Homeland Security Advisory Council

Foreign Fighter Task Force
Interim Report
Spring 2015
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Preface

The term “foreign fighter” or “foreign terrorist fighter” has become common shorthand to describe an individual who has left his country of residence or nationality to take part in a conflict elsewhere on behalf of a non-State actor, almost always identified with al Qaeda (AQ) inspired ideology. The term has found particular currency in the context of the civil war in Syria, where over 20,000 people from more than 80 States have travelled to join groups such as the self-proclaimed Islamic State (also known as ISIL) and Jabhat al Nusra, both of which have their origins in AQ.

Inevitably, some who go to join these groups find out that what they have to offer is, in reality, far different from what they claim to offer on social media, where their presence is ubiquitous. These recruits may therefore decide to return to their home countries to seek new avenues for their lives. Others who join violent extremist groups abroad, however, are likely to become imprisoned in an apocalyptic narrative that casts Western countries and their Arab allies as inimical to the interests of Islam and of individual Muslims. It is of significant concern that when these recruits return home, rather than seeking a return to normalcy in their lives, they may continue the campaign of violence by committing terrorist crimes in their own countries or elsewhere.

It is difficult to assess this threat accurately, but the fact that foreigners who join violent extremist groups abroad undergo an extensive period of training or indoctrination, makes them a clear risk for terrorism, both in terms of their ideologies and of their capabilities. It is also inevitable that during their time abroad foreign fighters may develop close bonds with others who may in the future call on their shared experience to persuade them to join a terrorist plot, even though they had no prior intention of doing so. Another factor that increases the long-term unpredictability of the behavior and attitudes of foreign fighters is the psychosis that may result from being exposed to extreme violence at a relatively young age; many recruits are in their late teens or early twenties. As a result, the long-term impacts of returning foreign fighters, while difficult to forecast, is likely to be substantive.

For these reasons, the authorities in many western and Muslim-majority countries have sought to develop policies to deal with returnees. Some nation-states have made it a criminal offense to fight abroad in a war or with a group that does not have the support of their government; others have criminalized association with any group designated by that government as a terrorist organization, similar to the “material support” provisions available to prosecutors in the United States. Other countries investigate returnees to see if they have committed an illegal act, usually of violence, while abroad. Some have gone so far as to seek to ban the return of foreign fighters.

Most countries believe that the policy options available and/or utilized up to this point are inadequate to address the evolving nature of the foreign fighter phenomenon. A further problem lies in the differing policy objectives that governments must take into account: they must attempt to dissuade people from becoming foreign fighters, they must make it as difficult as possible for
them to do so, and they must have in place policies to deal with their return, both through the judicial system and in terms of their reintegration into society.

A significant impediment to the formulation of effective policies has been the lack of empirical data as to what works and what does not. On dissuasion, many countries, including the United States, have sought to suppress or counter the narrative of overseas groups that advocate violent extremism. The combination of near-universal access to information through the Internet and the constitutional necessity to protect First Amendment rights, limits the desire and ability of government to close off the avenues by which extremists reach their audiences, unless in doing so they break laws against incitement to violence or hate speech. Even in these cases, however, the nature of the Internet is such that closed accounts quickly re-emerge; moreover, the emergence of the dark web and similar tools significantly limits the effectiveness of efforts by the government in this space. Due in part to these factors, many nations seek policies designed to strengthen the resilience of local communities against the allure of violent extremism, hoping that key influencers will protect the most vulnerable while being able to intervene when someone indicates increasing sympathy with violent extremism.

These policies are useful but hardly fail proof, especially in communities where the sense of common identity has eroded. Some governments have also sought to ban the travel of individuals who may plan to become foreign fighters. These policies also challenge basic freedoms and, like much counter-terrorism legislation, are open to criticism for appearing to punish an unproven intention, rather than a demonstrable crime. Furthermore, in European and other Western countries where the confiscation of travel documents is allowed on the basis of suspicion, foreign fighters have nonetheless managed to get through borders to join the fight.

