

Page 1 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 2 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 3 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act



MPAC-WNY NEWSLETTER

Vol. VIII No. 38, Muharram 1433; December 2011

WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCES INTERNSHIP AND FELLOWSHIP OPPORTUNITIES FOR 2012

White House Internship Program:

This hands-on program is designed to mentor and cultivate today's young leaders, strengthen their understanding of the Executive Office and prepare them for future public service opportunities. Interns are placed in various offices throughout the White House, and are given varying tasks, such as conducting research, managing incoming inquiries, attending meetings, and writing memos.

Application Due Date:	January 22, 2012 (for summer 2012 Term: 5/29/12 - 8/10/12)
Eligible Applicants:	Undergraduate/Graduate Students, Recent Graduates, Veterans
Compensation:	College credit, unpaid
Application Materials:	Two Essays, Current Resume, Two Letters of Recommendation
Website/Contact:	http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/internships

IN THIS ISSUE:

<i>Announcement</i>	<i>1-2</i>
<i>President's message</i>	<i>2-5</i>
<i>Important Dates</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Reviews of events</i>	<i>7-14</i>
<i>Homeland Security and MPAC-WNY</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>Annual Meeting</i>	<i>15</i>
<i>Job Opportunities</i>	<i>16-17</i>
<i>Sponsors</i>	<i>18-19</i>



White House Initiative on Asian American and Pacific Islanders:

The WHIAAPI Internship Program offers students the opportunity to work on a wide range of Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) issues, including education, health, sustainable neighborhoods, economic development, civil rights, and labor and employment. In addition to assisting with research on those topics, interns will help write policy memos and proposals, coordinate events, and conduct outreach to national and local AAPI organizations, elected officials, and ethnic media outlets.

Application Due Date:	March 15, 2012 (for summer 2012 Term: 6/12 - 8/12) May 15, 2012 (for fall 2012 term: 8/12 - 12/12)
Eligible Applicants:	Undergraduate/Graduate Students
Compensation:	College credit, unpaid

Application Materials: Statement that describes (1) one issue that affects the AAPI community, (2) a strategy that you would implement at the Initiative to address it, and (3) the organizations and/or federal agencies with whom you would collaborate.

Website/Contact: www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/aapi/internshipswhitehouseaapi@ed.gov

Presidential Management Fellowship:

The Presidential Management Fellowship (PMF) Program is a flagship leadership development program for advanced degree candidates interested in federal government work. The Program attracts and selects the best candidates through a rigorous application and selection process – all with the intention of developing a cadre of potential government leaders.

Application Due Date: PMF Class of 2012 application closed. Class of 2013 applications due in fall 2012

Eligible Applicants: Final Year Graduate Students

Compensation: Salary, benefits, leadership development training

Application Materials: Refer to the [Presidential Management Fellowship website](#) for more information

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

Dear Members and Supporters of MPAC-WNY:

Asalam-U-Alaikum (Peace be with you) and Season's Greetings:

Once again, wish you all a very heartfelt Eid-Mubarak. Hope you had a joyous Eid and were able to spend time with your family. Also wish you a very happy holiday season and a healthy new year. I would like to congratulate all those who recently returned from the Holy Pilgrimage of Hajj. May Allah accept your prayers and sacrifices (Ameen). The first of Muharram that heralds the start of the New Year (1433) in Islamic calendar fell on November 26, 2011 and the tenth of Muharram (Ashura) was observed on December 5, 2011.

As we look forward to 2012, I would like to emphasize the unique role MPAC-WNY plays as ***The Interface*** for our community with a large number of agencies, including those in the field of business, education, government, interfaith and media (online, print, radio and television). MPAC-WNY is uniquely qualified to play this role and does so with care, compassion and commitment that is second to none. No other Muslim organization has the expertise to deal with the issues of homeland security, civil rights, civic engagement and other relates issues of the community as does MPAC. The work that we do is a direct reflection of your board and volunteers, who dedicate their time and resources into making MPAC-WNY an effective organization. Our commitment as a ***full partner in the growth and prosperity*** of our community and our region is unwavering.

Over the last several weeks, I participated in ***three different briefings with the White House Office of Public Engagement***. These briefings dealt with diverse issues of internships, jobs,



homeland security and civil liberties. President Obama has introduced Initiative on Asian American and Pacific Islanders (AAPI) that facilitates work with federal agencies to create a roadmap of services and protections to improve the health, education and economic status of AAPIs across the country. The following is a very brief summary of these discussions:

- **White House Initiative on Asian American and Pacific islanders, Internship Program (WHIAAPI):** The WHIAAPI Internship Program offers students the opportunity to work on a wide range of AAPI issues, including education, health, economic development, civil rights, and labor and employment.
- **White House Internship Program:** This hands-on program is designed to cultivate young leaders, strengthen their understanding of the Executive Office and prepare them for future public service. Interns are placed in various offices in the White House and given tasks, such as conducting research, attending meetings and writing memos.
- **Presidential Management Fellowship (PMF):** The Presidential Management Fellowship Program is a flagship leadership development program for advanced degree candidates interested in federal government work. The Program attracts and selects the best candidates through a rigorous application and selection process – with the intention of developing a cadre of potential government leaders.

Further information with deadlines and website(s) for the application process for all of these programs is detailed on page 1-2. For general *students and recent graduates educational employment opportunities* with the federal government, be sure to visit:

<http://www.usajobs.gov/studentjobs>. Additional job and internship *opportunities in all the federal agencies and departments* are listed separately on page 16 and 17. Hope you can make use of this important information assembled for you at one place.

On December 8, 2011, I attended An “Open Dialogue Conference Call” on the “Release of President Obama’s Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) to the National Strategy on Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States”: The SIP is the blueprint for how the US Government will implement the Domestic Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), the first such strategy to address violent extremism in the US. The SIP lists the current and future actions the U.S. Government will take in support of a locally-focused, community-based approach, in three broad areas:

- Enhancing engagement with and support to local communities;
- Building government and law enforcement expertise; and,
- Countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.

This SIP is a follow up to the National Strategy on Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, released by the White House in August 2011.

Apart from these important White House Briefings, MPAC-WNY organized and sponsored a number of important events and programs in our region. Some of these include:

- *Tenth Anniversary of September 11, 2001 (See Pages 7-9);*
- *Full Page Advertisement in The Buffalo News (See Page 10);*
- *Sixth Annual "Tent of Abraham" Event ; (See Page 11)*
- *Public Forum for Somali Prime Minister Dr Abdewali Ali (See Page 12);*
- *Community Outreach Program with Dept. of Homeland Security (See Page 13);*
- *Mega Health Fair with Independent Health Foundation (See Page 14);*

A delegation from MPAC-WNY (comprised of Amanda Ahmed, Sadeq Ahmed, Zaid Islam and yours truly) attended the MPAC's 11th Annual Convention in Los Angeles, CA. "Spring Forward: America's Role in A Changing World," was a big success with more than 1,000 people in attendance. The audience enjoyed a lively day of candid dialogue about the impact of the Arab Spring, Islamophobia and the emergence of Islamic movements abroad that featured a dozen.



MPAC-WNY delegation in Los Angeles. Left to right: Ambassador to the US from South Africa Hon'ble Ebrahim Rasool, Sadeq Ahmed, Zaid Islam, Amanda Ahmed and Khalid J. Qazi.

prominent speakers, including government officials, interfaith leaders, civil rights advocates, Islamic scholars and media professionals. A sold-out banquet followed the convention where Dr. Cornel West, *New York Times* bestselling author and progressive cultural icon, and South African Ambassador Ebrahim Rasool, a prominent leader in the anti-apartheid movement, delivered keynote addresses stressing the importance of collaboration across cultural, religious and ethnic divides to achieve peace and understanding. The ambassador also had an informal session with the MPAC-WNY delegation for over an hour after the banquet relating his amazing journey in South Africa, from apartheid to freedom and now to ambassadorship.

The 2011 MPAC-WNY Annual Meeting is fast approaching on Saturday, ***January 21, 2012*** at the Muslim Community Center (Islamic Center). Please see page 15 for details. This year ***elections to the Executive Board*** for 2-year term are also to be conducted at the meeting. The meeting will be highly informational and rewarding. It is open to all the residents of WNY free of charge. Please make sure to attend this important event with your family and friends.

You need to know that ***MPAC and MPAC-WNY has devoted unprecedented resources*** to address the issues of Islamophobia, national security and civil rights and civic engagement. Since the calendar year is coming to a close, let me ask you to make a ***contribution to MPAC Foundation (fully tax-deductible*** under the federal laws). Please note that the work of MPAC is eligible for Zakah as well. Your contributions are critical for MPAC-WNY to continue its crucial work on your behalf and on behalf of the community at large. As you may know MPAC does not accept any foreign funds and totally depends on contributions from within the US. Please use the ***self-addressed envelope attached*** for your membership renewal and donations.

Finally, a plea for your continued ***active participation in developing MPAC-WNY programs*** so that such programs reflect your true desires and aspirations.

Thank you so much for your support and dedication. With my best wishes to you and your family for a very happy, healthy and prosperous new year.

Khalid J. Qazi ,
President

Mark Your Calendar Now

Important Islamic Dates Hijra (1433-1436)

	New Year	Ashura	Mawlid	Ramadan 1	al-Fitr	al-Adha
1433	11/26/11	12/05/11	02/04/12	07/20/12	08/19/12	10/25/12
1434	11/15/12	11/24/12	01/24/13	07/09/13	08/08/13	10/15/13
1435	11/04/13	11/13/13	01/13/14	06/28/14	07/28/14	10/04/14
1436	10/25/14	11/03/14	01/03/15	06/17/15	07/17/15	09/23/15

Dear Community Members,

As Salaam Alikum. I hope this newsletter finds everyone well. I'm writing to you in this newsletter to talk about some great things MPAC-WNY is doing today and what we are planning for the future.

This month, I was fortunate to attend the MPAC National convention with fellow board members Sadeq Ahmed, Zaid Islam and Khalid Qazi. The focus of the conference was on the US role in the Arab Spring. There were many topics addressed in panel discussions and workshops, including islamaphobia and viewpoints in different movements in Islam. We heard from fellow Muslims in Egypt, Syria, Iran, and across the Subcontinent. Our small delegation was also granted a rare opportunity to sit and talk with Ambassador Ebrahim Rasool from South Africa. He spoke to us directly about the challenges of building a nation, working with Nelson Mandela and the importance of being active in civic work to make a difference. It was very inspiring and uplifting. It was also great to see the people committed to making a difference in MPAC national, including the board members and staff. The organization overall has grown, as we have locally, alhumdulillah. MPAC National and our WNY Chapter have shown the resilience to adapt, not only to what the community's immediate needs are, but to be proactive on many fronts. In fact, in many cases, we have been the leading example for MPAC National and for other Muslim organizations across the country.

As the new year begins, it's good to review what we have accomplished and also make a "wish list" of things we'd like to do in the year to come. For us, the wish list includes the continuation of the outreach programs for Muslims across WNY, the proactive work that we do in the interfaith community and the development of programs dedicated to issues with local and federal government. The biggest item I'd like to add to this wish list would be for the resources to turn our *entirely* volunteer-run chapter into a chapter with a professional staff dedicated only to working for you. This would allow us to extend our reach and sustain MPAC-WNY for the future. Donations to the MPAC Foundation are tax deductible and zakat eligible as well as a good idea for year-end contributions. Please help us reach our goals this year. You will be amazed at the returns you will get on your investment, as it is an investment in your community.

Finally, plan to attend this year's annual meeting which will be held on January 21, 2012, at the muslim community center on Heim Road. It will give you an idea of the programs we are planning for 2012 and you will also hear inspiring discussions from the speakers. You may also bring your donation to this meeting and give it to a board member.

Thank you for all of your continued support to MPAC-WNY.

Amanda J. Ahmed
Board Member, Director of Communications

PROGRAM REVIEWS

OBSERVING TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF 9/11



Speakers, Sponsors and members of the MPAC-WNY Board members at the 9/11 Event

On 9/11/11, **MPAC-WNY** organized and hosted the tenth anniversary of 9/11 at the Jaffarya Center in Amherst for all sections of the WNY community to come together to remember, reflect and pay tribute to those who gave the ultimate sacrifice that fateful day and to recognize first responders of our region. The event started with the ***Color Guard*** from the Police Dept. of the Town of Amherst (TOA) followed by the ***Pledge of Allegiance*** to the Flag of the United States. A wide cross section of community members packed the hall. Those in attendance who made formal comments included **Rep. Brian Higgins**, **Rep. Kathy Hochul**, TOA Supervisor **Dr. Barry Weinstein**, US Attorney **William Hochul**, TOA Police **Chief John Askey**, TOA Emergency Services **Coordinator James Zymanek**, Imam **Muslim Mehdi Chawla** and **Khalid J. Qazi**. Names of **all the 26 local victims** who perished that day were individually recognized by name. A large number of elected and government officials, interfaith and civic leadership, media representatives as well as members and supporters of MPAC-WNY attended the event.

A **32 page booklet** entitled ***“Remembering 9/11”***, published and released by MPAC-WNY on the occasion for general distribution, included the names of all the local victims with short description along with **thoughtful reflections** of many government representatives as well as reflections from **Muslim organizations** of Western New York. The event was very well covered by radio, print and electronic media and received **excellent reviews** from the cross section of the community. Some of the comments are reproduced below.

COMMENTS BY COMMUNITY MEMBERS

We received a number of **comments from community members** regarding the 9/11 observance organized and hosted by MPAC-WNY on 9/11/11. A **representative sample** of these comments is reproduced here:

"....Thank you very much for conveying our feelings and condolences to the victims' friends and families of September 11....."

"...My wife, our daughter and I were deeply moved by the Remembering 9/11 program you developed...In honoring the victims of 9/11 as you did, you also honored yourself...."

"....An absolutely marvelous event this evening. Congratulations..."


"...A (sense of) real pride for all of us there. I'm sure the community leaders left the venue touched and moved..."

"...Thank you for leading this important occasion. I felt uplifted and inspired. It was certainly a special moment....."

"....The program was very nice. Brother, thank you very much for the best effort...to help the Muslim Ummah..."

"...Thank you very much for the recognition of our emergency responders. It is truly appreciated....."

Cover page from MPAC-WNY booklet commemorating 9/11



KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND
NEW YORK



UNITED STATES SENATOR

September 11, 2011

Dear Friends,

I am pleased to have the opportunity to send greetings to each of you attending 10th Anniversary of September 11, 2011 hosted by the Muslim Public Affairs Council of Western New York.

I commend you for honoring our fallen heroes. The role that they played on 9/11 illustrates the kind of people we have in America: brave, compassionate and committed to both our nation and the state of New York. Their service, dedication and sacrifice for our country and the freedom for which it stands will serve as a beacon of light and hope for all who look to this great nation for leadership and strength in these extraordinarily challenging times.

I send my best wishes for a successful event.

Sincerely,

Kirsten E. Gillibrand

Kirsten E. Gillibrand
United States Senator

BUFFALO NEWS AD. PUBLISHED ON 9/11/11

For our generation, September 11, 2001 will forever remain in infamy. On that day, a depraved band of zealots committed the most atrocious crime of murdering nearly 3000 innocent Americans.

As patriotic Americans, our condemnation of these heinous crimes has remained unequivocal. We stand united with our fellow citizens to defeat the scourge of terrorism comprehensively and without any reservation.


Ten years on, we reflect on the innocent victims: Fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, husbands and wives who lost their lives on that fateful day. Our hearts and minds are with their families and we hope and pray that they will find some solace in the fact that the entire country stands firmly united with them on this anniversary.

We salute the brave men and women in uniformed services and the first responders who made the ultimate sacrifice and, day in and day out, perform acts of heroism to keep us safe and maintain America as the beacon of light and hope for the entire world.

Through generations, America has been enriched by its diversity. Today, Muslims are making positive contributions in every sphere of American life, be it armed forces, first responders, civil services, medicine, engineering and law, education, labor, business or other professions. Let's use this anniversary to realize the full potential of American Muslims to strengthen the leadership role of this great nation in the world and keep the dream of E Pluribus Unum (out of many, one) alive.

Muslim Public Affairs Council of Western New York, since its inception in 2004, has been and will continue to be fully committed in moving forward through education, civic engagement and outreach programs for our community. In that effort we look forward to and welcome any assistance and partnership of our fellow citizens with pride and enthusiasm.

May God bless the United States of America.



Khalid J. Qazi, MD
President, MPAC-WNY

*On behalf of MPAC Board Members
and Muslims of WNY*

MUSLIM PUBLIC AFFAIRS COUNCIL
OF WESTERN NEW YORK
6343 Transit Road, Depew, NY 14043
Ph: (716) 683-1840 Fax: (716) 683-1843
www.mpac.org



SIXTH ANNUAL “TENT OF ABRAHAM” PROGRAM

MPAC-WNY held the *sixth annual “The Tent of Abraham”* event during the month of fasting (Ramadan) on Thursday, August 18th. This event has been held every year since 2006 to share the spirit of the month of Ramadan. MPAC-WNY collects non-perishable food items and cash donations for distribution to the needy through the *Food Pantry of WNY and Viva La Casa*.

The event started with a 5 mile walk (from *North Presbyterian Church in Williamsville*) to 4 mile walk (from the *Temple Beth Am*) and continued with one mile walk (from Heim Middle School). The walkers entered the *Islamic Center* to an applause from a large number of community members of all denominations and faith traditions who had already assembled at the Islamic center. The “*Abrahamic Walk*” was added to the “Tent” in 2009.

A traditional fast breaking with “Dates” was followed by sharing dinner together. As has been the tradition on this occasion, *MPAC-WNY collected non-perishable food* during the month of Ramadan and *matched cash donations* received for this purpose. The food and the cash donations were equally donated to Food Pantry of WNY and Viva La Casa.

MPAC-WNY is proud to organize and sponsor this yearly event. We want to thank the *Islamic Society of Niagara Frontier, Network of Religious Communities, North Presbyterian Church (Williamsville), Temple Beth Am and Westminster Presbyterian Church for co-sponsoring the event with MPAC-WNY.*



WELCOMING SOMALIA'S PRIME MINISTER



Prime Minister of Somalia, Dr. Abdewali Ali (on the left) greeted by Dr. Khalid Qazi, President of MPAC-WNY



First Lady of Somalia, Professor Hodan Isse, (University at Buffalo)

MPAC-WNY, with the cooperation of HEAL International, sponsored an ***“Open Forum with the Prime Minister of Somalia”*** at The Center for the Arts, UB Amherst (North) Campus on September 18, 2011. The event was attended by the faculty from UB and Niagara University and community members of all stripes. In his remarks, the ***Prime Minister, Dr Abdewali Ali*** mentioned about number of challenges Somalia faces today. Severe hunger and illiteracy, unemployment and crimes, rampant corruption, lawlessness and parallel government set by terrorist outfits of Al-Quida and al-Shabaab. As daunting as these issues are, he was confident that the struggle for the soul of Somalia can be won with hard work, honesty, dedication and passion. However, he reiterated the message he has been giving to the US leadership that Somalia will need significant international assistance to turn the country around.

Dr. Ali was accompanied by his children and wife, ***Prof. Hodan Isse***, who is on faculty at UB and an active member of the WNY community.

COMMUNITY OUTREACH PROGRAM WITH DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY



With assistance of the US Attorney for the Western District of New York, **Mr. William Hochul**, and the Field Operations Director for the Customs and Border Protection, **Mr. Jim Engleman**, MPAC-WNY hosted a major **community outreach program** at the Yemenite Benevolent Association Hall located at 109 Ridge Rd., Lackawanna on Saturday, *September 17, 2011*. The Customs and Border Protection Field Operations, Border Patrol, and Air and Marine were present to educate our community about Customs and Border issues such as what identification is acceptable at the border and what questions agents ask. In addition to CBP, Pass Port Issuing officials, department of agriculture officials and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies also attended. All the agencies had employment pamphlets and videos available explaining different types of jobs.

The federal agencies each had informational table for youth to visit and learn about the different duties and missions of these government agencies. There was also a table from the US immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) which had programs including cyber crimes, commercial merchandise violations, human trafficking, and counter-terrorism to help give attendees an understanding of the different agencies functions. ICE was also looking for qualified people with an interest in law enforcement. Several demonstrations using canine experts were given to the surprise and excitement of the audience.

The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) had a staff member present to answer immigration questions. The Buffalo Passport Agency was also there to give information about where to get a passport and what is required to get one. Lastly, the USDA (United States Food and Department on Agriculture) and APHIS (Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service) also gave information about what foods can be across borders and what agricultural products are prohibited. We are ***grateful to all the federal and state officials*** who joined the outreach program. It is truly appreciated.

MEGA-HEALTH FAIR

MPAC-WNY hosted a health fair with Independent Health **Foundation** on Saturday Sept. 24th in the Yemenite Benevolent Hall in Lackawanna, NY. This mega health fair was first of its kind for

our community with *physicians, dentists, chiropractors, pharmacists, nurses, nutritionists* and other health-related personnel on site, available to all community members to render their services. Laboratory services including blood tests for *diabetes, high cholesterol* etc. were performed on site and results reviewed with those who underwent the test.

Fruit and vegetable baskets were given to the first 300 people. Free items such as tooth brushes, tooth paste, dental floss, mirrors, masks, gloves, screening forms and many other items were also handed out. Healthy food including a delicious tofu salad, couscous, bottled water, and yogurt was provided to the participants. Independent Health Foundation had also provided T-shirt giveaways, raffle drawings, fun basketball games, arts and crafts for the kids and much much more. We are *grateful to the leadership of Independent Health Foundation* for working with MPAC-WNY to bring the much needed health fair to the community



House Committee on Homeland Security and MPAC-WNY

For the first time the two congressional representatives from WNY, *Rep. Brian Higgins and Rep Kathy Hochul, are members of the Homeland Security Committee*. This is very important especially for MPAC-WNY. As you may recall *Rep. Peter King* from Long Island, Chairman of the House Committee on Homeland Security, has made headlines over the last several years (especially since taking the current leadership position) for *accusing American Muslims* and Mosques of being security threat and making rounds of the media with baseless allegations. In a more recent hearing Congressman Peter King and Senator Joseph Lieberman, chairman of the

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held a joint hearing insinuating, yet again, that Muslim Americans are somehow a problem to be examined, specifically within the military community. Presiding over theatricals rather than productive hearings, ***Rep. King's intention for the hearing was to discredit American Muslims***, in general, and those serving in the military community, in particular.

Rep. Higgins called MPAC-WNY early this year to receive input on the critical role MPAC-WNY, in particular, is playing for the security of our homeland. Since then MPAC-WNY has appraised both Rep. Higgins and Rep. Hochul regarding the ongoing programs like BRIDGES, CREST and other outreach programs. Both of our elected representatives have shown keen interest and knowledge of the security issues we face and acknowledged the positive role MPAC is playing in securing our homeland. They totally agree that ***Muslims must be part of the solution*** as has been the position of MPAC all along. We will continue to engage our elected representatives in a constructive dialogue that will be meaningful to the proceedings of the Homeland Security Committee. In the final analysis we all want to make sure that our homeland is safe while insuring civil liberties for all Americans.

I would like to ***thank both Rep. Higgins and Rep. Hochul*** for allowing us to keep them fully informed about the contributions of MPAC for our homeland security and civil rights.

By Khalid J. Qazi, President, MPAC-WNY

***JOIN US FOR THE
MPAC-WNY 2011 Annual Meeting***

***Saturday January 21, 2012 at 5:30 PM;
Islamic Center, 745 Heim Road, Amherst, NY 14068***

***Special Town Hall Meeting on:
"Arab Spring: Implications for the Region & United States"***

Dr. Manar Sabry: Post-Mubarak Egypt

Dr. Mazin Tinawi: Syrian First Coalition

Discussion Facilitated By: Haris Tarin, Director, MPAC, DC Office

Program includes annual reports and election for the Ex. Br.

Admission free to all.....Finger food will be provided

FEDERAL INTERNSHIP AND JOB OPPORTUNITIES

A COMPLETE LISTING

This list contains internship information for the individual agencies that comprise the White House Initiative on AAPI's Interagency Working Group and/or President Obama's Cabinet.

- Visit: http://www.dol.gov/_sec/media/internprogram.htm
- For more information, also email wilkerson.vance@dol.gov.

Department of State

- Visit: <http://careers.state.gov/students>

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

- Visit: <http://www.consumerfinance.gov/>

Corporation for National and Community Service

- Visit: <http://www.nationalservice.gov/about/employment/index.asp>

Department of Agriculture

- Visit:
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/usdahome?navid=INTERN_SCHOLAR&parentnav=USDAEMP_SERVICES&navtype=RT

Department of Commerce

- Visit: <http://hr.commerce.gov/Careers/StudentCareerOpportunities/index.htm>

Department of Defense

- Visit:
<http://www.whs.mil/HRD/Apply/SpecialEmployment/StudentEmploymentPrograms/Index.cfm>

Department of Education

- Visit: <http://www2.ed.gov/students/prep/job/intern/index.html>

Department of Energy

- Visit: <http://jobs.energy.gov/entry-level-students>

Department of Health and Human Services

- Visit: <http://www.hhs.gov/careers/student/index.html>

Department of Homeland Security

- Visit: http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/careers/gc_1286805780388.shtm

Department of Housing and Urban Development

- Visit: http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/careers/gc_1286805780388.shtm

Department of the Interior

- Visit: <http://www.doiu.nbc.gov/intern.html>

Department of Justice

- Visit: <http://www.justice.gov/careers/student-opportunities.html>

Department of Transportation

- Visit: <http://careers.dot.gov/stuopp.html>

Department of the Treasury

- Visit: <http://www.treasury.gov/careers/hq-careers/Pages/Summer-Internship-Programs.aspx>

Department of Veterans Affairs

- Visit: <http://www.va.gov/jobs/>

Environmental Protection Agency

- Visit: <http://www.epa.gov/careers/stuopp.html>

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

- Visit: <http://eeoc.gov/eeoc/jobs/internships.cfm>

Federal Communications Commission

- Visit: <http://transition.fcc.gov/internships/>

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

- Visit: <http://www.nasajobs.nasa.gov/studentopps/employment/default.htm>

Office of Management and Budget

- http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/recruitment_default

Social Security Administration

- Visit: <http://www.ssa.gov/careers/student1.htm>

United States Trade Representative

- Visit: <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/human-resources/employment/student-internship-program>

“Eleventh Annual Understanding Islam Series”

A Joint Program by MPAC & Westminster Presbyterian Church

724 Delaware Ave. Buffalo, NY

Feb. 5, 12 and 26, 2012 at 9:30-10: 45 AM

Open to public....Free of charge



Solutions for Life Sciences

United Biochemicals is a primary manufacturer and distributor of biochemicals, reagents and solutions for the biotechnology industry.

We have three business segments:

- » Biological buffer and amino acid derivatives
- » Sterile buffer and filtered cell culture solutions
- » Penicillin-containing solutions

Our penicillin solutions business is housed in a segregated facility. All products are all offered on an OEM basis. We work closely with our customers to provide value added services that allow them to compete in an ever changing marketplace.

United Biochemicals
6351 Indecon Drive East
Sanborn, NY 14132

Telephone: (716) 731-5161
Toll-Free: (800) 726-9194
Fax: (716) 731-5163

www.unitedbiochemicals.com



Universal Fine Chemicals, Inc. serves the biotechnology, cosmetic and pharmaceutical industries, as well as R&D institutions. Our focus is on the production, distribution and processing of chemicals and biochemicals.

Telephone: (716) 731-5161
Toll-Free: (800) 726-9194
Fax: (716) 731-5163

www.ufchemicals.com

Nationally Recognized for Excellence in Brain & Spine Care

WWW.UBNS.COM



L.N. (Nick) Hopkins, MD
 Kevin J. Gibbons, MD
 Elad I. Levy, MD FACS FAHA
 James L. Budny, MD
 Adnan Siddiqui, MD PhD
 Walter Grand, MD
 Eric P. Roger, MD
 Jody Leonardo, MD
 Kimberly Trinidad, MD
 Robert J. Plunkett, MD
 Veetali Li, MD
 Jonathan P. Beck, DC



Adnan H. Siddiqui, MD PhD

*Assistant Professor of Neurosurgery
 Assistant Professor of Radiology*

Dr. Siddiqui has special interest and expertise in microsurgical, radiosurgical, and endovascular techniques for a wide range of cerebrovascular disease that includes aneurysms, arteriovenous malformations (AVM), dural, cavernous, and spinal fistulae, intra-arterial thrombolysis for acute stroke, as well as endovascular and microsurgical management of vascular occlusive disease.

Other clinical interests include endovascular management of intractable epistaxis; prophylactic head, neck, and brain tumor embolization; resection of skull base tumors; endoscopic surgery for aneurysms and pituitary tumors; third ventricle ulostomy; and arachnoid cysts.

**Teaching.
 Healing.
 Leading the Way.**



**UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO
 NEUROSURGERY**

Millard Fillmore
 (Gates) Hospital
 3 Gates Circle
 Buffalo, NY 14209
 (716) 887-5200

Buffalo General
 Hospital
 100 High Street, E-2
 Buffalo, NY 14203
 (716) 859-7500

Women & Children's
 Hospital of Buffalo
 219 Bryant Street
 Buffalo, NY 14222
 (716) 878-7386

NEWEST LOCATION
 Northtown Office
 3980A Sheridan Dr.
 Amherst, NY 14226
 (716) 218-1000

Neurovascular Disease & Stroke Prevention • Minimally Invasive Brain & Spine Surgery • Movement Disorders/Parkinson's Disease • Epilepsy Surgery
 Brain Endoscopy • Tumor/Gamma Knife Surgery • Skull Base Surgery • Back Pain Prevention and Treatment • Pediatric • Chiropractic Care



**Muslim
Public Affairs Council
Western New York**

Muslim Public Affairs Council
Western New York Chapter
6343 Transit Road
Depew, New York 14043

First Class
U.S. Postage
PAID
Beltsville, MD
Permit #3039



"Thank you" to our friends at North Presbyterian Church, Williamsville
for displaying the above sign during the month of Ramadan.

MARK YOUR CALENDAR

2012 ANNUAL BANQUET

SATURDAY, JUNE 9, 2012


ADAM'S MARK HOTEL, BUFFALO, NY



National Countering Violent Extremism Workshop

After-Action Report

November 2011



National Countering Violent Extremism Workshop

After-Action Report

This project was supported by Grant No. 2010-D6-BX-K055 awarded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justice's Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of Justice or the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.



Table of Contents

Table of Contents.....	iii
Section One—Introduction.....	1
Section Two—Overview.....	3
Section Three—Session Summaries	5
Understanding Violent Extremism: An Overview	5
Understanding Violent Extremism: Al-Qa’ida Inspired Threats	6
Najibullah Zazi: A Case Study.....	6
Understanding Violent Extremism: Domestic Threats	7
Countering Violent Extremism Through Community Policing	7
Building Relationships and Trust	8
Developing Actionable Products.....	8
Community Awareness Briefing	9
Regional Breakout Sessions.....	9
Section Four—Next Steps and Recommendations.....	13
Section Five—Conclusion.....	15



Section One

Introduction

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in partnership with the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), hosted the National Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Workshop in Columbus, Ohio, on August 2–3, 2011. The National CVE Workshop represents the first time fusion center directors and major city police department intelligence commanders were brought together to address the CVE topic: further enhancing state, local, and federal partnerships. More than 160 participants attended and heard subject-matter experts speak from all levels of government, fusion centers, academia, and the community on emerging issues related to violent extremism.

The purpose of the workshop was to build an understanding of violent extremism and share best practices aimed at:

1. Understanding the violent extremism phenomenon in the homeland.
2. Building awareness of the violent extremism threat to local communities.
3. Supporting fusion centers to develop better intelligence products to support law enforcement customers.

To achieve these goals, workshop sessions were held on the following topics:

- ◀ Understanding Violent Extremism: An Overview
- ◀ Understanding Violent Extremism: Al-Qa'ida-Inspired Threats
- ◀ Najibullah Zazi: A Case Study
- ◀ Understanding Violent Extremism: Domestic Threats
- ◀ Countering Violent Extremism Through Community Policing
- ◀ Building Relationships and Trust
- ◀ Developing Actionable Products

- ◀ Community Awareness Brief
- ◀ Regional Breakout Sessions

This After-Action Report summarizes the workshop sessions, gives feedback from the regional breakout sessions, and provides next steps for enhancing local, state, and federal efforts to counter violent extremism.



Section Two Overview

The workshop provided an important opportunity to address recommendations from Secretary Janet Napolitano's [Homeland Security Advisory Council \(HSAC\)](#) and, specifically, the [HSAC's Countering Violent Extremism Working Group](#), which acknowledged that "information-driven, community-based law enforcement efforts hold great promise in preventing violent crime that is terrorism-related, and that promise will be best realized when local authorities work with community members to understand and mitigate all threats facing local communities."

Based on these recommendations, the CVE workshop was developed to provide fusion center personnel and major city police department intelligence unit commanders with a better understanding of violent extremism and ongoing efforts to address the issue. Subject-matter experts were invited to present overviews of violent extremism, including academic perspectives, government perspectives, and case studies.

The workshop also provided a forum for fusion center directors and law enforcement leaders to share best practices to improve information sharing efforts and improve the development of products for state and local customers. The workshop encouraged an interactive dialogue and concluded with regional breakout sessions that provided participants with an opportunity to exchange information, share best practices, and discuss next steps to effectively:

1. Identify local law enforcement customer information needs to support efforts to countering violent extremism.
2. Identify approaches to develop new or tailor existing product lines to meet these needs.
3. Identify more effective approaches to ensure these products are disseminated to line officers (e.g., via Fusion Liaison Officer programs).

The National CVE Workshop coincided with the release of the White House strategy on countering violent extremism, entitled [Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States](#).¹ This strategy

¹ The White House, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, Washington, DC: August 2011.

outlined the commitment of the federal government to support and help empower American communities and their local partners in their grassroots efforts to prevent violent extremism by:

1. Improving support to communities, including sharing more information about the threat of radicalization.
2. Strengthening cooperation with local law enforcement, who work with these communities every day.
3. Helping communities to better understand and protect themselves against violent extremist propaganda, especially online.²

This strategy represents the first time the U.S. government has released a national strategy to address ideologically inspired violent extremism in the homeland. In alignment with the national CVE strategy, [DHS also released its approach to countering violent extremism](#), which includes working with a broad range of partners to gain a better understanding of the behaviors, tactics, and other indicators that could point to potential terrorist activity within the United States and the best ways to mitigate or prevent that activity. The DHS approach to CVE outlines three main objectives:

1. Support and coordinate efforts to better understand the phenomenon of violent extremism, including assessing the threat it poses to the nation as a whole and within specific communities.
2. Bolster efforts to catalyze and support nongovernmental, community-based programs, and strengthen relationships with communities that may be targeted for recruitment by violent extremists.
3. Disrupt and deter recruitment or individual mobilization through support for local law enforcement programs, including information-driven, community-oriented policing efforts that for decades have proven effective in preventing violent crime.³

The National CVE Workshop reflected these goals and provided a foundation for a better understanding of violent extremism.

² The White House, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, Washington, DC: August 2011.

³ Fact Sheet: "The Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Countering Violent Extremism," August 2011.



Section Three

Session Summaries

This section provides an overview of the workshop sessions, with the first day primarily dedicated to understanding extremist threat(s), both domestic and international, and the second day focused on how to leverage community-driven information needs in order to develop actionable products to meet the needs of local, state, and tribal customers.

Understanding Violent Extremism: An Overview

This session set the stage for the workshop by providing an overview of violent extremism, as well as associated terms, such as CVE, homegrown violent extremism, radicalization, and mobilization to violence. The panelists defined *radicalization* as “the process by which individuals come to believe that their engagement in nonstate violence to achieve societal change is necessary and justified.” They then discussed the definition of *mobilization to violence* as “a process by which radicalized individuals facilitate direct engagement in violence.” However, the presenters were clear in noting that there is not a single pathway to extremism. Based upon an analysis of existing case studies, several factors were identified as potential indicators of radicalization, including personal vulnerability, group dynamics, and community, sociopolitical, and ideological factors. These factors—coupled with mobilization dynamics such as readiness to act, targets, opportunity, and capability—have an impact on whether an individual is spurred to action.

Panelists noted that one dynamic that has changed since September 11 and, particularly, in the last five years is the emergence of social media. The increase in social media forums since 2005 has allowed for broader participation and increased learning opportunities to engage in violent extremism.

Examples of violent extremism were discussed, as well as the diversity of the threat and the emergence of the lone offender. It was noted that there is also diversity among lone offenders, as some individuals may have organizational ties and others may be completely self-reliant. ***Because there is not a single profile of behaviors and indicators resulting in individual radicalization, it is important not to focus on narrowing extremist radicalization to one factor.*** For example, often radicalization is associated with religiosity, but religiosity is not necessarily correlated with violent extremism. ***Because there is no single profile for a pathway to radicalization, suggestions were offered to incorporate the community as one mechanism to strengthen defenses against violent extremism.*** One way of doing so is to educate the community about violent extremism and common recruitment tactics using social media.

This session also discussed some preoperational indicators, such as individual withdrawal, decreasing signs of outward religiosity, and travel arrangements. It is this type of information that can help the community recognize any potential change that may be an early sign of radicalization amongst their community member(s).

Understanding Violent Extremism: Al-Qa'ida-Inspired Threats

This session built on the information presented in the prior session and began with an academic perspective on pathways to radicalization. Distinctions were made regarding the fact that threats differ based on foreign fighters versus civilian targets, lone offenders versus organizational linkages, and religiosity and ideology that are not uniform. ***The importance of suspicious activity reporting (SAR), community engagement, and community policing were also highlighted, as was the fact that citizens must view law enforcement practices as legitimate and fair in order to effectively garner cooperation from the local community.*** Often, the perception of fairness is based on the context of individual experience with local law enforcement, thus further underscoring the importance of community engagement.

The panelists then provided an overview of homegrown violent extremist activities and presented findings from an analysis of homegrown violent extremists and their associated characteristics. ***Of the 62 subjects identified through open source research, there was no single characteristic set identified,*** but four dominant characteristics were found:

1. Supported by nonkinship social networking.
2. Abandoned mainstream groups.
3. Sought out contact with a charismatic predominant figure or group associated with violent extremist ideologies.
4. Violent defense was required by their adopted social group.

By sharing this analysis, ***attendees received important context for better understanding violent extremism and the importance of ensuring close communication and coordination among local, state, and federal, partners on these issues.*** It was also noted that terrorism today is fluid, varied, and complex and that the planning of operations requires less funding, fewer operatives, less training, and a shorter execution time to implement. The panelists also echoed the increased use of social networking for propaganda and recruitment and noted that the same is also true with respect to domestic terrorism, as the Internet was noted as a primary vehicle to encourage extremist activity.

Najibullah Zazi: A Case Study

This panel presented a case study on Operation High Rise, the case against Najibullah Zazi, convicted of plotting to attack the New York City subway system. This session highlighted the partnership between the FBI and the Colorado Information Analysis Center. The presenters discussed the investigative tactics used to identify, arrest, and convict Zazi. ***They also talked about the collaboration and cooperation among local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to support the operation.*** This session provided participants with a firsthand account of the operation and lessons learned from the case about techniques, tactics, and procedures used by Zazi and his coconspirators.

Understanding Violent Extremism: Domestic Threats

Violent extremism is not limited to threats from al-Qa'ida, and this session was designed to provide overviews of recent domestic threats, as well as a discussion of techniques, trends, common behaviors, tactical approaches, analytical interpretations, and resulting actions to counter violent extremism. The session provided a summary of the different types of domestic groups that have become violent, including, but not limited to, white supremacists, militia extremists, sovereign citizens, antiabortionists, violent animal and environmental extremists, and anarchist extremists. Among the patterns highlighted was the increase in antigovernment groups within the United States.

To demonstrate an example of this issue, the U.S. Attorney from the Eastern District of Michigan provided an overview of the recent Hutaree Militia case. This antigovernment group used the Internet as a recruitment tool and plotted to kill law enforcement officers. Their plan was uncovered by the FBI, in partnership with state and local law enforcement, and led to several indictments.

Countering Violent Extremism Through Community Policing

A strategy that has been effective in addressing crime, social disorder, and fear of crime is community policing. The foundation of this approach is building relationships and solving problems. These same approaches are also valuable tools in countering violent extremism and have led to the adoption of community policing as an effective strategy to combat violent extremism. This panel featured representatives from three local law enforcement agencies who shared their community-policing approaches. The presenters identified commonalities in their approach and emphasized collaboration with the community and other key stakeholders as essential ingredients in their community-policing programs. Key partners in this community-policing effort were identified as government stakeholders; public, private, and faith-based organizations; nongovernmental organizations; schools; local businesses; and local communities. All three agencies had outreach programs, including some focused specifically on disenfranchised communities. They discussed building equity by listening to the community, helping them resolve disputes or answering questions, while at the same time building trust. There was a discussion about educating law enforcement about diverse communities and their respective traditions, while also raising awareness in the community about law enforcement cultural norms and practices in this country.

Effective programs that were highlighted included Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) programs, which facilitate the exchange of information between fusion centers and stakeholders, including local law enforcement. FLO programs have proved valuable in building partnerships between fusion centers and local law enforcement community-policing efforts. It was noted that FLOs serve as the primary conduit for a two-way exchange of information sharing between fusion centers and local agencies. Examples provided included the relaying of suspicious activity and the sharing of intelligence reports and analysis relevant to line-level officers.

Other programs highlighted were community outreach from the grassroots level to national campaigns, such as the "If You See Something, Say SomethingTM" public awareness campaign. For example, in order to effectively engage all communities in these efforts, outreach materials can be translated into other languages, such as Spanish, Arabic, and Hebrew.

Panelists stressed the importance of educating line officers on the diverse communities they serve and even assigning dedicated officers to work with specific communities. They noted that outreach efforts can include law enforcement participation in community meetings, citizen and youth academies, police athletic leagues (soccer, basketball, cricket), cadet programs, and officer recruitment or the development of outreach videos about preventing crime and violent extremism.

Finally, the panelists emphasized the importance of ensuring that community outreach efforts are separate and distinct from intelligence or operational activities and that the analytical efforts of fusion centers should be leveraged to effectively support and inform local law enforcement community engagement activities. ***While all the presenters touted community policing as an effective tool to counter violent extremism, they also emphasized that community policing is a starting point and not the total solution to countering violent extremism and must be coupled with other community-based programs and law enforcement efforts.***

Building Relationships and Trust

This session illustrated efforts to foster relationships and trust between law enforcement and the communities they serve. Discussion included overcoming barriers and highlighting promising practices at local, state, and federal levels. Panelists noted that outreach methods are similar regardless of the type of community and that the key is for law enforcement officers to engage the community at the grassroots level and focus on developing and maintaining regular and consistent relationships. There was also discussion about the importance of understanding other cultures, customs, and traditions, particularly if an agency wants to develop meaningful relationships with their diversified communities.

From a community perspective, one panelist discussed how counterterrorism efforts and investigations can cause a ripple effect throughout a community and described how relationships between law enforcement and the community can better inform community members about law enforcement and intelligence efforts, such as fusion centers, community policing, and suspicious activity reporting. This open dialogue and transparent process can help demystify law enforcement practices and build trusting relationships in the process.

Panelists also highlighted activities such as hosting regular meetings between community leadership and local law enforcement to help build and sustain trust. For example, the Building Communities of Trust Initiative was noted as one initiative to help facilitate these dialogues. ***These efforts to proactively engage with the community provide an opportunity to discuss a broad spectrum of concerns and can lead to the development of tailored solutions to a host of problems and issues raised. Ultimately, this type of communication and transparency in law enforcement efforts can help address community fears and misperceptions and provide valuable inroads to the community.***

Developing Actionable Products

This session reviewed the development of products that facilitate information-driven, community-policing efforts, including best practices for soliciting local law enforcement customer requirements and information needs. This session further discussed the development and application of both tactical and strategic intelligence products, including the process of determining the target audience(s) for the product. Panelists also highlighted the importance of FLO programs and reporting suspicious activities as driving forces for enhancing the development of fusion center products.

A firsthand perspective on product development was offered by several fusion center intelligence analysts, including a discussion of products that have been developed related to violent extremism. Analysts discussed the importance of ensuring that customers' requirements are identified prior to product development to ensure that products meet customer needs and that the customers receive products that are both informative and actionable. For example, the inclusion of key indicators and warnings associated with a particular threat provides context to local law enforcement about what they should be looking for in the course of their duties.

It was also noted that analysts should consider the product audience and customer needs in order to create targeted, actionable, and informed products. Many analysts begin to write products too early in the analytic process, which may lead to recycling the same ideas rather than looking at the problem with a new mind-set. ***Panelists suggested that analysts focus on understanding how global events affect local communities; take advantage of existing resources, such as Roll Call Releases and other federal products; and research information that is actionable for local law enforcement.***

Analysts were also encouraged to work directly with liaison officers and DHS contacts to help create objective and actionable products tailored to the needs of a state or local jurisdiction. By engaging these partners and meeting regularly with liaisons, analysts are able to solicit feedback on the intelligence products. ***Engagement with these partners (e.g., via FLO programs) also further supports the dissemination of fusion center products and the submission of suspicious activity reports.***

Community Awareness Briefing

In order to help engage community members in countering domestic radicalization, the community needs to better understand the nature of the extremist threat. Recognizing this, NCTC developed a briefing for the public that provides an overview of violent extremism and related efforts to foster radicalization within the United States. Although the Community Awareness Briefing is targeted to the community, the abbreviated version presented during the CVE Workshop was intended to raise participant awareness about resources that are available and can be used in their communities.

The brief not only educates community members about radicalization but empowers them with information about signs of violent extremism behavior. For example, while discussing the threat of terrorist recruitment, the Community Awareness Briefing focused on violent extremist use of the Internet and provided specific examples of terrorist recruiting videos, Web sites, and the use of social networking tools and other media. The discussion also centered on measures communities and government can take—together and individually—to counter violent extremism. In this way, it was noted, ***communities are not part of the problem; rather, they constitute an essential part of any strategy to counter violent extremist narratives.***

Regional Breakout Sessions

Following the workshop presentations, CVE Workshop participants broke into smaller, regionally focused groups for discussions facilitated by DHS intelligence officers, fusion center directors, and local law enforcement. The purpose of the regional breakouts was to engage attendees in a facilitated discussion on how to best:

1. Identify local law enforcement customer information needs to support efforts to counter violent extremism.
2. Identify approaches to develop new or tailor existing product lines to meet these CVE needs.
3. Identify more effective approaches to ensure that actionable products are disseminated to line officers.

Participants were divided into four regions based on their area of responsibility: Central, Northeast, Southeast, and Western. Key themes that emerged are summarized below.

1. Identify local law enforcement customer information needs to support efforts to counter violent extremism:

- ✦ Customer information needs should be regularly validated and updated, including how often specific customers would like products.
- ✦ Fusion centers should consider hosting regular meetings (e.g., quarterly) with local agency representatives or state police associations to solicit feedback and customer needs. This also provides an opportunity to educate the customer set on fusion center capabilities, products, and limitations.
- ✦ Information needs should be articulated to line officers and other homeland security partners via training, roll call announcements, and meetings.
- ✦ Fusion centers should leverage customer information needs, as well as how often specific customers would like products.
- ✦ Local law enforcement should be informed and trained on violent extremism recruitment trends, patterns, and behaviors, so they can better articulate information needs and gaps.
- ✦ Line officers should be trained on indicators and warnings of terrorism and how to report suspicious activity.

2. Identify approaches to develop new or tailor existing product lines to meet these CVE needs:

- ✦ Fusion centers should look for opportunities to interact with local law enforcement customers and seek feedback on products via a standardized process.
- ✦ Fusion centers should engage with their customers and develop tailored products with a targeted audience in mind.
- ✦ Fusion centers should recognize that information/products necessary to support local efforts may be different from information needs of federal partners.
- ✦ Knowledge of area of responsibility (AOR) and local law enforcement customers is crucial to product development.
- ✦ Fusion centers should leverage current products and/or develop new products to highlight actionable items for line officers.
- ✦ Fusion centers should optimize requests for information (RFIs) from local stakeholders to better inform and improve products.
- ✦ Daily fusion center products can be condensed into a weekly intelligence product summarizing activities for ease of use by fusion center customers.
- ✦ Participants agreed that developing joint-seal products between fusion centers and local law enforcement agencies would be a more effective way of fostering partnerships and collaboration.
- ✦ Fusion centers should develop roll call briefs and products for use at shift changes.

3. Identify more effective approaches to ensure that actionable products are disseminated to line officers:

- ✦ Fusion centers should identify all appropriate mechanisms/portals to disseminate products within their AOR.
- ✦ Leveraging FLOs, fusion centers should promote products being shared/briefed during shift changes.
- ✦ Fusion centers should use individualized tracking numbers on products to trace dissemination
- ✦ Fusion centers should consider the use of nondisclosure agreements for product recipients.
- ✦ Local law enforcement agencies should consider using technology, such as smart phones for line officers, to access critical information.
- ✦ Fusion centers should identify resources to help support outreach, products, and training for local customers, such as Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils, Peace Officer Standards and Training Council (POST) training, and SAR training.
- ✦ Fusion centers should explore using social networking to disseminate information.
- ✦ FLO programs should be used to disseminate products in order to leverage the most efficient distribution processes.



Section Four

Next Steps and Recommendations

As a result of the presentations, regional breakout sessions, and participant feedback, CVE Workshop participants recognized the importance of building partnerships among fusion centers, major city police department intelligence units, and federal partners to effectively understand and mitigate violent extremism. Additionally, it was recognized that fusion centers should focus their efforts on providing support and actionable information to law enforcement, so that law enforcement can more effectively engage with their communities. Feedback from the workshop discussions and regional breakout sessions is reflected below and includes the identification of next steps and recommendations, as well as opportunities for future engagement and support:

- ♦ More opportunities to engage fusion center directors and major city police department intelligence commanders on topic-specific issues (e.g., violent extremism).
 - Recommend future opportunities for engagement between these partners, such as collaborative forums and analyst exchanges.
- ♦ Continued expansion and growth of FLO programs to support coordination and communication between fusion centers and local law enforcement agencies.
 - Forums for FLO coordinators to share and exchange best practices to help standardize efforts across the nation.
- ♦ Continual evolution of products based on customer needs will support local law enforcement in understanding local implications of national intelligence, thus enabling local officials to better protect their communities.
 - Best practices and sample products should be shared across the national network of fusion centers to effectively showcase how local context can be provided on national intelligence.
 - Fusion centers should provide visibility on production plans, product catalogs, and distribution processes to ensure that local law enforcement customers have visibility and access to pertinent information.

- 4 Expanded delivery of training on indicators and warnings associated with violent extremism at the local, state, and federal levels.
 - Training should be made available to local, state, and federal law enforcement partners on violent extremism trends, patterns, and behaviors.
 - Training should provide best practices and approaches to effectively mitigate threats by engaging and building relationships with communities and through community-oriented policing.
 - SAR training should continue to be provided to all line officers, including training on indicators and warnings and how to report suspicious activity.



