster. Recovery assistance helps individuals affected by disasters and emergencies return to normal quickly and efficiently. |
| Scope of Data       | The scope of this measure is for all federally-declared disasters within the year.  Data collected as part of the customer satisfaction sub-element uses a random sample of registered disaster assistance applicants who received assistance within   |

|                             | the previous fiscal quarter of all individual disaster applicants who registered    |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | with FEMA and received assistance within the previous quarter.                      |
| Data Source                 | Several FEMA-owned data systems and sources are used to provide data for this       |
| Data Source                 |   |
|                             | measure. Data on the eligible applicants provided temporary housing assistance      |
|                             | within 60 day of a disaster and the State grant award of Disaster Case              |
|                             | Management come from the Individual Assistance (IA) Grants Management               |
|                             | System. The availability of the IA Grants Management System and Internet and        |
|                             | Telephone Registration System availability comes from the Office of the Chief       |
|                             | Information Officer Oerational Report. Call Center Average Answer Time comes        |
|                             | from the Call Center Database. The Recovery Human Capital Report provides           |
|                             | data on IA, National Processing Service Center, and the Business Management         |
|                             | Division Organizational Fill. Data on the IA Customer Service Satisfaction          |
|                             | Survey comes from the National Processing Service Center Survey Team report.        |
| Data Collection Methodology | The Recovery Performance Management Team collects, conducts a peer review           |
|                             | and analyzes all data. Once validated, data are grouped into three categories and   |
|                             | weighted for the composite score. Weighting is as follows: program services are     |
|                             | 40 percent, supporting infrastructure 35 percent and customer satisfaction 25       |
|                             | percent. Program services are the percent of eligible applicants provided           |
|                             | temporary housing assistance within 60 days of a disaster and the awarding of a     |
|                             | Disaster Case Management State Grant Award within 120 days of the receipt of a      |
|                             | complete application. Supporting infrastructure is the percent of time the          |
|                             | Individual Assistance (IA) grants management system is available, the percent of    |
|                             | time the internet and phone registration systems are available, the percent of time |
|                             | calls are answered within two minutes for the Call Center, and IA's                 |
|                             | organizational fill. Customer satisfaction is the percent of people who express     |
|                             |   |
| D.11.1.114 T. 1.            | satisfaction after receiving an IA grant in the previous quarter.                   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | Recovery Business Management Division manually checks the completeness and          |
| Reliability Check           | validity for Output factor data against status reports from the Chief Human         |
|                             | Capital, Chief Finanical, and Chief Procurement Officers. HQ Recovery               |
|                             | Indiviudal Assistance Division checks Preparedness, Awareness, Access, and          |
|                             | Action factor data using its IT systems and associated reporting tools, and its     |
|                             | Executive Communications Unit (ECU).  |
|                             |   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of recovery services through Public Assistance delivered to communities gauging the quality of program services, supporting infrastructure, and customer satisfaction following a disaster   |
|---------------------|--|
| Program             | Response and Recovery  |
| Description         | This measure is a weighted percent of how FEMA delivers quality services to communities following a disaster based upon three categories: program services, supporting infrastructure, and customer satisfaction. Sub-elements within these three categories include ensuring timely kickoff meetings following requests for public assistance; having available grant management systems; assuring that business staff are in place; and, delivering these services to enhance customer satisfaction of those receiving public assistance. Supporting and ensuring our citizens have quality support after a disaster is critical to facilitating a community's recovery. |
| Scope of Data       | The scope of this measure is for all federally-declared disasters within United States and territories.  |
| Data Source         | Several data sources are used to provide data for this measure. Data for the number of days for the Request for Public Assistance to the kickoff meeting comes from the Emergency Management Mission Integrated Environment (EMMIE). Information on EMMIE availability comes from the Office of the Chief Information Officer Operational Report. Organizational fill information comes from the Recovery Human Capital Report and the Customer Service Satisfaction Survey data comes from the National Processing Service Center Survey Team report.   |

| Data Collection Methodology | All data are collected, recorded, collated, and analyzed by the Recovery          |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | Performance Management Team. All data are checked for quality including           |
|                             | completeness, potential errors, and by conducting a peer review. Once data are    |
|                             | validated, the data is grouped into three categories, and weighted to determine   |
|                             | the composite score for the measure. Weighting is as follows: program services    |
|                             | are 50 percent, supporting infrastructure is 25 percent and customer satisfaction |
|                             | is 25 percent. Program services encompass the percent of time that kickoff        |
|                             | meetings occur within 60 days of a request for public assistance. Supporting      |
|                             | infrastructure encompasses the percent of time that the Public Assistance grants  |
|                             | management system (EMMIE) is available and the organizational fill of FEMA's      |
|                             | Public Assistance organization. Customer satisfaction information expresses the   |
|                             | percent of grantees and sub-grantees who expressed satisfaction after receiving a |
|                             | Public Assistance grant in the previous quarter.                                  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | The Recovery Performance Management Team manually checks the                      |
| Reliability Check           | completeness and validity for Output factor data against status reports from the  |
|                             | Chief Human Capital, Chief Finanical, and Chief Procurement Officers. HQ          |
|                             | Recovery Public Assistance Division checks Preparedness, Awareness, Access,       |
|                             | and Action factor data using EMMIE and its associated reporting tools.            |
|                             |   |
| Performance Measure         | Percent of shipments for required life-sustaining commodities (meals, water,      |
|                             | towns misstic shooting sots blankets and consectors) and leave initial response   |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of shipments for required life-sustaining commodities (meals, water, tarps, plastic sheeting, cots, blankets, and generators) and key initial response   |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | resources delivered by the agreed upon date  |
| Program                     | Response and Recovery  |
| Description                 | This measurement evaluates the percent of shipments from FEMA Distribution Centers or logistics partners that arrive at the specified location by the validated and agreed upon delivery date. The measurement is a percentage measurement   |
|                             | derived by dividing the number of shipments that are received on time by the total number requested.   |
| Scope of Data               | The parameters used to define what data is included in this performance measure are comparison of requested materials, date to be delivered, arrival status, and quantity received. All shipments resulting in a valid shipment will be measured. The "agreed upon date" is the established date that both supplier (logistics) and customer (operations) have determined best meets the need of the situation.  |
| Data Source                 | FEMA is shifting from manual record-keeping systems to an automated Logistics Supply Chain Management System (LSCMS). Both systems are used to report Receipt information from state sites to FEMA. As FEMA strives to integrate the LSCMS Request and Order systems, there may be some errors in recording the Required Delivery Date (RDD) on the Request into the Order system. Data responsibilities are shared by several FEMA and external groups: The NRCC Resource Support Section (RSS) verifies and validates the information and orders the assets. FEMA partners/Distribution Centers/Incident Support Bases (ISBs) fulfill the order and dispatch the shipments; FEMA HQ/field sites/states receive the shipments and verify time received and condition of the shipment. FEMA Logistics Management directorate owns the reporting database through the LSCMS/Total Asset Visibility (TAV) Program. |
| Data Collection Methodology | Requests for disaster assets are entered into LSCMS by supply chain managers at FEMA HQ or regional staff. When shipments are received at designated locations (either FEMA or state sites), the receipt is recorded in LSCMS by FEMA staff (state representatives report data to FEMA). FEMA analysts extract Tier I (life-saving/life-sustaining resources) and Tier II (key operational resources) data from LSCMS: (1) the number of shipments in an order meeting the RDD. For each tier, FEMA staff tabulates the percent of shipments arriving by the RDD.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |

| Explanation of Data | Data is first checked for accuracy and completeness by the Logistics               |
|---------------------|--|
| Reliability Check   | Management Center (LMC) within the Logistics Operations Division. The              |
|                     | specific role within the LMC to conduct this comprehensive review and analysis     |
|                     | is the LMC Chief. As a double-check, the Transportation Management Branch          |
|                     | (TMB) within the Distribution Management Division verifies any shipment            |
|                     | where there is a question against the actual Bill of Lading (BOL), which is the    |
|                     | contract between FEMA and the Transportation Service Provider, and is signed       |
|                     | and dated by the driver and the customer upon delivery. By comparing the date      |
|                     | the BOL was signed against the reported receiving date within LSCMS, the TMB       |
|                     | provides the double check to ensure data is accurate. The TMB also maintains a     |
|                     | daily log of all orders throughout the year which is used to clarify any questions |
|                     | or discrepancies.  |

| D C M                       |   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Performance Measure         | Percent of states and territories that have achieved an intermediate or above           |
| D                           | proficiency to address their targets established through their THIRA                    |
| Program                     | Preparedness and Protection   |
| Description                 | This measure assesses the percentage of state and territorial State Preparedness        |
|                             | Report (SPR) ratings at or above the 3.0 threshold when averaging across the            |
|                             | planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise (POETE) elements              |
|                             | rated by grantees for each core capability. The measure is calculated by                |
|                             | averaging SPR POETE ratings for each core capability that a state or territory          |
|                             | has identified as high-priority. If a state's or territory's average SPR rating for its |
|                             | high-priority core capability POETE elements is 3.0 or higher, it is counted            |
|                             | toward the measure. To increase the rating for one POETE element of a core              |
|                             | capability by one point, a state/territory would have to increase capability by as      |
|                             | much as 20 percent.   |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of this measure includes all 50 states and six territories.                   |
| Data Source                 | States and territories assess their current core capability levels relative to their    |
|                             | own capability targets annually through the State Preparedness Report (SPR).            |
|                             | This annual self-assessment provides detailed data on the number of states and          |
|                             | territories whose capability levels increase or decrease each year. SPR data used       |
|                             | in this measure are a self-assessed rating for each POETE solution area and a           |
|                             | priority (high, medium, or low) for each core capability. The data are collected        |
|                             | using Microsoft Excel from the official states' and territories' responses to the       |
|                             | annual SPR capability assessment that is submitted to the National Preparedness         |
|                             | Assessment Division (FEMA\NPD\NPAD). The analysis is done using Excel.                  |
| Data Collection Methodology | For each core capability, states and territories assess their preparedness levels in    |
|                             | each of the five solution areas—planning, organization, equipment, training, and        |
|                             | exercises (POETE). They use a five-point scale for each assessment, where level         |
|                             | one indicates little-to-no capability, and level five indicates that they have all or   |
|                             | nearly all of the capability required to meet their target. The data are obtained       |
|                             | from state and territory SPRs submitted to FEMA each year. The Excel based              |
|                             | data analysis tool will extract SPR data into a raw data worksheet. NPAD will           |
|                             | calculate the measure from the raw data.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | States and territories receive substantial technical assistance (TA) on conducting      |
| Reliability Check           | the THIRA and submitting their capability levels estimates through the SPR. TA          |
|                             | takes the form of published guidance (Comprehensive Preparedness Guide                  |
|                             | (CPG) 201: THIRA Guide, Second Edition), workshop sessions in the FEMA                  |
|                             | Regions, and just-in-time instruction during the assessment period. SPR                 |
|                             | submissions are routed through the Homeland Security Grant Program State                |
|                             | Administrative Agency to ensure it represents all preparedness stakeholders in          |
|                             | the jurisdiction. The Regional Federal Preparedness Coordinator and/or his or her       |
|                             | staff review all state, territorial, and other eligible grantee THIRA submissions in    |
|                             | their area of responsibility. The review ensures that the submitted THIRAs are          |
|                             | developed in alignment with CPG 201.  |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of states and territories with a Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk  |
|-----------------------------|---|
| 1 chormanee weasure         | Assessment (THIRA) that meets current DHS guidance  |
| Program                     | Preparedness and Protection   |
| Description                 | This measure quantifies the percentage of states and territories that develop a THIRA in accordance with the DHS guidance. The FY 2012 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP)/Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grant guidance requires the development and maintenance of a THIRA. Developing and maintaining an understanding of risks faced by communities and the Nation is an essential component of the National Preparedness System. THIRA guidance provides a common and consistent approach for identifying and assessing risks and their associated impacts. This common approach will enable the whole community to maintain a baseline understanding of the risks that they face, facilitating efforts to identify capability and resource gaps, focus capability improvements, and inform the community of actions they can take to manage their risks. |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of this measure includes all 50 states and six territories.   |
| Data Source                 | Grantees will be required to develop and submit a THIRA to PrepCAST no later than December 31 annually. The regions will review the THIRAs received and submit to headquarters via e-mail verification that the THIRAs meet current guidance; NPAD will be reviewing the results to use in the annual National Preparedness Report (NPR).   |
| Data Collection Methodology | Grantees will be required to develop and submit a THIRA to their FEMA region no later than December 31 annually as part of the FY 2012 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP)/Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grant guidance. The regions will review the THIRAs received and submit to headquarters verification that the THIRAs meet current guidance. Headquarters then calculates the percent of states and territories that completed all steps of the THIRA guidance and obtained regional review and verification. As THIRAs are submitted to FEMA at the end of the calendar year, there is a data lag for this measure - the activities occurring during calendar year 2012 will be analyzed during 2013 and will be reported as end of year results at the close of fiscal year 2013.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | The FEMA Regional Federal Preparedness Coordinators (FPCs) will review all  |
| Reliability Check           | state and territorial THIRA submissions to ensure that the submitted THIRAs meet current DHS guidance.  |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of the U.S. population directly covered by FEMA connected radio           |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | transmission stations   |
| Program                     | Preparedness and Protection   |
| Description                 | This measure tracks the percentage of U.S. residents that will be capable of      |
|                             | receiving an emergency alert message from a broadcast station that is connected   |
|                             | and enhanced by FEMA to provide resilient, last resort capability for the         |
|                             | President to address the American people. Executive Order 13407 requires the      |
|                             | Integrated Public Alert Warning System (IPAWS) to implement a capability to       |
|                             | alert and warn the American people in all hazards and "to ensure that under all   |
|                             | conditions the President can communicate with the American people."               |
| Scope of Data               | The population in the Continental United States as well as Alaska, Hawaii, and    |
|                             | the 6 U.S. territories.   |
| Data Source                 | For population data, the source of data in the most recent U.S. Census bureau     |
|                             | data. The source of data for radio locations, transmission data, contour maps,    |
|                             | frequency propagation tools, and population coverage is provided by the Federal   |
|                             | Communications Commission (FCC).  |
| Data Collection Methodology | An accounting of the Continental United States, Hawaii, Alaska, and the 6 U.S.    |
|                             | territories population that can receive alert and warning messages directly from  |
|                             | an initial delivery system is developed as follows: Service contours for stations |

|                     | participating in the Primary Entry Point (PEP) program are calculated using standard FCC methodology. Reference signal levels follow recommendations of Primary Entry Point Administrative Council (PEPAC): AM signal level: 0.5 mV/m, FCC M3 ground conductivity data; FM signal level 50 dBu, USGS 3 second terrain data. Station power and antenna specifications used were extracted from the FCC's online data resource. Served population is based on the most current US Census data aggregated into one kilometer tiles. The calculation of the population that can receive alert and warning messages is then divided by the total population to determine the percent of the U.S. population |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | directly covered by FEMA connected radio transmission stations.  |
| Reliability Index   | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data | The program office uses standard Federal Communications Commission   |
| Reliability Check   | accepted means and methods to calculate the amount of the population reached.  Calculations are verified by a broadcast engineer within the program office.  |

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of time the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) infrastructure is operating and available for use by federal, state, and local officials for the dissemination of emergency alerts  |
|--|--|
| Program                                  | Preparedness and Protection  |
| Description                              | EO 13407 states "It is the policy of the United States to have an effective, reliable, integrated, flexible, and comprehensive system to alert and warn the American people in situations of war, terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other hazards to public safety and well-being (public alert and warning system), taking appropriate account of the functions, capabilities, and needs of the private sector and of all levels of government in our Federal system, and to ensure that under all conditions the President can communicate with the American people." The IPAWS infrastructure provides alert and warning message collection and dissemination so that United States residents will receive authenticated emergency alert messages over as many communications paths as possible. |
| Scope of Data                            | The data range covers the Continental United States (CONUS) as well as Alaska, Hawaii, and the 6 U.S. territories (OCONUS) Census population data and available audience reach measures.   |
| Data Source                              | US Census bureau data for population. Initially based on 2000 census statistics, to be updated with 2010 census inputs as received; FCC radio station location and transmission data; Radio frequency propagation tools; OCIO server up time reports; test and exercise reports.   |
| Data Collection Methodology              | This is a composite of three metrics. The percent of time the Emergency Alert System server is up and running: NCP will receive reports from FEMA OCIO on server up time daily. This second metric is a result of a twice-weekly test of the IPAWS OPEN system: twice a week, IPAWS will send out a test message from the primary FEMA Operations Center (FOC) and the Alternate FEMA Operations Center (AFOC) systems to the FEMA PEP Stations. The final metric will be the results of a survey of PEP Station broadcasters as to whether the television and radio broadcasters received the weekly test and whether their systems operated as required.   |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | FEMA can verify the availability and operability of the EAS server and PEP Stations. There are some vulnerabilities, such as the physical equipment at each PEP Station which is susceptible to local events. The remainder of the system is dependent upon numerous large and small national and local private sector partners who rebroadcast the EAS messages to the American people through a variety of communications technologies. NCP verifies the operability of the entire system with occasional tests. The first nationwide test of FEMA PEP Station to AM, FM, Satellite Radio, Digital, Analog, Cable, and Satellite TV will be November 2011.   |

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of U.S. population (excluding territories) covered by planned mitigation  |
|--|---|
|  | strategies  |
| Program                                  | Mitigation  |
| Description                              | This is a point in time metric that determines the percent of U.S. population (excluding territories) covered by approved or approvable local Hazard Mitigation Plans. The population of each community with approved or approvable local Hazard Mitigation Plans is used to calculate the percentage of the national population. The FEMA Mitigation program gathers and analyzes critical data to aid in future mitigation efforts and enable communities to be better informed and protected. FEMA Mitigation helps communities reduce risk through sound land-use planning principles (such as planned mitigation strategies), floodplain management practices, and financial assistance.   |
| Scope of Data                            | The scope of this measure includes all Unites States jurisdictions excluding territories.   |
| Data Source                              | Data are derived from Regional Reports and are entered into an Excel spreadsheet, which is maintained on redundant network drives. A Headquarters master spreadsheet is populated monthly by FEMA Regional Risk Analysis staff that record, report, and store the names and locations of the jurisdictions that have received FEMA approval of mitigation plans.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | FEMA regional staff review each mitigation plan based on the regulations found in 44 CFR Part 201. Plans are not approved until they demonstrate that the affected jurisdiction(s) engaged in a planning process, identified and evaluated their risks from natural hazards, create overarching goals, and evaluate a range of specific actions that would reduce their risk, including a mitigation strategy that describes how the plan will be implemented. Data on the approved plans is stored by FEMA Headquarters (HQ) Risk Analysis Division in a MS Excel spreadsheet. The percent is calculated by dividing the population of jurisdictions with approved, or approvable, plans by the total population in the United States (excluding territories). |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | FEMA utilizes an iterative validation process for its Mitigation Plan approval inventory. The FEMA Regions house the approved plans and approval records, and the master spreadsheet is kept at FEMA HQ. Each Region produces monthly reports on approved plans, which are then sent to FEMA HQ and compiled into a master All Regions Plan Approval Inventory. The Inventory is matched to Federal Information Processing Standard and Community Identification Database codes to jurisdictions and utilizes Census data to match populations for each jurisdiction. The information is sent back to the Regions for validation and updating each month.   |

## **Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers**

| Performance Measure | Number of Federal law enforcement training programs and/or academies accredited or re-accredited through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation process   |
|---------------------|---|
| Program             | Law Enforcement Training  |
| Description         | This performance measure reflects the cumulative number of Federal law enforcement training programs and/or academies accredited or re-accredited through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation (FLETA) process. Accreditation ensures that training and services provided meet professional training standards for law enforcement. Re-accreditation is conducted every five years to remain current. The results of this measure provide on-going opportunities for improvements in Federal law enforcement training programs and academies. |

| Scope of Data                            | The scope of this measure includes all Federal law enforcement training programs and academies that have ever applied for accreditation/re-accreditation through the Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation's Office of Accreditation. The FLETA Office of Accreditation's applicant/customer base extends potentially to all Federal agencies with a law enforcement role. |
|--|---|
| Data Source                              | The source of the data is the FLETA Office of Accreditation applicant tracking database in MS Access which is used to track and maintain the status of all accreditations/re-accreditations.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | As accreditations/re-accreditations are finalized, the results are provided to the FLETA Office of Accreditation. Program personnel update the FLETA Office of Accreditation applicant tracking database and generate a report from the database to tabulate the number of Federal law enforcement training programs that have a current accreditation or re-accreditation.         |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | The FLETA Office of Accreditation verifies the data through quarterly reviews of the applicant tracking database. Program personnel generate a report and provide it to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation Board for review and discussion at regularly scheduled meetings. No known integrity problems exist.  |

| Danfarmanaa Maaayira        | Demonst of Postson Opposite tions that comes the Endown! I am Enforcement   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Performance Measure         | Percent of Partner Organizations that agree the Federal Law Enforcement   |
|                             | Training Centers training programs address the right skills (e.g., critical   |
|                             | knowledge, key skills and techniques, attitudes/behaviors) needed for their officers/agents to perform their law enforcement duties                                 |
| Due cue un                  |   |
| Program                     | Law Enforcement Training  |
| Description                 | This performance measure reflects the satisfaction of Partner Organizations that  |
|                             | Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers' (FLETC) training programs address   |
|                             | the right skills needed for their officers/agents to perform their law enforcement duties such as the prevention of the introduction of high-consequence weapons of |
|                             | mass destruction, terrorism and other criminal activity against the U.S. and our  |
|                             | citizens. The results of the measure provide on-going opportunities for   |
|                             | improvements that are incorporated into FLETC training curricula, processes and   |
|                             | procedures.   |
| Scope of Data               | This measure includes the results from all Partner Organizations (POs) that   |
| Stope of Dum                | respond to the Partner Organization Satisfaction Survey Statements 1 and 2,   |
|                             | respectively: "The FLETC's basic training programs and courses of instruction   |
|                             | address the right skills needed for my officers/agents to perform their law   |
|                             | enforcement duties," and "The FLETC's advanced training programs and courses  |
|                             | of instruction address the right skills needed for my officers/agents to perform  |
|                             | their law enforcement duties." FLETC collaborates with more than 85 Partner   |
|                             | Organizations, both internal and external to the Department of Homeland   |
|                             | Security.   |
| Data Source                 | The source of the data is the FLETC Partner Organization Satisfaction Survey  |
|                             | administered via a web-based survey program (Vovici), which tabulates and   |
|                             | calculates the survey results. The PO representative from each Partner  |
|                             | Organization provides responses to the survey through Vovici and saves the  |
|                             | responses online when the survey is completed.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | The FLETC POs are surveyed using the PO Satisfaction Survey. Data are   |
|                             | collected from mid-May through June. The measure uses an average of survey  |
|                             | Statements 1 and 2. Statement 1 begins "The FLETC's basic" and Statement 2  |
|                             | begins "FLETC's advanced." Each statement ends with "training programs and  |
|                             | courses of instruction address the right skills needed for my officers/agents to  |
|                             | perform their law enforcement duties." The survey uses a modified six-point   |
|                             | Likert scale. Program personnel import the survey data as saved by survey   |
|                             | respondents from Vovici into the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences to   |
|                             | generate descriptive statistics and then into Excel to generate data charts and   |
|                             | tables. The percent is calculated as the average of the number of POs that  |

|                     | responded "Strongly Agree" or "Agree" to Statements 1 and 2 divided by the number of POs that responded to each of the respective statements. POs that responded "Not Applicable" to either Statement were excluded from the calculations. |
|---------------------|--|
| Reliability Index   | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data | The survey was developed using contemporary survey methods comparable to   |
| Reliability Check   | those used by the military services and other major training organizations.  |
|                     | Following release of the survey summary report, FLETC leaders conduct verbal   |
|                     | sessions with Partner Organization key representatives to confirm and discuss  |
|                     | their responses. Throughout the year other formal and informal inputs are  |
|                     | solicited from the Partner Organization representatives by FLETC staff and used  |
|                     | to validate the survey results. No known integrity problems exist.   |

## **National Protection and Programs Directorate**

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of annual risk and vulnerability assessments completed for twenty-three cabinet level agencies and one-third of all non-cabinet level agencies   |
|--|--|
| Program                                  | Cybersecurity  |
| Description                              | This measure assesses how many risk and vulnerability assessments (RVAs) DHS provides each year and compares that result to the total number of targeted Federal, civilian Executive Branch agencies for that year. Each year, DHS will target twenty-three cabinet level agencies and one-third of the remaining 102 Federal, civilian Executive Branch agencies. Therefore, each of the targeted cabinet level agencies will receive an annual RVA, and the other targeted agencies will receive triennial RVAs. DHS leverages cybersecurity assessment methodologies, commercial best practices and threat intelligence integration to conduct the RVAs that enables cybersecurity stakeholders to better develop decision making and risk management guidance. |
| Scope of Data                            | The scope of the data includes all of the assessment findings from the National Cybersecurity Assessment and Technical Services (NCATS) Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (RVAs). The cabinet-level agencies consist of non-defense CFO Act agencies that receive annual assessments and an additional 102 smaller agencies and departments that receive an RVA every three years.  |
| Data Source                              | Assessment and countermeasure data are collected and stored by the NCATS team using a spreadsheet that tracks RVA engagements. In the future, an NPPD or CS&C-wide customer relationship management tool will be used. RVAs include external (remote) non-credentialed scanning along with penetration testing. Measurements are tracked and stored on the Cybersecurity Assurance Lab network where the penetration testing and remote scans are conducted.   |
| Data Collection Methodology              | A team lead will track the progress of the assessment, which is scoped out with the stakeholder in the pre-assessment walkthrough. The team lead will then walk through the assessment methodology and conduct a series of testing that was identified by the stakeholder. The information derived from the tests will then populate a draft report deliverable. The data used to create the report is maintained in a spreadsheet by the NCATS program. Information on the spreadsheet includes name of finding, service impacted (if any), detailed finding, NIST Control (if any), standard remediation write up, default finding severity.   |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Each assessment concludes with a final report. The metric will be compared to the report.  |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of calls made by National Security/Emergency Preparedness users              |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | during emergency situations that DHS ensured were connected                          |
| Program                     | Emergency Communications   |
| Description                 | This measure gauges the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service              |
| -                           | (GETS) call completion rate. The GETS call completion rate is the percent of         |
|                             | calls that a National Security/Emergency Preparedness (NS/EP) user completes         |
|                             | via public telephone network, landline, or wireless, to communicate with the         |
|                             | intended user/location/system/etc, under all-hazard scenarios. Hazard scenarios      |
|                             | include terrorist attacks or natural disasters such as a hurricane or an earthquake. |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of the data is all calls initiated by a national security emergency        |
|                             | preparedness user when the Public Switched Network experiences major                 |
|                             | congestion, typically due to the occurrence of a natural or man-made disaster        |
|                             | such as a hurricane, earthquake, or terrorist event.                                 |
| Data Source                 | The data sources are reports from the GETS priority communications systems           |
|                             | providers integrated by the GETS program management office.                          |
| Data Collection Methodology | Data is captured during the reporting period when the public switched network        |
|                             | communication experiences major congestion. The information is collected             |
|                             | within the priority service communications systems and provided to NS/EP             |
|                             | communications government staff and integrated by the GETS program                   |
|                             | management office. Based on information from these reports, the program              |
|                             | calculates call completion rate.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | Carrier data is recorded, processed and summarized on a quarterly basis in           |
| Reliability Check           | accordance with criteria established by management. Data collection has been         |
|                             | ongoing for GETS since 1994. All data collected is also in accordance with best      |
|                             | industry practices and is compared with previous collected data as a validity        |
|                             | check.   |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of facilities that are likely to integrate vulnerability assessment or survey   |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | information into security and resilience enhancements   |
| Program                     | Infrastructure Protection   |
| Description                 | This measure demonstrates the percent of facilities that are likely to enhance their security and resilience by integrating Infrastructure Protection vulnerability assessment or survey information. Providing facilities with vulnerability information allows them to understand and reduce risk of the Nation's critical infrastructure.  |
| Scope of Data               | The results are based on all available data collected during the fiscal year through vulnerability assessments and Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection (ECIP) security surveys. "Security and resilience enhancements" can include changes to physical security, security force, security management, information sharing, protective measures, dependencies, robustness, resourcefulness, recovery, or the implementation of options for consideration.  |
| Data Source                 | Data from interviews with facilities following vulnerability assessments and surveys are stored in the Infrastructure Survey Tool (IST), which is input into a central Link Encrypted Network System residing on IP Gateway. The Office of Infrastructure Protection owns the final reporting database.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | Infrastructure Protection personnel conduct voluntary vulnerability assessments and ECIP security surveys on critical infrastructure facilities to identify protective measures and security gaps or vulnerabilities. Data are collected using the web-based IST. Following the facility's receipt of the survey or assessment, they are contacted via an in-person or telephone interview. Feedback is quantified using a standard 5-level Likert scale where responses range from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree." Personnel at Argonne National Laboratory conduct analysis of the interview to determine the percent of facilities that have responded that they agree or strongly agree with the statement that, "My organization is likely to integrate the information provided by the |

|  | [vulnerability assessment or survey] into its future security or resilience   |
|--|---|
|  | enhancements." This information is provided to Infrastructure Protection  |
|  | personnel who verify the final measure results before reporting the data.   |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | The data collection is completed by trained and knowledgeable individuals familiar with the knowledge, skill and ability to determine effective protective measures. Additionally, the data go through a three tier quality assurance program that ensures the data collection is in line and coordinated with methodology in place. The quality assurance is conducted by the program and methodology designers providing a high level of confidence that data entered meets the methodology requirements. Any questionable data are returned to the individual that collected the information for clarification and resolution. Updates to the program or changes to questions sets are vetted by the field team members prior to implementation. Training is conducted at least semi-annually either in person or through webinar. Immediate changes or data collection trends are sent in mass to the field so that all get the message simultaneously. |
|  | in mass to the field so that an get the message simulaneously.  |
| Performance Measure                      | Percent of Facility Security Committee Chairs (or designated officials) satisfied with the level of security provided at federal facilities (New Measure)   |
| Program                                  | Federal Protective Service  |
| Description                              | This measure assesses the effectiveness of protection and security services provided by the Federal Protective Service (FPS) to Facility Security Committee Chairs, or their designated officials, through surveying their overall customer satisfaction. The Facility Security Committee Chairperson is the representative of the primary tenant and is the primary customer of FPS Facility Security Assessments and countermeasure consultation. This will enable FPS to make better informed decisions to enhance the services it provides to its tenants.  |
| Scope of Data                            | FPS surveys the Federal Security Committee (FSC) Chairs and Designated Officials (DO) as a proxy for all tenants. Each federal facility that FPS services is represented by at least one FSC Chair or DO; some FSC Chairs and DOs represent multiple facilities. If a federal facility is occupied by more than one agency, it is still represented by only one FSC Chair or DO. FSC Chairs and DOs are federal employees of one of the agencies that occupies space in the federal facility. FSC Chairs and DOs receive the FPS Facility Security Assessment (FSA) and are consulted with regarding countermeasures. As the primary customers of FPS, FSC Chairs and DOs have the greatest amount of interaction with FPS personnel and services. In addition, FSC Chairs and DOs understand the security issues at the facilities they represent from the tenant standpoint, so   |

they are qualified to serve as proxies for tenants.