In dealing with returning foreign fighters, policies often focus on prosecution or on reintegration, depending on the perceived level of threat or involvement. Successful prosecution can provide a temporary solution, but only so long as there is a chance that during incarceration the

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**The Threat**

US Persons with violent extremist groups could gain combat skills, connections, and possibly become persuaded to conduct directed or lone-wolf style attacks targeting the United States and US interests abroad.

- More than 180 US persons have traveled or attempted to travel to participate in conflict;
- About 40 have returned;
- At least 13 US persons arrested on charges for traveling to Syria or attempting or intending to do so;
- 4 US persons are reportedly killed in Syria while fighting alongside violent non-State actors.

**Female radicalization and Syria**

- At least five US-based women have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria, mirroring trends in other Western nations; one arrested for material support to ISIL
- Some express a desire to travel for the purposes of marrying a Syria-based fighter or to serve as a nurse
- The Internet and social media have helped women communicate with online radicalizers and foreign extremists.
foreign fighter may have a change of attitude. Otherwise, he or she may remain a threat on his or her release or even radicalize other prisoners during his or her sentence. Some countries have focused more therefore on “de-radicalization” and “re-integration” policies that attempt to explore the motivations of a foreign fighter and provide him or her with alternative outlets. This is resource-intensive work that has had success in some countries, such as Singapore, but not in all. It is highly dependent on the people involved, the culture in which they operate and the level of aftercare available to monitor the stability of the returnees.

The international community has recognized that these policy challenges are common to many areas of the world and has provided advice and encouragement in many forums, as well as mandating action through the Security Council. But as recognized by the Global Counterterrorism Forum in its “The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the Foreign Terrorist Fighters Phenomenon,” whatever a Government does must be consistent with applicable international law, as well as national law and regulations, taking into account the varied histories, cultures, and legal systems.

On October 29, 2014, Secretary Johnson requested that the Homeland Security Advisory Council establish a Task Force to provide ongoing recommendations on the foreign fighter threat and its impact on our homeland security first through an interim report, and then on a standing basis thereafter, and within the framework of a three-part mandate:

1. Design strategies to prevent Americans from joining foreign fighting efforts abroad.
2. Examine whether current border immigration, and transportation security policies are appropriate in addressing the return of foreign fighters.
3. Recommend strategies to effectively prevent individuals who are returning from foreign fighter experiences from engaging in violence within their communities.

This interim report by the Task Force attempts to provide general recommendations related to the three specific tasks mandated by the Secretary. The Task Force had broad access and cooperation from key stakeholders, to include: United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of State, and other state and local agencies, as well as faith-based and community relations groups. This outreach enabled the Task Force to gather data to better understand what has already been done on this critical issue as well as what needs to be undertaken as it relates to the Foreign Fighters phenomenon and other closely related topics.
Tasking 1

**Design strategies to prevent and discourage Americans from joining foreign fighting efforts abroad**: What strategies should the Department of Homeland Security employ to effectively discourage and prevent individuals from being inspired to violence and becoming foreign fighters? What strategies can be employed to communicate and educate members of the public to raise national awareness of this terrorist threat? Should the Department of Homeland Security better leverage the existing “If You See Something, Say Something” public awareness campaign? And if so, how?

**The Challenge**

Any recommended strategy or proposed stream of efforts concerning Task 1 shall include those individuals who are inspired by violent extremism narratives and/or foreign fighter activities and choose to travel to participate in a conflict elsewhere on behalf of a terrorist organization as well as those who stay and undertake attacks within the United States. It is important to note that Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs)\(^1\) continue to pose a significant threat that is neither constrained by international borders nor limited to any single ideology. HVEs could conduct an attack with little warning due to the individualized nature of the radicalization and mobilization process,\(^2\) which presents law enforcement with limited opportunities to detect plots and increase the difficulty of law enforcement to detect those HVEs with the greatest propensity to take violent actions.

