Message from the Deputy Secretary

November 23, 2015

I am pleased to submit the following report, “Investigations of DHS Employee Corruption Cases,” which has been coordinated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG).

This report was compiled pursuant to language set forth in the Explanatory Statement and Senate Report 113-198 accompanying the Fiscal Year 2015 DHS Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-4). The report provides information on the Department’s efforts to address employee corruption, and outlines the joint efforts of the Department’s OIG and its U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border Protection Components to pursue and investigate cases of employee corruption and to collaborate with the U.S. Department of Justice Border Corruption Task Forces.

Pursuant to congressional requirements, this report is being provided to the following Members of Congress:

The Honorable John R. Carter
Chairman, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Lucille Roybal-Allard
Ranking Member, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable John Hoeven
Chairman, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security

The Honorable Jeanne Shaheen
Ranking Member, Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security
Inquiries relating to this report may be directed to me at (202) 282-8204 or to the Department’s Deputy Under Secretary for Management and Chief Financial Officer, Chip Fulghum, at (202) 447-5751.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Alejandro N. Mayorkas
Deputy Secretary
Executive Summary

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to make progress on its efforts to identify and investigate allegations of employee corruption effectively. The Office of Inspector General (OIG), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Office of Internal Affairs (IA) work collaboratively to prevent, detect, and investigate employee corruption, conducting these investigations jointly when appropriate. DHS law enforcement Components continue to work with the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents on Border Corruption Task Forces to investigate border and public corruption allegations. In the Progress Reports section of this report, we include specific actions taken by OIG, ICE, and CBP to fight employee corruption.

Within the Department, OIG is authorized by the Inspector General Act of 1978 and the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to investigate allegations of employee misconduct. OIG is vested with the authority to investigate allegations of misconduct or may refer such cases to the ICE OPR or the CBP IA for investigation or administrative action. Specifically, DHS Management Directive 810.1 generally provides that certain categories of misconduct, including all allegations of criminal misconduct and allegations of misconduct involving higher-ranked employees or law enforcement officers, be referred immediately by DHS Components to OIG. Absent extraordinary circumstances, ICE and CBP must refrain from any investigation of such matters unless OIG refers the matter back to those components.

ICE and CBP are two of the largest federal law enforcement agencies in the United States. The men and women of these agencies are on the front lines, at risk of being corrupted by well-financed and ruthless criminal organizations. These organizations seek sensitive law enforcement information and assistance in moving contraband and undocumented aliens into the United States. DHS, including its law enforcement Components, takes every action to ensure that these employees uphold the public trust and conduct their missions with integrity and professionalism.
Investigation of DHS Employee Corruption Cases
Fiscal Year 2015 Progress Report to Congress

Table of Contents

I. Legislative Language ........................................................................................................... 1

II. Progress Reports.................................................................................................................. 2
   A. Office of Inspector General ............................................................................................. 2
      Prevention and Detection ................................................................................................. 2
      Investigations ................................................................................................................... 3
      Coordination and Cooperative Efforts ............................................................................. 3
   B. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ................................................................. 4
      Prevention and Detection ................................................................................................. 5
   C. U.S. Customs and Border Protection .............................................................................. 7
      Prevention and Detection ................................................................................................. 8

III. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 11

Appendices ............................................................................................................................. 12
   Appendix A. Abbreviations/Acronyms ................................................................................. 12
   Appendix B. Budget and Statistics ...................................................................................... 13
I. Legislative Language

This document was compiled pursuant to language in the Explanatory Statement and Senate Report 113-198 accompanying the Fiscal Year 2015 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-4).

The Explanatory Statement includes the following provision:

Conduct and Integrity Oversight

The Secretary announced the delegation of criminal misconduct investigative authority on September 18, 2014. This authority permits Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to work side by side, as appropriate, with other Federal investigative agencies looking into alleged criminal conduct by CBP employees, which should increase workforce accountability and enable CBP leadership to have greater awareness of conduct and integrity issues. CBP is directed to provide regular updates as it converts internal affairs investigators to criminal investigators as part of this transition. Further, the Deputy Secretary shall continue to oversee joint coordination of integrity oversight, as discussed in the Senate report.