Section Five

Conclusion

The National CVE Workshop provided an opportunity for local, state, and federal attendees to better understand violent extremism, particularly the behaviors, tactics, and other indicators associated with violent extremism. As highlighted during the workshop, the dynamics of radicalization can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and understanding the local area of responsibility is a key factor to countering extremism. Effective CVE approaches include community policing, building relationships and trust with community members, raising awareness and understanding of extremism both within communities and among local law enforcement, and the development of informative products that provide local context and relevance.

The workshop provided a forum for attendees to discuss these issues and also provided an opportunity for fusion center directors, major city police department intelligence commanders, and community-policing experts to discuss the role of the fusion center in developing and tailoring products to meet the needs of state and local law enforcement customers. In particular, fusion centers play a vital role through their assessment of the local implications of national intelligence and then sharing actionable information with local officials to enable them to more effectively tailor their efforts to engage and better protect their local communities.

For additional information or questions about the National Countering Violent Extremism Workshop or related materials, please contact the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

Page 01 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 02 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 03 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 04 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 05 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 06 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 07 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 08 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 09 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 10 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 11 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 12 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 13 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 14 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 15 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 16 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 17 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 18 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 19 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 20 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 21 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 22 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 23 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 01 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 02 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 03 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 04 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 05 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 06 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 07 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 08 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 09 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 10 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 11 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 12 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 13 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 14 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 15 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 16 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 17 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 18 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 19 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 20 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 21 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 22 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 23 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

TALKING POINTS ON THE CVE STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

- The White House CVE strategy was released in August, 2011.
- On December 8, 2011, after 5 months of planning and consultation with interagency partners, the White House released the Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for the Administration's CVE Strategy.
- The SIP lists the current and future actions the USG will take in support of a locally-focused, community-based approach, in three broad areas:
 - **Enhancing Engagement with and support to local communities:** Our aims in engaging with communities to discuss violent extremism are to (1) share sound, meaningful, and timely information about the threat of radicalization to violence with a wide range of groups and organizations; (2) respond to concerns about government policies and actions; and (3) better understand how we can effectively support community-based solutions.
 - **Building Government and Law Enforcement Expertise:** We are building robust training programs to ensure that communities, government, and law enforcement receive accurate, intelligence-based information about the dynamics of violent extremism. Misinformation about the threat and poor training harms our security by sending stakeholders in the wrong direction and creating tensions with communities.
 - **Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda while Promoting our Ideals:** We will aggressively counter violent extremist ideologies – including on the Internet – by educating and empowering communities and promoting our ideals. In the case of our current priority, we will, through our words and deeds, rebut al-Qa'ida's lie that the United States is somehow at war with Islam.
- The SIP Approach underscores the strength of community-based problem solving, local partnerships, and community-oriented policing. We are building our efforts from existing structures, while creating capacity to fill gaps as we implement programs.

As the activities described in the SIP are executed, there will be major and long-lasting impacts:

- There will be platforms throughout the country for including communities that may be targeted by violent extremists for recruitment and radicalization into ongoing Federal, State and local engagement efforts;
- The Federal Government will support that engagement through a task force of senior officials from across the government;
- Community-led efforts to build resilience to violent extremism will be supported;
- Analysis and production will increase in depth and relevance, and will be shared with those assessed to need it, including Governor-appointed Homeland Security Advisors, Major Cities Mayors' Offices, and local partners;
- Training for Federal, State, tribal, and local government and law enforcement officials on community resilience, countering violent extremism, and cultural competence will improve, and that training will meet rigorous professional standards; and
- Local partners, including government officials and community leaders, will better understand the threat of violent extremism and how they can work together to prevent it.



STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 2011





Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States

As a government, we are working to prevent all types of extremism that leads to violence, regardless of who inspires it. At the same time, countering al-Qa'ida's violent ideology is one part of our comprehensive strategy to defeat al-Qa'ida. Over the past 2½ years, more key al-Qa'ida leaders—including Usama bin Laden—have been eliminated in rapid succession than at any time since the September 11 attacks. We have strengthened homeland security and improved information sharing. Thanks to coordinated intelligence and law enforcement, numerous terrorist plots have been thwarted, saving many American lives.

—President Barack Obama, August 2011

Law enforcement and government officials for decades have understood the critical importance of building relationships, based on trust, with the communities they serve. Partnerships are vital to address a range of challenges and must have as their foundation a genuine commitment on the part of law enforcement and government to address community needs and concerns, including protecting rights and public safety. In our efforts to counter violent extremism, we will rely on existing partnerships that communities have forged with Federal, State, and local government agencies. This reliance, however, must not change the nature or purpose of existing relationships. In many instances, our partnerships and related activities were not created for national security purposes but nonetheless have an indirect impact on countering violent extremism (CVE).

At the same time, this Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) also includes activities, some of them relatively new, that are designed specifically to counter violent extremism. Where this is the case, we have made it clear. It is important that both types of activities be supported and coordinated appropriately at the local level.

Background

The President in August 2011 signed the *National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners), which outlines our community-based approach and the Federal Government's role in empowering local stakeholders to build resilience against violent extremism.¹ It recognizes that, as the National Security Strategy from May 2010 highlights, "our best defenses against this threat are well informed and equipped families, local communities, and institutions." To support our overarching goal of preventing violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the

1. The National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners defines violent extremists as "individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals."

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

United States to commit acts of violence, the Federal Government is focused on three core areas of activity: (1) enhancing engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists; (2) building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.

The SIP details how we are implementing the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners. It explains our core objectives and sub-objectives; describes how activities by departments and agencies are aligned with these; lists planned activities that address gaps and expand efforts; and assigns Federal Government leads and partners for various actions. The SIP provides a blueprint for how we will build community resilience against violent extremism.² It does not address our overseas CVE efforts, other than ensuring we coordinate domestic and international activities.

Although the SIP will be applied to prevent all forms of violent extremism, we will prioritize preventing violent extremism and terrorism that is inspired by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents, which the 2010 National Security Strategy, the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, and the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners identify as the preeminent security threats to our country. This is, however, a matter of emphasis and prioritization, and does not entail ignoring other forms of violent extremism. As the July 2011 terrorist attack in Norway underscored, free societies face threats from a range of violent extremists.

As the activities described in the SIP are executed, there will be major and long-lasting impacts:

- There will be platforms throughout the country for including communities that may be targeted by violent extremists for recruitment and radicalization into ongoing Federal, State, and local engagement efforts;
- The Federal Government will support that engagement through a task force of senior officials from across the government;
- Community-led efforts to build resilience to violent extremism will be supported;
- Analysis will increase in depth and relevance, and will be shared with those assessed to need it, including Governor-appointed Homeland Security Advisors, Major Cities Chiefs, Mayors' Offices, and local partners;
- Training for Federal, State, tribal, and local government and law enforcement officials on community resilience, CVE, and cultural competence will improve, and that training will meet rigorous professional standards; and
- Local partners, including government officials and community leaders, will better understand the threat of violent extremism and how they can work together to prevent it.

2. The concept of "resilience" has applied to a range of areas such as emergency preparedness and critical infrastructure protection (e.g., the ability of financial markets, power suppliers, and telecommunications companies to withstand an attack or disaster and resume operations rapidly.) The National Security Strategy emphasized the importance of including individuals and communities in our approach to enhancing resilience. Both the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners and the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism expanded this concept to CVE, the latter explicitly stating, "We are working to bring to bear many of these capabilities to build resilience within our communities here at home against al-Qa'ida inspired radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization to violence."

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

The SIP outlines ongoing, as well as planned, activities to counter violent extremism, which will be accomplished through existing funding and by prioritizing within the resources available to relevant departments and agencies. Some of these activities are specific to CVE, while others address broader non-security policy objectives but may have an indirect effect on countering radicalization to violence. Because our efforts are threaded across a range of different missions, such as training, outreach, and international exchanges, the execution of the SIP will be impacted by funding for both security and non-security related activities.

Process for Developing the SIP

The Obama Administration continues to prioritize and stress the critical importance of CVE in the Homeland. Given the complexities of addressing this threat and the uniqueness of the operating environment in the United States, the Administration recognizes the potential to do more harm than good if our Nation's approach and actions are not dutifully considered and deliberated. Throughout this process, careful consideration was given to the rule of law and constitutional principles, particularly those that address civil rights and civil liberties. With those principles in mind, we noted that departments and agencies with domestically focused mandates have an array of tools and capabilities that can be leveraged to prevent violent extremism, though some have limited experience in the national security arena. This necessitated a deliberative and carefully calibrated approach with an extensive evaluative period to fully address their potential roles and participation, which for some entailed thinking outside their traditional mandates and areas of work.

After assessing how individuals are radicalized and recruited to violence in the United States, the Administration established an accelerated process, led by the National Security Staff (NSS), to develop the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners and the SIP. An Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) on countering and preventing violent extremism in the United States was established—with Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretary-level representatives from across government—to consider roles and responsibilities, potential activities, guiding principles, and how best to coordinate and synchronize our efforts. The IPC, with support from specialist sub-IPCs, drafted our first national strategy on preventing violent extremism in the United States, which was approved by Deputies from the various departments and agencies and signed by the President.

- The following departments and agencies were involved in the deliberations and approval process: the Departments of State (State), the Treasury, Defense (DOD), Justice (DOJ), Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services (HHS), Education (EDU), Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security (DHS), as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).

To develop the SIP, the NSS tasked NCTC with coordinating the first comprehensive baseline of activities across the United States Government related to countering and preventing violent extremism in the United States, which constitutes the ongoing activities outlined in the SIP. This included CVE-specific initiatives, as well as activities that were not developed for CVE purposes, but nonetheless may indirectly contribute to the overall goals of the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners. These activities were aligned with objectives and sub-objectives—based on the strategy and approved by the IPC—to

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

assess our overall effort and identify gaps. The IPC then considered ongoing and potential actions to address these gaps, which form the basis of planned activities outlined in the SIP. The SIP was approved by Deputies from the various departments and agencies in November 2011.

Compliance with the Rule of Law

A fundamental precept of the SIP is that the Federal Government's actions must be consistent with the Constitution and in compliance with U.S. laws and regulations. Departments and agencies are responsible for identifying and complying with legal restrictions governing their activities and respective authorities. Compliance with the rule of law, particularly ensuring protection of First Amendment rights, is central to our National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners and the execution of the SIP.

Crosscutting and Supportive Activities

There are fundamental activities that are critical to our success and cut across the objectives of the SIP. These include: (1) whole-of-government coordination; (2) leveraging existing public safety, violence prevention, and community resilience programming; (3) coordination of domestic and international CVE efforts, consistent with legal limits; and (4) addressing technology and virtual space. In many instances, these crosscutting and supportive activities describe the ongoing activities of departments and agencies in fulfilling their broader missions. As they implement new initiatives and programs in support of the SIP, departments and agencies will ensure these enabling activities appropriately guide their efforts.

1. Whole-of-Government Coordination

Leveraging the wide range of tools, capabilities, and resources of the United States Government in a coordinated manner is essential for success. Traditional national security or law enforcement agencies such as DHS, DOJ, and the FBI will execute many of the programs and activities outlined in the SIP. However, as the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners states, we must also use a broader set of good governance programs, "including those that promote immigrant integration and civic engagement, protect civil rights, and provide social services, which may also help prevent radicalization that leads to violence." To this end, agencies such as EDU and HHS, which have substantial expertise in engaging communities and delivering services, also play a role.

This does not mean the missions and priorities of these partners will change or that their efforts will become narrowly focused on national security. Their inclusion stems from our recognition that radicalization to violence depends on a variety of factors, which in some instances may be most effectively addressed by departments and agencies that historically have not been responsible for national security or law enforcement. These non-security partners, including specific components within DOJ and DHS, have an array of tools that can contribute to this effort by providing indirect but meaningful impact on CVE, including after school programs, networks of community-based organizations that provide assistance to new immigrants, and violence prevention programs. We will coordinate activities, where appropriate, to support the CVE effort while ensuring we do not change the core missions and functions of these departments and agencies.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

2. Leveraging Existing Public Safety, Violence Prevention, and Resilience Programming

While preventing violent extremism is an issue of national importance, it is one of many safety and security challenges facing our Nation. As we enter an era of increased fiscal constraints, we must ensure our approach is tailored to take advantage of current programs and leverages existing resources. Our efforts therefore will be supported, where appropriate, by emphasizing opportunities to address CVE within available resources related to public safety, violence prevention, and building resilience.

3. Coordination of Domestic and International Efforts

While always ensuring compliance with applicable laws and regulations, we must ensure a high level of coordination between our domestic and international efforts to address violent extremism. Although both the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners and the SIP specifically address preventing violent extremism in the United States, the delineation between domestic and international is becoming increasingly less rigid. Violent extremists operating abroad have direct access to Americans via the Internet, and overseas events have fueled violent extremist radicalization and recruitment in the United States. The converse is also true: events occurring in the United States have empowered the propaganda of violent extremists operating overseas. While making certain that they stay within their respective authorities, departments and agencies must ensure coordination between our domestic and international CVE efforts. Given its mandate to support both domestic and international planning, NCTC will help facilitate this part of the CVE effort so that our Homeland and overseas activities are appropriately synchronized, consistent with all applicable laws and regulations. While individual departments and agencies will regularly engage foreign partners, all international engagement will continue to be coordinated through State.

4. Addressing Technology and Virtual Space

The Internet, social networking, and other technology tools and innovations present both challenges and opportunities. The Internet has facilitated violent extremist recruitment and radicalization and, in some instances, attack planning, requiring that we consider programs and initiatives that are mindful of the online nature of the threat. At the same time, the Federal Government can leverage and support the use of new technologies to engage communities, build and mobilize networks against violent extremism, and undercut terrorist narratives. All of our activities should consider how technology impacts radicalization to violence and the ways we can use it to expand and improve our whole-of-government effort. As noted in sub-objective 3.3, we will develop a separate strategy focused on CVE online.

Roles and Responsibilities

The SIP assigns Leads and Partners in each of the Future Activities and Efforts listed under respective sub-objectives. Leads and Partners have primary responsibility for coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing activities to achieve SIP sub-objectives and the overall goal of the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Expectation of Leads and Partners are as follows:

Lead: A department or agency responsible for convening pertinent partners to identify, address, and report on steps that are being taken, or should be taken, to ensure activities are effectively executed. The Lead is accountable for, among other things:

- Fostering communication among Partners to ensure all parties understand how to complete the activity;
- Identifying, in collaboration with assigned Partners, the actions and resources needed to effectively execute the activity;
- Identifying issues that impede progress; and
- Informing all departments and agencies about the status of progress by the Lead and other sub-objective Partners, including impediments, modifications, or alterations to the plan for implementation.

Partner: A department or agency responsible for collaborating with a Lead and other Partners to accomplish an activity. Partner(s) are accountable for:

- Accomplishing actions under their department or agency's purview in a manner that contributes to the effective execution of an activity;
- Providing status reports and assessments of progress on actions pertinent to the activity; and
- Identifying resource needs that impede progress on their department or agency's activities.

Assessing Progress

It is important to recognize that the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners represents the first time the United States Government has outlined an approach to address ideologically inspired violent extremism in the Homeland. While the objectives and sub-objectives listed in the SIP represent the collective wisdom and insight of the United States Government about what areas of action have the greatest potential to prevent violent extremism, we will learn more about our effectiveness as we assess our efforts over time, and we will adjust our activities accordingly.

Given the short history of our coordinated, whole-of-government approach to CVE, we will first develop key benchmarks to guide our initial assessment. Where possible, we will also work to develop indicators of impact to supplement these performance measures, which will tell us whether our activities are having the intended effects with respect to an objective or sub-objective. As we implement our activities, future evaluations will shift away from benchmark performance measures towards impact assessments. Departments and agencies will be responsible for assessing their specific activities in pursuit of SIP objectives, in coordination with an Assessment Working Group. We will develop a process for identifying gaps, areas of limited progress, resource needs, and any additional factors resulting from new information on the dynamics of radicalization to violence. Our progress will be evaluated and reported annually to the President.

Objectives, Sub-Objectives, and Activities

The SIP's objectives mirror the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners' areas of priority action: (1) enhancing Federal engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists; (2) building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals. Each of these is supported by sub-objectives, which constitute measurable lines of effort with which our specific programs and initiatives are aligned. A key purpose of the SIP is to describe the range of actions we are taking to improve or expand these efforts.

1. Enhancing Federal Engagement with and Support to Local Communities that May be Targeted by Violent Extremists

Communication and meaningful engagement with the American public is an essential part of the Federal Government's work, and it is critical for developing local partnerships to counter violent extremism. Just as we engage and raise awareness to prevent gang violence, sexual offenses, school shootings, and other acts of violence, so too must we ensure that our communities are empowered to recognize threats of violent extremism and understand the range of government and nongovernment resources that can help keep their families, friends, and neighbors safe. As noted in the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners:

Engagement is essential for supporting community-based efforts to prevent violent extremism because it allows government and communities to share information, concerns, and potential solutions. Our aims in engaging with communities to discuss violent extremism are to: (1) share sound, meaningful, and timely information about the threat of violent extremism with a wide range of community groups and organizations, particularly those involved in public safety issues; (2) respond to community concerns about government policies and actions; and (3) better understand how we can effectively support community-based solutions.

At the same time, we must ensure that our efforts to prevent violent extremism do not narrow our relationships with communities to any single issue, including national security. This necessitates continuing to engage on the full range of community interests and concerns, but it also requires, where feasible, that we incorporate communities that are being targeted by violent extremists into broader forums with other communities when addressing non-CVE issues. While we will engage with some communities specifically on CVE issues because of particular needs, care should be taken to avoid giving the false impression that engagement on non-security issues is taking place exclusively because of CVE concerns. To ensure transparency, our engagement with communities that are being targeted by violent extremists will follow two tracks:

- We will specifically engage these communities on the threat of violent extremism to raise awareness, build partnerships, and promote empowerment. This requires specific conversations and activities related to security issues.
- Where we engage on other topics, we will work to include them in broader forums with other communities when appropriate.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

1.1 Improve the depth, breadth, and frequency of Federal Government engagement with and among communities on the wide range of issues they care about, including concerns about civil rights, counterterrorism security measures, international events, and foreign policy issues.

Violent extremist narratives espouse a rigid division between “us” and “them” that argues for exclusion from the broader society and a hostile relationship with government and other communities. Activities that reinforce our shared sense of belonging and productive interactions between government and the people undercut this narrative and emphasize through our actions that we are all part of the social fabric of America. As President Obama emphasized, when discussing Muslim Americans in the context of al-Qa’ida’s attempts to divide us, “we don’t differentiate between them and us. It’s just us.”

Current Activities and Efforts

Departments and agencies have been conducting engagement activities based on their unique mandates. To better synchronize this work, U.S. Attorneys, who historically have engaged with communities in their districts, have begun leading Federal engagement efforts. This includes our efforts to engage with communities to (1) discuss issues such as civil rights, counterterrorism security measures, international events, foreign policy, and other community concerns; (2) raise awareness about the threat of violent extremism; and (3) facilitate partnerships to prevent radicalization to violence. The types of communities involved in engagement differ depending on the locations. United States Attorneys, in consultation with local and Federal partners, are best positioned to make local determinations about which communities they should engage. Appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, U.S. Attorneys are the senior law enforcement and executive branch officials in their districts, and are therefore well-placed to help shape and drive community engagement in the field.

In December 2010, 32 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices began expanding their engagement with communities to raise awareness about how the United States Government can protect all Americans from discrimination, hate crimes, and other threats; to listen to concerns; and to seek input about government policies and programs. In some instances, these efforts also included initiatives to educate the public about the threat of violent extremist recruitment, which is one of many components of a broader community outreach program.

- During this initial pilot, these U.S. Attorneys significantly expanded outreach and engagement on a range of issues of interest to communities; built new relationships where needed; and communicated the United States Government’s approach to CVE.
- Departments and agencies, including State, the Treasury, EDU, HHS, and DHS provided information, speakers, and other resources for U.S. Attorneys’ community engagement activities, frequently partnering with DOJ on specific programs and events.

A National Task Force, led by DOJ and DHS, was established in November 2010 to help coordinate community engagement at the national level. It includes all departments and agencies involved in relevant community engagement efforts and focuses on compiling local, national, and international best practices and disseminating these out to the field, especially to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. The Task Force is also responsible for connecting field-based Federal components to the full range of United States Government officials involved in community engagement to maximize partnerships,

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

coordination, and resource-sharing. The following are some examples of engagement efforts that are, or will be, coordinated with the Task Force:

- The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) this year doubled its outreach to communities and expanded its quarterly engagement roundtables to 14 cities throughout the country. During Fiscal Year 2011, CRCL also conducted 72 community engagement events, some of which included CVE-related topics.
- State engaged on U.S. foreign policy with a range of interested domestic communities. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs alone conducted 80 outreach events over the past year.
- DOJ has produced a number of brochures and other materials on civil rights protections and steps individuals can take to prevent or respond to discrimination, and has disseminated these to various communities, including those being targeted by violent extremists. DOJ has translated these materials into a number of languages, including Arabic, Somali, Urdu, Farsi, and Hindi.
- DOJ, in coordination with DHS, expanded the Building Communities of Trust (BCOT) Initiative, which focuses on developing relationships among local law enforcement departments, fusion centers, and the communities they serve to educate communities on: (1) the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI); (2) how civil rights and liberties are protected; and (3) how to report incidents in order to help keep our communities safe. DOJ continues to support the BCOT Initiative.

Future Activities and Efforts

The primary focus for the next year will be: (1) expanding the scope of engagement; (2) building new partnerships between communities and local law enforcement, local government officials, and civil society; (3) incorporating communities that are being targeted by violent extremist radicalization into broader forums with other communities to engage on a range of non-security issues; and (4) increasing our engagement specifically on CVE. Additional activities going forward include the following:

- DOJ will incorporate more U.S. Attorneys' Offices as engagement leads in the field, building on the initial U.S. Attorney-led effort. (Lead: DOJ; Partners: All)
- The National Task Force will: (1) disseminate regular reports on best practices in community engagement to local government officials, law enforcement, U.S. Attorneys' Offices, and fusion centers; (2) work with departments and agencies to increase their support to U.S. Attorney-led engagement efforts in the field; and (3) closely coordinate Federal engagement efforts with communities targeted by violent extremist radicalization. (Leads: DOJ and DHS; Partners: All)
- In consultation with Federal and local partners, the National Task Force and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices will facilitate, where appropriate, the inclusion of communities that may be targeted by violent extremist radicalization into broader engagement forums and programs that involve other communities. (Leads: DOJ and DHS; Partners: All)
- U.S. Attorneys will coordinate closely with local government officials, law enforcement, communities, and civil society to enhance outreach events and initiatives. (Lead: DOJ; Partners: All)

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

- In Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, CRCL plans on expanding its quarterly community engagement roundtables to a total of 16. CRCL is also in the process of implementing a campus youth community engagement plan, through which it will engage with young adults on the topic of violent extremism. (Lead: DHS)
- Depending on local circumstances, and in consultation with the FBI and other agencies as appropriate, U.S. Attorneys will coordinate any expanded engagement specific to CVE with communities that may be targeted by violent extremist radicalization. (Lead: DOJ; Partners: DHS, NCTC, and FBI)
- An FBI CVE Coordination Office will be established and, as part of its activities, will coordinate with the National Task Force on CVE-specific education and awareness modules. These modules will be developed and implemented, in part, by leveraging some of the FBI's existing programs and initiatives. (Lead: FBI; Partners: DOJ and DHS)
- DHS will oversee an online portal to support engagement by government officials and law enforcement with communities targeted by violent extremist radicalization, which will be used to share relevant information and build a community of interest. The portal will be accessible to government officials and law enforcement involved in overseas and domestic CVE and community engagement efforts to share best practices. (Lead: DHS; Partners: State, and NCTC)
- DOJ will expand the efforts of the BCOT initiative to help facilitate trust between law enforcement and community leaders. This dialogue could include local issues, as well as CVE. (Lead: DOJ; Partner: DHS)
- The United States Government will build a digital engagement capacity in order to expand, deepen, and intensify our engagement efforts. Where possible, virtual engagement will build on real world engagement activities and programs. (Lead: DHS; Partners: All)

1.2 Foster community-led partnerships and preventative programming to build resilience against violent extremist radicalization by expanding community-based solutions; leveraging existing models of community problem-solving and public safety; enhancing Federal Government collaboration with local governments and law enforcement to improve community engagement and build stronger partnerships; and providing communities with information and training, access to resources and grants, and connections with the philanthropic and private sectors.

The Federal Government can foster nuanced and locally rooted counter-radicalization programs and initiatives by serving as a facilitator, convener, and source of information to support local networks and partnerships at the grassroots level. Importantly, because the dynamics of radicalization to violence frequently vary from location to location, we recognize that a one-size-fits-all approach will be ineffective.

Current Activities and Efforts

The Federal Government has held a series of consultative meetings with communities, local government and law enforcement, civil society organizations, foundations, and the private sector to better understand how it can facilitate partnerships and collaboration. This leverages a key strength identified

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

in the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners: “The Federal Government, with its connections to diverse networks across the country, has a unique ability to draw together the constellation of previously unconnected efforts and programs to form a more cohesive enterprise against violent extremism.” Examples of this include the following:

- DHS Secretary Napolitano tasked her Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to develop recommendations on how the Department can best support law enforcement and communities in their efforts to counter violent extremism. An HSAC CVE Working Group convened multiple meetings with local law enforcement, local elected officials, community leaders (including faith-based leaders), and academics. The working group released its recommendations in August 2010, highlighting the importance of: (1) research and analysis of violent extremism; (2) engagement with communities and leveraging existing partnerships to develop information-driven, community-based solutions to violent extremism and violent crime; and (3) community oriented policing practices that focus on building partnerships between law enforcement and communities.
- DHS and NCTC began raising awareness about violent extremism among private sector actors and foundations and connected them with community civic activists interested in developing programs to counter violent extremism. DHS is now working with a foundation to pilot resiliency workshops across the country that address all hazards, including violent extremism.

We also began exploring how to incorporate CVE as an element of programs that address broader public safety, violence prevention, and resilience issues. This has the advantage of leveraging preexisting initiatives and incorporates CVE in frameworks (such as safeguarding children) used by potential local partners who may otherwise not know how they fit into such efforts. For example, although many teachers, healthcare workers, and social service providers may not view themselves as potentially contributing to CVE efforts, they do recognize their responsibilities in preventing violence in general. CVE can be understood as a small component of this broader violence prevention effort. Departments and agencies will review existing public safety, violence prevention, and resilience programs to identify ones that can be expanded to include CVE as one among a number of potential lines of effort.

- As an example, the Federal Government helped support a community-led initiative to incorporate CVE into a broader program about Internet safety. The program addressed protecting children from online exploitation, building community resilience, and protecting youth from Internet radicalization to violence.

Future Activities and Efforts

Planned activities to expand support to local partners include the following:

- The Federal Government will help broker agreements on partnerships to counter violent extremism between communities and local government and law enforcement to help institutionalize this locally focused approach. (Lead: DHS)
- DHS and DOJ will work to increase support for local, community-led programs and initiatives to counter violent extremism, predominantly by identifying opportunities within existing appropriations for incorporating CVE as an eligible area of work for public safety, violence prevention, and community resilience grants. (Leads: DHS and DOJ)

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

- DHS is working to increase funding available to integrate CVE into existing community-oriented policing efforts through FY12 grants. (Lead: DHS)
- DHS is establishing an HSAC Faith-Based Community Information Sharing Working Group to determine how the Department can: (1) better share information with faith communities; and (2) support the development of faith-based community information sharing networks. (Lead: DHS)
- DHS is developing its Hometown Security webpage to include resources such as training guidance, workshop reports, and information on CVE for both the general public and law enforcement. (Lead: DHS)
- The Treasury will expand its community outreach regarding terrorism financing issues. (Lead: Treasury; Partners: State, DOJ, DHS, FBI, and the U.S. Agency for International Development)³
- Depending on local circumstances and in consultation with the FBI, U.S. Attorneys will coordinate, as appropriate, any efforts to expand connections and partnerships at the local level for CVE, supported by the National Task Force where needed. (Lead: DOJ; Partners: All)
- Departments and agencies will expand engagement with the business community by educating companies about the threat of violent extremism and by connecting them to community civic activists focused on developing CVE programs and initiatives. (Lead: DHS; Partner: NCTC)

2. Building Government and Law Enforcement Expertise for Preventing Violent Extremism

It is critical that the Federal Government and its local government and law enforcement partners understand what the threat of violent extremism is, and what it is not. This helps ensure that we focus our resources where they are most effective and that we understand how we can best empower and partner with communities. Building expertise necessitates continued research about the dynamics of radicalization to violence and what has worked to prevent violent extremism; sharing this information as widely as possible; and then leveraging it to train government officials and law enforcement.

2.1 Improve our understanding of violent extremism through increased research, analysis, and partnerships with foreign governments, academia, and nongovernmental organizations.

The Federal Government has built a robust analytic program to understand violent extremism that includes analysis; research conducted by academia, think tanks, and industry; and exchanges with international allies to identify best practices. While we have increased our understanding of how individuals are radicalized to violence, we must continue to identify gaps, monitor changes in the dynamics of violent extremism, and remain vigilant by challenging our assumptions and continuing our research and analysis.

Current Activities and Efforts

The United States Government's research capacity on this issue has greatly expanded. DHS and NCTC both have analytic groups exclusively focused on violent extremist radicalization; the Interagency Intelligence Subcommittee on Radicalization helps coordinate and improve CVE intelligence analysis; and we work with foreign governments, academia, and nongovernmental organizations to inform and

3. The U.S. Agency for International Development's role will be limited to sharing relevant information.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

supplement our analysis and understanding. In addition to a large volume of intelligence products on CVE, examples of activities include:

- DHS Science & Technology (S&T) sponsored research on violent extremism in the United States, which it has shared with DHS components and other departments and agencies. Over 20 reports have been produced since 2009 and 5 more will be produced by the end of 2011. DHS is also developing an integrated open source database to help inform CVE programs.
- DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) collaborated with the FBI, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and NCTC to assess the capacity of state correctional institutions to detect and share information regarding individuals who demonstrate behaviors associated with violent extremism while in the correctional system.
- The National Intelligence Council, DHS, FBI, and NCTC briefed fusion centers and law enforcement around the country on violent extremism.
- DHS, in partnership with the FBI and NCTC, developed case studies on preoperational indicators and known threats for State and local law enforcement and affected communities.
- The United States Government held regular exchanges of best practices with Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the European Union, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and other partners to gain comparative insights about what might be effective in the Homeland.
- DHS expanded cooperation between the United States and Canada on CVE research and lessons learned.
- The United States Government participates in the Global Counterterrorism Forum's CVE Working Group.
- As directed in the Fort Hood Follow-on Review, DOD established the Force Protection Senior Steering Group. Among the Steering Group's duties is the coordination of non-traditional partners' activities within DOD (e.g., counterintelligence and behavioral health) to better understand how to identify and prevent all forms of violent extremism—not limited to al-Qa'ida-inspired extremism—within the military, including the potential use of DOD's extensive network of programs designed to support individuals who are potentially at risk of committing acts of violence against themselves, their families, or co-workers.

Future Activities and Efforts

Although we have a better understanding of the threat, there are gaps that need to be addressed through additional research and analysis. In this regard, we will:

- Expand analysis in five priority areas (Leads: DHS, FBI, NCTC, and State):
 1. The role of the Internet in radicalization to violence and how virtual space can be leveraged to counter violent extremism.
 2. Single-actor terrorism (so called "lone wolves"), including lessons learned from similar phenomena such as a school shooters.
 3. Disengagement from terrorism and violent extremism.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

4. Non-al-Qa'ida related radicalization to violence and anticipated future violent extremist threats.
 5. Preoperational indicators and analysis of known case studies of extremist violence in the United States.
- Continue DHS S&T's support for research on countering the threat of extremist violence. (Lead: DHS)
 - Continue DHS collaboration with the FBI, the BOP, and NCTC to: (1) improve awareness of the risk of violent extremism in correctional systems; (2) enhance screening of new inmates to detect individuals associated with violent extremist organizations; (3) improve detection of recruitment efforts within the correctional environment; and (4) increase information sharing, as appropriate, with Federal, State, and local law enforcement about inmates who may have adopted violent extremist beliefs and are being released. (Lead: DHS; Partners: DOJ, FBI, and NCTC)
 - Complete the creation of the FBI CVE Coordination Office to help assess and leverage existing Bureau efforts to better understand and counter violent extremism. (Lead: FBI)
 - Build lines of research specifically to support non-security Federal partners. (Leads: DHS and NCTC; Partners: EDU and HHS)

2.2 Increase Federal Government information sharing with State, local, and tribal governments and law enforcement on terrorist recruitment and radicalization.

As we enhance our partnerships with State, local, and tribal governments and law enforcement to counter violent extremism, it is essential that we share our expertise and insights about the dynamics of radicalization to violence and what has worked to prevent it. This, in turn, will help our partners identify potential areas of collaboration with communities and other local actors.

Current Activities and Efforts

Examples include:

- Based on direction from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), DHS led an effort to improve the analysis of homegrown violent extremism, including analytic tools to share with State, local, and tribal partners. DHS briefed representatives of 47 states on the project.
- DHS generated case studies of known and suspected terrorists and assessments of radicalization to violence, based on recent arrests, to share with local partners.
- FBI disseminated information to public safety partners, including information about radicalization to violence.
- DHS, NCTC, and FBI briefed and disseminated information on how individuals are radicalized to violence to law enforcement, fusion centers, and local government officials, including the Major Cities Chiefs, representatives from 47 states, Mayors' Offices, and State Homeland Security Advisors.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

- In partnership with NCTC, DOJ, DNI, and FBI, DHS led the first National CVE Workshop in August 2011, which brought together intelligence commanders from major metropolitan areas and fusion center directors to increase their understanding of CVE.

Future Activities and Efforts

More work needs to be done to ensure our State, local, and tribal partners have the information they need to counter violent extremism. Classification remains an obstacle to broader sharing with these partners, but we can better ensure that analytic production is tailored to the needs of practitioners in the field. Major work over the next year will focus on creating more analytic products on CVE that directly support local law enforcement and government. Planned actions include:

- Development of an analytic team focused on supporting local government and law enforcement CVE practitioners and increased production of analysis at appropriate classification levels. (Lead: DHS; Partners: FBI and NCTC)
- Development of practitioner-friendly summaries of current research and literature reviews about the motivations and behaviors associated with single-actor terrorism and disengagement from violent extremism. (Lead: DHS)
- Review of information-sharing protocols to identify ways of increasing dissemination of products to State, local, and tribal authorities. (Leads: DHS, DOJ, FBI, and NCTC)
- Expansion of briefings and information sharing about violent extremism with State and local law enforcement and government. (Lead: DHS, FBI, and NCTC)

2.3 Improve the development and use of standardized training with rigorous curricula based on the latest research, which conveys information about violent extremism; improves cultural competency; and imparts best practices and lessons learned for effective community engagement and partnerships.

The Federal Government has expanded and improved training related to CVE over the past year, but challenges remain. In particular, there is a need for a review process and standards for training specific to CVE, which was underscored by a small number of instances of Federally sponsored or funded CVE-related and counterterrorism training that used offensive and inaccurate information, which was inconsistent with our values and core principles. As our National Strategy to Empower Local Partners highlights, “Misinformation about the threat and dynamics of radicalization to violence can harm our security by sending local stakeholders in the wrong direction and unnecessarily creating tensions with potential community partners.” Therefore, improving Federal Government-approved training practices and processes related to CVE is a top priority of this plan.

Current Activities and Efforts

In November 2010, the IPC tasked DHS to form an Interagency Working Group on Training to catalogue and recommend improvements for CVE-related training across government. The Working Group brought together individuals responsible for CVE training and substantive specialists from civil rights and civil liberties offices, Federal law enforcement, and the analytic community. This is part of our overall

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

emphasis on improving the quality and quantity of CVE-related training. Notable accomplishments in our efforts to improve training include:

- Between October 2010 and October 2011, DHS CRCL trained nearly 2,700 law enforcement officials on CVE and cultural awareness at 46 separate events. The training served as the basis for best practices recommended by the Interagency Working Group on Training.
- Based on input from participating agencies, DHS issued CVE training guidance and best practices in October 2011 for Federal, State, local, and tribal government officials charged with organizing training related to CVE, cultural awareness, and counterterrorism.
- The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in October 2011 issued an Information Bulletin on CVE Training, which includes DHS's training guidance and best practices, as well as guidance for State, local, and tribal entities that regularly leverage FEMA grants to fund CVE-related trainings. DHS sent the best practices paper and the FEMA guidance to all DHS grantees, State and local governments, State and local law enforcement, relevant community stakeholders, and interagency partners.
- DHS provided a full-day of training, which included training on cultural competency, civil rights, and civil liberties to Federal, State, local, and tribal partners at 12 fusion centers in the past year and over 30 fusion centers since 2008. These trainings were coupled with 3- to 4-hour CVE training sessions for State and local law enforcement operating in the same state. Additionally, DHS provided "train the trainer" sessions for staff from nearly all fusion centers nationwide.
- DHS, working closely with other departments and agencies, local law enforcement, academics, and curriculum development experts, developed guidelines for a CVE curriculum that focuses on information-driven community-oriented policing practices and how to leverage existing community partnerships to counter violent extremism and violent crime. These guidelines were reviewed and validated in February 2011 at a "proof-of-concept" session at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), which was attended by State, local, and tribal law enforcement executives and frontline officers from rural and major city jurisdictions.
- State, working closely with NCTC and DHS, piloted specialized CVE training for United States Government officials working on CVE in the United States and abroad through its Foreign Service Institute in May 2011. Participation by domestic and international practitioners provided opportunities for exchanging best practices, enhanced the coordination of our Homeland and overseas efforts, and encouraged interagency partnerships.

Future Activities and Efforts

A review process by the Interagency Working Group on Training, as well as internal assessments by departments and agencies, identified two key challenges, which we will address over the next year:

- Many departments and agencies lack a review process for training materials and outside speakers on CVE, which led to a small number of cases of training that violated internal principles as well as core tenets of the National Strategy to Empower Local Partners.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

- There has been a lack of guidance and standards for training related to CVE, which left field offices, in particular, vulnerable to bad training. Without guidance or standards, it has been difficult to enforce accountability.

We have prioritized addressing these two shortcomings by doing the following:

- Departments and agencies are taking steps to identify training materials that may not meet internal standards and to improve processes for creating and reviewing such materials. Some departments are consulting with outside experts with established reputations to evaluate the content and training review process. Guidance on CVE-related training is being developed and will be issued, both across the organizations and to field components. Some departments may issue this as part of broader training guidance. (Lead: All)
- DHS, via FLETC, is in the process of developing a CVE curriculum to be integrated into existing training programs for Federal law enforcement. The curriculum will give Federal law enforcement a better understanding of CVE and how to more effectively leverage existing local partnerships. (Lead: DHS)
- DHS is in the process of establishing an internal committee to review all directly funded and issued DHS training on cultural competency, engagement, CVE, and counterterrorism. The committee will be responsible for reviewing any new content, evaluating experts, and establishing quality control. FEMA will incorporate the recently released Informational Bulletin and training guidance into FY12 grant guidance and will also leverage existing mechanisms to hold grantees and sub-grantees accountable. (Lead: DHS)

In addition to addressing the quality issue, we will work to expand the quantity of training.

- DHS, in partnership with the Los Angeles Police Department and the National Consortium for Advanced Policing, is developing a CVE curriculum that includes a 16-hour continuing education module for executive and frontline officers, as well as a 30-minute module that will be introduced at police academies. Both will be certified by the Police Officers Standards and Training Council. In October 2011 the Major Cities Chiefs Association passed a motion to adopt and implement the DHS CVE curriculum, which will be piloted with State and local law enforcement in San Diego by the end of 2011. By 2013, DHS seeks to: (1) implement the curriculum across the country on a regional basis; (2) develop a national network of trainers and subject matter experts who can administer the training and keep it current; and (3) build an online component for the curriculum. (Lead: DHS; Partners: DOJ and NCTC)
- DHS, via FLETC, will update current Federal training programs to integrate the CVE curriculum for Federal law enforcement in the coming year. (Lead: DHS)
- DHS is working with European law enforcement partners to share best practices and case studies to improve training, community policing, and operational information sharing. (Lead: DHS)
- DHS CRCL is expanding and institutionalizing its CVE and cultural competence training curricula to further enhance the material and its effectiveness. (Lead: DHS)

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

- The Interagency Working Group on Training will facilitate a “train the trainer program” to increase the reach of CVE training. (Leads: DHS and NCTC; Partners: DOJ, EDU, HHS, and FBI)
- The Interagency Working Group on Training will facilitate the development of an online training program that provides professional development credit for a broad range of professions, particularly those involved with public safety, violence prevention, and resilience. This will help build a basic understanding of CVE among a broad cross-section of stakeholders who have related mandates. (Leads: DHS and NCTC; Partners: DOJ, FBI, EDU, and HHS)
- The Interagency Working Group on Training will collaborate with non-security partners, such as EDU, to build CVE training modules that can be incorporated, as appropriate, into existing programs related to public safety, violence prevention, and resilience. These modules will be crafted in a way that is relevant to the specific audiences and their missions. Only trainers who have undergone CVE-specific training will deliver training programs that include CVE modules. (Lead: DHS; Partners: DOJ, EDU, HHS, FBI, and NCTC)
- DOD’s training programs and curricula will be informed by the work of the Interagency Working Group on Training, as appropriate. Additionally, DOD is conducting a review of CVE-related curricula and will make revisions and adjustments as necessary. (Lead: DOD; Partner DHS)

3. Countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals

As the National Counterterrorism Strategy emphasizes, “[t]he United States was founded upon a belief in a core set of values that is written into our founding documents and woven into the very fabric of our society. Where terrorists offer injustice, disorder, and destruction the United States must stand for freedom, fairness, equality, dignity, hope, and opportunity. The power and appeal of our values enables the United States to build a broad coalition to act collectively against the common threat posed by terrorists, further delegitimizing, isolating, and weakening our adversaries.”

Countering the ideologies and narratives that legitimize violence is central to our effort, but it also is the most challenging area of work, requiring careful consideration of a number of legal issues, especially those related to the First Amendment. In many instances, it will be more effective to empower communities to develop credible alternatives that challenge violent extremist narratives rather than having the Federal Government attempt to do so.

Our efforts include not only challenging justifications for violence, but affirming American ideals of inclusiveness and opportunity as well. Violent extremist narratives feed on disenchantment and the sense of exclusion. Our efforts therefore must include positive affirmation of our unity as a country. To some extent, this is addressed through our engagement activities, particularly where they address challenges facing all communities and not just those targeted by violent extremist radicalization. But there are also situations where we will need to more directly challenge violent extremist narratives.

3.1 Increase the capacity of communities to directly challenge violent extremist ideologies and narratives.

While the government cannot always directly contest violent extremist ideas, it can support capacity building within communities to take on this role. Whereas sub-objective 1.2 emphasizes preventative

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

measures and a defensive posture to build capacity for enhancing community resilience, sub-objective 3.1 focuses on increasing the ability of communities to push back against violent extremist propaganda.

Current Activities and Efforts

Most of our work in this area to date has focused on connecting community activists to potential civil society and private sector partners to focus specifically on undermining violent extremist narratives. Over the past year, we have taken the following steps:

- NCTC in 2010 developed a Community Awareness Briefing (CAB) to inform members of the public about efforts by al-Qa'ida and its adherents and affiliates to recruit Americans. The CAB highlights recruiting videos and examples of violent extremist propaganda, while underscoring the fact that these materials are often easily available on the Internet. Most importantly, the CAB aims to facilitate a discussion about what government and communities can do, together and independently, to counter the threat of violent extremist narratives. NCTC continues to deliver the presentation at forums composed of community leaders, educators, and parents in cities across the United States. In March 2011, NCTC held a workshop for local, State, and field-based Federal officials on how the CAB could be used in engagement efforts, when it makes sense and is appropriate.
- NCTC connected civic activists with technology experts, resulting in a training seminar on how to maximize the use of technology to counter violent extremism online.
- State sponsored speaker series and exchanges between international CVE practitioners and American communities targeted by violent extremist recruiters to better understand effective models for countering violent extremist narratives.

Future Activities and Efforts

This is a nascent area of effort and therefore will necessitate greater focus over the next year. Our planned actions include:

- Expanding efforts to raise community awareness about the threat of radicalization to violence, building from the experience of the CAB, and adapting those materials for different audiences where appropriate. (Leads: DOJ, DHS, FBI, and NCTC)
- Learning from former violent extremists, specifically those who can speak credibly to counter violent narratives, provide insights to government, and potentially catalyze activities to directly challenge violent extremist narratives. (Lead: DHS; Partner: NCTC)
- Providing grants to counter violent extremist narratives and ideologies, within authorities and relevant legal parameters, by reprioritizing or increasing the flexibility of existing funding. (Lead: DHS)
- Brokering connections between private sector actors, civil society, and communities interested in countering violent extremist narratives. (Lead: DHS; Partner: NCTC)
- Promoting international exchange programs to build expertise for countering violent extremist narratives. (Lead: State; Partners: DOJ, DHS, FBI, and NCTC)

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

- Increasing technical training to empower communities to counter violent extremists online, including the development of training for bloggers. (Lead: DHS; Partners: State, NCTC, and FBI)

3.2 Improve and increase our communication to the American public about the threat posed by violent extremist groups, myths and misperceptions about violent extremist radicalization, and what we are doing to counter the threat.

It is important that we communicate to the American public the realities of what the threat is, and what it is not. Misconceptions about the threat and statements and actions that cast suspicion on entire communities based on the actions of a few distract attention from the real threat and can undermine our ability to build partnerships. An informed citizenry enhances our national security.

Current Activities and Efforts

In 2011, the Federal Government focused on developing its approach to domestic CVE and communicating this to the American public. This involved briefings to Congress, public addresses, and media interviews. We will continue these activities.

Future Activities and Efforts

In 2012, we will work to expand our efforts to raise awareness in the general public about radicalization to violence in the United States and the tools to prevent it by:

- Providing regular briefings to Congress, think tanks, and members of the media. (Lead: DHS; Partners: DOJ, FBI, and NCTC)
- Creating programs to directly engage the public on the issue. (Lead: All)
- Building a public website on community resilience and CVE. (Lead: DHS)

3.3 Build a strategy to leverage new technologies and address online violent extremist radicalization

The Internet has become an increasingly potent element in radicalization to violence, enabling violent extremists abroad to directly communicate to target audiences in the United States. This direct communication allows violent extremists to bypass parents and community leaders. The SIP specifically addresses the online arena in several sub-objectives, but because of the importance of the digital environment, we will develop a separate, more comprehensive strategy for countering and preventing violent extremist online radicalization and leveraging technology to empower community resilience that considers: (1) the latest assessment of the role of the Internet; (2) the absence of clear national boundaries in online space and the relationship between international and domestic radicalization to violence; (3) relevant legal issues; and (4) the differing authorities and capabilities of departments and agencies.

Conclusion

Protecting our Nation's communities from violent extremist recruitment and radicalization is a top national security priority. It is an effort that requires creativity, diligence, and commitment to our fundamental rights and principles. In his cover letter to the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners, President Obama wrote:

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Sadly, the threat of violent extremism in America is nothing new. Throughout our history, misguided groups—including international and domestic terrorist organizations, neo-Nazis and anti-Semitic hate groups—have engaged in horrific violence to kill our citizens and threaten our way of life. Most recently, al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have attempted to recruit and radicalize people to terrorism here in the United States, as we have seen in several plots and attacks, including the deadly attack 2 years ago on our service members at Fort Hood. As a government, we are working to prevent all types of extremism that leads to violence, regardless of who inspires it.

—President Barack Obama, August 3, 2011

A complex issue like violent extremist radicalization and recruitment requires a nuanced path to guide a whole-of-government approach. The SIP outlines this path and facilitates a division of labor by assigning responsibilities between Federal Government departments, agencies, and components focused on law enforcement and national security and those whose efforts support, but do not directly lie within, these areas.

From:	Lee, SY (b)(6)
To:	"Snyder, Nathaniel (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject:	RE: DRAFT: SECRETARY NAPOLITANO MEETS WITH STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL AND TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ON COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Date:	2012/01/13 18:37:23
Priority:	Normal
Type:	Note

Yeah, (b)(6) and I discussed that. Amy's shop is pretty good with stuff 24/7 so we're not worried about her side. Just want to make sure we have enough leeway in case there's some back and forth with the WH later (as there sometimes is on cve).

From: Snyder, Nathaniel
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2012 6:35 PM
To: Lee, SY
Subject: RE: DRAFT: SECRETARY NAPOLITANO MEETS WITH STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL AND TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ON COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

I will make edits, but MLK Day is on Monday... may be hard to get people to respond.

From: Lee, SY
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2012 6:29 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: DRAFT: SECRETARY NAPOLITANO MEETS WITH STATE, LOCAL, TRIBAL AND TERRITORIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ON COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Good evening—please see below for the draft readout of the Secretary's meeting at the WH on CVE. Please send edits by Monday 10AM. Thanks!


Press Office
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Press Release

Jan. 18, 2012
Contact: DHS Press Office, (202) 282-8010

(b)(5)

(b)(3)



###

Sender:	Lee, SY	(b)(6)
Recipient:	"Snyder, Nathaniel	(b)(6)
Sent Date:	2012/01/13 18:37:22	

Delivered Date:	2012/01/13 18:37:23
------------------------	---------------------

Page 1 of 1

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From:	Simmons, Caroline (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
To:	"Cohen, John </O=
	"Snyder, Nathaniel
	(b)(6)
Subject:	RE: WH CVE Event
Date:	2012/01/13 10:13:08
Priority:	Normal
Type:	Note

Hi John and Nate-

Per Quintan's request in the email below, the following is background and TP's for him for the White House CVE conference. Let me know if you have edits before I send to him.

Background

The White House, in conjunction with DHS, NCTC, DOJ, and the FBI have organized this CVE conference for law enforcement officials to initiate the implementation of the Obama Administration's recently released Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. Over 35 senior and front line law enforcement officials from across the country will attend the event to learn about the Administration's approach to countering violent extremism and to provide feedback on how the federal government can best support local law enforcement efforts to implement this initiative. Secretary Napolitano and AG Holder are planning to provide welcoming remarks during the afternoon session and John Brennan is also planning to attend (and possibly provide remarks?). Dan Sutherland from NCTC, and Sean Joyce from the FBI will also be in attendance.

Talking Points

- The White House CVE strategy was released in August, 2011 and the Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for the Administration's CVE Strategy was released on December 8, 2011.
- This CVE strategy was heavily informed by State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial law enforcement and community member organizations.
- The SIP underscores the strength of community-based problem solving, local partnerships, and community-oriented policing. The SIP lists the current and future actions the USG will take in support of a locally-focused, community-based approach, in three broad areas:
 - **Enhancing Engagement with and support to local communities:** Our aims in engaging with communities to discuss violent extremism are to (1) share sound, meaningful, and timely information about the threat of radicalization to violence with a wide range of groups and organizations; (2) respond to concerns about government policies and actions; and (3) better understand how we can effectively support community-based solutions.
 - **Building Government and Law Enforcement Expertise:** We are building robust training programs to ensure that communities, government, and law

enforcement receive accurate, intelligence-based information about the dynamics of violent extremism. Misinformation about the threat and poor training harms our security by sending stakeholders in the wrong direction and creating tensions with communities.