- The early detection, prevention and intervention of individuals identifying a tendency towards violent extremism is the duty of the whole community; community engagement is often the key in identifying and addressing issues related to the behavior associated with individuals exhibiting these tendencies. By empowering communities to intervene with individuals potentially supporting violent extremism, we are thus able to properly address this destructive influence before it manifests itself as violent behavior. This holistic approach will ensure a synergy not possible with all stakeholders acting independently of one another.

- One of the persistent challenges is the lack of early “off-ramps” for those on the road to violence or foreign fighter travel. The legal system as it relates to counterterrorism (CT) is aimed at prosecution with serious penalties: lacking established models, CT and law enforcement agencies become involved as the behaviors grow more worrisome. This process usually leads to arrest on material support grounds or charges related to attempting to join a designated terrorist group. This creates a challenge of addressing potentially problematic behavior with friends, family or community members who fear that attempts to assist will result in prosecution and punishment.

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\(^1\) DHS defines an HVE as a person of any citizenship who has lived or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing material support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a terrorist organization, but who is acting independently of direction by a terrorist organization.

\(^2\) Radicalization is the process through which an individual changes from non-violent belief system to a belief system that includes the willingness to advocate, facilitate, or use violence as a method to effect societal or political change.
The issue of foreign fighter radicalization to violence is a complex problem with mostly local solutions. There is “no-one-size-fits-all” approach and strategies must be developed with the consideration of the given nature of communities and personalities that are involved.

Generally, there are multiple efforts being undertaken by various federal entities to study, develop programming or effectuate prevention/off-ramping strategies of individuals who are either contemplating or retuning from foreign fighting experiences or – more broadly – are being inspired to undertake violent extremism. It is essential to enhance the unity of vision among the various stakeholders, and to properly prepare, train, or equip frontline responders: local governments, local law enforcement, and community/religious organizations and networks.

Identify best-practice programs to adequately train key grassroots stakeholders to intervene with individuals who are contemplating traveling overseas to become foreign fighters or undertake attacks domestically.

**Initial Findings**

- Early detection, prevention and intervention relating to the radicalizing pathway towards violent extremism or foreign fighter travel cannot be overstated.

- The process of radicalization to violence resembles a road or path that individuals take on the way to becoming a would-be violent extremist or foreign fighter. In some cases there may be a triggering event, such as a negative life experience; in other instances, particular social media messaging may resonate with the individual. In particular cases, underlying mental/social disorders may be present. These triggers or factors may tip the individual into an embrace of violence.

- At-risk individuals often go through the process of pulling away from society and its institutions, a common characteristic identified with the lone-wolf phenomena. This “social fading process” lowers their profile as the radicalization process takes root, making it difficult for traditional CT and Law Enforcement approaches to identify, understand or address potential issues. To that end, community engagement that is rooted at the local level can be one of the most effective best practices even as it is one of the hardest to replicate.

- Community leaders, parents, educators, mental health providers, and local law enforcement are most effective at identifying at-risk individuals, detecting suspicious behavior, intervening before travel and/or violence is undertaken and ultimately rehabilitating and reintegrating at-risk individuals into community life.

- Thought leaders exist within the state and local space that are developing best practice programs identifying, detecting, intervening and ultimately preventing individuals or clusters from potential motivation to acts of violence.

- Success in the prevention and off-ramping space is contingent on strong relationships between local, state and federal law enforcement working in conjunction with – or supporting – communities including those in the private, non-profit and academic sectors.

- The level of understanding of the threat posed by foreign fighters to the homeland by state and local law enforcement agencies may not be highly developed; this, combined with lack of
clear bi-directional communication with existing federal resources, further convolutes the manner in which local and state law enforcement agencies are made aware of the presence of individuals who may be on the path of violent extremism in their communities, or – potentially – to those who have returned from foreign fighting experiences.

- Working with a community where a member has been inspired to join the ranks of foreign fighters is done best when there is both a more comprehensive as well as pre-existing relationship of trust between the community and local law enforcement; this engagement is most effective when addressed in the broader context of dealing with all crimes or threats, and in furtherance of building community awareness efforts that enhance security across the whole community.”