Senate Report 113-198 states:

DEPARTMENTAL INTEGRITY EFFORTS

The Committee maintains a strong interest in enhancing the investigative relationship between the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and CBP regarding corruption investigations. However, given the recent personnel changes in CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs, the Committee directs the Deputy Secretary, jointly with the OIG, CBP, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), to submit a status update report, not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this act, outlining the specific steps being taken to further address the process for investigating cases of corruption of DHS employees, and outline the plan to address, as a unified DHS, the engagement of DHS with the Department of Justice’s Border Corruption Task Forces.
II. Progress Reports

A. Office of Inspector General


Prevention and Detection

OIG continues to engage in prevention efforts against corruption. As part of this effort, OIG special agents provide integrity briefings to new hires and frontline employees. These briefings inform DHS employees about fraud, employee misconduct indicators, the need to be alert to such indicators, and how to report suspected violations. OIG also uses these integrity briefings to remind DHS employees of the high degree of trust placed in them, to reinforce their obligation to uphold that trust, and the consequences of their failure to do so. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2014, OIG agents conducted 151 integrity briefings for 4,387 employees.

DHS awards more than $16 billion annually using nine acquisition offices. Because of this, OIG is engaged in developing a comprehensive anticorruption initiative. This program focuses on acquisition risks, emphasizes prevention, and targets high-risk and high-impact areas within DHS. As the initiative progresses, OIG investigators and auditors will develop an internal fraud training program for OIG employees and create multidisciplinary teams of subject matter experts to target acquisition and procurement fraud. OIG expects these efforts to prevent and deter fraud while seeking to identify employees and contractors who may have corrupted the procurement process.

OIG is also in the planning stages of establishing a Computer Forensics Division and a greater intelligence analysis capacity. Establishing its own Computer Forensics Division will end OIG’s dependence on other law enforcement entities to conduct computer forensics examinations and analysis. A greater intelligence analysis capacity will enable OIG to address corruption and other complex crimes more efficiently, effectively, and proactively.

In 2014, OIG began issuing selected reports in real time, ensuring that Department leadership, Congress, and the public receive immediate and meaningful oversight, and enabling the Department to take immediate corrective action. For example, we issued a series of reports on U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) efforts to handle an influx of unaccompanied children crossing the border. We plan to continue issuing these
reports on selected high-profile cases, such as employee corruption cases, with the hope that they have a deterrent effect.

**Investigations**

OIG has approximately 200 special agents vested with the authority to conduct investigations of criminal and administrative employee misconduct. It may also refer such allegations to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) or CBP Internal Affairs (IA) for investigation.

In FY 2014, the OIG Intake Division received a total of 16,368 allegations for investigative consideration from various sources, including from the Joint Intake Center (JIC), described below. Of the total 16,368 complaints received, 794 (4.8 percent) pertained to alleged employee corruption.

**Coordination and Cooperative Efforts**

OIG has assigned five full-time and nine part-time agents to support the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)-led Border Corruption Task Forces (BCTF) and works jointly with ICE OPR and CBP IA whenever appropriate. In FY 2014, OIG investigated 351 cases jointly with our law enforcement partners. Specifically, OIG worked 76 cases with ICE, 30 with CBP, 74 with FBI, and 171 with other agencies. CBP IA has assigned agents to several of OIG’s 31 field locations to assist in investigating CBP-related employee misconduct allegations. These cooperative relationships ensure that our individual efforts are not in conflict and are properly coordinated.

With 14 offices investigating border matters, OIG is well-positioned to address border corruption cases. During FY 2014, OIG initiated 168 new corruption investigations, 111 of which were CBP-related, 24 were ICE-related, and the remainder involved other agencies. OIG made approximately 33 DHS corruption-related arrests in FY 2014. Of those, 8 related to CBP programs (4 were employees) and 15 related to ICE programs (1 was an employee). OIG also secured 37 corruption-related convictions in FY 2014. CBP accounted for 14 of the convictions (1 was an employee), and there were 6 ICE non-employee-related convictions.