- **Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda while Promoting our Ideals:** We will aggressively counter violent extremist ideologies – including on the Internet – by educating and empowering communities and promoting our ideals. In the case of our current priority, we will, through our words and deeds, rebut al-Qa’ida’s lie that the United States is somehow at war with Islam.
- With the release of the SIP we are again seeking guidance from State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial law enforcement on how the SIP can be implemented locally and how the Administration can support local efforts. We look forward to hearing from your feedback throughout the day and to continuing to partner with you on implementing the SIP and building safety and resiliency among our communities.

From: Snyder, Nathaniel
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2012 9:30 AM
To: Simmons, Caroline
Subject: FW: WH CVE Event

See below.

Quintan is asking for bullets on the event and I think will use this to brief Brennan (John).

Can you take crack at this?

May want to shoot to John and me a draft.

From: Wiktorowicz, Quintan (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, January 13, 2012 6:58 AM
To: Snyder, Nathaniel
Subject: Re: WH CVE Event

Will (b)(6) be coming as well? I think the plan right now, pending change, is for John to join them at 1pm.

Can you send me background on the event as well as some TPs you would like to use with this particular audience sometime this morning? Thanks!

Q

From: Snyder, Nathaniel (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, January 12, 2012 11:47 PM
To: Wiktorowicz, Quintan
Subject: WH CVE Event

Hi Quintan – attached is the latest agenda for the event along with current attendee list. Our hard count is at 41 participants.

Do you have a sense when (b)(6) will be dropping by? We have not mentioned his potential drop-by.

Also, AG Holder will be attending along with the Secretary. Both are scheduled for 1pm-1:45pm.

Thanks,

-Nate

Nate Snyder

US Department of Homeland Security

Office of the Secretary

*Special Advisor for Community Partnership &
Strategic Engagement*

Counterterrorism Working Group

Email: (b)(6)

JWICS:

Office:

Cell; 20

Sender:	Simmons, Caroline (b)(6)
Recipient:	"Cohen, John </O= "Snyder, Nathaniel (b)(6)
Sent Date:	2012/01/13 10:13:07
Delivered Date:	2012/01/13 10:13:08



Homeland Security



Fusion Center Privacy and Civil Liberties Training Program

Cultural Tactics for Intelligence Professionals
DHS
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties





SITE



DHS-01-425-003738

On a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being least and 10 being most, how much do you know about Islam, Arab-Americans and Arab culture?



OVERVIEW

- Radicalization 101The Threat, The Threat 2.0Violent Radicalization ProcessCountering Violent Extremism“al-Qaida inspired terrorism”, not IslamThe Narrative & Countering the NarrativeEngage popular culture perceptions and misperceptions.Provide a thorough background of communities targeted for recruitment by AQ.



The Threat

1. “Bomb throwers” Overseas terrorists who target US and US interests worldwide
9/11 UBL, Zawahiri, 9/11 hijackers
Material Support Hawalas, Financiers, bulk cash smuggling



The Threat 2.0

VIOLENT RADICALIZATION The process through which an individual changes from a non-violent belief system to a belief system that includes the willingness to actively advocate, facilitate, or use violence as a method to effect societal or political change Not all radicals are terrorists!



We face a wide range of violent extremist threats ...

➤ Eco-terrorists Neo-Nazi and Racist-based Groups Other Extremist Groups



This brief focuses on the threat of

Al-Qa'ida and Allied Groups (AQAG)



Terror threat at “most heightened state” since 9/11 – Feb 9, 2011



- AQ today: Bigger, more geographically widespread, more influential than 2001



True or False, all Arabs are Muslim, and all Muslims are Arab?



Global Muslim Population



Violent Radicalization/ Extremism



Violent Radicalization/ Extremism



Violent Radicalization/ Extremism

- Violent Extremist Narrative - distorts religion.
No profile - No definition
Insular communities may be prone to violent radicalization (South Asians in UK, Somalis in US)



Violent Extremist Narratives: An Example

The radical narrative shapes how violent extremists view the world around them

➤ Muslim governments have apostatized as a result of U.S. influence. The U.S. has brought ruin and disgrace to Islam. Muslims are the target of U.S. aggression.

U.S. is at war with Islam

“Muslims must counter this threat through violence”





In the past few years, there have been at least 22 disruptions, attempts, or attacks potentially involving “extremists” or “terrorists”...



...all of which had some connection to the United States.



According to the New American Foundation, 21% of foiled homegrown plots have come from tips/cooperation from the Muslim Community. This includes...





Homeland Security

Office of Intelligence and Analysis

Prevalence of Clusters Among Homegrown Violent Extremists

Jihadi Cool Cluster

U.S.-raised violent extremists who were attracted more to the excitement and perceived glory of fighting for a cause than to the strict doctrine or ideas of Salafi ideology.

Somali Nationalist Cluster

Young Somali immigrants and refugees with a strong attachment to Somalia who primarily join extremist groups to fight in their country's civil war rather than to attack U.S. persons or property globally.

Predisposed to Violence Cluster

Violent individuals who consciously or unconsciously use extremist ideology to channel and justify violent behavior.

Lost or Damaged Cluster

Individuals who felt a strong need to belong to a social group or context, had had trouble finding a group or context to fit into, and those who were obliged to have suffered from one or more diagnosable psychiatric disorders.

Foreign Policy Driven Cluster

Individuals whose personalized outrage over U.S. or Western foreign policy leads to violent extremist ideology as a way to understand and oppose the policies they dislike.

Total HVE Sample

Out of 62 total HVEs in the Sample
42 individuals, or 67.7%, belong to
one or more clusters.

DHS-01-425-003753



Violent Extremist Narrative

- US is at war with IslamEvidenceUS military in Afghanistan/ Pakistan, IraqIncreased tension among Muslim-Americans post-9/11 about position in American societyIncreased surveillance/ harassment, investigation, arrest, and prosecution of Muslims



Inspire Magazine



"I actually consider al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula . . . [to be] probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland...They've been quite successful at being innovators." - NCTC Director Michael Leiter, before Congress, Feb. 9, 2011



Narrative

- Denmark Cartoon Crisis
Banning face veil
Objection to mosques



Narrative



Narrative

- “International Burn a Koran Day” September 11, 2010
“Koran on Trial” Day March 20, 2011



Violent Extremist Use of the Internet

The YouTube logo, featuring the word "You" in black and "Tube" in white inside a red rounded rectangle.

Video Sharing



Social Networking



USG Response

EMPOWERING LOCAL
PARTNERS TO PREVENT
VIOLENT EXTREMISM
IN THE UNITED STATES

AUGUST 2011



DHS Response



- US Government shiftEmphasis on building safe, secure, resilient, and crime-resistant communitiesViolent crime local

- Community policingMeaningful partnershipsCollaborative problem-solvingInstitutional changesPartner rather than problem

www.dhs.gov/hsac



Counter-Narrative

- The Duke Study
Anti-radicalizing actions:
Denunciations of violence
Self-policing
Community Building
Political Activism
Identity Politics



Counter-Narrative

www.mpac.org/publications



Muslim communities have stepped forward to help law enforcement foil almost 4 out of every 10 Al Qaeda-related terror plots threatening America since 9/11/01. Muslim communities have help law enforcement prevent the last 7 out of 10 Al Qaeda related plots.



Fiqh Council of North America

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful The Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA) wishes to reaffirm Islam's condemnation of terrorism and religious extremism by issuing the following fatwa, or formal religious ruling: We have consistently condemned terrorism and extremism in all forms and under all circumstances, and we reiterate this unequivocal position. Islam strictly condemns religious extremism and the use of violence against innocent lives. There is no justification in Islam for extremism or terrorism. Targeting civilians' life and property through suicide bombings or any other method of attack is haram and those who commit these barbaric acts are criminals, not "martyrs". "Whoever kills a person unjustly, it is as though he has killed all mankind"

- Holy Qur'an, 5:32




Counternarrative – Uprisings in the Arab World

- Al Qaeda: unsuccessful The democratic uprisings make AQ look like “ineffectual bystanders to history while offering young Muslims an appealing alternative to terrorism.” New York Times, Feb 2011 Democracy vs. Islamism



What is the most populous Muslim country?




Muslims in America

- Approximately 6 million
Not monolith: from 68 different countries
40% college degrees (29% national average)
Muslim women earn near husbands (more than national average)
74% have a job (60% national average)
Well integrated - American dream




Diverse Demographics

American Muslims by Ethnicity



Origin of American-born Muslims Ancestry



From the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point



Young and Increasingly American

Origin and time in US	%
Foreign born Less than 10 years	3
Foreign born 10-19 years	21
Foreign born 20 years or longer	46
US born	28

Age	Muslim population	Total US population
18-29	39.8%	14.1%
30-49	49.5%	31.1%
50-64	6.4%	27.7%
65+	1.0%	27.2%



Islam

Islam is NOT the THREAT
Conversion to Islam is not Radicalization
VIOLENT RADICALIZATION:
Process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change
Threat is from those who “exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends”



Basic Facts – Glossary of Muslim Terms

- Salaam A'laikum Wa'alaikum Salaam - legal statement or decree
Allah - Arabic word for God
Halal - permissible under Islamic Law
Hijab - head covering and clothing worn by Muslim women in public
Imam - Muslim prayer leader
Qur'an - Islam's holy book
Madrasa - school



Six Articles of Faith – The Islamic Creed

- 1) Belief in one God
Belief in the angels
Belief in Divine Scripture - Torah, Bible, and Qur'an
Belief in the Messengers of God - Abraham, Moses, David, Jesus, Muhammad
Belief in the Day of Judgment
Belief in destiny



Basic Facts – The Five Pillars of Islam

- 1) Shahada– Testament of Faith
Salaat – Prayer
Zakat – Charity
Sawm – Fasting
Hajj – Pilgrimage



The Five Pillars of Islam

1) Shehada: Declaration of Faith

“There is no God but God,
Muhammad is his messenger”


لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ مُحَمَّدٌ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ



The Five Pillars of Islam

2) Salaat: Prayer

- Offered five times each day
Fajr – dawn to sunrise
Zuhr – at noon Asr –
afternoon to sunset Maghrib
– sunset to dark Isha – night
prayers Must do ablution
before prayers



The Five Pillars of Islam

3) Zakat: Charity



The Five Pillars of Islam

4) Sawm: Fasting during Ramadan
Suhoor – pre-dawn meal
Sawm – fast from dawn to dusk
Iftar – fast-breaking meal



BASIC FACTS

- SAWM- EID AL-FITR



The Five Pillars of Islam

5) Hajj – Pilgrimage to Mecca



BASIC FACTS

- *HAJJ- EID AL-ADHA*
the Sacrifice



“Feast of



Basic Facts – Sources of Islam

- Qur`an – divine scripture
Hadith – sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad
Sunnah – ways and manners of Prophet Muhammad
Ijma/Shura – consensus, as interpreted by religious leaders.



Basic Facts – Arabic Names

Multiple variations of one name(m-h-m-d)Mohammad is common out of respect for the prophet. It can be a first, middle, or last name. Most popular name in the world, period. As with Christianity, many people will name Mary beth, Mary lou, Mary jane. Mohamad, Mohammed, Muhamed, Muhammed, Mahamet, Mouhamed, Mehmet, Muhamed, Mahamed – variations - Ahmed, Hamad. Transliteration: Best is ask someone how to spell their name in English. Qadafi, leader of Libya can be spelled 32 ways.



Basic Facts – Arabic Names

- Basic Arabic names consist of 2 to 4 parts and can have as many as 6 parts. An individual may select among these names when asked to fill in one form in the United States. On another occasion when asked to fill in another form, he or she may pick another selection of his/her names. Given name, generational or lineage name(s), sometimes tribal, and/or descriptive names.
Example: Salman Bin Kareem al-Libbi. This same person could also be known as Abu Mustafa – Literally Father of Mustafa. - As that can be their nickname – and they may or may not have a child named Mustafa. In addition, the person may use an informal version of his or her name. The same way we have common nicknames in US culture, and everyone understands that Bob is actually Robert; Arabic nicknames often come as father of or mother of the eldest child or a descriptive name like “graceful”. Particularly after 9/11, some people with Arab or Muslim names choose to “westernize” their names but may not make the change on official documents. Examples: Usama = Sam Sowsan = Susan Ibrahim = Abraham Salwa = Sally



Somali cultural guide

- Clan: bond,
divisiveConservativeSufi
sm,
SalafismBirthdayKhat
Desert-inspired
dressRefugee



Interaction – Somali Americans

Feedback from American Somali Community: Do not ask about clan
U.S. law enforcement
New immigrant population
US Foreign Policy towards Somalia
Gap between elders and youth
Gang violence
Remittances



Misconceptions About Islam and Muslims

- Mosques Sharia Jihad Suicide bombing Islam, Judaism, and Christianity Women in Islam



Misconceptions -Mosques



Misconceptions - Shariah

- Crime, politics, economics, hygiene, diet, prayer, fasting, ethics
- The Quran, the Sunnah, the Fiqh (ijma) God's law, with different interpretations
- No official document
- May be considered in civil cases, like divorce or wills
- Supremacy clause: Constitution is always "supreme law of the land."



The debate has poles



PHOTO: Ellen Davidson



Misconceptions – Jihad?!?



Misconceptions – Concepts of Jihad

Jihad – “struggle, striving” in the name of God
NOT a “Holy War”
Greater Jihad – Spiritual struggle to be a better person.
Lesser/Defensive Jihad – Extreme defensive military reaction.



Misconceptions – Concepts of Jihad

- 2:190 – “Fight in the way of God against those who fight against you

but begin not hostilities. Lo! God loveth not aggressors.”

- 2:193 – “And fight them until persecution is no more, and religion is for God but if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression.”
- 2:192 – “But if they cease, God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.”

—*Holy Qur`an*



Misconceptions – Concepts of Jihad

- Contradictory teachings resolved by consensus of religious leaders (Shurah council) Islam teaches to fight only against those who first attack Muslims “Modern day terrorism is contrary to the purview of the real spirit of Islamic Jihad”



Misconceptions – Suicide Bombing

“Whosoever killed a human being - unless it be in punishment for murder or for spreading corruption on earth - it shall be as if he had killed all mankind; whereas, if anyone saves a life, it shall be as though he had saved the lives of all mankind” —

Holy Qur`an 5:32



Misconceptions – Judaism, Christianity, and Islam

“Ahl al Kittab”



Misconceptions – Women in Islam



Profiling

“If I see someone who comes in that’s got a diaper on his head and a fan belt wrapped around the diaper on his head, that guy needs to be pulled over”

—Former Senate

Candidate



Profiling

The formulation of Reasonable Suspicion
predicated solely on the individual's ethnicity
or race
Korematsu v. United States
(1944)
Whren v. United States (1996)



SPOT THE TERRORIST?



SPOT THE TERRORIST?



SPOT THE TERRORIST?



Sikhs

- Not Muslims, not Hindus
Balbir Singh Sodh



The Sikh Khalsa



Sikhism



- Major world religion, 20 million followers
- 2 million in the US
- Monotheistic – one God, no idol worship
- Guru Nanak: 1st of 10 Gurus
- 11th guru: Holy book, Guru Granth Sahib



I'M SORRY, SIR—
YOU'LL HAVE TO GET OFF.
YOUR RESEMBLANCE TO
THE OKLAHOMA CITY
BOMBER IS MAKING
THE OTHER PASSENGERS
NERVOUS.



DHS-01-425-003003

Questions?

Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties



Page 01 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 02 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 03 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 04 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 05 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 06 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 07 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 08 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 09 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 10 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 11 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 12 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 13 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 14 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 15 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 16 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 17 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 18 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 19 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 20 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 21 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 22 of 22

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 1 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 2 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 3 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 1 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 2 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 3 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From:	Azar, Haroon <(b)(6)>
To:	"Cohen, John <(b)(6)>
CC:	"Snyder, Nathaniel (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject:	Fw: Congress/ GAO
Date:	2011/11/02 11:56:43
Type:	Note

FYSA

From: Abdeen, Muawiya M. (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 02:32 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Congress/ GAO

Salam Haroon,

We received the following questions to answer from the GAO, have you seen this before? Do you have any input? I expect a call from their office to discuss and trying to get as much info as possible.

Thanks

Mike

General Questions

1. Since 9/11, efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE), have become a staple of state and municipal law enforcement operations. What challenges have MCC member cities faced to integrate these efforts into their law enforcement agendas?
 - a. What is the MCC's perspective on the potential threat and prevalence of "home grown" violent extremists?
 - b. Is the threat of "home grown terrorists" perceived as a major emerging issue for any of the MCC's member cities?
 - c. The White house recently released its strategy to counter violent extremism which includes:
 - i. enhancing federal engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted for violent extremists,
 - ii. building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism, and
 - iii. countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting ideals.
 Are you familiar with this strategy? Does the MCC have any views on this approach?
2. Are there any specific CVE strategies or models that are generally supported by the MCC or the law enforcement community as a whole?
 - a. With what domestic efforts for combating violent extremism or homegrown terrorism has the MCC played a direct role (e.g., programs, grants, initiatives)?
 - b. Please describe these efforts and the extent to which you or your organization is involved with them.
 - c. To what extent are these efforts federally funded or supported (e.g., through grants)?
 - d. To what extent do these efforts focus specifically on countering violent extremism?

Training-related Questions

3. To what extent, if at all, does the MCC provide, facilitate, or otherwise participate in training for state and local law enforcement concerning violent extremism?
 - a. What is the focus of each curriculum and by whom and to whom is it provided?
 - b. What qualifications are generally required of the instructors?
 - c. What steps, if any, does the MCC take to ensure the quality of its training?
4. If applicable, how does the MCC develop curriculum and determine course content?
 - a. Are there any specific training models or teaching strategies to which the MCC subscribes?
 - b. How does the MCC determine what constitutes appropriate and effective content for a training program intended to educate state and local partners about violent extremism?
 - c. To what extent is the federal government involved in developing the content and curriculum of training courses related to violent extremism that are supported by federal funds?
 - d. What steps, if any, does the federal government take action to ensure the quality of this training?
 - e. Could you provide us with examples or copies of select courses?
 - f. Can you identify any specific training programs or courses offered by the MCC or any other entity that you think are particularly effective or ineffective? Why?
5. To what extent have your members received CVE training directly from the federal government?
 - a. Which federal agencies have provided this training and in what format and mode of delivery?
 - b. Are you aware if your members have used federal grant funds to pay for CVE training, and if so, which grant programs?
 - c. Could you provide us with specific Sheriffs' departments that have had federally-provided or federally-funded CVE training?
6. There have been media reports and allegations that some of the individuals who provide training to law enforcement agencies have characterized all Muslims as terrorists and equated our war against terrorism as a war against Islam. To what extent, if at all, are you aware of any complaints about the content or administration of training programs related to countering violent extremism?
7. What challenges, if any, exist in providing training related to countering violent extremism?
8. What actions do you think federal, state, or local law enforcement should take to ensure that efforts to counter violent extremism are appropriate and effective?

Other Questions

9. Is there anything we have not asked about that you think is important we know?

Can you recommend any specific state and local law enforcement entities or training providers for us to consult for our review?

Sender:	Azar, Haroon <(b)(6)>
Recipient:	"Cohen, John <(b)(6)> "Snyder, Natha (b)(6)
Sent Date:	2011/11/02 11:56:42
Delivered Date:	2011/11/02 11:56:43

Page 01 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 02 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 03 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 04 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 05 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 06 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 07 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 08 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 09 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 10 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 11 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 12 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 13 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 14 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 15 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 16 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 17 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 18 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 19 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 20 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 21 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 22 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 23 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 1 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 2 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 3 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 01 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 02 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 03 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 04 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 05 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 06 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 07 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 08 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 09 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 10 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 11 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 12 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 13 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 14 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 15 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 16 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 17 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 18 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 19 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 20 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 01 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 02 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 03 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 04 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 05 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 06 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 07 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 08 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 09 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 10 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 11 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 12 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 13 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 14 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 15 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 16 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 17 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 18 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 19 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 20 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 21 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 22 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 23 of 23

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 01 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 02 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 03 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 04 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 05 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 06 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 07 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 08 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 09 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 10 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 11 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 12 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 13 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 14 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 15 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 16 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 17 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 18 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 19 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 20 of 20

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 1 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 2 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 3 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 01 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 02 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 03 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 04 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 05 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 06 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 07 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 08 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 09 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 10 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 11 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 12 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 13 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 14 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 15 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 16 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 17 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 18 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 19 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 20 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 21 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 22 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 23 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 24 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 25 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 26 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 27 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 28 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 29 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 30 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 31 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 32 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 33 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 34 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 35 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 36 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 37 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 38 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 39 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 40 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 41 of 41

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 1 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 2 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 3 of 3

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 1 of 2

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 2 of 2

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From:	(b)(6)
To:	"Snyder, Nathaniel </O=DHS ORG/OU=E2K3 ADMIN G (b)(6)
CC:	"Simmons, Caroline </ (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject:	RE: National Strategic Implementation Plan to Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the US
Date:	2012/01/09 09:51:08
Type:	Note

I will have some other ideas for names.

From: Snyder, Nathaniel (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, January 09, 2012 9:44 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: Simmons, Caroline
Subject: RE: National Strategic Implementation Plan to Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the US

Sure thing.

I am making some final edits on the agenda and will send that out as well.

It will still be a draft agenda, but will have more than enough detail for people to get a firm grasp of the day.

I will send you that along with the strategy and implementation plan first.

We'll have another email go out with more read-aheads but this should get people situated.

Good news about (b)(6) attending.

We are still working on bolstering out numbers so if you have any further ideas on additional participants that are within driving distance of NCR that would be great.

Thanks again,

-Nate

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, January 09, 2012 9:38 AM
To: Snyder, Nathaniel
Subject: RE: National Strategic Implementation Plan to Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the US

Nate:

Can you also send to me the other relevant information – IE the actual strategy – and also any other materials you believe would be useful to the members attending this meeting.

Thanks,

From: Snyder, Nathaniel (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, December 08, 2011 2:54 PM
To: Snyder, Nathaniel
Subject: National Strategic Implementation Plan to Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the US
Importance: High



Dear Department of Homeland Security Partners,

Today, President Obama released the Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) to the National Strategy on Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (attached). The SIP is the blueprint for how we will implement the Domestic Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), the first U.S. Government strategy to address violent extremism in the Homeland. The SIP lists the current and future actions the U.S. Government will take in support of a locally-focused, community-based approach, in three broad areas: (1) enhancing engagement with and support to local communities; (2) building government and law enforcement expertise; and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals. This is the first U.S. Government strategy and implementation plan to address ideologically-inspired violent extremism in the homeland.

This SIP is a follow up to the [National Strategy on Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States](#), which was released by the White House in August 2011. DHS, along with interagency partners, worked with the Administration to develop this SIP.

For additional information on the DHS approach to CVE, see our [DHS CVE Fact Sheet](#).

Thank you for all you do to help keep our nation safe and secure.

Sender:	(b)(6)	
Recipient:	"Snyder, Nathaniel (b)(6) (b)(6)	

	"Simmons, Caroline (b)(6)
	(b)(6)
Sent Date:	2012/01/09 09:52:35
Delivered Date:	2012/01/09 09:51:08

Homeland Security Advisory Council Meeting

12:00 pm-3:30 pm, January 9, 2012, TSA HQ, 601 South 12th St., East Bldg, Crystal City

LOGISTICS:

Closed Session/Secret Level:

- 12:00 p.m. Secretary Napolitano will speak about 2012 Secretarial Initiatives
- 1:00 p.m. Working Lunch – John Pistole will speak about TSA Risk-Based Security
- 1:45 p.m. BREAK
- **2:10 p.m. You** and (b)(6) are introduced by (b)(6)
- **2:15 p.m. You** discuss your role as the CVE Coordinator at DHS and your joint efforts with the NSS, NCTC, DOJ, and the FBI to implement the SIP
- **3:30 p.m. You** depart from the meeting

You will be speaking to an in-person meeting of the HSAC and there will be time for questions following your briefing. The HSAC Chair, (b)(6) and all of the HSAC members will be present. Additionally, there will be 25 DHS personnel attending the meeting. The HSAC meeting will be held at the secret level.

DECISION POINTS OR ASKS:

- Announce the newly released National CVE SIP and discuss efforts to work with the White House, interagency, and State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial partners to implement the SIP.
 - Note that DHS, NCTC, DOJ, and the FBI have formed a small working group to meet on a weekly basis to ensure the priorities in the SIP are implemented in a timely manner.
 - Mention that the SIP action items fulfill a number of the HSAC CVE Working Group Recommendations.
- Announce that DHS, in conjunction with the NSS and interagency, has implemented a number of the HSAC CVE Working Group Recommendations, including: 1) Developing CVE training for law enforcement and communities; 2) Creating best practices for law enforcement agencies and the community; 3) Working with DOJ to better incorporate community-oriented policing efforts; 4) Establishing information-driven, community-based violent crime reduction capabilities; 5) Developing common terminology; 6) Expanding CRCL engagements; and 7) Developing case studies.
- Highlight the following key CVE milestones:
 - **SAR Training:** Over 181,000 Law Enforcement officials have been trained on the DHS-DOJ led Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative.
 - **Curriculum Development:** DHS is working to pilot two curriculum efforts by the end of February, 2012: 1) FLETC's curriculum for federal officers, to be piloted in Glynnco, GA in February, 2012; and 2) LAPD and the National Consortium for Advanced Policing (NCAP)'s State and Local curriculum for Academies and the 16-hour continuing education block for frontline officers, to be piloted in San Diego by the end of January. **Note:** The Major City Chiefs (MCC) passed a motion to adopt the new SLTT CVE Curriculum at all of their Law Enforcement Academies by the end of 2012. **Note:** These trainings fulfill a major HSAC CVE recommendation.
 - **S&T Reports:** Since 2009, S&T has produced over 20 reports on violent extremism.

- **CRCL Roundtables:** In 2011, CRCL doubled its engagement efforts and conducted over 72 community engagement events.
- **CVE Website:** DHS created a CVE website with best practices and CVE resources for Federal and SLTT officials. The website can be accessed at www.dhs.gov/cve
- **“If You See Something Say Something™” Expansion:** In 2011, DHS expanded See Something partnerships with additional cities, states, and private sector partners, including: the Jewish Community, the NFL, NBA, MLB, MLS, and the American Hotel & Lodging Association and Indianapolis 500. DHS will continue to expand these in 2012.
- **International CVE Coordination:** DHS has worked with several international partners (Canada, Germany, Belgium, the UK) and has launched a major information sharing initiative with Europol, and will host a delegation of Europol/EU Members in January.
- **CVE Conference:** DHS held a CVE conference for over 200 SLTT partners in Columbus, OH in August, 2011.
- **Grant Guidance:** DHS is working to incorporate CVE language into 2012 grant guidance.

SIP TALKING POINTS:

- On December 8, 2011, after 5 months of planning and consultation with interagency partners, the White House released the Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for the Administration’s CVE Strategy.
- The SIP lists the current and future actions the USG will take in support of a locally-focused, community-based approach, in three broad areas:
 - **Enhancing Engagement with and support to local communities:** Our aims in engaging with communities to discuss violent extremism are to (1) share timely information about the threat of radicalization to violence with a wide range of groups and organizations; (2) respond to concerns about government policies and actions; and (3) better understand how we can effectively support community-based solutions.
 - **Building Government and Law Enforcement Expertise:** We are building robust training programs to ensure that communities, government, and law enforcement receive accurate, intelligence-based information about the dynamics of violent extremism. Misinformation about the threat and poor training harms our security by sending stakeholders in the wrong direction and creating tensions with communities.
 - **Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda while Promoting our Ideals:** We will aggressively counter violent extremist ideologies – including on the Internet – by educating and empowering communities and promoting our ideals.
- The SIP Approach underscores the strength of community-based problem solving, local partnerships, and community-oriented policing. We are building our efforts from existing structures, while creating capacity to fill gaps as we implement programs.

KEY BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The HSAC is an organizationally independent advisory board of highly-distinguished leaders from state and local government, first responder communities, the private sector, and academia which provide you with recommendations and strategic guidance.

In January 2011, Secretary Napolitano announced the National Terrorism Advisory System, which was informed by the HSAC’s Homeland Security Advisory System Task Force. In August 2011, DHS and the White House announced the Department and Administration’s

approach to Countering Violent Extremism. These documents were informed by the HSAC's Countering Violent Extremism working group that put forth recommendations in May 2010. A number of the HSAC CVE recommendations have been implemented and are also included in the SIP.

IF ASKED:

- **Which of the HSAC CVE Working Group Recommendations have been implemented?**
 - DHS, in conjunction with the White House, NCTC, DOJ, and the FBI, has implemented a number of priorities in the SIP, including the following: 1) Developing CVE training for law enforcement and communities; 2) Creating best practices for law enforcement agencies and the community; 3) Working with DOJ to better incorporate community-oriented policing efforts; 4) Establishing information-driven, community-based violent crime reduction capabilities; 5) Developing common terminology; 6) Expanding CRCL engagements; and 7) Developing case studies.
- **How is DHS working to implement the priorities in the SIP?**
 - DHS' Internal CVE Working Group meets weekly to ensure the priorities of the SIP are being implemented and is tracking the progress of each individual priority. DHS, NCTC, DOJ, and the FBI have also formed a small working group which meets on a weekly basis to ensure the priorities in the SIP are implemented in a timely manner. The interagency also coordinated the development of the SIP through the multiple Deputies Breakfast meetings, and will continue to advance the SIP goals through these meetings.
- **How is DHS ensuring that its training and curriculum development is coordinated with the interagency and meets the mutual standards agreed upon by the interagency?**
 - DHS created a CVE Curriculum Working Group on September 17, 2010, chaired by LAPD Deputy Chief Michael Downing, as a result of the HSAC recommendations that were issued in August, 2010, and this Curriculum Working Group was comprised of representatives from the federal government and state and local law enforcement entities. This working group discussed best practices for community policing and created a new curriculum guidance based on mutually agreed upon standards and definitions.
 - DHS is establishing an internal training review process that will look at all DHS CVE trainings and ensure consistency with the Administration's CVE approach.
 - FEMA issued an informational bulletin to all grantees, state and local partners, and law enforcement outlining how training and trainers should accurate, intelligence driven, legally following civil rights and civil liberties protections, and operationally sound.
 - The guidance is based off the work of the Interagency Law Enforcement Training Working Group that is lead by DHS and continues to meet.

ATTACHMENTS:

- A. Draft Agenda for January 9th HSAC Meeting
- B. HSAC Member Biographies
- C. HSAC CVE Working Group Recommendations
- D. National CVE SIP

Staff Responsible for Briefing Memo:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CT Working Group, (b)(6)



HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL

Membership Roster

William Webster	(Chair) Retired Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP
Bill Bratton	(Vice-Chair) Chairman, Altegrity-Kroll
Norman Augustine	Retired Chairman and CEO, Lockheed Martin Corporation
Leroy Baca	Sheriff, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Richard Cañas	Former Director, New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness
Chuck Canterbury	National President, Fraternal Order of Police
Jared Cohon	President, Carnegie Mellon University
Ruth David	President and CEO, Analytic Services Inc.
Manny Diaz	Partner, Diaz & O'Naghten
Mohamed Elibiary	President and CEO, The Freedom and Justice Foundation
Clark Ervin	Director, Homeland Security Initiative, The Aspen Institute
Ellen Gordon	Associate Director, Naval Postgraduate School, Center for Homeland Defense & Security
Lee Hamilton	Director, Center on Congress, Indiana University
Raymond Kelly	Police Commissioner, City of New York
John Magaw	Domestic and International Security Consultant
Bonnie Michelman	Director of Security, Massachusetts General Hospital
Jeff Moss	Director, Black Hat and Tech Web
Martin O'Malley	Governor, State of Maryland
Harold Schaitberger	General President, International Association of Firefighters
Joe Shirley	Former President, The Navajo Nation
Lydia Thomas	Trustee, Noblis, Inc.
Frances Fragos Townsend	Partner, Baker Botts, LLP
Chuck Wexler	Executive Director, Police Executive Research Forum
John "Skip" Williams	Provost and Vice President for Health Affairs of The George Washington University

DHS Participant List for January 9th HSAC Meeting

Abraham	Georgia	Director	DHS/HSAC/CMO
Adams	Charles	Director	DHS/HSAC
Allan	Thomas	CAPT; Commandant COS	US Coast Guard CGHQ-2212
Beers	Rand	Under Secretary	DHS/NPPD
Berry	Anthony	Executive Assistant	DHS/HSAC
Cohen	John	Principle Deputy for Counterterrorism	DHS
Frome	Stu	Executive Director	DHS/SLLE
Heyman	David	Assistant Secretary of Policy	DHS/Office of Policy
Jones	Beth	Assistant to the Administrator	TSA
Markey	Betsy	Assistant Secretary	IGA
Marks	Steve	Law Enforcement Advisor to the Secretary	DHS
McQuillan	Patrick	Deputy Executive Director	DHS/HSAC
Midgette	Fred	RDML; Military Advisor to the Sec	DHS
Minnick	John	Director	DHS/HSAC
Miron	Mike	Director	DHS/HSAC
Napolitano	Secretary	Secretary	DHS
Papp	Robert	Admiral, Commandant	US Coast Guard CGHQ-2212
Pistole	John	Administrator	Transportation Security Administration
Quijas	Louis	Assistant Secretary	DHS/SLLE
Ramanathan	Sue	Counselor to the Secretary	DHS
Scalici	Dawn	Deputy Undersecretary for Analysis	DHS/I&A
Sharp	Becca	Executive Director	DHS/HSAC
Smith	Douglas	Assistant Secretary	DHS/PSO
Smith	William	Director	DHS/HSAC
Tennyson	Stephanie	Deputy Assistant Secretary	IGA
Warrick	Thomas	Deputy Assistant Secretary	DHS/PDEV



STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER 2011





Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States

As a government, we are working to prevent all types of extremism that leads to violence, regardless of who inspires it. At the same time, countering al-Qa'ida's violent ideology is one part of our comprehensive strategy to defeat al-Qa'ida. Over the past 2½ years, more key al-Qa'ida leaders—including Usama bin Laden—have been eliminated in rapid succession than at any time since the September 11 attacks. We have strengthened homeland security and improved information sharing. Thanks to coordinated intelligence and law enforcement, numerous terrorist plots have been thwarted, saving many American lives.

—President Barack Obama, August 2011

Law enforcement and government officials for decades have understood the critical importance of building relationships, based on trust, with the communities they serve. Partnerships are vital to address a range of challenges and must have as their foundation a genuine commitment on the part of law enforcement and government to address community needs and concerns, including protecting rights and public safety. In our efforts to counter violent extremism, we will rely on existing partnerships that communities have forged with Federal, State, and local government agencies. This reliance, however, must not change the nature or purpose of existing relationships. In many instances, our partnerships and related activities were not created for national security purposes but nonetheless have an indirect impact on countering violent extremism (CVE).

At the same time, this Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) also includes activities, some of them relatively new, that are designed specifically to counter violent extremism. Where this is the case, we have made it clear. It is important that both types of activities be supported and coordinated appropriately at the local level.

Background

The President in August 2011 signed the *National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States* (National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners), which outlines our community-based approach and the Federal Government's role in empowering local stakeholders to build resilience against violent extremism.¹ It recognizes that, as the National Security Strategy from May 2010 highlights, "our best defenses against this threat are well informed and equipped families, local communities, and institutions." To support our overarching goal of preventing violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the

1. The National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners defines violent extremists as "individuals who support or commit ideologically motivated violence to further political goals."

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

United States to commit acts of violence, the Federal Government is focused on three core areas of activity: (1) enhancing engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists; (2) building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.

The SIP details how we are implementing the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners. It explains our core objectives and sub-objectives; describes how activities by departments and agencies are aligned with these; lists planned activities that address gaps and expand efforts; and assigns Federal Government leads and partners for various actions. The SIP provides a blueprint for how we will build community resilience against violent extremism.² It does not address our overseas CVE efforts, other than ensuring we coordinate domestic and international activities.

Although the SIP will be applied to prevent all forms of violent extremism, we will prioritize preventing violent extremism and terrorism that is inspired by al-Qa'ida and its affiliates and adherents, which the 2010 National Security Strategy, the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, and the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners identify as the preeminent security threats to our country. This is, however, a matter of emphasis and prioritization, and does not entail ignoring other forms of violent extremism. As the July 2011 terrorist attack in Norway underscored, free societies face threats from a range of violent extremists.

As the activities described in the SIP are executed, there will be major and long-lasting impacts:

- There will be platforms throughout the country for including communities that may be targeted by violent extremists for recruitment and radicalization into ongoing Federal, State, and local engagement efforts;
- The Federal Government will support that engagement through a task force of senior officials from across the government;
- Community-led efforts to build resilience to violent extremism will be supported;
- Analysis will increase in depth and relevance, and will be shared with those assessed to need it, including Governor-appointed Homeland Security Advisors, Major Cities Chiefs, Mayors' Offices, and local partners;
- Training for Federal, State, tribal, and local government and law enforcement officials on community resilience, CVE, and cultural competence will improve, and that training will meet rigorous professional standards; and
- Local partners, including government officials and community leaders, will better understand the threat of violent extremism and how they can work together to prevent it.

2. The concept of "resilience" has applied to a range of areas such as emergency preparedness and critical infrastructure protection (e.g., the ability of financial markets, power suppliers, and telecommunications companies to withstand an attack or disaster and resume operations rapidly.) The National Security Strategy emphasized the importance of including individuals and communities in our approach to enhancing resilience. Both the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners and the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism expanded this concept to CVE, the latter explicitly stating, "We are working to bring to bear many of these capabilities to build resilience within our communities here at home against al-Qa'ida inspired radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization to violence."

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

The SIP outlines ongoing, as well as planned, activities to counter violent extremism, which will be accomplished through existing funding and by prioritizing within the resources available to relevant departments and agencies. Some of these activities are specific to CVE, while others address broader non-security policy objectives but may have an indirect effect on countering radicalization to violence. Because our efforts are threaded across a range of different missions, such as training, outreach, and international exchanges, the execution of the SIP will be impacted by funding for both security and non-security related activities.

Process for Developing the SIP

The Obama Administration continues to prioritize and stress the critical importance of CVE in the Homeland. Given the complexities of addressing this threat and the uniqueness of the operating environment in the United States, the Administration recognizes the potential to do more harm than good if our Nation's approach and actions are not dutifully considered and deliberated. Throughout this process, careful consideration was given to the rule of law and constitutional principles, particularly those that address civil rights and civil liberties. With those principles in mind, we noted that departments and agencies with domestically focused mandates have an array of tools and capabilities that can be leveraged to prevent violent extremism, though some have limited experience in the national security arena. This necessitated a deliberative and carefully calibrated approach with an extensive evaluative period to fully address their potential roles and participation, which for some entailed thinking outside their traditional mandates and areas of work.

After assessing how individuals are radicalized and recruited to violence in the United States, the Administration established an accelerated process, led by the National Security Staff (NSS), to develop the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners and the SIP. An Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) on countering and preventing violent extremism in the United States was established—with Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretary-level representatives from across government—to consider roles and responsibilities, potential activities, guiding principles, and how best to coordinate and synchronize our efforts. The IPC, with support from specialist sub-IPCs, drafted our first national strategy on preventing violent extremism in the United States, which was approved by Deputies from the various departments and agencies and signed by the President.

- The following departments and agencies were involved in the deliberations and approval process: the Departments of State (State), the Treasury, Defense (DOD), Justice (DOJ), Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services (HHS), Education (EDU), Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security (DHS), as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).

To develop the SIP, the NSS tasked NCTC with coordinating the first comprehensive baseline of activities across the United States Government related to countering and preventing violent extremism in the United States, which constitutes the ongoing activities outlined in the SIP. This included CVE-specific initiatives, as well as activities that were not developed for CVE purposes, but nonetheless may indirectly contribute to the overall goals of the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners. These activities were aligned with objectives and sub-objectives—based on the strategy and approved by the IPC—to

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

assess our overall effort and identify gaps. The IPC then considered ongoing and potential actions to address these gaps, which form the basis of planned activities outlined in the SIP. The SIP was approved by Deputies from the various departments and agencies in November 2011.

Compliance with the Rule of Law

A fundamental precept of the SIP is that the Federal Government's actions must be consistent with the Constitution and in compliance with U.S. laws and regulations. Departments and agencies are responsible for identifying and complying with legal restrictions governing their activities and respective authorities. Compliance with the rule of law, particularly ensuring protection of First Amendment rights, is central to our National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners and the execution of the SIP.

Crosscutting and Supportive Activities

There are fundamental activities that are critical to our success and cut across the objectives of the SIP. These include: (1) whole-of-government coordination; (2) leveraging existing public safety, violence prevention, and community resilience programming; (3) coordination of domestic and international CVE efforts, consistent with legal limits; and (4) addressing technology and virtual space. In many instances, these crosscutting and supportive activities describe the ongoing activities of departments and agencies in fulfilling their broader missions. As they implement new initiatives and programs in support of the SIP, departments and agencies will ensure these enabling activities appropriately guide their efforts.

1. Whole-of-Government Coordination

Leveraging the wide range of tools, capabilities, and resources of the United States Government in a coordinated manner is essential for success. Traditional national security or law enforcement agencies such as DHS, DOJ, and the FBI will execute many of the programs and activities outlined in the SIP. However, as the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners states, we must also use a broader set of good governance programs, "including those that promote immigrant integration and civic engagement, protect civil rights, and provide social services, which may also help prevent radicalization that leads to violence." To this end, agencies such as EDU and HHS, which have substantial expertise in engaging communities and delivering services, also play a role.

This does not mean the missions and priorities of these partners will change or that their efforts will become narrowly focused on national security. Their inclusion stems from our recognition that radicalization to violence depends on a variety of factors, which in some instances may be most effectively addressed by departments and agencies that historically have not been responsible for national security or law enforcement. These non-security partners, including specific components within DOJ and DHS, have an array of tools that can contribute to this effort by providing indirect but meaningful impact on CVE, including after school programs, networks of community-based organizations that provide assistance to new immigrants, and violence prevention programs. We will coordinate activities, where appropriate, to support the CVE effort while ensuring we do not change the core missions and functions of these departments and agencies.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

2. Leveraging Existing Public Safety, Violence Prevention, and Resilience Programming

While preventing violent extremism is an issue of national importance, it is one of many safety and security challenges facing our Nation. As we enter an era of increased fiscal constraints, we must ensure our approach is tailored to take advantage of current programs and leverages existing resources. Our efforts therefore will be supported, where appropriate, by emphasizing opportunities to address CVE within available resources related to public safety, violence prevention, and building resilience.

3. Coordination of Domestic and International Efforts

While always ensuring compliance with applicable laws and regulations, we must ensure a high level of coordination between our domestic and international efforts to address violent extremism. Although both the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners and the SIP specifically address preventing violent extremism in the United States, the delineation between domestic and international is becoming increasingly less rigid. Violent extremists operating abroad have direct access to Americans via the Internet, and overseas events have fueled violent extremist radicalization and recruitment in the United States. The converse is also true: events occurring in the United States have empowered the propaganda of violent extremists operating overseas. While making certain that they stay within their respective authorities, departments and agencies must ensure coordination between our domestic and international CVE efforts. Given its mandate to support both domestic and international planning, NCTC will help facilitate this part of the CVE effort so that our Homeland and overseas activities are appropriately synchronized, consistent with all applicable laws and regulations. While individual departments and agencies will regularly engage foreign partners, all international engagement will continue to be coordinated through State.

4. Addressing Technology and Virtual Space

The Internet, social networking, and other technology tools and innovations present both challenges and opportunities. The Internet has facilitated violent extremist recruitment and radicalization and, in some instances, attack planning, requiring that we consider programs and initiatives that are mindful of the online nature of the threat. At the same time, the Federal Government can leverage and support the use of new technologies to engage communities, build and mobilize networks against violent extremism, and undercut terrorist narratives. All of our activities should consider how technology impacts radicalization to violence and the ways we can use it to expand and improve our whole-of-government effort. As noted in sub-objective 3.3, we will develop a separate strategy focused on CVE online.

Roles and Responsibilities

The SIP assigns Leads and Partners in each of the Future Activities and Efforts listed under respective sub-objectives. Leads and Partners have primary responsibility for coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing activities to achieve SIP sub-objectives and the overall goal of the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Expectation of Leads and Partners are as follows:

Lead: A department or agency responsible for convening pertinent partners to identify, address, and report on steps that are being taken, or should be taken, to ensure activities are effectively executed. The Lead is accountable for, among other things:

- Fostering communication among Partners to ensure all parties understand how to complete the activity;
- Identifying, in collaboration with assigned Partners, the actions and resources needed to effectively execute the activity;
- Identifying issues that impede progress; and
- Informing all departments and agencies about the status of progress by the Lead and other sub-objective Partners, including impediments, modifications, or alterations to the plan for implementation.

Partner: A department or agency responsible for collaborating with a Lead and other Partners to accomplish an activity. Partner(s) are accountable for:

- Accomplishing actions under their department or agency's purview in a manner that contributes to the effective execution of an activity;
- Providing status reports and assessments of progress on actions pertinent to the activity; and
- Identifying resource needs that impede progress on their department or agency's activities.

Assessing Progress

It is important to recognize that the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners represents the first time the United States Government has outlined an approach to address ideologically inspired violent extremism in the Homeland. While the objectives and sub-objectives listed in the SIP represent the collective wisdom and insight of the United States Government about what areas of action have the greatest potential to prevent violent extremism, we will learn more about our effectiveness as we assess our efforts over time, and we will adjust our activities accordingly.

Given the short history of our coordinated, whole-of-government approach to CVE, we will first develop key benchmarks to guide our initial assessment. Where possible, we will also work to develop indicators of impact to supplement these performance measures, which will tell us whether our activities are having the intended effects with respect to an objective or sub-objective. As we implement our activities, future evaluations will shift away from benchmark performance measures towards impact assessments. Departments and agencies will be responsible for assessing their specific activities in pursuit of SIP objectives, in coordination with an Assessment Working Group. We will develop a process for identifying gaps, areas of limited progress, resource needs, and any additional factors resulting from new information on the dynamics of radicalization to violence. Our progress will be evaluated and reported annually to the President.

Objectives, Sub-Objectives, and Activities

The SIP's objectives mirror the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners' areas of priority action: (1) enhancing Federal engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists; (2) building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals. Each of these is supported by sub-objectives, which constitute measurable lines of effort with which our specific programs and initiatives are aligned. A key purpose of the SIP is to describe the range of actions we are taking to improve or expand these efforts.

1. Enhancing Federal Engagement with and Support to Local Communities that May be Targeted by Violent Extremists

Communication and meaningful engagement with the American public is an essential part of the Federal Government's work, and it is critical for developing local partnerships to counter violent extremism. Just as we engage and raise awareness to prevent gang violence, sexual offenses, school shootings, and other acts of violence, so too must we ensure that our communities are empowered to recognize threats of violent extremism and understand the range of government and nongovernment resources that can help keep their families, friends, and neighbors safe. As noted in the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners:

Engagement is essential for supporting community-based efforts to prevent violent extremism because it allows government and communities to share information, concerns, and potential solutions. Our aims in engaging with communities to discuss violent extremism are to: (1) share sound, meaningful, and timely information about the threat of violent extremism with a wide range of community groups and organizations, particularly those involved in public safety issues; (2) respond to community concerns about government policies and actions; and (3) better understand how we can effectively support community-based solutions.

At the same time, we must ensure that our efforts to prevent violent extremism do not narrow our relationships with communities to any single issue, including national security. This necessitates continuing to engage on the full range of community interests and concerns, but it also requires, where feasible, that we incorporate communities that are being targeted by violent extremists into broader forums with other communities when addressing non-CVE issues. While we will engage with some communities specifically on CVE issues because of particular needs, care should be taken to avoid giving the false impression that engagement on non-security issues is taking place exclusively because of CVE concerns. To ensure transparency, our engagement with communities that are being targeted by violent extremists will follow two tracks:

- We will specifically engage these communities on the threat of violent extremism to raise awareness, build partnerships, and promote empowerment. This requires specific conversations and activities related to security issues.
- Where we engage on other topics, we will work to include them in broader forums with other communities when appropriate.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

1.1 Improve the depth, breadth, and frequency of Federal Government engagement with and among communities on the wide range of issues they care about, including concerns about civil rights, counterterrorism security measures, international events, and foreign policy issues.

Violent extremist narratives espouse a rigid division between “us” and “them” that argues for exclusion from the broader society and a hostile relationship with government and other communities. Activities that reinforce our shared sense of belonging and productive interactions between government and the people undercut this narrative and emphasize through our actions that we are all part of the social fabric of America. As President Obama emphasized, when discussing Muslim Americans in the context of al-Qa’ida’s attempts to divide us, “we don’t differentiate between them and us. It’s just us.”

Current Activities and Efforts

Departments and agencies have been conducting engagement activities based on their unique mandates. To better synchronize this work, U.S. Attorneys, who historically have engaged with communities in their districts, have begun leading Federal engagement efforts. This includes our efforts to engage with communities to (1) discuss issues such as civil rights, counterterrorism security measures, international events, foreign policy, and other community concerns; (2) raise awareness about the threat of violent extremism; and (3) facilitate partnerships to prevent radicalization to violence. The types of communities involved in engagement differ depending on the locations. United States Attorneys, in consultation with local and Federal partners, are best positioned to make local determinations about which communities they should engage. Appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, U.S. Attorneys are the senior law enforcement and executive branch officials in their districts, and are therefore well-placed to help shape and drive community engagement in the field.

In December 2010, 32 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices began expanding their engagement with communities to raise awareness about how the United States Government can protect all Americans from discrimination, hate crimes, and other threats; to listen to concerns; and to seek input about government policies and programs. In some instances, these efforts also included initiatives to educate the public about the threat of violent extremist recruitment, which is one of many components of a broader community outreach program.

- During this initial pilot, these U.S. Attorneys significantly expanded outreach and engagement on a range of issues of interest to communities; built new relationships where needed; and communicated the United States Government’s approach to CVE.
- Departments and agencies, including State, the Treasury, EDU, HHS, and DHS provided information, speakers, and other resources for U.S. Attorneys’ community engagement activities, frequently partnering with DOJ on specific programs and events.