- Social media, a primary recruiting tool skillfully utilized by ISIS/ISIL/DAESH and other terror groups, is extremely easy to learn, use, and usually free of charge, thus aiding to the increased usage among this group and terrorist organizations. Additionally, this instrument provides these individuals an opportunity to effectively and anonymously communicate in real time with other like-minded individuals who support their cause on a global stage. Most importantly, it also provides an opportunity to recruit and victimize individuals who feel they have been alienated, marginalized and disenfranchised by society.

**Recommendations**

1. Work to foster locally-based cultures of trust and security between law enforcement and community leaders; standardize approaches to facilitate security and enhance bi-directional communication between local, state, and federal law enforcement, community institutions, Protective Security Advisors, and Fusion Centers. The culture of trust and collaboration will enhance community engagement and enable the Department to better leverage its public

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**Motivations for Joining the Fight in Syria**

- **Support Violent Extremist Causes:**
  
  *Individuals who adhered to ISIL or al-Qaeda’s worldview;*
  
  *Probably would travel to other conflict zones;*

- **Solidarity with Syrian Opposition:**
  
  *Perceived duty to fight against the regime;*
  
  *Probably would not travel to other conflict zones;*

- **Possible Nationalist Reasons:**
  
  *Ethnic Syrians;*
  
  *Some intended to link up with secular-oriented groups;*

- **Pro-Assad Regime:**
  
  *Motivated to support the regime, their ethnic or sectarian groups, and/or Lebanese Hezbollah;*
outreach initiatives such as the existing “If You See Something, Say Something™” public awareness campaign.

2. Undertake an assessment on what training is being provided to local and state law enforcement as well as community leaders on the identification of indicators related to violent extremism; assess, map and develop a process of who is commencing research or developing identification, off-ramp and/or prevention programs within the federal government.

3. Key thought leaders from the public, private, non-profit and academic sectors – to include faith-based and civic leaders and individuals from local, state and federal entities – must be brought together so as to coordinate ongoing efforts and make recommendations on best practices regarding training, off-ramp models and other relevant areas.

4. Allocated appropriate resources and training from federal funds to CVE prevention and community engagement initiatives. Within DHS and the federal government, there is currently no dedicated budget, office, human capital or other support dedicated full time to CVE and/or foreign fighter initiatives.

5. Ensure efficient information sharing systems between local and federal levels, better connecting local, state, and federal entities through the use of Protective Security Advisors, Fusion Centers, Task Forces (notably the Joint Terrorism Task Forces) and other means.

6. Government should support credible messages and messengers aimed to counter the narratives of violent extremists through public/private partnerships. Government should not be the messenger, as it is immediately dismissed by the target audience, but it can assist to bring together social media, analytic experts, technology innovators, and young people to discuss, innovate and execute a counter-narrative initiative as well as net roots/grassroots capacity building efforts to amplify creditable messengers and challenge on and offline actions.
**Tasking 2**

*Examine whether current border, immigration, and transportation security policies appropriate in addressing the return for them fighters?* What can the Department of Homeland Security do to ensure we are aware of foreign fighters? Which key partners can help address the return of foreign fighters? Are there intervention techniques that can be employed by the Department and its partners to neutralize returning foreign fighters? At the national level, are we leveraging existing capacity appropriately to address the foreign fighters issue? Do current policies support the necessary domestic and international partnerships to mitigate the foreign fighter threat? What legislative and regulatory changes, if any, are necessary to create the framework to address the return of foreign fighters?

**The Challenge**

With respect to border inspections, immigration, and transportation security policies, the Foreign Fighter threat is part of the larger threat environment that the Department of Homeland Security confronts in carrying out its missions. That mission is to insure the United States meets its sovereign responsibilities in a rapidly changing global commons. In addition to the continual movement of people, cargo, and conveyances, the Department also faces threat environments that are agnostic to traditional physically and geographical described borders such as weather, the Internet, financial networks, and health threats.