Although OIG and the Component agencies are committed to effective cooperation, OIG is also committed to guarding against conditions that may compromise its statutory independence and oversight responsibilities. The procedures established in DHS Management Directive 810.1, allowing OIG investigative primacy with respect to ICE and CBP in matters involving allegations of serious criminal misconduct, are important in this respect.
OIG remains committed to sharing case-related and intelligence information efficiently and effectively with the FBI. Recently, OIG and FBI officials met to discuss ways to improve working relationships between field offices, particularly along the Southwest Border. Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to transparency and information sharing. To ensure that this commitment has impact, FBI and OIG field managers are meeting to discuss ways to enhance the productivity and effectiveness of their relationships. Additionally, FBI intelligence specialists will be conducting an intelligence briefing with all OIG special agents-in-charge at a meeting in Washington, D.C.

The JIC, operated jointly by CBP IA and ICE OPR, is the central clearinghouse for receiving, processing, and assigning allegations of misconduct involving ICE and CBP employees and contractors. If OIG decides not to conduct an investigation itself, ICE or CBP may investigate, or an investigation can be undertaken jointly. In FY 2014, the JIC received more than 16,368 allegations of misconduct and other reportable information. The JIC is the leading source of allegations and complaints regarding DHS employee corruption.

In FY 2014, CBP established the Use of Force Review Board (UFRB)—a unified, agency-wide process to review use-of-force incidents resulting in death or serious bodily injury. The UFRB includes members from all CBP operational components, as well as representatives from the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, OIG, the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and ICE OPR. The UFRB convenes quarterly or as needed to determine if the application of force was consistent with CBP policy. The UFRB also makes observations and recommendations concerning training, tactics, standards, equipment, and other policy or potential misconduct issues arising from the incident. OIG expects the UFRB to increase accountability and transparency in response to significant use-of-force incidents.

B. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

With nearly 20,000 employees, ICE is the largest investigative agency in DHS and the second largest federal law enforcement contributor to the Joint Terrorism Task Force. The priority of ICE is protecting America and upholding public safety. ICE accomplishes its mission by identifying criminal activities and eliminating vulnerabilities that pose a threat to our Nation’s borders, as well as by enforcing economic, transportation, and infrastructure security in an effort to eliminate potential threats of terrorist acts against the United States. Specifically, ICE dismantles transnational criminal organizations by targeting their members, seizing their assets, and disrupting their criminal operations.

ICE OPR ensures that ICE employees embody the highest standards of excellence, professionalism, and integrity. ICE OPR investigates allegations of criminal and
administrative misconduct involving ICE employees and, in conjunction with CBP IA, investigates criminal misconduct involving CBP employees when there is a direct nexus to investigations being conducted by Homeland Security Investigations. ICE OPR’s integrity assurance process includes a layered security approach in order to protect ICE personnel, facilities, and information from criminal and/or terrorist organizations as well as a vigorous initial screening of applicants through comprehensive and periodic background investigations. ICE OPR also assesses ICE’s organizational health by providing independent reviews of agency programs, offices, and detention facilities to measure compliance with applicable policies, standards, and procedures.

OPR has a comprehensive integrity strategy that integrates training, prevention, detection, and investigation capabilities to deter and respond to misconduct in the ICE workforce. This strategy involves collaboration with other law enforcement entities, a vigorous comprehensive screening process for new hires, and education and training of existing ICE employees.

**Prevention and Detection**

ICE’s commitment to integrity begins with the quality of employees hired. ICE’s integrity assurance process includes a vigorous initial screening of applicants, a comprehensive background investigation, and periodic reinvestigations conducted every 5 years. Additionally, in FY 2016, pending approval from the Office of Personnel Management, ICE OPR plans to implement pre-employment polygraph examinations for law enforcement applicants. Further, ICE OPR administers a continuous evaluation program after an employee’s initial background investigation and adjudication, which relies on employees and supervisors to report misconduct and events that could indicate corruption, such as significant job performance failures, egregious policy or procedural violations, suspicious activities, disreputable associations, or unusual affluence.

The agency communicates its expectations of integrity for ICE employees throughout their career. ICE OPR provides integrity awareness training at new employee orientations; basic, advanced, and supervisory academies; mandatory annual online training and in-person presentations at field offices, conferences, and to those employees preparing for long-term foreign assignments. In FY 2014, ICE OPR special agents delivered more than 110 integrity awareness presentations to nearly 2,500 ICE employees.