A National Task Force, led by DOJ and DHS, was established in November 2010 to help coordinate community engagement at the national level. It includes all departments and agencies involved in relevant community engagement efforts and focuses on compiling local, national, and international best practices and disseminating these out to the field, especially to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. The Task Force is also responsible for connecting field-based Federal components to the full range of United States Government officials involved in community engagement to maximize partnerships,

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

coordination, and resource-sharing. The following are some examples of engagement efforts that are, or will be, coordinated with the Task Force:

- The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) this year doubled its outreach to communities and expanded its quarterly engagement roundtables to 14 cities throughout the country. During Fiscal Year 2011, CRCL also conducted 72 community engagement events, some of which included CVE-related topics.
- State engaged on U.S. foreign policy with a range of interested domestic communities. The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs alone conducted 80 outreach events over the past year.
- DOJ has produced a number of brochures and other materials on civil rights protections and steps individuals can take to prevent or respond to discrimination, and has disseminated these to various communities, including those being targeted by violent extremists. DOJ has translated these materials into a number of languages, including Arabic, Somali, Urdu, Farsi, and Hindi.
- DOJ, in coordination with DHS, expanded the Building Communities of Trust (BCOT) Initiative, which focuses on developing relationships among local law enforcement departments, fusion centers, and the communities they serve to educate communities on: (1) the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI); (2) how civil rights and liberties are protected; and (3) how to report incidents in order to help keep our communities safe. DOJ continues to support the BCOT Initiative.

Future Activities and Efforts

The primary focus for the next year will be: (1) expanding the scope of engagement; (2) building new partnerships between communities and local law enforcement, local government officials, and civil society; (3) incorporating communities that are being targeted by violent extremist radicalization into broader forums with other communities to engage on a range of non-security issues; and (4) increasing our engagement specifically on CVE. Additional activities going forward include the following:

- DOJ will incorporate more U.S. Attorneys' Offices as engagement leads in the field, building on the initial U.S. Attorney-led effort. (Lead: DOJ; Partners: All)
- The National Task Force will: (1) disseminate regular reports on best practices in community engagement to local government officials, law enforcement, U.S. Attorneys' Offices, and fusion centers; (2) work with departments and agencies to increase their support to U.S. Attorney-led engagement efforts in the field; and (3) closely coordinate Federal engagement efforts with communities targeted by violent extremist radicalization. (Leads: DOJ and DHS; Partners: All)
- In consultation with Federal and local partners, the National Task Force and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices will facilitate, where appropriate, the inclusion of communities that may be targeted by violent extremist radicalization into broader engagement forums and programs that involve other communities. (Leads: DOJ and DHS; Partners: All)
- U.S. Attorneys will coordinate closely with local government officials, law enforcement, communities, and civil society to enhance outreach events and initiatives. (Lead: DOJ; Partners: All)

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

- In Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, CRCL plans on expanding its quarterly community engagement roundtables to a total of 16. CRCL is also in the process of implementing a campus youth community engagement plan, through which it will engage with young adults on the topic of violent extremism. (Lead: DHS)
- Depending on local circumstances, and in consultation with the FBI and other agencies as appropriate, U.S. Attorneys will coordinate any expanded engagement specific to CVE with communities that may be targeted by violent extremist radicalization. (Lead: DOJ; Partners: DHS, NCTC, and FBI)
- An FBI CVE Coordination Office will be established and, as part of its activities, will coordinate with the National Task Force on CVE-specific education and awareness modules. These modules will be developed and implemented, in part, by leveraging some of the FBI's existing programs and initiatives. (Lead: FBI; Partners: DOJ and DHS)
- DHS will oversee an online portal to support engagement by government officials and law enforcement with communities targeted by violent extremist radicalization, which will be used to share relevant information and build a community of interest. The portal will be accessible to government officials and law enforcement involved in overseas and domestic CVE and community engagement efforts to share best practices. (Lead: DHS; Partners: State, and NCTC)
- DOJ will expand the efforts of the BCOT initiative to help facilitate trust between law enforcement and community leaders. This dialogue could include local issues, as well as CVE. (Lead: DOJ; Partner: DHS)
- The United States Government will build a digital engagement capacity in order to expand, deepen, and intensify our engagement efforts. Where possible, virtual engagement will build on real world engagement activities and programs. (Lead: DHS; Partners: All)

1.2 Foster community-led partnerships and preventative programming to build resilience against violent extremist radicalization by expanding community-based solutions; leveraging existing models of community problem-solving and public safety; enhancing Federal Government collaboration with local governments and law enforcement to improve community engagement and build stronger partnerships; and providing communities with information and training, access to resources and grants, and connections with the philanthropic and private sectors.

The Federal Government can foster nuanced and locally rooted counter-radicalization programs and initiatives by serving as a facilitator, convener, and source of information to support local networks and partnerships at the grassroots level. Importantly, because the dynamics of radicalization to violence frequently vary from location to location, we recognize that a one-size-fits-all approach will be ineffective.

Current Activities and Efforts

The Federal Government has held a series of consultative meetings with communities, local government and law enforcement, civil society organizations, foundations, and the private sector to better understand how it can facilitate partnerships and collaboration. This leverages a key strength identified

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

in the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners: “The Federal Government, with its connections to diverse networks across the country, has a unique ability to draw together the constellation of previously unconnected efforts and programs to form a more cohesive enterprise against violent extremism.” Examples of this include the following:

- DHS Secretary Napolitano tasked her Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to develop recommendations on how the Department can best support law enforcement and communities in their efforts to counter violent extremism. An HSAC CVE Working Group convened multiple meetings with local law enforcement, local elected officials, community leaders (including faith-based leaders), and academics. The working group released its recommendations in August 2010, highlighting the importance of: (1) research and analysis of violent extremism; (2) engagement with communities and leveraging existing partnerships to develop information-driven, community-based solutions to violent extremism and violent crime; and (3) community oriented policing practices that focus on building partnerships between law enforcement and communities.
- DHS and NCTC began raising awareness about violent extremism among private sector actors and foundations and connected them with community civic activists interested in developing programs to counter violent extremism. DHS is now working with a foundation to pilot resiliency workshops across the country that address all hazards, including violent extremism.

We also began exploring how to incorporate CVE as an element of programs that address broader public safety, violence prevention, and resilience issues. This has the advantage of leveraging preexisting initiatives and incorporates CVE in frameworks (such as safeguarding children) used by potential local partners who may otherwise not know how they fit into such efforts. For example, although many teachers, healthcare workers, and social service providers may not view themselves as potentially contributing to CVE efforts, they do recognize their responsibilities in preventing violence in general. CVE can be understood as a small component of this broader violence prevention effort. Departments and agencies will review existing public safety, violence prevention, and resilience programs to identify ones that can be expanded to include CVE as one among a number of potential lines of effort.

- As an example, the Federal Government helped support a community-led initiative to incorporate CVE into a broader program about Internet safety. The program addressed protecting children from online exploitation, building community resilience, and protecting youth from Internet radicalization to violence.

Future Activities and Efforts

Planned activities to expand support to local partners include the following:

- The Federal Government will help broker agreements on partnerships to counter violent extremism between communities and local government and law enforcement to help institutionalize this locally focused approach. (Lead: DHS)
- DHS and DOJ will work to increase support for local, community-led programs and initiatives to counter violent extremism, predominantly by identifying opportunities within existing appropriations for incorporating CVE as an eligible area of work for public safety, violence prevention, and community resilience grants. (Leads: DHS and DOJ)

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

- DHS is working to increase funding available to integrate CVE into existing community-oriented policing efforts through FY12 grants. (Lead: DHS)
- DHS is establishing an HSAC Faith-Based Community Information Sharing Working Group to determine how the Department can: (1) better share information with faith communities; and (2) support the development of faith-based community information sharing networks. (Lead: DHS)
- DHS is developing its Hometown Security webpage to include resources such as training guidance, workshop reports, and information on CVE for both the general public and law enforcement. (Lead: DHS)
- The Treasury will expand its community outreach regarding terrorism financing issues. (Lead: Treasury; Partners: State, DOJ, DHS, FBI, and the U.S. Agency for International Development)³
- Depending on local circumstances and in consultation with the FBI, U.S. Attorneys will coordinate, as appropriate, any efforts to expand connections and partnerships at the local level for CVE, supported by the National Task Force where needed. (Lead: DOJ; Partners: All)
- Departments and agencies will expand engagement with the business community by educating companies about the threat of violent extremism and by connecting them to community civic activists focused on developing CVE programs and initiatives. (Lead: DHS; Partner: NCTC)

2. Building Government and Law Enforcement Expertise for Preventing Violent Extremism

It is critical that the Federal Government and its local government and law enforcement partners understand what the threat of violent extremism is, and what it is not. This helps ensure that we focus our resources where they are most effective and that we understand how we can best empower and partner with communities. Building expertise necessitates continued research about the dynamics of radicalization to violence and what has worked to prevent violent extremism; sharing this information as widely as possible; and then leveraging it to train government officials and law enforcement.

2.1 Improve our understanding of violent extremism through increased research, analysis, and partnerships with foreign governments, academia, and nongovernmental organizations.

The Federal Government has built a robust analytic program to understand violent extremism that includes analysis; research conducted by academia, think tanks, and industry; and exchanges with international allies to identify best practices. While we have increased our understanding of how individuals are radicalized to violence, we must continue to identify gaps, monitor changes in the dynamics of violent extremism, and remain vigilant by challenging our assumptions and continuing our research and analysis.

Current Activities and Efforts

The United States Government's research capacity on this issue has greatly expanded. DHS and NCTC both have analytic groups exclusively focused on violent extremist radicalization; the Interagency Intelligence Subcommittee on Radicalization helps coordinate and improve CVE intelligence analysis; and we work with foreign governments, academia, and nongovernmental organizations to inform and

3. The U.S. Agency for International Development's role will be limited to sharing relevant information.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

supplement our analysis and understanding. In addition to a large volume of intelligence products on CVE, examples of activities include:

- DHS Science & Technology (S&T) sponsored research on violent extremism in the United States, which it has shared with DHS components and other departments and agencies. Over 20 reports have been produced since 2009 and 5 more will be produced by the end of 2011. DHS is also developing an integrated open source database to help inform CVE programs.
- DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) collaborated with the FBI, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and NCTC to assess the capacity of state correctional institutions to detect and share information regarding individuals who demonstrate behaviors associated with violent extremism while in the correctional system.
- The National Intelligence Council, DHS, FBI, and NCTC briefed fusion centers and law enforcement around the country on violent extremism.
- DHS, in partnership with the FBI and NCTC, developed case studies on preoperational indicators and known threats for State and local law enforcement and affected communities.
- The United States Government held regular exchanges of best practices with Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the European Union, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and other partners to gain comparative insights about what might be effective in the Homeland.
- DHS expanded cooperation between the United States and Canada on CVE research and lessons learned.
- The United States Government participates in the Global Counterterrorism Forum's CVE Working Group.
- As directed in the Fort Hood Follow-on Review, DOD established the Force Protection Senior Steering Group. Among the Steering Group's duties is the coordination of non-traditional partners' activities within DOD (e.g., counterintelligence and behavioral health) to better understand how to identify and prevent all forms of violent extremism—not limited to al-Qa'ida-inspired extremism—within the military, including the potential use of DOD's extensive network of programs designed to support individuals who are potentially at risk of committing acts of violence against themselves, their families, or co-workers.

Future Activities and Efforts

Although we have a better understanding of the threat, there are gaps that need to be addressed through additional research and analysis. In this regard, we will:

- Expand analysis in five priority areas (Leads: DHS, FBI, NCTC, and State):
 1. The role of the Internet in radicalization to violence and how virtual space can be leveraged to counter violent extremism.
 2. Single-actor terrorism (so called "lone wolves"), including lessons learned from similar phenomena such as a school shooters.
 3. Disengagement from terrorism and violent extremism.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

4. Non-al-Qa'ida related radicalization to violence and anticipated future violent extremist threats.
 5. Preoperational indicators and analysis of known case studies of extremist violence in the United States.
- Continue DHS S&T's support for research on countering the threat of extremist violence. (Lead: DHS)
 - Continue DHS collaboration with the FBI, the BOP, and NCTC to: (1) improve awareness of the risk of violent extremism in correctional systems; (2) enhance screening of new inmates to detect individuals associated with violent extremist organizations; (3) improve detection of recruitment efforts within the correctional environment; and (4) increase information sharing, as appropriate, with Federal, State, and local law enforcement about inmates who may have adopted violent extremist beliefs and are being released. (Lead: DHS; Partners: DOJ, FBI, and NCTC)
 - Complete the creation of the FBI CVE Coordination Office to help assess and leverage existing Bureau efforts to better understand and counter violent extremism. (Lead: FBI)
 - Build lines of research specifically to support non-security Federal partners. (Leads: DHS and NCTC; Partners: EDU and HHS)

2.2 Increase Federal Government information sharing with State, local, and tribal governments and law enforcement on terrorist recruitment and radicalization.

As we enhance our partnerships with State, local, and tribal governments and law enforcement to counter violent extremism, it is essential that we share our expertise and insights about the dynamics of radicalization to violence and what has worked to prevent it. This, in turn, will help our partners identify potential areas of collaboration with communities and other local actors.

Current Activities and Efforts

Examples include:

- Based on direction from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), DHS led an effort to improve the analysis of homegrown violent extremism, including analytic tools to share with State, local, and tribal partners. DHS briefed representatives of 47 states on the project.
- DHS generated case studies of known and suspected terrorists and assessments of radicalization to violence, based on recent arrests, to share with local partners.
- FBI disseminated information to public safety partners, including information about radicalization to violence.
- DHS, NCTC, and FBI briefed and disseminated information on how individuals are radicalized to violence to law enforcement, fusion centers, and local government officials, including the Major Cities Chiefs, representatives from 47 states, Mayors' Offices, and State Homeland Security Advisors.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

- In partnership with NCTC, DOJ, DNI, and FBI, DHS led the first National CVE Workshop in August 2011, which brought together intelligence commanders from major metropolitan areas and fusion center directors to increase their understanding of CVE.

Future Activities and Efforts

More work needs to be done to ensure our State, local, and tribal partners have the information they need to counter violent extremism. Classification remains an obstacle to broader sharing with these partners, but we can better ensure that analytic production is tailored to the needs of practitioners in the field. Major work over the next year will focus on creating more analytic products on CVE that directly support local law enforcement and government. Planned actions include:

- Development of an analytic team focused on supporting local government and law enforcement CVE practitioners and increased production of analysis at appropriate classification levels. (Lead: DHS; Partners: FBI and NCTC)
- Development of practitioner-friendly summaries of current research and literature reviews about the motivations and behaviors associated with single-actor terrorism and disengagement from violent extremism. (Lead: DHS)
- Review of information-sharing protocols to identify ways of increasing dissemination of products to State, local, and tribal authorities. (Leads: DHS, DOJ, FBI, and NCTC)
- Expansion of briefings and information sharing about violent extremism with State and local law enforcement and government. (Lead: DHS, FBI, and NCTC)

2.3 Improve the development and use of standardized training with rigorous curricula based on the latest research, which conveys information about violent extremism; improves cultural competency; and imparts best practices and lessons learned for effective community engagement and partnerships.

The Federal Government has expanded and improved training related to CVE over the past year, but challenges remain. In particular, there is a need for a review process and standards for training specific to CVE, which was underscored by a small number of instances of Federally sponsored or funded CVE-related and counterterrorism training that used offensive and inaccurate information, which was inconsistent with our values and core principles. As our National Strategy to Empower Local Partners highlights, “Misinformation about the threat and dynamics of radicalization to violence can harm our security by sending local stakeholders in the wrong direction and unnecessarily creating tensions with potential community partners.” Therefore, improving Federal Government-approved training practices and processes related to CVE is a top priority of this plan.

Current Activities and Efforts

In November 2010, the IPC tasked DHS to form an Interagency Working Group on Training to catalogue and recommend improvements for CVE-related training across government. The Working Group brought together individuals responsible for CVE training and substantive specialists from civil rights and civil liberties offices, Federal law enforcement, and the analytic community. This is part of our overall

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

emphasis on improving the quality and quantity of CVE-related training. Notable accomplishments in our efforts to improve training include:

- Between October 2010 and October 2011, DHS CRCL trained nearly 2,700 law enforcement officials on CVE and cultural awareness at 46 separate events. The training served as the basis for best practices recommended by the Interagency Working Group on Training.
- Based on input from participating agencies, DHS issued CVE training guidance and best practices in October 2011 for Federal, State, local, and tribal government officials charged with organizing training related to CVE, cultural awareness, and counterterrorism.
- The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in October 2011 issued an Information Bulletin on CVE Training, which includes DHS's training guidance and best practices, as well as guidance for State, local, and tribal entities that regularly leverage FEMA grants to fund CVE-related trainings. DHS sent the best practices paper and the FEMA guidance to all DHS grantees, State and local governments, State and local law enforcement, relevant community stakeholders, and interagency partners.
- DHS provided a full-day of training, which included training on cultural competency, civil rights, and civil liberties to Federal, State, local, and tribal partners at 12 fusion centers in the past year and over 30 fusion centers since 2008. These trainings were coupled with 3- to 4-hour CVE training sessions for State and local law enforcement operating in the same state. Additionally, DHS provided "train the trainer" sessions for staff from nearly all fusion centers nationwide.
- DHS, working closely with other departments and agencies, local law enforcement, academics, and curriculum development experts, developed guidelines for a CVE curriculum that focuses on information-driven community-oriented policing practices and how to leverage existing community partnerships to counter violent extremism and violent crime. These guidelines were reviewed and validated in February 2011 at a "proof-of-concept" session at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), which was attended by State, local, and tribal law enforcement executives and frontline officers from rural and major city jurisdictions.
- State, working closely with NCTC and DHS, piloted specialized CVE training for United States Government officials working on CVE in the United States and abroad through its Foreign Service Institute in May 2011. Participation by domestic and international practitioners provided opportunities for exchanging best practices, enhanced the coordination of our Homeland and overseas efforts, and encouraged interagency partnerships.

Future Activities and Efforts

A review process by the Interagency Working Group on Training, as well as internal assessments by departments and agencies, identified two key challenges, which we will address over the next year:

- Many departments and agencies lack a review process for training materials and outside speakers on CVE, which led to a small number of cases of training that violated internal principles as well as core tenets of the National Strategy to Empower Local Partners.

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

- There has been a lack of guidance and standards for training related to CVE, which left field offices, in particular, vulnerable to bad training. Without guidance or standards, it has been difficult to enforce accountability.

We have prioritized addressing these two shortcomings by doing the following:

- Departments and agencies are taking steps to identify training materials that may not meet internal standards and to improve processes for creating and reviewing such materials. Some departments are consulting with outside experts with established reputations to evaluate the content and training review process. Guidance on CVE-related training is being developed and will be issued, both across the organizations and to field components. Some departments may issue this as part of broader training guidance. (Lead: All)
- DHS, via FLETC, is in the process of developing a CVE curriculum to be integrated into existing training programs for Federal law enforcement. The curriculum will give Federal law enforcement a better understanding of CVE and how to more effectively leverage existing local partnerships. (Lead: DHS)
- DHS is in the process of establishing an internal committee to review all directly funded and issued DHS training on cultural competency, engagement, CVE, and counterterrorism. The committee will be responsible for reviewing any new content, evaluating experts, and establishing quality control. FEMA will incorporate the recently released Informational Bulletin and training guidance into FY12 grant guidance and will also leverage existing mechanisms to hold grantees and sub-grantees accountable. (Lead: DHS)

In addition to addressing the quality issue, we will work to expand the quantity of training.

- DHS, in partnership with the Los Angeles Police Department and the National Consortium for Advanced Policing, is developing a CVE curriculum that includes a 16-hour continuing education module for executive and frontline officers, as well as a 30-minute module that will be introduced at police academies. Both will be certified by the Police Officers Standards and Training Council. In October 2011 the Major Cities Chiefs Association passed a motion to adopt and implement the DHS CVE curriculum, which will be piloted with State and local law enforcement in San Diego by the end of 2011. By 2013, DHS seeks to: (1) implement the curriculum across the country on a regional basis; (2) develop a national network of trainers and subject matter experts who can administer the training and keep it current; and (3) build an online component for the curriculum. (Lead: DHS; Partners: DOJ and NCTC)
- DHS, via FLETC, will update current Federal training programs to integrate the CVE curriculum for Federal law enforcement in the coming year. (Lead: DHS)
- DHS is working with European law enforcement partners to share best practices and case studies to improve training, community policing, and operational information sharing. (Lead: DHS)
- DHS CRCL is expanding and institutionalizing its CVE and cultural competence training curricula to further enhance the material and its effectiveness. (Lead: DHS)

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

- The Interagency Working Group on Training will facilitate a “train the trainer program” to increase the reach of CVE training. (Leads: DHS and NCTC; Partners: DOJ, EDU, HHS, and FBI)
- The Interagency Working Group on Training will facilitate the development of an online training program that provides professional development credit for a broad range of professions, particularly those involved with public safety, violence prevention, and resilience. This will help build a basic understanding of CVE among a broad cross-section of stakeholders who have related mandates. (Leads: DHS and NCTC; Partners: DOJ, FBI, EDU, and HHS)
- The Interagency Working Group on Training will collaborate with non-security partners, such as EDU, to build CVE training modules that can be incorporated, as appropriate, into existing programs related to public safety, violence prevention, and resilience. These modules will be crafted in a way that is relevant to the specific audiences and their missions. Only trainers who have undergone CVE-specific training will deliver training programs that include CVE modules. (Lead: DHS; Partners: DOJ, EDU, HHS, FBI, and NCTC)
- DOD’s training programs and curricula will be informed by the work of the Interagency Working Group on Training, as appropriate. Additionally, DOD is conducting a review of CVE-related curricula and will make revisions and adjustments as necessary. (Lead: DOD; Partner DHS)

3. Countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals

As the National Counterterrorism Strategy emphasizes, “[t]he United States was founded upon a belief in a core set of values that is written into our founding documents and woven into the very fabric of our society. Where terrorists offer injustice, disorder, and destruction the United States must stand for freedom, fairness, equality, dignity, hope, and opportunity. The power and appeal of our values enables the United States to build a broad coalition to act collectively against the common threat posed by terrorists, further delegitimizing, isolating, and weakening our adversaries.”

Countering the ideologies and narratives that legitimize violence is central to our effort, but it also is the most challenging area of work, requiring careful consideration of a number of legal issues, especially those related to the First Amendment. In many instances, it will be more effective to empower communities to develop credible alternatives that challenge violent extremist narratives rather than having the Federal Government attempt to do so.

Our efforts include not only challenging justifications for violence, but affirming American ideals of inclusiveness and opportunity as well. Violent extremist narratives feed on disenchantment and the sense of exclusion. Our efforts therefore must include positive affirmation of our unity as a country. To some extent, this is addressed through our engagement activities, particularly where they address challenges facing all communities and not just those targeted by violent extremist radicalization. But there are also situations where we will need to more directly challenge violent extremist narratives.

3.1 Increase the capacity of communities to directly challenge violent extremist ideologies and narratives.

While the government cannot always directly contest violent extremist ideas, it can support capacity building within communities to take on this role. Whereas sub-objective 1.2 emphasizes preventative

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

measures and a defensive posture to build capacity for enhancing community resilience, sub-objective 3.1 focuses on increasing the ability of communities to push back against violent extremist propaganda.

Current Activities and Efforts

Most of our work in this area to date has focused on connecting community activists to potential civil society and private sector partners to focus specifically on undermining violent extremist narratives. Over the past year, we have taken the following steps:

- NCTC in 2010 developed a Community Awareness Briefing (CAB) to inform members of the public about efforts by al-Qa'ida and its adherents and affiliates to recruit Americans. The CAB highlights recruiting videos and examples of violent extremist propaganda, while underscoring the fact that these materials are often easily available on the Internet. Most importantly, the CAB aims to facilitate a discussion about what government and communities can do, together and independently, to counter the threat of violent extremist narratives. NCTC continues to deliver the presentation at forums composed of community leaders, educators, and parents in cities across the United States. In March 2011, NCTC held a workshop for local, State, and field-based Federal officials on how the CAB could be used in engagement efforts, when it makes sense and is appropriate.
- NCTC connected civic activists with technology experts, resulting in a training seminar on how to maximize the use of technology to counter violent extremism online.
- State sponsored speaker series and exchanges between international CVE practitioners and American communities targeted by violent extremist recruiters to better understand effective models for countering violent extremist narratives.

Future Activities and Efforts

This is a nascent area of effort and therefore will necessitate greater focus over the next year. Our planned actions include:

- Expanding efforts to raise community awareness about the threat of radicalization to violence, building from the experience of the CAB, and adapting those materials for different audiences where appropriate. (Leads: DOJ, DHS, FBI, and NCTC)
- Learning from former violent extremists, specifically those who can speak credibly to counter violent narratives, provide insights to government, and potentially catalyze activities to directly challenge violent extremist narratives. (Lead: DHS; Partner: NCTC)
- Providing grants to counter violent extremist narratives and ideologies, within authorities and relevant legal parameters, by reprioritizing or increasing the flexibility of existing funding. (Lead: DHS)
- Brokering connections between private sector actors, civil society, and communities interested in countering violent extremist narratives. (Lead: DHS; Partner: NCTC)
- Promoting international exchange programs to build expertise for countering violent extremist narratives. (Lead: State; Partners: DOJ, DHS, FBI, and NCTC)

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

- Increasing technical training to empower communities to counter violent extremists online, including the development of training for bloggers. (Lead: DHS; Partners: State, NCTC, and FBI)

3.2 Improve and increase our communication to the American public about the threat posed by violent extremist groups, myths and misperceptions about violent extremist radicalization, and what we are doing to counter the threat.

It is important that we communicate to the American public the realities of what the threat is, and what it is not. Misconceptions about the threat and statements and actions that cast suspicion on entire communities based on the actions of a few distract attention from the real threat and can undermine our ability to build partnerships. An informed citizenry enhances our national security.

Current Activities and Efforts

In 2011, the Federal Government focused on developing its approach to domestic CVE and communicating this to the American public. This involved briefings to Congress, public addresses, and media interviews. We will continue these activities.

Future Activities and Efforts

In 2012, we will work to expand our efforts to raise awareness in the general public about radicalization to violence in the United States and the tools to prevent it by:

- Providing regular briefings to Congress, think tanks, and members of the media. (Lead: DHS; Partners: DOJ, FBI, and NCTC)
- Creating programs to directly engage the public on the issue. (Lead: All)
- Building a public website on community resilience and CVE. (Lead: DHS)

3.3 Build a strategy to leverage new technologies and address online violent extremist radicalization

The Internet has become an increasingly potent element in radicalization to violence, enabling violent extremists abroad to directly communicate to target audiences in the United States. This direct communication allows violent extremists to bypass parents and community leaders. The SIP specifically addresses the online arena in several sub-objectives, but because of the importance of the digital environment, we will develop a separate, more comprehensive strategy for countering and preventing violent extremist online radicalization and leveraging technology to empower community resilience that considers: (1) the latest assessment of the role of the Internet; (2) the absence of clear national boundaries in online space and the relationship between international and domestic radicalization to violence; (3) relevant legal issues; and (4) the differing authorities and capabilities of departments and agencies.

Conclusion

Protecting our Nation's communities from violent extremist recruitment and radicalization is a top national security priority. It is an effort that requires creativity, diligence, and commitment to our fundamental rights and principles. In his cover letter to the National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners, President Obama wrote:

STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES

Sadly, the threat of violent extremism in America is nothing new. Throughout our history, misguided groups—including international and domestic terrorist organizations, neo-Nazis and anti-Semitic hate groups—have engaged in horrific violence to kill our citizens and threaten our way of life. Most recently, al-Qa’ida and its affiliates have attempted to recruit and radicalize people to terrorism here in the United States, as we have seen in several plots and attacks, including the deadly attack 2 years ago on our service members at Fort Hood. As a government, we are working to prevent all types of extremism that leads to violence, regardless of who inspires it.

—President Barack Obama, August 3, 2011

A complex issue like violent extremist radicalization and recruitment requires a nuanced path to guide a whole-of-government approach. The SIP outlines this path and facilitates a division of labor by assigning responsibilities between Federal Government departments, agencies, and components focused on law enforcement and national security and those whose efforts support, but do not directly lie within, these areas.

Homeland Security Advisory Council Meeting

12:00 pm-3:30 pm, January 9, 2012, TSA HQ, 601 South 12th St., East Bldg, Crystal City

LOGISTICS:

Closed Session/Secret Level:

- 12:00 p.m. Secretary Napolitano will speak about 2012 Secretarial Initiatives
- 1:00 p.m. Working Lunch - (b)(6) will speak about TSA Risk-Based Security
- 1:45 p.m. BREAK
- **2:10 p.m.** You and (b)(6) are introduced by (b)(6)
- **2:15 p.m.** You discuss your role as the CVE Coordinator at DHS and your joint efforts with the NSS, NCTC, DOJ, and the FBI to implement the SIP
- **3:30 p.m.** You depart from the meeting

You will be speaking to an in-person meeting of the HSAC and there will be time for questions following your briefing. The (b)(6) the (b)(6) (b)(6) and all of the HSAC members will be present. Additionally, there will be 25 DHS personnel attending the meeting. The HSAC meeting will be held at the secret level.

DECISION POINTS OR ASKS:

- Announce the newly released National CVE SIP and discuss efforts to work with the White House, interagency, and State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial partners to implement the SIP.
 - Note that DHS, NCTC, DOJ, and the FBI have formed a small working group to meet on a weekly basis to ensure the priorities in the SIP are implemented in a timely manner.
 - Mention that the SIP action items fulfill a number of the HSAC CVE Working Group Recommendations.
- Announce that DHS, in conjunction with the NSS and interagency, has implemented a number of the HSAC CVE Working Group Recommendations, including: 1) Developing CVE training for law enforcement and communities; 2) Creating best practices for law enforcement agencies and the community; 3) Working with DOJ to better incorporate community-oriented policing efforts; 4) Establishing information-driven, community-based violent crime reduction capabilities; 5) Developing common terminology; 6) Expanding CRCL engagements; and 7) Developing case studies.
- Highlight the following key CVE milestones:
 - **SAR Training:** Over 181,000 Law Enforcement officials have been trained on the DHS-DOJ led Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative.
 - **Curriculum Development:** DHS is working to pilot two curriculum efforts by the end of February, 2012: 1) FLETC's curriculum for federal officers, to be piloted in Glynco, GA in February, 2012; and 2) LAPD and the National Consortium for Advanced Policing (NCAP)'s State and Local curriculum for Academies and the 16-hour continuing education block for frontline officers, to be piloted in San Diego by the end of January.
Note: The Major City Chiefs (MCC) passed a motion to adopt the new SLTT CVE Curriculum at all of their Law Enforcement Academies by the end of 2012.
Note: These trainings fulfill a major HSAC CVE recommendation.
 - **S&T Reports:** Since 2009, S&T has produced over 20 reports on violent extremism.

- **CRCL Roundtables:** In 2011, CRCL doubled its engagement efforts and conducted over 72 community engagement events.
- **CVE Website:** DHS created a CVE website with best practices and CVE resources for Federal and SLTT officials. The website can be accessed at www.dhs.gov/cve
- **International CVE Coordination:** DHS has worked with several international partners (Canada, Germany, Belgium, the UK) and has launched a major information sharing initiative with Europol, and will host a delegation of Europol/EU Members in January.
- **CVE Conference:** DHS held a CVE conference for over 200 SLTT partners in Columbus, OH in August, 2011.
- **Grant Guidance:** DHS is working to incorporate CVE language into 2012 grant guidance.

SIP TALKING POINTS:

- On December 8, 2011, after 5 months of planning and consultation with interagency partners, the White House released the Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for the Administration's CVE Strategy.
- The SIP lists the current and future actions the USG will take in support of a locally-focused, community-based approach, in three broad areas:
 - **Enhancing Engagement with and support to local communities:** Our aims in engaging with communities to discuss violent extremism are to (1) share sound, meaningful, and timely information about the threat of radicalization to violence with a wide range of groups and organizations; (2) respond to concerns about government policies and actions; and (3) better understand how we can effectively support community-based solutions.
 - **Building Government and Law Enforcement Expertise:** We are building robust training programs to ensure that communities, government, and law enforcement receive accurate, intelligence-based information about the dynamics of violent extremism. Misinformation about the threat and poor training harms our security by sending stakeholders in the wrong direction and creating tensions with communities.
 - **Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda while Promoting our Ideals:** We will aggressively counter violent extremist ideologies – including on the Internet – by educating and empowering communities and promoting our ideals. In the case of our current priority, we will, through our words and deeds, rebut al-Qa'ida's lie that the United States is somehow at war with Islam.
- The SIP Approach underscores the strength of community-based problem solving, local partnerships, and community-oriented policing. We are building our efforts from existing structures, while creating capacity to fill gaps as we implement programs.

KEY BACKGROUND INFORMATION:

The HSAC is an organizationally independent advisory board of highly-distinguished leaders from state and local government, first responder communities, the private sector, and academia which provide you with recommendations and strategic guidance.

In January 2011, Secretary Napolitano announced the National Terrorism Advisory System, which was informed by the HSAC's Homeland Security Advisory System Task Force. In August 2011, DHS and the White House announced the Department and Administration's

approach to Countering Violent Extremism. These documents were informed by the HSAC's Countering Violent Extremism working group that put forth recommendations in May 2010. A number of the HSAC CVE recommendations have been implemented and are also included in the SIP.

IF ASKED:

- **Which of the HSAC CVE Working Group Recommendations have been implemented?**
 - DHS, in conjunction with the White House, NCTC, DOJ, and the FBI, has implemented a number of priorities in the SIP, including the following: 1) Developing CVE training for law enforcement and communities; 2) Creating best practices for law enforcement agencies and the community; 3) Working with DOJ to better incorporate community-oriented policing efforts; 4) Establishing information-driven, community-based violent crime reduction capabilities; 5) Developing common terminology; 6) Expanding CRCL engagements; and 7) Developing case studies.
- **How is DHS working to implement the priorities in the SIP?**
 - DHS' Internal CVE Working Group meets weekly to ensure the priorities of the SIP are being implemented and is tracking the progress of each individual priority. DHS, NCTC, DOJ, and the FBI have also formed a small working group which meets on a weekly basis to ensure the priorities in the SIP are implemented in a timely manner. The interagency also coordinated the development of the SIP through the multiple Deputies Breakfast meetings, and will continue to advance the SIP goals through these meetings.
- **How is DHS ensuring that its training and curriculum development is coordinated with the interagency and meets the mutual standards agreed upon by the interagency?**
 - DHS created a CVE Curriculum Working Group on September 17, 2010, chaired by LAPD Deputy Chief Michael Downing, as a result of the HSAC recommendations that were issued in August, 2010, and this Curriculum Working Group was comprised of representatives from the federal government and state and local law enforcement entities. This working group discussed best practices for community policing and created a new curriculum guidance based on mutually agreed upon standards and definitions.
 - DHS is currently establishing an internal training review process that will look at all DHS provided and funded CVE trainings; it will ensure that all DHS trainings are in line with Department and Administration approach on CVE.
 - FEMA issued an informational bulletin to all grantees, state and local partners, and law enforcement outlining how training and trainers should accurate, intelligence driven, legally following civil rights and civil liberties protections, and operationally sound.
 - The guidance is based off the work of the Interagency Law Enforcement Training Working Group that is lead by DHS and continues to meet.

ATTACHMENTS:

- A. Draft Agenda for January 9th HSAC Meeting
- B. HSAC Member Biographies
- C. HSAC CVE Working Group Recommendations
- D. National CVE SIP

Staff Responsible for Briefing Memo: Caroline Simmons, CT Working Group, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Page 1 of 7

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 2 of 7

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 3 of 7

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 4 of 7

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 5 of 7

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 6 of 7

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

Page 7 of 7

Withheld pursuant to exemption

(b)(5)

of the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act

From:	(b)(6)
To:	"Snyder, Nathaniel" (b)(6) (b)(6)
Subject:	Re: Thank you and moving forward
Date:	2011/10/21 16:54:13
Type:	Note

Looks good..we will format the report and show it to you before it goes out. Did you see the GAO questions? They asked for this report.

All the best,

(b)(6)

On Oct 21, 2011, at 12:46 PM, "Snyder, Nathaniel" (b)(6)

(b)(6) - Sorry for the delay.

>

> Here is the list of both the DHS CVE Curriculum Development Working Group that Chief Downing chaired for us, and the participants at the FLETC 'proof of concept' session who validated and had further comments on the curriculum development guidance document.

>

> I apologize for any duplicates.

>

> FLETC Proof of Concept Participants

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

- > Irfan Saeed - Senior Policy Advisor, DHS
- > Gary Schenkel - SLLE , DHS
- > Nathaniel Snyder – Special Advisor for Community Partnership and Strategic Engagement, DHS
- > Patrick McQuillan - Policy Director, DHS

(b)(6)

COPS, DOJ- COPS

(b)(6)

- > DHS CVE Curriculum Working Group Participants

> (b)(6)

- > Kevin Livingston – Deputy Associate Director FLETC
- > David Bynum – Program Specialist for CT Division FLETC
- > Arthur Roderick – Law Enforcement Policy Advisor FLETC
- > Chris Logan – FEMA PNP

(b)(6)

- > Irfan Saeed – Senior Policy Advisor DHS-CRCL

(b)(6)

Spec.Asst. to the Director Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

> (b)(6)

- > Kate Black – Office of the Program Manager Information Sharing Environment

(b)(6)

>

>

>

> From: (b)(6)

> Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2011 5:15 PM

> To: Snyder, Nathaniel

> Subject: RE: Thank you and moving forward

>

> Sure. That's fine, and thanks!

>

> All the best,

> CBD

> From: Snyder, Nathaniel (b)(6)
> Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2011 4:38 PM
> To: (b)(6)
> Subject: Re: Thank you and moving forward

(b)(6) I have a list for you that I am finalizing. Can I get it to you tomorrow AM?

- > Nate Snyder
- > US Dept of Homeland Security
- > Cell: (b)(6)
- > Email: [REDACTED]
- > JWI: [REDACTED]
- > Message sent via BlackBerry

> From: (b)(6)
> Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2011 06:31 PM
> To: Snyder, Nathaniel <(b)(6)>
> Subject: RE: Thank you and moving forward

> Great – FYI I will put it into a document for GAO. BTW, here are the sort of questions they are asking....

> General Questions

> 1. Since 9/11, efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE), have become a staple of state and municipal law enforcement operations. What challenges have MCC member cities faced to integrate these efforts into their law enforcement agendas?

> a. What is the MCC's perspective on the potential threat and prevalence of "home grown" violent extremists?

- > b. Is the threat of “home grown terrorists” perceived as a major emerging issue for any of the MCC’s member cities?
- >
- > c. The White house recently released its strategy to counter violent extremism which includes:
 - >
 - > i. enhancing federal engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted for violent extremists,
 - >
 - > ii. building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism, and
 - >
 - > iii. countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting ideals.
- >
- > Are you familiar with this strategy? Does the MCC have any views on this approach?
- >
- >
- >
- > 2. Are there any specific CVE strategies or models that are generally supported by the MCC or the law enforcement community as a whole?
- >
- > a. With what domestic efforts for combating violent extremism or homegrown terrorism has the MCC played a direct role (e.g., programs, grants, initiatives)?
- >
- > b. Please describe these efforts and the extent to which you or your organization is involved with them.
- >
- > c. To what extent are these efforts federally funded or supported (e.g., through grants)?
- >
- > d. To what extent do these efforts focus specifically on countering violent extremism?
- >
- >
- >
- > Training-related Questions
- >
- > 3. To what extent, if at all, does the MCC provide, facilitate, or otherwise participate in training for state and local law enforcement concerning violent extremism?
- >
- > a. What is the focus of each curriculum and by whom and to whom is it provided?
- >
- > b. What qualifications are generally required of the instructors?
- >
- > c. What steps, if any, does the MCC take to ensure the quality of its training?
- >
- >
- >
- > 4. If applicable, how does the MCC develop curriculum and determine course content?

- >
- > a. Are there any specific training models or teaching strategies to which the MCC subscribes?
- >
- > b. How does the MCC determine what constitutes appropriate and effective content for a training program intended to educate state and local partners about violent extremism?
- >
- > c. To what extent is the federal government involved in developing the content and curriculum of training courses related to violent extremism that are supported by federal funds?
- >
- > d. What steps, if any, does the federal government take action to ensure the quality of this training?
- >
- > e. Could you provide us with examples or copies of select courses?
- >
- > f. Can you identify any specific training programs or courses offered by the MCC or any other entity that you think are particularly effective or ineffective? Why?

>

>

>

>

>

> From: Snyder, Nathaniel (b)(6)

> Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2011 6:27 PM

> To: (b)(6)

> Subject: RE: Thank you and moving forward

>

(b)(6) - I have this list plus the list that was the initial CVE curriculum development working group.

>

(b)(6) wants to touch base with me in the AM tomorrow and we will get a definitive answer to you ASAP!

>

>

> From: (b)(6)

> Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2011 6:13 PM

> To: Snyder, Nathaniel

> Subject: FW: Thank you and moving forward

>

> Nate

>

> Do you have a minute to chat – this is the list for the Working Group that we have used in the past.

>

> From: "Snyder, Nathaniel" (b)(6)

> Date: February 18, 2011 2:10:14 PM PST

> To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

> Subject: Thank you and moving forward

>

> All – I wanted to thank you all again for participating the in the session at FLETC. Thank you to FLETC and staff for making the session possible and for all of the accommodations; and thank you to Chief Downing who has been driving and guiding the development effort along with development team members, including everyone on this email.

>

> We covered a lot during the session and discussed many best practices, programs, ideas moving forward and ideas that need further clarification. We were able have honest conversations on what works and what will not and does not work. We were able to tackle definitions that need clarity and new ones that need to be elaborated. Everyone's individual points of view and subject matter expertise made it possible.

>

> Because we had participation from agencies large and small and staff from executive to line officer the feedback we were able to collect was a wealth of knowledge that will continue to guide this curriculum development process.

>

> All that being said, this is just the beginning of the conversation; many conversations are yet to be had. We especially want to keep the conversation flowing with this group. Already

participants are sharing best practices and new ideas that were spurned from the session at FLETC. It would be great if we could continue to share best practices and ideas among this group.

>

> As for next steps in the process, we are working to compile everything that was shared and learned. The amount of information is vast. We would then like to continue to get everyone's input and insight moving forward.

>

> Until then I have pasted a simple table below of everyone's information so that you all can stay in contact with one another.

>

> I will be in touch, please do not hesitate to contact me.

>

> Thanks,

>

> -Nate

>

>

> Agency

>

> City

>

> State

>

> First Name

>

> Last Name

>

> Title

>

> Email Address

>

> DHS

>

> Washington

>

> DC

>

(b)(6)

>

> IGA

>

(b)(6)

> DHS

>
> Washington
>
> DC
>
> Irfan
>
> Saeed
>
> Senior Policy Advisor
>

(b)(6)

>
> DHS
>
> Washington
>
> DC
>

(b)(6)

>
> DHS
>
> Washington
>
> DC
>
> Nathaniel
>
> Snyder
>
> White House Liaison (acting)
>

(b)(6)

>
> DHS
>
> Washington
>
> DC

(b)(6)



(b)(6)



(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)



(b)(6)



(b)(6)



(b)(6)



[illegible]

(b)(6)

✓
✓

Sender:	(b)(6)
Recipient:	"Snyder, Nathaniel </O=DHS.ORG/OU=E2K3 ADMIN (b)(6)
Sent Date:	2011/10/21 16:53:08
Delivered Date:	2011/10/21 16:54:13

From:	(b)(6)
To:	"Snyder, Nathaniel </O=DHS.ORG/OU=E2K3 ADMIN (b)(6)>
Subject:	RE: Thank you and moving forward
Date:	2011/10/20 17:14:55
Type:	Note

Sure. That's fine, and thanks!

All the best,

(b)(6)

From: Snyder, Nathaniel (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 20, 2011 4:38 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Thank you and moving forward

(b)(6) - I have a list for you that I am finalizing. Can I get it to you tomorrow AM?

Nate Snyder
US Dept of Homeland Security
Cell: (b)(6)
Email: (b)(6)
JWID (b)(6)
Message sent via BlackBerry

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2011 06:31 PM
To: Snyder, Nathaniel (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Thank you and moving forward

Great – FYI I will put it into a document for GAO. BTW, here are the sort of questions they are asking....

General Questions

1. Since 9/11, efforts to counter violent extremism (CVE), have become a staple of state and municipal law enforcement operations. What challenges have MCC member cities faced to integrate these efforts into their law enforcement agendas?
 - a. What is the MCC's perspective on the potential threat and prevalence of "home grown" violent extremists?
 - b. Is the threat of "home grown terrorists" perceived as a major emerging issue for any of the MCC's member cities?
 - c. The White house recently released its strategy to counter violent extremism which includes:
 - i. enhancing federal engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted for violent extremists,
 - ii. building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism, and
 - iii. countering violent extremist propaganda while promoting ideals.

Are you familiar with this strategy? Does the MCC have any views on this approach?

2. Are there any specific CVE strategies or models that are generally supported by the MCC or the law enforcement community as a whole?
 - a. With what domestic efforts for combating violent extremism or homegrown terrorism has the MCC played a direct role (e.g., programs, grants, initiatives)?
 - b. Please describe these efforts and the extent to which you or your organization is involved with them.
 - c. To what extent are these efforts federally funded or supported (e.g., through grants)?
 - d. To what extent do these efforts focus specifically on countering violent extremism?

Training-related Questions

3. To what extent, if at all, does the MCC provide, facilitate, or otherwise participate in training for state and local law enforcement concerning violent extremism?
 - a. What is the focus of each curriculum and by whom and to whom is it provided?
 - b. What qualifications are generally required of the instructors?
 - c. What steps, if any, does the MCC take to ensure the quality of its training?
4. If applicable, how does the MCC develop curriculum and determine course content?

- a. Are there any specific training models or teaching strategies to which the MCC subscribes?
- b. How does the MCC determine what constitutes appropriate and effective content for a training program intended to educate state and local partners about violent extremism?
- c. To what extent is the federal government involved in developing the content and curriculum of training courses related to violent extremism that are supported by federal funds?
- d. What steps, if any, does the federal government take action to ensure the quality of this training?
- e. Could you provide us with examples or copies of select courses?
- f. Can you identify any specific training programs or courses offered by the MCC or any other entity that you think are particularly effective or ineffective? Why?

From: Snyder, Nathaniel (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2011 6:27 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Thank you and moving forward

(b)(6) – I have this list plus the list that was the initial CVE curriculum development working group.

(b)(6) wants to touch base with me in the AM tomorrow and we will get a definitive answer to you ASAP!

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, October 19, 2011 6:13 PM
To: Snyder, Nathaniel
Subject: FW: Thank you and moving forward

Nate

Do you have a minute to chat – this is the list for the Working Group that we have used in the past.

From: "Snyder, Nathaniel" (b)(6)
Date: February 18, 2011 2:10:14 PM PST
To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Thank you and moving forward

All – I wanted to thank you all again for participating the in the session at FLETC. Thank you to FLETC and staff for making the session possible and for all of the accommodations; and thank you to Chief Downing who has been driving and guiding the development effort along with development team members, including everyone on this email.

We covered a lot during the session and discussed many best practices, programs, ideas moving forward and ideas that need further clarification. We were able have honest conversations on what works and what will not and does not work. We were able to tackle definitions that need clarity and new ones that need to be elaborated. Everyone's individual points of view and subject matter expertise made it possible.

Because we had participation from agencies large and small and staff from executive to line officer the feedback we were able to collect was a wealth of knowledge that will continue to guide this curriculum development process.

All that being said, this is just the beginning of the conversation; many conversations are yet to be had. We especially want to keep the conversation flowing with this group. Already participants are sharing best practices and new ideas that were spurned from the session at FLETC. It would be great if we could continue to share best practices and ideas among this group.

As for next steps in the process, we are working to compile everything that was shared and learned. The amount of information is vast. We would then like to continue to get everyone's input and insight moving forward.

Until then I have pasted a simple table below of everyone's information so that you all can stay in contact with one another.

I will be in touch, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Thanks,

-Nate

Agency	City	State	First Name	Last Name	Title
DHS	Washington	DC	Fayrouz	Saad	IGA
DHS	Washington	DC	Irfan	Saeed	Senior Policy Advisor
DHS	Washington	DC	Gary	Schenkel	SLLE
DHS	Washington	DC	Nathaniel	Snyder	White House Liaison (a
DHS	Washington	DC	Patrick	McQuillan	Policy Director
DOJ- COPS	Washington	DC	(b)(6)		
DOJ-BJA	Washington	DC			
Freedom and Justice Foundation	Dallas	TX			
IACP	Alexandria	VA			
LSU-NCBRT	Baton Rouge	LA			
NCAP	Los Angeles	CA			
Brunswick Police Department	Brunswick	GA			
Camden County Sheriff's Department	Woodbine	GA			
Chicago Police Department	Chicago	IL			
Chicago Police Department	Chicago	IL			
Dearborn Police Department	Dearborn	MI			
Dearborn Police Department	Dearborn	MI			
Dearborn Police Department	Dearborn	MI			
Hennepin County Sheriff's Office	Minneapolis	MN			
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department	Los Angeles	CA			
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department	Los Angeles	CA			
Los Angeles Police Department	Los Angeles	CA			
Los Angeles Police Department	Los Angeles	CA			
Los Angeles Police Department	Los Angeles	CA			
Los Angeles Police Department	Los Angeles	CA			
LSU-NCBRT Subject Matter Expert	Baton Rouge	LA			
Minneapolis Police Department	Minneapolis	MN			
Minneapolis Police Department	Minneapolis	MN			

NYPD	New York	NY
Oneida Police Department	Oneida	WI
St. Paul Police Department	St Paul	MN
St. Paul Police Department	St Paul	MN

(b)(6)

Nate Snyder

US Department of Homeland Security
Acting White House Liaison

(b)(6)

Sender:	(b)(6)
Recipient:	"Snyder, Nathaniel </O=DHS ORG/OU=E2K3 ADMIN (b)(6)
Sent Date:	2011/10/20 17:14:41
Delivered Date:	2011/10/20 17:14:55



American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat

Jerome P. Bjelopera

Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism

November 15, 2011

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

R41416

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

DHS-01-425-004040

Page 1 of 145

Summary

From May 2009 through October 2011, arrests were made for 32 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in Texas and Abdulhakim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR—and produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes (9/11) through April 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks, and no more than six plots occurred in a single year (2006). The apparent spike in such activity from May 2009 to October 2011 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny minority—continue to be susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad.

This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. For this report, “homegrown” and “domestic” are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity.

The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities. **Appendix A** provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress.

There is an “executive summary” at the beginning that summarizes the report’s findings, observations, and policy considerations for Congress.