The survey FPS administers targets Facility Security Committee Chairs (or designated officials) overall satisfaction with FPS provided services. The survey is made accessible and available to all Facility Security Committee Chairs (or designated officials). Respondents rate their satisfaction using a five-point Likert scale, in which the potential responses range from 1 ("Strongly Disagree") to 5 ("Strongly Agree"). The survey is administered through SurveyMonkey. The final results are exported from SurveyMonkey to an Excel spreadsheet. This spreadsheet is validated and used to conduct results analysis at FPS HQ.

The survey will be administrated on an annual basis in late Q3 or early Q4.

Invitations to take the survey will be sent to FSC Chairs and DOs utilizing SurveyMonkey's email invitation capability. Survey access is tied to a unique link provided in the email message for each user. This survey includes a question targeted at understanding customers' overall satisfaction with FPS services. The question, "Overall, what is your satisfaction level with FPS services?" employs a five-point Likert scale for respondents to rate satisfaction. The percentage of

Data Collection Methodology

Data Source

|                     | tenants satisfied is derived from the total number of respondents who provide a |
|---------------------|---|
|                     | greater than neutral response divided by the total number of respondents.       |
| Reliability Index   | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data | The complete list of FSC Chairs and DOs, including contact information, is      |
| Reliability Check   | vetted with each of FPS' eleven regions to validate that those individuals are  |
|                     | currently serving as FSC Chairs and DOs and that the contact information is up  |
|                     | to date. The anonymous survey is sent to each FSC Chair and DO on the           |
|                     | validated list through SurveyMonkey's sinvitation tool. SurveyMonkey's survey   |
|                     | functionality ensures data reliability from a collection standpoint because it  |
|                     | ensures individuals can only submit responses to the survey once. The survey    |
|                     | results undergo multiple rounds of review beginning with the survey             |
|                     | administration team and continuing up through the Director of FPS.              |

| D 6                         | In an  |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Performance Measure         | Percent of federal, civilian executive branch personnel for whom EINSTEIN  |
|                             | intrusion prevention system coverage has been deployed   |
| -                           | (New Measure)  |
| Program                     | Cybersecurity  |
| Description                 | This measure gauges the intrusion prevention coverage provided by EINSTEIN 3   |
|                             | Accelerated (E3A) that is currently operating on civilian executive branch   |
|                             | networks. E3A has the capacity to both identify and block known malicious  |
|                             | traffic. This performance measure assesses the extent to which DHS has   |
|                             | deployed at least one E3A countermeasure to protect federal, civilian executive  |
|                             | branch Chief Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies. This measure calculates the   |
|                             | percentage of CFO Act personnel that are protected by at least one E3A   |
|                             | countermeasure.  |
| Scope of Data               | Data are based on self-reported federal, civilian executive branch CFO Act   |
|                             | Department or Agency (D/A) Personal Identity Verification (PIV) counts as  |
|                             | required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12, the date on which the   |
|                             | participating CFO Act D/A successfully completes cutover (signifying deployed  |
|                             | protection by E3A), and the service(s) selected by the participating CFO Act   |
|                             | D/A. CFO Act D/A PIV counts provide an estimate of the number of personnel   |
|                             | (federal and contractor) assigned to that CFO Act D/A. In addition, DHS also   |
|                             | uses the estimated number of privileged and unprivileged network accounts (for   |
|                             | both federal and contractor) at each D/A through Federal Information Security  |
|                             | Management Act (FISMA) reporting. DHS combines the PIV counts (aka "seat   |
|                             | count") data gathered through E3A deployment, and the FISMA network account  |
| D + C                       | data to create an "integrated seat count".   |
| Data Source                 | Federal, civilian executive branch CFO Act D/A PIV counts, number of   |
|                             | privileged and unprivileged FISMA network accounts, the services selected, and   |
|                             | cutover dates are tracked on the LAN-A hosted E3A Executive Reporting  |
|                             | Tracker, which is a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The Network Security Division   |
|                             | (NSD) Mission Engineering & Technology (ME&T) populates the dates when   |
|                             | the Departments and Agencies become covered by an E3A service, updates D/A   |
| Data Callagian Mathadalaga  | integrated seat counts, and tracks status towards cutover.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | EINSTEIN intrusion prevention system coverage is considered "deployed" when  |
|                             | the D/A successfully completes routing its traffic through a Domain Name   |
|                             | Service (DNS) server/service and/or Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) server/service to be filtered; this is also known as the cutover date. If the D/A |
|                             | opts to use one countermeasure (e.g., DNS before getting SMTP) prior to getting  |
|                             | the second, the earlier date is used as the cutover date. When the cutover is  |
|                             | completed, all D/A seats are considered protected.   |
|                             | When completing the cumulative quarterly percentage, the numerator consists of   |
|                             | the sum of the "integrated seat count" of all CFO Act D/A having a cutover date  |
|                             | prior to the reporting date and having selected either DNS and/or SMTP; the sum  |
|                             | of all known D/A seats forms the denominator. This fraction is multiplied by   |
|                             | 100 to obtain the percentage.  |
|                             | 100 to obtain the percentage.  |
|                             | l  |

| Reliability Index   | Reliable   |
|---------------------|--|
| Explanation of Data | The Network Security Division team will update the E3A Executive Reporting |
| Reliability Check   | Tracker with additional D/A PIV count and FISMA network account numbers,   |
|                     | D/A cutover dates, and selected E3A services.                              |

| D C 34                      |   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Performance Measure         | Percent of high-risk facilities that receive a facility security assessment in        |
|                             | compliance with the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) schedule                     |
| Program                     | Federal Protective Service  |
| Description                 | This measure reports the percentage of high risk (Facility Security Level 3 & 4)      |
|                             | facilities that receive a facility security assessment (FSA) in compliance with the   |
|                             | ISC schedule. An FSA is a standardized comprehensive risk assessment that             |
|                             | examines credible threats to Federal buildings and the vulnerabilities and            |
|                             | consequences associated with those threats. Credible threats include crime            |
|                             | activity or potential acts of terrorism. Each facility is assessed against a baseline |
|                             | level of protection and countermeasures are recommended to mitigate the gap           |
|                             | identified to the baseline or other credible threats and vulnerabilities unique to a  |
|                             | facility. Requirements for the frequency of Federal building security                 |
|                             | assessments are driven by the ISC standards with high risk facility assessments       |
|                             | occurring on a three year cycle.  |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of this measure includes all high risk facilities with a security level of  |
|                             | 3 or 4.   |
| Data Source                 | Data is collected in the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool (MIST) and is            |
|                             | owned and maintained by the Federal Protective Service's (FPS's) Risk                 |
|                             | Management Division (RMD).  |
| Data Collection Methodology | Results from each assessment are collected in MIST by inspectors. At the end of       |
|                             | each reporting period, the percent of high risk facilities that receive an FSA is     |
|                             | divided by the number of scheduled assessments for that period.                       |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | FSA results are consolidated and reviewed by FPS's RMD for quality assurance          |
| Reliability Check           | and performance measure reporting.  |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of incidents detected by the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team        |
|-----------------------------|--|
| 1 criormance recasare       | for which targeted agencies are notified within 30 minutes                         |
| Program                     | Cybersecurity  |
| Program                     | · ·  |
| Description                 | The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) detects              |
|                             | malicious cyber activity targeting Federal agencies. This measure assesses the     |
|                             | percent of incidents directed at Federal agencies and detected by the US-CERT      |
|                             | for which agencies are informed of this malicious activity within 30 minutes.      |
|                             | This measure demonstrates the US-CERT's ability to share situational awareness     |
|                             | of malicious activity with its Federal agency stakeholders through the EINSTEIN    |
|                             | intrusion detection systems and other tools. The numerator for this measure is the |
|                             | number of notifications within 30 minutes and the denominator is the total of      |
|                             | incidents detected.  |
| Scope of Data               | The range of data includes all malicious cyber activity detected by Einstein (E2)  |
|                             | and the notification time to that affected agency by the US-CERT team. This        |
|                             | information is stored in the system of records, Remedy.                            |
| Data Source                 | Tableau, a graphical reporting tool, is used to pull data from Remedy (our         |
|                             | official incident repository) using MySQL query which is maintained by the         |
|                             | Helpdesk. This measurement will be reported by the Business Transformation         |
|                             | Unit to CS&C Enterprise Performance Management Office.                             |
| Data Collection Methodology | The NCCIC Business Transformation Unit (BTU) extracts this number on a             |
|                             | monthly and quarterly basis from the incident management system, Remedy. An        |
|                             | MS-Excel file is created using the Tableau business intelligence tool, from the    |
|                             | SQL database in Remedy. The response data is collected in Remedy through an        |
|                             | automated e-mail system that is used to send information to a pre-determined       |
|                             | point of contact at the affected agency. The date and time of the response is time |
|                             | point of contact at the directed agency. The date and time of the response is time |

|                     | stamped in the Remedy database when e-mail notification is sent. This information is used to determine which incidents met the 30 minute notification target for this measure. The results are calculated by taking the difference from the Detected Date and the Submitted Date for the respective date range (e.g., Q1 of FY12), which is the notification time. Once all the notifications times have been calculated, the number of incidents resulting in notification within 30 mins is divided by the total number of incidents. |
|---------------------|---|
| Reliability Index   | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data | The date time stamps stored in the fields Report Date and Submit Date are   |
| Reliability Check   | computer generated. The formula is entered into Excel and checked by US-  |
|                     | CERT leadership and performance management personnel to ensure quality.   |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of known malicious cyber traffic prevented from causing harm at federal   |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | agencies  |
|                             | (Retired Measure)   |
| Program                     | Cybersecurity   |
| Description                 | This performance measure assesses the percent of known malicious activity that    |
|                             | is mitigated on federal agencies' networks through an active defense capability   |
|                             | known as EINSTEIN 3 Accelerated (E3A). This is achieved by actively               |
|                             | defending against malicious activity through detection and prevention, and        |
|                             | applying countermeasures if needed for protection. This measure assesses the      |
|                             | ability of the Department of Homeland Security to defend federal civilian agency  |
|                             | networks from cyber threats.  |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of the data includes all federal agencies covered by E3A and all        |
|                             | incidents derived by E3A recorded in the SourceFire Defense Center Database.      |
|                             | This measure covers countermeasures applied through automated mitigation that     |
|                             | is performed as designed. This measure excludes discovery signature activity,     |
|                             | which is designed to identify potential malicious activity.                       |
| Data Source                 | Detection and countermeasure data are collected and stored in the SourceFire      |
|                             | Defense Center database that is owned by United States Computer Emergency         |
|                             | Readiness Team Network Analysis.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | On a quarterly basis, data are pulled from the SourceFire Defense Center          |
|                             | database and exported into a .csv file. The data from the most recent quarter are |
|                             | added to the previously collected data. The results are calculated with the       |
|                             | numerator being the number of indicators that have an associated                  |
|                             | countermeasure that were applied divided by the denominator of the number of      |
|                             | all indicators that alerted. The result is then multiplied by 100.                |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | The data is contained in an empirical data source that cannot be manipulated      |
| Reliability Check           | across scale. US-CERT leadership performs quality management to ensure            |
|                             | reliability of data entry.  |

| Performance Measure | Percent of organizations that have implemented at least one cybersecurity           |
|---------------------|---|
|                     | enhancement after receiving a cybersecurity vulnerability assessment or survey      |
| Program             | Infrastructure Protection   |
| Description         | This measure addresses the extent to which critical infrastructure owners and       |
|                     | operators use the results of cybersecurity vulnerability and resiliency assessments |
|                     | to improve their cybersecurity posture. This measure demonstrates the percent of    |
|                     | assessed asset owners and operators that are not only developing a better           |
|                     | understanding of their cybersecurity posture, but also implementing at least one    |
|                     | cybersecurity enhancement to improve that posture.                                  |
| Scope of Data       | Data consists of the results of reviews and assessments of the Cyber Security       |
|                     | Evaluation Program (CSEP) and the Control Systems Security Program (CSSP)           |
|                     | as well as responses to a feedback form regarding whether the asset owner is        |
|                     | planning to, has scheduled, or has implemented any of the options or areas for      |
|                     | consideration. Both the CSEP Cyber Resilience Reviews (CRRs) and CSSP               |

|                             | assessments using the Cyber Security Evaluation Tool (CSET) are voluntary, as are the feedback forms.  |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Data Source                 | Data for CSEP are collected and stored on the CSEP Assessment Tracker, and   |
|                             | completed forms are stored on CSEP's SharePoint site. CSET information is kept   |
|                             | in an Excel spreadsheet, called the "ICS-CERT Assessment Tracker".   |
| Data Collection Methodology | The Control Systems Security Program and the Cyber Security Evaluation   |
|                             | Program reach out to each assessed asset owner and operator 180 days after   |
|                             | completing the CSET assessment or CRR to ask whether any cybersecurity   |
|                             | enhancements were implemented since the date of the assessment. Analysts from  |
|                             | the CSSP and CSEP programs store the associated data in the ICS-CERT   |
|                             | Assessment Tracker and the CSEP Assessment Tracker, respectively. The  |
|                             | measure result will be calculated by dividing the number of those asset owners   |
|                             | and operators who indicate the implementation of at least one enhancement by   |
|                             | the total number of onsite assessments conducted and for which a feedback form   |
|                             | was received.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | The data is collected in the ordinary course of operations for both the Control  |
| Reliability Check           | Systems Security Program and the Cyber Security Evaluation Program. Results are reported to the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, which will also review the data sources. |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of participating federal, civilian executive branch agencies for which    |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | Phase 3 continuous diagnostics and mitigation tools have been delivered to        |
|                             | monitor their networks  |
|                             | (New Measure)   |
| Program                     | Cybersecurity   |
| Description                 | This performance measure assesses the extent to which DHS has contractually       |
|                             | delivered Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Phase 3 (event              |
|                             | management) services and tools to participating federal civilian executive branch |
|                             | agencies. Once DHS has delivered the tools through contract award, agencies       |
|                             | must still take action to deploy and operate CDM on their networks. By making     |
|                             | event management available to agencies, they will now be able to more             |
|                             | effectively manage coordinated threats to their network.                          |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of the data includes all available data from the Federal Agencies       |
| -                           | participating in CDM Phase 3. The parameters used to define the data included     |
|                             | in this measure are the number of agencies with signed Memoranda of               |
|                             | Agreement (MOA) to participate in CDM and are included in the task order          |
|                             | groupings to have CDM Phase 3 tools and services delivered. The scope             |
|                             | captures progress in achieving delivery of CDM Phase 3 tools and services to      |
|                             | agencies so that they can monitor their networks and better understand what is    |
|                             | happening on their network.   |
| Data Source                 | The Office of Cybersecurity and Communications' CDM Program Office will           |
|                             | track CDM Blanket Purchase Agreement Task Orders for Phase 3 progress via         |
|                             | contract deliverables and progress reports provided by Continuous Monitoring as   |
|                             | a Service (CMaaS) providers to the contracting officer at General Services        |
|                             | Administration Federal Systems Integration and Management Center (GSA             |
|                             | FEDSIM). Each event is captured directly in contract documentation for each       |
|                             | participating agency on a monthly basis. Signed MOAs are documented by the        |
|                             | CDM Program Office and updated as changes occur.                                  |
| Data Collection Methodology | GSA FEDSIM provides monthly reports on Phase 3 contracts. These reports are       |
|                             | analyzed by the CDM Program Office and data for this measure are documented.      |
|                             | The CDM Program Office measures the number of agencies with signed MOAs           |
|                             | that have had CDM Phase 3 tools and services delivered through contract award.    |
|                             | The measure is calculated by dividing the total number of agencies with signed    |
|                             | MOAs with Phase 3 delivered by the total number of agencies with signed           |
|                             | MOAs participating in CDM Phase 3.  |

| Reliability Index   | Reliable  |
|---------------------|---|
| Explanation of Data | The CDM Program Office will validate and accept each contract deliverable after |
| Reliability Check   | a review for completeness and accuracy.   |

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of performance standards implemented by the highest risk chemical  |
|--|--|
|  | facilities and verified by DHS   |
| Program                                  | Infrastructure Protection  |
| Description                              | This measure reports the percent of applicable risk based performance standards (RBPS) that are approved and implemented within site security plans (SSPs) or alternative security programs (ASPs) for Tier 1 and Tier 2 facilities that are compliant with the Chemical Facility Anti-terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulation. Following submission of a proposed SSP/ASP by a covered facility, the CFATS regulatory authority will conduct an "authorization inspection" of the covered facility to verify that the SSP/ASP is compliant with the CFATS regulation. For this measure, SSPs/ASPs determined to meet the RBPS requirements with current and planned measures will be approved. Upon approval of its SSP/ASP, the covered facility is required to fully implement the existing measures that are described in the SSP/ASP.  |
| Scope of Data                            | The scope of this data includes all of the chemical facilities that have been given a risk based classification of Tier 1 or 2. The number of facilities identified as Tier 1 or 2 changes over time.  |
| Data Source                              | Reported data are the resulting summaries from queries against internal systems and are stored in the Chemical Security Assessment Tools Suite (CSATs). CSATs is used to provide facility identification and registration, to identify facilities that meet the Department's criteria for high risk chemical facilities, and store the methodologies to record and initially evaluate security vulnerability assessments (SVAs) and to create and store respective site security plans (SSPs) and alternate security programs (ASPs). CSATs is a secure web-based system.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | High-risk chemical facilities provide originating source data via the CSATs system. Infrastructure Security Compliance Division (ISCD) HQ staff and inspection cadre posts added information and status to the CSATs system that includes Chemical Security Evaluation and Compliance System (CHEMSEC) applications as a course of normal operations. The success percentage for this measure will be based upon: the number of approved RBPS measures of Tier 1 and Tier 2 regulated facilities that have been implemented (existing and planned with past completion dates). This number does not include those planned RBPS with future completion dates. This number is then divided by the total number of applicable RBPS measures for facilities receiving a final tiering letter (tiers 1-2 inclusive) (TRBPSFTL). Formula: Approved and Implemented RBPS (Tiers 1 and 2) ÷ TRBPSFTL (Tier 1 + Tier 2) = %. Additional details on the calculation methodology are available in ISCD's GPRA Measure Guidance. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | The accuracy of data captured and reported via the CSATs system is validated during the Systems Engineering Life Cycle (SELC) phases (deployment readiness and testing). Information is reviewed by Infrastructure Security Compliance Division Director/Deputy Director, leadership at the Office of Infrastructure Protection, and NPPD leadership.  |

| Performance Measure | Percent of respondents indicating that operational cybersecurity information products provided by DHS are helpful (New Measure)   |
|---------------------|---|
| Program             | Cybersecurity   |
| Description         | This measure assesses whether the products that the DHS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) provides are helpful for its customers. A customer survey will be used to acquire data on how helpful information provided by the NCCIC is for its stakeholders. |

| Scope of Data               | This measure is limited to customer feedback from a survey covering the Office   |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Scope of Data               | of Cybersecurity and Communications' National Cybersecurity and  |
|                             | Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) information products.  |
| Data Source                 | The data source for this performance measure is a customer feedback survey   |
| Data Source                 | available across the www.us-cert.gov web pages used by the NCCIC and its   |
|                             | DHS components. The survey contains the standard Departmental question   |
|                             | intended to elicit the degree of customer satisfaction with the helpfulness of the   |
|                             | product. The questions asks customers to answer "Was the information helpful?"   |
|                             | on a four-point rating scale (yes, somewhat, no, not applicable). A "yes" response   |
|                             | will be considered to have met the criteria for "helpful". NPPD will aggregate the   |
|                             | results obtained based on the survey metadata, and maintain the results in the   |
|                             | NCCIC Business Transformation Unit and the CS&C Enterprise Performance   |
|                             | ÷  |
| Data Callaction Mathadalacu | Management Office.  Each quarter, the NCCIC will disseminate a customer satisfaction survey to the   |
| Data Collection Methodology |  |
|                             | following stakeholder groups: Critical infrastructure owners and operators,  |
|                             | Federal agency SOCs, and State and local CISOs and their staff. The survey sent to these specific stakeholder groups will have a unique identifier attached to the |
|                             | response in order to control for public access to the survey. Only those surveys   |
|                             | with the unique stakeholder identifier will be analyzed for this measure. One  |
|                             | question is used to collect data for this measure: "Was the information helpful?"  |
|                             |  |
|                             | In addition to collecting feedback through disseminated surveys, a sample of   |
|                             | NCCIC stakeholders will be interviewed each quarter during customer feedback   |
|                             | sessions, which will include the use of the survey. The PRA number for this  |
| Daliahilita Indan           | survey is 1601-0014.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | Survey responses will be collected and maintained by NCCIC Business  |
| Reliability Check           | Transformation Unit, US-CERT Communications and CS&C Enterprise  |
|                             | Performance Management Office (EPMO) and shared with relevant CS&C   |
|                             | divisions and programs in the ordinary course of business. Data will be validated  |
|                             | by program manager reviews in relevant divisions and programs and by the   |
|                             | EPMO Performance Management branch.  |

| Performance Measure | Percent of respondents indicating that operational cybersecurity information      |
|---------------------|---|
|                     | products provided by DHS are timely and actionable                                |
|                     | (Retired Measure)   |
| Program             | Cybersecurity   |
| Description         | This measure assesses whether the products that the DHS National Cybersecurity    |
|                     | and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) provides are timely and             |
|                     | actionable for its customers. The NCCIC will follow up with cyber customers, to   |
|                     | whom information products were provided, in order to determine the timeliness     |
|                     | and effectiveness of those products. A customer survey will be used to acquire    |
|                     | data on areas such as usefulness, timeliness, actionable nature, and relevance.   |
| Scope of Data       | This measure is limited to customer feedback from a stakeholder survey covering   |
|                     | the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications' National Cybersecurity and        |
|                     | Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) operational information products.       |
| Data Source         | The data source for this performance measure is a stakeholder survey              |
|                     | disseminated and completed in connection with NCCIC information products.         |
|                     | The surveys contains the standard Departmental question intended to elicit the    |
|                     | degree of customer satisfaction with the usefulness of the product as well as its |
|                     | timeliness, actionable nature and relevance. The questions asks customers to rate |
|                     | satisfaction on a five-point rating scale (very satisfied, somewhat satisfied,    |
|                     | neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied).    |
|                     | Responses "very satisfied" and "somewhat satisfied" will be considered to have    |
|                     | met the criteria for "satisfactory". NPPD will aggregate the results obtained     |
|                     | based on the survey metadata, and maintain the results in the CS&C Enterprise     |
|                     | Performance Management Office. The spreadsheet will contain several elements,     |

|                             | including the unique product identifier, date disseminated, date survey results  |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | received, and score for each question.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | CS&C Enterprise Performance Management Office (EPMO) will make available         |
|                             | a customer satisfaction survey in connection with its information products. Two  |
|                             | questions are used to collect data for this measure: "Was this product timely?"  |
|                             | and "Was this product actionable?" Responses are weighted and the answers to     |
|                             | the question will be divided by the total number of points possible based on     |
|                             | responses received. A third question will be included in the survey to identify  |
|                             | respondents for whom the product's information is not applicable (i.e. the       |
|                             | product addresses a vulnerability in an application or operating system that a   |
|                             | given respondent does not use). The denominator will be adjusted to account for  |
|                             | stakeholders who self-identify with the population for whom the product is not   |
|                             | applicable. In addition to collecting feedback through disseminated surveys, a   |
|                             | sample of NCCIC stakeholders will be interviewed each quarter during customer    |
|                             | feedback sessions, which will include the use of the survey.                     |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | Survey responses will be collected and maintained by CS&C Enterprise             |
| Reliability Check           | Performance Management Office (EPMO) and shared with relevant CS&C               |
|                             | divisions and programs, including the NCCIC, in the ordinary course of business. |
|                             | Data will be validated by program manager reviews in relevant divisions and      |
|                             | programs and by the EPMO Performance Management branch.                          |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of respondents reporting that DHS critical infrastructure information will   |
|-----------------------------|--|
| 1 chomance weasure          | inform their decision making on risk mitigation and resilience enhancements  |
| Program                     | Infrastructure Protection  |
| Description                 | This measure will report the percent of critical infrastructure partners who   |
|                             | participated in education, training, exercise, and information sharing activities  |
|                             | developed or coordinated by the Office of Infrastructure Protection and indicated  |
|                             | that the information and products received are useful for informing their risk   |
|                             | management programs and influencing future decision-making regarding safety  |
|                             | and/or security improvements and/or resilience enhancements at their facilities.   |
|                             | Active outreach efforts and effective public-private partnerships on critical  |
|                             | infrastructure issues help to reduce risk and increase resilience across the   |
|                             | country.   |
| Scope of Data               | The scope includes quantifiable feedback received from critical infrastructure   |
|                             | partners participating in sector-specific and cross-sector education, training,  |
|                             | exercise, and information sharing activities conducted or coordinated by the   |
|                             | Sector Outreach and Programs Division (SOPD). The activities include, but are  |
|                             | not limited to webinars, facilitated workshops, seminars, instructor-led courses,  |
|                             | computer-based training, tabletop exercises, and information products such as technical guidelines, handbooks, and recommended practices. This measure |
|                             | includes a range of activities developed and implemented for the six sectors led   |
|                             | by the Office of Infrastructure Protection, which include chemical, commercial   |
|                             | facilities, critical manufacturing, dams, emergency services, and nuclear sectors,   |
|                             | as well as cross-sector engagements with local, state, and regional partners.  |
| Data Source                 | The data supporting this measure come from feedback from public and private  |
|                             | critical infrastructure partners participating in SOPD activities and programs.  |
|                             | Activity evaluation forms are systematically collected by individual Sector  |
|                             | Specific Agencies (SSA) corresponding to the six sectors led by the Office of  |
|                             | Infrastructure Protection as well as personnel involved in cross-sector education,   |
|                             | training, exercise, and information sharing activities. The information is   |
|                             | reviewed and consolidated by SOPD front office personnel into a standard   |
|                             | tracking database developed using Microsoft Excel. The database is owned and   |
|                             | maintained by the SOPD Front Office.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | Data collection is conducted through voluntary submissions of standardized   |
|                             | evaluation forms that are made available to public and private critical  |
|                             | infrastructure partners distributed and collected at the conclusion of education,  |

|  | training, exercise, and information sharing activities. Individual feedback is quantified using a standard 5-level Likert scale, in which the potential responses range from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree." The measure is calculated as the number of respondents answering "Agree" or "Strongly Agree" with the statement that, "The information received in the activity or product will effectively inform my decision making regarding safety and security risk mitigation and resilience enhancements" and then divided by the total number of respondents.   |
|--|---|
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | The data will be collected by SOPD designated personnel in coordination with the IP Strategy and Policy Office (Measurement and Reporting). The corresponding SOPD branch chiefs will be responsible for the validity of the data collected and generated in support of this measure. SOPD Front Office personnel will be responsible for working closely with project and activity leads to develop standard operating procedures for data collection, consolidation, and storage. Periodic quality checks will be conducted to identify anomalies or missing values and ensure data accuracy and reliability.   |
|  |   |
| Performance Measure                      | Percent of States and Territories with operational communications capabilities at the highest levels relative to Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) preparedness targets  |
| Program                                  | Emergency Communications  |
| Description                              | This measure uses the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and State Preparedness Report (SPR) process, conducted by FEMA on an annual basis, to identify the level of Operational Communications capabilities reported by the 56 States and Territories inclusive of applicable Urban Areas. The measure reflects the level of increase or decrease in those capabilities relative to targets established through the THIRA. The result is calculated by identifying the number of States and Territories scoring a "4" or "5" on a 5-point scale where 1 indicates little-to-no capability and 5 indicates that they have all or nearly all of the Operational Communications capabilities required to meet their targets. That number forms the numerator, which is divided by 56 and multiplied by 100 to achieve the percentage. |
| Scope of Data                            | Data is from the Threat and Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and State Preparedness Report (SPR) process, conducted by FEMA on an annual basis, to identify the level of Operational Communications capabilities reported by the 56 States and Territories inclusive of applicable Urban Areas. Each of the 56 States and Territories must, as a pre-condition for receiving DHS preparedness grant funds, complete this process.   |
| Data Source                              | As part of the broader Threat and Hazards Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and State Preparedness Report (SPR) process, through the State Administrative Agency (SAA), each State and Territory works with the jurisdictions within their boundaries to assess their present levels of Operational Communications capabilities relative to the target capabilities set forth in their THIRA. Data is reported to FEMA annually using a standardized format (the THIRA-SPR Unified Reporting Tool). The THIRA is a four step common risk assessment process that maps risks to a defined set of Core Capabilities; one is "Operational Communications."  |
| Data Collection Methodolog               | Through the THIRA, each State and Territory is required to establish a target   |