Additionally, ICE employees must follow the Employee Code of Conduct that establishes general standards of conduct for all ICE employees to follow that promote integrity and professionalism, conform to established ethical principles, and further the mission of ICE and the efficiency of the Federal Government in a manner that merits the respect of the public.
In addition, ICE OPR provides numerous information security-related training courses and briefings, focusing on operational security, security awareness, and classified information protection.

ICE OPR has more than 200 special agents, composed of senior special agents detailed from ICE HSI, who are deployed in 26 field offices across the United States and Puerto Rico, including a special investigative unit based at ICE Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

OPR conducts criminal and administrative investigations of alleged employee misconduct with assistance from all ICE program offices. In FY 2014, ICE OPR investigated nearly 1,200 criminal and administrative misconduct cases, resulting in the arrest of six DHS employees (three ICE employees and three CBP employees). Additionally, ICE OPR arrested 2 ICE contractors and 20 U.S. civilians. Nearly 200 of all investigations were alleged acts of corruption, involving ICE, CBP, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) employees and contractors. Such alleged corruption included bribery and the smuggling of drugs, aliens, and other contraband.

ICE OPR partners with OIG, CBP, FBI, U.S. Attorneys’ offices, and other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to prevent, detect, and prosecute alleged corruption by DHS employees. During FY 2014, OPR worked jointly with other agencies as follows: DHS OIG – 79 cases; CBP – 220 cases; FBI/BCTFs – 16 cases; and Drug Enforcement Administration – 2 cases. These numbers exclude OPR’s assistance provided to these agencies for law enforcement services, including technical operations, intelligence products, computer forensics, or other investigative support.

OPR recently led a DHS internal investigation with CBP IA, HSI, USCIS Office of Security and Integrity, and local law enforcement that revealed a vast and elaborate public corruption scheme involving several DHS agencies including HSI, USCIS, and CBP. In addition to current DHS employees, the investigation revealed the involvement of civilians, former USCIS and CBP employees, and an immigration attorney, all of whom were co-conspirators in a decade-long bribery and immigration fraud scheme. The DHS employees supplied unwarranted benefits to aliens from countries of special interest, entered false information into federal computer databases, and altered documents and other contents of alien registration files. This highly sensitive public corruption investigation resulted in the successful prosecution of seven individuals, including five current or former DHS employees. Additionally, the investigation revealed vulnerabilities to our national security, and allowed USCIS and HSI to identify several hundred individuals who have gained fraudulent immigration status. These individuals are under review for potential removal proceedings.

In summary, ICE OPR’s investigative strategy is a multilayered approach, utilizing the full capabilities of its three operational divisions (Investigations, Inspections, and
C. U.S. Customs and Border Protection

With nearly 60,000 employees, CBP is the largest federal law enforcement organization in the United States, with a priority mission of keeping terrorists and their weapons out of the country. CBP also has responsibility for securing approximately 7,000 miles of land borders and 95,000 miles of coastline while simultaneously facilitating lawful international trade and travel. On a typical day, CBP processes nearly 1 million travelers, screens more than 67,000 cargo containers, arrests more than 1,100 individuals, and seizes nearly 6 tons of illicit drugs. CBP enforces hundreds of U.S. laws and regulations, including customs, immigration, trade, and drug statutes.

The Nation has placed its trust in the men and women of CBP to carry out their duties with professionalism, honor, and, above all, integrity. Corruption, or the abuse of public office for personal gain, destroys the public’s trust and confidence in CBP. Corrupt acts of commission or omission on the part of a single employee harm the entire organization and can undermine CBP’s efforts to carry out its mission successfully; therefore, ensuring employees conduct themselves with integrity and professionalism is among CBP’s highest priorities. Furthermore, an employee’s obligation to act with integrity, honor, and professionalism does not end when his or her work shift is over, but continues off duty as well.

The overwhelming majority of CBP employees serve with distinction, honor, and integrity; however, a small number of employees are known to have betrayed the public trust and violated their oath of office. From October 1, 2004, through September 30, 2014, 168 current or former CBP employees were arrested, indicted, or otherwise prosecuted on corruption charges.