Contents

Executive Summary	1
Homegrown Jihadist Terrorists: The Problem	1
How Do People Become Violent Jihadists?	2
Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots	2
Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists	3
Preventive Policing	3
State and Local Authorities	4
Investigative Approaches	4
Trust and Partnership.....	4
Balancing Security and Liberty.....	4
Issues for Congress.....	5
Introduction.....	6
Homegrown Violent Jihadists	7
Shortcomings and Strengths	8
Radicalization and Violent Extremism	12
From Radicalization to Violent Extremism	12
Forces and Factors in the Forging of Terrorists.....	14
Intermediaries.....	14
Social Networks	19
The Internet	21
Jailhouse Jihadism.....	23
Overview of Post-9/11 Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism Plots and Attacks.....	25
Overarching Themes.....	25
A Variety of Endgames.....	26
Little Stomach for Suicide or Martyrdom	33
The Success of Lone Wolves.....	34
Varied Capabilities	34
Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Enforcement Activities	36
Intelligence Approaches	37
Preventive Policing	38
The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement.....	43
Investigative Approaches.....	46
The Capone Approach.....	46
Agent Provocateur Cases	48
Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Building Trust and Partnership.....	53
Engagement with Communities.....	53
Federal Activities.....	55
State and Local Government Activities.....	60
Muslim Community Activities	61
Risks and Challenges	62
The Tension Between Enforcement and Engagement Activities.....	63
Policy Considerations for Congress.....	68
Implementing the Administration's CVE Strategy and Developing a Cohesive Domestic Intelligence Program	68

Implementing the CVE Strategy	69
Enhancing Domestic Intelligence.....	72

Figures

Figure 1. Counterterrorism Context.....	37
Figure B-1. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11: Terrorist Profile and Training	138
Figure B-2. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11: Targets, Endgames, and Investigative Tools	140

Appendixes

Appendix A. Summary of Post-9/11 Homegrown Violent Jihadist Terrorist Plots.....	74
Appendix B. Figures	138

Contacts

Author Contact Information.....	141
Acknowledgments	141

Executive Summary

This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. It discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorist activity and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities.

The report does not address terrorist activity against the United States conducted by foreigners, such as the airline bombing attempts by Farouk Abdulmutallab (Christmas Day 2009), the perpetrators of the Transatlantic Airlines plot (August 2006), or the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid (December 2001). Nor does the report address domestic terrorism attributed to violent extremists inspired by right-wing or left-wing ideologies and environmental, animal rights, or anti-abortion causes.

Specific plots and attacks are described throughout the report to support analytic findings. A full description of each of the post-9/11 cases is provided in **Appendix A** of the report. The report also offers policy considerations for Congress.

Homegrown Jihadist Terrorists: The Problem

“Homegrown” is the term that describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph.

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that there have been 53 homegrown violent jihadist plots or attacks in the United States since September 11, 2001 (9/11).¹ As part of a much-discussed apparent expansion of terrorist activity in the United States, from May 2009 through October 2011, arrests were made for 32 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks. Most of the 2009-2011 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist activity away from schemes directed by core members of significant terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.

Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when compared to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Homegrown violent jihadists, some say, possibly lack deep understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making. They may not have the financing, training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in international organizations. These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent jihadists from independently engaging in large-scale suicide strikes. Because of this, they may turn to violence requiring less preparation, such as assaults using firearms. These shortcomings pose challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting,

¹ Throughout this report, plots involving persons indicted at either the federal or state level are discussed. This report does not presume the guilt of indicted individuals in pending cases.

preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. It is likely much harder to detect smaller conspiracies that can develop quickly.

How Do People Become Violent Jihadists?

Individuals can become jihadist terrorists by radicalizing and then adopting violence as a tactic. “Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding extremist, or jihadist *beliefs*. This activity is not necessarily illegal. For this report, “violent extremism” describes *violent action* taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs. For many, “violent extremism” is synonymous with “violent jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.” In other words, when someone moves from simply believing in jihad to illegally pursuing it via violent methods, he becomes a terrorist. Because the move from belief to violence is so individualized, there is no single path that individuals follow to become full-fledged terrorists.

Intermediaries, social networks, the Internet, and prisons have been cited as playing key roles in the radicalization process. Intermediaries—charismatic individuals—often help persuade previously law-abiding citizens to radicalize or even become violent jihadists. Social networks, virtual or actual, support and reinforce the decisions individuals make as they embrace violent jihad, as does perusal of online materials. While there has been much discussion regarding the powerful influence online jihadist material may have on the formation of terrorists, no consensus has emerged regarding the Web and terrorism. Prisons, seen by some as potential hotbeds of radicalization, have not played a large role in producing homegrown jihadists.

Analysis of Homegrown Jihadist Plots

Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. No workable general profile of domestic violent jihadists exists. According to CRS analysis, the 53 plots since 9/11 exhibit four broad themes: a variety of endgames, little stomach for suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and a wide range of capabilities among the plots.

- **Endgames:** Sixteen plots involved individuals exclusively interested in becoming foreign fighters in conflict zones involving violent jihad abroad. Fifteen plots exclusively intended to use explosives or incendiary devices. Three exclusively intended to use or did use firearms. Nineteen attacks and plots incorporated multiple, unspecific, or unique tactics. Finally, outside of the 53 violent plots since 9/11, other schemes intended from the start only to fund or materially support the activities of their jihadist colleagues.
- **Suicide or Martyrdom:** According to publicly available information, only nine plots included individuals who clearly professed interest in killing themselves while engaged in violent jihad.
- **Success of Lone Wolves:** Lone wolves conducted all four successful homegrown attacks since 9/11.
- **Divergent Capabilities:** Among the 53 homegrown plots since 9/11, the operational capabilities of participants diverged greatly. Some evinced terrorist tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others appeared to be far less experienced.

Combating Homegrown Violent Jihadists

The spate of recent arrests should not obscure the challenges facing law enforcement in disrupting homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism activity exists within two broad contexts. The first of these involves addressing radicalization, much of which occurs in the open marketplace of ideas. The second context is more “operational” and encompasses both violent jihadist plots—largely involving secretive illegal activity—and the police work used to dismantle them. The latter context, by necessity, also occurs outside of the public’s view. Government efforts to combat domestic violent jihad straddle both of these arenas.

Preventive Policing

In the post-9/11 environment, the public has expected law enforcement to adopt a proactive posture in order to disrupt terrorist plots before an attack occurs. Investigative leads about terrorist plots in the homeland may originate from foreign intelligence sources. But, for the most part, information about homegrown plots is available only through domestic intelligence activities. In order to proactively gather intelligence, law enforcement has adopted a preventive policing approach that focuses not just on crime that has occurred, but on the possibility that a crime may be committed in the future.

In this context, a major challenge for law enforcement is gauging how quickly and at what point individuals move from radicalized beliefs to violence so that a terrorist plot can be detected and disrupted. At the federal level, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have implemented a forward-leaning approach with a revision to the *Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations*.² The revision, meant to streamline the FBI’s investigations and make them more proactive, has at its heart a new investigative tool, assessments. These allow for the investigation of individuals or groups without factual predication. The new guidelines have, however, generated some controversy among civil libertarians.

Also critical among the proactive approaches employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of Internet and social networking sites. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) authorizes the FBI to use National Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to e-mail and Internet use. It appears that U.S. law enforcement has effectively exploited the Internet—which radicalizing individuals can mine for information and violent jihadists use while plotting—in its pursuit of terrorists. A review of criminal complaints and indictments in terrorism cases reveals that the FBI has exploited the Internet and/or e-mail communications to build cases against defendants in at least 22 of the post-9/11 cases studied in this report. Although much is said about terrorist use of the Internet for recruitment, training, and communications, these cases suggest that terrorists and aspiring terrorists will *not* find the Internet to be a uniformly permissive environment.

² The FBI declined to speak with CRS about its counterterrorism programs, investigative activities, or engagement efforts for this report.

State and Local Authorities

The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting is particularly important, especially considering the challenges involved in detecting lone wolves and homegrown jihadist groups with few connections to larger terrorist organizations. Ten years after the 9/11 attacks, integrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the national counterterrorism effort continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. DOJ and the FBI have established Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) to help coordinate federal, state, and local investigative activities. States and major urban areas have also established intelligence fusion centers with federal agencies, in part to share intelligence. The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative (NSI) is a program to push terrorism-related information generated locally between and among federal, state, local, and tribal levels via fusion centers. NSI is in the process of being implemented throughout the country.

Investigative Approaches

To counter violent jihadist plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been described as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.” These tactics have long been used in a wide variety of cases but apparently have particular utility in counterterrorism investigations. As the “Al Capone” moniker suggests, historically, these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants. The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. In agent provocateur cases—often called sting operations—government undercover operatives befriend suspects and offer to facilitate their activities. The use of these techniques has generated public controversy and illustrates a bind that law enforcement faces. It has been charged with preventing homegrown terrorism, but its use of preemptive techniques spawns concern among community members and civil libertarians.

Trust and Partnership

Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize that the prevention of terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. At the same time, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Americans recognized the need to define themselves as distinctly American communities who, like other Americans, desire to help prevent another terrorist attack. The concept of building trust through engagement and partnership is rooted in the community policing model developed by law enforcement professionals in the 1990s. Currently, numerous U.S. government agencies conduct outreach, engage, and partner with Muslim American communities. From the community angle, several Arab, Muslim, Sikh and South Asian American community groups have formed partnerships with government officials.

Balancing Security and Liberty

Although many public officials support community engagement, significant challenges may exist in the development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than token discussions or community relations events. Striking a balance between security and liberty—relying on local communities to provide critical information to further proactive policing while simultaneously building trust and preserving the freedoms of community members—is seen as difficult. Law

enforcement investigative activities and tactics may pose particular complications in partnership building. Especially challenging are law enforcement activities perceived by community members to be unfairly targeting law-abiding citizens or infringing on speech, religion, assembly, or due process rights.

The recruitment and management of informants—essential to many law enforcement investigations—may, however, pose an obstacle to successful community engagement efforts. Some Muslim community activists fear that law enforcement coerces immigrants into becoming informants, especially those with legal problems or those applying for green cards. Others fear that informants target and potentially entice impressionable youth into fictitious terrorist plots. There has also been public discussion of the trustworthiness of informants with criminal backgrounds. CRS analysis of open source reports indicate that confidential informants or undercover operatives were used in at least 25 of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorism cases. In some of those cases, the informants had criminal histories. In considering the tradeoff between security and liberty, policy makers face a judgment in those cases where an investigative tactic might inflame members of a particular community: Is the impact of that tactic counterproductive in the long run, or is it necessary, short-term collateral damage?

Issues for Congress

Many agencies at all levels of government are engaged in counterterrorism activities. In 2011, the Obama Administration articulated two broad strategies that address violent homegrown jihadist activity. The administration recognized the significance of the homegrown threat in its June 2011 *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*. Additionally, in August 2011, the Obama Administration released a strategy for combating violent extremism (CVE). It revolves around countering the radicalization of all types of potential terrorists. As such, it covers the radicalization of violent jihadists and focuses on outreach, building trust, and fostering partnerships with U.S. Muslim communities. In addition to these two new strategies, some critics have suggested that the United States has to develop a more cohesive domestic intelligence program drawing on local policing efforts.³ Additionally, critics contend that the CVE strategy is largely philosophical and light on guidelines for implementation.⁴ These areas—domestic intelligence and the implementation of the CVE strategy—may merit oversight from Congress.

³ *America's Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate: The Country Still Lacks A Coherent National Domestic Intelligence-Collection Effort*, Notes prepared by Brian Michael Jenkins, acting chair of a group of unofficial, non-partisan acting and former senior intelligence and law enforcement officials, practitioners, and terrorism analysts devoted to intelligence issues. The group serves without compensation or political agenda and does not seek to influence government, although its observations are circulated among government officials. Hereinafter: *America's Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate*, June 2010. See also: Andrew G. Mills and Joseph R. Clark, *Running a Three-Legged Race: The San Diego Police Department, the Intelligence Community, and Counterterrorism*, Homeland Security Policy Institute, Issue Brief 12, Washington, DC, August 1, 2011, p. 1, http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/issuebrief_sdpcintel.pdf. Hereinafter: Mills and Clark, *Running*.

⁴ Dina Temple-Raston, "White House Unveils Counter-Extremism Plan," *National Public Radio*, August 3, 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2011/08/03/138955790/white-house-unveils-counter-extremism-plan>. Hereinafter: Temple-Raston, "White House Unveils." See also: Anthony Kimery, "White House Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism Gets Mixed Reviews," *Homeland Security Today*, August 4, 2011, <http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-news-briefings/single-article/white-house-strategy-to-counter-violent-extremism-gets-mixed-reviews/b8e1b0107b3c136997d2244726f6c165.html>.

Introduction

As part of a much-discussed apparent uptick in terrorist activity in the United States, from May 2009 through October 2011, arrests were made for 32 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States.⁵ Two of these resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in Texas and Abdulhakim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR—produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes (9/11) through April 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks, and never more than six occurred in a single year (2006).⁶ The apparent spike in such activity after April 2009 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny minority—are susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad.

How serious is the threat of homegrown, violent jihadists in the United States? Experts differ in their opinions. In May 2010 congressional testimony, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman emphasized that it is, “difficult to be complacent when an average of one plot is now being uncovered per month over the past year or more—and perhaps even more are being hatched that we don’t know about.”⁷ By contrast, a recent academic study of domestic Muslim radicalization supported by the National Institute of Justice reveals that “the record over the past eight years contains relatively few examples of Muslim-Americans that have radicalized and turned toward violent extremism” and concludes that “homegrown terrorism is a serious but limited problem.”⁸ Another study has suggested that the homegrown terrorist threat has been exaggerated by federal cases that “rely on the abusive use of informants.”⁹ Moreover, the radicalization of violent jihadists may not be an especially new phenomenon for the United States. Estimates suggest that between 1,000 and 2,000 American Muslims engaged in violent jihad during the 1990s in

⁵ For this report, “homegrown” or “domestic” describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. “Jihadist” describes radicalized Muslims using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for belief in the establishment of a global caliphate—a jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph—via violent means. Jihadists largely adhere to a variant of Salafi Islam—the fundamentalist belief that society should be governed by Islamic law based on the Quran and adhere to the model of the immediate followers and companions of the Prophet Muhammad. For more on Al Qaeda’s global network, see CRS Report R41070, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy*, coordinated by John Rollins.

⁶ See **Appendix A** for a summary of publicly available information regarding these alleged plots and attacks. The summary is presented in reverse chronological order. The two attacks between 9/11 and May 2009 involved Hasan Akbar and Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar. On March 23, 2003, two days after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Army Sergeant Akbar killed two U.S. Army officers and wounded 14 others at U.S. Army Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait, 25 miles from the Iraq border. On March 3, 2006, Taheri-Azar, a naturalized American citizen from Iran, drove his sport utility vehicle (SUV) into a crowd at The Pit, a popular student gathering spot at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The SUV struck and injured several people.

⁷ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Written Testimony of Bruce Hoffman, Hearing: “Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: How Can We Address an Evolving Tool While Protecting Free Speech,” 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 26, 2010, p. 2., <http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100526101502-95237.pdf>.

⁸ David Schanzer, Charles Kurzman, and Ebrahim Moosa, *Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans*, January 6, 2010, p. 1, http://www.sanford.duke.edu/news/Schanzer_Kurzman_Moosa_Anti-Terror_Lessons.pdf. Hereinafter: Schanzer, et.al, *Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans*.

⁹ Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, *Targeted and Entrapped: Manufacturing the “Homegrown Threat” in the United States* (New York: NYU School of Law, 2011), p. 38.

Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya.¹⁰ More broadly, terrorism expert Brian Michael Jenkins notes that during the 1970s domestic terrorists “committed 60-70 terrorist incidents, most of them bombings, on U.S. soil every year—a level of activity 15-20 times that seen in most years since 9/11.”¹¹ Few of the attacks during the 1970s appear to have involved individuals motivated by jihadist ideas.

But as Dr. Hoffman’s comments suggest, the November 2009 Fort Hood shootings, which killed 13, and the other plots and arrests in 2009, 2010, and 2011, are worrying. Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano has said that authorities are “just beginning to confront the reality that we have this issue ... and that we really don’t have a very good handle on how you prevent someone from becoming a violent extremist.”¹² A single successful attack can incur scores of casualties and cause considerable socioeconomic disruption. Regardless of their novelty, frequency, or lethality, violent attacks fostered by violent jihadists radicalized in the United States remain a security concern.

The bulk of the 2009-2011 homegrown plots likely reflect a trend in jihadist terrorist activity away from schemes directed by the core leaders of Al Qaeda or other significant terrorist groups. Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations officer who writes about terrorism, has noted a global shift in terrorism toward decentralized, autonomously radicalized, violent jihadist individuals or groups who strike in their home countries.¹³ Global counterterrorism efforts have made it harder for international terrorist networks to formulate plots, place their recruits in targeted countries, and carry out violent strikes in locations far from their bases of operation.¹⁴ A senior counterterrorism official told the *Los Angeles Times* that Al Qaeda and affiliated groups are moving “away from what we are used to, which are complex, ambitious, multilayered plots.”¹⁵

Homegrown Violent Jihadists

This report focuses on geography and citizenship in its characterization of homegrown terrorism by defining the phenomenon as jihadist terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely

¹⁰ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), p. 3. See William Rosenau and Sara Daly, “American Journeys to Jihad: U.S. Extremists During the 1980s and 1990s,” *CTC Sentinel*, vol. 3, no. 8 (August 2010) pp. 17-20, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss8.pdf>.

¹¹ Brian Michael Jenkins, *Would Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Terrorist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001* (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2010), p. viii. Hereinafter: Jenkins, *Would-Be Warriors*.

¹² Paul West and Julie Bykowicz, “Information-Sharing Still a Roadblock,” *Baltimoresun.com*, February 22, 2010, <http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-md.omalley22feb22,0,4661474,print.story>.

¹³ Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), pp. 71, 133-146. Hereinafter: Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad*.

¹⁴ Philip Mudd, “Evaluating the Al-Qa’ida Threat to the U.S. Homeland,” *CTC Sentinel*, vol. 3, no. 8 (August 2010) p. 2, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss8.pdf>; Dennis C. Blair, *Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: U.S. Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment: Statement for the Record*, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 2, 2010, pp. 7-8, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf. Hereinafter: Blair, *Annual Threat Assessment*, February 2, 2010.

¹⁵ Greg Miller, “Al-Qaeda’s New Tactic is to Seize Shortcuts,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 19, 2010, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-qaeda19-2010mar19,0,1676434.story>.

within the United States.¹⁶ These homegrown groups or individuals can focus their plots on foreign targets. They can have operational ties to foreign terrorist groups, but most of the plots after April 2009 have not. Homegrown violent jihadists potentially either come from Muslim immigrant communities or are converts to Islam. A review of the numerous arrests of homegrown violent jihadists on terrorism-related charges since 9/11 suggests a wide array of incidents. There have been those who have plotted or attempted terrorist attacks. Others have provided material support to terrorist groups. Some have recruited individuals to travel abroad—or have gone themselves—to acquire terrorist training, conduct terrorism, or join in other forms of jihadist conflict, such as the fighting in Somalia or Afghanistan.

Shortcomings and Strengths

Homegrown violent jihadists may exhibit a number of conventional shortcomings when compared to international terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda. Because some homegrown terrorists are not tied to international groups, some say they possibly lack deep, hands-on understanding of specialized tradecraft such as bomb making and may not have the financing, training camps, support networks, and broad expertise housed in international organizations with extensive rosters and greater resources.¹⁷ Also, homegrown groups tend to be much less formally structured than international organizations.¹⁸ A former CIA case officer recently commented that the threat posed by self-radicalized “lone” bombers lacking support networks, “even those who have been in contact with either Al Qaeda or the Taliban, will be hit or miss at best.”¹⁹

These apparent shortcomings may keep some homegrown violent jihadists from independently planning, coordinating, and implementing large-scale suicide strikes such as 9/11 or the Mumbai attacks of November 2008.²⁰ Because of this, they may turn to violence involving less planning and preparation, such as assaults using firearms.²¹

¹⁶ Others have used similar definitions. Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian define homegrown as “extremist violence perpetrated by U.S. legal residents and citizens. See Rick “Ozzie” Nelson and Ben Bodurian, *A Growing Terrorist Threat? Assessing “Homegrown” Extremism in the United States*, Center For Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, March 8, 2010, p. v, <http://csis.org/publication/growing-terrorist-threat>. Hereinafter: Nelson and Bodurian, *A Growing Terrorist Threat?* For further discussion of definitions of homegrown terrorism, see Sam Mullins, “Home-grown Terrorism: Issues and Implications,” *Perspectives on Terrorism*, vol 1, no. 3 (2007), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=12&Itemid=54. The FBI and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) use the term “homegrown violent extremist” instead of homegrown violent jihadist. They define “homegrown violent extremist” as “a person of any citizenship who has lived and/or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities (including providing support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a foreign terrorist organization, but is acting independently of direction by a foreign terrorist organization.” This definition appears to differ from the one used in this report by 1. largely focusing on whether or not an individual was directed by a foreign organization and by 2. including all sorts of terrorists, not just violent jihadists. See DHS and FBI, Joint Intelligence Bulletin, “Use of Small Arms: Examining Lone Shooters and Small-Unit Tactics,” August 16, 2011, p. 3.

¹⁷ Dina Temple-Raston, “Would-Be Bombers in U.S. Hampered by Logistics,” *National Public Radio*, June 21, 2010, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127909962>.

¹⁸ Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad*, pp. 71, 133-146; Scott Stewart, *Jihadism: The Grassroots Paradox*, STRATFOR, March 18, 2010, http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100317_jihadism_grassroots_paradox?ip_auth_redirect=1. Hereinafter: Stewart, *Jihadism*.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ On November 26, 2008, ten militants came ashore from the Arabian Sea on small boats and attacked numerous high-profile targets in Mumbai, India, with automatic weapons and explosives. Among the sites attacked were two luxury (continued...)

Al Qaeda appears to have embraced such homegrown lone wolf terrorist plots. In March 2010, *As Sahab*, Al Qaeda's media wing, released an English language video titled "A Call to Arms" featuring American-born spokesperson Adam Gadahn. In the video directed toward jihadists in the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom, Gadahn extols alleged Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hasan as a "trailblazer" who did not attract law enforcement attention by training abroad or relying on conspirators.²² Gadahn encourages would-be terrorists to select realistically hittable targets that are familiar to them and have some broadly symbolic—especially economic—resonance.²³ In an early June 2011 English language video message titled "Do Not Rely on Others, Take the Task Upon Yourself," Al Qaeda's American-born spokesperson Adam Gadahn even more clearly emphasized lone wolf operations. In the video he suggests possible weapons,

Let's take America as an example. America is absolutely awash with easily obtainable firearms. You can go down to a gun show at the local convention center and come away with a fully automatic assault rifle, without a background check, and most likely without having to show an identification card. So what are you waiting for?²⁴

Gadahn stresses "targeting major institutions—after a clip showing the logos of such firms as Exxon, Merrill Lynch and Bank of America—and 'influential public figures.'"²⁵ At about the same time as this video was released, users of jihadist websites apparently began posting potential targets and developing hit lists.²⁶

In the same vein as Gadahn's video, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (an Al Qaeda affiliate) has issued an English language propaganda magazine titled *Inspire*. The magazine has encouraged homegrown violent jihadist activity in the West, focusing on smaller scale strategies such as using a vehicle to run over victims.²⁷ It has featured articles attributed to three prominent violent jihadist propagandists with strong American ties: Gadahn, radical U.S.-born imam Anwar al-Awlaki, and Saudi-born American citizen Samir Khan.²⁸ In September 2011, the latter two died in a widely reported U.S. air strike in Yemen.²⁹

(...continued)

hotels—the Taj Mahal Palace and the Oberoi-Trident—along with the main railway terminal, a Jewish cultural center, a café frequented by foreigners, a cinema house, and two hospitals. By the time the episode ended some 62 hours later, about 165 people, along with nine terrorists had been killed (one terrorist was captured), and hundreds more injured. Six American citizens were among the 26 foreigners reported dead. For more information, see CRS Report R40087, *Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for U.S. Interests*, by K. Alan Kronstadt.

²¹ Art Keller, "Why Was Faisal Shahzad a Bad Bombmaker?" AfPak Channel, a special project of *Foreign Policy* and the New America Foundation, May 14, 2010, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/14/bad_bombmakers. See also Exclusive Analysis, "North American Quarterly Terrorism Update," December 2009, p. 5.

²² Stewart, *Jihadism*.

²³ Ibid; Exclusive Analysis, "Global Jihad Quarterly Update," May 2010, pp 6-7.

²⁴ Matthew Cole, "New Al Qaeda Video: American Muslims Should Buy Guns, Start Shooting People," *ABC News*, June 3, 2011, <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-video-buy-automatic-weapons-start-shooting/story?id=13704264>.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ John Hudson, "A Very Odd Al Qaeda 'Hit List,'" *The Atlantic Wire*, June 17, 2011, <http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2011/06/very-odd-al-qaeda-hit-list/38967/>; Judson Berger, Al Qaeda-Linked Site Posts "'Hit List' of U.S. Targets, Prompting Feds to Send Alert," *Fox News*, June 16, 2011, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/06/16/feds-send-alert-after-al-qaeda-linked-site-posts-hit-list-us-targets/#ixzz1QbS44Tc6>.

²⁷ Kimberly Dozier, "Yemeni al Qaeda Publishes Second Edition of English Magazine," *Washington Times*, *Associated Press*, October 12, 2010, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/12/yemeni-al-qaeda-publishes-second-edition-english-m/print/>.

²⁸ Ibid; Judith Miller and David Samuels, "A Glossy Approach to Inciting Terrorism," *Wall Street Journal*, November (continued...)

This does not mean that homegrown terrorists are incapable of sophisticated, coordinated action or linking up with international groups. For example, in 2008 foiled New York City subway bomber Najibullah Zazi received explosives instruction from Al Qaeda in Pakistan. He and co-conspirators then tried to implement this training in the United States.³⁰ U.S. authorities allege that senior Al Qaeda official Adnan el-Shukrijumah possibly recruited Zazi and his fellow plotters.³¹ Shukrijumah—a Saudi-born, naturalized American citizen who spent part of his youth in Brooklyn—and others involved in Al Qaeda’s “external operations” program allegedly planned the attack.³² The relative sophistication of Zazi’s plot may have actually exposed it to greater law enforcement scrutiny. Authorities likely learned of the plot while monitoring a known Al Qaeda e-mail account.³³

The conventionally perceived shortcomings of homegrown terrorists may actually pose some challenges for law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials charged with detecting, preventing, or disrupting terrorist plots. According to terrorism analyst Steve Emerson, “The smaller cells tend to be less powerful than a central terrorist organization like Al Qaeda, but they are harder to detect.... When the group of conspirators are [sic] small it’s much more difficult for the FBI.... The larger the group, the greater the chances the FBI can infiltrate.”³⁴ Former Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair noted that many of the terrorist schemes disrupted in 2009—including homegrown activity—relied on short-term planning. These quickly generated schemes are harder to identify and disrupt than more traditional and more highly organized international terrorist conspiracies, which can gestate for years.³⁵

According to at least one study, homegrown terrorists can be nimble adversaries, because as U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents, they can travel easily between the United States and foreign countries.³⁶ While abroad, they could receive training from foreign terrorist organizations, conduct surveillance operations against foreign targets, and plan attacks. In the case of recent immigrants to the United States, they are particularly comfortable moving between American and

(...continued)

27, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703572404575635053157718986.html?mod=googlenews_wsj. None of the three reside in the United States.

²⁹ Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, and Robert F. Worth, “Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of Awlaki in Yemen,” *New York Times*, September 30, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html?pagewanted=all>.

³⁰ For 10 years prior to the plot, Zazi, an Afghan immigrant legally present in the United States, lived in the New York City Borough of Queens. Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. persons or property, conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, and providing material support to a terrorist organization. See Department of Justice (DOJ), Press Release, “Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Use Explosives Against Persons or Property in U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad, and Providing Material Support to al Qaeda,” February 22, 2010, <http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo022210.html>. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, “Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty.” For more on Zazi’s childhood, see Michael Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor to Terror Suspect,” *New York Times*, September 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/nyregion/26profile.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print. Hereinafter: Wilson, “From Smiling Coffee Vendor.”

³¹ William K. Rashbaum, “Al Qaeda Figure to Be Indicted in Subway Plot,” *New York Times*, July 7, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/nyregion/08terror.html>. Hereinafter: Rashbaum, July 7, 2010.

³² Ibid. Al Qaeda’s external operations program focuses on targeting the United States and the West.

³³ “U.S. Officials Link Al Qaeda Operative to New York Plot,” *Daily Times* (Pakistan), July 2, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2010\07\02\story_2-7-2010_pg7_39.

³⁴ Rashbaum, July 7, 2010.

³⁵ Blair, Annual Threat Assessment, February 2, 2010, p. 7.

³⁶ Nelson and Bodurian, *A Growing Terrorist Threat?* p. v.

foreign cultural contexts.³⁷ English language skills, the ability to navigate Western culture, society, and context are likely key ingredients for successful strikes.³⁸ Three recent cases involving alleged or actual homegrown terrorists illustrate how these factors possibly facilitate terrorist plotting:

- In February 2011, Colleen LaRose (aka “Jihad Jane”) pled guilty “to all counts of a superseding indictment charging her with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, conspiracy to kill in a foreign country, making false statements, and attempted identity theft.”³⁹ She allegedly discussed with her co-conspirators how her mainstream American physical appearance would allow her to “blend in with many people.”⁴⁰
- On March 18, 2010, David Headley, born Daood Sayed Gilani to an American mother and Pakistani father, pled guilty to helping plan the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, and for plotting to attack the offices of a newspaper in Copenhagen, Denmark. Headley was able to use his American citizenship and Pakistani heritage to move between the United States and abroad for seven years during which time he received terrorist training in Pakistan and scouted locations in India and Denmark for terrorist attacks.⁴¹
- For 10 years prior to his involvement in a September 2009 plot to trigger explosive devices in New York City’s subways, Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant legally present in the United States, lived in the New York City borough of Queens and had family in Pakistan.⁴²

In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Office of Intelligence and Analysis warned, “probable terrorist perception of success in challenging the U.S. even through failed attacks, suggest[s] Al Qaeda and associated groups will try to conduct operations in the United States with increased frequency.”⁴³ It appears that for the foreseeable future, American citizens

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Michael Kenney, “Organizational Learning and Islamic Militancy,” *National Institute of Justice Journal*, no. 265 (April 2010), p. 19.

³⁹ DOJ Press Release, “Pennsylvania Woman Pleads Guilty in Plot to Recruit Violent Jihadist Fighters and to Commit Murder Overseas,” February 1, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2011/ph020111.htm>; Derrick Nunnally et al., “‘Jihad Jane’ Said to Have Confessed,” *Philly.com*, March 18, 2010, <http://www.philly.com/philly/news/breaking/88307227.html>

⁴⁰ *United States vs. Colleen R. LaRose*, Grand Jury Indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, filed March 4, 2010, <http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2010-03-04-LaRose-Indictment.pdf>.

⁴¹ Jane Perlez, “American Terror Suspect Traveled Unimpeded,” *New York Times*, March 25, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/world/asia/26pstan.html?scp=1&sq=American%20Terror%20Suspect%20Traveled%20Unimpeded&st=cse>; DOJ Press Release, “Chicago Resident David Coleman Headley Pleads Guilty to Role in India and Denmark Terrorism Conspiracies,” March 18, 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-ag-277.html>. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, March 18, 2010.

⁴² On February 22, 2010, Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to commit murder overseas, and providing material support for a terrorist organization. John Marzulli, “Zazi, Al Qaeda Pals Planned Rush-Hour Attack on Grand Central, Times Square Subway Stations,” *New York Daily News*, April 12, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/04/12/2010-04-12_zazi_pals_planned_rushhour_attack_on_2_busiest_subway_stations.html; Stephanie Simon, “FBI Again Questions Immigrant in Terror Probe,” *Wall Street Journal*, September 18, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125323086773921349.html>.

⁴³ DHS, Office of Intelligence and Analysis Note, IA-0291-10, “Evolution of the Terrorist Threat to the United States,” May 21, 2010, p.1.

and legal permanent residents of the United States radicalized within the nation's borders will continue to pose a sizeable violent jihadist threat.⁴⁴

Radicalization and Violent Extremism

Radicalization and violent extremism are terms that are sometimes used interchangeably but do not mean the same thing. Radicalization has been described as the exposure of individuals to ideological messages and the movement of those individuals from mainstream beliefs to extremist viewpoints.⁴⁵ Others say radicalization consists of changes in belief and behavior to justify intergroup violence and personal or group sacrifice to forward specific, closely held ideas.⁴⁶ Still others use the term to more closely link extremist beliefs to violent action, as in this working definition by the DHS, which states that radicalization “entails the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.”⁴⁷

But there is an important distinction between the terms “radicalization” and “violent extremism” as it relates to the threshold of U.S. law enforcement interest and action. This is because Americans have the right under the First Amendment to adopt, express, or disseminate ideas, even hateful and extremist ones. But when radicalized individuals mobilize their views (i.e., they move from a radicalized viewpoint to membership in a terrorist group, or to planning, materially supporting, or executing terrorist activity) then the nation's public safety and security interests are activated. Thus, the terms may be differentiated as follows:

- “Radicalization” describes the process of acquiring and holding radical, extremist, or jihadist *beliefs*.
- “Violent extremism,” for this report, describes *violent action* taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs. For many, this term is synonymous with “violent jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.”

From Radicalization to Violent Extremism

As the terrorist threat becomes increasingly homegrown, a key way to fight it is to develop an understanding of how radicalization works and formulate ways to prevent the radicalization from morphing into violent extremism.⁴⁸ In 2007, the New York City Police Department's (NYPD's)

⁴⁴ Eileen Sullivan and Devlin Barrett, “Recent Cases Show Challenge of U.S. Terrorists,” *Associated Press*, March 18, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hvogWD5bjFT7x-mkAwUu2tpIN_cgD9EGKHJ80. Hereinafter: Sullivan and Barrett, March 18, 2010.

⁴⁵ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, National Security Criminal Investigations, *Radicalization: A Guide for the Perplexed*, Canada, June 2009, p. 1. Hereinafter: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Radicalization*.

⁴⁶ Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 20, no. 3 (July 2008), p. 416.

⁴⁷ U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Written Testimony of Charles E. Allen, Assistant Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis and Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security, “Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland,” 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 14, 2007, p. 4. Hereinafter: Allen Testimony, March 14, 2007.

⁴⁸ See Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad*.

Intelligence Division released a study of domestic jihadist radicalization that has been widely circulated within the law enforcement community.

The study describes a general four-step process of radicalization leading to violent extremism. First, individuals exist in a pre-radicalization phase in which they lead lives unaware of or uninterested in either violent jihad or fundamentalist Salafi Islam. Next, they go through self-identification in which some sort of crisis or trigger (job loss, social alienation, death of a family member, international conflict) urges them to explore Salafism. Third, individuals undergo indoctrination or adoption of jihadist ideals combined with Salafi views. The study indicates that, typically, a “spiritual sanctioner” or charismatic figure plays a central role in the indoctrination process. Finally, radicalizing individuals go through “jihadization,” where they identify themselves as violent jihadists, and are drawn into the planning of a terrorist attack.⁴⁹ At this point, according to the NYPD, they can be considered violent extremists. The FBI’s own four-stage model of radicalization closely follows that of the NYPD.⁵⁰

This model and the process it describes—though useful—should, however, be read with caution, according to some observers. The radicalization process is best depicted in broad brush strokes. Brian Michael Jenkins has suggested that

There is no easily identifiable terrorist-prone personality, no single path to radicalization and terrorism. Many people may share the same views, and only a handful of the radicals will go further to become terrorists. The transition from radical to terrorist is often a matter of happenstance. It depends on whom one meets and probably on when that meeting occurs in the arc of one’s life.⁵¹

Some experts have warned against viewing the radicalization process as a “conveyor belt,” somehow starting with grievances and inevitably ending in violence.⁵² The NYPD report itself acknowledges that individuals who begin this process do not necessarily pass through all the stages nor do they necessarily follow all the steps in order, and not all individuals or groups who begin this progression become terrorists.⁵³ Studies by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis indicate that the radicalization dynamic varies across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums, different geographic regions, and socio-economic conditions. Moreover, there are many diverse “pathways” to radicalization and individuals and groups can radicalize or “de-radicalize” because of a variety of factors.⁵⁴

⁴⁹ Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat*, City of New York Police Department, Intelligence Division, New York, 2007, pp. 6-8, http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/files/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf.

⁵⁰ Carol Dyer, Ryan E. McCoy, Joel Rodriguez, et al., “Countering Violent Islamic Extremism: A Community Responsibility,” *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, December 2007, p. 6.

⁵¹ Jenkins, *Would-Be Warriors*, p. 7.

⁵² Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley, “Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 21, no. 2 (April 2009), pp. 239-40.

⁵³ Silber and Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West*, pp. 10, 19.

⁵⁴ Allen Testimony, March 14, 2007, p. 5.

Forces and Factors in the Forging of Terrorists

What drives radicalization and spurs the creation of terrorists remains open to debate. Poverty, alienation, brainwashing, or personal humiliation—commonly seen as factors driving radicalization and terrorism—may not play particularly significant roles. Likewise, failed multiculturalism or failed integration into the larger society does not predict radicalization or terrorist activity.⁵⁵ The radicalization process and jihadist violence may offer participants powerful but intangible spiritual incentives such as salvation and paradise in the afterlife.

Other forces are key in radicalization and the evolution of jihadist terrorists. Family ties and socialization are critical. Moral outrage or perceptions that the West is harming the global community of Muslims (the *Ummah*),⁵⁶ or even waging war against it may also spur radicalization and violence. And travel to regions featuring terrorist activity can foster radicalization. Religious conversion plays a key role in the radicalization of some individuals.⁵⁷ CRS analysis of the 53 plots since 9/11 suggests that 22 of them included converts to Islam (Figure B-1).

As all of this may suggest, in fact, “pre-radicalization” indicators are subtle and may not be detectable and the forces driving jihadists can be described in only the most general of terms. Certainly, radicalizing individuals and terrorists connect larger grievances about the world to their own direct experiences. A study of 2,032 foreign fighters who joined Al Qaeda and its affiliated organizations broadly suggests that these individuals can be categorized as revenge seekers, status seekers, identity seekers, or thrill seekers who possessed “an unfulfilled need to define themselves.”⁵⁸ Even more broadly and fundamentally, one author has suggested that psychologically, individual terrorists “see the world in Manichean, black-and-white terms; they identify with others; and they desire revenge.”⁵⁹

Overall, many scholars and counterterrorism analysts who have studied post-9/11 jihadist terrorist attacks have noted the prominence of a number of forces impacting radicalization and extremism. These include intermediaries (the “spiritual sanctioners” identified by the NYPD report on radicalization), social networks, the Internet, and prisons.

Intermediaries

Intermediaries are critical in the development of terrorist plots and radicalization. They quicken the formulation of individual or group beliefs regarding violent jihad. Terrorist recruiters from Al

⁵⁵ Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Radicalization*, pp. 1-9; Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad*, p. 48, 50-51, 73-88; Aidan Kirby, “The London Bombers as ‘Self-Starters’: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 30, no. 5 (May 2007), p. 422. For more on the spiritual incentives involved in joining radical Islamic groups see, Quintan Wiktorowicz and Karl Kaltenthaler, “The Rationality of Radical Islam,” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 121, no. 2 (Summer 2006) pp. 295-300.

⁵⁶ The Quran uses the term *umma* to refer to the community of believers. The term is used to describe both individual communities, great and small, of faithful Muslims and to refer to the world-wide community of believers. See Richard Hooker, *World Civilizations*, Glossary, 1996, <http://www.wsu.edu/~dee/GLOSSARY/UMMAH.HTM>.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ John M. Venhaus, *Why Youth Join al-Qaeda*, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 236, Washington, DC, May 2010, p. 1, <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR236Venhaus.pdf>.

⁵⁹ Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat* (New York: Random House, 2006), p. 41.

Qaeda or extremist clerics tied to such organizations can play this role in the radicalization process. They can interact with individuals interested in terrorism either directly (face-to-face discussion groups) or in online forums. Some recent terrorist plots have included an intermediary.⁶⁰ In some cases a key intermediary may be a government informant or undercover agent. Four charismatic U.S. citizens have played especially prominent roles in international jihadist propaganda, but determining the impact—if any—of these and other intermediaries can be difficult.

Anwar al-Awlaki was a radical imam and key international charismatic figure in jihadist circles prior to being killed in an alleged U.S. air strike in Yemen in September 2011.⁶¹ Awlaki allegedly served as a leader in the terrorist group known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).⁶² He was a U.S. citizen born in New Mexico in 1971 and had been linked to a number of domestic jihadist plots. He had also been tied to alleged foreign terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab's failed Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt.⁶³ However, according to publicly available sources, his exact connections to these individuals are largely unclear. Accused of propagandizing for Al Qaeda, Awlaki was associated with the group's Arabian Peninsula offshoot.⁶⁴ Before his alleged November 5, 2009, gun rampage at Fort Hood, TX, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan purportedly exchanged e-mails with Awlaki. It remains publicly unknown how the contact influenced Hasan. After the Fort Hood shootings, Awlaki issued a statement dubbing Hasan a hero.⁶⁵

The imam also likely influenced people involved in other violent homegrown jihadist plots. In December 2010, federal officials charged Antonio Martinez, a Muslim convert, in a plot to bomb an Armed Forces recruiting station. A sting operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) ensnared Martinez. He allegedly planned to attack an Armed Forces recruiting station in Maryland using a sport utility vehicle loaded with what he believed was a bomb. During the course of his plot, he also allegedly praised Awlaki.⁶⁶ Naturalized U.S. citizen Farooque Ahmed was arrested in October 2010 for attempting to assist people he believed to be terrorists in planning the bombing of Washington, DC, Metrorail stations.⁶⁷ Ahmed allegedly possessed a

⁶⁰ Rick "Ozzie" Nelson, *Countering Terrorism and Radicalization in 2010 and Beyond: A New Terrorist Threat? Assessing 'Homegrown Extremism,'* Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, January 22, 2010, <http://csis.org/publication/homegrown-terrorism-fact-sheet>.

⁶¹ For context regarding Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report RL34170, *Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations*, by Jeremy M. Sharp; CRS Report R41070, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy*, coordinated by John Rollins.

⁶² For context regarding Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report RL34170, *Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations*, by Jeremy M. Sharp; CRS Report R41070, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy*, coordinated by John Rollins.

⁶³ Greg Miller and Spencer S. Hsu, "Muslim Cleric Tied to Bomb Attempt," *The Washington Post*, July 1, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/30/AR2010063005343.html>.

⁶⁴ For details on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, see CRS Report R41070, *Al Qaeda and Affiliates: Historical Perspective, Global Presence, and Implications for U.S. Policy*, coordinated by John Rollins.

⁶⁵ "Profile: Anwar al-Awlaki," *BBC News*, January 3, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8438635.stm.

⁶⁶ Dina Temple-Raston, "Officials Worry About Some Latino Converts To Islam," *National Public Radio*, August 24, 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2010/12/09/131916271/officials-worry-about-some-latino-converts-to-islam>; DOJ Press Release, "Maryland Man Charged in Plot to Attack Armed Forces Recruiting Center," December 8, 2010, <http://www.fbi.gov/baltimore/press-releases/2010/ba120810.htm>.

⁶⁷ DOJ Press Release, "Virginia Man Arrested for Plotting Attacks on D.C.-Area Metro Stations with People He Believed to Be al Qaeda Members," October 27, 2010, <http://washingtondc.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/wfo102710.htm>.

biography of Awlaki and listened to his online sermons.⁶⁸ Also apprehended in October 2010, U.S. citizen Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, who allegedly tried to join overseas extremist groups such as the Taliban, modeled one of the jihadist websites he managed after Awlaki's teachings. The website offered hyperlinks to Awlaki's online lectures. Shehadeh also discussed Awlaki's ideas with an individual he tried (and failed) to recruit for violent jihad.⁶⁹ Zachary Chesser, who allegedly tried to join al-Shabaab as late as July 2010 and propagandized online, e-mailed Awlaki. The cleric responded twice, according to court documents.⁷⁰ In July 2010, Paul Rockwood Jr., pled guilty to making false statements in a domestic terrorism investigation. He closely followed Awlaki's online pronouncements and developed an "execution" hit list that included 15 people Rockwood believed had desecrated Islam.⁷¹ According to court documents, Shaker Masri encouraged an FBI cooperating source to "review speeches" by Awlaki.⁷² Arrested in June 2010 while allegedly trying to join al-Shabaab, Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte, watched videos of and listened to sermons by Awlaki.⁷³

According to media sources, Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani immigrant who admitted that he attempted to detonate an explosives-filled vehicle in New York City's Times Square on May 1, 2010, cited Awlaki and another cleric, Abdullah Faisal from Jamaica, as key influences on him.⁷⁴ Also, a surveillance recording from 2007 captured one of six individuals eventually convicted of plotting to attack Fort Dix in New Jersey talking about an Awlaki lecture.⁷⁵

U.S. officials believe Awlaki also had contact with Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the young Nigerian who concealed an explosive device in his underwear and attempted to detonate it on a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009.⁷⁶ In October 2011, when he pled guilty to his involvement in the plot Abdulmutallab stated, "I was greatly inspired to participate in jihad by the lectures of the great and rightly guided mujahedeen who is alive, Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki, may Allah preserve him and his family and give them victory, Amin,

⁶⁸ Carol Cratty, "Accused Would-Be DC Metro Bomber Pleads Not Guilty in Federal Court," *CNN.com*, November 9, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-09/justice/virginia.bomb.plot_1_qaeda-al-awlaki-speedy-trial?_s=PM:CRIME; Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, "Officials: Muslim Source Turned in Terror Suspect," *Associated Press*, October 28, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20101028/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/us_terror_arrest.

⁶⁹ *United States v. Abdel Hameed Shehadeh*, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District for the Eastern District of New York, October 21, 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1400.pdf.

⁷⁰ *United States v. Zachary Adam Chesser*, Affidavit, 1:10-MJ-504, U.S. District for the Eastern District of Virginia, July 21, 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1343.pdf.

⁷¹ DOJ Press Release, "Alaska Man Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements in Domestic Terrorism Investigation, Spouse Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements," July 21, 2010, <http://anchorage.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/ak072110.htm>.

⁷² *United States v. Shaker Masri*, Criminal Complaint 10-CR-0655, U.S. District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, August 9, 2010, <http://jnsfp.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/masri-complaint1.pdf>.

⁷³ Anti-Defamation League, "New Jersey Residents Arrested for Attempting To Join Somali-Based Terrorist Group," June 7, 2010, updated July 22, 2010, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/new_jersey_al_shabaab.htm.

⁷⁴ Dina Temple-Raston, "Jamaican Imam Said to Inspire Times Square Suspect," *National Public Radio*, May 19, 2010, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126962091>. For more on Shahzad's suspected ties to Awlaki, see, Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, "Times Sq. Bomb Suspect Is Linked to Militant Cleric," *New York Times*, May 6, 2010.

⁷⁵ Scott Shane, "Born in U.S., a Radical Cleric Inspires Terror," *New York Times*, November 18, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/us/19awlaki.html>.

⁷⁶ Jeanne Meserve, "Anti-Terrorism Chief, U.S.-Born Cleric had Major Role in Airline Bombing Try," *CNN.com*, June 30, 2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/30/leiter.al.awlaki/index.html>.

and Allah knows best.”⁷⁷ A U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the topic’s sensitivity, told *The Washington Post* that Awlaki was the first U.S. citizen added to a list of suspected terrorists the CIA is authorized to kill.⁷⁸

Samir Khan—before he was killed in the same alleged airstrike as Awlaki—served as the editor of *Inspire* magazine, launched in 2010 by AQAP.⁷⁹ *Inspire* has been described as “a slick magazine for jihadists ... that featured political and how-to articles written in a comfortable American vernacular.”⁸⁰ The magazine is intended to attract would-be jihadists in the West.

The Saudi-born Khan lived in Queens, NY, and Charlotte, NC. He radicalized after the Al Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001, and moved with his parents to Charlotte in 2004. He left Charlotte in 2009 and joined AQAP in Yemen.⁸¹ Prior to leaving the United States, Khan had gained some notoriety as a jihadist blogger and as creator of the online magazine, *Jihad Recollections*—*Inspire*’s forerunner.⁸²

Reportedly, Khan and his online publications may have influenced homegrown jihadists. In July 2011, U.S. Army private Naser Abdo was arrested near Fort Hood in Texas for allegedly plotting a shooting spree and bombing in the area. Abdo intended to kill soldiers near the same place where Army Major Nidal Hasan reportedly killed 13 individuals in 2009. Federal officials noted that Abdo also possessed an article on how to construct an explosive device, among other items. The article was from *Inspire*.⁸³ In November 2010, Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen, was arrested as part of an FBI sting operation, moments after he tried to detonate a van he believed was packed with explosives in Portland’s Pioneer Courthouse Square.⁸⁴ According to DOJ, Mohamud wrote articles for Khan’s first magazine, *Jihad Recollections*.⁸⁵ Aside from editing *Inspire* Khan also contributed to it. Additionally, the magazine

⁷⁷ See “Transcript: Read Abdulmutallab’s Statement on Guilty Plea,” *Detroit Free Press*, October 12, 2011, <http://www.freep.com/article/20111012/NEWS01/111012038/Transcript-Read-Abdulmutallab-s-statement-guilty-plea>. See Monica Davey, “Would-Be Plane Bomber Pleads Guilty, Ending Trial,” October 12, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/us/umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-pleads-guilty-in-plane-bomb-attempt.html>.

⁷⁸ Greg Miller, “Muslim Cleric Awlaki is 1st U.S. citizen on List of Those CIA is Allowed to Kill,” *The Washington Post*, April 7, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/06/AR2010040604121.html>.

⁷⁹ Kimberly Dozier, “Yemeni al Qaeda Publishes Second Edition of English Magazine,” *Washington Times*, *Associated Press*, October 12, 2010, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/12/yemeni-al-qaeda-publishes-second-edition-english-m/print/>.

⁸⁰ Robbie Brown and Kim Severson, “2nd American in Strike Waged Qaeda Media War,” *New York Times*, September 30, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/samir-khan-killed-by-drone-spun-out-of-the-american-middle-class.html>. Hereinafter: Brown and Severson, “2nd American.” Mark Schone and Matthew Cole, “American Jihadi Samir Khan Killed with Awlaki,” *ABC News*, September 30, 2011, <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/american-jihadi-samir-khan-killed-awlaki/story?id=14640013>. Hereafter: Schone and Cole, “American Jihadi.”

⁸¹ Brown and Severson, “2nd American.”

⁸² Schone and Cole, “American Jihadi”; Aaron Y. Zelin, “American Jihadi,” *Foreign Policy*, September 30, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/samir_khan_dead_inspire_magazine?page=full.

⁸³ DOJ Press Release, “Naser Jason Abdo Charged Federally in Bomb Plot,” July 29, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/usao/tw/press_releases/2011/Abdo.pdf; David Goodman, “Soldier Held Amid Claim of Terror Plot at Fort Hood,” *New York Times*, July 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/us/29awol.html?_r=1.

⁸⁴ Jerry Markon, “FBI Foils Elaborate Bomb Plot in Oregon,” *Washington Post*, November 28, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/27/AR2010112700546.html>.