capability level which reflects the highest capability level they may need based on their identified threats and hazards. Within the SPR, each State and Territory is required to rate their current capabilities on a scale of 1 (little-to-no capability) to 5 (have all or nearly all of the Operational Communications capabilities required to meet their targets). Annually, each jurisdiction sets a Target score and Capability Assessment score. Participants update target levels of performance specific to their jurisdiction for each of the 31 core capabilities and then assess

|                     | their ability to meet those unique targets. The percent increase in operational communications capabilities is calculated by taking the total number of States and Territories that have a rating of "4" or "5" and dividing the total by 56 (the total number of States & Territories) and multiplied by 100 to achieve the |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | percentage.  |
| Reliability Index   | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data | The data is collected by FEMA and shared with OEC who compile the  |
| Reliability Check   | performance results. CS&C Enterprise Performance Management Office receives  |
|                     | the performance results on an annual basis and maintains a standard operating  |
|                     | procedure to check performance results against underlying data sources.  |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of survey respondents that were satisfied or very satisfied with the   |
|-----------------------------|--|
| 1 cirormanee wieasure       | timeliness and relevance of cyber and infrastructure analysis based products   |
| Program                     | Integrated Operations  |
| Program  Description        | The Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) produces infrastructure analytic products for DHS customers to make meaningful risk investment and resource allocation decisions in both crisis and steady state environments in order to reduce the impacts of infrastructure disruptions. In order for our customers to apply the knowledge gained from our products they must have the right information in a timely manner to inform decisions. Survey respondents comment on their level of satisfaction with both timeliness and relevance (two separate questions) of OCIA's analytic products which, in turn, provides OCIA with feedback that will be used to improve future products. OCIA averages the two responses for one metric. This is relevant to OCIA achieving its mission since the purpose of OCIA's analytic products are to inform decision-makers. Their feedback matters to the core of OCIA's purpose and is important to help   |
| Scope of Data               | OCIA gauge its progress toward accomplishing its mission.  The data is pulled from feedback surveys that are attached to OCIA products and are voluntarilly submitted electronically to OCIA. The number of survey results is limited to 1100 respondents per the OMB (Office of Management and Budget) approval on the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) approval form (OMB Control Number 1670-0027). Sampling is not used and the data is compiled and then presented as a cumulative result for the quarter and cumulative result for the fiscal year.   |
| Data Source                 | Surveys are submitted to a centralized inbox on a voluntary basis from stakeholders that received OCIA products. The inbox is managed by the OCIA Office of Management Operations. These surveys are archived on the DHS Shared Drive folder with restricted access. The PerformanceAnalyst then records survey feedback in an Excel spreadsheet by assigning number values to the quantitative feedback in order to aggregate the responses and run percentages. The analyzed data is then presented in a PowerPoint presentation and stored on the DHS Shared Drive.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | Step 1: Performance analyst imports the survey responses into Excel and conducts analysis to obtain percentages of respondents satisfied with both timeliness and relevance. The percentage of customers who are satisfied or very satisfied is calculated by summing the number of respondents who were "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with both timeliness and relevance and dividing by the total number of respondents. Surveys with an "N/A" response to either question are discarded. For example, if 1 customer reports "very satisfied" with timeliness but "somewhat dissatisfied" with relevance, 1 customer reports "somewhat satisfied" with timeliness but "N/A" for relevance, and 4 customers report "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with both timeliness and relevance, then 4 out of 5 responses meet the requirement for a result of 80%.  Step 4: Performance Analyst creates metrics report in PowerPoint to present to OCIA leadership on a quarterly basis or as requested by OCIA leadership. |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
|                             |  |

| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Once the SPP analyst records and analyzes the data in Excel, there is a second analyst to cross-check the data entry and analysis and provide a peer review to |
|--|--|
|  | check for accuracy.  |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of tenants satisfied with the level of security provided at federal facilities |
|-----------------------------|--|
| 1 chomance weasure          | * ±  |
|                             | (Retired Measure)  |
| Program                     | Federal Protective Service   |
| Description                 | This measure assesses the effectiveness of security services provided by the           |
|                             | Federal Protective Service (FPS) to the Government Services Agency (GSA)               |
|                             | tenants through the use of a formal customer satisfaction survey. FPS uses the         |
|                             | feedback from this survey to identify opportunities for improvement in the             |
|                             | security services provided to its customers.   |
| Scope of Data               | GSA distributes the Public Building Service (PBS) tenant satisfaction survey on        |
|                             | an annual basis. This web-based survey is distributed throughout the 11 GSA            |
|                             | regions to gauge the level of effectiveness of FPS and contract guard security         |
|                             | services.  |
| Data Source                 | The source of the data for this measure is GSA's PBS web based survey.                 |
| Data Collection Methodology | Using the data from the PBS survey, FPS records the level of satisfaction              |
|                             | regarding security services provided in an Excel spreadsheet. These data are           |
|                             | averaged to derive the results of this measure. These results are analyzed at the      |
|                             | Headquarters level and then submitted to FPS leadership.                               |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | FPS uses the Public Building Survey (PBS) data provided by GSA. In this case           |
| Reliability Check           | this is third party information. The program has reviewed GSA's process and has        |
|                             | determined there is sufficient oversight of data quality by GSA.                       |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of traffic monitored for cyber intrusions at civilian Federal Executive   |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | Branch agencies   |
| Program                     | Cybersecurity   |
| Description                 | This measure assesses DHS's scope of coverage for malicious activity across those non-DOD Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act and Trusted Internet Connection Access Provider (TICAP) Federal Executive Branch civilian agency networks. Federal Executive branch network monitoring uses EINSTEIN 2 intrusion detection system sensors, which are deployed to Trusted Internet Connections locations at agencies or Internet Service Providers. These sensors capture network flow information and provide alerts when signatures, indicative of malicious activity, are triggered by inbound or outbound traffic. The federal government's situational awareness of malicious activity across its systems will increase as more networks are monitored and the methodology will require data normalization to account for the addition of large numbers of networks. |
| Scope of Data               | The measure includes the non-DOD CFO Act agencies and the TICAP Federal Executive Branch civilian agencies. Percentage is determined by compiling and averaging estimates provided by the Departments and Agencies (D/As) of percent of total traffic monitored on their respective networks. The individual percentages are currently reported to OMB.   |
| Data Source                 | From data reported to NCSD from the agencies.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | For TICAP locations with operational sensors: Once EINSTEIN installations are successfully tested (including a formal Installation Test & Checkout Review) notification is provided to the respective program managers. The number of installations is tracked and published by NCPS program managers. For D/As percentage of traffic monitored (consolidated): Each TICAP Agency currently tracks and reports the estimated percent of traffic consolidated (monitored) to DHS on a yearly basis. DHS also tracks each CFO Act Agency that obtains EINSTEIN 2 coverage through an Internet Service Provider. EINSTEIN is already fully deployed and operational at each Internet Service Provider. Tracking for these agencies is binary—the information provided to DHS indicates   |

|                                       | either 100% consolidation through the ISP or 0% consolidation. DHS reports TICAP and non-TICAP CFO Act agency information to OMB on an indvidual |
|---------------------------------------|--|
|                                       | D/A basis.   |
| Reliability Index                     | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data Reliability Check | The completion of EINSTEIN installations are validated by the respective program managers during the review process. The percentage of traffic   |
| Renaulity Check                       | consolidated (monitored) is a best-effort estimate provided by the respective  |
|                                       | D/As to DHS and OMB.   |

### **Office of Health Affairs**

| Performance Measure         | Average time (in hours) to initiate a BioWatch National Conference Call to discuss the detection of a biological agent of concern and assess the risk to |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | public health with federal, state, and local partners  |
|                             | (New Measure)  |
| Program                     | Chemical and Biological Capability   |
| Description                 | This measure calculates the time in hours between a BioWatch Actionable  |
|                             | Result (BAR) Declaration and the BioWatch National Conference Call   |
|                             | (BWNCC) with local, state and federal partners. A BAR is declared when   |
|                             | positive laboratory test results detects a biological agent present with a   |
|                             | geographical area or within an indoor facility. The BioWatch National  |
|                             | Conference Call is a formal procedure initiated by DHS to notify federal, state,   |
|                             | and local resources. During an incident where a BAR is declared, the correlation   |
|                             | between the time it takes to inform and coordinate between federal, state and  |
|                             | local jurisdictional resources will impact the number of lives to be saved by the  |
|                             | coordinated response. In most cases, the highest effect would be detecting and   |
|                             | locating hostile use of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials.  |
| Scope of Data               | Any incident that is formally defined as a BioWatch Actionable Result (BAR)  |
|                             | Declaration that is documented by the completion of the BAR Declaration Form   |
|                             | is included in this measure.   |
| Data Source                 | The data source is the National Conference Call Initiation spreadsheet and the   |
|                             | original BAR Data Forms. Both of these forms are maintained by the OHA   |
|                             | Desk at the DHS National Operations Center.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | The BioWatch Program Office issues guidance to each of the BioWatch  |
|                             | jurisdictions with outlined expectations and requirements for activities to  |
|                             | determine if a BAR has been detected. To make this determination, the lab must   |
|                             | run collected samples from BioWatch collectors in indoor and outdoor field   |
|                             | locations through two verification panels and a positive result occur on both  |
|                             | tests. A BAR is declared after the jurisdictional laboratory director (or designee)  |
|                             | determines that the results are valid and not the results of artifact or   |
|                             | contamination and meet the predetermined algorithm constituting a positive   |
|                             | result. Laboratory Directors have the option to hold a conference call with OHA  |
|                             | and CDC to review the molecular biology results prior to making a BAR  |
|                             | declaration. If the decision is to move forward with the findings, the Lab   |
|                             | Director initiates the formal BAR Declaration process by completing and  |
|                             | distributing the BAR Data Form to the OHA desk at the DHS National   |
|                             | Operations Center.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | The Program Manager will double check the validity of the summary results  |
| Reliability Check           | recorded on the National Conference Call Initiation spreadsheet against the  |
|                             | original BAR Declaration Forms to confirm that the calculations are accurate   |
|                             |  |

| Performance Measure                      | Time between laboratory receipt of BioWatch detector samples to completion of screening for known biological micro-organisms of interest (in hours) (New Measure)  |
|--|--|
| Program                                  | Chemical and Biological Capability   |
| Description                              | This measure reflects how quickly BioWatch laboratories are completing the screening tests of field samples from BioWatch detectors to determine if known biological microorganisms of interest are present. This screening may potentially consist of two steps. The first step to determine if a potentially harmful biological agent exists in the sample. If a positive results is found, then the sample testing moves to the second set of panel tests to confirm the results, and is then followed by reporting by the local laboratory representative if a confirmed result is found. This measure will be determined and recorded daily at each operational laboratory. The system-wide average will be calculated to determine if degradation in the ability to generate results within the required time frame is occurring across the program. This measure gauges the ability to determine if a known biological agent of interest has been confirmed and notify the proper authorities so as to appropriately respon |
| Scope of Data                            | The scope of this measure includes all samples taken from BioWatch detectors in the field, delivered to designated BioWatch laboratories that have been authorized to support the BioWatch program. Thus the measure includes the time to run the initial tests along with the time to run the confirmation tests for those samples where the second test was required.  |
| Data Source                              | Each BioWatch laboratory captures the times to complete the initial tests and if needed the confirmation tests on a daily basis on a spreadsheet is known as the Sample Management System. The results for tests run on each sample are recorded and transmitted in the Laboratory Response Network Results Messenger system managed by the Centers for Disease Control. If a confirmation test is positive for a known biological micro-organism of interest, a BAR Data Form is produced.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Samples that are collected in the field and provided to authorized laboratories, who then test them for the presence of known biological micro-organisms of interest. Identification of known biological micro-organisms of interest is the laboratory process by which samples are tested for multiple pieces of DNA. The BioWatch program manages the development of the standard operating procedure and the format for the excel spreadsheet to allow the laboratories to capture time of receipt and time to run the tests for each sample as needed. The time from receipt of the sample to completion of the initial screening test, and completion of the confirmation test if needed, is recorded by lab technicians on the Sample Management System spreadsheet.   |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | The data reliability of the process is overseen by quality assurance staff of the BioWatch program. These individuals verify if the data provided by the BioWatch Quality Assurance program contractor complies with the standards of reporting and analysis established in their contract. Staff from the BioWatch program also perform periodic site visits to the laboratories for first-hand observation of procedures to ensure compliance with program policies, protocols, and procedures.  |

## **Science and Technology Directorate**

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of Apex technologies or knowledge products transitioned to customers for planned improvements in the Homeland Security Enterprise  |
|--|--|
| Program                                  | Research, Development, and Innovation  |
| Description                              | This measure gauges the transition of high priority, and high value research and development projects known as Apex projects. Apex technologies and knowledge products are quickly delivered to improve homeland security operations. Apex products consist of cross-cutting, multi-disciplinary efforts which employ 3 to 5 year innovation cycles from project inception through operational testing.  |
| Scope of Data                            | This measure encompasses the Apex technology or knowledge products determined by the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) and Homeland Security Enterprise and First Responders (FRG) leadership prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. A successful transition is considered to be the ownership and operation of a technology or knowledge product by a customer within the Homeland Security Enterprise. When applicable, this includes transition outcomes specifically from Apex engines, which provide a centralized pool of solution development resources for Apex projects and the broader S&T organization.  |
| Data Source                              | The system of record is the quarterly data call spreadsheet submitted by the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) front office and the Homeland Security Enterprise and First Responders (FRG) front office to the S&T Performance Team through the S&T ExecSec process. This spreadsheet is completed by the HSARPA front office and FRG front office and provided back to the S&T Performance Team for review and management.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | The status of each Apex technology or knowledge product is gathered from the individual divisions within the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) and Homeland Security Enterprise and First Responders (FRG) from a variety of sources including final reports, test or pilot results collected during trials, and various reviews (technology reviews and portfolio reviews); HSARPA and FRG senior leadership are briefed on end results, metrics, current status, go/no go decisions, as well as milestone success. For the percent result of this measure, the total number of Apex technologies and/or products transitioned (numerator) is divided by the total number of planned Apex technologies and/or products to be transitioned within the fiscal year (denominator), then multiplied by 100. This information is captured in a quarterly data call spreadsheet submitted by HSARPA and FRG front offices to the S&T Performance Team. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Following the collection and analysis of data by program managers, the Directors of HSARPA and FRG review the data to ensure accuracy and consistency, approve the status, and submit the data to the Science and Technology's Performance Team within the Finance and Budget Division's Budget and Performance Branch. The S&T Performance Team provides a third data reliability review before results are finalized and submitted to DHS.   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of planned cyber security products and services transitioned to            |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | government, commercial and open sources  |
| Program             | Research, Development, and Innovation  |
| Description         | This measure reflects the percent of identified and completed planned transitions  |
|                     | of cybersecurity products and/or services (e.g. technologies, tools, capabilities, |
|                     | standards, knowledge products) within Science & Technology Directorate's           |
|                     | Cyber Security Division projects to government, commercial or open sources.        |
|                     | The percent reported is reviewed using the number of planned transition            |

|   | milestones stated in the Cyber Security Division's budget execution plan for the fiscal year, and the explanation that is provided in each quarterly performance data call. The Program identifies, funds, and coordinates cyber security research and development resulting in deployable security solutions. These solutions include user identity and data privacy technologies, end system security, research infrastructure, law enforcement forensic capabilities, secure protocols, software assurance, and cybersecurity education.   |
|---|---|
| Scope of Data   | This measure encompasses the transitions of cybersecurity products and/or services expected by the Science & Technology Directorate's Cyber Security Division (CSD) prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. A successful transition is considered to be the ownership and operation of a technology or knowledge product by a customer within the Homeland Security Enterprise. A "transition" may include, but is not limited to completion/delivery of a product, capability or service, release of a knowledge product, publication of standards, demonstration of a capability. During Q4 of each fiscal year, CSD works with the S&T Performance Team to identify expected transitions for the upcoming Fiscal Year. Once defined, that number serves as the baseline denominator for the measure   |
| Data Source   | for the given fiscal year.  The source of the data is the individual project schedules and planning documents maintained by each Program Manager and their Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance support contractor. The system of record is the quarterly data call spreadsheet completed and submitted by the CSD front office to the S&T Performance Team through the S&T ExecSec process. This spreadsheet is completed by the CSD front office and provided back to the S&T Performance Team for review and management.   |
| Data Collection Methodology                             | The CSD Front Office requests feedback from the applicable Program Managers during quarterly performance data calls from the S&T Performance Team, and the Program Managers indicate whether the transition has occurred. If on-going and the transition is still likely to occur, Program Managers provide the expected quarter of completion within the subject fiscal year. If a transition will not occur during the given fiscal year, the Program Manager provides details as to why not (e.g., delays due to development or budget). For the percent result of this measure, the total number of CSD products and/or services transitioned (numerator) is divided by the total number of planned CSD products and/or services to be transitioned within the fiscal year (denominator), then multipled by 100. This information is captured in a quarterly data call spreadsheet submitted by CSD front office to the S&T Performance Team. |
| Reliability Index Explanation of Data Reliability Check | Reliable  Following the collection and analysis of data by program managers, the Director of CSD reviews the data to ensure accuracy and consistency, approves the status, and submits the data to the Science and Technology's Performance Team within the Finance and Budget Division's Budget and Performance Branch. The S&T Performance Team provides a third data reliability review before results are finalized and submitted to DHS.   |

## **Transportation Security Administration**

| Performance Measure                      | Average number of days for DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) redress requests to be closed  |
|--|---|
| Program                                  | Aviation Screening Operations   |
| Description                              | This measure describes the average number of days for the processing of traveler redress requests, excluding the time for the traveler to submit all required documents. DHS TRIP is a single point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution regarding difficulties they experienced during their travel screening at transportation hubs or crossing U.S. borders. DHS TRIP is part of an effort by the Departments of State and Homeland Security to welcome legitimate travelers while securing our country from those who want to do us harm. This measure indicates how quickly the program is providing redress to individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution regarding difficulties they experienced during their travel screening at transportation hubs or crossing U.S. borders. |
| Scope of Data                            | The scope of this measure is all closed cases for each month from the time DHS TRIP receives a complete redress application—one that includes all required documents to the time DHS TRIP closes that application (i.e., all processing/analysis has been completed and the applicant has been provided a final response letter). The amount of time does not include the time requests are pending while the applicant provides required documents. Sampling is not used in this process; the calculation is based on 100% of the cases that meet the criteria.  |
| Data Source                              | The source of the data is the Redress Management System (RMS), a database which tracks all redress requests received via the DHS internet portal, e-mail, and by regular mail. Civil Rights and Liberties, Ombudsman, and Traveler Engagement division owns the database.   |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Redress program specialists pull data from the Redress Management System using existing reports of closed cases that show the average amount of time it is taking to close a case. The timeliness metric measures time DHS TRIP receives a complete redress application—one that includes all required documents to the time DHS TRIP closes that application (i.e., all processing/analysis has been completed and the applicant has been provided a final response letter). The amount of time does not include the time the applicant takes to provide required documents. The final number represents the average amount of time it takes DHS TRIP to close a case. The number is reported to TSA and DHS senior leadership on a monthly and quarterly basis.   |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Data is auto generated from the Redress Management System and redress program specialists double checks the work to pull the data. The Director and Operations Manager review daily reports to ensure the data is complete and accurate. These reports include the given measure along with other measures/indicators that assist with corroboration.   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of air carriers operating from domestic airports in compliance with         |
|---------------------|---|
|                     | leading security indicators   |
| Program             | Other Operations and Enforcement  |
| Description         | This measure identifies air carrier compliance for U.S. flagged aircraft operating  |
|                     | domestically with leading security indicators. These critical indicators are        |
|                     | derived from security laws, rules, regulations, and standards. A leading security   |
|                     | indicator is a key indicator that may be predictive of the overall security posture |
|                     | of an air carrier. Identifying compliance with the key indicators assesses air      |
|                     | carrier's vulnerabilities and is part of an overall risk reduction process.         |
|                     | Measuring compliance with standards is a strong indicator of system security.       |

| 2 27                        | Г <del>а</del>  |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Scope of Data               | The scope of this measure includes all U.S. passenger-only carriers subject to      |
|                             | Transportation Security Administration transportation rules and regulations.        |
| Data Source                 | Air carrier inspection results are maintained in the Performance and Results        |
|                             | Analysis System (PARIS), which serves as the official source of data repository     |
|                             | for the Office of Compliance's Regulatory activities.                               |
| Data Collection Methodology | Compliance Inspections are performed in accordance with an annual work plan.        |
|                             | That plan specifies frequencies and targets for inspection based on criteria        |
|                             | established by the Office of Compliance. When inspections are completed, the        |
|                             | results are entered into the Performance and Results Information System which       |
|                             | and are subsequently used to calculate the results for this measure. The result for |
|                             | this measure is reported quarterly and annually and is calculated as the total of   |
|                             | "in compliance" inspections divided by the total inspections for the reporting      |
|                             | period.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
|                             |   |
| Explanation of Data         | Data reliability is ensured through a series of actions. There are system record    |
| Reliability Check           | tracking audit trails and spot audit checks, followed by a management review and    |
|                             | validation process at the headquarters level.                                       |
| Performance Measure         | Percent of daily passengers receiving expedited physical screening based on         |
| r errormance ivieasure      | assessed low risk   |
| D                           |   |
| Program                     | Aviation Screening Operations   |
| Description                 | This measure gauges the percent of daily passengers who received expedited          |
|                             | physical screening because they meet low risk protocols or have been otherwise      |
|                             | assessed at the checkpoint as low-risk. TSA Pre?® incorporates modified             |
|                             | screening protocols for eligible participants who have enrolled in the TSA Pre?®    |
|                             | program as well as other known populations such as known crew members,              |
|                             | active duty service members, members of Congress and other trusted                  |
|                             | populations. In an effort to strengthen aviation security while enhancing the       |
|                             | passenger experience, TSA is focusing on risk-based, intelligence-driven security   |
|                             | procedures and enhancing its use of technology in order to focus its resources on   |
|                             | the unknown traveler.   |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of this measure is the percentage daily of passengers who received        |
| •                           | expedited screening out of the total nationwide airport throughput based on         |
|                             | assessed low risk either through TSA Pre?®, Known crewmember (KCM),                 |
|                             | Managed Inclusion or some other form of expedited screening process out of the      |
|                             | total number of daily passengers. Known Suspected Terrorists are always             |
|                             | ineligible, as well as those listed on the PreCheck Disqualification Protocol.      |
| Data Source                 |   |
|                             | TSA's Performance Management Information System (PMIS) and KCM System               |
| Data Collection Methodology | Data on individuals who underwent expedited physical screening is collected at      |
|                             | each screening lane and entered daily into the PMIS system. Information             |
|                             | regarding the number of airline flight and cabin crew personnel is collected        |
|                             | automatically within the KCM system and reported by KCM portal location and         |
|                             | also entered in PMIS. Daily data runs are completed within the Office of            |
|                             | Security Operations and compiled into a daily report. Daily information is also     |
|                             | provided for each airport reflecting the number of travelers who received           |
|                             | expedited screening based on whether they were designated as lower risk via         |
|                             | Secure Flight, or were included via the Managed Inclusion program. Information      |
|                             | is generally collected and entered into PMIS for each hour in which the screening   |
|                             | lane was in operation, and periodic reports on hourly expedited throughput are      |
|                             | generated to gage efficiency of the operation. This information will be is          |
|                             | calculated each quarter, with results being reported cumulatively.                  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | PMIS data is required to be collected and entered each day for every screening      |
| Reliability Check           | lane in operation. Missing information is immediately flagged for follow-up with    |
| Kendonity Check             | the specific airport. Data on individuals eligible for expedited screening from     |
|                             | Secure Flight and the number of individuals who actually received expedited         |
|                             | т эесте спунгана не иншестинаст от натупнату мно астияну тесетуел ехрелиел          |

Secure Flight and the number of individuals who actually received expedited

| screening at the airport allows for daily reliability and accuracy checks. Data   |
|---|
| anomalies are quickly identified and reported back to the airport for resolution. |

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of domestic air enplanements vetted against the terrorist watch list  |
|--|---|
| 1 chormance weasure                      | through Secure Flight   |
|  | (Retired Measure)   |
| Date                                     |   |
| Program                                  | Aviation Screening Operations   |
| Description                              | The Secure Flight program compares domestic passenger information to the No Fly and Selectee List components of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), which contains the Government's consolidated terrorist watch list, maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center. The No Fly and Selectee Lists are based on all the records in the TSDB, and represent the subset of names who meet the criteria of the No Fly and Selectee designations. Secure Flight will also match data against additional subsets of the TSDB as determined by Department and Agency leadership. This is a unified approach to watch list matching for covered passenger flights, to avoid unnecessary duplication of watch list matching efforts and resources and reduce the burden on aircraft operators. |
| Scope of Data                            | This measure relates to all covered flights operated by U.S. aircraft operators that are required to have a full program under 49 CFR 1544.101(a), 4. These aircraft operators generally are the passenger airlines that offer scheduled and public charter flights from commercial airports.   |
| Data Source                              | Data source is the Secure Flight Reports Management System (RMS). This  |
|  | system provides daily statistics including the number of enplanements vetted  |
|  | against the terrorist watch lists.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | TSA requires covered aircraft operators to collect information from passengers, transmit passenger information to TSA for watch list matching purposes, and process passengers in accordance with TSA boarding pass printing results regarding watch list matching results. Covered aircraft operators must transmit to TSA the information provided by the passenger in response to the request described above.   |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Vetting analysts review a report (produced daily) by the Secure Flight Reports Management System (RMS). RMS provides the number of enplanements by U.S. aircraft operator and the estimated number of U.S. aircraft operator enplanements covered by the Secure Flight Final Rule for that year. A Secure Flight vetting analyst forwards the data to Secure Flight leadership for review. Secure Flight forwards the data to Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing management, TSA senior leadership team (SLT), as well as the DHS SLT. It is also distributed to the TSA Office of Intelligence, Transportation Sector Network Management, and the Office of Global Strategies.   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of domestic cargo audits that meet screening standards                      |
|---------------------|---|
| Program             | Other Operations and Enforcement  |
| Description         | This measure gauges the compliance of shippers with cargo screening standards.      |
|                     | Enforcing and monitoring cargo screening standards is one of the most direct        |
|                     | methods TSA has for overseeing air cargo safety. TSA conducts these audits of       |
|                     | shippers based on cargo regulations specified in Title 49 Code of Federal           |
|                     | Regulations Part 1540 and these audits include: training, facilities, acceptance of |
|                     | cargo, screening, certifications, identification verification, and procedures.      |
|                     | Ensuring successful cargo screening means having a safe, fast flow of air           |
|                     | commerce and reduces the risk of criminal and terrorist misuse of the supply        |
|                     | chain. The objective is to increase the security posture and compliance rate for    |
|                     | each entity conducting domestic cargo screening.                                    |
| Scope of Data       | The scope of this data includes all cargo screening inspections completed by the    |
|                     | Transportation Security Inspectors (TSI) at domestic locations.                     |

| Data Source                              | The data to support this measure is contained in the Performance and Results In formation System (PARIS) which serves as the official source of data repository for the Compliance Branch of the Office of Security Operations. Every time an entity is inspected the data is entered into PARIS by the domestic field inspector TSI. All findings are required to be entered into PARIS and tracked. |
|--|---|
| Data Collection Methodology              | TSIs enter the results of every domestic inspection into PARIS. The data for this measure is then calculated based on the reporting form PARIS. The result for this measure is calculated by dividing the total number of successful domestic cargo audits (successful meaning those resulting in no Civil Penalty) divided by the total number of domestic cargo audits.                             |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Inspections are completed per the TSI Compliance Work Plan. These inspections are entered into PARIS and are randomly reviewed by the Regional Security Inspectors (RSI) for Cargo for accuracy.  |

| Performance Measure | Percent of foreign airports that serve as last points of departure and air carriers involved in international operations to the United States advised of necessary actions to mitigate identified vulnerabilities in order to ensure compliance with critical security measures   |
|---------------------|---|
| Program             | Other Operations and Enforcement  |
| Description         | This index combines: (1) percent of foreign airports serving as Last Point of Departure (LPD) to the U.S. notified of critical vulnerabilities and accompanying recommendations, and (2) percent of foreign air carriers operating flights from these foreign airports and U.S. air carriers operating from any foreign airport regardless of destination notified of violations of critical regulations and accompanying recommendations/follow-up action. TSA evaluates/documents security at foreign airports with service to U.S., airports from which U.S. air carriers operate, and other sites on a 5-point scale against critical International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) aviation and airport security standards. TSA assess compliance with these standards and provides feedback to the host governments for awareness and recommended follow-up action. Identifying and notifying air carriers of non-compliance with critical regulations mitigates air |
|                     | carrier vulnerabilities and reduces risk.   |
| Scope of Data       | Airport assessments reflect information collected by Transportation Security Specialists during evaluation of implementation of ICAO aviation security standards at LPD foreign airports with direct service to the U.S. and those airports from which U.S. air carriers operate, regardless of destination. Attention focuses on critical standards across 5 categories: Aircraft & Inflight Security, Passenger & Cabin Bag Screening, Hold Baggage Security, Cargo/Catering Security, and Access Control. Assessment is done using a risk informed approach that includes threat, vulnerability, and consequence ratings: low-risk airports every 3 years; medium-risk airports every 2 years; high-risk airports yearly.  |
| Data Source         | The data to support foreign airport assessments is contained in Foreign Airport Assessment Program (FAAP) reports prepared by Transportation Security Specialists (TSSs) following each airport assessment. Completed reports are submitted by the TSSs in Regional Operation Centers (ROCs) to the ROC Managers and stored in a database maintained by the Office of Global Strategies (OGS). Each FAAP report contains data and observations collected during the assessment and highlights any shortfalls in security. Air carrier inspection results are maintained in TSA's Performance and Results Information System (PARIS), which serves as the official data repository for TSA's regulatory activities. The OGS and PARIS databases also store accompanying information indicating that notification of shortfalls was provided to the host government and air carriers following airports assessments and air carrier inspections.                                |