**Initial Findings**

The Task Force finds that the Foreign Fighter threat should be viewed as an included threat stream within the larger border sovereignty context. The Foreign Fighter “cycle” of radicalization to violence, travel, participation, and return creates similar demands on DHS mission execution as those related to transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking. Other related illegal activities include proliferation, trafficking in antiquities, war crimes, and genocide. The threat is a network threat and must be confronted and defeated by a network. A network consisting of integrated intelligence, inspection, interdiction, and investigative activities that focus on three inevitable vulnerabilities of criminal networks: the need to travel, communicate, and finance their operations. The Task Force recommendations related to Task 2, focus on activities to defeat Foreign Fighter networks within the authorities or capabilities of DHS as part of the larger national and international effort (DoD, Intelligence Community, the Interagency, and international partners). There are two general areas of focus for the recommendations provided in this interim report as the basis for follow-on effort.

- **Information is Essential:** The fundamental building block in the successful network engagement of the Foreign Fighter threat is information. Accordingly, the recommendations of the Subgroup are premised on the overarching need to develop, deploy, and mature the DHS Data Framework to all phases of intelligence, inspections, interdiction, and investigative mission execution.
• **Unity of Effort Must Guide DHS Operations:** In support of the Secretary’s Unity of Effort guidance, the respective Component and DHS Directorate activities should be unified under a DHS Concept of Operations that can integrate policies, information sharing, operational planning and coordination, and resource allocation. In addition, the Foreign Fighter threat response should be aligned with the DHS Task Forces being established.

**Recommendations**

1. The DHS Data Framework should be the overarching organizing concept for the acquisition, management, analysis and sharing of information and intelligence for DHS mission execution.

2. DHS should develop a systematic approach to the ingest of data into the framework that includes existing systems of records (SOR) that are copied or backed up into the larger Data Framework, including novel sources such as the manual ingest of information developed in the course of mission operations (i.e. Pocket litter).

3. The recently issued Private Impact Statement (PIA), “DHS Data Framework – Interim Process to Address an Emergent Threat” regarding the ingest of data into the framework provides the policy rationale to move unclassified data into classified systems to take advantage of more robust analytical tools and should continue and be refined. The Task Force supports this approach.

4. DHS will need to address the status of new information that is developed with multiple data sources in relation to privacy and civil liberties to insure the information is documented with a SOR.

5. As part of the development of the DHS Data Framework the Secretary should direct a component level assessment of existing data systems and their readiness to be assimilated into the Framework to support future policy and resource decisions.

6. The DHS Data Framework should receive policy and funding support to build out the multi-tiered system capable of managing data at all levels of classification.

7. The current DHS Policy Engagement Matrix is an effective tool to understand existing relationships with international partners, current agreements (formal and informal instruments), and gaps. The Matrix should be used as the basis for a larger more comprehensive capture of component and directorate activities.

8. Deployment of DHS personnel outside the United States should be done within a Concept of Operations that integrates all DHS mission priorities and potential synergies between DHS components: for example, the strategic mission-based linkage between deployed ICE personnel who support the Visa Security Program (pre-adjudicative visa vetting) and CBP personnel involved in pre-departure targeting programs (Joint Security Program, Immigration Advisory Programs, Regional Carriers Liaison Groups).
9. The current DHS Counterterrorism Advisory Board (CTAB) charter was signed by Secretary Napolitano in 2011, with the caveat that it would be reviewed every 2 years. It is recommended that the charter be reviewed and revised to reflect: (1) the current threat environment, (2) any policy changes that have been made since issuance, and (3) to align DHS CT activities under the Secretary’s Unity of Effort guidance. The current charter predates the current focus on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) or the Foreign Terrorist Fighter threat. It is also recommended that the charter recognize the linkages between transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking with terrorism and Foreign Terrorist Fighters. Finally, the charter should recognize the importance of information sharing and reflect recent decisions of the Joint Requirements Council regarding the deployment of the DHS Data Framework.