⁸⁵ *United States v. Mohamed Osman Mohamud*, Affidavit, U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, November 26, 2010, p. 3.

included commentary from Awlaki and another American Al Qaeda propagandist, Adam Gadahn.⁸⁶

Adam Gadahn has served as a translator and English-language propagandist for Al Qaeda and has been charged with treason by the United States. He has appeared in a number of the organization's videos widely circulated on the Web. Born in 1978 and raised in California, Gadahn converted to Islam as a teenager and moved to Pakistan by 1999. As a young convert in California, Gadahn was influenced by two jihadists involved with a discussion group he attended. One of these men also likely introduced him into Al Qaeda circles in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 2004, he first appeared in a widely released video threatening attacks on the United States, and in another dispatch he urged Americans to convert to Islam. In a recent video, posted on June 20, 2010, Gadahn rails against President Barack Obama describing him as, "treacherous, bloodthirsty, and narrow-minded."⁸⁷

Omar Hammami, also known as "Abu Mansour al-Amriki," is originally from Daphne, AL. He has emerged as a key international intermediary for the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab. The son of a Syrian-born father and an American mother, he has been featured in propagandist videos distributed by the group. In one he instructs recruits in urban warfare. Zachary Chesser saw Hammami as a role model. He even imitated Hammami's adoption of "al-Amriki" (the American) as part of his own jihadist name—"Abu Talhah Al-Amrikee." Somali officials tie Hammami to al-Shabaab recruitment and financial management. He may also have led battlefield skirmishes. On August 5, 2010, DOJ unsealed a 2009 superseding indictment against him.⁸⁸

As a child, Hammami lived between the Christian world of his mother and the Muslim beliefs of his father. He converted to Islam in high school, and while a student at the University of South Alabama, he led the Muslim Student Association and began adhering to Salafi doctrine. His Salfism sprang in part from a desire to rebel against his father. In 2002, he dropped out of school, and by 2004 he had found his way to Toronto, Canada, where American combat in Iraq and Afghanistan encouraged him to reconsider his nonviolent Salafi views. One of his friends alleges that Hammami began surfing the Web for information on jihad at this time. While in Canada, he

⁸⁶ Ibid; Judith Miller and David Samuels, "A Glossy Approach to Inciting Terrorism," *Wall Street Journal*, November 27, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703572404575635053157718986.html?mod=googlenews_wsj. None of the three reside in the United States.

⁸⁷ "American-Born al Qaeda Spokesman Appears in New Video," *CNN.com*, June 20, 2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/20/al.qaeda.video/index.html>; Raffi Khatchadourian, "Azzam the American: The Making of an Al Qaeda Homegrown," *The New Yorker*, January 22, 2007, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/01/22/070122fa_fact_khatchadourian; "Al Qaeda's 'American Voice of Islam,'" STRATFOR, September 5, 2006, http://www.stratfor.com/al_qaedas_american_voice_islam?fn=8415719516; Evan Kohlmann, "American Greases al-Qaida Media Machine," *MSNBC*, July 14, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13842265/>.

⁸⁸ Spencer S. Hsu, "Arrest of Va. Man Spotlights al-Qaeda's New American Recruiter," *The Washington Post*, August 1, 2010; DOJ Press Release, "Fourteen Charged with Providing Material Support to Somalia-Based Terrorist Organization al Shabaab," August 5, 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-ag-898.html>; Andrea Elliott, "The Jihadist Next Door," *New York Times Magazine*, January 31, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/magazine/31Jihadist-t.htm>; John Goddard, "Terrorist Leader Lived in Toronto," *The Hamilton Spectator*, Ontario, Canada, January 4, 2010; Brendan Kirby, "Report: Former Daphne High and USA Student Has Been Charged in a Secret Indictment in Mobile with Providing Material to Terrorists," *Mobile Register*, September 5, 2009, http://blog.al.com/live/2009/09/report_former_daphne_high_and.html; The Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation, "Shabaab al-Mujahideen Releases Footage of 'Abu Suleim Training Camp,'" September 2009, <http://www.nefafoundation.org/multimedia-prop.html>.

married a Somali woman. In 2005 they moved to Cairo, and by late 2006 he was in Somalia pursuing violent jihad.⁸⁹

Social Networks

Social networks appear to be central to the radicalization process and to terrorist plots as well. Networks can be actual groups—encompassing intimate kinship ties, bonds of friendship, links forged in student associations, or cliques tied to radical mosques. They may also be virtual and fostered by the Internet. Group loyalties can form around jihadist messages entailing moral outrage over the perceived suffering of fellow Muslims and a sense that the West is at war with Islam. Networks help place these messages into the context of an individual's personal experiences.⁹⁰

Beyond the radicalization experience, the development and strengthening of affective ties with like-minded individuals may play a prominent role in the formation of terrorist groups.⁹¹ According to *The New York Times*, Faisal Shahzad befriended Shahid Hussain, a fellow Pakistani, while the two were enrolled at the University of Bridgeport in Connecticut in the early 2000s. Shahzad appears to have started to radicalize in the United States by 2004. During trips to Pakistan prior to his attempted Times Square bombing, Shahzad reestablished ties with Hussain. The latter had also returned to Pakistan. Together, the two grew more militant, especially when in 2007 Pakistani forces stormed Lal Masjid, the “Red Mosque,” a center of Islamic fundamentalism. The two friends socialized with a third individual, Muhammad Shouaib Mughal. The three were keenly interested in global jihad. Mughal eventually trained with the Pakistani Taliban, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. He brought Shahzad and Hussain into the group's camps for training in 2009.⁹²

Intermediaries within Networks

Social networks often feature their own internal intermediaries or charismatic leaders. Daniel Boyd and six other North Carolina residents were indicted on terrorism charges in 2009. In June 2010, another individual, who was living in Mitrovica, Kosovo, was charged in a criminal complaint linked to the case.⁹³ This small social network included Dylan and Zakariya Boyd, sons of Daniel Boyd. A charismatic leader, the elder Boyd allegedly led a conspiracy from November 2006 to 2009 to radicalize, recruit, and assist young men interested in overseas terrorism. The conspiracy also purportedly included fundraising for and provision of material support to terrorist groups. Using stories of his supposed past violent jihadist exploits in Pakistan and Afghanistan, Boyd recruited and trained individuals for violent terrorist activity, according to FBI courtroom testimony. From 1989-1992, Boyd supposedly trained at terrorist camps in Afghanistan and

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad*, pp. 71-85.

⁹¹ Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” *International Security*, vol. 32, no. 4 (Spring 2008), p. 96.

⁹² Andrea Elliott, “Militant's Path From Pakistan to Times Square,” *New York Times*, June 22, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/23/world/23terror.html>. Hereinafter: Andrea Elliott, June 22, 2010.

⁹³ DOJ Press Release, “Kosovar National Charged with Terrorism Violations,” June 17, 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-nsd-706.html>.

Pakistan and may have been a fighter in Afghanistan.⁹⁴ In 2011, the Boyds pled guilty to charges related to the case.⁹⁵

Jihadi Cool

Recent plots suggest that intermediaries and social networks can emphasize persuasive messages featuring elements outside of jihadist religious rhetoric. Adventurism and romanticized notions of revolution seem to have some prominence in the radicalization process. A desire to protect the *Ummah* against what he perceived as Western incursion may have been more important to Faisal Shahzad than more overtly religious rhetoric.⁹⁶ Terrorist recruiters are also promoting “jihadi cool” by producing rap videos advocating terrorism and releasing them on the Web. In 2007, Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax, a charismatic recruiter for the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab, enticed young Somali men in Minnesota with a jihadi cool message replete with war stories. According to federal court documents, he emphasized jihad but also stressed the sense of brotherhood he had experienced while fighting. He detailed his own experiences in guerilla combat and reassured his listeners that it was fun and not to be afraid. He further underscored that recruits would get the chance to use firearms.⁹⁷

“Jihadi cool” may have also played a role in pushing five young Northern Virginia Muslim men to travel in 2009 to Pakistan, where they were arrested for allegedly attempting to join jihadist organizations in the region. On June 24, 2010, the five were convicted on terrorism charges and sentenced to 10 years in prison in Pakistan.⁹⁸ Muslim leaders from Alexandria, VA, indicated that they had no inkling of radicalization among the five.⁹⁹ Abroad, as early as 2006, Dutch officials noted an “intensification of radicalization tendencies” among young Muslims in the Netherlands and a perception that jihad was “cool.”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁴ Mike Baker, “Feds Play Audio Tapes at Tense NC Terror Hearing,” *Associated Press*, in *SCnow.com*, August 5, 2009, http://www2.scnw.com/news/2009/aug/05/feds_play_audio_tapes_at_tense_nc_terror_hearing-ar-350281/; DOJ Press Release, “Seven Charged with Terrorism Violations in North Carolina,” July 27, 2009, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-nsd-725.html> (Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, July 27, 2009)

⁹⁵ DOJ Press Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge,” September 14, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-charge-1>; DOJ Press Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge,” June 7, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-charge>; DOJ Press Release, “Raleigh-Area Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charges,” February 9, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/ce020911.htm>.

⁹⁶ Andrea Elliott, June 22, 2010.

⁹⁷ *United States v. Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax and Abdiweli Yassin Isse*, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court State and District of Minnesota, October 8, 2009, http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20091124_TERROR_DOCS/faarax.pdf; See Dina Temple-Raston, “Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters’ Latest Weapon,” *National Public Radio*, March 26, 2010, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125186382&ft=1&f=1001>.

⁹⁸ Shaiq Hussain and Brigid Schulte, “5 N.Va. Men Convicted on Terrorism Charges in Pakistan, Given 10 Years in Prison,” *The Washington Post*, June 25, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2009/12/10/ST2009121002234.html?sid=ST2009121002234>.

⁹⁹ Mary Beth Sheridan and Spencer S. Hsu, “Arrests Suggest U.S. Muslims, Like Those in Europe, Can Be Radicalized Abroad,” *The Washington Post*, December 12, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/11/AR2009121104404.html>

¹⁰⁰ Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, The Netherlands, *Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat*, The Hague, March 2006, p. 8, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf>.

The Internet

The Web may also play a role in the experiences of many would-be and actual terrorists, just as it does in the lives of so many people. The interactivity of chat rooms, blogs, social networking sites, message boards, video hosting sites, and e-mail blurs the lines between readership and authorship that previous generations of terrorists and sympathizers encountered with pamphlets, newspapers, and newsletters.¹⁰¹ This blurring possibly encourages people who interact in such forums to more easily see themselves as part of broader jihadist movements and not just casual readers or online spectators. They may eventually engage in more substantive activity—actual propagandizing, financial support, or joining a terrorist network.¹⁰²

The Web's impact on individual would-be jihadists likely varies. In some cases accessing and engaging in online jihadist rhetoric possibly prods an individual toward violence. One author asserts that Internet activity has been central in the development of a "self-starter" phenomenon¹⁰³ and offers would-be violent jihadists what has been described as a "de-formalized" radicalization experience.¹⁰⁴ "Self-starters" are groups that lack ties to major international terrorist networks and do not receive orders from such organizations.¹⁰⁵ However, instances of solely virtual radicalization without face-to-face interaction seem to be rare. Most radicalization apparently requires experience with real-world social networks.¹⁰⁶

In other instances, terrorist "wannabes" may see online activity as a suitable substitute for direct violence and face-to-face contact with hardcore terrorists. Simply, individuals interested in violent jihad no longer have to physically travel to formal terrorist camps for indoctrination and rudimentary training. One author has also indicated that activity in the virtual realm may even play a much more profound, "cathartic" role, "allow[ing] aspiring jihadists to be part of the broader global jihad but crucially without engaging in direct violence."¹⁰⁷ In essence, online activity may channel individuals away from the violent expression of their radical beliefs by allowing them to air their grievances. While such activity may be seen in terrorist circles as an increasingly legitimate option—instead of violent jihad—it does not come without repercussions for online supporters of terrorism. Individuals absorbed in such activities may run afoul of law enforcement for materially aiding terrorist organizations.¹⁰⁸

Regardless of whether jihadist online activity drives individuals to violence, the Internet arguably serves to spur radicalization in three ways. First, it allows jihadists to augment their messages with suggestive audio and video. Second, it makes it easier for would-be jihadists to find and

¹⁰¹ Maura Conway, "Terrorism and Mass Communication: Nitro to the Net," *The World Today*, vol. 60, no. 8/9 (Aug/Sep 2004), pp. 19-22, http://doras.dcu.ie/513/1/nitro_to_net_2004.pdf.

¹⁰² Gilbert Ramsay, "Relocating the Virtual War," *Defence Against Terrorism Review*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 2009), p. 34, http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publications/datr3/03_Gilbert%20Ramsay.pdf.

¹⁰³ Aiden Kirby, "The London Bombers as 'Self-Starters: A Case Study in Indigenous Radicalization and the Emergence of Autonomous Cliques," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 30, issue 5 (May 2007), p. 416, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/122510_731260637_773633171.pdf.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 425.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 415.

¹⁰⁶ Tim Stevens, "Regulating the 'Dark Web: How a Two-Fold Approach Can Tackle Peer-to-Peer Radicalisation," *The RUSI Journal*, vol. 154, no. 2 (April 2009), p. 29.

¹⁰⁷ Akil N. Awan, "The Virtual Jihad: An Increasingly Legitimate Form of Warfare," *CTC Sentinel*, vol. 3, no. 5 (May 2010), p. 11, <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol3Iss5.pdf>. Hereinafter: Awan, "The Virtual Jihad."

¹⁰⁸ Awan, "The Virtual Jihad," p. 12.

interact with like-minded people around the world. Finally, the Internet “normal[izes] behaviors considered unacceptable or inappropriate in real-world environments.”¹⁰⁹ Terrorists publish rhetoric online that displaces culpability for their violent actions, which they commonly describe as inevitable responses when faced with overpowering enemies such as the West.¹¹⁰

Radicalizing material is readily accessible online, as are virtual communities in which one can discuss violent jihad. Since 2005, video sharing websites have broadened the availability of jihadi video material. All sorts of other texts and graphic images supporting violent jihad exist on the Web, as does a great volume of tradecraft, such as bomb-making guides.

Social networking, now inherently part of the Internet, is likely a tool that is used in the development of contacts among radicalized individuals and recruitment into violent jihadist groups. Before he died, Anwar al-Awlaki circulated jihadist lectures online and managed his own popular Facebook page and blog.¹¹¹ The five Virginia men convicted on June 24, 2010, in Pakistan on terrorism charges allegedly contacted an Al Qaeda operative via social networking websites, according to press coverage of their trial in the city of Sarghoda.¹¹²

Another case that highlights Internet-related issues involves Tarek Mehanna. Mehanna, a pharmacist living with his parents in Sudbury, a wealthy Boston suburb, was arrested on terrorism charges in October 2009.¹¹³ Among other alleged activities, Mehanna and co-conspirators translated from Arabic to English documents advocating terrorism and posted them on jihadist websites.¹¹⁴ They viewed themselves as the “media wing” for Al Qaeda in Iraq. In the eyes of some terrorism experts, the Mehanna case highlights the shift away from core members of Al Qaeda toward Internet-inspired, homegrown radicalization and self-starting terrorists. The Mehanna case emphasizes how recruiters from foreign terrorist organizations no longer seem necessary to shepherd radicalized individuals into terrorist training abroad. (Mehanna, himself, allegedly tried but failed to get into such camps.) Sam Rascoff, a former New York Police Department terrorism specialist, notes that “there is a sense that these guys are radicalizing on their own.”¹¹⁵ Frank J. Cilluffo notes that the Web has supplanted mosques as a recruitment venue, especially as terrorists try to draw Westerners into their organizations.¹¹⁶

¹⁰⁹ Gabriel Weimann, *Terror on the Internet: The New Arena, the New Challenge* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2006), p. 116. Hereinafter: Weimann, *Terror on the Internet*; Awan, “The Virtual Jihad,” p. 12.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ NEFA Foundation, “Anwar al Awlaki: Pro Al-Qaida Ideologue with Influence in the West,” February 5, 2009, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/nefabackgrounder_alawlaki.pdf.

¹¹² Brigid Schulte, “5 Va. Men Facing Terrorism Charges in Pakistan Write of ‘Noble’ Motivation,” *The Washington Post*, May 16, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/15/AR2010051503548.html>

¹¹³ Denise Lavoie, “Mass. Terror Suspect Taught Kids at Muslim School,” *Guardian.co.uk*, Associated Press, foreign, October 21, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8766970>.

¹¹⁴ Shelley Murphy, “Taking Refuge Where His Woes Began: Sudbury Terror Suspect Presses Case on Internet,” *The Boston Globe*, February 1, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/02/01/web_is_now_refuge_for_man_caught_online/?page=1 (Hereinafter: Murphy, Feb 1, 2010); Denise Lavoie, Abby Goodnough, and Liz Robbins, “Mass. Man Arrested in Terrorism Case,” *New York Times*, October 21, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/us/22terror.html>; Superseding Indictment, *U.S. v. Tarek Mehanna and Ahmad Aghasamra*, Cr. No. 09-CR-10017 GAO, U.S. District Court District of Massachusetts, 2009, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1121.pdf.

¹¹⁵ Dina Temple-Raston, “Mass. Arrest Spurs Fear of Homegrown Terrorism,” *National Public Radio*, October 22, 2009, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114020731>.

¹¹⁶ Murphy, February 1, 2010.

Aside from its possible impact on the radicalization process, the Internet potentially offers terrorists operational capabilities.¹¹⁷ Its decentralized form mirrors the flattened, cellular structures of most terrorist organizations. Among other things, it could help them to collect intelligence about their targets, communicate with one another, propagandize, recruit foot soldiers, provide training, raise funds, and communicate operational direction.¹¹⁸

Jailhouse Jihadism

In the last several years, terrorism experts and some Members of Congress have shown interest in jihadist prison radicalization.¹¹⁹ But the research is decidedly unclear regarding the threat posed by radicalization behind bars. A scholar of the prison phenomenon in the United Kingdom notes that jail time potentially accelerates the radicalization process for many individuals. Prison brings together disaffected people who may be receptive to anti-social messages offering “clear, albeit intolerant, solutions to complex problems of identity and belonging.”¹²⁰ Experts have sounded warnings about the unknown level of threat posed by radicalization and terrorist recruitment in U.S. jails.¹²¹

Others are quick to point out, however, that while conversion to Islam and radicalization occur among incarcerated populations, the jump to terrorist plotting in the United States is rare.¹²² This is at least partly due to prison officials’ efforts to counter jailhouse jihadism, according to a study involving interviews with 210 prison officials and 270 inmates mostly from state correctional systems.¹²³ The Federal Bureau of Prisons acknowledges the possibility of inmate radicalization but “do[es] not believe that there is widespread terrorist-inspired radicalization or recruiting in federal prisons,” where between 5% and 6% of prisoners identify as Muslims.¹²⁴ Based on CRS analysis of the 53 violent jihadist plots and attacks since 9/11, only one involved radicalization in prison. A study of 117 homegrown jihadist terrorists from the United States and United Kingdom

¹¹⁷ Weimann, *Terror on the Internet*, pp. 56.

¹¹⁸ Weimann, *Terror on the Internet*, pp. 111-140.

¹¹⁹ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, *Threat of Muslim-American Radicalization in U.S. Prisons*, 112th Cong., 1st sess., June 15, 2011; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?* 109th Cong., 2nd sess. September 19, 2006, S. Hrg. 109-954 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007), pp. 1-6, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:30597.pdf.

¹²⁰ James Brandon, “The Danger of Prison Radicalization in the West,” *Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel*, vol. 2, no. 12 (December 2009), pp. 1-3, <http://etc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol2Iss12.pdf>. Hereinafter: Brandon, “The Danger of Prison.”

¹²¹ See George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and The University of Virginia Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG), “Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization,” HSPI and CIAG, Washington, DC, September 2006, http://www.healthsystem.virginia.edu/internet/ciag/publications/out_of_the_shadows.pdf.

¹²² Brandon, “The Danger of Prison,” p. 4; Mark S. Hamm, “Prisoner Radicalization: Assessing the Threat in U.S. Correctional Institutions,” *National Institute of Justice Journal*, no. 261 (October 2008), p. 18, <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/224085.pdf>.

¹²³ Bert Useem and Obie Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” *Criminology & Public Policy*, vol. 8, no. 3 (August 2009), pp. 586-587, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1745-9133.2009.00574.x/pdf>. Hereinafter: Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners.”

¹²⁴ Gary Fields and Suzanne Sataline, “Bomb Case Raises Issue of Islam in Jails,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 23, 2009; <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124303841574048865.html>.

found only seven cases in which prison had a significant impact on an individual's radicalization process.¹²⁵

The lack of conclusive prison-based radicalization among the jihadist terrorism plots and foiled attacks since 9/11 suggests that the threat emanating from prisons does not seem as substantial as some experts may fear. One of the recent cases, commonly known as the Newburgh Four plot, included at least two individuals who converted to Islam while in state prison, but it remains unclear whether they radicalized behind bars, and whether the plot itself took form outside of jail.¹²⁶

The most prominent post-9/11 example of domestic violent jihadist activity inspired in prison implicated the group, Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS or the "Authentic Assembly of God"). Kevin James, Levar Washington, Gregory Patterson, and Hammad Samana were arrested and charged in August 2005 for their participation in a plot to attack Jewish institutions and other targets in the Los Angeles area, including synagogues, the Israeli Consulate, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), U.S. military recruiting offices, and military bases.

According to DOJ, the incarcerated James founded JIS in 1997 based on his interpretation of Islam. His views are apparent in several of his prison writings, including a 104-page document titled the "JIS Protocol." In this document, James supports the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the United States and describes "Jihad [as] the only true 'anti-terrorist action[.],' a defensive battle against the aggression of theological imposters led by Zionism." The document also advocated the killing of "lawful targets," including non-Muslims. Reportedly, James met Washington in prison in 2004 and introduced him to JIS and its beliefs. After his release, Washington, who converted to Islam while he was in prison, recruited Patterson, an employee at LAX, and Samana at the Jamaat-E-Masijudal mosque in Inglewood, CA, where they all worshipped. Both Patterson and Samana swore allegiance to Washington and pledged to serve as "mujahideen," according to court documents.¹²⁷ One study has pointed out that James' radicalization manifested itself in prison but may not have been heavily influenced by his experiences behind bars. Two points suggest that factors outside of prison may have at least partly

¹²⁵ Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman, *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.: An Empirical Examination of the Radicalization Process*, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Center for Terrorism Research, Washington, DC, April 2009, pp. 14-15, http://www.defenddemocracy.org/downloads/HomegrownTerrorists_USandUK.pdf. Hereinafter: Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.*

¹²⁶ Eric Gorski and Rachel Zoll, "Plot Renews Fears of Radical Islam in Prison," *Associated Press*, in *msnbc.com*, May 22, 2009, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30891721/>; Daniel J. Wakin, "Imams Reject Talk That Islam Radicalizes Inmates," *New York Times*, May 24, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/nyregion/24convert.html>.

¹²⁷ DOJ Press Release, "Man Who Formed Terrorist Group that Plotted Attacks on Military and Jewish Facilities Sentenced to 16 Years in Federal Prison," March 6, 2009, <http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/la030609ausa.htm> (Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, March 6, 2009); Anti-Defamation League, "Two Sentenced in Los Angeles Terror Plot against Jewish Institutions," *adl.com*, August 24, 2008, updated 2009, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/los_angeles_sentenced.htm; DOJ Press Release, "Man Involved in Domestic Terrorism Plot Targeting Military and Jewish Facilities Sentenced to 22 Years," July 23, 2008, <http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel08/la062308usa.htm>; DOJ Press Release, "Second Man Involved in Domestic Terrorism Plot Targeting Military, Jewish Facilities Sentenced to Prison," July 21, 2008, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-nsd-634.html>; DOJ Press Release, "Four Men Indicted on Terrorism Charges," August 31, 2005, http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/IGInformationReleases/fourmen_090105.pdf. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, August 31, 2005.

driven his radicalization: his “JIS Protocol” does not focus on jailhouse conditions, and his father had been a member of the Black Panther Party.¹²⁸

Overview of Post-9/11 Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism Plots and Attacks

Scholars and law enforcement officials have noted that no workable general profile of domestic violent jihadists exists. According to the NYPD’s Intelligence Division, there is no effective profile to predict exactly who will radicalize.¹²⁹ Another study found only broad trends among domestic jihadist terrorists, specifically that they are overwhelmingly male and about two-thirds of them are younger than 30 years old.¹³⁰ As the above discussion may suggest, generalizing about the individuals involved is problematic.

Indeed, there does not appear to be a common thread connecting the U.S. Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Hasan with the Caucasian convert, Daniel Patrick Boyd; the Afghan immigrant Najibullah Zazi with Carlos Bledsoe, an African American of a happy childhood who converted to Islam and renamed himself Abdulhakim Muhammed; David Headley, who was born Daood Gilani to a successful Pakistani immigrant father and American mother, with Talib Islam, who was born Michael Finton and raised in multiple foster homes; or the educated pharmacist Tarek Mehanna, with the Somali American from Minneapolis Shirwa Ahmed, who traveled to the land of his birth and became the first U.S. citizen suicide bomber. The plots and attacks drew in first- and second-generation Muslim American immigrants and native-born Americans who converted to the faith. Some included individuals acting alone, while others had multiple co-conspirators. Some plots were aspirational. Others appear to have been pushed along by government informants or undercover agents, and still others were serious and calculating until uncovered by intelligence and/or law enforcement officials (see **Appendix A** for details on the cases).

Figure B-1 provides information about the profile and training of individuals involved in domestic jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. **Figure B-2** documents the specific plots and attacks, including the intended endgame (use of firearms, explosives, or fight abroad), target (within/outside the United States), and tools used by investigators to disrupt the plotting.

Overarching Themes

Homegrown violent jihadist activity since 9/11 defies easy categorization. For example, conventional notions of “homegrown” may suggest plots that are hatched and executed solely within the United States. But in a globalized environment, many domestic jihadist terrorist plots have some sort of international dimension. For example, some plotters train abroad. Some receive cues from terrorist Internet propagandists operating in foreign lands. And as suggested above, homegrown terrorists can focus their violent plans on domestic or international entities. Since 9/11, 32 homegrown plots featured domestic targets, 18 focused on foreign ones, and three conspiracies had both domestic and foreign targeting elements. From another perspective, 30

¹²⁸ Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” pp. 581-582.

¹²⁹ Silber and Bhatt, *Radicalization in the West*, p. 8.

¹³⁰ Schanzer, et.al, *Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim Americans*, p. 10.

involved intent or actual travel abroad for training or to plan for terrorist attacks. The 53 homegrown jihadist attacks and plots since 9/11 do exhibit four broad themes: a variety of endgames, little stomach for suicide or martyrdom among plotters, successful attacks by lone wolves, and varied capabilities among the plots.

A Variety of Endgames

Homegrown violent jihadists pursue a number of endgames. Some seek involvement in foreign conflicts or insurgencies. Others plan and attempt to execute either bombings or assaults with firearms. Finally, some jihadists apparently intended from the start only to fund or materially support the activities of their brethren.

Foreign Fighters

Sixteen of the post-9/11 homegrown plots have featured individuals exclusively seeking to become foreign fighters with terrorist groups entangled in insurgency-type conflicts. Al-Shabaab-related cases concerning young men leaving the United States to fight in Somalia are the paramount example. Other cases include the following:

- In a case mentioned elsewhere in this report, five men from Northern Virginia (Northern Virginia Five) were arrested in Sarghoda, Pakistan, in December 2009. They purportedly traveled there hoping to join jihadist groups and battle U.S. troops in Afghanistan. On June 24, 2010, they were convicted of terrorism charges in a special Pakistani anti-terror court. Prosecutors say the five men also began planning attacks against a Pakistani nuclear plant and an air base and other targets in Afghanistan and “territories of the United States.”¹³¹
- In February 2006, three residents of Toledo, OH—Mohammad Zaki Amawi, a dual U.S. and Jordanian citizen; Marwan Othman El-Hindi, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Jordan; and Wassim Mazloum, a legal permanent resident from Lebanon (Toledo, Ohio Plotters)—were charged with conspiracy to kill or maim persons in locations outside the United States, to include U.S. Armed Forces personnel serving in Iraq.¹³² On June 13, 2008, a federal jury convicted all three of conspiring to commit terrorist acts against Americans overseas and material support to terrorists.¹³³

Explosives and Firearms

Fifteen of the 53 homegrown jihadist plots targeting the United States since 9/11 exclusively involved explosives or incendiary devices. Suspects at least discussed the use of bombs, hand grenades, or missiles in these cases.¹³⁴ From a broader perspective, 27 cases involved plotting

¹³¹ Jerry Markon, et al., “Pakistan Charges 5 Northern Virginia Men in Alleged Terrorism Plot,” *Washington Post*, March 18, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031700430_pf.html.

¹³² *United States v. Mohammad Zaki Amawi, et al.*, Indictment, 3:06CR0719, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio Western Division, 2006, p. 2, http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/indictment_22006.pdf.

¹³³ Anti Defamation League, “Three Men Face Terrorism Charges in Ohio,” *adl.org*, October 21, 2009, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/Ohio_men_trial.htm.

¹³⁴ This includes one case involving a surface-to-air missile (to be supplied by an undercover agent).

revolving around explosives or incendiary devices coupled with another endgame—either the use of firearms or plans to become foreign fighters. Historically, most terrorist incidents in the United States have involved bombs or fires. According to research drawn from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s Global Terrorism Database, about 83% of all terrorist incidents on U.S. soil between 1970 and 2007—including violent jihadists as well as non-jihadists—have included explosives or incendiary devices. Roughly 9% involved firearms.¹³⁵

The Zazi case (as mentioned elsewhere) and the attempt by Faisal Shahzad to detonate an explosives-filled 1993 Nissan Pathfinder in New York City’s Times Square stand out as examples of plots incorporating explosive or incendiary devices. On May 1, 2010, investigators discovered fireworks, clocks, wiring, filled propane tanks, gasoline canisters, and fertilizer that Shahzad had rigged for explosion in his vehicle.¹³⁶ The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan helped facilitate the failed attack by training Shahzad and sending him \$12,000 in funding.¹³⁷

Three plots intended to use firearms exclusively, while 16 plots involved in whole or in part the use of firearms. The three plots that focused on firearms include two of the successful post-9/11 attacks. The deadlier of the two attacks was the shooting at Fort Hood, TX, on November 5, 2009. U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan was charged in the attack which killed 13 and wounded or injured 43 others.¹³⁸ Abdulhakim Muhammad was arrested on June 1, 2009, in connection with a shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR, that killed one soldier and wounded another.¹³⁹ The third case that centered on firearms involved six men. They were arrested in May 2007 in a plot against Fort Dix, a U.S. Army base in New Jersey. The plan focused on firearms and included attacking and killing soldiers. In December 2008, a jury found five of the six guilty of conspiring to kill military personnel but cleared them of attempted murder.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ Gary LaFree, “Terrorist Attacks Against the United States Homeland from 1970 to 2007,” p. 57, in Appendix B, “Community-Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force,” *Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security*, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, College Park, MD, February 16, 2010, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_HFD_CommRadReport.pdf.

¹³⁶ DOJ Press Release, “Faisal Shahzad Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to 10 Federal Crimes Arising from Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square,” June 21, 2010, <http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo062110.htm>. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, June 21, 2010; DOJ Press Release, “Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Faisal Shahzad with Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square,” May 4, 2010, <http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo050410a.htm>; *United States v. Faisal Shahzad*, Criminal Complaint 01:10-mj-00928-UA, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, June 17, 2010, <http://cryptome.org/shahzad/usa-v-shahzad.htm>.

¹³⁷ DOJ Press Release, June 21, 2010; Anne Flaherty, “White House Says Pakistan Taliban Behind N.Y. Bomb,” *Associated Press* in *abcnews.com*, May 9, 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=10596709>.

¹³⁸ “Fort Hood Shooting Suspect to Remain Confined,” *Associated Press State and Local Wire*, in *msnbc.com*, November 21, 2009, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34084622>; “Fort Hood Shooting Suspect Out of Intensive Care,” *CNN.com*, December 16, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/16/texas.fort.hood.hasan/index.html?iref=allsearch>.

¹³⁹ NEFA, “Target America Series #18: The Little Rock Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting,” June 2009, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/NEFA_littlerockrecruitingshooting.pdf; James Dao, “Man Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting,” *New York Times*, January 22, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/22littlerock.html>.

¹⁴⁰ Christopher Dela Cruz, “Three convicted in Fort Dix terror plot are sentenced to life in prison,” *NJ.com*, April 28, 2009, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/04/judge_sentences_fort_dix_defen.html. Hereinafter: Dela Cruz, *NJ.com* April 28, 2009.

Multiple, Unclear, or Unique Tactics

In total, 19 attacks and plots incorporated multiple or unique tactics or the tactics were not clear from the public record. One attack involving multiple tactics occurred abroad but targeted members of the U.S. Armed Forces at a base. In that attack, which occurred on March 23, 2003, U.S. Army Sergeant Hasan Akbar used hand grenades (explosives) and his military-issued M-4 rifle to kill two fellow U.S. servicemen and wound 14 others at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait.¹⁴¹ Other examples of multiple, unique, or unspecified tactics include the following:

- Members of the plot involving Daniel Boyd allegedly attempted to travel abroad to engage in jihad as *foreign fighters* and also likely prepared to attack a domestic site—the U.S. Marine Corps Base in Quantico, VA, using *firearms*.¹⁴²
- Bryant Vinas, who plotted to blow up (*explosives*) the Long Island railroad in New York, admitted to U.S. officials that he met with Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and, between March and July 2008, attended three Al Qaeda training courses.¹⁴³ In September 2008, as a *foreign fighter* he took part in a rocket attack targeting a U.S. military base in Afghanistan.¹⁴⁴
- Even though the plotters discussed using *explosives*, the four individuals tied to JIS and arrested in 2005 used *firearms* in robberies to generate funding for their scheme.¹⁴⁵
- In a case involving unspecified tactics, Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, a U.S. citizen born in Virginia, and Syed Haris Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, scouted targets in Washington, DC, in 2005.¹⁴⁶
- In an attack that did not feature guns or bombs, on March 3, 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, a naturalized U.S. citizen, crashed his SUV into a crowd near the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. No one was seriously injured in the attack, and he pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder. The assailant allegedly hoped to avenge the deaths of Muslims abroad that he believed were caused by the United States.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴¹ Convicted and sentenced to death in military court, Akbar was at least in part motivated by extremist Islamic beliefs. He had converted to Islam as an adult. Madeline Gruen, “Backgrounder: Sgt. Hasan Akbar,” PowerPoint presentation, NEFA, Jan 2010, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefa_akbarbackgrounder.pdf; Manuel Roig-Franzia, “Army Soldier Is Convicted in Attack on Fellow Troops,” *The Washington Post*, April 22, 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7210-2005Apr21.html>.

¹⁴² DOJ Press Release, “Superseding Indictment in Boyd Matter,” September 24, 2009, <http://charlotte.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/2009/ce092409.htm>; DOJ Press Release, July 27, 2009.

¹⁴³ Paul Cruickshank, Nic Robertson, and Ken Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore: The Plot to Bomb New York,” *cnn.com*, May 21, 2010, <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/14/bryant.neal.vinas.part2/index.html>; Hereinafter: Cruickshank, Robertson, and Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore;” Sebastian Rotella and Josh Meyer, “U.S.-born Militant Who Fought for Al Qaeda Is In Custody,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 23, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/23/nation/na-american-jihad23>.

¹⁴⁴ Cruickshank, Robertson, and Shiffman, “From Long Island to Lahore.”

¹⁴⁵ DOJ Press Release, March 6, 2009; DOJ Press Release, August 31, 2005.

¹⁴⁶ DOJ Press Release, “Terrorism Defendants Sentenced,” December 14, 2009, <http://atlanta.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/at121409a.htm>.

¹⁴⁷ “Iranian Ex-UNC Student Gets 33 Years in Prison for Plowing SUV into Crowd to Avenge Muslim Deaths,” *Associated Press*, in *FoxNews.com*, August 26, 2008, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,410904,00.html>; “Driver Charged for Plowing Through Crowd,” *msnbc.com*, March 5, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11660817/>.

Material Support

Although this report largely focuses on radicalization and violent jihadist plotting, there is at least one other illegal method for individuals to assist terrorists. Radicalization may lead people to help terrorist organizations by illegally providing them material support *unrelated to specific violent jihadist plots*. How frequently this has occurred since 9/11 is difficult to discern, because material support¹⁴⁸ charges are often part of the illegal activity in violent plots. DOJ has publicly released information on unsealed terrorism convictions between September 11, 2001, and March 18, 2010.¹⁴⁹ CRS analysis of this information indicates that homegrown jihadists unconnected to any specific violent plots were prosecuted for materially supporting terrorists in at least six schemes.¹⁵⁰ The six schemes supported violent jihadist or jihadist-linked groups such as Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, Abu Sayyaf, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT). They included the following:

- **Rahmat Abdhir:** A U.S. citizen living in San Jose, CA, Abdhir was indicted in 2007 for providing material support to his brother, Zulkifli Abdhir, a member of Jemaah Islamiyah based in the Philippines. The U.S. government accused

¹⁴⁸ As described in U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, 2339A and 2339B. For more information, see CRS Report R41333, *Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B*, by Charles Doyle.

¹⁴⁹ DOJ, "National Security Division Statistics on Unsealed International Terrorism-Related Convictions 9/11/01-3/18/10," <http://theplumline.whorungov.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/March-26-2010-NSD-Final-Statistics.pdf>.

¹⁵⁰ For this measure, 1) *Homegrown* jihadists were convicted under either section 2339A or 2339B of U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, and no other "Category I"*(see definition below) conviction charges were tied to their cases. 2) The scheme or the radicalization of the individuals involved had to have largely occurred after 9/11. 3) The scheme was jihadist in nature, eliminating material support cases involving non-jihadist terrorist groups. 4) The scheme did not include a violent plot as reported publicly. So, for example, the August 2004 Albany, New York plot implicating Yassin M. Aref and Mohammed Mosharref Hossain in an FBI sting involving material support to a Pakistani terrorist group is not included among the six material support cases. This is because the case involved a scheme to launder through Hossain's pizza shop and real estate holdings the proceeds of the sale of a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile which was purportedly to be used in a fictitious plot to assassinate Pakistan's United Nation's envoy.

*The introduction included with DOJ's "National Security Division Statistics," enumerates two categories of offenses involved in the 403 terrorism and terrorism-related prosecutions listed between 9/11/01 and 3/18/10. According to the Department of Justice document, "Category I Offenses" are "violations of federal statutes that are directly related to international terrorism and that are utilized regularly in international terrorism matters." The statistical portion of the document includes 105 individuals who had material support charges under 18 U.S.C. §2339A or 18 U.S.C. §2339B among their conviction charges. Appendix A in the Department of Justice, "National Security Division Statistics," describes the following as Category I Offenses: Aircraft Sabotage (18 U.S.C. §32); Animal Enterprise Terrorism (18 U.S.C. §43); Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (18 U.S.C. §§112, 878, 1116, 1201(a)(4)); Use of Biological, Nuclear, Chemical or Other Weapons of Mass Destruction (18 U.S.C. §§175, 175b, 229, 831, 2332a); Production, Transfer, or Possession of Variola Virus (Smallpox) (18 U.S.C. §175c); Participation in Nuclear and WMD Threats to the United States (18 U.S.C. §832); Conspiracy Within the United States to Murder, Kidnap, or Maim Persons or to Damage Certain Property Overseas (18 U.S.C. §956); Hostage Taking (18 U.S.C. §1203); Terrorist Attacks Against Mass Transportation Systems (18 U.S.C. §1993); Terrorist Acts Abroad Against United States Nationals (18 U.S.C. §2332); Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries (18 U.S.C. §2332b) Bombings of places of public use, Government facilities, public transportation systems and infrastructure facilities (18 U.S.C. §2332f); Missile Systems designed to Destroy Aircraft (18 U.S.C. §2332g); Production, Transfer, or Possession of Radiological Dispersal Devices (18 U.S.C. §2332h); Harboring Terrorists (18 U.S.C. §2339); Providing Material Support to Terrorists (18 U.S.C. §2339A); Providing Material Support to Designated Terrorist Organizations (18 U.S.C. §2339B); Prohibition Against Financing of Terrorism (18 U.S.C. §2339C); Receiving Military-Type Training from an FTO (18 U.S.C. §2339D); Narco-Terrorism (21 U.S.C. §1010A); Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities or Fuel (42 U.S.C. §2284); Aircraft Piracy (49 U.S.C. §46502); Violations of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. §1705(b)) involving E.O. 12947 (Terrorists Who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process); E.O. 13224 (Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit, or Support Terrorism or Global Terrorism List); and E.O. 13129 (Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With the Taliban).

Rahmat of sending to his brother more than \$10,000 in supplies, including chocolates, underwear, knives, guns, and radios.¹⁵¹

- **Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed:** According to DOJ, during a routine traffic stop in Goose Creek, SC, on August 4, 2007, law enforcement officials found explosive materials (PVC pipe containing potassium nitrate and kitty litter as well as about 20 feet of fuse) during a consensual search of the trunk of the Toyota Camry Mohamed was driving. A laptop retrieved from the car yielded a video produced by Mohamed depicting how components from a remote controlled toy car could be used to fashion a detonator for an explosive device. Mohamed had uploaded the recording to YouTube. Although no specific terrorist group was linked to Mohamed, he did admit that he intended the recording as instruction to “suiciders” on how to spare themselves in attacks. An Egyptian resident of Tampa, FL, Mohamed entered the United States on an F-1 student visa.¹⁵²
- **Tarik Shah, Rafiq Abdus Sabir, Mahmud Faruq Brent:** In an investigation stretching back at least to December 2001, the FBI infiltrated a group of acquaintances interested in supporting international jihadist terrorist organizations. Shah and Brent pled guilty to material support in 2007 and Sabir was convicted of the charge the same year. In 2005, Shah, a Bronx, New York City, jazz musician and martial arts instructor, had sworn allegiance to Al Qaeda in the presence of an FBI agent who posed as a recruiter for the group. He had also allegedly offered to train Al Qaeda fighters in hand-to-hand combat. Shah purported to have been interested in traveling to Afghanistan in 1998 to attend terrorist training camps.¹⁵³ Sabir, a doctor from Florida, swore allegiance to Al Qaeda in the same ceremony as his friend, Shah. Sabir also offered his medical skills to treat injured Al Qaeda fighters.¹⁵⁴ Brent, a Washington, DC, cab driver, traveled to Pakistan in 2002 to attend a Lashkar-i-Taiba training camp.¹⁵⁵ A fourth individual was arrested in the investigation but did not get convicted of material support.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹ Bob Egelko, “Bail Denied for Man Accused of Aiding Brother Tied to Terror,” February 16, 2008; DOJ Press Release, “Specially Designated Global Terrorist and His Brother Indicted for Providing Material Support to Terrorists,” August 3, 2007, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Abdhir_DOJPRIndictment.pdf.

¹⁵² DOJ Press Release, “Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to Terrorists,” June 18, 2008, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-nsd-544.html>; *United States v. Ahmed Abdellatif Sherif Mohamed*, Sentencing Memorandum, Case No. U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2008, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/718.pdf.

¹⁵³ Joseph Goldstein, “Bronx Man Pleads Guilty to Pledging Fealty to Qaeda,” *New York Sun*, April 5, 2007, <http://www.nysun.com/new-york/bronx-man-pleads-guilty-to-pledging-fealty/51890/>; DOJ Press Release, “Bronx Martial Arts Instructor Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Support Al Qaeda,” April 4, 2007, <http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/April07/shahpleApril.pdf>.

¹⁵⁴ DOJ Press Release, “Florida Doctor Sentenced to 25 Years for Conspiring and Attempting to Support Al Qaeda,” November 28, 2007, http://media-newswire.com/release_1058218.html; Stephen W. Smith, “Fla. Doctor Convicted in NY Terror Case,” *CBSNews.com*, May 21, 2007, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/21/terror/main2833349.shtml>.

¹⁵⁵ DOJ Press Release, “Maryland Man Sentenced to 15 Years for Providing Material Support to Terrorist Organization,” July 25, 2007, <http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July07/brentsentencingpr.pdf>.

¹⁵⁶ Larry Neumeister, “Moroccan-Born Bookseller Sentenced to 13 Years in Terror Case by Federal Judge in New York,” *Associated Press in Worldstream*, April 16, 2007.

- **Ronald Grecula:** In an FBI sting operation, Grecula negotiated to build and sell an explosive device with individuals he believed were tied to Al Qaeda.¹⁵⁷
- **Ilyas Ali:** In a drugs-for-arms case, Ali, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in India, admitted to conspiring in 2002 with two Pakistanis to supply Al Qaeda with anti-aircraft missiles bought using proceeds from the sale of heroin and hashish.¹⁵⁸
- **Cedric Carpenter and Lamont Ranson:** In February 2005, the duo from New Orleans pled guilty to conspiring to sell false Mississippi Driver's licenses, Social Security cards, and birth certificates to undercover informants they believed were members of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization.¹⁵⁹

Aside from the convictions derived from the DOJ's list covering the period between 9/11 and March 18, 2010, several material support cases have come to light recently. It is unclear what accounts for this recent flurry of arrests. It may be a parallel to the uptick in violent jihadist plotting. Some of the cases include the following:

- In May 2011, FBI agents arrested **Hafiz Khan** (a naturalized U.S. citizen and resident of Miami) and two of his sons **Izhar Khan** and **Irfan Khan** (both naturalized U.S. citizens). They were allegedly involved in efforts to provide financing and other material support to the Pakistani Taliban. The trio was assisted by three other indicted individuals at large in Pakistan. This second group included **Amina Khan**—Izhar Khan's daughter—and her son, **Alam Zeb**, as well as an individual named **Ali Rehman**. Hafiz and Izhar Khan are imams in South Florida mosques.¹⁶⁰
- **Nima Ali Yusuf:** A permanent resident of the United States living in San Diego, Yusuf was arrested on November 12, 2010, on charges of conspiracy to provide material support to al-Shabaab and for making false statements to a government agency regarding an international terrorism matter.¹⁶¹
- **Mohamud Abdi Yusuf, Abdi Mahdi Hussein, and Duwayne Mohamed Diriye** participated in a scheme to provide material support to al-Shabaab, according to an indictment unsealed November 3, 2010. Yusuf, a resident of St. Louis, MO, is accused of sending funds to people tied to the terrorist organization in Somalia,

¹⁵⁷ DOJ Press Release, "Ronald Grecula Pleads Guilty to Attempting to Provide Material Support to Al-Qaeda," September 22, 2006. http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/US_v_Grecula_DOJPRGuiltyPlea.pdf.

¹⁵⁸ Kelly Thornton, "Man Sentenced in Drugs-for-Missiles Plot," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, April 14, 2006; Thornton, "Drugs-for-Arms Plot Nets Prison," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, April 5, 2006, http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060405/news_2m5missile.html; "Al-Qaeda Dealers' Face US Trial," *BBC News*, January 6, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2630849.stm>.

¹⁵⁹ U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Press Release, "Two New Orleans Men Admit Offering to Sell False Identities to Assist Members of Terrorist Organization," February 28, 2005.

¹⁶⁰ Jay Weaver, "No Decision from Judge on Bail for Accused South Florida Muslim Clerics," *Miami Herald*, July 1, 2011, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/07/01/2294392/accused-south-florida-muslim-clerics.html>; Julie K. Brown, "Imam's Arrest Stuns Mosque Members," *Miami Herald*, May 14, 2011, <http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/05/14/2217517/mosque-members-imam-doesnt-have.html>; DOJ Press Release, "Six Individuals Charged for Providing Material Support to the Pakistani Taliban," May 14, 2011, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-nsd-621.html>.

¹⁶¹ DOJ Press Release, "San Diego Woman Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al Shabaab," November 15, 2010, <http://sandiego.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/sd111510.htm>; *United States v. Nima Ali Yusuf*, Indictment, Case Number: 10-CR-4551, U.S. District Court, Southern District of California, November 12, 2010.

including Diriye. Yusuf purportedly worked with Hussein to structure financial transactions while the latter was an employee of a licensed money-remitting business.¹⁶² In November 2011, Yusuf “pled guilty to providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization.”¹⁶³

- According to an indictment unsealed on November 2, 2010, San Diego residents, **Basaaly Saeed Moalin, Mohamed Mohamed Mohamud, and Issa Doreh** conspired to provide material support to al-Shabaab. The indictment states that Moalin received a request for financial support from one of al-Shabaab’s military leaders in December 2007 and subsequently worked with Mohamud and Doreh to fill the request.¹⁶⁴ In a separate indictment unsealed on December 3, 2010, Anaheim resident **Ahmed Nasir Taalil Mohamud** was tied to the scheme.¹⁶⁵
- **Barry Bujol:** According to DOJ, Bujol, a U.S. citizen living in Texas, allegedly attempted to provide money, pre-paid telephone calling cards, and global positioning system receivers (among other items), to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula after he had communicated with radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.¹⁶⁶ He was arrested on May 30, 2010.¹⁶⁷ In November 2011, he was convicted of attempting to provide material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization as well as aggravated identity theft.¹⁶⁸
- **Khalid Quazzani:** On May 19, 2010, Ouazzani, a naturalized U.S. citizen originally from Morocco and living in Kansas City, MO, pled guilty to participating in a material support scheme that provided more than \$23,000 to Al Qaeda.¹⁶⁹
- **Syed Hashmi:** A Pakistan-born U.S. citizen, Hashmi pled guilty to material support charges on April 27, 2010. He admitted that while he was a graduate student in London, he allowed a roommate to store in his apartment ponchos,

¹⁶² DOJ Press Release, “Two Indicted in Missouri on Charges of Providing Material Support to a Terrorist Organization,” November 3, 2010, <http://stlouis.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/sl110310.htm>.

¹⁶³ DOJ Press Release, “Local Man Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to Terrorist Organization,” November 3, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/stlouis/press-releases/2011/local-man-pleads-guilty-to-providing-material-support-to-terrorist-organization?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=st-louis-press-releases&utm_content=44103.

¹⁶⁴ DOJ Press Release, “Three California Men Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al Shabaab,” November 2, 2010, <http://sandiego.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/sd110210.htm>; *United States v. Basaaly Saeed Moalin, et al.*, Indictment, Case Number: 10-CR-4246, U.S. District Court, Southern District of California, November 2, 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1409.pdf.

¹⁶⁵ DOJ Press Release, “California Man Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to al Shabaab,” December 3, 2010, <http://sandiego.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/sd120310a.htm>.

¹⁶⁶ Evan Perez, “U.S. Terror Suspect Arrested,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 3, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703340904575285310199323440.html>; DOJ Press Release, “Texas Man Indicted for Attempting to Provide Material Support to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” June 3, 2010, <http://houston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/ho060310.htm>.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ DOJ Press Release, “Texas Man Convicted for Attempting to Provide Material Support to Al Qaeda,” November 14, 2011, <http://www.justice.gov/usao/txs/1News/Releases/2011%20November/111114%20Bujol.htm>.