| Data Collection Methodology | A standard template is used for collecting/reporting data on airport assessments.    |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | Vulnerability ratings are assigned by Global Compliance leadership to ensure         |
|                             | consistent application of the ratings from 1 (no shortfalls) through 5 (instances of |
|                             | egregious non-compliance). Results are entered into the OGS database at TSA          |
|                             | headquarters. The measure is calculated by OGS headquarters staff who identify       |
|                             | airports receiving notification of vulnerability scores of 4 or 5 in any of the      |
|                             | critical ICAO standards. Compliance inspections for air carriers are performed       |
|                             | according to an annual work plan specifying frequencies/targets for inspection       |
|                             | based on criteria established by OGS including risk methodology. Inspection          |
|                             | results are entered into PARIS and are used to calculate the data. OGS               |
|                             | headquarters staff identify notification/follow-up action with air carriers in       |
|                             | question. The index averages the percentage of airports and air carriers notified    |
|                             | of non-compliance with leading security indicators.                                  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | TSSs submit a comprehensive airport assessment report to ROC Managers.               |
| Reliability Check           | Reports are reviewed for quality and consistency and forwarded through senior        |
|                             | leadership in Global Compliance to the Assistant Administrator, OGS, for final       |
|                             | approval. This process may result in inquiries to a TSA Representative or the        |
|                             | TSS for clarifying information. Analysis for strengths and weaknesses,               |
|                             | consistency or divergence from other airports, trends, and smart practices also      |
|                             | occurs from these reviews. Results are maintained for each assessed airport as       |
|                             | well as consolidated into a report of overall security posture of the airports       |
|                             | relative to the ICAO standards. Results are also shared with the foreign airport     |
|                             | and host government to determine next steps and proposed areas of cooperation        |
|                             | and assistance. Data reliability for air carrier assessments is ensured through      |
|                             | system record tracking audit trails and spot audit checks followed by a              |
|                             | management review and validation process at the headquarters level.                  |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of international air enplanements vetted against the terrorist watch list    |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | through Secure Flight  |
|                             | (Retired Measure)  |
| Program                     | Aviation Screening Operations  |
| Description                 | The Secure Flight program compares international passenger information to the        |
|                             | No Fly and Selectee List components of the Terrorist Screening Database              |
|                             | (TSDB), which contains the Government's consolidated terrorist watch list,           |
|                             | maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center. The No Fly and Selectee Lists are      |
|                             | based on all the records in the TSDB, and represent the subset of names who          |
|                             | meet the criteria of the No Fly and Selectee designations. Secure Flight will also   |
|                             | match data against additional subsets of the TSDB as determined by Department        |
|                             | and Agency leadership This is a unified approach to watch list matching for          |
|                             | covered passenger flights, to avoid unnecessary duplication of watch list            |
|                             | matching efforts and resources and reduce the burden on aircraft operators.          |
| Scope of Data               | This measure relates to all flights conducted by a covered foreign air carrier       |
|                             | arriving in or departing from the United States, or overflying the continental       |
|                             | United States, defined as the lower contiguous 48 states, that are required to have  |
|                             | a security program under 49 CFR 1546.101(a) or (b). These aircraft operators         |
|                             | generally are the passenger airlines that offer scheduled and public charter flights |
|                             | from commercial airports.  |
| Data Source                 | Data source is the Secure Flight Reports Management System (RMS). This               |
|                             | system provides daily statistics including the number of enplanements vetted         |
|                             | against the terrorist watch lists.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | TSA requires covered aircraft operators to collect information from passengers,      |
|                             | transmit passenger information to TSA for watch list matching purposes, and          |
|                             | process passengers in accordance with TSA boarding pass printing results             |
|                             | regarding watch list matching results. Covered aircraft operators must transmit to   |
|                             | TSA the information provided by the passenger in response to the request             |
|                             | described above.   |

| Reliability Index   | Reliable   |
|---------------------|--|
| Explanation of Data | Vetting analysts review a report (produced daily) by the Secure Flight Reports   |
| Reliability Check   | Management System (RMS). RMS provides the number of enplanements by              |
|                     | foreign air carrier, as well as the estimated number of foreign air carrier      |
|                     | enplanements covered by the Secure Flight Final Rule for that year. A Secure     |
|                     | Flight vetting analyst forwards the data to Secure Flight leadership for review. |
|                     | Secure Flight forwards the data to Transportation Threat Assessment and          |
|                     | Credentialing management, TSA senior leadership team (SLT), as well as the       |
|                     | DHS SLT. It is also distributed to Office of Intelligence, Transportation Sector |
|                     | Network Management, and the Office of Global Strategies.                         |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of international cargo audits that meet screening standards                |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Program                     | Other Operations and Enforcement   |
| Description                 | This measure gauges the compliance of international shippers with cargo            |
|                             | screening standards. Enforcing and monitoring cargo screening standards is one     |
|                             | of the most direct methods TSA has for overseeing air cargo safety. TSA            |
|                             | conducts these audits of shippers based on cargo regulations specified in Title 49 |
|                             | Code of Federal Regulations Part 1540 and these audits include: training,          |
|                             | facilities, acceptance of cargo, screening, certifications, identification         |
|                             | verification, and procedures. Ensuring successful cargo screening means having     |
|                             | a safe, fast flow of air commerce and reduces the risk of criminal and terrorist   |
|                             | misuse of the supply chain. The objective is to increase the security posture and  |
|                             | compliance rate for each entity conducting domestic cargo screening.               |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of this data includes all cargo screening inspections completed by the   |
|                             | Transportation Security Inspectors (TSI) at international locations.               |
| Data Source                 | The data to support this measure is contained in the Performance and Results       |
|                             | Analysis System (PARIS) which serves as the official source of data repository     |
|                             | for the Compliance Branch of the Office of Global Strategies. Every time an        |
|                             | entity is inspected the data is entered into PARIS by the TSI. All findings are    |
|                             | required to be entered into PARIS and tracked.                                     |
| Data Collection Methodology | TSIs enter the results of every domestic inspection into PARIS. The data for this  |
|                             | measure is then calculated based on the reporting form PARIS. The result for       |
|                             | this measure is calculated by dividing the total number of successful domestic     |
|                             | cargo audits (successful meaning those resulting in no Civil Penalty) divided by   |
|                             | the total number of domestic cargo audits.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | Inspections are completed per the Master Work Plan. These inspections are          |
| Reliability Check           | entered into PARIS and are randomly reviewed by the Transportation Security        |
|                             | Specialist for Cargo for accuracy.   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of overall compliance of domestic airports with established aviation         |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | security indicators  |
| Program             | Other Operations and Enforcement   |
| Description         | This measure provides the percent of domestic airports assessed that comply with     |
|                     | established security standards and practices related to aviation security. Security  |
|                     | indicators are key indicators that may be predictive of the overall security posture |
|                     | of an airport. Identifying compliance with the key indicators assesses airport       |
|                     | vulnerabilities and is part of an overall risk reduction process. Measuring          |
|                     | compliance with standards is a strong indicator of system security.                  |
| Scope of Data       | The scope of this measure includes all U.S. airports that regularly serve            |
|                     | operations of an aircraft operator as described in 49 CFR part 1544                  |
|                     | §1544.101(a)(1): "a scheduled passenger or public charter passenger operation        |
|                     | with an aircraft having a passenger seating configuration of 61 or more seats".      |
| Data Source         | Airport inspection results are maintained in the Performance and Results             |
|                     | Information System (PARIS), which serves as the official source of data              |

|                             | repository for TSA's Office of Security Operations compliance's Regulatory         |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | activities.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | Compliance Inspections are performed in accordance with an annual work plan,       |
|                             | which specifies frequencies and targets for inspections based on criteria          |
|                             | established by the Office of Security Operations/Compliance. Each inspection is    |
|                             | based on a standard set of inspection prompts that are derived from the            |
|                             | requirements of 49 CFR 1542. Prompts are the objective means by which TSA          |
|                             | assesses the effectiveness of an airport's systems, methods, and procedures        |
|                             | designed to thwart attacks against the security of passengers, aircraft and        |
|                             | facilities used in air transportation. Each prompt is phrased in a declarative     |
|                             | sentence to provide the Inspector with a Yes/No response. When inspections are     |
|                             | completed, the results are entered into PARIS and are used to calculate the        |
|                             | results for this measure. The percentage reported represents the total prompts in  |
|                             | compliance divided by total inspection prompts, aggregated for all airports        |
|                             | subject to the requirement.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | Data reliability is ensured through a series of actions. The process of entering a |
| Reliability Check           | record into PARIS requires review and approval by a TSA official who has been      |
|                             | delegated that authority, generally a first line supervisor, Assitant Federal      |
|                             | Security Director, Manager, team lead, or other individual exercising              |
|                             | management authority. Under no circumstances is an inspection, investigation, or   |
|                             | incident record be approved by the same individual who created that record.        |
|                             | This system of checks and balances provides for improved quality and data          |
|                             | integrity.   |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of overall level of implementation of industry agreed upon Security and   |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | Emergency Management action items by mass transit and passenger rail agencies     |
| Program                     | Other Operations and Enforcement  |
| Description                 | This measure provides the rate of implementation by mass transit, light and       |
|                             | passenger rail, bus, and other commuter transportation agencies with established  |
|                             | security standards and practices related to six critical Security Action Items    |
|                             | (SAIs). These six SAIs are key indicators of the overall security posture of a    |
|                             | mass transit and passenger rail transportation system. Measuring implementation   |
|                             | of these six SAIs assesses transit vulnerabilities and is part of an overall risk |
|                             | reduction process.  |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of the data is limited to the largest mass transit and passenger rail   |
|                             | systems based on passenger volume (average weekday ridership > 60,000) that       |
|                             | have agreed to participate in the Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement    |
|                             | (BASE) program. BASE assessments are completed jointly by a team of               |
|                             | Transportation Security Inspectors and participating mass transit and passenger   |
|                             | rail systems. The BASE program assesses whether comprehensive Security and        |
|                             | Emergency Management Action Items that are critical to an effective security      |
|                             | program, including security plans, training, exercises, public awareness, and     |
|                             | other security areas, are in place.   |
| Data Source                 | The source of the data is the assessments completed by a team of Transportation   |
|                             | Security Inspectors and transit agencies. Transportation Security Inspectors      |
|                             | document assessment results by placing the information in a central database on   |
|                             | the TSA computer system, which is analyzed by staff members at Headquarters.      |
| Data Collection Methodology | TSA assesses mass transit and passenger rail modes through the Baseline           |
|                             | Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program for 17 Security and            |
|                             | Emergency Management Action Items. The 17 Action Items resulted from a            |
|                             | coordinated review and update among TSA, Federal Transit Administration, and      |
|                             | the Mass Transit Sector Coordinating Council. Action Items cover a range of       |
|                             | areas foundational to an effective security program, with emphasis on 6 Security  |
|                             | Action Items (SAIs): defined responsibilities for security and emergency          |
|                             | management; background investigations of employees and contractors; security      |
|                             | training; exercises and drills; using a risk management process to assess and     |

|  | manage threats, vulnerabilities and consequences; and public awareness and preparedness campaigns. Achieving an Effectively Implementing rating requires a score of 70 or higher in each of these six critical SAIs. Periodic review and completion of needed refinements remains a key component of this program.   |
|--|--|
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | When assessments are completed, findings are entered into a central database and are subsequently used to calculate the results for this measure, which are reviewed and analyzed by staff members at Headquarters to determine trends and weaknesses within the Security and Emergency Management Action Item areas. Quality reviews are performed on assessment data at multiple points in the process. Senior Transportation Security Inspector Program staff and Mass Transit staff perform quality reviews on the BASE assessment reports. These reviews may result in inquiries to clarify information and inconsistencies in evaluation and correct any erroneous data. Findings from these quality reviews are applied to lessons learned and best practices that are incorporated into basic and ongoing training sessions to improve the quality and consistency of the data and data collection process. This system of checks and balances provides for improved quality and data integrity. |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of passenger data submissions that successfully undergo Secure Flight        |
|-----------------------------|--|
| 1 01101111111100 1/10010010 | watch list matching  |
|                             | (New Measure)  |
| Program                     | Aviation Screening Operations  |
| Description                 | This measure will report the percent of qualified message submissions received       |
| -                           | from the airlines that are successfully matched by the Secure Flight automated       |
|                             | vetting system against the existing high risk watch lists. A qualified message       |
|                             | submission from the airlines contains passenger data sufficient to allow             |
|                             | successful processing in the Secure Flight automated vetting system.                 |
| Scope of Data               | This measure relates to all covered flights operated by U.S. aircraft operators that |
|                             | are required to have a full program under 49 CFR 1544.101(a), 4. These aircraft      |
|                             | operators generally are the passenger airlines that offer scheduled and public       |
|                             | charter flights from commercial airports.  |
| Data Source                 | The data source is SLA_RAW_DATA table from the SLA database.                         |
| Data Collection Methodology | Ad-hoc reports will be created in the Reports Management System to pull both         |
|                             | the number of Boarding Pass Printed Results and the number of unique qualified       |
|                             | data submissions received from U.S. and foreign aircraft operators out of the        |
|                             | Service Level Agreement (SLA) database for a specified date range. These             |
|                             | numbers will be compared to ensure 100% of the qualified data submissions are        |
|                             | vetted using the Secure Flight automated vetting system.                             |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | Vetting analysts review a report (produced daily) by the Secure Flight Reports       |
| Reliability Check           | Management System. An analyst then forwards the data to Secure Flight                |
|                             | leadership for review. Once reviewed, reports are forwarded to the TSA Office        |
|                             | of Intelligence and Analysis management, TSA senior leadership team (SLT), as        |
|                             | well as the DHS SLT. It is also distributed to the TSA Office of Security Policy     |
|                             | and Industry Engagement, and the TSA Office of Global Strategies.                    |

# **U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services**

| Performance Measure         | Average of processing cycle time (in months) for adjustment of status to   |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | permanent resident applications (I-485)  |
| Program                     | Immigration Examinations Fee Account   |
| Description                 | An I-485, Application to Register for Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, is filed by an individual to apply for permanent residence in the United States or to adjust their current status. This measure assesses the program's ability to meet its published processing time goals by reporting on the volume of pending applications and petitions by Center or Field Office. The Cycle Time, reflected in months (e.g. 4.0 months), measures only the pending volume in Active Pending status, deducting from Gross Pending the total volume of cases subject to customer-induced delays and Department of State visa availability, categorized as Active Suspense.  |
| Scope of Data               | This measure is based on the volume in Active Pending status of I-485 applications. Applications are classified in an Active Suspense category if a visa number for an application is not available and the application has been preadjudicated or if the case is awaiting additional evidence from the customer. Active Suspense cases are not included in this measure. Active Suspense categories include: Pending Request for Evidence or Intent to Deny/Revoke; Visa Unavailable. Additionally, the measure only includes the aggregate of I-485 Adjustment based on eligibility from Employment, Family, certain Cuban nationals and All Other. It excludes I-485 Adjustment based on Refugee, Asylee or Indochinese Status. |
| Data Source                 | Offices self-report data to the USCIS Office of Performance & Quality (OPQ) primarily through the Performance Reporting Tool (PRT). The National Benefits Center (NBC) also sends an import file (text file) to OPQ which contains data on I-485 cases at the NBC. The PRT submissions by the offices, as well as the NBC import file are uploaded into a database.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | On a monthly basis, OPQ collects performance data on I-485 applications received, completed, and pending through the Performance Reporting Tool (PRT) and through NBC's import file. The data is then used to calculate the average cycle time, expressed in months relative to the volume of applications/petitions in Active Pending status.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | OPQ conducts monthly quality control reviews of the data reported to ensure  |
| Reliability Check           | data integrity.  |

| Performance Measure | Average of processing cycle time (in months) for naturalization applications (N-400)   |
|---------------------|--|
| Program             | Immigration Examinations Fee Account   |
| Description         | An N-400, Application for Naturalization, is filed by an individual applying to become a United States citizen. This measure assesses the program's ability to meet its published processing time goals by reporting on the volume of pending applications by Center or Field Office. The Cycle Time, reflected in months (e.g. 5.0 months), measures only the pending volume in Active Pending status, deducting from Gross Pending the total volume of cases subject to customer-induced delays, categorized as Active Suspense.                     |
| Scope of Data       | This measure is based on the volume in Active Pending status of N-400 applications. Applications are classified in an Active Suspense category if the applicant has failed the English/Civics requirement and is waiting the statutory period between testing attempts, if the applicant has requested rescheduling of the required interview, or if the case is awaiting additional evidence from the customer. Active Suspense cases are not included in this measure. Active Suspense categories include: Pending Request for Evidence or Intent to |

|  | Deny/Revoke and Pending Re-exam as requested by the customer. The measure excludes naturalization applications based on eligibility from service in the Armed Forces of the United States.  |
|--|---|
| Data Source                              | Offices self-report data to the USCIS Office of Performance & Quality (OPQ) primarily through the Performance Reporting Tool (PRT). The National Benefits Center (NBC) also sends an import file to OPQ which contains data on N-400 non-military cases at the NBC. In addition, the Nebraska Service Center (NSC) submits an Excel report to OPQ for cases associated with spouses of members of the Armed Forces. The PRT submissions by the offices, as well as the NBC import file and the NSC Excel file are uploaded into a database. |
| Data Collection Methodology              | On a monthly basis, OPQ collects performance data on N-400 applications received, completed, and pending through the Performance Reporting Tool (PRT), NBC's import file, and NSC's Excel file. The data is then used to calculate the average cycle time, expressed in months relative to the volume of applications in Active Pending status.   |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | OPQ conducts monthly quality control reviews of the data reported to ensure data integrity.   |

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of applications for citizenship and immigration benefits not approved  |
|--|--|
|  | following a potential finding of fraud   |
| Program                                  | Fraud Prevention and Detection Account   |
| Description                              | This measure reflects the agency's capacity to prevent fraud, abuse, and exploitation of the immigration system, and address systemic vulnerabilities that threaten its integrity. By not approving (denial, abandonment, withdrawal, etc.) benefits to individuals potentially attempting to commit fraud and who were not eligible for a waiver or exemptions, USCIS is actively eliminating   |
|  | vulnerabilities, and identifying ways to continue to deter and prevent fraud in the future. As a result, those instances where benefits are approved should be very low.   |
| Scope of Data                            | A sample of case management entities that contain Statements of Findings (SOFs) of "Fraud Found" are used for this measure. Sample sizes are taken to achieve or exceed a .05 margin of error. The sample size will be a minimum of 1,000 cases. USCIS limits data to those fraud investigations completed in the previous fiscal year and stored at the National Records Center. The completion of a fraud investigation is followed by additional adjudications processing time and then records transferring time to the National Records Center. Therefore, while many of the fraud investigations may be completed in one fiscal year they may not have final adjudicative decisions made and be permanently stored until the following year.                           |
| Data Source                              | A sample of case management entities will be pulled from the FDNS-Data System (DS) and physical alien files will be reviewed. The results of the review are stored electronically on a SharePoint page and can be produced for review.   |
| Data Collection Methodology              | The percentage will be estimated using a sample of cases from the Fraud Detection and National Security Data System (FDNS-DS), which contain Statements of Findings (SOFs) of "Fraud Found". The sample cases will be physically reviewed in order to identify if a benefit was denied. If a benefit was granted after a SOF of "Fraud Found", the reason will be identified. Cases where a legal waiver, statutory exemption, additional information (e.g. Request for Evidence) that overcame the initial finding of fraud, multiple SOFs associated on the same case management entity, or the case was resolved by the courts will be excluded from the final percentage calculation as legitimate exemptions. Pending applications are not included in the calculation. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | In cases where a benefit was approved after a finding of "Fraud Found", each A-file will be rated by at least two personnel to cross validate the survey results. A  |

| third, senior reviewer is available in rare cases where reviewers disagree on the |
|---|
| reason for an approved benefit.   |

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of customers satisfied with the citizenship and immigration-related   |
|--|---|
| Terrormance Weasure                      | support received from the National Customer Service Center  |
| Program                                  | Immigration Examinations Fee Account  |
| Description                              | This measure gauges the overall customer rating of the support received from the National Customer Service Center. This measure is based on the results from the following areas: 1) Accuracy of information; 2) Responsiveness to customer inquiries; 3) Accessibility to information; and 4) Customer satisfaction.   |
| Scope of Data                            | Using the telephone number, the National Customer Service Center (NCSC) captures the telephone numbers of incoming calls and the level of service reached by each call. The data is then downloaded into a master file, resulting in a database with approximately 120,000 phone numbers. Duplicate phone numbers and calls with duration of less than one minute are eliminated. The data is then randomized using a query which randomly assigns different values to each record and sorts the records by value. The first 5,000 records are selected. The telephone number data is retrieved for the week preceding the execution of the phone survey so that the target population is contacted for the survey within approximately one week of having called the NCSC 800-Line to capture the customers' most recent experience. |
| Data Source                              | Data is captured via phone interview and stored in a Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) database.   |
| Data Collection Methodology              | On a monthly basis, data is captured from the survey sample. Data is collected using prescribed totals for different categories of callers, and from that month's population a random sample is contacted. The data collection continues until a sufficient number of respondents complete the survey. The survey question that pertains to this measure is "How satisfied were you with your entire experience the last time you called the 800-Line. This includes the recording and any agency representatives."   |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | The survey is performed by an independent contractor and the results are reported using standard statistical practices to ensure the appropriate level of confidence.   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of students enrolled in classes under the Citizenship and Integration      |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | Grant Program that show educational gains  |
| Program             | Immigration Examinations Fee Account   |
| Description         | This measure reports on the success of grant recipients to increase knowledge of   |
|                     | English necessary for students receiving services under the program to pass the    |
|                     | naturalization test. Under the Citizenship and Integration Grant Program, grant    |
|                     | recipients are required to use a nationally normed standardized test of English    |
|                     | language proficiency for student placement and assessment of progress. This        |
|                     | measure evaluates the percentage of students receiving these services who          |
|                     | demonstrate an increase in score   |
| Scope of Data       | This measure will draw on cumulative English language proficiency test results     |
|                     | for Q1-Q3 of the fiscal year. The measure will only include results from students  |
|                     | who receive services from a grant recipient and were pre- and post-tested.         |
| Data Source         | The data source is the OoC Database Management Tool owned by the Office of         |
|                     | Citizenship and is located on the USCIS Enterprise Collaboration Network           |
|                     | (ECN). The measure will be tracked using quarterly grant recipient performance     |
|                     | reports submitted in MS Excel format. For each permanent resident who receives     |
|                     | citizenship instruction and/or naturalization application services under the grant |
|                     | program, each grant recipient must provide information on the services actually    |
|                     | provided, including dates of enrollment in citizenship class and pre and post-test |
|                     | scores. These reports are submitted quarterly within 30 days of the conclusion of  |

|                             | each quarter. The data contained in each quarterly report is then reviewed, uploaded into the data source, and analyzed by Office of Citizenship program officers.   |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Data Collection Methodology | Grant recipients complete and submit quarterly reports via email within 30 days of the end of each quarter. The calculation is the total number of students who were pre and post-tested and who scored higher on the post-test divided by the total number of students who were pre and post-tested through Q3.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | The reliability of this measure will be established through uniform data   |
| Reliability Check           | collection and reporting procedures, ongoing follow-up with grant recipients on information included in the quarterly reports, and through onsite monitoring visits, as necessary. All grant recipients will receive training at the beginning of the performance period on how to complete the quarterly report forms. The Office of Citizenship will provide written feedback on each quarterly report, and will ask grant recipients for clarification if there are questions about information in the reports. The Office of Citizenship will annually conduct onsite monitoring visits to approximately one-third of all new grant recipients. During these visits, program staff members review records (e.g. student intake forms, classroom attendance sheets, student assessment scores, copies of filed Form N-400s, etc.) that were used to compile data for the quarterly reports. |

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of workers determined to be "Employment Authorized" after an initial mismatch   |
|--|---|
| Program                                  | Employment Status Verification  |
| Description                              | This measure assesses the accuracy of the E-verify process by assessing the percent of employment verification requests that are not positively resolved at time of initial review.   |
| Scope of Data                            | Only E-Verify cases where a Tentative Non-Confirmation (or "initial mismatch") results in a finding of "Employment Authorized" are within the scope of this measure.  |
| Data Source                              | Data source for this measure is stored in the Verification Information System (VIS).  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | All steps of the E-Verify process are automatically captured in VIS as they occur, and records of each case are made available for reporting purposes. A standardized summary of case outcomes is retrieved quarterly, providing both the numerator and denominator for this measure. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | E-Verify transaction data are extracted quarterly from the VIS by the contractor that manages VIS. An algorithm is then applied to the data to remove all duplicate and invalid queries. The data are referred to the USCIS Verification Division for review and clearance.           |

### **U.S.** Coast Guard

| Performance Measure                      | Availability of maritime navigation aids  |
|--|---|
| Program                                  | Operating Expenses  |
| Description                              | This measure indicates the hours that short-range federal Aids to Navigation are available. The aid availability rate is based on an international measurement standard established by the International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) (Recommendation O-130) in December 2004. A short-range Aid to Navigation is counted as not being available from the initial time a discrepancy is reported until the time the discrepancy is corrected.   |
| Scope of Data                            | The measure is the hours short range Aids to Navigation were available as a percent of total hours they were expected to be available.  |
| Data Source                              | The Integrated Aids to Navigation Information System (I-ATONIS) is the official system used by the U.S. Coast Guard to store pertinent information relating to short-range aids to navigation.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Trained personnel in each District input data on aid availability in the Integrated Aids to Navigation Information System (I-ATONIS) system. The total time short-range Aids to Navigation are expected to be available is determined by multiplying the total number of federal aids by the number of days in the reporting period they were deployed, by 24 hours. The result of the aid availability calculation is dependent on the number of federal aids in the system on the day the report is run. The calculation is determined by dividing the time that Aids are available by the time that Aids are targeted to be available. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | To ensure consistency and integrity, data entry in the I-ATONIS system is limited to specially trained personnel in each District. Quality control and data review is completed through U.S. Coast Guard and National Ocean Service processes of generating local Notices to Mariners, as well as by designated Unit and District personnel. Temporary changes to the short-range Aids to Navigation System are not considered discrepancies due to the number of aids in the system on the day the report is run.  |

| Performance Measure         | Fishing regulation compliance rate   |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Program                     | Operating Expenses   |
| Description                 | The U.S. Coast Guard uses the percentage of fishing vessels observed at sea        |
|                             | complying with domestic regulations as a measure of the Coast Guard's activities   |
|                             | and their impact on the health and well-being of U.S. fisheries and marine         |
|                             | protected species. This specific measure reflects the percent of boardings at sea  |
|                             | by the U.S. Coast Guard during which no significant violations of domestic         |
|                             | fisheries regulations are detected.  |
| Scope of Data               | This measure addresses compliance in and around domestic fisheries. Most           |
|                             | inspections take place on U.S. commercial fishing vessels inside the U.S.          |
|                             | Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), but the measure also includes inspections of        |
|                             | (a) U.S. commercial and recreational fishing vessels outside the U.S. EEZ, (b)     |
|                             | foreign fishing vessels permitted inside the U.S. EEZ, (c) recreational fishing    |
|                             | vessels in the U.S. EEZ, and (d) U.S. commercial and recreational fishing vessels  |
|                             | inside the portion of state waters that extends from three to nine nautical miles  |
|                             | seaward of the boundary line.  |
| Data Source                 | Boardings and violations are documented by U.S. Coast Guard Report of              |
|                             | Boarding Forms and entered into the Marine Information for Safety and Law          |
|                             | Enforcement (MISLE) database.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | U.S. Coast Guard units enter their enforcement data directly into the MISLE        |
|                             | database after completion of fisheries enforcement boardings. Each year a          |
|                             | compliance rate is calculated for the data quality. This is determined by dividing |

|                     | the total number of Living Marine Resources boardings without a significant number of violations by the total number of Living Marine Resources boardings |
|---------------------|---|
| Reliability Index   | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data | The program manager reviews entries into MISLE database monthly and   |
| Reliability Check   | compares to other sources of information (i.e., after-action reports, message   |
|                     | traffic, etc.) to assess reliability of the database. District, Area, and Headquarters  |
|                     | law enforcement staffs review, validate, and assess the data on a quarterly basis   |
|                     | as part of the Law Enforcement Planning and Assessment System.  |

| Performance Measure         | Migrant Interdiction Effectiveness in the Maritime Environment  |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Program                     | Operating Expenses  |
| Description                 | This measure reports the percent of detected undocumented migrants of all   |
|                             | nationalities who were interdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard and partners via   |
|                             | maritime routes.  |
| Scope of Data               | This measure tracks interdiction of migrants from all nationalities attempting  |
|                             | direct entry by maritime means into the United States, its possessions, or  |
|                             | territories.  |
| Data Source                 | Interdiction information is obtained through the U.S. Coast Guard Marine  |
|                             | Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) database, and Customs  |
| D. C.II. d. M.I. I.I.       | and Border Protection records.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | The interdiction rate compares the number of migrants interdicted at sea by U.S.  |
|                             | Coast Guard, other law enforcement agencies, or foreign navies, and deceased  |
|                             | migrants recovered from smuggling events, to the total number of migrants interdicted at sea plus the migrants that landed in the US, its territories, or |
|                             | possessions. Migrant landing information is obtained through the analysis of  |
|                             | abandoned vessels, other evidence of migrant activity that indicate the number of   |
|                             | migrants evading law enforcement, successfully landing in the U.S., migrants  |
|                             | captured by law enforcement entities in the U.S., and self-reporting by migrants  |
|                             | (Cuban migrants are allowed to stay once arriving in the U.S. and typically report  |
|                             | their arrival). The U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center compiles  |
|                             | and analyzes landing information. Data collection is managed by the Migrant   |
|                             | Interdiction Program Manager.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | The numbers of illegal migrants entering the U.S. by maritime means,  |
| Reliability Check           | particularly non-Cubans, is subject to estimating error due to migrant efforts to   |
|                             | avoid law enforcement. Arrival numbers for Cubans tend to be more reliable than   |
|                             | other nationalities as immigration law allows Cubans to stay in the US once   |
|                             | reaching shore, which encourages self-reporting of arrival. Over the last 5 years,  |
|                             | Cubans have constituted approximately one quarter to one half of all maritime   |
|                             | migrant interdictions. Migrant landing information is validated across multiple   |
|                             | sources using established intelligence rules that favor conservative estimates.   |

| Performance Measure | Number of detected incursions of foreign fishing vessels violating U.S. waters   |
|---------------------|--|
| Program             | Operating Expenses   |
| Description         | This measure is the number of detected illegal fishing incursions into the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Incursions detected by both the U.S. Coast Guard and other sources are included when the reports are judged by operational  |
|                     | commanders as being of sufficient validity to order resources to respond.  |
| Scope of Data       | This measure includes incursions of foreign fishing vessels detected by the U.S. Coast Guard or other sources that results in either: 1) significant damage or impact to U.S. fish stocks (based on volume extracted or status of stock targeted); 2) significant financial impact due to volume and value of target fish stocks; 3) significant sovereignty concerns due to uncertainty or disagreement with foreign neighbors over the U.S. EEZ border. Standard rules of evidence (i.e. positioning accuracy) do not apply in determining detections; if a detection is reasonably believed to have occurred, it is counted. Reports of foreign fishing |

|  | vessels illegally fishing inside the U.S. EEZ are counted as detections when these reports are judged by operational commanders as being of sufficient validity to  |
|--|---|
|  | order available resources to respond.   |
| Data Source                              | Data for the measure are collected through the Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) system and from U.S. Coast Guard units patrolling the Exclusive Economic Zone. The information is consolidated at U.S. Coast Guard HQ through monthly messages from the Area Commanders.   |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Data for the measure are collected through the MISLE system and from U.S. Coast Guard units patrolling the Exclusive Economic Zone. The information is consolidated at U.S. Coast Guard HQ through monthly messages from the Area Commanders. The number of incursions is calculated by including incursions of foreign fishing vessels detected by the U.S. Coast Guard or other sources that results in: significant damage or impact to U.S. fish stocks (based on volume extracted or status of stock targeted); significant financial impact due to volume and value of target fish stocks; significant sovereignty concerns due to uncertainty or disagreement with foreign neighbors over the U.S. EEZ border. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | The program manager (CG-3RPL) reviews entries into MISLE database monthly and compares to other sources of information (i.e., after action reports, message traffic, etc.) to assess reliability of the database.   |