10. To assess the adequacy, robustness, and coherency of the current collective data sets in the Department of Homeland Security, the Department should consider a Department wide simulation or war game that “stresses” the various nodes of the Foreign Terrorist Fighter cycle. A complicated scenario that includes interrupted travel that could reveal weaknesses and gaps would be useful in developing current tactics and operational responses and form the basis for a more strategic approach in the future. Simpler and unclassified version of such a simulation could be used as an information and awareness tool at the state and local level as part of the CVE program.
Tasking 3

*Recommend strategies to effectively prevent individuals, returning from foreign fighting experiences, from engaging in violence within our communities:* Community leaders, parents, educators, mental health providers, and local law enforcement are most effective at identifying, detecting, intervening and ultimately preventing potential motivation to acts of violence. If ideologically-motivated individuals cannot be stopped from engaging in foreign fighter activity, what can the Department of Homeland Security do to ensure these individuals do not engage in violence within their communities upon re-entry into American communities? What research, known examples of the behavior or returned persons, communication, outreach, and training, can be coordinated with community leaders, parents, educators, mental health providers, and state and local partners to address the foreign fighter issue?

The Challenge

In dealing with returnees, the first task will be to identify them. As databases improve, so too will the ability to do detect terrorist travel activities. DHS should lead a whole of government approach to the effective exchange of information, both between domestic agencies and with partners abroad, designed to create as complete an inventory as possible of foreign fighters, particularly those who may find entry into the United States the easiest.

A further invaluable source of information about returning foreign fighters will be their own communities. We need to ensure that families and the wider communities within which they live see far more advantage in discussing the returnee with the authorities than in trying to hide the fact of his return. It will be important in this respect that the families of foreign fighters are not stigmatized, either by officials or by those who live around them.

Initial Findings

- In response to the Secretary’s tasking to the Foreign Fighter Task Force, we find a logical and compatible nexus between Tasks 1 and 3. Both of these Tasks are directly related to communities on a local level and we will set forth strategies for community engagement. However, we recognize two major distinctions: the first is that the individual in Task 1 has not yet become a foreign fighter; the second is that in Task 1 there is still an opportunity for prevention. This allows for proactive, preventative, and pre-emptive measures that range from awareness raising to off-ramping throughout the entire community.

- When considering Task 3 (the effective management of returning foreign fighters), a constructive response for rehabilitation and reintegration of Foreign Fighters will require the sharing of applicable/appropriate intelligence between Federal and local law enforcement. Incidents involving returning foreign fighters will require a comprehensive holistic community approach, to include families, educators, faith-based organizations and networks, civic groups, health and social professionals, and law enforcement.
• Until recently, terrorist groups associated with AQ have assigned subordinate, domestic, non-combatant roles to women and have not sought to recruit them. ISIL however has made a strong appeal to foreign women to travel to the ‘Islamic State’. Although their main role is still to bear and raise children and to look after their husbands, female recruits from abroad have also been recruited to be nurses, to police the behavior of other women and even to fight on the front lines in specific circumstances. The ISIL appeal has resulted in many hundreds of Western women traveling to Syria, including some from the United States. Inevitably some will return home.

**Recommendations**

1. Individuals returning to the United States, or arriving for the first time, will present unique challenges. It will be critical that information regarding returning individuals is shared between local, state, and federal law enforcement, community institutions, Protective Security Advisors, and Fusion Centers; the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces can play a critical role in this effort. A comprehensive database of returning foreign fighters should be available to these entities.

2. Building from the Task 2 recommendation regarding a DHS-wide simulation to assess the adequacy, robustness, and coherency of the current collective data sets in the Department of Homeland Security, it is recommended that DHS develop similar data sets for local stakeholders working with federal partners, to test weaknesses and gaps in the information-sharing processes as well as tactical/operational responses to foreign fighter matters or closely related topics such as HVEs at the local/partnership-based level.