In a number of instances, corruption was the result of inducements or coercion by transnational criminal organizations (TCO) via monetary bribes, nontraditional forms of corruption, and blackmail. The deployment of advanced technology, physical infrastructure, and additional manpower along the border has made it more difficult now than ever before for TCOs to conduct and promote their illegal activities. The expanding size, scope, complexity, and influence of TCOs is a direct contributing factor to corruption in CBP since TCOs have determined that infiltrating or undermining the stability of the CBP workforce is a worthwhile endeavor to further their criminal enterprise.

In FY 2014, to promote public trust and confidence further, the Commissioner issued CBP’s Integrity and Personal Accountability Strategy, outlining a unified and comprehensive approach for preventing, detecting, investigating, and responding to
threats to the integrity of the CBP workforce. The strategy establishes a unified and multilayered approach organized around four integrity-related mission areas: prevention, detection, investigation, and response to corruption and associated misconduct. Capitalizing on the synergies and varied capabilities of its component offices, the Integrity Strategy enhances CBP’s collective ability to address corruption in the workforce.

**Prevention and Detection**

CBP’s commitment to integrity begins with the quality of the employees hired. CBP IA performs initial screening of applicants, pre-employment polygraph examinations of all law enforcement candidates, and an exhaustive background investigation commencing upon the initial selection of a prospective employee. Law enforcement officers occupy Critical Sensitive positions that require the Single Scope Background Investigation, the highest level background investigation. Conducted prior to employment, the Single Scope Background Investigation covers a 10-year period and includes checks of citizenship, residence, education, employment, character references, local law enforcement, credit/financial history, court records, military service, and a National Agency Check for the applicant, the spouse or cohabitant(s), and foreign-born relatives/associates.

Federally certified CBP IA polygraph examiners administer the standardized Law Enforcement Pre-Employment Test to screen applicants for law enforcement positions. The pre-employment test addresses both suitability and national security issues, including involvement in serious crimes, distribution or use of illegal drugs, falsifications or omissions on employment application forms, involvement in terrorism or espionage activities, unauthorized disclosure of classified information, and unreported foreign contacts. Each tool is capable of identifying vulnerabilities the others cannot and, in combination, allow for thorough vetting of the men and women seeking employment with CBP. Periodic reinvestigations are conducted every 5 years throughout an employee’s career and serve to identify any emerging integrity and conduct issues that have the potential to compromise CBP’s mission.

In addition to rigorous screening, enhancing employee awareness is a critical underpinning to preventing corruption and strengthening the CBP culture of integrity. Awareness is increased by training and communication programs that ingrain and reinforce the standards of conduct all employees are expected to maintain. Integrity, counter-corruption and counterintelligence awareness messaging communicated to the workforce through new employee orientation programs, training modules delivered at CBP’s Basic Training Academies, employee musters, and mandatory computer-based training are all used to help employees identify suspicious behavior or potentially corrupt activity and reinforce their responsibility to report such matters immediately. For example, as a result of counterintelligence awareness training, CBP employees now
recognize that they are being targeted by TCOs particularly while off duty but also during the course of their work day. These seemingly innocuous interactions are bona fide attempts to establish relationships and ultimately recruit the employees to work with the TCOs.

In addition to vigorous efforts to prevent corruption, CBP actively seeks to detect instances of corruption to neutralize and remove integrity-related threats from the workforce. CBP takes an intelligence-driven approach that applies behavioral science and analytical research methods to identify potential indicators of workforce corruption. In concert with IA, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) and the Office of Border Patrol have taken significant steps, utilizing their resources to identify operational data anomalies. Under the leadership of OFO’s Analytical Management Systems Control Office, CBP officers and Border Patrol agents use automated systems to analyze crossing, referral, and results data to identify anomalies that may be indicative of integrity issues.

This analysis is critically important as CBP continues to implement new systems to process travelers and cargo electronically in a more efficient and effective manner. In addition, CBP IA uses behavioral science and analytical techniques to identify corruption and insider threat on the basis of data gathered from background investigations, polygraph examinations, known cases of corruption, and other sources. These tools support a proactive, intelligence-driven methodology for detecting potential corruption.