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of people in imminent danger saved in the maritime environment   |
|--|--|
| Program                                  | Operating Expenses   |
| Description                              | This is a measure of the percent of people who were in imminent danger on the oceans and other waterways and whose lives were saved by U.S Coast Guard. The number of lives lost before and after the U.S Coast Guard is notified and the number of persons missing at the end of search operations are factored into this percentage. Several factors hinder successful response including untimely distress notification to the U.S Coast Guard, incorrect distress site location reporting, severe weather conditions at the distress site, and distance to the scene.  |
| Scope of Data                            | One hundred percent of the maritime distress incidents reported to the U.S. Coast Guard are collected in the Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) database. The scope is narrowed to include only cases where there was a positive data element in the field lives saved, lives lost before notification, lives lost after notification, or lives unaccounted for. The scope of this data is further narrowed by excluding any case reports with eleven or more lives saved and/or lost in a single incident. Data accuracy is limited by two the rescuer's subjective interpretation of the policy criteria for the data point lives saved (for instance, was the life saved or simply assisted).  |
| Data Source                              | The data source is the U.S. Coast Guard's MISLE database.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Operational units input Search and Rescue data directly into the MISLE database. Program review and analysis occurs at the Districts, Area, and Headquarters levels. First, one hundred percent of the maritime distress incidents reported to the U.S. Coast Guard are collected in the MISLE database. Then, these reports are narrowed to include only cases where there was a positive data element in the fields lives saved, lives lost before notification, lives lost after notification, or lives unaccounted for. The scope of this data is further narrowed by excluding any case reports with eleven or more lives saved and/or lost in a single incident, which would overweight and mask other trends. After the data is properly scoped, the percentage of people in imminent danger saved in the maritime environment is calculated by dividing the number of people saved by the total number of people in imminent danger. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Checks on data input are made by individual case owners during the case documentation processes. Data is reviewed by the SAR Mission Coordinator either at the District or Sector level. This review occurs when cases are validated   |

| during a Search and Rescue case and after a case is concluded when the case is   |
|--|
| reviewed by individuals formally charged with that review. Data is also verified |
| quarterly by the Headquarters program manager via data extraction and checks     |
| for anomalies within the data. The database includes built-in prompts to check   |
| questionable data.   |

| Performance Measure                      | Security compliance rate for high risk maritime facilities   |
|--|--|
| Program                                  | Operating Expenses   |
| Description                              | This measure is a leading indicator of maritime facility security and resiliency in our nation's ports. Compliance of high risk (Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)) facilities is determined based upon finding a major problem during an inspection, requiring a notice of violation or civil penalty. MTSA facilities are a high risk subset of the national waterfront facility population given the nature of their activities and/or the products they handle; which pose a greater risk for significant loss of life, environmental damage, or economic disruption if attacked. This subset is approximately 3,100 facilities. The Coast Guard completes one scheduled and one unscheduled inspection on each facility annually. This measure provides insight into resiliency by verifying MTSA facilities maintain proper access safeguards and exercise approved plans/procedures to prevent and react to security emergencies; making them better suited to resist, adapt, and recover to adversity or disruption. |
| Scope of Data                            | MTSA facilities are a high risk subset of the entire national waterfront facility population given the nature of their activities and/or the products they handle; which pose a greater risk for significant loss of life, environmental damage, or economic disruption if attacked. MTSA regulation applies to facilities that: handle dangerous cargoes, liquid natural gas, or transfer oil or hazardous materials in bulk; or receive vessels that: carry more than 150 passengers, are foreign cargo vessels greater than 100 gross tons, or are U.S. cargo vessels greater than 100 gross tons carrying dangerous cargoes as prescribed by Federal Regulations. This does not apply to facilities that have a waiver or exemption including facilities that: are U.S. military, do not store minimum established amounts of dangerous cargoes, are shipyards, or are deemed public access facilities. This measure includes the results from annual Coast Guard security inspections conducted on all MTSA-regulated facilities  |
| Data Source                              | The data source is Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement database (MISLE).   |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Results of MTSA compliance examinations and security spot checks are entered into the Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement database. Data is collected centrally by a HQ-level office responsible for compliance. The percent is calculated by dividing the number of MTSA facilities who did not receive a notice of violation and/or civil penalty by the total number of MTSA facilities inspected.  |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | There is no material inadequacy in the data, i.e., those that significantly impede<br>the use of program performance data by agency managers and government<br>decision makers.  |

| Performance Measure | Three-year average number of serious marine incidents  |
|---------------------|--|
| Program             | Operating Expenses   |
| Description         | This measure reports the three-year average number of Serious Marine Incidents as defined by 46 CFR 4.03-2, which include: death or injury requiring professional treatment beyond first aid, reportable property damage greater than \$100,000, actual or constructive loss of certain vessels, discharge of oil of 10,000 gallons or more; or a discharge of a reportable quantity of a hazardous substance. |
| Scope of Data       | This measure reports the three-year average number of serious marine incidents as defined in 46 CFR 4.03-2. Serious Marine Incidents include any marine  |

|                             | casualty or accident defined by 46 CFR 4.03-1 which meets defined thresholds.  |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | These include: death or injury requiring professional treatment beyond first aid,  |
|                             | reportable property damage greater than \$100,000, actual or constructive loss of  |
|                             | certain vessels, discharge of oil of 10,000 gallons or more; or a discharge of a   |
|                             | reportable quantity of a hazardous substance.  |
| Data Source                 | Serious Marine Incidents are recorded in the Marine Information for Safety and   |
|                             | Law Enforcement (MISLE) database   |
| Data Collection Methodology | To obtain serious marine incidents, investigations recorded in the MISLE database are counted. Commercial mariner deaths and injuries include casualties           |
|                             | of crewmembers or employees aboard U.S. commercial vessels in U.S. waters.   |
|                             | Passenger deaths and injuries include casualties from passenger vessels operating in U.S. waters (disappearances or injuries associated with diving activities are |
|                             | excluded). Oil discharges of 10,000 gallons or more into navigable waterways of  |
|                             | the U.S. and reportable quantities of hazardous substances, whether or not   |
|                             | resulting from a marine casualty, are included. The three-year average for a   |
|                             | given year is calculated by taking the average of the number of serious marine   |
|                             | incidents for the most recent three years. Due to delayed receipt of some reports,   |
|                             | published data is subject to revision with the greatest impact on recent quarters.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | To ensure consistency and integrity, MISLE data entry is controlled through  |
| Reliability Check           | program logic and pull-down menus that require key elements, prohibit the  |
| •                           | inappropriate, and limit choices to pre-determined options. Comprehensive  |
|                             | training and user guides help ensure reliability and the application itself contains   |
|                             | embedded Help screens. MISLE system quality control, and data verification and   |
|                             | validation, is affected through regular review of records by the U.S. Coast Guard  |
|                             | Office of Investigations and Analysis. MISLE system quality control, and data  |
|                             | verification and validation, is affected through regular review of records by the  |
|                             | Coast Guard Office of Investigations and Casualty Analysis.  |

### **U.S.** Customs and Border Protection

| Performance Measure         | Amount of smuggled outbound currency seized at the ports of entry (in millions)   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Program                     | Trade and Travel Operations   |
| Description                 | This measure provides the total dollar amount of all currency in millions seized during outbound inspection of exiting passengers and vehicles, both privately-owned and commercial. The scope of this measure covers both the southwest and northern borders and includes all modes of transportation, (land, air, and sea).   |
| Scope of Data               | All outbound-related currency seizures are included in this measure. This covers both the southwest and northern borders and includes all modes (land, air, and sea).   |
| Data Source                 | All currency seizures are entered into the Seized Assets and Case Tracking System (SEACATS) which is a subsystem of TECS, the principal system of record used by CBP. Currency seizures information is accessed in report format through the BorderStat reporting tool.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | All CBP officers effecting outbound currency seizures enter seizure data into TECS via the Seized Assets and Case Tracking System (SEACATS) subsystem, using the proper codes to denote the seizure was made at exit during outbound operations. The SEACATS subsystem analyzes all seizure data and extracts currency seized data for the different categories of currency violations. |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | CBP Officers enter information into TECS for each currency seizure performed.   |
| Reliability Check           | A first line supervisor must review the information and approve it before it can be extracted and included in daily, monthly and annual reporting. A validation   |

| check is also conducted when the data is extracted from TECS and reported via |
|---|
| BorderStat.   |

| Performance Measure         | Number of smuggled outbound weapons seized at the ports of entry                 |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Program                     | Trade and Travel Operations  |
| Description                 | This measure provides the total number of illegal weapons seized during          |
|                             | outbound inspection of exiting passengers and vehicles, both privately-owned     |
|                             | and commercial. Weapons are defined as pistols, rifle-shotgun combinations,      |
|                             | rifles, revolvers, shotguns, disguised weapons, machine guns, submachine guns    |
|                             | or machine pistols. Seizing weapons being smuggled for criminal purposes         |
|                             | strengthens our border security by preventing the movement of assault weapons    |
|                             | and ammunition.  |
| Scope of Data               | All outbound-related seizures of weapons being smuggled for criminal purposes    |
|                             | are included in this measure. This measure excludes temporary seizures from      |
|                             | legitimate exporters due to improper documentation or administrative errors.     |
|                             | This covers both the southwest and northern borders and includes all modes of    |
|                             | transportation (land, air, and sea).   |
| Data Source                 | All weapons seizures are entered into SEACATS which is a subsystem of TECS,      |
|                             | the principal system of record used by CBP. Weapons seizure information is       |
|                             | accessed in report format through the BorderStat reporting tool.                 |
| Data Collection Methodology | All CBP officers effecting weapons seizures (e.g., inbound and outbound) must    |
|                             | enter seizure data into TECS via the SEACATS subsystem. The SEACATS              |
|                             | subsystem analyzes all seizure data and extracts weapons seized data.            |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | CBP Officers enter information into TECS (the principal system of record used    |
| Reliability Check           | by CBP) for each weapons seizure performed. A first line supervisor must         |
|                             | review the information and approve it before it can be extracted and included in |
|                             | daily, monthly and annual reporting. A validation check is also conducted when   |
|                             | the data is extracted from TECS and reported via BorderStat at CBP Office of     |
|                             | Field Operations Headquarters.   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of recurring border surveillance implemented in remote low risk areas   |
|---------------------|---|
|                     | between ports of entry  |
|                     | (New Measure)   |
| Program             | Border Security Operations  |
| Description         | This measure represents the percentage of remote low risk areas along the land border that are covered by recurring surveillance that can detect possible illicit activity. Low risk areas are geographically remote parts of the border that also have historically had low levels of illegal activity. Recurring surveillance is achieved through geospatial capabilities that monitor these areas for potential illicit activity and provide information to CBP Office of Intelligence analysts who review the information and determine if a response is needed. The measure demonstrates the Border Patrol's ability to maintain awareness of illicit activity |
| Scope of Data       | without needing to have agents directly located in these remote areas.  This measure includes the entire southern and northern land borders (excluding Alaska) that have been determined by CBP's U.S. Border Patrol Sector Chiefs to be low flow/low risk areas. While each Sector Chief can change the designation for any mile within their area of responsibility, in FY 2016 there were approximately 3,990 miles of the total 5,980 miles of the U.S. continental land  |
|                     | border designated as low risk/low flow areas suitable for geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) recurring surveillance. A "covered border mile" is defined as one mile of the border where CBP has the capability of deploying GEOINT capabilities if intelligence reports or risk analyses require GEOINT surveillance. This measure does not include the maritime domain.  |
| Data Source         | The data will be collected by CBP Office of Intelligence in the National Technical Collections Branch. The miles covered and required to be covered are   |

|                             | currently stored in the CBP Shared Server. That data is reported to U.S. Border  |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | Patrol enterprise Geospatial Information Services office for reporting.          |
| Data Collection Methodology | As U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) coverage capability increases, USBP changes the     |
|                             | designation of border miles from "proposed geospatial intelligence (GEOINT)      |
|                             | collection area" to "active GEOINT collection area." Sector Chiefs report which  |
|                             | miles of the border are low risk to CBP's Office of Intelligence (OI), who then  |
|                             | works to deploy GEOINT capabilities in those areas. CBP OI maintains an excel    |
|                             | spreadsheet in OI's National Technical Collections Branch (NTCB) by a            |
|                             | Collections Manager, which is updated as OI adds designated miles of the border  |
|                             | that are covered by GEOINT capabilities. The NTCB Branch Chief reviews the       |
|                             | spreadsheet for accuracy. After approval the spreadsheet is saved to the CBP     |
|                             | Shared Server. The NTCB Collections Manager then emails the new miles to a       |
|                             | Geospatial Information Services (GIS) analyst who updates the GIS map. The       |
|                             | Branch Chief of the NTCB uses these maps in their monthly report to the Border   |
|                             | Patrol Chief. The USBP liaison will report this information quarterly.           |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | The mileage added to active geospatial intelligence collection is tracked via an |
| Reliability Check           | excel spreadsheet that is updated by the NTCB and maintained on the CBP          |
|                             | Shared Server. A Collections Manager inputs the data, which is reviewed for      |
|                             | accuracy by the Branch Chief. After approval the spreadsheet is sent to a        |
|                             | Geospatial Information Services analyst within U.S. Border Patrol who then       |
|                             | uploads that data to a map that allows analysts to visualize their progress.     |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of cargo by value imported to the U.S. by participants in CBP trade         |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | partnership programs  |
| Program                     | Trade and Travel Operations   |
| Description                 | This measure describes the percent of all cargo that is imported from CBP trade     |
|                             | partnership programs based on the value compared to total value of all imports.     |
|                             | Partnership programs include both Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism       |
|                             | (C-TPAT) and Importer Self Assessment (ISA). CBP works with the trade               |
|                             | community through these voluntary public-private partnership programs,              |
|                             | wherein some members of the trade community adopt tighter security measures         |
|                             | throughout their international supply chain and in return are afforded benefits. A  |
|                             | variety of trade actors are included in these partnership programs, such as         |
|                             | importers, carriers, brokers, consolidators/third party logistic providers, Marine  |
|                             | Port Authority and Terminal Operators, and foreign manufacturers.                   |
| Scope of Data               | This measure includes all cargo and is a comparison of the value of cargo that is   |
|                             | imported from trade partnership programs to the total value of all imports          |
| Data Source                 | Data is extracted from the Automated Targeting System (ATS) and the                 |
|                             | Automated Commercial Environment (ACE).   |
| Data Collection Methodology | Importers, or brokers acting on their behalf, submit data electronically, which is  |
|                             | captured by the Automated Commercial System (ACS). The Office of                    |
|                             | International Trade (OT) pulls this data from their systems of record (ACS and      |
|                             | the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE)) once a month. After the line            |
|                             | value data is extracted, the measure is calculated by dividing the import value     |
|                             | associated with ISA or C-TPAT importers by the total value of all imports.          |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | Monthly internal monitoring of process and data quality issues is conducted at      |
| Reliability Check           | both the field level and HQ level. As part of our analytical process, the data used |
|                             | for this measure is compared to other known reliable data sets and measures.        |

| Performance Measure | Percent of detected conventional aircraft incursions resolved along all borders of |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | the United States  |
| Program             | Border Security Operations   |
| Description         | The measure represents the percent of conventional aircraft, once detected         |
|                     | visually or by radar, that are suspected of illegal cross border activity and are  |

|  | brought to a successful law enforcement resolution. In some cases, Office of Air and Marine (OAM) assets are launched to interdict the aircraft. In most cases, resolution of the aircraft identity is made by the Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) working with interagency partners such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). If the incursion is deemed legal, OAM considers the incursion resolved. If not resolved, AMOC working with our partners including OAM assets - could not identify the target and is thus considered illegal. |
|--|--|
| Scope of Data                            | The scope of this measure includes all potential identified air space incursions by conventional aircraft along all borders of the United States.  |
| Data Source                              | Tasking Operations Management Information System, TECS, and the AMOC Integrated Information Database   |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Airspace incursions are identified by the Air and Marine Operations Center.  Once identified, this information is transmitted to the closest air branch for air support. The results are then entered into the TECS and the Air and Marine Operations Report systems, and tallies of all incursions are summarized on a monthly basis.   |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Data is routinely reconciled by a comparison of information in the systems manually by contractor and program staff on a monthly and/or quarterly basis.   |

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of import revenue successfully collected  |
|--|---|
| Program                                  | Trade and Travel Operations   |
| Description                              | This measure estimates the collected duties, taxes, and fees (called net undercollection of revenue) expressed as a percent of all collectable revenue due from commercial imports to the United States directed by trade laws, regulations, and agreements. The total collectable revenue is total collected revenue plus the estimated net undercollected revenue based on trade violations. The revenue gap is a calculation of uncollected duties (the difference between estimated undercollection and overpayment) based on statistical sampling.   |
| Scope of Data                            | This measure is part of the annual Trade Compliance Measurement (TCM) program. The program involves taking a statistical sample (about 65,000 import entry lines) from a given population of imports. This population covers consumption and Anti-Dumping/Countervailing Duty (AD/CVD) entry types, excluding informal entries. This data will be produced monthly, aggregated year-to-date, and then presented as an annual figure.  |
| Data Source                              | The Automated Commercial System (ACS) is the source until 2/14/2010. After 2/14/2010, the targeting feature of the program resides in the Automated Targeting System (ATS) with User Defined Rules (UDR) and the review findings are recorded in the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) using the Validation Activity (VA) functionality.   |
| Data Collection Methodology              | At the start of each fiscal year, an analysis of import data is conducted to help design a statistical survey program, which is implemented with User Defined Rules (UDR) in the Automated Targeting System (ATS). Entry Summary line transactions are identified by ATS which opens a Validation Activity in ACE. Each Field Office must review the identified entry summary line transaction for compliance and record the findings with a Validation Activity Determination (VAD). VAD data is extracted monthly by HQ analysts and statistics are compiled monthly and annually by the resident statistician within the Trade Analysis and Measures Division. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Monthly internal monitoring of process and data quality issues are conducted at both the field level and HQ level. This is treated as a shared responsibility of both HQ and field locations, where multiple levels of checks are conducted, and any found problems are quickly addressed. HQ also hosts quarterly conference calls with field locations to openly discuss these issues, and provides reports to field locations when remediation action is needed. This oversight is documented  |

| and provided as evidence of program control to outside independent auditors |
|---|
| each year.  |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of imports compliant with U.S. trade laws                                    |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Program                     | Trade and Travel Operations  |
| Description                 | This measure reports the percent of imports that are compliant with U.S. trade       |
|                             | laws including customs revenue laws. Ensuring that all imports are compliant         |
|                             | and free of major discrepancies allows for lawful trade into the U.S.                |
| Scope of Data               | The measure is part of the annual Trade Compliance Measurement (TCM)                 |
|                             | program. The program involves taking a statistical sample (about 65,000 import       |
|                             | entry lines) from a given population of imports. This MTD measure covers the         |
|                             | population consumption and Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty entry types,         |
|                             | excluding informal entries. Recorded discrepancies are considered to be              |
|                             | significant or major as they have additional conditions on the value of imports,     |
|                             | amount of revenue loss, etc. For example, a discrepancy in value with a revenue      |
|                             | loss greater than \$1,000, a clerical error that results a revenue loss greater than |
|                             | \$1,000, an IPR violation, and a country of origin discrepancy with value greater    |
|                             | than 33rd percentile or revenue loss greater than \$1,000.                           |
| Data Source                 | Data resides in the Automated Targeting System (ATS) with User Defined Rules         |
|                             | (UDR) and the review findings are recorded in the Automated Commercial               |
|                             | Environment (ACE) using the Validation Activity (VA) functionality. Data from        |
|                             | before 2/14/2010 resided in the Automated Commercial System (ACS).                   |
| Data Collection Methodology | At the start of each fiscal year, based on previous year imports risk, volume,       |
|                             | value, and compliance history a stratified random sampling methodology is used       |
|                             | to select import entries summary lines, which is implemented with User Defined       |
|                             | Rules (UDR) in the Automated Targeting System (ATS). Entry Summary line              |
|                             | transactions are identified by ATS which opens a Validation Activity in ACE.         |
|                             | Each Field Office must review the identified entry summary line transaction for      |
|                             | compliance and record the findings with a Validation Activity Determination          |
|                             | (VAD). VAD data is extracted monthly by HQ analysts and statistics are               |
|                             | compiled monthly and annually by the resident statistician within the Trade          |
| Reliability Index           | Analysis and Measures Division. Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | Monthly internal monitoring of process and data quality issues are conducted at      |
| Reliability Check           | both the field level and HQ level. This is treated as a shared responsibility of     |
| Reliability Check           | both HQ and field locations, where multiple levels of checks are conducted, and      |
|                             | any found problems are quickly addressed. HQ also hosts quarterly conference         |
|                             | calls with field locations to openly discuss these issues, and provides reports to   |
|                             | field locations when remediation action is needed. This oversight is documented      |
|                             | and provided as evidence of program control to outside independent auditors          |
|                             | each year.   |
|                             | out jour.  |

| Performance Measure | Percent of inbound cargo identified by CBP as potentially high-risk that is        |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | assessed or scanned prior to departure or at arrival at a U.S. port of entry       |
| Program             | Trade and Travel Operations  |
| Description         | This measure gauges the percent of international cargo coming to the United        |
|                     | States via air, land, and sea identified as potentially high-risk using the        |
|                     | Automated Targeting System (ATS) that is assessed or scanned prior to lading or    |
|                     | at arrival at a U.S. port of entry. Assessing, resolving, and when necessary       |
|                     | scanning potentially high-risk cargo prior to lading or at arrival at the ports of |
|                     | entry ensures the safety of the U.S. public and minimizes the impact to the trade  |
|                     | through the effective use of risk-focused targeting.                               |
| Scope of Data       | For FY 2012 Q3 and Q4 reporting, this measure includes cargo in the sea and air    |
|                     | environment destined for a U.S. port of entry. Land cargo will be included in this |
|                     | measure beginning in FY 2013. Cargo is identified as potentially high-risk by      |
|                     | CBP's Automated Targeting System (ATS) using a risk-focused security index         |

|                             | coming alcouithm. Chiamanta and flagged as notantially high misk if they have an   |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | scoring algorithm. Shipments are flagged as potentially high-risk if they have an  |
|                             | ATS security index score of 190 or above on either bill or entry. The National     |
|                             | Targeting Center - Cargo works with the Targeting and Analysis Systems             |
|                             | Program Office (TASPO), Office of Information Technology to determine the          |
|                             | final status of all identified potentially high-risk cargo.                        |
| Data Source                 | CBP's Automated Targeting System (ATS) contains the requisite data to              |
|                             | determine the total amount of cargo that was scored 190 or above by either bill or |
|                             | entry. The ATS 4 module (CERTS) contains the data used to determine the            |
|                             | disposition of the cargo that was flagged as potentially high-risk by ATS.         |
| Data Collection Methodology | Electronic manifest data is provided to CBP by shippers and brokers and loaded     |
|                             | into CBP's Automated Targeting System (ATS) database. The ATS screening            |
|                             | algorithms are applied to this data and the results are provided electronically to |
|                             | the Cargo Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System (CERTS), including             |
|                             | entry status data for all modes of cargo identified as high-risk. Based on this    |
|                             | information, the percent of cargo reviewed, scanned, and resolved is calculated    |
|                             | by taking all cargo shipments with a score of 190 or above that have been          |
|                             | reviewed/examined/mitigated (determined from CERTS) and dividing this by the       |
|                             | total number of cargo shipments with a score of 190 or above.                      |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | CBP Officers review and examine the Automated Targeting System (ATS)               |
| Reliability Check           | information on potentially high-risk cargo, resolve or mitigate security concerns, |
| Reliability Cheek           | determine those cases where further examination is required, and record the        |
|                             |  |
|                             | findings of this review/examination process in the ATS 4 (CERTS) module,           |
|                             | annotating all methods and tools they required to complete the examination. For    |
|                             | land border ports of entry, they also enter findings into the Automated            |
|                             | Commercial Environment (ACE) system, which is mandatory for land ports to          |
|                             | allow the truck and cargo to be released from CBP. Supervisors periodically        |
|                             | extract high threat examination findings data from the CERTS module for review     |
|                             | and validation of the data entered by CBP Officers. Anomalies in the findings      |
|                             | data are identified and immediate corrective actions are taken to ensure data      |
|                             | integrity.   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of people apprehended multiple times along the Southwest border  |
|---------------------|--|
| Program             | Border Security Operations   |
| Description         | This measure examines the percent of deportable individuals who have been apprehended multiple times by the U.S. Border Patrol. This measure calculates the number of people apprehended multiple times divided by the total number of apprehensions of people during a fiscal year. Effective and efficient application of consequences for illegal border crossers will, over time, reduce overall recidivism.   |
| Scope of Data       | All apprehensions of deportable illegal aliens apprehended that have or recieve a Fingerprint Identification Number (FIN) within the nine sectors of the Southwest Border within the defined time period of the reporting year are used in calculating the denominator of this measure. The numerator of the calculation includes a count of the number of apprehensions of the same person (with FIN) more than one time that occurred in the same defined time period. Fingerprints are not taken and FINs are not generated for individuals under age 14, over age 86, and for some humanitarian cases; but, these individuals compose the approximately 2% of the population which is not included in the scope of this measure. |
| Data Source         | This data is captured by Border Patrol agents at the station level, where apprehension data is entered into the e3 Processing system. All data entered via e3 Processing resides in the Enforcement Integrated Database (EID), the official system of record for this data, which is under the purview of the Border Patrol Headquarters Statistics and Data Integrity unit. The physical database is owned  |

|  | and maintained by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Office of   |
|--|--|
|  | Chief Information Officer (OCIO).  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Apprehension data is entered into the e3 Processing application by Border Patrol Agents at the Station level. Data input can be made by the apprehending agent, or by another agent who obtains details concerning the apprehension from the apprehending agent. The e3 Processing application continuously updates the Enforcement Integrated Database with the apprehension data. This data can be reviewed at the station, sector or Headquarters level in a variety of reporting formats. Calculation of this measure is as follows: The number of Unique Subjects (with FIN) that have been apprehended multiple times within a specified time period and geographic parameter, divided by the total number of Unique subjects (with FIN) apprehended during the same time period and geographic parameter. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | All apprehension data entered into e3 Processing is subject to review by supervisors at multiple levels. Data reliability tools are built into the system; for example, data input not conforming to appropriate expectations for each cell is flagged for re-entry. The Enforcement Integrated Database continuously updates to compile all apprehension data. This data can then be extracted into summary reports, and these summaries are available for review and analysis at station, sector, and Headquarters levels. At the Headquarters level, the Statistics and Data Integrity Unit conducts monthly Data Quality reports as well as weekly miscellaneous checks. When discrepencies are found, they are referred back to the apprehending Sector/Station for review and correction.                  |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of time the U.S. Border Patrol meets its goal of responding to potential      |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | illegal activity in remote, low-risk areas  |
|                             | (New Measure)   |
| Program                     | Border Security Operations  |
| Description                 | In order to ensure an effective response, the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) aims to       |
| 1                           | respond to potentially illicit activity in remote low risk areas within 24 hours.     |
|                             | This measure gauges USBP's ability to meet that goal and ensure potential             |
|                             | illegal activity is properly assessed and responded to.                               |
| Scope of Data               | This measure encompasses all GEOINT-informed (geospatial intelligence)                |
|                             | reports of potential illicit activity in remote low risk areas. This measure includes |
|                             | all miles of the southern and northern land border (excluding Alaska) that have       |
|                             | been determined by each USBP sector to be low flow and low risk areas. In             |
|                             | FY16, this was approximately 2,638.27 miles of the total 5,980 miles of the U.S.      |
|                             | continental land border. This measure does not include the maritime domain. A         |
|                             | response is defined as when a USBP sector receives an e-mail notification from        |
|                             | an analyst and deploys USBP Agents to investigate the detected activity.              |
| Data Source                 | The data source is mined from e-mail notifications and individual Field               |
|                             | Information Reports (FIR) which are stored in a web-based CBP Intelligence            |
|                             | Reporting System.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | When the collection platform detects potential illicit activity the Office of         |
|                             | Intelligence sends an e-mail notification to the appropriate USBP Sector. The         |
|                             | Sector then deploys Border Patrol Agents to respond. The clock officially starts      |
|                             | on the response when the e-mail notification is sent and is recorded by the           |
|                             | responding sector. The arrival time of the Agents at the coordinates provided in      |
|                             | the notification is recorded as the response time in the Field Information Reports    |
|                             | (FIR). The measure will be reported quarterly by USBP Sectors to USBP                 |
|                             | Headquarters.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | The responding Agent drafts the Field Information Reports (FIR), which is then        |
| Reliability Check           | reviewed by a supervisor. The Patrol Agent In Charge must review and give final       |

|  | approval on all FIRs submitted. All FIRs must be submitted within 72 hours of notification.   |
|--|---|
|  |   |
| Performance Measure                      | Rate of interdiction effectiveness along the Southwest Border between ports of entry  |
| Program                                  | Border Security Operations  |
| Description                              | This measure reports the percent of detected illegal entrants who were apprehended or turned back after illegally entering the United States between the ports of entry on the Southwest border. The Border Patrol achieves this desired strategic outcome by maximizing the apprehension of detected illegal entrants or, confirming that illegal entrants return to the country from which they entered; and by minimizing the number of persons who evade apprehension and can no longer be pursued.   |
| Scope of Data                            | The scope includes all areas of the Southwest border that are generally at or below the northern most checkpoint within a given area of responsibility, and applies the following data filters:  In Border Zones: Includes all Apprehensions, Got Aways (GA), and Turn Backs (TB).  In Non-Border Zones: Includes apprehended subjects who have been identified as being in the US illegally for 30 days or less, does not include GA and TB. Definitions:  Apprehension: A deportable subject who, after making an illegal entry, is taken into custody and receives a consequence.  Gotaway: A subject who, after making an illegal entry, is not turned back or apprehended and is no longer being actively pursued by Border Patrol agents.  Turn Back: A subject who, after making an illegal entry into the US, returns to the country from which he/she entered, not resulting in an apprehension or GA.                     |
| Data Source                              | Apprehension, gotaway, and turnback data is captured by Border Patrol agents at the station level into the following systems:  Apprehensions are entered into the e3 Processing (e3) system. All data entered via e3 resides in the Enforcement Integrated Database (EID), the official system of record for this data, which is under the purview of the Border Patrol Headquarters Statistics and Data Integrity (SDI) Unit. The physical database is owned and maintained by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Gotaways and Turnbacks are entered into the CBP Enforcement Tracking System 1 (BPETS1), which resides with Office of Border Patrol. BPETS1 is under the purview of and is owned by the Enforcement Systems Unit.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Apprehension data is entered into e3 by Border Patrol agents (BPAs) at the station level as part of the standardized processing procedure. BPAs use standard definitions for determining when to report a subject as a GA or TB. Some subjects can be observed directly as evading apprehension or turning back; others are acknowledged as GAs or TBs after BPAs follow evidence that indicate entries have occurred, such as foot sign, sensor activations, interviews with apprehended subjects, camera views, communication between and among stations and sectors, and other information. Data input into the BPETS1 system occurs at the station level.  The e3 Processing application and BPETS1 are used continuously to document apprehension, GA, and TB data. Calculation of the measure is done by the HQ SDI Unit and is: (Apprehensions + TB)/Total Entries. Total entries is the sum of Apprehensions, TBs, and GAs. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Patrol Agents in Charge ensure all agents are aware of and utilize proper definitions for apprehesions, GAs and TBs at their respective stations. They also ensure the necessary communication takes place between and among sectors and stations to ensure accurate documentation of subjects who may have crossed more than one station's area of responsibility. In addition to station level safeguards,  |

| the HQ Statistics and Data Integrity (SDI) Unit validates data integrity by utilizing various data quality reports. Data issues are corrected at the headquarters level, or forwarded to the original inputting station for correct All statistical information requested from within DHS, USBP, or external sources are routed through the centralized HQ office within USBP. The S Unit coordinates with these entities to ensure accurate data analysis and or | DI |
|---|----|
|---|----|