¹⁶⁹ DOJ Press Release, “Al Qaeda Supporter Pleads Guilty to Supporting Terrorist Organization,” May 19, 2010, <http://kansascity.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/kc051910.htm>. Terry Frieden, “U.S. Citizen Pleads Guilty to Sending Funds to al Qaeda,” *CNN.com*, May 19, 2010, <http://www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/19/missouri.al.qaeda.funding.plea/index.html>.

sleeping bags, and waterproof socks destined for Al Qaeda. Hashmi also loaned the individual \$300 to travel to Waziristan, Pakistan, to deliver the goods.¹⁷⁰

- **Raja Lahrasib Khan:** On March 25, 2010, Khan, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, was charged with providing material support (in the form of money) to Al Qaeda. The criminal complaint alleges that Khan accepted \$1,000 from an undercover agent and assured him that the money would be used to purchase weapons and possibly other supplies.¹⁷¹
- Between November 2007 and March 2010, U.S. citizens **Wesam El-Hanafi** and **Sabirhan Hasanoff** allegedly engaged in a scheme to, among other things, provide computer expertise to and purchase seven Casio digital watches for Al Qaeda.¹⁷²

Little Stomach for Suicide or Martyrdom

Few of the terrorist conspiracies examined in this report clearly contained suicidal or martyrdom overtones. Two terrorist plots clearly had suicide missions as core elements. Najibullah Zazi and his associates planned their attack on New York's subways as suicide missions. Also, some Americans recruited into al-Shabaab have reportedly committed suicide attacks. On October 29, 2008, al-Shabaab recruit Shirwa Ahmed became the first known American suicide bomber when he drove an explosives-laden truck into a government building in Somalia, one of five simultaneous assaults that killed 22 U.N. aid workers and others.¹⁷³ The FBI also identified Farah Mohamed Beledi as a suicide bomber who died as he tried to detonate his suicide vest in a May 2011 attack in Mogadishu, Somalia.¹⁷⁴ According to media reports, al-Shabaab has claimed that Abdisalan Hussein Ali purportedly blew himself up while attacking African Union troops in Mogadishu in October 2011.¹⁷⁵ Reportedly, the FBI is also investigating whether a Seattle man was responsible for a suicide truck bombing in Mogadishu, Somalia on September 17, 2009, that killed 21 peacekeepers and himself.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁰ DOJ Press Release, "U.S. Citizen Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 15 Years in Prison for Conspiring to Provide Material Support to Al Qaeda," June 9, 2010, <http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo060910.htm>; Benjamin Weiser, "Former Brooklyn College Student Admits He Conspired to Help Al Qaeda," *New York Times*, April 28, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/28/nyregion/28hashmi.html>; Allison Gendar, "Plea Gets Terror Thug 15 Years," *New York Daily News*, April 28, 2010.

¹⁷¹ Mike Robinson, "Chicago Terrorism Suspect Pleads Not Guilty," *Associated Press*, April 5, 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5i8cDBcu_QALQpoeOTNk3X03l3L9AD9ET4U6O0; DOJ Press Release, "Chicago Man Charged with Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda by Attempting to Send Funds Overseas," March 26, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2010/pr0326_01.pdf.

¹⁷² DOJ Press Release, "Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Two Brooklyn Men with Conspiring to Provide Material Support to al Qaeda," April 30, 2010, <http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo043010.htm>; Benjamin Weiser, "2 Ex-Brooklyn Men Charged in Terror Plot," *New York Times*, April 30, 2010; <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/01/nyregion/01terror.html>.

¹⁷³ DOJ Press Release, "Terror Charges Unsealed in Minnesota Against Eight Defendants," November 23, 2009, <http://minneapolis.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/mp112309.htm>.

¹⁷⁴ FBI Press Release, "FBI Announces Identity of Transitional Federal Government Checkpoint Suicide Bomber," June 9, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2011/fbi-announces-identity-of-transitional-federal-government-checkpoint-suicide-bomber>.

¹⁷⁵ Josh Kron, "American Identified as Bomber in Attack on African Union in Somalia," *New York Times*, October 30, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/world/africa/shabab-identify-american-as-bomber-in-somalia-attack.html>.

¹⁷⁶ Mike Carter, "Somali Bomb Suspect Tied to Seattle," *The Seattle Times*, September 24, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009930567_somalia24m.html.

Eight others clearly expressed a willingness to perform a suicide mission. For example, Daniel Maldonado told authorities that he would be willing to become a suicide bomber if he were wounded and could not otherwise fight.¹⁷⁷ Al Qaeda member and U.S. citizen Bryant Neal Vinas wanted to become a suicide bomber but was rebuffed by the group.¹⁷⁸ In e-mails intercepted by law enforcement authorities, Colleen LaRose (“Jihad Jane”) wrote that she was prepared to be a martyr. And, in recordings of his conversations with an informant, Shaker Masri stated that he would be willing to walk up to a group of U.S. Army soldiers and blow himself up as a martyr.¹⁷⁹

The Success of Lone Wolves

Lone wolves (Nidal Hasan, Abdulhakim Muhammad, Hasan Akbar, and Mohammed Taheri-Azar) have conducted the four successful homegrown attacks since 9/11. Three other plotters acted alone. The remaining disrupted or failed plots have involved two or more participants in a group or network of one type or another. Three of the four lone wolf attacks involved firearms and they targeted U.S. military personnel.

It is difficult to generalize from such a small pool of cases. However, the success of four solo actors may highlight two contrasting points. First, law enforcement may face significant challenges in identifying and stopping lone wolf terrorists involved in technically uncomplicated plots unconnected to terrorist groups. Second, U.S. Law enforcement has been successful in disrupting and dismantling homegrown terrorist groups or networks since 9/11. Bolstering this point, undercover agents or cooperating witnesses infiltrated and monitored groups involved in 14 of the plots.

Varied Capabilities

Among the 53 homegrown plots since 9/11, the operational capabilities of participants diverge greatly. Some evinced terrorist tradecraft such as bomb making skills. Others appeared to be far less experienced. For instance, long before Derrick Shareef was apprehended in 2006, he likely intended to commit terrorist acts. However, he appears not to have possessed the capability to do so on his own until he was approached by an undercover FBI informant.

Shareef, a Muslim convert and 22 years old at the time of his arrest, plotted to set off hand grenades at a shopping mall in Rockford, Illinois. FBI informant William “Jamaal” Chrisman played a central part in the plot. At the behest of authorities, Chrisman befriended Shareef in September 2006 while the latter was working in a video store and had nowhere to live. Chrisman invited the young man to move in with him and began reporting to his law enforcement handlers regarding Shareef’s jihadist tendencies.¹⁸⁰ Shareef was unaware that Chrisman secretly recorded

¹⁷⁷ *United States v. Daniel Joseph Maldonado*, Superseding Criminal Complaint, Case Number: H-07-125M, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, February 13, 2007, pp. 4-5, http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/Maldonado_Complaint.pdf.

¹⁷⁸ Michael Powell, “U.S. Recruit Reveals How Qaeda Trains Foreigners,” *New York Times*, July 23, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/nyregion/24terror.html>.

¹⁷⁹ *United States v. Shaker Masri*, Affidavit in support of Criminal Complaint 10-CR-0655, U.S. District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, August 9, 2010, p. 22, <http://jnsfp.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/masri-complaint1.pdf>.

¹⁸⁰ Michael Mayko, “FBI Informant Testifies in Terror Case,” *Connecticut Post*, November 30, 2007, quoted in NEFA Foundation, “The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot,” December 2007, p. 2, <http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/> (continued...)

their conversations. The duo talked about violent jihad against civilians, public buildings, and a judge in DeKalb, IL.¹⁸¹ They concocted a plan to attack a local shopping mall. Chrisman told the young jihadist of a friend who could procure weapons for them. Unknown to Shareef, the “friend” was an undercover FBI agent.¹⁸² On December 6, 2006, the duo met the undercover FBI agent in the mall’s parking lot where Shareef attempted to trade stereo speakers for hand grenades and was arrested.¹⁸³ Shareef, who pled guilty to one count of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, was sentenced in September 30, 2008, to 35 years in prison.¹⁸⁴

Conversely, two of the homegrown jihadist terrorist plots appear to stand out for the capability their plotters. Both came to public attention in 2009. Both involved homegrown jihadists who had strong ties to foreign terrorist organizations. Attorney General Eric Holder characterized one of those plots—Najibullah Zazi’s plan to blow up explosives on the New York City subway—as

one of the most serious terrorist threats to our nation since September 11th, 2001, and were it not for the combined efforts of the law enforcement and intelligence communities, it could have been devastating. This attempted attack on our homeland was real, it was in motion, and it would have been deadly. We were able to thwart this plot because of careful analysis by our intelligence agents and prompt actions by law enforcement.¹⁸⁵

While a complete picture of Zazi’s radicalization process is not publicly available, some details regarding his plot have emerged. In his youth, he may have listened to the radical messages of Saifur Rahman Halimi, an imam who advocated jihad, attended the same mosque as Zazi’s family, and lived in the same Queens building.¹⁸⁶ Regardless, Zazi pled guilty on February 22, 2010, to a number of terrorism charges. As mentioned above, the young man admitted to receiving Al Qaeda training in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2008. There, he learned about explosives and discussed specific targets with Al Qaeda members. He returned to the United States in January 2009 and moved to Denver. He also traveled to New York to discuss the timing for the attacks with a network of conspirators. In July and early September in Denver, he gathered materials for detonator components and assembled them based on the detailed training he had received in Afghanistan. Zazi admitted to bringing the explosive Triacetone Triperoxide (TATP) into New York on Thursday September 10, 2009. He intended to finish bomb construction over the weekend and planned to target New York’s subway lines early the next week.¹⁸⁷

(...continued)

FeaturedDocs/ChicagoPlot1207.pdf; John Christoffersen, “After September 11, 3 Muslim Converts Take Different Paths,” *Associated Press*, December 2, 2007. Hereinafter: Christoffersen, December 2, 2007.

¹⁸¹ Pierre Thomas and Jason Ryan, “‘Lone Wolf’ Charged With Plotting Attack During Christmas Rush,” *abcnews.com*, December 8, 2006. <http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=2710776&page=1>.

¹⁸² *United States v. Derrick Shareef*, Affidavit, 06-CR-919, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 2006, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/348.pdf.

¹⁸³ Melissa Bailey, “Ode to Osama,” *New Haven Independent*, November 28, 2007. http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/ode_to_osama/; Thomas and Ryan, “‘Lone Wolf’ Charged.”

¹⁸⁴ Anti-Defamation League, “Illinois Man Sentenced for Planning Holiday Mall Attack,” October 13, 2008. http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/derrick_shareef.htm.

¹⁸⁵ DOJ Press Release, February 22, 2010.

¹⁸⁶ Samantha Gross, David Caruso, and Michael Rubinkam, “Radical Influences All Around NYC Terror Suspect,” *Associated Press*, in *abcnews.com*, October 4, 2009, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=8741604>.

¹⁸⁷ Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction against U.S. persons or property, conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country, and a provision of material support to a terrorist organization. See DOJ Press (continued...)

On March 18, 2010, David Headley pled guilty to terrorism charges. He admitted that he helped plan two plots for the Pakistani terrorist group, Lashkar-i-Taiba (LeT)—the November 2008 Mumbai attack and an un-executed conspiracy targeting a Danish newspaper. He received training from LeT and claimed membership in the organization. Headley attended the group's training camps five times between 2002 and 2005. These stints in Pakistan provided him with weapons training, indoctrination in jihad as well as instruction in close combat, survival skills, and counter-surveillance, among other things.

Between 2005 and 2008, he received extensive direction from LeT members and engaged in reconnaissance for the group in preparation for its Mumbai attack. To provide cover for his surveillance activity, Headley encouraged a co-conspirator in Chicago, who owned an immigration services business, to open a satellite office in Mumbai.¹⁸⁸ Headley conducted video surveillance of potential Mumbai targets for LeT, and using a global positioning system device, he pinpointed landing sites for a waterborne assault. At the behest of LeT, Headley also conducted reconnaissance of the offices of the Danish newspaper *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten*. Representatives of both LeT and Al Qaeda schemed with him to strike the newspaper after it had published unflattering cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.¹⁸⁹

Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Enforcement Activities

The Obama Administration has recognized the significance of the homegrown jihadist threat in its June 2011 *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*.¹⁹⁰ The strategy focuses on Al Qaeda, its affiliates (groups aligned with it), and its *adherents* (individuals linked to or inspired by the terrorist group).¹⁹¹ John Brennan, President Obama's top counterterrorism advisor, publicly described the strategy as the first one, "that designates the homeland as a primary area of emphasis in our counterterrorism efforts."¹⁹² The *Strategy* states:

(...continued)

Release, February 22, 2010. For more on Zazi's childhood, see Michael Wilson, "From Smiling Coffee Vendor,"

¹⁸⁸ In June 2011, the friend, Tahawwur Hussain Rana, was convicted of conspiracy in the Danish plot and for providing material support to LeT. However, he was acquitted of involvement in the Mumbai plot. See DOJ Press Release, "Chicago Businessman Tahawwur Hussain Rana Guilty of Providing Material Support to Terror Group and Supporting Role in Denmark Terrorism Conspiracy," June 9, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/chicago/press-releases/2011/chicago-businessman-tahawwur-hussain-rana-guilty-of-providing-material-support-to-terror-group-and-supporting-role-in-denmark-terrorism-conspiracy>; *United States v. David Coleman Headley*, Plea Agreement, 09 CR 830-3, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, 2010, <http://www.hindu.com/nic/headleyplea.pdf>; DOJ Press Release, March 18, 2010.

¹⁸⁹

¹⁹⁰ White House, *National Strategy for Counterterrorism*, June 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf. Hereinafter: *National Strategy*.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁹² Mathieu Rabechault, "U.S. Refocuses on Home-Grown Terror Threat," *AFP*, June 29, 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hLyJyB7khhqlxWO0ImCj7fYsRQ?docId=CNG.3f90005700ea65e0b05509a135c7a3a8.471>; Karen DeYoung, "Brennan: Counterterrorism Strategy Focused on al-Qaeda's Threat to Homeland," *Washington Post*, June 29, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/brennan-counterterrorism-strategy-focused-on-al-qaedas-threat-to-homeland/2011/06/29/AGki1LrH_story.html.

We know al-Qa'ida and its affiliates continue to try to identify operatives overseas and develop new methods of attack that can evade U.S. defensive measures. At the same time, plots directed and planned from overseas are not the only sort of terrorist threat we face. Individuals inspired by but not directly connected to al-Qa'ida have engaged in terrorism in the U.S. Homeland. Others are likely to try to follow their example, and so we must remain vigilant.¹⁹³

The spate of recent arrests and other counterterrorism successes should not obscure the challenges facing law enforcement in disrupting homegrown terrorist plotting. Counterterrorism efforts exist within two broad contexts. Many of the legal behaviors associated with radicalization occur in the open marketplace of ideas where consumers weigh competing ideologies within the context of free speech. Conversely, the operational aspects of violent jihadist plots largely involve illegal activity. In this secretive realm involving criminality, law enforcement pursues terrorists in a real-world version of hide-and-seek.

The divergent nature of these two contexts may imply a distinct wall between the public realm and the secretive operational realm. In reality, the barrier is far from distinct. What happens operationally has significant impacts in the marketplace of ideas (**Figure 1**). The success of terrorist plots may spur radicalization, while effective policing may make terrorism a less popular option for radicals. High levels of radicalization may expand the potential pool of terrorist recruits.

Figure 1. Counterterrorism Context



Source: CRS

Intelligence Approaches

A group of intelligence and terrorism experts argues that “to infiltrate terrorist conspiracies, identify and head off future terrorist attacks, and build the knowledge base required to rapidly

¹⁹³ *National Strategy*, p. 11.

investigate when terrorist incidents do occur requires human intelligence.”¹⁹⁴ The DOJ and FBI operate 104 Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) in the United States—69 created since 2001.¹⁹⁵ These interagency entities include more than 4,000 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and agents who “investigate acts of terrorism that affect the U.S., its interests, property and citizens, including those employed by the U.S. and military personnel overseas.”¹⁹⁶ As this suggests, their operations are highly tactical and focus on investigations, developing human sources (informants), and gathering intelligence to thwart terrorist plots.

JTTFs offer an important conduit for the sharing of intelligence developed from FBI-led counterterrorism investigations with outside agencies. These task forces also connect state and local law enforcement with the U.S. Intelligence Community on terrorism-related matters. To help facilitate this, especially as the threat of homegrown jihadists has emerged, the number of top-secret security clearances issued to local police working on JTTFs has increased from 125 to 878 between 2007 and 2009.¹⁹⁷

A significant dilemma for law enforcement and intelligence officials who straddle the public realm of ideas and the secretive realm of terrorist operations is how to sift the law-abiding, non-violent radical attracted to jihadist rhetoric from the would-be terrorist who merits targeting. The vast amount of terrorist-related material available on the Internet in a relatively anonymous setting attracts homegrown individuals open to radicalization. Many of these individuals may show great interest in radical content, engage in radical discourse, but not become terrorists.¹⁹⁸ A growing pool of those who view jihadism as “cool” and engage in online “talk” may make it harder for police to identify actual terrorists.

Preventive Policing

Since the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement has taken a more proactive, intelligence-driven posture in its investigations. While serving as Deputy Attorney General, Paul McNulty described the Justice Department’s aggressive, proactive, and preventative course as

the only acceptable response from a department of government charged with enforcing our laws and protecting the American people. Awaiting an attack is not an option. That is why the Department of Justice is doing everything in its power to identify risks to our Nation’s

¹⁹⁴ *America’s Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate*, June 2010.

¹⁹⁵ FBI, “The FBI: A Decade in Numbers,” September 14, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ten-years-after-the-fbi-since-9-11/just-the-facts-1/the-fbi-a-decade-in-numbers>.

¹⁹⁶ Brig Barker and Steve Fowler, “The FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force Officer,” *The FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, vol. 77, no. 11 (November 2008), pp. 12-15; FBI, “Protecting America Against Terrorist Attack: A Closer Look at Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces,” May 2009, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/may09/jtfts_052809.html.

¹⁹⁷ Kevin Johnson, “FBI Issues More Top Secret Clearance for Terrorism Cases,” *USA Today*, August 12, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-08-12-secret-clearances_N.htm; STRATFOR, *A Decade of Evolution in U.S. Counterterrorism Operations*, Special Report, December 2009, http://www.stratfor.com/memberships/150745/analysis/20091216_us_decade_evolution_counterterrorism_operations?ip_auth_redirect=1; CRS Report RL33033, *Intelligence Reform Implementation at the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Issues and Options for Congress*, by Alfred Cumming.

¹⁹⁸ Gilbert Ramsay, “Relocating the Virtual War,” *Defence Against Terrorism Review*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2009), p. 35, http://www.tmmm.tsk.tr/publications/datr3/03_Gilbert%20Ramsay.pdf.

security at the earliest stage possible and to respond with forward-leaning—preventative—prosecutions.¹⁹⁹

One observer has described intelligence gathering in this context as “driven by a theory of preventive policing: in order to anticipate the next terror attack, authorities need to track legal activities.... It focuses not on crime, but on the possibility that a crime might be committed at some future date.”²⁰⁰

The FBI and DOJ emphasized their forward-leaning approach with its September 29, 2008, revision of the *Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations* which they claim “make the FBI’s operations in the United States more effective by providing simpler, clearer, and more uniform standards and procedures.”²⁰¹ This revision went into effect on December 1, 2008. In large part, the guidelines sprang from the post-9/11 national security context in which the FBI surmised that it could not simply react to crimes. It had to preemptively search for criminal, counterintelligence, and terrorist threats to the homeland.²⁰² In 2008, as then FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni stated in congressional testimony:

We believe that this will allow the FBI to take additional necessary steps to becoming a more proactive organization. One of the key issues that we think the FBI needs to be able to do is assess potential risks and vulnerabilities. Having these additional techniques available at the assessment level, we think, will be key to the FBI’s ability to efficiently and effectively answer those questions and assess risks.²⁰³

The 2008 guidelines represent a consolidation of several other previously stand-alone documents that had governed FBI investigations. The FBI’s document governing the bureau’s implementation of the ideas embodied in the guidelines is the 2008 *Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide* (DIOG). The DIOG has been modified recently.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁹ Prepared Remarks of Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty at the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, May 24, 2006, http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dag_speech_060524.html.

²⁰⁰ Thomas Cincotta, “From Movements to Mosques, Informants Endanger Democracy,” *The Public Eye*, <http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques.html>. Hereinafter: Cincotta, “From Movements to Mosques.”

²⁰¹ DOJ Press Release, “Memorandum for the Heads of Department Components: The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations,” September 29, 2008, <http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines-memo.pdf>.

²⁰² Prepared Statement of Elisebeth Collins Cook, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, DOJ and Valerie Caproni, General Counsel, FBI, U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Criminal Investigations, National Security Investigations, and the Collection of Foreign Intelligence*, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., September 23, 2008, S. HRG. 110–846 (Washington: GPO, 2009), p. 10, <http://intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/110846.pdf>.

²⁰³ Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Criminal Investigations, National Security Investigations, and the Collection of Foreign Intelligence*, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., September 23, 2008, S. HRG. 110–846 (Washington: GPO, 2009), p. 17, <http://intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs/110846.pdf>.

²⁰⁴ For information on the most recent revisions, see Charlie Savage, “F.B.I. Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds,” *New York Times*, June 12, 2011, <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/us/13fbi.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1319655619-5RliYhVcCzmR4+L5McT77Q>; Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Oversight and Review Division, *Investigation of Allegations of Cheating on the FBI’s Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG) Exam*, Washington, DC, September 2010, pp. 1, 34, <http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s100927.pdf>. Interestingly, this report discusses the findings of an investigation into a string of incidents in which FBI employees cheated on a mandatory exam covering the DIOG. See FBI, *Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide*, (DIOG) redacted, December 16, 2008, p. 2, <http://www.eff.org/fn/directory/8364/354>. Hereinafter: DIOG, redacted.

The most prominent changes embodied in the 2008 guidelines and DIOG concern “assessments” that agents and analysts may now use outside of investigations. Investigations require some level of factual predication,²⁰⁵ while an assessment does not.²⁰⁶ However, assessments are to follow a specifically articulated purpose. The guidelines have established six authorized purposes:²⁰⁷

- check leads on individuals or activities,
- check leads on groups or organizations,
- collect information to analyze potential threats and vulnerabilities,
- gather information for intelligence analysis or planning,
- vet and manage the agency’s confidential human sources (informants), and
- collect foreign intelligence.

Assessments are not to be based on “arbitrary or groundless speculation, nor can an assessment be based solely on the exercise of First Amendment protected activities or on the race, ethnicity, national origin or religion of the subject.”²⁰⁸ Assessments offer terrorism investigators a variety of techniques, including public surveillance and the use of confidential informants to penetrate conspiracies.²⁰⁹

Civil libertarians and Muslim community organizations have voiced broad concerns about the new guidelines.²¹⁰ According to media reporting, Farhad Khera, executive director of the nonprofit Muslim Advocates, has suggested that the Attorney General Guidelines are invasive and based on “generalized suspicion and fear on the part of law enforcement, not on individualized evidence of criminal activity.”²¹¹ The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has criticized the FBI’s amassing of racial and ethnic data based on the new guidelines.²¹² As written, the guidelines

²⁰⁵ Ibid. Factually predicated investigations include preliminary and full investigations. Preliminary investigations can be opened with “‘allegation or information’ indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security.” Opening a full investigation requires an “‘articulable factual basis’ of possible criminal or national threat.” See DIOG, redacted, pp. 76, 85.

²⁰⁶ According to the DIOG, “Although difficult to define, ‘no particular factual predication’ is less than ‘information or allegation’ as required for the initiation of a preliminary investigation. For example, an assessment may be conducted when there is a basis to know: (i) whether more information or facts are required to determine if there is a criminal or national security threat; and (ii) there is a rational and articulable relationship between the stated authorized purpose of the assessment on the one hand and the information sought and the proposed means to obtain that information on the other. Regardless of whether specific approval or specific documentation is required, an FBI employee should be able to explain the purpose of an assessment and the reason for the methods used to conduct the assessment. Those FBI employees who conduct assessments are responsible for assuring that assessments are not pursued for frivolous or improper purposes and are not based solely on First Amendment activity or on the race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion of the subject of the assessment.” DIOG, redacted, p. 39.

²⁰⁷ DIOG, redacted, pp. 44-56. See Andrew Kalloch, “FBI General Counsel Defends New Guidelines,” *Harvard Law Record*, December 4, 2008, updated September 29, 2009, <http://www.hlrecord.org/2.4463/fbi-general-counsel-defends-new-guidelines-1.577396>.

²⁰⁸ DIOG, redacted, p. 39.

²⁰⁹ Charlie Savage, “Wider Authority for F.B.I. Agents Stirs Concern,” *New York Times*, October 29, 2009.

²¹⁰ See Emily Berman, *Domestic Intelligence: New Powers, New Risks*, Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2011, pp. 8-9, 11.

²¹¹ Yost, July 27, 2010.

²¹² Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director Washington Legislative Office, Michael German, Policy Counsel, and Hina Shamsi, Director National Security Project, to Hon. Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney General, October 20, 2011, http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_letter_to_ag_re_rm_102011_0.pdf; Brent Jones, “ACLU Seeks Information (continued...)”

allow for the collection of information about ethnic or racial communities and justify the gathering of such information for proactive purposes. The guidelines state that it should be done if it “will reasonably aid the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities, and, overall, assist domain awareness for the purpose of performing intelligence analysis.”²¹³ One ACLU official has described this as “racial profiling of entire communities.”²¹⁴

Detecting the Shift from Radical to Violent Jihadist

A major challenge for law enforcement is to gauge how quickly and at what point individuals move from radicalized beliefs to violence.²¹⁵ Because not all terrorist suspects follow a single radicalization roadmap on their way to executing plots, U.S. law enforcement also faces the task of discerning exactly when radicalized individuals become real threats.

Among the tools employed by law enforcement is the monitoring of Internet and social networking sites. The USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) authorizes the FBI to use National Security Letters to obtain a range of information including data pertaining to e-mail and Internet use from Internet Service Providers.²¹⁶ In addition, according to an internal Justice Department document obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, law enforcement agents may also go undercover into social networking sites with false online profiles to exchange messages with suspects, identify a target’s friends or relatives, and browse private information such as postings, personal photographs and video clips.²¹⁷ The Obama Administration is seeking approval from Congress to expand FBI authority to obtain records related to the context of e-mails and other Internet-based communications without first obtaining a warrant from a judge. “The proposal would add ‘electronic communication transaction records’—like e-mail addresses used in correspondence and Web pages visited—to a list of the categories of information that FBI agents can demand.”²¹⁸

A review of criminal complaints and indictments in terrorism cases reveal that the FBI has exploited the Internet and/or e-mail communications to build cases against defendants in at least 19 of the post-9/11 cases studied in this report. Although much is said about terrorist use of the

(...continued)

About FBI Racial, Ethnic Data Collection,” *Baltimore Sun*, July 28, 2010, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-07-28/news/bs-md-aclu-fbi-20100728_1_ethnic-data-profiling-aclu-representatives; Pete Yost, “FBI Defends Guidelines on Eve of Senate Testimony,” *Associated Press*, in *boston.com*, July 27, 2010. Hereinafter: Yost, July 27, 2010. http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/07/27/fbi_defends_guidelines_on_eve_of_senate_testimony/

²¹³ DIOG, redacted, p. 32.

²¹⁴ Michael German, “Three Faces of Racial Profiling: Profiling Communities is Bad Law Enforcement,” *ACLU Blog of Rights*, October 24, 2011, <http://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/three-faces-racial-profiling-profiling-communities-bad-law-enforcement>.

²¹⁵ Eileen Sullivan and Devlin Barrett, “Recent Cases Show Challenge of US Terrorists,” *Associated Press*, in *abcnews.com*, March 17, 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=10121734>.

²¹⁶ For a discussion of the use of National Security Letters, see Laura K. Donohue, *The Costs of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics, and Liberty*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 236-243.

²¹⁷ Richard Lardner, “Break the Law and Your New ‘Friend’ May Be the FBI,” *Associated Press* cited by *abcnews.com*, March 16, 2010. <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=10111664>.

²¹⁸ Charlie Savage, “White House Seeks to Clarify F.B.I. Powers vis-à-vis E-Mail,” *New York Times*, July 29, 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/30/us/30fbi.html>.

Internet for recruitment, training, and communications, these cases suggest that terrorists and aspiring terrorists will *not* find the Internet a uniformly permissive environment.

The case involving Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte highlights the complexities in detecting transitions from radicalization to violent extremism. Investigators arrested the duo on June 5, 2010, at John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK) in New York as they allegedly tried to fly to Egypt. They hoped to eventually link up with the Somali terrorist organization, al-Shabaab.²¹⁹ The case started with an e-mail tip to the FBI on October 9, 2006, which stated,

[e]very time [Alessa and Almonte] access the Internet all they look for is all those terrorist videos about the Islam holly [sic] war and where they kill US soldiers and other terrible things.... They keep saying that Americans are their enemies, that everybody other than Islamic followers are their enemies ... and they all must be killed.²²⁰

This statement suggests that in 2006, the two young men engaged in radical behavior, perusing jihadist websites and discussing terrorist activity.

Between 2006 and 2010, investigators monitored the duo's actions as their beliefs arguably morphed into something more dangerous. Initially it was unclear whether the pair was just engaged in radical talk or actually planning for violent jihad.²²¹ In 2006 and 2007, investigators debated the level of threat posed by Alessa and Almonte. A key shift occurred when law enforcement discovered after the fact that the duo had travelled to Jordan in 2007 but failed to get recruited as mujahedeen fighters. This helped convince authorities of the two plotters' actual intent to do harm. By 2009, the case included an undercover investigator from the NYPD interacting with the two suspects.²²²

The U.S. government's criminal complaint against Alessa and Almonte lays out the alleged overt activities marking the duo's change from radicals to terrorist suspects worthy of arrest. Back in New Jersey, Alessa and Almonte supposedly trained for jihad by lifting weights and rehearsing combat techniques using paintball guns. The government claims that they gathered equipment, including tactical-brand flashlights and combat boots. The pair also purportedly saved over \$7,000 to fund their foreign violent jihad. The criminal complaint describes how the two discussed violent jihad and downloaded jihadist rhetoric. For example, Almonte is said to have kept a lecture by radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki on his cell phone. The U.S. government contends that Alessa viewed a video including scenes of Al-Qaeda spokesperson Adam Gadahn praising Nidal Hasan, the alleged Ft. Hood shooter. Also, according to the criminal complaint, Almonte possessed computer files of violent jihadist documents authored by Osama Bin Ladin and his second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri. For the government, Alessa and Almonte's

²¹⁹ Richard Esposito, "Terror Raids at JFK Airport Net American Alleged Terror Plotters Headed for Somalia," *abcnews.com*, June 6, 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/terror-raids-jfk-airport-net-alleged-terror-plotters/story?id=10839045>.

²²⁰ *U.S. v. Mohamed Alessa and Carlos E. Almonte*, Criminal Complaint, Magistrate No. 10-8109 (MCA), U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey, June 4, 2010, p. 11, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/32643121/US-v-Alessa-and-Almonte>. Hereinafter: *U.S. v. Alessa and Almonte*, Criminal Complaint.

²²¹ Peter Finn and Jerry Markon, "N.J. Men Arrested Are Latest From U.S. Tied To Terrorist Groups," *The Washington Post*, June 7, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/06/AR2010060600418.html>. Hereinafter: Finn and Markon, June 7, 2010.

²²² Ted Sherman, "FBI Followed Every Move of Two N.J. Terror Suspects for Years, Culminating in Airport Arrests," *Star-Ledger*, June 13, 2010, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/06/authorities_followed_every_mov.html.

transformation from radicals to terrorists likely culminated when the two allegedly booked reservations for separate flights to Egypt scheduled for June 5, 2010.²²³

Two successful plots emphasize the difficulty of discerning when radicals become terrorist threats. Even if a suspect comes to the attention of law enforcement, evaluating the person's intent and capability remains challenging. Prior to the Fort Hood shooting, over the course of several months, Nidal Hasan allegedly sent a number of e-mails to Awlaki (who reportedly replied to only two of them). The e-mail exchange was assessed by investigators to be in line with the psychiatrist's research into Muslim U.S. soldiers' reactions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, thus, presumably protected speech.²²⁴ In retrospect it appears Hasan's intentions were far more menacing.

Prior to Abdulhakim Muhammed's arrest for the June 1, 2009, shooting incident in Little Rock, Arkansas, the FBI interviewed him on several occasions. Muhammad spent 16 months in Yemen starting in the fall of 2007. While there, he married a woman from the southern part of the country. He allegedly taught English and learned Arabic during his time in the country. Yemeni officials imprisoned him in November 2008 on a visa overstay. He also supposedly possessed a fraudulent Somali visa.²²⁵ Yemen deported him to the United States in January 2009.²²⁶ The FBI is reported to have interviewed him before the shooting, including while he was in prison in Yemen and then again in Nashville soon after he returned.²²⁷ According to law enforcement officials, the episode in Yemen prompted a preliminary investigation by the FBI and other American law enforcement agencies into whether he had ties to extremist groups. But that investigation was inconclusive, leaving the FBI with insufficient evidence to wiretap his phone or put him under surveillance.²²⁸

The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement

A terrorist attack in the United States, whether committed by homegrown or foreign terrorists, will occur in a community within a state or tribal area. Since the plotting and preparation for domestic terrorist attacks (such as surveillance of a target, acquisition and transport of weapons or explosives, and even the recruitment of participants) will also occur within local communities, preventing such attacks is not only a federal responsibility but also a state, local, and tribal one. In 2010 testimony to Congress, Brian Michael Jenkins says that

The diffuse nature of today's terrorism threat and the emphasis on do-it-yourself terrorism challenge the presumption that knowledge of terrorist plots will come first to federal

²²³ Finn and Markon, June 7, 2010.

²²⁴ David Tarrant, "Suspects in Dallas Plot, Fort Hood Shootings Were on FBI's Radar, But Only One Was Taken Down," *The Dallas Morning News*, November 22, 2009, <http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/texasouthwest/stories/112209dnentlonewolf.450512f.html> Hereinafter: Tarrant, November 22, 2009; Ann Scott Tyson and Dana Priest, "Army Sought Ways to Channel Hasan's Absorption with Islam," *The Washington Post*, November 12, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/11/AR2009111128106.html>

²²⁵ Ibid.

²²⁶ James Dao, "Man Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting" *New York Times*, January 22, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/22littlerock.html>, Hereinafter: Dao, January 22, 2010.

²²⁷ See Ibid; and Dina Temple-Raston, "FBI Encountered Accused Ark. Shooter In Yemen," *National Public Radio*, June 8, 2009, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105128523>.

²²⁸ James Dao and David Johnson, "Suspect in Soldier Attack was Once Detained in Yemen," *New York Times*, June 3, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/04recruit.html>.

authorities, who will then share this information with state and local authorities. It is just as likely—perhaps more likely—that local law enforcement could be the first to pick up clues of future conspiracies.²²⁹

Every day, officers at over 17,000 state and local law enforcement agencies collect and document information regarding behaviors, incidents, and other suspicious activity associated with crime including terrorism.²³⁰ A joint study by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and senior law enforcement officials concluded that “[t]he gathering, processing, reporting, analyzing, and sharing of suspicious activity is critical to preventing crimes, including those associated with domestic and international terrorism.”²³¹ A former police chief observed that

On the beat or mobile, cops are sensitive to things that do not look right or do not sound right ... [r]emember, it was a rookie cop on a routine check that resulted in the arrest of Eric Robert Rudolph in North Carolina despite the enormous commitment of federal resources.²³²

Another example is the case of Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh. He was arrested after a traffic stop when Oklahoma State Trooper Charles J. Hanger noticed that McVeigh’s yellow 1977 Mercury Marquis had no license plate.²³³ Using his home state as an example, a former U.S. Attorney maintains that “evidence of a potential terrorist threat or organized criminal enterprise is far more likely to be found in the incidental contact with the 10,000 police officers in the state of Washington than by the less than 150 FBI agents assigned to the Seattle Field Division.”²³⁴

The role of state, local, and tribal law enforcement in detecting nascent terrorist plotting is particularly important considering the challenges noted elsewhere in this report in detecting terrorist lone wolves. The four successful homegrown jihadist terrorist attacks that have occurred

²²⁹ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, *Internet Terror Recruitment and Tradecraft: How Can We Address an Evolving Tool While Protecting Free Speech?*, Written Testimony of Brian Michael Jenkins, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., May 26, 2010, p. 7. <http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100526101532-91592.pdf>. Hereinafter: Jenkins Testimony, May 26, 2010.

²³⁰ *Findings and Recommendations of the SAR Support and Implementation Project, Final Draft*, June 2008, p. 6. The SAR Support and Implementation Project was a joint effort of DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Major Cities Chiefs Association, DOJ’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, and DHS to develop recommendations to be used by law enforcement agencies to improve identification and reporting of suspicious activity and the sharing of that information with fusion centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces. See pp. 1-2. <http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/mccarecommendation-06132008.pdf>.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²³² U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, *Homeland Security Intelligence: Its Relevance and Limitations*, Statement of John W. Gaisert, Chief of Police, Commerce, Georgia, 111th Cong., 1st sess., March 18, 2009, <http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20090318101123-58795.pdf>.

²³³ Trooper Hanger had no reason to suspect a connection between McVeigh and the bombing in Oklahoma City. But, the trooper’s suspicions were raised when the driver looked at his bumper when told why he had been pulled over. Says Trooper Hanger: “I thought if he knew he didn’t have a tag, why did he look at the back of the car like that? It just didn’t seem right.” In addition, McVeigh was unable to provide proof of insurance and a bill of sale for the vehicle and then disclosed that he had a firearm. Trooper Hanger arrested McVeigh for five misdemeanors and took him into custody. McVeigh was awaiting arraignment when the FBI connected him to the bombing. See National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial at http://www.nleomf.com/TheFund/programs/OOM/hanger_oct01.htm.

²³⁴ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, *A Report Card on Homeland Security Information Sharing*, Statement of John McKay, Former U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., September 24, 2008. Hereinafter: McKay Testimony, September 24, 2008, <http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20080924102041-86400.pdf>.

since 9/11 were all committed by lone wolves. Jenkins believes that preventing future terrorist attacks requires effective domestic intelligence collection that is best accomplished by local authorities.²³⁵

Integrating state, local, and tribal law enforcement into the national counterterrorism effort continues to be an abiding concern of policymakers. After the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) cited breakdowns in information sharing and the failure to fuse pertinent intelligence (i.e., “connecting the dots”) as key factors in the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks²³⁶ several efforts were made to improve the sharing of terrorism information between federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies:

- States and major urban areas established intelligence fusion centers.²³⁷ Congress has defined fusion centers as a “collaborative effort of two or more Federal, state, local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”²³⁸ At the end of 2009, there were 72 DHS/FBI designated state and Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) fusion centers.²³⁹
- In the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458), Congress mandated the creation of an Information Sharing Environment (commonly known as the “ISE”)²⁴⁰ to provide and facilitate the means of sharing terrorism information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities, and the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies.²⁴¹
- Congress made information sharing a priority of the new DHS intelligence organization, requiring it “to disseminate, as appropriate, information analyzed by the Department within the Department, to other agencies of the Federal government with responsibilities related to homeland security, and to agencies of State and local government and private sector entities, with such responsibilities in order to assist in the deterrence, prevention, preemption of, or response to, terrorist attacks against the United States.”²⁴²
- Congress mandated that DHS support fusion centers in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53).²⁴³ DHS supports these centers through its State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center

²³⁵ Jenkins Testimony, May 26, 2010, p. 5.

²³⁶ National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, July 22, 2004, pp. 353-356 and 416-418. <http://www.9-11commission.gov>. Hereinafter: *9/11 Commission Report*.

²³⁷ For a full discussion of fusion centers, see CRS Report RL34070, *Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress*, by John Rollins. For an informative discussion of one of the earliest efforts at local law enforcement collaboration and intelligence fusion and analysis, see John Sullivan and Alain Bauer, *Los Angeles Terrorist Early Warning Group*, published by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department in 2008.

²³⁸ P.L. 110-53, §511, 121 STAT. 322. Amends *Homeland Security Act of 2002* by adding §210A(j).

²³⁹ National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center; Tallahassee, Florida; November 4, 2009.

²⁴⁰ P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004, §1016(b), 118 STAT. 3665

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

²⁴² *Ibid.*, §201d(1), 116 STAT. 2146.

²⁴³ P.L. 110-53, §511, 121 STAT. 318. Amends *Homeland Security Act of 2002* by adding §210A(a).

Initiative by providing operational, analytic, reporting, and management advice and assistance; training; information technology systems and connectivity; and intelligence officers and analysts.²⁴⁴

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative (NSI) is a program to push terrorism-related information generated locally between and among federal, state, local, and tribal levels. Specifically, it is a framework to support the reporting of suspicious activity—from the point of initial observation to the point where the information is available in the information sharing environment.²⁴⁵ It is a standardized, integrated approach to gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing information about suspicious activity that is potentially terrorism-related while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of Americans.²⁴⁶ The intent is for this locally generated suspicious activity reporting to be combined in a systematic way with other sources of intelligence at the federal level to uncover criminal activity, including terrorism.

Investigative Approaches

To counter violent jihadist plots, U.S. law enforcement has employed two tactics that have been described by one scholar as the “Al Capone” approach and the use of “agent provocateurs.”²⁴⁷ The Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. In agent provocateur cases—often called sting operations—government undercover operatives befriend suspects and offer to facilitate their activities. As the “Al Capone,” moniker suggests, historically, these tactics have been employed against many types of targets such as mafia bosses, white-collar criminals, and corrupt public servants. While these techniques combined with the cultivation of informants as well as surveillance (especially in and around mosques) may be effective in stymieing rapidly developing terrorist plots, their use has fostered concern within U.S. Muslim communities.

The Capone Approach

As mentioned, the Capone approach involves apprehending individuals linked to terrorist plots on lesser, non-terrorism-related offenses such as immigration violations. This approach fits within a preventative mode of counterterrorism prosecution and has received media scrutiny.²⁴⁸ Experts have noted that immediately after 9/11, DOJ often leveled lesser charges against terrorist suspects to preemptively squelch potential attacks. However, according to the Center on Law and Security

²⁴⁴ Ibid. 121 STAT. 319. Amends *Homeland Security Act of 2002* by adding §210A(b) and (c).

²⁴⁵ NSI Project Overview Briefing by Russ Porter, Chairman of the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council of the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative.

²⁴⁶ See Ibid, p. A1-6, and PM-ISE, *Fact Sheet: Nationwide Suspicious Activities Reporting Initiative*, December 23, 2008, p. 1, http://www.ise.gov/docs/sar/Fact_Sheet_NSI_-_December_23_2008_Final.pdf *National Strategy for Information Sharing*.

²⁴⁷ Lorenzo Vidino, “Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon?” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 32, no. 1, January 2009, p. 13, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com/738522_731260637_907926062.pdf.

²⁴⁸ Dan Eggen and Julie Tate, “U.S. Campaign Produces Few Convictions on Terrorism Charges,” *The Washington Post*, June 12, 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/11/AR2005061100381.html>; Andrew Adams, “FBI’s New Approach: Minor Charges Now Stop Terrorism Later,” *Lodi News-Sentinel*, June 17, 2005.

at New York University School of Law, DOJ has moved toward trying suspected terrorists *as terrorists* instead of leaning heavily on lesser charges. In 2001 and 2002, 8% of defendants labeled as terrorists in the media were charged under terrorism statutes, this figure rose to 47% by 2006 and 2007.²⁴⁹ Regardless, the Capone approach is still used in terrorism cases.

Lying to an FBI Special Agent is one of the violations reminiscent of the Capone approach.²⁵⁰ A recent example stands out. On July 21, 2010, Paul Rockwood, Jr., a U.S. citizen and Muslim convert, pled guilty to making false statements to the FBI. Rockwood's wife, Nadia Rockwood, also pled guilty to making false statements related to her husband's case. By early 2010, while living in King Salmon, AK, Paul Rockwood had developed a list of 15 people he planned to kill, believing that they had desecrated Islam. He had also researched explosives and shared with others ideas about mail bombs or using firearms to kill his targets. It appears that prosecutors could not pursue a case based on more substantive terrorism charges and opted to neutralize a threat—someone apparently preparing to kill people—by using the Capone approach.

The utility of this preventative technique coupled with actual terrorism charges was exhibited by the FBI in its case against Najibullah Zazi. As mentioned above, Zazi arrived in New York on September 10, 2009, with explosive material and plans to detonate bombs in New York's subway system. Zazi feared authorities had caught up to him and returned to Denver on September 12. Between September 10 and 19, the FBI monitored his activities and bolstered its case with searches of a vehicle and locations linked to him in New York and Denver. Zazi also agreed to interviews with the FBI in Denver. On September 19, Special Agents first arrested Zazi in Aurora, CO, for knowingly and willfully lying to the FBI. Presumably this was done because he might flee. Four days later, a grand jury returned a more substantive one-count indictment against him on weapons of mass destruction charges.²⁵¹

DOJ used similar charges against Ahmad Wais Afzali, an imam from Queens. He was arrested for tipping off Zazi to the FBI's investigation. On March 4, 2010, Afzali pled guilty to lying to federal officials. He admitted that he warned Zazi that the FBI had asked about him. Afzali also stated that during the phone conversation he simply cautioned Zazi not to "get involved in Afghanistan garbage."²⁵² He stated in court that he misled the FBI about a telephone conversation he had with Zazi. Afzali claimed that by lying to investigators he had hoped to protect himself, not Zazi. Afzali had been a source of information for federal and New York City investigators in the past.²⁵³

In another instance of the Capone approach, in 2008 the federal government charged Tarek Mehanna for lying to FBI agents regarding his relationship to Daniel Maldonado, subsequently convicted and jailed for terrorism-related offenses. Mehanna's 2008 arrest occurred at Boston's

²⁴⁹ The Center on Law and Security New York University School of Law, *Terrorist Trial Report Card: September 11, 2001-September 11, 2009*, New York, NY, January 2010, p. ii, <http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/TTRCFinalJan142.pdf>.

²⁵⁰ 18 U.S.C. §1001.

²⁵¹ DOJ Press Release, "Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty," Feb 22, 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/February/10-ag-174.html>; Nicole Vap, "Timeline of Terror Plot Investigation," KUSA TV, NBC affiliate, September 2009, <http://www.9news.com/news/specials/terrorplot/article.aspx?storyid=123658&catid=207>.

²⁵² A.G. Sulzberger, "Imam Snared in Terror Plot Admits He Lied to the F.B.I." *New York Times*, March 4, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/05/nyregion/05terror.html>.

²⁵³ Al Baker, Karen Zraick, "Lawyer Defends Queens Imam Arrested in Terror Inquiry," *New York Times*, September 21, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/nyregion/21imam.html>.

Logan International Airport as he was preparing to leave the country, according to news reports. He was subsequently released on bail. His defense attorney claimed that the FBI wanted Mehanna to become an informant, and his refusal precipitated his 2009 indictment and re-arrest on terrorism charges.²⁵⁴

Agent Provocateur Cases

Agent provocateur cases rely on expert determination by law enforcement that a specific individual or group is likely to move beyond radicalized talk and engage in violent jihad. The ultimate goal is to catch a suspect committing an overt criminal act such as pulling the proverbial trigger but on a dud weapon. By engaging in such strategy, investigators hope to obtain ironclad evidence against suspects.

Three recent FBI investigations exemplify the utility of this approach. On November 26, 2010, Mohamed Osman Mohamud was arrested after he attempted to set off what he believed was a vehicle bomb at an annual Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, OR. Mohamud thought he had plotted with terrorists to detonate the bomb. In actuality the device was a dud assembled by his co-conspirators, FBI undercover operatives. Mohamud offered the target for the strike, provided components for assembly of the device, gave instructions for the operation, and mailed passport photographs for his getaway plan to FBI undercover operatives.²⁵⁵

On September 24, 2009, a Jordanian immigrant named Hosam Smadi was arrested for attempting to detonate what he thought was a car bomb in the parking lot of a 60-story skyscraper in Dallas, TX. On May 26, 2010, he pled guilty to one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction.²⁵⁶ Smadi's apprehension resulted from an FBI operation including at least three undercover employees. The operation duped Smadi into believing he was planning an attack with Al Qaeda operatives. It ended with Smadi driving a truck he believed to contain a live bomb into the underground garage of 60-story Fountain Place in Dallas, TX. He used a cell phone to try and trigger the dud.²⁵⁷

The same day of Smadi's arrest, the FBI apprehended Michael C. Finton in Springfield, IL, on similar but unrelated charges. Finton's case also relied heavily on undercover FBI personnel. Allegedly they supplied him with a van Finton believed contained almost one ton of high explosives. According to the DOJ, he drove and parked the van near the Paul Findley Federal

²⁵⁴ Laura Crimaldi, "Many Rally for Alleged Terrorist," *The Boston Herald*, November 13, 2009, http://bh.heraldinteractive.com/news/regional/view.bg?articleid=1211567&srvc=next_article.

²⁵⁵ DOJ Press Release, "Oregon Resident Arrested in Plot to Bomb Christmas Tree Lighting Ceremony in Portland," November 27, 2010, <http://portland.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/pd112610.htm>. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, November 27, 2010.

²⁵⁶ DOJ Press Release, "Man Admits Attempting to Use a Weapon of Mass Destruction to Bomb a Skyscraper in Downtown Dallas," May 26, 2010, <http://dallas.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/dl052610.htm>.

²⁵⁷ *United States v. Hosam Maher Husein Smadi*, Affidavit, 3: 09-MJ-286, U.S. District Court Northern District of Texas, September 24, 2009, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1074.pdf. Hereinafter: *U.S. v. Smadi*, Affidavit; Jon Nielsen, "Officials: Teen Cut Video for bin Laden Tape, Other Evidence Leads Magistrate to Continue Smadi's Case," *The Dallas Morning News*, October 6, 2009; "Timeline of Dallas Terror Case," *Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, October 5, 2009, <http://www.star-telegram.com/2009/10/05/1662752/timeline-of-dallas-terror-case.html>.

Building and Courthouse in downtown Springfield. FBI Special Agents arrested Finton after he tried to detonate the bogus bomb using a cell phone.²⁵⁸

Initially, the FBI appears to have just tracked the activities of Finton and Smadi. How Mohamud's case played out is less certain, based on publicly available information. However, the investigations—particularly the Finton and Smadi cases—likely reached tipping points encouraging the bureau to initiate much more proactive agent provocateur-type operations. Finton had converted to Islam while in prison on aggravated robbery and battery charges. According to court documents, he was released in 2006 but in 2007 was re-arrested and returned to prison because of a parole violation. At the time, a search of Finton's vehicle revealed passages he wrote that championed martyrdom as well as attempted correspondence with John Walker Lindh, a U.S. citizen who pled guilty in federal court to serving in the Taliban army and carrying weapons. In 2008, after Finton was released from prison for his parole violation, members of the FBI's Springfield JTTF interviewed him. The JTTF also used an informant to monitor Finton, who engaged in radical rhetoric after his release. In January 2009, the informant reported that Finton planned to travel to the Gaza strip to fight Israelis. At this juncture in the investigation, the FBI allegedly initiated its agent provocateur strategy to nab Finton.²⁵⁹

The tipping point in the Smadi investigation is a little less specific. He allegedly had come to the agency's attention because the jihadist sentiment he displayed among an online group of extremists supposedly "stood out."²⁶⁰ Investigators claim Smadi exhibited "vehement intention to conduct terror attacks in the United States and ... zealous devotion to Osama Bin Ladin and Al Qaeda."²⁶¹ As a result, an FBI undercover employee communicated with Smadi. More than 10 exchanges between the two emphasized Smadi's desire to conduct violent jihad on behalf of Al Qaeda. Thus, the FBI determined he was a "legitimate threat," introduced him to another undercover employee who posed as a senior member of an Al Qaeda sleeper cell, and ostensibly set the sting in motion.²⁶²

The tipping point in the Mohamud investigation is even less clear due to ambiguity in the publicly available information regarding the timeline of the case. At some point, someone from the local Muslim community alerted the FBI to Mohamud, a 19-year-old Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen. Media reports have suggested that a family member, perhaps Mohamud's father, relayed concerns about the young man to officials.²⁶³ According to DOJ, in December 2009 Mohamud communicated with an individual the U.S. government believed to be a terrorist located in Pakistan. The duo allegedly discussed Mohamud traveling to Pakistan to prepare for violent jihad.