**Investigations and Response**

In September 2014, Secretary Johnson delegated to CBP the authority to conduct internal affairs investigations of alleged criminal misconduct by CBP employees and convert eligible IA agents to the GS-1811 series so that they may conduct such investigations. Allegations of criminal misconduct on the part of CBP employees declined for investigation by OIG are now assigned directly to CBP IA for action.

In accordance with the Secretary’s decision, CBP converted 188 eligible General Schedule (GS)-1801 IA investigative program specialists to GS-1811 criminal investigators. In addition, CBP IA is currently in the final stages of filling 29 additional 1811 positions to supplement staffing levels in critical locations, including several IA field offices along the Southwest Border. With the newly delegated investigative authority and increased 1811 staffing, CBP IA is well-positioned to respond to allegations of corruption on a timely basis using a wide array of investigative tools, including fully equipped computer and digital electronic forensics programs. The delegation creates a more efficient process for investigating corruption allegations within CBP. CBP leadership is in a better position to establish investigative priorities while managing the inherent risk associated with leaving potentially corrupt officers or agents in frontline positions as prosecutors and investigators attempt to build stronger cases.
CBP also recognizes that collaboration and information sharing are critical factors in maintaining border integrity and investigating allegations of criminal misconduct. CBP IA, DHS OIG, ICE OPR, and the FBI often work together to address cases of suspected border corruption. CBP has an active presence in 22 FBI-led BCTFs organized throughout the United States. This layered approach and collaboration among federal agencies is critical to combating the threat of border corruption, allowing for an effective and timely investigative response. CBP will continue to participate in task force operations that promote multijurisdictional, multi-agency investigations leveraging the resources of all members.

Responding to confirmed cases of corruption through appropriate judicial and disciplinary action is intended to neutralize or remove the individual threat to CBP’s culture of integrity. Equally as important, CBP intends to eliminate vulnerabilities that create opportunities for corruption or exploitation through post-corruption analysis reports produced by CBP offices in conjunction with IA. These reports help CBP to better identify corruption risks and to better tailor existing procedures. These reports detail how employees were able to exploit current procedures or protocols and contain recommendations for preventing further corruption.

CBP employees are bestowed significant power and authority in the performance of their duties. With that power and authority comes a high degree of accountability. CBP continues to take aggressive measures to prevent, detect, investigate, and respond to workforce corruption.
III. Conclusion

ICE and CBP are two of the largest federal law enforcement agencies in the United States and operate in environments where our Nation’s adversaries actively attempt to compromise them. Although the overwhelming majority of ICE and CBP employees display the highest levels of integrity and perform their duties with honor every day, acts of employee corruption do occur. Our citizens bestow great trust upon their law enforcement organizations and deserve accountability from their public servants. When acts of corruption are suspected or discovered, DHS takes immediate action to ensure that departmental employees and contractors uphold the public trust and conduct their respective missions with integrity and professionalism. OIG, ICE, and CBP are aware of our collective responsibility and take aggressive measures to detect, deter, and investigate workforce corruption. We seek every opportunity to refine and improve the joint investigations and cooperation between our agencies and will continue to do so.
Appendices

Appendix A. Abbreviations/Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation/Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCTF</td>
<td>Border Corruption Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBP</td>
<td>U.S. Customs and Border Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>General Schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Office of Internal Affairs (CBP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICE</td>
<td>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Intake Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFO</td>
<td>Office of Field Operations (CBP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIG</td>
<td>Office of Inspector General (DHS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPR</td>
<td>Office of Professional Responsibility (ICE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCO</td>
<td>Transnational Criminal Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFRB</td>
<td>Use of Force Review Board</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B. Budget and Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 2015</th>
<th>OIG</th>
<th>ICE OPR</th>
<th>CBP IA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agents</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locations</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget¹</td>
<td>$ 47.9M</td>
<td>$ 79.2M</td>
<td>$ 36.7M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cases</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>1,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS Employee Arrests²</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Arrests³</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity Briefings</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHS Employees Briefed</td>
<td>4,387</td>
<td>2,471</td>
<td>5,425</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Includes personnel, operational, and support expenses.
² Includes joint arrests.
³ Reflects CBP IA’s participation in FBI BCTFs and Peruvian Counterfeit Task Forces.