### **U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement**

| Performance Measure                      | Average length of stay in detention of all convicted criminal aliens prior to  |
|--|--|
|  | removal from the United States (in days)   |
| Program                                  | Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)   |
| Description                              | This measure provides an indicator of efficiencies achieved in working to drive down the average length of stay for convicted criminals in ICE's detention facilities. Decreases in the average length of stay can significantly reduce the overall costs associated with maintaining an alien population prior to removal.  |
| Scope of Data                            | The scope of this measure includes all criminal aliens who were detained within ICE's detention facilities or while in ICE custody in federal, state, and local jails during the fiscal year awaiting due process.   |
| Data Source                              | Data is maintained in the Alien Removal Module of the ENFORCE database. This database is maintained at headquarters and the data entry occurs at Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Field Offices throughout the country. Tools in the Integrated Decision Support System are used to query the Alien Removal Module and produce reports to calculate the final results for this measure.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | ERO field offices are responsible for the entry and maintenance of data regarding the removal/return of illegal aliens. Officers track the status of administrative processes and/or court cases and indicate when actual removals occur in the Alien Removal Module of the ENFORCE database. When an alien is removed/returned from the United States, case officers in the field will indicate the case disposition and date the removal/return occurred in the database. Reports generated from the Alien Removal Module are used to determine the total number of illegal aliens removed/returned from the country during the specified time.  |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Headquarters staff validate the completeness and accuracy of the data entered by field offices into the Alien Removal Module through trend analysis to look for aberrations and unusual patterns. Data is analyzed on a weekly basis and compared to statistics from prior months and the previous year. An additional reliability check occurs when data is cross - referenced between field office detention facility reports of the number of removals, and data entered into the database. The Statistical Tracking unit checks for consistency of the results or measuring instrument through validation, back-end testing or reproducibility of the data through alternative methodology. Depending upon the degree of consistency between two measures of the same measure allows the statistician to determine whether the data is considered reliable and or stable. Any inaccuracies will need to be sent to the Unit Chief, who will make the necessary corrections to the tasking query. |

| Performance Measure | Number of convicted criminal aliens removed per fiscal year                       |
|---------------------|---|
| Program             | Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)  |
| Description         | This measure includes removals from the U.S. under any types of removal order     |
|                     | as well as voluntary returns of immigration violators to their country of origin. |

|  | This measure reflects the full impact of program activities to ensure that criminal aliens identified in the country, that are amenable to removal do not remain in the U.S. (statistical tracking note: Measure equals the case status with a departure date within the fiscal year, filtered by criminality and exiting ERO Criminal Alien Program codes.)   |
|--|--|
| Scope of Data                            | Total number of criminal removals and returns defined by case category 0,3,9 - Returns and case category 6,8,X - Returns. The term 'Returns' include Voluntary Returns, Voluntary Departures and Withdrawals under Docket Control.   |
| Data Source                              | Data is maintained in the Alien Removal Module of the ENFORCE database. This database is maintained at headquarters and the data entry occurs at Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Field Offices throughout the country. Tools in the Integrated Decision Support System are used to query the Alien Removal Module and produce reports to calculate the final results for this measure.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Enforcement and Removals Operations field offices are responsible for the entry and maintenance of data regarding the removal/return of illegal aliens. Officers track the status of administrative processes and/or court cases and indicate when actual removals occur in the Alien Removal Module of the ENFORCE database. When an alien is removed/returned from the United States, case officers in the field will indicate in the database the case disposition and date the removal/return occurred in the database. Reports generated from the Alien Removal Module are used to determine the total number of illegal aliens removed/returned from the country during the specified time.  |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Headquarters staff validate the completeness and accuracy of the data entered by field offices into the Alien Removal Module through trend analysis to look for aberrations and unusual patterns. Data is analyzed on a weekly basis and compared to statistics from prior months and the previous year. An additional reliability check occurs when data is cross - referenced between field office detention facility reports of the number of removals, and data entered into the database. The Statistical Tracking unit checks for consistency of the results or measuring instrument through validation, back-end testing or reproducibility of the data through alternative methodology. Depending upon the degree of consistency between two measures of the same measure allows the statistician to determine whether the data is considered reliable and or stable. Any inaccuracies will need to be sent to the Unit Chief, who will make the necessary corrections to the tasking query. |
| Performance Measure                      | Number of enforcement-related actions against employers that violate immigration-related employment laws   |
| Program                                  | Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)   |
| Description                              | This measure is a cumulative result of enforcement-related actions against employers that hire illegal labor. Enforcement-related actions include criminal arrests, audits, and final orders of fines of employers related to worksite enforcement. This measure demonstrates the impact of worksite enforcement operations to ensure that employers do not violate immigration-related employment laws.   |
| Scope of Data                            | This measure includes employers that have been audited, sanctioned, fined, arrested, or otherwise brought into compliance with the law. For the purpose of this measure, "audit" is defined as an administrative examination by ICE personnel of employer organizations. "Sanction" is defined as a detriment, loss of   |

reward, or coercive intervention as a means of enforcing immigration law.

monetary fines levied against companies for a specific time period.

Data is retrieved from the investigative case management system, TECS. Data query results identify the number of criminal arrests, audits, and/or amount of

Data Source

| Data Collection Methodology  Reliability Index | Under federal law, employers are obligated to ensure their employees are eligible to work in the United States. When immigration-related questions arise regarding the accuracy of I-9 forms or other documentation for employer personnel, an audit may be performed by ICE to investigate possible violations. Arrests and various forms of sanction can occur based upon the outcome of these audits. After an employer has been audited, sanctioned, or arrested, the record is entered into the TECS system. A data request is sent to the HSI Executive Information Unit (EIU) from the Budget Formulation and Strategic Planning Unit. EIU returns an excel spreadsheet with the number of criminal arrests, audits, and/or amount of monetary fines levied against companies for a specific time period.               |
|--|--|
| Explanation of Data                            | Case information in TECS is verified and audited by the HSI Data Quality Unit  |
| Reliability Check                              | on a monthly basis.  |
| Renability Check                               | on a monumy basis.   |
| Performance Measure                            | Percent of detention facilities found in compliance with the national detention standards by receiving a final acceptable inspection rating  |
| Program  | Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)   |
| Description                                    | This measure gauges the percent of detention facilities that have received an overall rating of acceptable or above within the Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) National Detention Standards Program. The National Detention Standards were originally issued in September 2000 to facilitate consistent conditions of confinement, access to legal representation, and safe and secure operations across the immigration detention system. The standards have been updated into a performance based format known as the Performance Based National Detention Standards. Through a robust inspections program, the program ensures facilities utilized to detain aliens in immigration proceedings or awaiting removal to their countries do so in accordance with the Performance Based National Detention Standards. |
| Scope of Data                                  | Currently all facilities on the authorized facility's list are included in this  |
| 1  | measure. Authorized facilities include detention centers that have been inspected by ERO/Custody Operations law enforcement personnel, or their Subject Matter Experts (SME), to ensure the facility meets all requirements of the ICE/ERO National Detention Standards provisions.  |
| Data Source                                    | The annual review rating is contained in formal inspection reports provided by the Detention Standards Compliance Unit (DSCU) contractor and is further reviewed by the DSCU. The information from these reports will be compiled to determine the agency-wide percentage of facilities receiving acceptable or above rating.  |
| Data Collection Methodology                    | Data for this measure is collected by annual inspections, which are then evaluated by ERO inspectors. These inspections review the current 38 National Detention Standards that apply to all facilities, and rate whether the facility is in compliance with each standard. Based on these ratings, the compliance for each facility is calculated. This information is communicated in formal reports to the program and the ERO Inspections and Audit Unit and the Detention Standards Compliance Unit at ERO Headquarters, which oversees and reviews all reports. The program reports semi-annually on agency-wide adherence with the Detention Standards based on calculating the number of facilities receiving an acceptable or better rating, compared to the total number of facilities inspected.                    |
| Reliability Index                              | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check       | The program reviews all reports of detention facilities inspections conducted by the contractor. Inspections that receive a final rating of "Acceptable" or above are reviewed by the Detention Standards Compliance Unit (DSCU) and the Inspections and Audit Unit. Inspections that receive deficient or at-risk rating are reviewed by DSCU SMEs.   |

| Performance Measure                   | Percent of ICE removals that support current enforcement priorities (New   |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| D                                     | Measure)   |
| Program                               | Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)   |
| Description                           | This measure reports on the percent of significant transnational criminal investigations that resulted in a disruption or dismantlement. "Disruption" is defined as impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization. "Dismantlement" is defined as destroying the organization's leadership, financial base and network to the degree that the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself.  ICE investigations cover a broad range of areas, including national security threats, financial and smuggling violations (including illegal arms exports), financial crimes, commercial fraud, human trafficking, narcotics smuggling, child pornography/exploitation and immigration fraud.   |
| Scope of Data                         | Data will be retrieved from the Investigative Case Management system (ICM), to include all validated records of significant transnational worksite investigations. The following shall constitute the Department's civil immigration enforcement priorities: Priority 1 (threats to national security, border security, and public   |
|                                       | safety), Priority 2 (misdemeanants and new immigration violators), and Priority 3 (other immigration violations, which includes those who have been issued a final order of removal on or after January 1, 2014). This guidance is outlined in DHS Memo Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants dated 20 November 2014.  |
| Data Source                           | Data are stored in the ICE Integrated Decision Support (IIDS) system data  |
|                                       | warehouse and maintained by ERO's Statistical Tracking Unit (STU). The IIDS reflects officer-entered data into DHS's case management system and its tables are refreshed nightly and provide data with a 36-hour delay.  |
| Data Collection Methodology           | When an alien is processed, an ERO officer selects which priority category the alien falls under and provides accompanying rationale within DHS' case management system. ICE ERO's Law Enforcement Systems and Analysis group queries the ICE Integrated Decision Support (IIDS) to determine both the total number of removals, as well as the priority of those removals during the  |
|                                       | reporting period. IIDS queries cross-check priority selections with additional priority-relevant data about the removal (e.g., date of issuance for a final order of removal) to ensure data reliability. The final calculation is made by dividing the number of top Priority 1 removals by the number of total removals.   |
| Reliability Index                     | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data Reliability Check | The IIDS, ERO's main data warehouse, is routinely maintained for accuracy. Law Enforcement Systems and Analysis' Statistical Tracking Unit (STU) has internal control measures in place to check data reliability. STU validates queries each week to benchmark against prior weeks' reported figures, which are archived internally. Data abnormalities are examined by the STU analyst to identify any technical issues and adjusted accordingly. The corrected data model is archived and used moving forward. If the data are determined to have potential data quality issues due to Field input, the STU analyst will work in conjunction with the STU officers to perform a case review in addition to a review of the alien's criminal history in the front-end applications. Any major data quality issues and anomalies are shared with the Data Quality and Integrity Unit to potentially facilitate the Field fixing or addressing a larger-scale issue with the front-end applications. |
| Performance Measure                   | Percent of removal orders secured by ICE attorneys that support current enforcement priorities   |
| Program                               | Office of Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA)   |
| Description                           | This measure indicates the percent of total removal orders secured by OPLA attorneys that support the Department's highest enforcement priorities. OPLA  |

| attorneys play an integral role in enforcing the nation's immigration laws by  |
|--|
| litigating cases in immigration court and securing orders of removal against those   |
| found to be in the United States illegally.  |
| The scope of data will consist of removal order cases with an Immigration Judge  |
| (IJ) order date occurring during the fiscal year that supports the Department's  |
| highest current stated priorities: Priority 1 (threats to national security, border  |
| security, and public safety) and Priority 2 (misdemeanants and new immigration   |
| violators) This guidance is outlined in DHS Memo Policies for the  |
| Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants dated 20  |
| November 2014.   |
| The information will be retrieved from the Principal Legal Advisor's Network   |
| (PLAnet) and the Enforcement Integrated Database (EID).  |
| OPLA analysts retrieve Alien File (A-File) information for cases with an IJ order  |
| from PLAnet and provide a data file comprised of those A-File numbers to ERO.  |
| ERO then matches the relevant civil immigration enforcement priority   |
| information to each A-File number and returns the data file to OPLA. OPLA  |
| analysts then calculate the percentage of removal orders that are Priority 1 or  |
| Priority 2. OPLA then analyzes the data and provides a written explanation of  |
| results.   |
| Reliable   |
| OPLA's Knowledge Management Division and Field Legal Operations attorneys  |
| review and confirm the accuracy of the data presented.   |
| Percent of significant child exploitation or child sex trafficking investigations  |
| that resulted in a disruption or dismantlement   |
| (Retired Measure)  |
| Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)   |
| This measure reports the percent of transnational child exploitation or child sex  |
| rafficking investigations resulting in the disruption or dismantlement of high-  |
| threat criminal organizations/individuals. "Child exploitation" is defined as  |
| manufacturing and distributing sexual or perverted acts or images of children  |
| under the age of 18. "Disruption" is defined as impeding the normal and  |
| effective operation of the targeted organization. "Dismantlement" is defined as  |
| destroying the organization's leadership, financial base and network to the degree   |
| that the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself. ICE  |
| has established a Child Exploitation Investigations Center (CEIC) to serve as a  |
|  |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center   |
|  |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center   |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.   |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child  |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.   |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) system. "High-threat" language  |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury   |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) system. "High-threat" language  |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) system. "High-threat" language refers to cases flagged and reviewed through ICE's Significant Case Review (SCR) process. Threshold levels are established in the respective case categories to identify those cases investigating the most significant crimes.  |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) system. "High-threat" language refers to cases flagged and reviewed through ICE's Significant Case Review (SCR) process. Threshold levels are established in the respective case categories to identify those cases investigating the most significant crimes.  Specific case information will be entered through the use of the Significant Case   |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) system. "High-threat" language refers to cases flagged and reviewed through ICE's Significant Case Review (SCR) process. Threshold levels are established in the respective case categories to identify those cases investigating the most significant crimes.  Specific case information will be entered through the use of the Significant Case Report (SCR) Module in TECS.  |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) system. "High-threat" language refers to cases flagged and reviewed through ICE's Significant Case Review (SCR) process. Threshold levels are established in the respective case categories to identify those cases investigating the most significant crimes.  Specific case information will be entered through the use of the Significant Case Report (SCR) Module in TECS.  |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) system. "High-threat" language refers to cases flagged and reviewed through ICE's Significant Case Review (SCR) process. Threshold levels are established in the respective case categories to identify those cases investigating the most significant crimes.  Specific case information will be entered through the use of the Significant Case Report (SCR) Module in TECS.  ICE agents utilize TECS to track and manage investigative case data, which begins with the opening of a case and identification of a case category or   |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) system. "High-threat" language refers to cases flagged and reviewed through ICE's Significant Case Review (SCR) process. Threshold levels are established in the respective case categories to identify those cases investigating the most significant crimes.  Specific case information will be entered through the use of the Significant Case Report (SCR) Module in TECS.  ICE agents utilize TECS to track and manage investigative case data, which begins with the opening of a case and identification of a case category or categories. Substantive case information during the investigative process is  |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) system. "High-threat" language refers to cases flagged and reviewed through ICE's Significant Case Review (SCR) process. Threshold levels are established in the respective case categories to identify those cases investigating the most significant crimes.  Specific case information will be entered through the use of the Significant Case Report (SCR) Module in TECS.  ICE agents utilize TECS to track and manage investigative case data, which begins with the opening of a case and identification of a case category or categories. Substantive case information during the investigative process is entered into TECS, eventually reflecting indictment, conviction, and/or case   |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) system. "High-threat" language refers to cases flagged and reviewed through ICE's Significant Case Review (SCR) process. Threshold levels are established in the respective case categories to identify those cases investigating the most significant crimes.  Specific case information will be entered through the use of the Significant Case Report (SCR) Module in TECS.  ICE agents utilize TECS to track and manage investigative case data, which begins with the opening of a case and identification of a case category or categories. Substantive case information during the investigative process is entered into TECS, eventually reflecting indictment, conviction, and/or case closure. This data is routinely validated for accuracy, prior to any reporting. To  |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) system. "High-threat" language refers to cases flagged and reviewed through ICE's Significant Case Review (SCR) process. Threshold levels are established in the respective case categories to identify those cases investigating the most significant crimes.  Specific case information will be entered through the use of the Significant Case Report (SCR) Module in TECS.  ICE agents utilize TECS to track and manage investigative case data, which begins with the opening of a case and identification of a case category or categories. Substantive case information during the investigative process is entered into TECS, eventually reflecting indictment, conviction, and/or case closure. This data is routinely validated for accuracy, prior to any reporting. To report for this measure, a data request will be sent to the Homeland Security  |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) system. "High-threat" language refers to cases flagged and reviewed through ICE's Significant Case Review (SCR) process. Threshold levels are established in the respective case categories to identify those cases investigating the most significant crimes.  Specific case information will be entered through the use of the Significant Case Report (SCR) Module in TECS.  ICE agents utilize TECS to track and manage investigative case data, which begins with the opening of a case and identification of a case category or categories. Substantive case information during the investigative process is entered into TECS, eventually reflecting indictment, conviction, and/or case closure. This data is routinely validated for accuracy, prior to any reporting. To report for this measure, a data request will be sent to the Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Executive Information Unit (EIU) from the Budget  |
| central coordination point for state, local, and tribal offices, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, and other federal law enforcement agencies, as well as international law enforcement agencies dedicated to combating the sexual exploitation of children.  The scope of this measure includes all validated records of significant child exploitation or sex trafficking investigations that are entered in to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) system. "High-threat" language refers to cases flagged and reviewed through ICE's Significant Case Review (SCR) process. Threshold levels are established in the respective case categories to identify those cases investigating the most significant crimes.  Specific case information will be entered through the use of the Significant Case Report (SCR) Module in TECS.  ICE agents utilize TECS to track and manage investigative case data, which begins with the opening of a case and identification of a case category or categories. Substantive case information during the investigative process is entered into TECS, eventually reflecting indictment, conviction, and/or case closure. This data is routinely validated for accuracy, prior to any reporting. To report for this measure, a data request will be sent to the Homeland Security  |
| life I to his very I to a few of the control of the |

|  | percentage of SCR cases with an approved disruption or dismantlement is then derived.  |
|--|--|
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | All SCR child exploitation or child sex trafficking cases will be approved by a panel represented by 5 HSI Divisions, HSI Operations, International Affairs and Intelligence. The panel will validate the information provided and determine if the nominated cases indeed meet the criteria of significant investigations resulting in a disruption or dismantlement.   |
| Performance Measure                      | Demonst of cignificant drug investigations that regulted in a disminston or  |
|  | Percent of significant drug investigations that resulted in a disruption or dismantlement (Retired Measure)  |
| Program                                  | Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)   |
| Description                              | This measure will report on the percent of transnational drug investigations resulting in the disruption or dismantlement of high-threat transnational drug trafficking organizations/individuals. "Transnational drug trafficking organization" is defined by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) as those organizations on approved Consolidated Priority Organizational Target (CPOT) or Regional Priority Organizational Target (RPOT) lists or those who are earning, laundering, or moving more than \$10 million a year in drug proceeds. "Disruption" is defined as impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization. "Dismantlement" is defined as destroying the organization's leadership, financial base and network to the degree that the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself. To impact the result of this measure, ICE established international partnerships to link global customs and law enforcement agencies.                      |
| Scope of Data                            | The scope of this measure includes validated records of all drug related trade, travel, and finance investigations that are entered in to the Investigative Case Management system and have been referred to and approved by ICE's   |
|  | Significant Case Review process. "Disruption" is defined as impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted organization. "Dismantlement" is defined as destroying the organization's leadership, financial base and network to the degree that the organization is incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself.   |
| Data Source                              | Specific case information will be entered through the use of the Significant Case Report Module in the Investigative Case Management (ICM) system.   |
| Data Collection Methodology              | ICE agents utilize the Investigative Case Management (ICM) system to manage investigative case data, beginning with opening a case and identifying the case categories. Substantive case information is entered into ICM, including indictment, conviction, and/or case closure. This data is routinely validated for accuracy prior to reporting. To report this measure the Homeland Security Investigations Executive Information Unit sends an Excel spreadsheet with approved Significant Case Review (SCR) to the Budget Formulation and Strategic Planning Unit. The percentage of SCR cases with disruptions or dismantlements is calculated by comparing the number of cases that have been disrupted or dismantled to all open SCR cases (the total number of cases that are open at the beginning of the reporting period plus cases that are open during the reporting period). As cases are closed, dismantled, or disrupted, they continue to be included in the denominator for this calculation. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | All significant criminal investigations will be approved by a panel represented by HSI Divisions, HSI Operations, HSI International Operations and Intelligence. The panel will validate the information provided and determine which nominated cases indeed meet the criteria of investigations resulting in the disruption or dismantlement of significant transnational investigations.   |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of significant Homeland Security Investigation cases that result in a       |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | disruption or dismantlement   |
|                             | (New Measure)   |
| Program                     | Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)  |
| Description                 | This measure reports on the percent of significant transnational criminal           |
|                             | investigations that resulted in a disruption or dismantlement. "Disruption" is      |
|                             | defined as impeding the normal and effective operation of the targeted              |
|                             | organization. "Dismantlement" is defined as destroying the organization's           |
|                             | leadership, financial base and network to the degree that the organization is       |
|                             | incapable of operating and/or reconstituting itself. ICE investigations cover a     |
|                             | broad range of areas, including national security threats, financial and smuggling  |
|                             | violations (including illegal arms exports), financial crimes, commercial fraud,    |
|                             | human trafficking, narcotics smuggling, child pornography/exploitation and          |
|                             | immigration fraud.  |
| Scope of Data               | Data will be retrieved from the Investigative Case Management system (ICM), to      |
| 1                           | include all validated records of significant transnational worksite investigations. |
| Data Source                 | Specific case information will be entered through the use of the Significant Case   |
|                             | Report (SCR) Module in ICM.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | Substantive case information during the investigative process is entered into       |
|                             | ICM, eventually reflecting indictment, conviction, and/or case closure. This data   |
|                             | is validated for accuracy, prior to any reporting. For this measure, a data request |
|                             | will be sent to the HSI Executive Information Unit (EIU). EIU will return an        |
|                             | Excel spreadsheet with approved SCR transnational cases by year. A percentage       |
|                             | of approved SCR cases with approved disruptions or dismantlements within a          |
|                             | specific time period is then derived at the end of the time period by comparing it  |
|                             | to closed SCR cases within the time period and all open SCR cases. All open         |
|                             | SCR cases refers to the total number of cases that are open at the beginning of     |
|                             | the fiscal year as well as cases that are open throughout the year that is being    |
|                             | reported. As cases are closed or dismantled/disrupted, they continue to be          |
|                             | included in the denominator for calculation purposes.                               |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | All significant criminal investigations will be approved by a panel represented by  |
| Reliability Check           | HSI, which includes HSI Operations, HSI International Operations and                |
|                             | Intelligence. The panel will validate the information provided and determine        |
|                             | which nominated cases indeed meet the criteria of investigations resulting in the   |
|                             | disruption or dismantlement of significant transnational investigations.            |
|                             |   |
| Performance Measure         | Percent of significant transnational gang investigations that resulted in a         |
|                             | disruption or dismantlement   |
|                             | (Retired Measure)   |
| Program                     | Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)  |
| Description                 | This measure reports on the percent of transnational gang investigations resulting  |
|                             | in the disruption or dismantlement of high-threat transnational criminal gangs.     |
|                             | "Transnational gang" is defined as members within a transnational criminal          |
|                             | organization linked to gang activity as defined by the Racketeering Influenced      |
|                             | Corrupt Organization (RICO) and/or the Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering         |
|                             | (VICAR) statutes. To impact the result of this measure ICE has developed and        |
|                             | implemented anti-gang initiatives focused on violent criminal activities and on     |
|                             | crimes with a nexus to the border.  |
| Scope of Data               | This measure includes the number of audits, sanctions, fines, arrests, and other    |
| •                           | actions that bring employers into compliance with the law. This measure does        |
|                             | not include employers that have requested to be audited as part of the IMAGE        |
|                             | program. For the purpose of this measure, "audit" is defined as an administrative   |
|                             | examination by ICE personnel of employer organizations. "Sanction" is defined       |
|                             | as a detriment, loss of reward, or coercive intervention as a means of enforcing    |
|                             | immigration law.  |

| Data Source                 | Data is retrieved from the Investigative Case Management system. Data query results identify the number of criminal arrests, audits, and/or amount of monetary |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | fines levied against companies for a specific time period.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | Under federal law, employers are obligated to ensure their employees are eligible  |
|                             | to work in the United States. When immigration-related questions arise regarding   |
|                             | the accuracy of I-9 forms or other documentation for employer personnel, an  |
|                             | audit may be performed by ICE to investigate possible violations. Arrests and  |
|                             | various forms of sanction can occur based upon the outcome of these audits.  |
|                             | After an employer has been audited, sanctioned, or arrested, the record is entered   |
|                             | into the ICM system. A data request is sent to the HSI Executive Information   |
|                             | Unit (EIU) from the Budget Formulation and Strategic Planning Unit. EIU  |
|                             | returns an excel spreadsheet with the number of criminal arrests, audits, and/or   |
|                             | amount of monetary fines levied against companies for a specific time period.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | Case information in ICM is verified and audited by the HSI Data Quality Unit on  |
| Reliability Check           | a monthly basis.   |

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of total aliens removed that are criminal aliens (Retired Measure)  |
|--|---|
| Program                                  | Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO)  |
| Description                              | This measure reflects the number of criminal aliens removed against the total overall number of alien removals from the U.S. during a fiscal year. This measure reflects the full impact of program activities for aliens that are deemed removable.  |
| Scope of Data                            | This measure includes removals from the U.S. under all types of orders as well as returns of immigration violators to their country of origin.  |
| Data Source                              | Data is maintained in the Alien Removal Module of the ENFORCE database.  This database is maintained at ERO Headquarters and the data entry occurs at ERO Field Offices throughout the country. Tools in the Integrated Decision Support System are used to query the Alien Removal Module and produce reports to calculate the final results for this measure.   |
| Data Collection Methodology              | ERO Field Offices are responsible for the entry and maintenance of data regarding the removal/return of illegal aliens. Officers track the status of administrative processes and/or court cases and indicate when actual removals occur in the Alien Removal Module of the ENFORCE database. When an alien is removed/returned from the United States, case officers in the field will indicate the case disposition and date the removal/return occurred in the database. Reports generated from the Alien Removal Module are used to determine the total number of illegal aliens removed/returned from the country during the specified time. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Headquarters staff validates the completeness and accuracy of the data entered by field offices into the Alien Removal Module through trend analysis to look for aberrations and unusual patterns. Data is analyzed on a weekly basis and compared to statistics from prior months and the previous year. An additional reliability check occurs when data is cross - referenced between field office detention facility reports of the number of removals, and data entered into the database.   |