3. Attitudes of individuals returning from, or arriving with, foreign fighting experiences to the homeland will be influenced by three factors: a) the reasons that they left the US – or their country of residence – initially; b) the experiences that they had while abroad, and; c) the reasons for their return or entry into the United States. DHS, working collaboratively with other entities, should ensure that mechanisms are in place to assess and better understand the motivations of these individuals.

4. Careful and rigorous monitoring of returnees/arrivals with foreign fighting experiences will be necessary, particularly those who are not convicted of a crime or in prison. Family, friends, teachers, and other community leaders should be included in any interaction with an individual returnee, evaluation of his motivation, and assessment of the threat that he poses. Individuals, regardless of whether they rejected/were disillusioned with foreign fighter groups or ideologies, will have both short- and long-term effects from their experiences. These must be closely reviewed to ensure the individuals are not a danger to themselves or to others. Information from returnees will also assist in developing prevention and off-ramp models for other individuals. DHS should provide resource material to communities for families and communities that need assistance from youth counselors, religious advisors, or mental health experts.
5. Any designed strategy should take into account that women may also be vulnerable to the ISIL appeal and should raise awareness of this threat at a community level. Women recruits to ISIL are often in their teens or early twenties and families are likely to be particularly anxious at what may happen to them if they join ISIL. DHS should assist stakeholders and community based organizations to counter the unhealthy interest in violent extremist groups by young women, which is unlikely to be the same as the interests for male sympathizers. Teachers and community leaders should be armed with real life stories of how women are treated by ISIL, whether foreign or local. There should be a deliberate and public effort to counter the ISIL appeal to women, using returnees of both genders as appropriate.

6. DHS should collect and analyze information about returnees to identify indicators of vulnerability to radicalization to violence. DHS should work with selected returnees, where appropriate, to craft and disseminate counter-narrative efforts, work with potentially at-risk individuals, as well as help design and monitor programs related to the rehabilitation and reintegration of others.

7. Even those who have been convicted of committing a crime by going abroad to fight and have been incarcerated will need some help with rehabilitation beyond that offered to other prisoners in their demographic. They may not see their action as a crime, and the prison experience may serve to make them more radical, so presenting an enduring threat on their release. In addition, as experience builds, DHS may have the opportunity to reach out to foreign fighters from the United States to encourage their managed return. In this case, foreign fighters will want to know that they will be treated fairly and predictably, and that some program exists to help them. Foreign Fighters who have already returned home will be the most significant influence on those who are still abroad. DHS can assist by developing and/or promoting rehabilitation/re-integration efforts in cooperation/coordination with other stakeholders, prosecutors or the judiciary where such action is deemed more appropriate than incarceration.
APPENDIX A

FOREIGN FIGHTERS TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Paul Goldenberg (Co-Chair) – President and CEO, Cardinal Point Strategies
Ali Soufan (Co-Chair) – President, The Soufan Group LLC
John Allen – General (Ret.), U.S. Marine Corps
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Ronald Haddad – Chief of Police, Dearborn Police Department
Jane Harman – President/CEO, Woodrow Wilson Center
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APPENDIX B

Secretary Johnson requested that the Homeland Security Advisory Council establish a Task Force to provide ongoing recommendations on the foreign fighter threat and its impact on our homeland security following a comprehensive briefing from the Department. This Task Force will provide recommendations on the topics outlined below, first through an interim report, and then on a standing basis thereafter. As the Council is comprised of senior level officials from local and federal government, academic experts, and community leaders, the Council is uniquely positioned to provide actionable expertise to policymakers, governments, faith-based and civic organizations and communities. Secretary Johnson requested that Advisory Council members Paul Goldenberg and Ali Soufan serve as co-chairs of this task force. The Foreign Fighters Task Force should address, among other closely related topics, the following subjects:

1) **Design strategies to prevent Americans from joining foreign fighting effort abroad:** What strategies should the Department of Homeland Security employ to effectively discourage and prevent individuals from being inspired to violence and becoming foreign fighters? What strategies can be employed to communicate and educate members of the public to raise national awareness of this terrorist threat? Should the Department better leverage the existing “If You See Something, Say Something™” public awareness campaign? And if so, how?