## **U.S. Secret Service**

| Performance Measure                      | Amount of dollar loss prevented by Secret Service cyber investigations (in millions)  |
|--|---|
| Program                                  | Field Operations  |
| Description                              | This measure is an estimate of the direct dollar loss to the public prevented due to cyber investigations by Secret Service. The dollar loss prevented is based on the estimated amount of cyber losses that would have occurred had the offender not been identified nor the criminal enterprise interrupted. The measure reflects the Secret Service's efforts to reduce cyber related financial losses to the public.  |
| Scope of Data                            | This measure is an estimate of the direct dollar loss to the public prevented due to cyber crime investigations by the Secret Service. Error is due to lag time in data entry or corrections to historical data.  |
| Data Source                              | The Cyber Crimes Loss Prevented measure is collected from the Field Investigative Reporting System (FIRS). This system is used by all Secret Service investigative field offices, and provides a means of record keeping for all case and subject information.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | The Secret Service collects data on its cyber investigations through its case management system known as the Field Investigative Reporting System (FIRS). Data is input to FIRS via Secret Service personnel located in field offices throughout the United States and overseas. Data pertaining to this particular measure (loss prevented) are extracted from FIRS by designated cyber crime case violation codes and the dates these cases were closed. The data is then aggregated up to the highest levels by month, year, office, and Service-wide. This information is then reported through various management and statistical reports to Secret Service headquarters program managers, field offices, and the Department of Homeland Security. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | FIRS has many features built into it in order to provide the most accurate data possible. Along with the mainframe security features, there are many edit checks built into the applications to ensure the accuracy and validity of the data. Only authorized headquarters and field personnel have access to the applications, and they are governed by specific procedures to input case and arrest data. An annual audit is conducted and recurring verification reports are generated and reviewed to reduce errors and ensure data accuracy.   |

| Performance Measure         | Financial crimes loss prevented through a criminal investigation (in billions)     |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Program                     | Field Operations   |
| Description                 | An estimate of the direct dollar loss to the public that was prevented due to      |
|                             | Secret Service intervention or interruption of a criminal venture through a        |
|                             | criminal investigation. This estimate is based on the likely amount of financial   |
|                             | crime that would have occurred had the offender not been identified nor the        |
|                             | criminal enterprise disrupted, and reflects the Secret Service's efforts to reduce |
|                             | financial losses to the public attributable to financial crimes.                   |
| Scope of Data               | This measure reports an estimate of the direct dollar loss prevented due to Secret |
|                             | Service intervention/interruption of a criminal venture through a criminal         |
|                             | investigation. Error is due to lag time in data entry or corrections to historical |
|                             | data.  |
| Data Source                 | The Financial Crimes Loss Prevented measure is collected from the Field            |
|                             | Investigative Reporting System (FIRS). This system is used by all Secret Service   |
|                             | investigative field offices, and provides a means of record keeping for all case   |
|                             | and subject information.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | The Secret Service collects data on its multitude of criminal investigations       |
|                             | through its case management system known as the Field Investigative Reporting      |
|                             | System (FIRS). Data is input to FIRS via Secret Service personnel located in       |

|  | field offices throughout the United States and overseas. Data pertaining to this particular measure (loss prevented) are extracted FIRS by designated financial crime case violation codes and the dates these cases were closed. The data is then aggregated up to the highest levels by month, year, office, and Service-wide. This information is then reported through various management and statistical reports to Secret Service headquarters program managers, field offices, and the Department of Homeland Security.                    |
|--|---|
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | FIRS has many features built into it in order to provide the most accurate data possible. Along with the mainframe security features, there are many edit checks built into the applications to ensure the accuracy and validity of the data. Only authorized headquarters and field personnel have access to the applications, and they are governed by specific procedures to input case and arrest data. An annual audit is conducted and recurring verification reports are generated and reviewed to reduce errors and ensure data accuracy. |

| Performance Measure         | Number of cyber mitigation responses  |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Program                     | Field Operations  |
| Description                 | This measure represents the number of cyber mitigation responses provided by the Secret Service. The USSS responds to organizations that suspect a malicious network intrusion has occurred and implements mitigation responses to secure |
|                             | the network(s). Each cyber mitigation response involves one or more of the  |
|                             | following activities related to a particular network intrusion: identifying potential   |
|                             | victims/subjects, notifying victims/subjects, interviewing victims/subjects,  |
|                             | confirming network intrusion, supporting mitigation of breach activity, and   |
|                             | retrieving and analyzing forensic evidence. State or Federal arrests resulting from   |
| G                           | and/or related to these intrusions are measured separately.   |
| Scope of Data               | Performance data is based on the number of cyber mitigation responses   |
|                             | conducted by the U.S. Secret Service within the given fiscal year.  |
| Data Source                 | The cyber mitigation response data is collected from an application in the Field  |
|                             | Investigative Reporting System (FIRS) called the Network Intrusion Action   |
|                             | Center (NIAC). This system is used by all Secret Service investigative field  |
|                             | offices and provides actionable intelligence for network defense.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | NIAC is a recently developed application that began data collection in FY 2014.   |
|                             | Special agents and/or administrative personnel enter the required information   |
|                             | into the system and update which activities are included in the response as the   |
|                             | investigation progresses. Data pertaining to this particular measure is extracted   |
|                             | from the system on a quarterly basis and aggregated by the quarter and fiscal   |
|                             | year entered. This information is then reported through various management and  |
|                             | statistical reports to Secret Service headquarters program managers, field offices,   |
|                             | and the Department of Homeland Security.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | Only authorized Secret Service personnel have access to the application. The  |
| Reliability Check           | program manager regularly extracts and randomly verifies data to ensure data  |
|                             | accuracy. Once the quarterly data has been aggregated, trends are compared and  |
|                             | any inconsistencies are validated.  |

| Performance Measure | Number of financial accounts recovered (in millions)                             |
|---------------------|--|
| Program             | Field Operations   |
| Description         | This measure represents the number of financial accounts recovered during cyber  |
|                     | investigations. Financial accounts include bank accounts, credit card accounts,  |
|                     | PayPal and other online money transfer accounts.                                 |
| Scope of Data       | This measure represents the number of financial accounts recovered during cyber  |
|                     | investigations.  |
| Data Source         | The Financial Accounts measure is collected from the Field Investigative         |
|                     | Reporting System (FIRS). This system is used by all Secret Service investigative |

|                             | Field offices and manifest and manifest and making                                |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | field offices, and provides a means of record keeping for all case and subject    |
|                             | information.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | The Secret Service collects data on its cyber investigations through its case     |
|                             | management system, Field Investigative Reporting System (FIRS). Data is input     |
|                             | FIRS via Secret Service personnel located in field offices throughout the United  |
|                             | States and overseas. Data pertaining to this particular measure (financial        |
|                             | accounts recovered) are extracted from FIRS by designated cyber crime case        |
|                             | violation codes and the dates these cases were closed. The data is then           |
|                             | aggregated up to the highest levels by month, year, office, and Service-wide.     |
|                             | This information is then reported through various management and statistical      |
|                             | reports to Secret Service headquarters program managers, field offices, and the   |
|                             | Department of Homeland Security.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | FIRS has many features built into it in order to provide the most accurate data   |
| Reliability Check           | possible. Along with the mainframe security features, there are many edit checks  |
|                             | built into the applications to ensure the accuracy and validity of the data. Only |
|                             | authorized headquarters and field personnel have access to the applications, and  |
|                             | they are governed by specific procedures to input case and arrest data. An annual |
|                             | audit is conducted and recurring verification reports are generated and reviewed  |
|                             | to reduce errors and ensure data accuracy.  |

| D C 1/                      |  |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Performance Measure         | Number of law enforcement individuals trained in cybercrime and cyber                |
|                             | forensics both domestically and overseas   |
| Program                     | Field Operations   |
| Description                 | This measure represents the number of individuals trained in cybercrime and          |
| _                           | cyber forensics by the Secret Service. This specialized technical training occurs    |
|                             | both domestically and overseas in an effort to strengthen our ability to fight       |
|                             | cyber crime.   |
| Scope of Data               | This measure captures the total number of individuals trained by the Secret          |
|                             | Service in cybercrime and cyber forensics.   |
| Data Source                 | Data on individuals trained by the USSS is currently collected through internal      |
|                             | tracking devices. We are attempting to move towards an enterprise solution to        |
|                             | allow for easier dataset extraction and analysis.                                    |
| Data Collection Methodology | Data is entered through internal tracking devices by authorized Secret Service       |
|                             | personnel. Quarterly data is then extracted from the database and aggregated up      |
|                             | to the highest levels by month and year. Training data is collected and              |
|                             | aggregated by the number of individuals who attend each training class. Because      |
|                             | of this, the potential exists for counting unique individuals multiple times if they |
|                             | attend more than one training per fiscal year.                                       |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | Only authorized Secret Service personnel have access to the applications. Once       |
| Reliability Check           | the data has been aggregated, it is double checked for verification and to ensure    |
|                             | data accuracy.   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of currency identified as counterfeit   |
|---------------------|---|
| Program             | Field Operations  |
| Description         | The dollar value of counterfeit notes passed on the public reported as a percent of dollars of genuine currency. This measure is calculated by dividing the dollar value of counterfeit notes passed by the dollar value of genuine currency in circulation. This measure is an indicator of the proportion of counterfeit currency relative to the amount of genuine U.S. Currency in circulation, and reflects our efforts to reduce financial losses to the public attributable to counterfeit currency. |
| Scope of Data       | This measure is an indicator of the proportion of counterfeit currency relative to the amount of genuine U.S. currency in circulation. The measure reports the dollar value of counterfeit notes passed on the public as a percent of dollars of  |

|                             | genuine currency. Past audits indicate that overall error rates are less than one   |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | percent. Error is due to lag time in data entry or corrections to historical data.  |
| Data Source                 | All Counterfeit program measures are collected from the Counterfeit/Contraband      |
|                             | System. This system is used by all Secret Service investigative field offices, and  |
|                             | provides a means of record keeping for all case and subject information.            |
| Data Collection Methodology | The Secret Service collects data on global counterfeit activity through the         |
|                             | Counterfeit Tracking Application database. Data is input to the Counterfeit         |
|                             | Tracking Application via Secret Service personnel located in field offices          |
|                             | throughout the United States and overseas. Data pertaining to this particular       |
|                             | measure are extracted from the Counterfeit Tracking Application by designated       |
|                             | counterfeit note classifications, their dollar value, and the dates the counterfeit |
|                             | data was recorded in the system. The counterfeit data (dollar value of notes        |
|                             | passed on the public) is then aggregated up to the highest levels by month, year,   |
|                             | office, and Service-wide and then compared to the amount of US dollars in           |
|                             | circulation (reported from the US Department of the Treasury). This information     |
|                             | is then calculated as a percent and reported through various management and         |
|                             | statistical reports to Secret Service headquarters program managers, field offices, |
|                             | and the Department of Homeland Security.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | The Counterfeit Tracking Application database has many features built into it in    |
| Reliability Check           | order to provide the most accurate data possible. Along with the mainframe          |
|                             | security features, there are many edit checks built into the applications to ensure |
|                             | the accuracy and validity of the data. Only authorized headquarters and field       |
|                             | personnel have access to the applications, and they are governed by specific        |
|                             | procedures to input case and arrest data. Recurring verification reports are        |
|                             | generated and reviewed to ensure data accuracy.                                     |

| D ( ) /                     |  |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Performance Measure         | Percent of National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC)                |
|                             | examinations requested that are conducted  |
| Program                     | Field Operations   |
| Description                 | This measure represents the percentage of Secret Service computer and                |
|                             | polygraph forensic exams conducted in support of any investigation involving         |
|                             | missing or exploited children in relation to the number of computer and              |
|                             | polygraph forensic exams requested.  |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of this measure is the total number of requested examinations              |
|                             | requested to support other law enforcement investigations with missing and/or        |
|                             | exploited children cases. Exams are completed at Secret Service field offices        |
|                             | and headquarter offices.   |
| Data Source                 | Number of computer and forensic exams conducted is collected from the                |
|                             | Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program (ECSAP), used by the Electronic              |
|                             | Crimes Special Agent Program personnel to report forensic examination                |
|                             | findings.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | The Secret Service collects computer and polygraph forensic exam data that           |
|                             | relate to missing or exploited children investigations through an application in its |
|                             | Field Investigative Reporting System. Data is input to Field Investigative           |
|                             | Reporting System via Secret Service personnel located in field offices. Data         |
|                             | pertaining to this particular measure are extracted from Field Investigative         |
|                             | Reporting System by designated missing or exploited children violation codes         |
|                             | and the dates these exams were completed. The data is then aggregated up to the      |
|                             | highest levels by month, year, office, and Service-wide and then compared to the     |
|                             | number of computer and polygraph forensic exams requested by the National            |
|                             | Center for Missing and Exploited Children. This information is then reported as a    |
|                             | percent through various management and statistical reports to Secret Service         |
|                             | headquarters program managers.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |

| Explanation of Data | Only authorized headquarters and field personnel have access to the applications, |
|---------------------|---|
| Reliability Check   | and they are governed by specific procedures to input case data. Recurring        |
|                     | verification reports are generated and reviewed to ensure data accuracy.          |

| - 2                         |   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Performance Measure         | Percent of National Special Security Events that were successfully completed  |
| Program                     | Protective Operations   |
| Description                 | This measure is a percentage of the total number of National Special Security Events (NSSEs) completed in a Fiscal Year that were successful. A successfully completed NSSE is one where once the event has commenced, a security incident(s) inside the Secret Service - protected venue did not preclude the event's agenda from proceeding to its scheduled conclusion.  |
| Scope of Data               | The security of protectees is the ultimate priority of the Secret Service. The Secret Service conducts after action reviews to gauge performance of specific protective operations. These reviews are used to measure how successfully the Secret Service performed its mission and what can be done to increase efficiency without compromising a protectee or event. There is no error rate for this measure.   |
| Data Source                 | This program measure originates from the protective event or visit.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | The Secret Service completes an After-Action Report following every National Special Security Event. This comprehensive report depicts all aspects of the event to include any and all incidents that occurred during the event. Subsequently, the After-Action reports are reviewed to determine the number of National Special Security Events that were successfully completed. This information is then calculated as a percentage and reported through various management and statistical reports to Secret Service headquarters program managers. |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | Any breach of Protective Operations would be immediately known and subject to   |
| Reliability Check           | a thorough investigation.   |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of protectees that arrive and depart safely   |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | Protective Operations   |
| Program                     | *   |
| Description                 | This measure gauges the percent of travel stops where Secret Service protectees   |
|                             | arrive and depart safely. The performance target is always 100%.  |
| Scope of Data               | This measure is an indicator of the percentage of travel stops where protectees   |
|                             | arrive and depart safely. The number of protective stops protectees arrive and  |
|                             | depart safely divided by the total number of protective stops protectees arrive   |
|                             | and depart.   |
| Data Source                 | Protective stops information is collected from the Agent Management &   |
|                             | Protection Support System. This system is used by Secret Service protective   |
|                             | divisions, and provides a means of record keeping for all protective stops  |
|                             | information.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | Results from Protective Operations, as well as any incident that may occur, are   |
|                             | immediately reported by detail leaders to the Special Agent in Charge, who  |
|                             | submits an After Action Report to Protective Operations program managers, and   |
|                             | are disseminated within the organization for further analysis. Analysts collect   |
|                             | protective travel stops for domestic protectees, foreign dignitaries, and campaign  |
|                             | protectees and aggregate the totals into one measure. The number of incident-   |
|                             |   |
|                             | free protection stops is divided by the total number of protection stops to achieve   |
|                             | a percent outcome.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | Program managers and Operations Research Analysts continually monitor and   |
| Reliability Check           | review performance, including all instances of arrival and departure. Any breach  |
|                             | of Protective Operations would be immediately known and subject to a thorough   |
|                             |   |
| Reliability Check           | review performance, including all instances of arrival and departure. Any breach of Protective Operations would be immediately known and subject to a thorough investigation. |

| Performance Measure                      | Percent of total protection activities that are incident-free at the White House   |
|--|--|
| 1 offormation following                  | Complex, Vice President's Residence, and other protected facilities  |
| Program                                  | Protective Operations  |
| Description                              | This measure gauges the percent of instances where the Secret Service provides incident free protection to the White House Complex, Vice President's Residence, and other protected facilities. An incident is defined as someone who is assaulted or receives an injury from an attack while inside the White House Complex, Vice President's Residence, or other protected facility.   |
| Scope of Data                            | Performance data is based on the percentage of days where incident-free protection is provided to persons (protectees, staff/employees, guests, and the public) inside the White House Complex, the Vice President's Residence, and other protected facilities.  |
| Data Source                              | The Secret Service conducts after action reviews to gauge performance of specific protective operations. These reviews are used to measure how successfully the Secret Service performed its mission and what can be done to increase efficiency without compromising a protectee or event.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Results from Protective Operations, as well as any incident that may occur, are immediately reported by detail leaders to the Special Agent in Charge, who submits an After Action Report to Protective Operations program managers, and are disseminated within the organization for further analysis. Analysts aggregate this information and report it by the number of days incident free protection was provided at facilities during the fiscal year divided by the number of days in the fiscal year. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Program managers and Operations Research Analysts continually monitor and review performance. Any breach of Protective Operations would be immediately known and subject to a thorough investigation.  |

| Performance Measure         | Terabytes of data forensically analyzed for criminal investigations               |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Program                     | Field Operations  |
| Description                 | This measure represents the amount of data, in terabytes, seized and forensically |
|                             | analyzed through Secret Service investigations and those conducted by partners    |
|                             | trained at the National Computer Forensic Institute (NCFI). The training of these |
|                             | law enforcement partners substantially enhances law enforcement efforts to        |
|                             | suppress the continually evolving and increasing number of cyber and electronic   |
|                             | crime cases affecting communities nationwide.                                     |
| Scope of Data               | This measure captures the amount of data seized and forensically analyzed         |
|                             | through Secret Service cyber investigations and investigations conducted by       |
|                             | partners trained at the National Computer Forensic Institute (NCFI).              |
| Data Source                 | Both Secret Service and partner forensic data is collected from an application in |
|                             | the Field Investigative Reporting System (FIRS). FIRS is used by the Electronic   |
|                             | Crimes Special Agent Program personnel to report forensic examination             |
|                             | findings. USSS partners do not have access to FIRS. Partners submit their         |
|                             | terabytes seized information through a standardized form to their USSS contact.   |
|                             | The USSS contact then enters this information directly into a partners data       |
|                             | collection table in FIRS.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | The Secret Service collects computer and polygraph forensic exam data through     |
|                             | an application in its Field Investigative Reporting System (FIRS). Both USSS      |
|                             | and partner data is input to FIRS via Secret Service personnel located in field   |
|                             | offices. Data pertaining to this particular measure are extracted from FIRS,      |
|                             | including the number of terabytes examined, dates these forensic exams were       |
|                             | completed, and who completed each exam. The data is then aggregated up to the     |
|                             | highest levels by month, year, and office.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |

| Explanation of Data | Only authorized Secret Service personnel have access to the applications, which |
|---------------------|---|
| Reliability Check   | are governed by specific procedures to input case data. Recurring verification  |
|                     | reports are generated and reviewed to ensure data accuracy.                     |

# FY 2016-2017 Agency Priority Goal (APG) Measures

#### **APG:** Enhance Federal Network Security

| Performance Measure                   | Percent of annual assessments completed for the twenty-three cabinet level   |
|---------------------------------------|--|
|                                       | agencies and one-third of all non-cabinet level agencies   |
| Program                               | Infrastructure Analysis  |
| Description                           | This measure assesses how many risk and vulnerability assessments (RVAs) DHS completes each year and compares that result to the total number of targeted Federal, civilian Executive Branch agencies for that year. Each year, DHS will target 23 cabinet level agencies and one-third of the remaining 102 Federal, civilian Executive Branch agencies. Therefore, each of the targeted cabinet level agencies will receive an annual RVA, and each other targeted agency will receive triennial RVAs. DHS leverages cybersecurity assessment methodologies, commercial best practices and threat intelligence integration that enables cybersecurity stakeholders to better develop decision making and risk management guidance. The RVA team consists of subject matter experts in penetration testing methodology and tactical delivery, which includes focusing on web applications, networks, databases, wireless, mobile computing, cloud security, social engineering, social media, and intelligence gathering. |
| Scope of Data                         | The scope of the data includes all of the assessment findings from the National Cybersecurity Assessment and Technical Services (NCATS) Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (RVAs). This includes the 23 cabinet-level agencies and one-third of the remaining 102 Federal, civilian Executive Branch agencies.   |
| Data Source                           | Assessment and countermeasure data are collected and stored by the NCATS team using a spreadsheet that tracks RVA engagements. In the future, an NPPD or Cybersecurity & Communications-wide customer relationship management tool will be used. RVAs include external (remote) non-credentialed scanning along with penetration testing. Measurements are tracked and stored on the Cybersecurity Assurance Lab network where the penetration testing and remote scans are conducted.   |
| Data Collection Methodology           | A team lead will track the progress of the assessment, which is scoped out with the stakeholder in the pre-assessment walkthrough. The team lead will then walk through the assessment methodology and conduct a series of testing that was identified by the stakeholder. The information derived from the tests will then populate a draft report deliverable. The data used to create the report is maintained in a spreadsheet by the NCATS program. Information on the spreadsheet includes name of finding, service impacted (if any), detailed finding, NIST Control (if any), standard remediation write up, default finding severity. The calculation is derived by dividing the number of completed assessments by the total number required for the fiscal year, which would be 57 (23 cabinet-level agencies + 1/3 of 102 remaining agencies).   |
| Reliability Index                     | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data Reliability Check | Each assessment concludes with a final report. The metric will be compared to the report by the NCCIC Business Transformation Unit.  |

| Performance Measure | Percent of DHS cybersecurity and cyber law enforcement components |
|---------------------|---|
|                     | participating in automated indicator sharing                      |
| Program             | Infrastructure Analysis   |

| Description                              | The Federal government can better protect itself through increased information sharing. Specifically, automation will increase the speed and volume of threat indicators that can be shared within government, within the private sector, and between government and the private sector. DHS, which operates EINSTEIN intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, and individual Federal, civilian Executive Branch agencies, can expedite their threat detection and blocking through the automated receipt of threat indicators. In addition to establishing an automated environment for machine-speed sharing across the Federal government, subject to appropriate privacy safeguards, various DHS components can receive and contribute threat indicators to this environment. This measure assesses the extent to which individual DHS components are participating in this automated indicator sharing environment. |
|--|--|
| Scope of Data                            | DHS cybersecurity components are those DHS components with security operation centers (SOCs). This measure includes: DHS Office of Chief Information Officer (OCIO), National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), United States Secret Service (USSS), Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE), United States Coast Guard (USCG), Customs Border Protection (CBP), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).   |
| Data Source                              | An Excel file maintained by DHS National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) Technology Support Services (TSS) calculates per month how many are participating in AIS. Participation in AIS can be with the private sector, Federal, State, Local, Tribal, Territorial, and DHS Components; however, the data for this measure is only specific to DHS Components. The file is available on TSS SharePoint site for approved users.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Participation in AIS is determined through the implementation and testing process, which is tracked by a spreadsheet maintained by DHS NCCIC. To be classified as participating, the component Security Operations Center (SOC) must successfully complete operational testing of one or more type of information flow through the Trusted Automated Exchange of Indicator Information (/TAXII) server. Results will be tracked through monthly reviews and reported to DHS on a quarterly basis. The denominator for this measure consists of the total number of cybersecurity and cyber law enforcement components within DHS (10). The numerator is the number of DHS components participating in automated information sharing.   |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | The AIS program will make available the data files of the TAXII server. NPPD/Cyber Security & Communications (CS&C) Enterprise Performance Management Office (EPMO) will validate the data by quarterly reviewing the logs of the TAXII server to verify that components that are reported to be sharing data via AIS are doing so.  |

| Performance Measure | Percent of federal, civilian executive branch personnel for whom EINSTEIN                        |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | intrusion prevention system coverage has been deployed   |
| Program             | Protect Infrastructure   |
| Description         | This measure gauges the intrusion prevention coverage provided by EINSTEIN 3                     |
|                     | (E <sup>3</sup> A) Accelerated that is currently operating on civilian executive branch          |
|                     | networks. E <sup>3</sup> A has the capacity to both identify and block known malicious           |
|                     | traffic. This performance measure assesses the extent to which DHS has deployed                  |
|                     | at least one E <sup>3</sup> A countermeasure to protect federal, civilian executive branch Chief |
|                     | Financial Officer (CFO) Act agencies. This measure calculates the percentage of                  |
|                     | CFO Act personnel that are protected by at least one E3A countermeasure.                         |
| Scope of Data       | Data are based on all self-reported federal, civilian executive branch CFO Act                   |
|                     | Department or Agency (D/A) Personal Identity Verification (PIV) counts as                        |
|                     | required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12, the date on which the                   |
|                     | participating CFO Act D/A successfully completes cutover (signifying deployed                    |

|  | protection by E3A), and the service(s) selected by the participating CFO Act D/A. CFO Act D/A PIV counts provide an estimate of the number of personnel (federal and contractor) assigned to that CFO Act D/A; subsequently it provides an approximation of size with respect to the .gov population.  |
|--|--|
| Data Source                              | Federal, civilian executive branch CFO Act D/A PIV counts, the services selected, and cutover dates are tracked on the LAN-A hosted E3A Executive Reporting Tracker, which is a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The Network Security Division (NSD) Mission Engineering & Technology (ME&T) populates the dates when the Departments and Agencies become covered by an E3A service, updates D/A PIV counts, and tracks status towards cutover.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | EINSTEIN intrusion prevention system coverage is considered "deployed" when the D/A successfully completes routing its traffic through a Domain Name Service (DNS) server/service and/or Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) server/service to be filtered; this is also known as the cutover date. If the D/A opts to use one countermeasure (e.g., DNS before getting SMTP) prior to getting the second, the earlier date is used as the cutover date. When the cutover is completed, all D/A seats are considered protected. When completing the cumulative quarterly percentage, the numerator consists of the sum of all CFO Act D/A PIV counts (aka "seat" in the reporting tracker) having a cutover date prior to the reporting date and having selected either DNS and/or SMTP; the sum of all known D/A seats forms the denominator. This fraction is multiplied by 100 to obtain the percentage. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | The NSD ME&T team will update the E <sup>3</sup> A Executive Reporting Tracker with additional D/A PIV counts, D/A cutover dates, and selected E3A services.   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of participating federal, civilian executive branch agencies for which                          |
|---------------------|---|
|                     | Phase 1 and 2 continuous diagnostics and mitigation tools have been delivered to monitor their networks |
| Duo ouom            | Protect Infrastructure  |
| Program             |   |
| Description         | This performance measure assesses the extent to which DHS has contractually                             |
|                     | delivered Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Phase 1 (asset                                    |
|                     | management) and Phase 2 (user management) services and tools to participating                           |
|                     | Federal civilian executive branch agencies. Once DHS has delivered the tools                            |
|                     | through contract award, agencies must still take action to deploy and operate                           |
|                     | CDM on their networks. By making asset and user management tools available,                             |
|                     | agencies can begin to actively manage the risk on their networks.                                       |
| Scope of Data       | The scope of the data includes all available data from the Federal Agencies                             |
|                     | participating in CDM Phase 1 and Phase 2. The parameters used to define the                             |
|                     | data included in this measure are the number of agencies with signed                                    |
|                     | Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) to participate in CDM and are included in                                |
|                     | the task order groupings to have CDM Phase 1 and Phase 2 tools and services                             |
|                     | delivered to them. The scope captures progress in awarding the contract to deliver                      |
|                     | CDM Phase 1 and Phase 2 tools and services to agencies so that they can monitor                         |
|                     | their networks for what is on their network (Phase 1) and who is on their network                       |
|                     | (Phase 2).  |
| Data Source         | The Office of Cybersecurity and Communications' CDM Program Office will                                 |
|                     | track CDM Blanket Purchase Agreement Task Order 2 (Phase 1), Task Order                                 |
|                     | PRIV [Privileges] (Phase 2), and Task Order CRED [Credentials and                                       |
|                     | Authentication Management] (Phase 2), progress via Contract deliverables and                            |
|                     | progress reports provided by Continuous Monitoring as a Service (CMaaS)                                 |
|                     | providers to the contracting officer at General Services Administration Federal                         |
|                     | Systems Integration and Management Center (GSA FEDSIM). Each event is                                   |
|                     | captured directly in contract documentation for each participating agency on a                          |
|                     | monthly basis. Signed MOAs are documented by the CDM Program Office and                                 |
|                     | updated as changes occur.   |
|                     |   |

| Data Collection Methodology | GSA FEDSIM provides monthly reports on Phase 1 and Phase 2 contracts. These     |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | reports are analyzed by the CDM Program Office and data for this measure are    |
|                             | documented. The CDM Program Office measures the number of agencies with         |
|                             | signed MOAs that have had CDM Phase 1 and Phase 2 Tools and Services            |
|                             | delivered. The measure is calculated by dividing the total number of agencies   |
|                             | with signed MOAs with Phase 1 and Phase 2 delivered through contract award, by  |
|                             | the total number of agencies with signed MOAs participating in CDM Phase 1 and  |
|                             | Phase 2.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | The CDM Program Office will validate and accept each contract deliverable after |
| Reliability Check           | a review for completeness and accuracy.   |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of participating federal, civilian executive branch agencies for which   |
|-----------------------------|--|
| 1 01101111111100 1/1000010  | Phase 3 continuous diagnostics and mitigation tools have been delivered to   |
|                             | monitor their networks   |
| Program                     | Protect Infrastructure   |
| Description                 | This performance measure assesses the extent to which DHS has contractually  |
| 1                           | delivered Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Phase 3 (event   |
|                             | management) services and tools to participating federal civilian executive branch  |
|                             | agencies. Once DHS has delivered the tools through contract award, agencies  |
|                             | must still take action to deploy and operate CDM on their networks. By making  |
|                             | event management available to agencies, they will now be able to more effectively  |
|                             | manage coordinated threats to their network.   |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of the data includes all available data from the Federal Agencies  |
|                             | participating in CDM Phase 3. The parameters used to define the data included in   |
|                             | this measure are the number of agencies with signed Memoranda of Agreement   |
|                             | (MOA) to participate in CDM and are included in the task order groupings to  |
|                             | have CDM Phase 3 tools and services delivered. The scope captures progress in  |
|                             | achieving delivery of CDM Phase 3 tools and services to agencies so that they can  |
|                             | monitor their networks and better understand what is happening on their network.   |
| Data Source                 | The Office of Cybersecurity and Communications' CDM Program Office will  |
|                             | track CDM Blanket Purchase Agreement Task Orders for Phase 3 progress via  |
|                             | contract deliverables and progress reports provided by Continuous Monitoring as  |
|                             | a Service (CMaaS) providers to the contracting officer at General Services   |
|                             | Administration Federal Systems Integration and Management Center (GSA  |
|                             | FEDSIM). Each event is captured directly in contract documentation for each  |
|                             | participating agency on a monthly basis. Signed MOAs are documented by the   |
| D. C.II. d. W.I. I.I.       | CDM Program Office and updated as changes occur.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | GSA FEDSIM provides monthly reports on Phase 3 contracts. These reports are  |
|                             | analyzed by the CDM Program Office and data for this measure are documented.   |
|                             | The CDM Program Office measures the number of agencies with signed MOAs  |
|                             | that have had CDM Phase 3 tools and services delivered through contract award.<br>The measure is calculated by dividing the total number of agencies with signed |
|                             | MOAs with Phase 3 delivered by the total number of agencies with signed MOAs   |
|                             | participating in CDM Phase 3.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | The CDM Program Office will validate and accept each contract deliverable after  |
| Reliability Check           | a review for completeness and accuracy.  |
| Renability Check            | a review for completeness and accuracy.  |