2) **Examine whether current border, immigration, and transportation security policies appropriate in addressing the return of foreign fighters?** What can the Department of Homeland Security do to ensure we are aware of returning foreign fighters? Which key partners can help address the return of foreign fighters? Are there intervention techniques that can be employed by the Department and its partners to neutralize returning foreign fighters? At the National level, are we leveraging existing capacity appropriately to address the foreign fighter issue? Do current policies support the necessary domestic and international partnerships to mitigate the foreign fighter threat? What legislative or regulatory changes, if any, are necessary to create the framework to address the return of foreign fighters?

3) **Recommend strategies to effectively prevent individuals, returning from foreign fighting experiences, from engaging in violence within our communities:** Community leaders, parents, educators, mental health providers, and local law enforcement are most effective at identifying, detecting, intervening and ultimately preventing potential motivation to acts of violence. If ideologically motivated individuals cannot be stopped from engaging in foreign fighter activity, what can the Department of Homeland Security do to ensure these individuals do not engage in violence within their communities upon re-entry into American communities? What research, known examples of the behavior or returned persons, communication, outreach, and training, can be coordinated with community leaders, parents, educators, mental health providers, and state and local partners to address the foreign fighter issue?
APPENDIX C

SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS

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William Hewitt, Intelligence Operations Specialist, Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Dr. Mohammed A Kaiseruddin, Chairman of the Council of Islamic Organizations of Greater Chicago
Mark Koumans, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of International Affairs, Office of Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Ambassador Thomas Krajieski, Senior Advisor, Foreign, Office of International Affairs, Office of Policy, U.S. Department of State
Matt Lenkowsky, Chief, Terrorist Travel and Immigration Security Branch, Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Imam Mohamed Magid, Executive Director of the All Dulles Area Muslim Society
Michael Masters, Executive Director, Cook County Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Illinois
Darryl McSwain, Assistant Chief of Police, Montgomery County Police Department, Maryland
Troy A. Miller, Executive Director, National Targeting Center, Customs and Border Protection
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Kurt Reuther, Director of Operations, State and Local Programs Office, Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Luther Reynolds, Assistant Chief of Police, Montgomery County Police Department, Maryland
Joseph Salvator, Assistant Administrator, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, Transportation Security Administration
Nathaniel Snyder, Senior Adviser for Global Law Enforcement Partnership, Office of State and Local Law Enforcement
Shawn Stallworth, Deputy Branch chief, Office of Bombing Prevention, National Protection and Programs Directorate
Michael B. Steinbach, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Benjamin Stefano, Senior Intelligence Officer, Homeland Counterterrorism Division, Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Francis X. Taylor, Under Secretary, Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Thomas Warrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterterrorism Policy, Counterterrorism Coordinator staff.
APPENDIX D

ANNOTATED DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS LISTING

• “ANNOTATED DATA COLLECTION” Initiative, The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum, Global Counterterrorism Forum


• Statement by the Secretary, Hearing on 2178 (2014) The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum, Coordinator staff. U.S. Department of Homeland, December 17, 2014

• Fact Sheet: Strategy to Counter ISIL, The White House, September 10, 2014

• Fact Sheet: Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Syria and the Broader Region,

• The White House, September 24, 2014

• Assorted Joint Intelligence Bulletins and Primary Source Materials


• Fact Sheet: A Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Countering Violent Extremism

• Fact Sheet: A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies, United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts, February 2015.

• Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, Global Counterterrorism Forum.


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• Strategic Communications for Countering Violent Extremist Narratives

• The Montgomery County Model, The World Organization for Resource Development & Education.

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• Policy Briefing: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online, Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

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• Developing Effective Counter-Narrative Frameworks for Countering Violent Extremism: Meeting Note, Hedayah and International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague, September 2014.


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