# **APG:** Enhance Disaster Preparedness and Response

| Deufermen an Manage         | A  |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Performance Measure         | Average annual percentage of administrative costs for field operations, as             |
| 7                           | compared to total program costs  |
| Program                     | Management and Administration  |
| Description                 | These measures allows FEMA to understand what share of its disaster                    |
|                             | expenditures are administrative costs compared to the share that FEMA grants to        |
|                             | survivors as assistance. It helps FEMA know if the agency is being efficient in        |
|                             | the way it provides disaster assistance. This particular measure is for FEMA's         |
|                             | most common disasters – less than \$50M.   |
| Scope of Data               | The results are based on all available data and not a sample of data for Major         |
| •                           | Disasters under \$50M. The measure only applies to Major Disasters (DRs). It           |
|                             | does not apply to Emergency Declarations (EMs), Fire Management Assistance             |
|                             | Grants (FMAGs) or any other administrative costs in the disaster relief fund.          |
|                             | Administrative Costs are those costs which are classified in IFMIS (Integrated         |
|                             | Financial Management Information System) as "Administrative" in FEMA's                 |
|                             | system of record, EDW (Enterprise Data Warehouse) reports and FIT (Financial           |
|                             | Information Tool) reports. Examples include but are not limited to salaries and        |
|                             | benefits, travel, facilities. Note that some cost codes were reclassified as           |
|                             | administrative or program on October 1, 2014. The reclassification was applied         |
|                             | retroactively to past transactions so past years can be compared to current and        |
|                             | future years. The data included is FEMA's actual obligations for a disaster. This      |
|                             |  |
|                             | is different from any projected total damage (an amount which might come from          |
| Data Carrier                | PDAs) or the projected federal obligations which may not have occurred yet.            |
| Data Source                 | The data is collected and stored in IFMIS. It is reported via FIT reports and in the   |
|                             | Automated COP, both of which also pull data directly from IFMIS. OCFO owns             |
|                             | IFMIS and the FIT reports. ORR owns the Automated COP.                                 |
| Data Collection Methodology | The data is collected via IFMIS and reported in FIT reports. The remaining steps       |
|                             | can be conducted by an analyst using data from a FIT report, but have been             |
|                             | automated in the Automated COP. The data is organized so that disasters are first      |
|                             | separated by their size which is determined by the total actual federal dollars        |
|                             | obligated. Small disasters have total actual federal obligations less than \$50M.      |
|                             | An administrative cost percentage is calculated for each disaster and is the (Total    |
|                             | Administrative Costs for that disaster)/ (Total Obligations for that disaster). To     |
|                             | create the score for each year, the analyst groups all disasters declared in that year |
|                             | of the same size and calculates the average administrative cost percentage across      |
|                             | all those disasters (Sum of Admin Cost Percentages of Each Disaster)/Total             |
|                             | Number of Disasters). This results in three scores per year, one each for small,       |
|                             | medium, and large disasters. Since the data is organized by the fiscal year of the     |
|                             | declaration, but transactions are likely to occur on disasters in years after the      |
|                             | declaration fiscal year. The score for each year will be captured and reported on      |
|                             | September 30, one full fiscal year after the declaration fiscal year. So, the score    |
|                             | for FY15, will be available on September 30, 2016.                                     |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | For this particular measure, the results are drawn from a Financial System that        |
| Reliability Check           | undergoes a rigorous financial management process that includes internal controls      |
|                             | and audit controls.  |
|                             | and their controls.  |

| Performance Measure | Operational readiness rating of FEMA's specialized incident workforce cadres    |
|---------------------|---|
| Program             | Response and Recovery   |
| Description         | This measure gauges the overall readiness of 23 cadres in the Incident          |
|                     | Management Workforce (IMW) by examining staffing, training, and equipping       |
|                     | variables of qualified personnel. The IMW are the primary first responders that |
|                     | provide services to disaster survivors immediately after an event and support   |
|                     | Response and Recovery operations. The ability to gauge readiness provides key   |

| Scope of Data                            | information for ensuring that qualified and equipped personnel are available to respond to a disaster examining the below variables:  1. Staffing Category Variable: % of Force Structure currently on board; % of force strength available; % of force strength deployed  2. Training Category Variable: % of force strength qualified; % of qualified personnel currently available; % of all trainees who have completed their qualification sheets but still need to demonstrate performance.  3. 3. Equipping Category Variable: Percent of Reservists 1-1-1* ready  * The Reservist has a laptop, RSA token, and a phone  The results are based on all available data and not a sample of data. The data  |
|--|---|
|  | included in this performance measure are an aggregate of measures of staffing, training, and equipping readiness categories.  |
| Data Source                              | The data source is the Cadre Operational Readiness and Deployability Status (CORDS) Report that measures the overall readiness of the incident management workforce for all 23 cadres. The Response Directorate's Incident Management Workforce Division (IWMD) pulls this data bi-weekly from the Deployment Tracking System.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | IWMD pulls data from the Deployment Tracking System. The CORDS report algorithm measures 3 readiness categories and assigns an overall Cadre Readiness metric called its Deployability Rating (D-Rating of 1-5) to each cadre and the organization as a whole. The D-Rating applies a weight to each individual factor used to determine the final score: 50% Staffing, 35% Training, 15% Equipping. This weighting recognizes staffing as the critical element of an expeditionary workforce. Training and Equipping are instrumental to success and efficiency, but in an emergency, having people on-hand and available is most important. The formula for measuring the D-Rating is:  [(Force Strength * .5) + (Availability of Force Strength * .15) + (Inverse of Deployed * .35)] * .5 = Staffing  [(Qualified &Available * .35) + (Trainees with Academics Complete * .15) + (Qualified Force Strength * .5)] * .35 = Training  (Equipment Ready * .15) = Equipping  Staffing + Training + Equipping = Weighted Average |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Cadres conduct quality assurance/quality management reviews of Deployment Tracking System (DTS) data to ensure the system accurately reflects the individuals within their cadre and individuals within the cadres are carrying accurate FEMA Qualification System (FQS) titles. If the cadre data is incorrect, the Cadre will work with IWMD to correct the data based upon internal data management processes. Once verified, reliable data will be made in the system immediately.  IWMD conducts quality assurance/quality management reviews of DTS data to ensure the system accurately reflects deployment and qualifications related data reflected in the system is accurate. If deployment or qualifications data is incorrect, IWMD works with the Cadre or Program Office to change the data based upon internal data management processes. Once verified, reliable data will be made in the system immediately.   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of FEMA Individual Assistance services that are delivered in a timely,      |
|---------------------|---|
|                     | effective and efficient manner  |
| Program             | Response and Recovery   |
| Description         | This is a weighted percent that reflects FEMA's role in delivering quality services |
|                     | to disaster survivors. This measure is based upon three categories: program         |
|                     | services, supporting infrastructure, and customer satisfaction. Sub-elements within |
|                     | these three categories include providing temporary housing assistance and case      |
|                     | management; having available grant management and internet and telephone            |
|                     | registration systems; ensuring call centers respond quickly and business staff are  |
|                     | in place; and, delivering these services to enhance customer satisfaction of those  |

|  | receiving individual assistance from FEMA following a disaster. Recovery assistance helps individuals affected by disasters and emergencies return to normal quickly and efficiently.   |
|--|---|
| Scope of Data                            | The scope of this measure is for all federal disaster assistance activity within the reporting year. Data collected as part of the customer satisfaction sub-element uses a random sample of applicants who registered with FEMA and received assistance within the previous fiscal quarter. Customer Satisfaction results in Q1 of each fiscal year reflect the sentiment of applicants from disasters declared in the Q4 of the previous year.  |
| Data Source                              | Several FEMA-owned data systems and sources are used to provide data for this measure. Data on the eligible applicants provided temporary housing assistance within 60 day of a disaster and the State grant award of Disaster Case Management come from the Individual Assistance (IA) Grants Management System. The availability of the IA Grants Management System and Internet and Telephone Registration System availability comes from the Office of the Chief Information Officer Daily Operational Report. Call Center Average Answer Time comes from the Call Center Database. The Recovery Human Capital Report provides data on IA, National Processing Service Center, and the Business Management Division Organizational Fill. Data on the IA Customer Service Satisfaction Survey comes from the Customer Satisfaction Assessment Team report.   |
| Data Collection Methodology              | The Strategic Analysis and Reporting section collects, conducts a peer review and analyzes all data. Once validated, data are grouped into three categories and weighted for the composite score. Weighting is as follows: program services are 40 percent, supporting infrastructure 35 percent and customer satisfaction 25 percent. Program services are the percent of eligible applicants provided temporary housing assistance within 60 days of a disaster and the awarding of a Disaster Case Management State Grant Award within 120 days of the Governor's request. Supporting infrastructure is the percent of time the Individual Assistance (IA) grants management system is available, the percent of time the internet system is available, the percent of calls answered within two minutes for the Call Center, and IA's organizational fill. Customer satisfaction is the percent of people who express satisfaction after receiving an IA grant in the previous quarter. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Recovery Reporting and Analysis Division manually checks the completeness and validity for Output factor data against status reports from the Chief Human Capital, Chief Financial, and Chief Procurement Officers. HQ Recovery Individual Assistance Division checks Preparedness, Awareness, Access, and Action factor data using its IT systems and associated reporting tools, and its Executive Communications Unit (ECU).   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of National Exercise Program (NEP) exercises demonstrating substantive       |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | whole community partnership and participation  |
| Program             | Preparedness and Protection  |
| Description         | This measure tracks the percent of National Exercise Program (NEP) exercises         |
|                     | with partners from the private and non-profit sectors, including nongovernmental     |
|                     | organizations, that sponsor an exercise or is a major participant. The intent of the |
|                     | measure is to increase the percentage of private-sector entities conducting          |
|                     | exercises by soliciting their participation in the NEP. Their participation as an    |
|                     | exercise sponsor or major participant is key to FEMA's ability to promote the        |
|                     | whole community approach to validating the capabilities needed to achieve the        |
|                     | goal of more secure and resilient nation.  |
| Scope of Data       | All of the exercises identified in the NEP Cycle Calendar of Events are included     |
|                     | in the scope of data for this performance measure. The NEP Cycle Calendar of         |
|                     | Events is continuously updated throughout the two-year NEP cycle. Over the two-      |
|                     | year period, National Exercise Division (NED) solicits private sector, faith based,  |

|                             | and nongovernmental participants by working through FEMA regions to identify         |
|-----------------------------|--|
|                             | exercise opportunities for private sector participation or sponsorship. NED also     |
|                             | works through intra- and inter-agency private sector liaisons to provide outreach    |
|                             | on the NEP to promote the benefits of exercises, identify exercise opportunities,    |
|                             | and potential exercise sponsors. Only those NEP exercises with a private and         |
|                             | nonprofit sector exercise sponsor or major participant are included in the           |
|                             | calculation of the performance measure.  |
| Data Source                 | Information about the private and non-profit organizations that participate as an    |
|                             | exercise sponsors or major participants can be found in NEP nomination forms;        |
|                             | exercise objectives for individual exercises are identified in Situation Manuals and |
|                             | After Action Reports. Along with the number of exercises, exercise type, date, and   |
|                             | location, the NED maintains the name of the exercise, name of the exercise           |
|                             | sponsor, and exercise objectives contributed by major participants in an Excel       |
|                             | spreadsheet. NED owns the final reporting database.                                  |
| Data Collection Methodology | Staff from NED compiles the information from NEP nomination forms, Situation         |
|                             | Manuals, and After Action Reports. The numerator for this measure will be            |
|                             | determined by counting the number of exercises on the NEP Cycle Calendar of          |
|                             | Events where the nomination form or After Action Report identifies a                 |
|                             | nongovernmental partner as a sponsor or where an individual Situation Manual or      |
|                             | After Action Report identifies an exercise objective as having been contributed by   |
|                             | a private nonprofit sector partner. The denominator for this measure will be the     |
|                             | number of exercises on the NEP Calendar of Events.                                   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | There is no material inadequacy in the data to significantly impede the use of       |
| Reliability Check           | program performance data.  |

| Performance Measure         | Percent of states and territories that have achieved an intermediate or above proficiency to address their targets established through their THIRA                |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Program                     | Preparedness and Protection   |
| Description                 | This measure assesses the percentage of state and territorial State Preparedness  |
|                             | Report (SPR) ratings at or above the 3.0 threshold when averaging across the  |
|                             | planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise (POETE) elements rated  |
|                             | by grantees for each core capability. The measure is calculated by averaging SPR  |
|                             | POETE ratings for each core capability that a state or territory has identified as  |
|                             | high-priority. If a state's or territory's average SPR rating for its high-priority core  |
|                             | capability POETE elements is 3.0 or higher, it is counted toward the measure. To  |
|                             | increase the rating for one POETE element of a core capability by one point, a  |
|                             | state/territory would have to increase capability by as much as 20 percent.   |
| Scope of Data               | The scope of this measure includes all 50 states and six territories.   |
| Data Source                 | States and territories assess their current core capability levels relative to their  |
|                             | own capability targets annually through the State Preparedness Report (SPR). This   |
|                             | annual self-assessment provides detailed data on the number of states and   |
|                             | territories whose capability levels increase or decrease each year. SPR data used   |
|                             | in this measure are a self-assessed rating for each POETE solution area and a   |
|                             | priority (high, medium, or low) for each core capability. The data are collected  |
|                             | using Microsoft Excel from the official states' and territories' responses to the   |
|                             | annual SPR capability assessment that is submitted to the National Preparedness   |
| D. C.II. d. M.I. 1.1        | Assessment Division (FEMA\NPD\NPAD). The analysis is done using Excel.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | For each core capability, states and territories assess their preparedness levels in  |
|                             | each of the five solution areas—planning, organization, equipment, training, and  |
|                             | exercises (POETE). They use a five-point scale for each assessment, where level   |
|                             | one indicates little-to-no capability, and level five indicates that they have all or   |
|                             | nearly all of the capability required to meet their target. The data are obtained from state and territory SPRs submitted to FEMA each year. The Excel based data |
|                             | analysis tool will extract SPR data into a raw data worksheet. NPAD will calculate  |
|                             | the measure from the raw data.  |
|                             | the measure from the law data.  |

| Reliability Index   | Reliable   |
|---------------------|--|
| Explanation of Data | States and territories receive substantial technical assistance (TA) on conducting |
| Reliability Check   | the THIRA and submitting their capability levels estimates through the SPR. TA     |
|                     | takes the form of published guidance (Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG)       |
|                     | 201: THIRA Guide, Second Edition), workshop sessions in the FEMA Regions,          |
|                     | and just-in-time instruction during the assessment period. SPR submissions are     |
|                     | routed through the Homeland Security Grant Program State Administrative            |
|                     | Agency to ensure it represents all preparedness stakeholders in the jurisdiction.  |
|                     | The Regional Federal Preparedness Coordinator and/or his or her staff review all   |
|                     | state, territorial, and other eligible grantee THIRA submissions in their area of  |
|                     | responsibility. The review ensures that the submitted THIRAs are developed in      |
|                     | alignment with CPG 201.  |

## **APG: Combatting Transnational Criminal Organizations**

| Performance Measure         | Number of criminal arrests linked to transnational criminal organizations targeted by the Joint Task Forces   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Program                     | Cross cutting initiative that involves the DHS Joint Task Forces and multiple Component programs.   |
| Description                 | This measure indicates the number of criminal arrests of associated persons of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) targeted by the Joint Task Forces. Arrest of persons identified as having connections to the most dangerous and damaging criminal and smuggling operations is a necessary step toward the disrupting and dismantling of these organizations. By removing key operatives in a TCO network, we are working to impact the ability of the TCO to continue operations as usual. A criminal arrest could potentially rise to the level of disrupting a TCO if it leads to changes in the organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of the operation. |
| Scope of Data               | This measure includes all arrests of individuals by ICE and CBP that are linked to organizations who have been targeted by the JTFs Each JTF will use a list of prioritized targets that will be measured against.  |
| Data Source                 | JTF- I will enter all criminal arrest information into the TECS system. Criminal arrest information from CBP will be stored in the JTF-W measure tracking tool which will be maintained in the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).  |
| Data Collection Methodology | Once a criminal is arrested by either CBP or ICE the case information will be entered into the Components respective databases. On a quarterly basis, JTF-I will send out the TCO measure data collection tool to JTF-W. Next, JTF-W will pull the appropriate data from the JTW-W Measure tracking tool and send the data to JTF-I. JTF-I will take the data received JTF-W and consolidate it, along with their own input.  |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | The results for this measure are assessed quarterly and undergo review by DHS   |
| Reliability Check           | components/JTFs. For JTF-I; once an agent enters criminal arrest information into TECS it will undergo a review from the agent's group supervisor. The record will also be reviewed at the ICE/HSI headquarters level. For JTF-W once the data for the measure has been entered into the JTF-W metrics measure tracking tool, it's reviewed for accuracy by the officer/agents commander, and then reviewed by the director.  |

| Performance Measure | Number of JTF operations executed against transnational criminal organizations   |
|---------------------|--|
|                     | targeted by the Joint Task Forces  |
| Program             | Cross cutting initiative that involves the DHS Joint Task Forces and multiple    |
|                     | Component programs.  |
| Description         | This measure reports the number of operations that have been planned by the JTFs |
|                     | that were actually executed via integrated component operations. The JTFs        |

|                             | provide a deliberate joint operational approach to achieve unity of effort and greater levels of security in their areas of responsibility. The JTFs lead and coordinate threat-based, targeted, integrated operations. This measure communicates the execution of these written JTF plans intended to best utilize available resources to counter Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs).  |
|-----------------------------|--|
| Scope of Data               | This measure includes all formalized JTF-E and JTF-W written operation plans against prioritized TCO targets. The scope of operations may include but are not limited to: deliberately planned or surge operations, such as targeted enforcement operations, existing routine operations, newly developed operations, and consolidated joint operations. The span of any of the aforementioned may range from a matter of days to years as required.   |
| Data Source                 | Results for this measure will be tracked in the JTF-W Operations Tracking Tool (JTF-W OTT) which stores all of the targets information as well as the results (consequence applied) of targeted enforcement action against each target (individual linked/associated to the priority organizations).   |
|                             | JTF-E data for this measure will be stored in and extracted from various approved component databases and information sharing systems. JTF-E will maintain a list of prioritized, active, and planned operations as part of its annual deliberate planning process. Results will be maintained and reported by Intelligence and Operations staff.  |
| Data Collection Methodology | The JTFs will construct integrated operational plans to disrupt and degrade the TCO activities. JTF-E and JTF-W will maintain a list of these planned operations. As planned operations are executed, each JTF will examine expected outcomes/outputs and assess if operations have accomplished the desired objectives. Those that meet desired objectives will be considered executed plans and recorded in their respective databases. On a quarterly basis, JTF-I will send out the TCO measure data collection excel spreadsheet to JTF-E and JTF-W, and they will pull the appropriate data from their respective systems of record and send it to JTF-I. JTF-I will take the data received from JTF-E and JTF-W and add together the number of operations executed. |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data         | JTF-W and JTF-E will maintain and distribute the formal list of approved   |
| Reliability Check           | operational plans. Having a written approved plan provides the reliability check for those operations included in this measure. The number of executed operational plans will be reviewed by area commanders/supervisors to ensure that determinations that written plans have been executed are accurate.   |

| Performance Measure | Percent of transnational criminal organizations targeted by the Joint Task Forces |
|---------------------|---|
|                     | that are disrupted or dismantled  |
| Program             | Cross cutting initiative that involves the DHS Joint Task Forces and multiple     |
|                     | Component programs.   |
| Description         | This measure represents the number of disruptions and dismantlements compared     |
|                     | to the total number of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) that have      |
|                     | been identified as a priority target by the Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Through     |
|                     | targeting based on intelligence, risk, and threat the JTFs assist in helping the  |
|                     | Department best utilize its resources in order to have the largest impact on      |
|                     | disrupting and dismantling the TCOs that pose the biggest threat impacting our    |
|                     | Nation's southern border and approaches regions. Daily actions are taken to       |
|                     | counter and degrade these threats, but true disruptions and dismantlements of     |
|                     | TCOs are hard won battles. This measure communicates our greatest and most        |
|                     | enduring successes against these criminal organizations, to remove these threats  |
|                     | and demonstrate the gains to border security made possible through coordinated    |
|                     | law enforcement campaigns.  |
| Scope of Data       | JTF-W and JTF-I will have a pre-identified list of targeted TCOs which will serve |
|                     | as the denominator for this measure. The numerator includes the operations and    |

|  | significant investigations that had an approved disruption or dismantlement of the targeted TCOs. A disruption occurs when efforts have successfully impeded the normal and effective operation of the target organization or targeted criminal activity as they occur, as indicated by changes in the organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of the operation of the target organization or targeted criminal activity. A dismantlement is when the cumulative impact of disruption  |
|--|--|
|  | efforts destroy the targeted organization's leadership and network to the point that the organization is incapable of reconstituting itself.   |
| Data Source                              | For JTF-I, data is entered in the Significant Case Report (SCR) Module in TECS. Data inputs from JTF-W will be stored in the JTF-W measure tracking tool.  |
| Data Collection Methodology              | Each JTF has a process to document significant cases that are to be nominated for a disruption/dismantlement. These nominated operations/investigations are then reviewed to confirm they meet the definitions. For JTF-I, these nominations are reviewed by the Significant Case Review (SCR) process in HSI. For JTF-W the nominations are evaluated by a review panel made up of representatives from JTF-W Headquarters Operations and Intelligence Sections, JTF-W Corridor Commanders or their representatives, and representatives from JTF-I and JTF-E. The JTF-E nomination process includes coordinating nominations with component investigation and intelligence entities which are then reviewed, prioritized, and approved by JTF-E prior to submission to JTF-I for consideration. On a quarterly basis, JTF-I will send out the TCO measure data collection excel spreadsheet and JTF-W will pull the appropriate data from their tracking tool and send it to JTF-I. JTF-I will consolidate the data with their own inputs. The number of reported disruptions and dismantlements will be divided by the number of identified targeted TCOs to calculate the percent. |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | Both JTF-I and JTF-W have multi-level reviews of the results for validation prior to consolidation and external reporting. Once an agent or officer enters significant investigation or operational information into their appropriate system of records, it is then reviewed by the next level in their chain of command, either the agent's group supervisor or the Commander. Internal reviews of the data occur prior to the review panel evaluation by JTF-W, or the peer and Significant Case Review process for JTF-I. These panels serve as an additional reliability check on whether the operations/cases are truly a disruption or dismantlement.   |

| Performance Measure         | Pounds of drugs seized linked to transnational criminal organizations targeted by the Joint Task Forces   |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Program                     | Cross cutting initiative that involves the DHS Joint Task Forces and multiple Component programs.   |
| Description                 | This measure represents the number of pounds seized for any illicit drugs as a result of interdiction actions against Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) targeted by the Joint Task Forces. Disrupting the flow of illegal drugs is critical for drugs provide a major revenue stream for TCO operations. This measure reflects drugs that are both physically seized and also those that are jettisoned over the side of a boat. A drug seizure could potentially rise to the level of disrupting a TCO if it leads to changes in the organizational leadership and/or changes in methods of the operation. |
| Scope of Data               | This measure includes all drugs seized by CBP, USCG and ICE, from significant investigations that have been targeted by JTF-E, JTF-W, and JTF-I. In the case of JTF-E and USCG, drugs jettisoned over the side of a boat (otherwise deemed irretrievable) are included in the measure. Each JTF will identify a list of targets that will be measured against.  |
| Data Source                 | Each JTF will utilize their respective systems of record for tracking drug seizures, such as TECS and the Consolidated Counter Drug Database.   |
| Data Collection Methodology | Each JTF/Component will regularly enter their respective drug seizure information into their unique databases. Case numbers in TECS Drug seizures   |

|  | from the JTF-E that are entered into TECS will be linked to JTF-I significant investigations. On a quarterly basis, JTF-I will send out the TCO measure data collection excel spreadsheet to JTF-E and JTF-W. JTF-E and JTF-W will pull the appropriate data from their respective systems of record and send it to JTF-I. JTF-I will take the data received from JTF-E and JTF-W and consolidate it along   |
|--|--|
|  | with their own inputs.   |
| Reliability Index                        | Reliable   |
| Explanation of Data<br>Reliability Check | The results for this measure are assessed quarterly and undergo review by DHS components/JTFs. For JTF-I once an agent enters criminal arrest information into TECS it will undergo a review from the agent's group supervisor. The record will also be reviewed at the ICE/HSI headquarters level. For JTF-W once the data for the measure has been entered into the JTF-W metrics measure tracking tool, its reviewed for accuracy by the officer/agents commander, and then reviewed by the director. For JTF-E/USCG the CCDB is the authoritative source for drug seizures. The CCDB is an interagency-vetted database that is reviewed quarterly. |

| Performance Measure         | Total amount of currency and/or monetary instruments seized of transnational  |
|-----------------------------|---|
|                             | criminal organizations targeted by the Joint Task Forces  |
| Program                     | Cross cutting initiative that involves the DHS Joint Task Forces and multiple   |
|                             | Component programs.   |
| Description                 | This measure represents the total dollars seized for any currency or monetary   |
| •                           | instrument against any Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) targeted by  |
|                             | the Joint Task Forces. Monetary instruments are defined in 31 USC § 5312 (3)  |
|                             | and includes items such as bank accounts, checks, savings bonds, virtual currency,  |
|                             | and stocks. Seizing currency and monetary instruments could potentially rise to   |
|                             | the level of disrupting a TCO if it leads to changes in the organizational leadership   |
|                             | and/or changes in methods of the operation.   |
| Scope of Data               | This measure includes all currency and monetary items seized by CBP, USCG,  |
|                             | and ICE from significant investigations targeting TCOs who have been targeted   |
|                             | by JTF-E, JTF-W, and JTF-I. Each JTF will identify a list of targets that will be   |
|                             | measured against.   |
| Data Source                 | The JTFs will utilize a combination of component approved databases to capture  |
|                             | and extract data, such as TECS, the Marine Information for Safety and Law   |
|                             | Enforcement (MISLE), and the JTF-W measure tracking tool which will be  |
| 5 6 11 11 11 11             | maintained in the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).   |
| Data Collection Methodology | Upon seizing currency through operations, each JTF/Component will enter their   |
|                             | respective currency seizure case information into their unique databases. On a  |
|                             | quarterly basis, JTF-I will send out the TCO measure data collection tool JTF-E   |
|                             | and JTF-W. JTF-E and JTF-W will pull the appropriate data from their respective systems of record and send the data to JTF-I. JTF-I will take the data received |
|                             | from JTF-E and JTF-W and consolidate it, along with their own inputs.   |
| Reliability Index           | Reliable  |
| Explanation of Data         | The results for this measure are assessed quarterly and undergo review by DHS   |
| Reliability Check           | components/JTFs. For JTF-I once an agent enters currency seizure information  |
| Reliability Check           | into TECS it will undergo a review from the agent's group supervisor. The record  |
|                             | will also be reviewed at the ICE/HSI headquarters level. For JTF-W once the data  |
|                             | for the measure has been entered into the JTF-W metrics measure tracking tool,  |
|                             | it's reviewed for accuracy by the officer/agents commander, and then reviewed by  |
|                             | the director. Within the JTF-E, the program manager reviews entries into MISLE  |
|                             | database monthly and compares to other sources of information to assess   |
|                             | reliability of the database. District, Area, and Headquarters law enforcement   |
|                             | staffs review, validate, and assess the data on a quarterly basis as part of the Law  |
|                             | Enforcement Planning and Assessment System.   |





#### We are DHS.

Every single day, the dedicated men and women of the Department of Homeland Security safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values. By air, by land, by sea, or in cyberspace, more than 230,000 employees of DHS work every day to keep our nation safe.

Today, DHS will...



As of September 14, 2016 (unaudited)