²⁵⁸ DOJ Press Release "Illinois Man Arrested in Plot to Bomb Courthouse and Murder Federal Employees: Vehicle Bomb Placed at Scene Was Inactive and Posed No Danger to Public," September 24, 2009, <http://springfield.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/2009/si092409.htm>.

²⁵⁹ Bruce Rushton, "Man Accused in Bombing Plot Known for Strong Stance on Islam," *pjstar.com*, September 24, 2009, <http://www.pjstar.com/archive/x1800826354/Man-accused-in-bombing-plot-known-for-strong-stance-on-Islam>; *United States v. Michael C. Finton*, Affidavit, 09: 3048-M, U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois, September 24, 2009, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1073.pdf. Hereinafter: *U.S. v. Finton*, Affidavit.

²⁶⁰ *U.S. v. Smadi*, Affidavit.

²⁶¹ Thomas D. Petrowski, et al., "Case Study: The Hosam Smadi Case, An Example of Success," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, September 2011, p. 14.

²⁶² *U.S. v. Smadi*, Affidavit.

²⁶³ Caryn Brooks, "Portland's Bomb Plot: Who Is Mohamed Mohamud?" November 28, 2010, *Time Magazine*, <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2033372,00.html>.

When exactly the FBI learned this information is unknown. However, after Mohamud was not allowed to board a flight from Portland to Kodiak, Alaska, on June 14, 2010, the FBI interviewed him. He purportedly told the FBI that he planned to take a fishing job in Alaska for the summer and that he had previously wanted to travel to Yemen but had neither purchased tickets nor obtained a visa. According to court documents, shortly thereafter, on June 23, an FBI undercover employee professing to be an associate of the Pakistan-based terrorist e-mailed Mohamud. It is unclear whether or not Mohamud's attempt to travel to Alaska and his interview precipitated the undercover operation.²⁶⁴

Court documents in the Smadi, Finton, and Mohamud cases allege that FBI undercover employees tested the suspects to ascertain the depth of their intent to do harm. The FBI evaluated Mohamud's resolve on a number of occasions. Two stand out. Mohamud's first meeting with an undercover FBI operative entailed a discussion in which the would-be violent jihadist was told that he could help "the cause" in "a number of ways ... ranging from simply praying five times a day to becoming a martyr." The young man responded, saying that he wanted to become "operational" and needed help in staging an attack. When in a following meeting Mohamud suggested the Christmas tree lighting ceremony as his intended target, an FBI undercover employee noted that children attend such events. Mohamud responded by saying that he wanted a large crowd "that will ... be attacked in their own element with their families celebrating the holidays."²⁶⁵

In the Smadi and Finton cases, the suspects received reassurances that if they quit the schemes, they would face no repercussions from their fellow (sham) plotters. FBI undercover operatives repeatedly tried to discourage Smadi's violent jihadist sentiments. In July 2009, an undercover employee (the fictitious senior member of an Al Qaeda sleeper cell), offered Smadi a way out of the plot. The mock Al Qaeda operative counseled Smadi by saying that different types of jihad existed, and he did not have to follow through on the plot if he was uncomfortable with it. He reassured Smadi by stressing that if he backed out, he would remain part of Al Qaeda's "brotherhood." Regardless, Smadi steadfastly believed in the plot and refused to quit.²⁶⁶ Like Smadi, Finton was given at least one opportunity to abandon his scheme. He allegedly understood that, "anytime he felt uncomfortable, he could walk out the door and still be a brother."²⁶⁷

The "Bind" for Law Enforcement

Not all agent provocateur cases appear as thorough in their efforts to reveal the harmful intent of suspects. Some cases have raised controversy about the extent to which government informants or agents have entrapped suspects and/or supported or pushed along terrorist plots. These instances illustrate what *Philadelphia Inquirer* reporter and author, Stephan Salisbury, describes as the "bind" the FBI finds itself in. "On one hand it is being charged by the Justice Department to go out and stop this stuff [terrorism] before it happens. But on the other, it is getting criticized for the techniques it is using to do that."²⁶⁸ The 2008 Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI

²⁶⁴ DOJ Press Release, November 27, 2010.

²⁶⁵ Ibid; *United States v. Mohamed Osman Mohamud*, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, November 26, 2010, p. 2, http://media.oregonlive.com/portland_impact/other/USAFFIDAVIT.pdf.

²⁶⁶ *U.S. v. Smadi*, Affidavit.

²⁶⁷ *U.S. v. Finton*, Affidavit.

²⁶⁸ Stephan Salisbury, "Leather Glove," Audio Interview, *tomdispatch.com*, July 5, 2010.

<http://tomdispatch.blogspot.com/2010/07/leather-glove.html>. Hereinafter: Salisbury, "Leather Glove."

Operations address the same competing forces, and as mentioned their implementation has spurred concerns among civil liberties groups.

Investigations of the so-called Newburgh Four and Liberty City Seven plots illustrate this bind. In each, law enforcement has been criticized for its use of undercover informants. To counter this, in both cases, officials emphasized the importance of prevention—neutralizing threats posed by the groups involved. For example, in a press conference related to the Newburgh plot, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg reassured the public by stating that the plotters did not have ties to a larger terrorist organization. However, he went on to stress the preemptive aspects of the case, “I’ve always thought of our police department’s primary job, not as first responders but as first preventers.”²⁶⁹ Cognizant of criticisms that the Liberty City men neither were competent nor their plotting viable, former Attorney General Gonzalez cautioned that

our philosophy here is that we try to identify plots in the earliest stages possible, because we don’t know what we don’t know about a terrorist plot ... it’s dangerous for us to make an evaluation case by case ... well, this is a really dangerous group, this is really not a dangerous group. And we felt that the combination of the planning and the overt acts taken were sufficient to support this prosecution.²⁷⁰

Newburgh Four

The Newburgh Four case has kindled controversy regarding the use of an agent provocateur. In the investigation, an FBI informant allegedly offered plotters \$250,000 and a luxury car, among other inducements to trigger explosives near a synagogue and to shoot down military aircraft.²⁷¹ On June 14, 2010, the federal judge hearing the trial delayed its start, because prosecutors may have failed to provide to defense attorneys relevant case information. Days earlier the defense received an FBI document suggesting that the lead plotter, James Cromitie, was not a threat.²⁷² News accounts suggest the plotters may have been heavily influenced by the FBI’s informant.²⁷³ They have also raised questions about the informant in the case, alleged to be a man named Shahed Hussain.²⁷⁴ According to the *Village Voice*, Hussain duped the Newburgh Four into their

²⁶⁹ Chris Dolmetsch and Edvard Pettersson, “N.Y. Bomb Suspects Said to Have No Terror Group Link,” *Bloomberg*, May 21, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aj43cfOgpp_A.

²⁷⁰ Salisbury, “Leather Glove.”

²⁷¹ Chris Herring, “Bomb Case Bail Hearing,” *Wall Street Journal*, June 22, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704256304575321131297175098.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_sections_newyork; A.G. Sulzberger, “Defense Cites Entrapment in Terror Case,” *New York Times*, March 17, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/18/nyregion/18newburgh.html>. Hereinafter: Sulzberger, “Defense Cites Entrapment.”

²⁷² Chris Dolmetsch, “Synagogue Bomb Plot Trial Delayed for Medical Review,” *Bloomberg Businessweek*, September 13, 2010, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-09-13/synagogue-bomb-plot-trial-delayed-for-medical-review.html>; William Glaberson, “Newburgh Terrorism Case May Establish a Line for Entrapment,” *New York Times*, June 15, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/16/nyregion/16terror.html>.

²⁷³ Timothy O’Connor, “Lawyers for 4 Accused in Synagogue Terror Plot Say Government Informant Enticed Them with Cash, Food,” *The Journal News* (Westchester County, NY), September 18, 2009, <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/lohud/access/1865253521.html?FMT=ABS&date=Sep+18%2C+2009>; Jim Fitzgerald, “NYC Synagogue Bomb Defendants May Claim Entrapment,” *Associated Press* in *abcnews.com*, September 17, 2009, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=8606330>.

²⁷⁴ Graham Rayman, “The Alarming Record of the FBI’s Informant in the Bronx Bomb Plot,” *The Village Voice*, July 8, 2009, <http://www.villagevoice.com/2009-07-08/news/the-alarming-record-of-the-f-b-i-s-informant-in-the-bronx-bomb-plot/> (Hereinafter: Rayman, July 8, 2009); Tony Allen-Mills, “FBI ‘Lured Dimwits’ into Terror Plot,” *The Sunday Times*, London, May 24, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article6350389.ece

plot. The *Voice* suggested that the quartet of smalltime felons had no grand terrorist ambitions, and Hussain had plied them with cash and suggestions.²⁷⁵

The Newburgh Four were arrested in May 2009. They purportedly had attempted to detonate explosives near a synagogue in the Riverdale section of the Bronx in New York City. The federal government asserts the plotters also planned to shoot down military airplanes at the New York Air National Guard Base at Stewart Airport in Newburgh, NY. Hussain allegedly passed himself off as a member of a Pakistani terrorist organization, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and provided the four suspects with inert C-4 explosives and an inactive Stinger surface-to-air missile.²⁷⁶ The Newburgh Four were found guilty of the plot on October 18, 2010.²⁷⁷

According to other news reports, Hussain, a Pakistani immigrant, became an FBI informant in 2002 to win leniency and avoid deportation on fraud charges. They stemmed from when he worked as a translator for the New York Department of Motor Vehicles. Hussain pled guilty to production and transfer of false government identification documents—illegally helping immigrants obtain licenses. He had also served as the key informant in the 2003 and 2004 FBI sting operation implicating Mohammed Hossain and Yassin Aref in a plot to launder money related to the sham sale of surface to air missiles to terrorists.²⁷⁸

Liberty City Seven

Like the Newburgh Four case, the Liberty City Seven investigation also generated questions regarding informant use by the FBI. Seven Miami-area men were arrested in 2006 for allegedly plotting to blow up the Sears Tower (now called Willis Tower) in Chicago, the FBI building in North Miami Beach, and other government buildings in Miami-Dade County. Defense attorneys called the case an outrageous example of government entrapment claiming that the men had neither the will nor the means to carry out the crimes.²⁷⁹ An FBI informant posing as an Al Qaeda member in the case, offered the men \$50,000 as part of their plot. He also obtained warehouse space for the group's activities, led a ceremony in which the conspirators swore allegiance to Al Qaeda, gave the group video cameras for surveillance activities, and suggested targeting Miami's FBI offices.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁵ Graham Rayman, July 8, 2009.

²⁷⁶ Sulzberger, "Defense Cites Entrapment"; Murray Weiss, Dan Mangan, "Informant Fingered \$\$ Launderer Duo," *New York Post*, May 22, 2009, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/item_6C8LbZXechQkuNGyAkHfGLj;jsessionid=D864E8F8E05AB7CE4443B7C98281CEF1; Brendan Lyons, "Mosque Welcomed in Informant," *Albany Times Union*, August 8, 2004, <http://www.timesunion.com/ASPStories/story.asp?StoryID=273922>. Hereinafter, Weiss, Mangan, "Informant Fingered \$\$.

²⁷⁷ DOJ Press Release, "Four Men Found Guilty of Plotting to Bomb New York Synagogue and Jewish Community Center and to Shoot Military Planes with Stinger Missiles," October 18, 2010, <http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo101810.htm>.

²⁷⁸ Sulzberger, "Defense Cites Entrapment"; Weiss, Mangan, "Informant Fingered \$\$.

²⁷⁹ Carol J. Williams, "A Case of Terror or Entrapment," *Los Angeles Times*, November 30, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/30/nation/na-liberty30>.

²⁸⁰ "5 Convicted in 'Liberty City' Terror Trial," *CNN.com*, May 12, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/05/12/liberty.seven/index.html>; "Sears Tower Bomb Plot Leader Narseal Batiste Jailed," *BBC News*, November 20, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8371671.stm>; Amanda Ripley, "Preemptive Terror Trials: Strike Two," *Time Magazine*, December 13, 2007, <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1694430,00.html>; "Seven Charged over 'Chicago Plot,'" *BBC News*, June 23, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5110342.stm>. Walter Pincus, "FBI Role in Terror Probe Questioned," *The Washington Post*, September 2, 2006, [http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/\(continued...\)](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/(continued...))

One of the two FBI informants in the investigation, Abbas al-Saidi, was jailed after reportedly having extorted \$7,000 from a friend who raped his girlfriend and then, after accepting the money, beat her up.²⁸¹ The other informant, Elie Assad, also had a domestic battery charge on his record. According to FBI agents, Assad failed a polygraph test administered while he was working for them on a previous case in Chicago. A 35-year veteran of the FBI, who was hired as an expert witness by the Liberty City defense team, stated that Assad never should have been authorized to work on the [Liberty City] case at all. However, at trial, the former FBI agent was not allowed to testify nor did the judge permit the testimony about Assad's failed polygraph test.²⁸² After juries in the first two trials failed to reach a verdict, six of the seven Liberty City men were convicted at a third trial and sentenced to long prison sentences.

Combating Homegrown Terrorism: Building Trust and Partnership

Scholars who have studied the circumstances that are associated with voluntary cooperation by Muslim-Americans in anti-terror policing efforts have identified strong evidence that when authorities are viewed as more legitimate, their rules and decisions are more likely to be accepted.²⁸³ Engagement is one strategy by law enforcement to build trust and enhance community perceptions of legitimacy.

In August 2011, the Obama Administration released a strategy for combating violent extremism (CVE).²⁸⁴ It revolves around countering the radicalization of all types of potential terrorists. As such, the radicalization of violent jihadists falls under its purview. Federal CVE efforts often depend on government agencies cooperating with local groups. In fact, the Obama Administration's national CVE strategy highlights a "community-based approach" for the federal government, and much of the activity it describes will take place in the "marketplace of ideas" described in **Figure 1**. To this end, the federal government most effectively acts as a "facilitator, convener, and source of information."²⁸⁵ As this may suggest, to date, the bulk of federal-level CVE work has revolved around *community engagement*.

Engagement with Communities

The concept of building trust through engagement and partnership is rooted in the community policing model developed by law enforcement professionals in the 1990s, and community

(...continued)

article/2006/09/01/AR2006090101764.html.

²⁸¹ Ibid.

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Tom R. Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer, and Aziz Huq, "Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-Terrorism Policing," New York University School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 10-15, February 23, 2010, p. 2, http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1182&context=nyu_plltwp.

²⁸⁴ *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, August 2011, p. 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf. Hereinafter: *Empowering Local Partners*.

²⁸⁵ *Empowering Local Partners*, p. 3.

policing is mentioned in the Administration's CVE strategy.²⁸⁶ Following the 9/11 attacks, law enforcement agencies came to realize the prevention of terrorist attacks would require the cooperation and assistance of American Muslim, Arab, and Sikh communities. "Embedded within these communities," notes Professor Deborah Ramirez, "are the linguistic skills, information, and cultural insights necessary to assist law enforcement in its efforts to identify suspicious behavior. In order to have access to these critical tools and information, law enforcement recognized the need to build bridges required for effective communication with these groups."²⁸⁷ At the same time, Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Americans recognized the need to define themselves as distinctly American communities who, like all Americans, desire to help prevent another terrorist attack.²⁸⁸

A study by the Homeland Security Institute found that "[c]ommunity policing has been applied with notable success in places such as New York City, Chicago, Boston, and San Diego, and has been widely adopted (at least in name) throughout the United States."²⁸⁹ A Homeland Advisory Council (HSAC) working group²⁹⁰ chaired by Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley found that Community-Oriented Policing works:

Effective public-private partnerships, designed to enable civic engagement, problem-solving, and violent crime mitigation provide the foundation for efforts to prevent, protect against and respond to violent criminal activity—including that which may be motivated by ideological objectives.²⁹¹

²⁸⁶ Ibid., pp. 3, 6. The Justice Department defined community policing as "a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime." One of its key features is the establishment of collaborative partnerships between law enforcement agencies and individuals and organizations they serve to develop solutions to problems and increase trust in police. See DOJ Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, *Community Policing Defined*. April 3, 2009., p. 3, <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/e030917193-CP-Defined.pdf>.

²⁸⁷ Deborah A. Ramirez, Sasha Cohen O'Connell, and Rabia Zafar, The Partnering for Prevention and Community Safety Initiative, *A Promising Practices Guide Executive Summary*, 2004, p. 2, http://www.cps.neu.edu/pfp/downloads/PFP_Executive_Summary_cover.pdf.

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Rosemary Lark (Task Lead), Richard Rowe, and John Markey, *Community Policing Within Muslim Communities: An Overview and Annotated Bibliography of Open-Source Literature*, Homeland Security Institute, December 27, 2006, p. iii. This study, prepared for the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, sought to identify the literature that examined community policing initiatives underway within Muslim Communities in the U.S., and the extent to which they were successful in achieving the objectives of (1) inclusiveness, promoting integration, and potentially minimize the disaffection that can lead to radicalization, particularly among Muslim youth; (2) serve as early warning to identify incipient radicalization or terrorist activities; and (3) open a new channel of communication with individuals who can navigate the linguistic and cultural complexities of Islam, providing needed context to inform intelligence analysis, http://www.homelandsecurity.org/hsireports/Task_06-99_Community_Policing_within_Muslim_Communities.pdf.

²⁹⁰ The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The chair of the council is Judge William Webster, former Director of the CIA and Director of the FBI. Other members include leaders from state and local government, first responder communities, the private sector, and academia. The Countering Violent Extremism Working Group originated from a tasking by Secretary Napolitano to the HSAC in February 2010 to work with state and local law enforcement and relevant community groups to develop and provide recommendations on how DHS can better support community-based efforts to combat violent extremism domestically. See Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, Spring 2010, p. 2.

²⁹¹ Homeland Security Advisory Council, Countering Violent Extremism Working Group, Spring 2010, p. 5. Hereinafter: HSAC CVE Working Group, Spring 2010.

Federal Activities

Currently, numerous U.S. government agencies engage and partner with Muslim American communities. Some of the efforts by DHS, DOJ, and FBI are detailed below.

Department of Homeland Security

DHS has stated that public outreach to local communities plays a major role in the department's mission.²⁹² Engagement activities are centered in its Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), which began its outreach in 2003.²⁹³ Its work involves counterterrorism and CVE-related matters but is broader. The office is also responsible for²⁹⁴

- advising DHS leadership, personnel, and partners about civil rights and civil liberties issues;
- communicating with individuals and communities whose civil rights and civil liberties may be affected by DHS activities, informing them about policies and avenues of redress, and promoting appropriate attention within DHS to their experiences and concerns; and
- investigating and resolving civil rights and civil liberties complaints filed by the public.

CRCL has a Community Engagement Section. Recent domestic CVE-related²⁹⁵ outreach events coordinated by CRCL and its Community Engagement Section include the following:

- **Community Roundtables.** DHS describes these as “the core of CRCL’s engagement efforts.” These “regular location-based” meetings include representatives from federal, state, and local government agencies as well as individuals from the private sector and community leaders “whose communities have civil rights concerns.”²⁹⁶ In the past, these roundtables have focused on leaders from the American Arab, Muslim, South Asian, Middle Eastern, and Sikh communities, but in 2010, CRCL broadened them to include other immigrant communities.²⁹⁷ Some of the roundtables discussed how local communities could

²⁹² Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, “Engagement with Key Communities Team,” August 14, 2009. Hereinafter: CRCL Engagement Team, August 14, 2009.

²⁹³ CRCL, *Newsletter*, vol. 2, no. 1 (September 2011), <http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=36956>. Hereinafter: CRCL, *Newsletter*, September 2011.

²⁹⁴ The mission of the DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties is outlined in 6 U.S.C. 345, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0481.shtm. See DHS, Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, <http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/crcl.shtm>.

²⁹⁵ Much like CRCL, the Section’s mission involves more than CVE. It reaches out to other communities whose issues are not necessarily tied to radicalization.

²⁹⁶ CRCL, *Fiscal Year 2010 Annual and Consolidated Quarterly Reports to Congress*, September 20, 2011, pp. 14-15, <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/crcl-annual-report-fy-2010.pdf>. Hereinafter: CRCL, *Fiscal Year 2010*.

²⁹⁷ According to CRCL, “Regular roundtables were held in FY 2010 in Washington, DC; Chicago, IL; Los Angeles, CA; Boston, MA; Detroit, MI; Columbus, OH; and three new cities that were added in late 2010—Seattle, WA; Atlanta, GA; and Minneapolis, MN. In addition, special meetings were held in Tucson, AZ; Fremont, CA; San Diego, CA; San Jose, CA; Hartford, CT; Tampa, FL; Portland, ME; Raleigh, NC; Albuquerque, NM; New York, NY; Cleveland, OH; Portland, OR; Kingston, RI; Dallas, TX; and San Antonio, TX.” See *ibid*.

partner with government in CVE efforts.²⁹⁸ Between January and September 2011, CRCL had conducted more than 150 roundtables and similar events.²⁹⁹

- **The Somali-American Initiative.** This initiative has involved DHS officials engaging Somali communities and organizations in Columbus, OH; Seattle, WA; and San Jose, CA. Issues discussed in these meetings included fighting in the Horn of Africa and other items relevant to the local Somali communities.³⁰⁰
- **Special Issue-Focused Engagement.** Efforts in this area have included meetings about policing, civil rights, and engagement held with leaders of national-level interest groups such as the Muslim Public Affairs Council.³⁰¹
- **Youth Programs.** For one event in this area, DHS led a meeting in Los Angeles, California that included American Arab, Muslim, Sikh, South Asian, Middle Eastern, and Somali youth and discussed civil rights issues and CVE.³⁰²
- **The Incident Communication Coordination Team (ICCT).** The ICCT provides a venue for government officials and community leaders to work together to exchange information and resolve issues immediately after terrorist attacks or other significant incidents. ICCT members include officials from DHS, the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense. Also involved are FBI representatives and leaders of the Arab, Muslim, Sikh, Middle Eastern, Somali, and South Asian American communities. When an incident occurs, the ICCT is assembled via conference call. It has been activated numerous times since its establishment including after the Fort Hood shootings in November 2009 and the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines flight #253 in December 2009.³⁰³

Department of Justice

DOJ's CVE-related engagement activities largely appear to come from the Civil Rights Division, the Community Relations Service, and United States Attorneys. DOJ has stated that its engagement efforts:

have two central components. First [DOJ] seek[s] to build trust by working with Muslim elders to find out how we can better serve the community on issues like civil rights enforcement to anti-bullying efforts. In addition, we work to equip and empower local

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

²⁹⁹ CRCL, *Newsletter*, September 2011.

³⁰⁰ CRCL, *Fiscal Year 2010*, p. 15.

³⁰¹ CRCL, *Fiscal Year 2010*, p. 16.

³⁰² Ibid.

³⁰³ Ibid., p. 17. See CRCL Engagement Team, August 14, 2009. DHS also provides law enforcement training related to CVE in the United States. With DOJ, DHS has instructed more than 46,000 "front line officers" on suspicious activity reporting. As of September 2011, CRCL has taught over 2,000 law enforcement officials in the area of CVE. CRCL CVE training highlights topics such as understanding violent radicalization, cultural awareness, and community engagement. The training was developed "in response to concerns from attendees at community roundtables." See DHS, Fact Sheet, "The Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Countering Violent Extremism," <http://www.dhs.gov/files/fact-sheet-approach-to-countering-violent-extremism.pdf> DHS; CRCL, *Fiscal Year 2010*, pp. 18-19; CRCL, *Fiscal Year 2010*, p. 19; CRCL, *Newsletter*, vol. 1, no. 8 (June 2011), <http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=36057>.

Muslim elders to help them guard against violent extremists who are targeting young people in their communities for recruitment to misguided, violent causes.³⁰⁴

According to its website, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), the Civil Rights Division of DOJ has prioritized prosecution of bias crimes and discrimination against Muslims, Sikhs, and persons of Arab and South-Asian descent, as well as individuals perceived to be members of these groups. These types of incidents are commonly referred to as “backlash.” The division has also educated people in these communities about their rights and available government services.³⁰⁵

Senior Civil Rights Division officials have met with Muslim, Sikh, Arab, and South Asian community leaders regarding backlash discrimination issues. The division has also provided convention speakers and participated in other community events. It hosts a quarterly meeting that brings together leaders from these communities with officials from a variety of federal departments and agencies including DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Department of Transportation to address civil rights issues.³⁰⁶

Like the Civil Rights Division, DOJ’s Community Relations Service is involved in outreach. Since 9/11, the service has held more than 750 meetings around the country to address backlash-related issues.³⁰⁷ For example, in March 2010, it brought together the U.S. Attorney and leaders from Muslim and Arab communities in the Seattle, Washington area to address racial tensions.³⁰⁸ Also, the service has employed conflict resolution specialists in more than 50 communities to “alleviate tensions in the wake of backlash incidents.”³⁰⁹ In addition, the Community Relations Service does the following:³¹⁰

- Provides technical assistance and targeted training efforts toward establishing dialogue between government officials and Arab, Muslim, and Sikh communities in the United States.
- Runs the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Cultural Awareness Program for law enforcement officials, and has offered this training to well over 500 law enforcement departments and agencies across the country.
- Conducts train-the-trainer programs, often in conjunction with the Cultural Awareness Program, to train volunteers from the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh communities. These volunteers then conduct trainings for law enforcement officials and first responders, providing them with an understanding of Arab,

³⁰⁴ DOJ, “Attorney General Holder Meets with Muslim Leaders in Portland,” September 30, 2011, <http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/1617?print=1>. Hereinafter: DOJ, “Attorney General Holder Meets.”

³⁰⁵ Civil Rights Division, “Initiative to Combat Post-9/11 Discriminatory Backlash,” <http://www.justice.gov/crt/legalinfo/discrimupdate.php>. Hereinafter: Civil Rights Division, “Initiative.”

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

³⁰⁸ Community Relations Service, *America’s Peacemaker, Community Relations Service, U.S. Department of Justice, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2010*, <http://www.justice.gov/crs/pubs/annualreport2010.pdf>.

³⁰⁹ DOJ, *Ten Years Later: The Justice Department After 9/11, Partnering with the Muslim, Arab, and Sikh Communities*, <http://www.justice.gov/911/partnerships.html>. Hereafter: DOJ, *Ten Years Later*.

³¹⁰ Civil Rights Division, “Initiative.” See Ondray T. Harris, Director, DOJ Community Relations Service, “Creating Positive Perception of Sikh Identity in the U.S. Public,” speech at the 2nd Global Sikh Civil Rights Conference in Toronto, Canada, December 19, 2009, <http://www.justice.gov/crs/united-sikhs.pdf>.

- Muslim, and Sikh cultures that will enable them to more effectively work in these communities.
- Trains law enforcement officials on racial profiling to identify best practices to prevent illegal discrimination against Arabs, Muslims, and Sikhs and to improve daily contact and strengthen mutual trust and effective policing practices in these communities.
 - Posts on its website two films it developed for law enforcement officers: *The First Three to Five Seconds - Law Enforcement Roll Call Training Video on Arab and Muslim Cultural Awareness*, and *On Common Ground - Law Enforcement Training Video on Sikhism*.³¹¹

Also, Attorney General Eric Holder has pushed the U.S. Attorneys to enhance their outreach efforts to Muslim, Sikh, and Arab American communities.³¹² U.S. Attorneys are “the nation’s principal litigators under the direction of the Attorney General.”³¹³ Within their districts across the country, U.S. Attorneys have met with Muslim communities regarding specific situations and trends.³¹⁴ For example, in September 2011, the U.S. Attorney for the District of Oregon and Attorney General Holder met with Arab and Muslim community representatives Portland, OR.³¹⁵ In a similar vein, the District of Minnesota has established the Young Somali-American Advisory Council. This responded to al-Shabaab’s³¹⁶ recruitment of young men within the greater Minneapolis-St. Paul’s Somali community. The council includes more than a dozen people between the ages of 18 and 30. Among the outreach activities tied to the council, the U.S. Attorney’s office instructed council members on civics issues. Comparable outreach has been pursued by other U.S. Attorneys. For example, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida and Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez met with Muslim and Arab leaders in Miami in February 2011.³¹⁷ In November 2010, an alleged jihadist terrorist plotter was arrested for purportedly attempting to bomb a Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, OR. In its wake, the state’s U.S. Attorney repeatedly met with local Muslim leaders.³¹⁸

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The FBI has publicly suggested that since 9/11, it has been formulating an “extensive program” to bolster its relationship with Arab, Muslim, Sikh, and South Asian communities in the United States.³¹⁹ In March 2010, the Chief of the Community Relations Unit of the FBI’s Office of

³¹¹ Ibid.

³¹² DOJ, “Arab and Muslim Engagement: U.S. Attorneys’ Outreach Efforts,” http://www.justice.gov/usao/briefing_room/crt/engagement.html. Hereinafter: DOJ, “Arab and Muslim.”

³¹³ DOJ, “United States Attorneys’ Mission Statement,” <http://www.justice.gov/usao/about/mission.html>.

³¹⁴ DOJ, *Ten Years Later*.

³¹⁵ DOJ, “Attorney General Holder Meets.”

³¹⁶ A terrorist group in Somalia.

³¹⁷ DOJ, “Arab and Muslim.”

³¹⁸ Peter Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization in America*, Bipartisan Policy Center, (June 2011), p. 37 <http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf>. Hereinafter: Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization*.

³¹⁹ Scott Atran, *Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities: Countering Violent Extremism: Statement for the Record, Addendum-2*, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 10, 2010, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/03%20March/Atran%2003-10-10.pdf>. Hereinafter: Atran Testimony, March 10, (continued...)

Public Affairs testified to Congress that the primary purpose of the agency's outreach program was "to enhance public trust and confidence in the FBI."³²⁰ This involves fostering a positive image of law enforcement among U.S. organizations that have condemned terrorism and violent radicalization.

The FBI relies on programs at the field office level to foster interaction with a wide variety of local groups. As the chief of the FBI's Community Relations Unit stated to Congress in 2010:

It is very important to make sure that we engage with a number of different communities, because terrorism really is just fear, and that fear comes in different shapes, forms and fashion depending on what environment that you're—that you're looking at. So whether you're talking about gang activity, whether you're talking about Klan activity, the bottom line—it's terrorism. And that's one of the things I—we do at the FBI. We take a look at the various communities. And it—I would say it's a customized outreach program. What I mean by that is we have 56 FBI field offices that serve, again, across this country, and they have to tailor their outreach efforts based on the demographics of the area of responsibilities that they serve. That's the only effective way to do engagement, because there is not one shoe fits all.³²¹

In 2003, the FBI Washington Field Office (WFO) established one such program, the Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Advisory Council (AMSAC), to create transparency and stronger communication between its office and multiple religious communities. According to the WFO, on a quarterly basis its officials and AMSAC executives share cultural, linguistic, and contextual expertise and work to prevent hate crimes by building relationships with community members who are not afraid to come forward with information.³²²

An outreach program developed by the Community Relations Unit at FBI Headquarters is the Specialized Community Outreach Team (SCOT). It is described as an effort to, "engage communities that are particularly insular or where barriers of fear or suspicion of law enforcement exist." The SCOT was piloted with Somali American communities in Minneapolis; Denver, CO; Columbus, OH; San Diego, CA; Seattle; and Washington, DC.³²³ This effort helped the FBI address a Somali-linked threat to the 2009 Presidential Inauguration, and in this instance SCOT outreach in Columbus facilitated FBI investigative work.³²⁴

(...continued)

2010.

³²⁰ Brett Hovington, *House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment: Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots: Statement for the Record*, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 17, 2010, <http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100317103507-03554.pdf>. Hereinafter: Hovington Testimony, March 17, 2010.

³²¹ Hovington Testimony, March 17, 2010.

³²² FBI, "Building Trust: The Arab, Muslim, and Sikh Advisory Council," June 1, 2009, <http://washingtondc.fbi.gov/trust060109.htm>.

³²³ *Ibid.*

³²⁴ Atran Testimony, March 10, 2010.

Aside from the FBI's inclusion of Muslim Americans in broad outreach programs,³²⁵ some FBI field offices have formally interacted with local Muslim communities regarding specific cases. One case involved the agency's top official at the New York Field Office meeting with 40 community leaders regarding Najibullah Zazi, who has confessed to plotting to bomb subway trains in New York City. Other field offices have held town hall meetings to interact with the communities.³²⁶ At the national level, FBI headquarters representatives have engaged in liaison with Arab and Muslim American advocacy groups and have regular issue-focused conference calls with community leaders.³²⁷ The FBI is also a member of the Incident Coordination Communications Team managed by DHS CRCL. Finally, CRS discussions with Muslim community leaders revealed that the FBI has partnered with community members in specific cases where the FBI has detected radicalization in an effort to prevent those individuals from transitioning to acts of violent extremism.³²⁸

State and Local Government Activities

In addition to federal engagement efforts, state and local governments also engage with Muslim communities. Minneapolis and St. Paul, MN, stand out as examples. The cities and surrounding region have the largest Somali American community in the United States.³²⁹ Since 2007, numerous people have been charged in an ongoing Justice Department investigation into the recruitment of Somali American youth from the Minneapolis area by al-Shabaab. Recognizing that youth violence—not just terrorism and radicalization—is a public health epidemic that requires a holistic, multi-faceted response, Minneapolis has promoted an “enterprise-wide” approach to the challenge. Drawing on a mix of law enforcement and public health strategies, the city, in partnership with a host of community stakeholders, created the “Blueprint for Action.”³³⁰ The Blueprint's goals are to

- connect every youth with a trusted adult,
- intervene at the first sign that youth are at risk for violence,
- restore youth who have gone down the wrong path, and
- unlearn the culture of violence in the community.³³¹

The Minneapolis Police Department is actively involved in community outreach initiatives and has full-time liaisons to the Somali and Latino communities. In addition, in 2009, the city established the Neighborhood and Community Relations Department staffed with outreach

³²⁵ Programs such as the FBI's Citizens' Academy acquaint local civic leaders with FBI operations. The Citizens' Academy, sponsored by FBI Field Offices, has given thousands of local community leaders a chance to learn about the FBI mission and capabilities. See “FBI Citizens' Academies: An Eye-Opening Experience,” October 26, 2009, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/oct09/citizens_academies_102609.html; and “In Your Community: FBI Citizens' Academy,” <http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ood/opca/outreach/academy.htm>.

³²⁶ Hovington Testimony, March 17, 2010.

³²⁷ Atran Testimony, March 10, 2010.

³²⁸ Discussions with CRS held on May 12 and 18, 2010.

³²⁹ City of Minneapolis, “Blueprint for Action: Preventing Youth Violence in Minneapolis,” <http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/dhfs/yv.asp>.

³³⁰ *Ibid.*

³³¹ *Ibid.*

specialists who speak several East African languages.³³² An example of this department's outreach work was its participation in a community forum on December 1, 2010. Hosted by the British Broadcasting Corporation's "BBC Somali," a popular radio service among Somalis, the discussion was prompted by a spate of high-profile crimes involving young Somali-Americans, including the November 26, 2010, arrest of a 19-year-old Portland, OR, resident accused of plotting a bomb attack in that city's Pioneer Courthouse Square.³³³ At the meeting, broadcast to a worldwide audience, about 40 mothers, fathers, and community leaders spoke passionately about the challenges of raising kids in the United States.

The St. Paul Police Department began its engagement with local Somalis in 2004. Much of this effort eventually morphed into the department's African Immigrant Muslim Community Outreach Program (AIMCOP). In 2009, AIMCOP received funding from the Bureau of Justice Assistance.³³⁴ AIMCOP involves meetings between the St. Paul Police Department and local Somali community leaders as well as youth-oriented programming such as after-school study programs, gym activities, arts and crafts programs, and camping trips.³³⁵ Additionally, the city's Police Athletic League has more than 300 Somali American youth participating in soccer, flag football, softball, and volleyball. The league relies on city police officers as coaches, referees, and organizers.³³⁶

Muslim Community Activities

As Attorney General Eric Holder has stated publicly, "Members of the American Muslim community have been—and continue to be—strong partners in fighting this emerging threat [of terrorism]. They have regularly denounced terrorist acts and those who carry them out. And they have provided critical assistance to law enforcement in helping to disrupt terrorist plots and combat radicalization."³³⁷ "One of the most important benefits of trusted partnerships," says Alejandro Beutel of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, "is the ability of community members to feel comfortable enough to step forward and provide critical information to prevent any crime, including terrorism."³³⁸ In an October 2011 background paper, he documents 19 instances since 9/11 in which Muslims provided information to U.S. government authorities regarding terrorist plots tied to Al Qaeda.³³⁹

A partial list of community initiatives to tackle the problem of violent extremism includes the following:

³³² Briefing for CRS by Neighborhood and Community Relations Department official, Dec. 2, 2010.

³³³ Allie Shah, "Somalis Bring Fears for their Youth to Radio," *Minneapolis Star-Tribune*, December 1, 2010, <http://www.startribune.com/local/111166374.html>

³³⁴ See <http://stpaul.gov/index.aspx?NID=3393>.

³³⁵ Thomas E. Smith, *House Committee on Homeland Security: Al-Shabaab: Recruitment and Radicalization within the Muslim American Community and the Threat to the Homeland: Statement for the Record*, 112th Cong., 1st sess., July 27, 2011, <http://chsdemocrats.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20110727094311-57068.pdf>.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*

³³⁷ Attorney General Eric Holder, DOJ Press Release, August 5, 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100805.html>.

³³⁸ Alejandro Beutel, *Data on Post 9/11 Terrorism in the United States*, Muslim Public Affairs Council, October 2011, p. 10, <http://www.mpac.org/publications/policy-papers/post-911-terrorism-database.php>.

³³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 12. Some of these plots did not involve homegrown jihadists.

- Muflehun. Describing itself as an “independent think-and-do tank,” Muflehun seeks to use faith-based values for empowerment and continued integration of the Muslim community within the larger society. It focuses on two main research areas: radicalization prevention in the United States, and horizon scanning for emerging trends within the Muslim American community.³⁴⁰
- The Straight Path Initiative. Founded by The Muslim American Society, the initiative seeks to engage all components of the Muslim American community, with a special focus on youth ages 15-30. It seeks to pinpoint the roots of extremism, the ways in which individuals are radicalized, and the tools needed to address these challenges, including an honest and open dialogue about radicalization and extremism in Muslim American communities; research to pinpoint the root causes of radicalization and extremism among Muslim American youth in particular; engagement with the Muslim American community in monitoring and detecting extremist trends and their impact on vulnerable members of the community.³⁴¹
- National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism. An initiative of The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), it seeks to (1) [raise] religious awareness and education to create a strong Islamic environment that does not allow terrorism to be considered as a form of struggle in Islam; (2) control the inter-mosque environment and activities to prevent intruders and unauthorized, unknown persons from exploiting the open environment of [mosques]; and (3) acquire skills to detect any potential criminal activity to be able to thwart them.³⁴²

Risks and Challenges

Although there is considerable support among public officials for community engagement, some experts warn of significant challenges in the development of programs that foster substantive relationships rather than token discussions or community relations events. A study of policing in Arab American communities sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, for example, highlighted four key obstacles hindering outreach between U.S. Arabs (Christian and Muslim) and law enforcement: “Distrust between Arab communities and law enforcement, lack of cultural awareness among law enforcement officers, language barriers, and concerns about immigration status and fears of deportation.”³⁴³

Terrorism expert Marc Sageman cautions that engagement can be a sign of government focus on Muslim communities when instead it should be stressed that Muslims are Americans just like

³⁴⁰ Humera Khan and Mohamed Magid, *Muflehun: Community Building Through Values, Social Responsibility, and Civic Engagement*, <http://www.muflehun.org>.

³⁴¹ The Muslim American Society, *The Straight Path Initiative*, <http://muslimamericansociety.org/main/content/straight-path-initiative>.

³⁴² Muslim Public Affairs Council, *National Grassroots Campaign to Fight Terrorism Handbook*, 2005, p. 7, <http://www.mpac.org/publications/campaign-to-fight-terrorism/campaign-to-fight-terrorism-brochure.pdf>.

³⁴³ Nicole J. Henderson et al., *Policing in Arab-American Communities After September 11*, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC, July 2008, p. ii. For the full study, see Nicole J. Henderson et al., *Law Enforcement and Arab American Community Relations After September 11, 2001: Engagement in a Time of Uncertainty*, Vera Institute of Justice, New York, NY, June 2006, <http://www.vera.org/policerelations>. As its title clearly suggests, this project examined the experiences of Arab-Americans, two thirds of whom are Christian.

everyone else.³⁴⁴ He sees another challenge arise when engagement on the government side is led by federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies. “It can send the message that we are only interested in Muslims because they are potential law breakers. No other foreign or religious communities in the United States get this type of scrutiny.”³⁴⁵

Mohamed Elibiary, the President of the Freedom and Justice Foundation, a Muslim community group based in Carrollton, TX, has told Congress that “while the government has publicly claimed a desire for ‘partnership’ with the mainstream American Muslim community, law enforcement has only offered the community a conduit to ‘inform’ on community members of concern.”³⁴⁶ He argues that this “securitization” of government interactions with Muslim American communities would be counterproductive.

Outreach may be most effective when U.S. Muslim communities initiate it and community-government contact revolves around countering the extremist messages popular among homegrown violent jihadists.³⁴⁷ Marc Sageman suggests it would be more appropriate for local authorities, such as a mayor’s office, to perform the engagement role because they know these communities better than federal officials. An important role at the federal level is to lead efforts to combat discrimination against Muslim-Americans,³⁴⁸ an activity in which the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice is currently engaged.³⁴⁹

The Tension Between Enforcement and Engagement Activities

An inherent challenge to building trust and partnership involves law enforcement investigative activities and tactics that can be perceived to unfairly target law-abiding citizens or infringe on speech, religion, assembly, or due process rights. One expert has noted that “counter-radicalization is not about intelligence-gathering nor is it primarily about policing.”³⁵⁰ The HSAC Countering Violent Extremism Working Group found that

There can be tension between those involved in law enforcement investigations and those collaborating to establish local partnerships to stop violent crime. Community policing can be impeded if other enforcement tactics are perceived as conflicting with community partnership efforts.³⁵¹

This challenge is evident in law enforcement efforts to recruit and manage informants. One Muslim community leader who has published widely on domestic terrorism, states that “many

³⁴⁴ Discussion with CRS, April 7, 2010.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Hearing: “Working with Communities to Disrupt Terror Plots,” Testimony of Mohamed Elibiary, President and CEO of the Freedom and Justice Foundation, 111th Cong., 2nd sess., March 17, 2010, p. 2, <http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20100317103442-74422.pdf>. Hereinafter: Elibiary Testimony, March 17, 2010.

³⁴⁷ Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, *Homegrown Terrorists in the U.S. and U.K.*, p. 60.

³⁴⁸ Discussion with CRS, April 7, 2010.

³⁴⁹ DOJ Civil Rights Division, “Initiative to Combat Post-9/11 Discriminatory Backlash,” July 25, 2008, http://www.justice.gov/crt/legalinfo/nordwg_mission.php.

³⁵⁰ Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization*, p. 19.

³⁵¹ HSAC CVE Working Group, Spring 2010, p 6.

Muslim Americans fear that paid FBI informants specifically target impressionable youth and that law enforcement agents coerce community members to become informants themselves to avoid complications with immigration procedures.”³⁵²

Community leaders report numerous attempts by the FBI to recruit Muslims as informers. In virtually all cases, the Muslims in question had immigration and other legal problems or were applying for green cards according to Shakeel Syed of the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California, an umbrella organization of 68 area mosques. Syed said the FBI told Muslims, “We will make your problems vanish if you cooperate.” He goes on to say that “For some individuals who have refused recruitment, there is startling evidence that the FBI has actually retaliated against them.”³⁵³

Two cases that are often cited to support these allegations are those of Foad Farahi and Yassine Ouassif. Farahi is an imam at a mosque in North Miami Beach, FL, who has lived in the United States since 1993. Although an Iranian citizen, he does not speak Farsi because he grew up as a Sunni Muslim in Kuwait speaking Arabic. He applied for political asylum in the United States in 2002 after it was determined that he could be removed from the country because he had failed to maintain his student status. He sought asylum based upon a fear of persecution if deported to Iran because he is a Sunni Muslim and Iran is overwhelmingly Shia.

In 2004, when he was first approached by the FBI, Farahi said he told them that he was willing to work with them, but the relationship would need to be public. He claimed the FBI wanted him to be a secret informant instead and promised him residency and money for school.³⁵⁴ But Farahi declined saying “People trust you as a religious figure, and you’re trying to kind of deceive them. That’s where the problem is.”³⁵⁵

In the summer of 2007, Farahi declined a second request from the FBI to become a secret informant. The consequences for this followed later that year at a hearing on his asylum case. Four Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, armed and wearing bullet proof vests, followed him into the Miami Immigration Court. They allegedly told his attorney they had a file with evidence that he was supporting or involved in terrorist groups and gave him an ultimatum: Drop the asylum case and leave the United States voluntarily or be charged as a terrorist. Farahi reported that these threats led to the involuntary and coerced withdrawal of his asylum application before the Immigration Court.³⁵⁶

According to Farahi’s attorneys, the government has never shared any information or evidence that he was involved in terrorism, nor has the government charged him for any terrorist offenses. He has appealed the withdrawal of his asylum application to the U.S. Court of Appeals. Farahi

³⁵² Alejandro J. Beutel, “Muslim Americans and U.S. Law Enforcement: Not Enemies, But Vital Partners,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, December 30, 2009, <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/1230/Muslim-Americans-and-US-law-enforcement-not-enemies-but-vital-partners..>

³⁵³ Council on American-Islamic Relations, Greater Los Angeles Chapter, “The FBI’s Use of Informants, Recruitment and Intimidation Within Muslim Communities,” March 26, 2009, p. 1, http://ca.cair.com/losangeles/campaign/fbi_instigators_in_the_american_muslim_community.

³⁵⁴ Trevor Aronson, “FBI Tries to Deport Muslim Man for Refusing to be an Informant,” *miaminewtimes.com*, Oct 8, 2009, <http://www.miaminewtimes.com/2009-10-08/news/unholy-war-fbi-tries-to-deport-north-miami-beach-imam-foad-farahi-for-refusing-to-be-an-informant/>. Hereinafter: Aronson, October 8, 2009.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

believes that “People have two choices. Either they end up working with the FBI or they leave the country on their own. It’s just sometimes when you’re in that situation, not many people are strong enough to stand up and resist and fight—to reject their offers.”³⁵⁷

Farahi’s assertion that the government tried to coerce him to become an informant cannot be verified independently because the FBI won’t comment on his case. When asked by a journalist who has written on the case, a Miami FBI Special Agent stated: “It is a matter of policy that we do not confirm or deny who we have asked to be a source.”³⁵⁸

In a case reported by *The Wall Street Journal*, a 24-year-old Moroccan, Yassine Ouassif, was stopped in November 2005 and questioned for several hours by immigration officials as he crossed into New York from Canada. His legal permanent resident card was taken from him and he was told to contact an individual when he returned home to San Francisco. Ouassif complied with the immigration officials’ instructions and the individual he contacted turned out to be an FBI agent. The agent told him that he had been monitoring Ouassif and his friends for many months.³⁵⁹

According to Ouassif, the FBI agent offered him the opportunity to become an informant and regularly report to the FBI on what his Muslim friends in San Francisco were saying and doing. In exchange, his legal permanent resident card would be returned and he could resume his education, bring his Moroccan wife to America, and pursue his dream of buying a car, moving to Sacramento, and becoming an engineer. If he refused, according to an account written by Ouassif soon after the meeting, the FBI agent told him, “I will work hard to deport you to Morocco as soon as possible.”³⁶⁰

According to the *Los Angeles Times*, “this account of Ouassif’s ordeal is based largely on interviews with him and his lawyer, as well as his own written chronicle. Immigration officials declined to comment, since no formal action was taken against Ouassif. FBI officials also declined to discuss the investigation, saying it is classified.”³⁶¹

Two cases involving one FBI informant have roiled the Muslim American community in Southern California.³⁶² The bureau employed a convicted con man, Craig Monteilh, as an informant in an investigation called “Operation Flex.” Monteilh claimed in interviews and court documents that he served the FBI as a paid informant from July 2006 to October 2007 and used concealed audio and video equipment to record thousands of hours of conversations with Muslims in homes, restaurants and mosques in Irvine, Tustin, Mission Viejo and elsewhere.³⁶³ Monteilh, who has a

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Aronson, October 8, 2009.

³⁵⁹ Peter Waldman, “A Muslim’s Choice: Turn U.S. Informant or Risk Losing Visa,” *Wall Street Journal*, July 11, 2006, <http://www.legalsanctuary.org/doc/article13970.pdf>.

³⁶⁰ Ibid.

³⁶¹ Lee Romney, “Immigrant Says FBI Tried Threats to Make Him Spy,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 12, 2006, <http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/4112103.html>.

³⁶² Teresa Watanabe and Paloma Esquivel, “L.A. area Muslims say FBI surveillance has a chilling effect on their free speech and religious practices,” *Los Angeles Times*, March 1, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/01/local/me-muslim1>. Hereinafter: Watanabe and Esquivel, March 1, 2009.

³⁶³ Salvador Hernandez, “Release terms eased for man accused of lying about alleged terrorist ties,” *The Orange County Register*, June 11, 2010, <http://www.ocregister.com/articles/niazi-252994-fbi-case.html?pic=1>. Hereinafter: Hernandez, June 11, 2010.

lawsuit pending against the FBI, has also claimed that he signed a non-disclosure agreement with the FBI in exchange for \$25,000. The *Washington Post* reports that an FBI letter to Monteilh's attorney on file in U.S. District Court in Santa Ana says Monteilh signed the non-disclosure agreement in 2007.³⁶⁴ Additionally, the ACLU of Southern California and the Los Angeles chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), which describes itself as an "Islamic advocacy group,"³⁶⁵ have filed a lawsuit against the FBI regarding Monteilh's activities.³⁶⁶ The lawsuit alleges Monteilh's activity at the behest of his FBI handlers violated the religious freedom of people he monitored.³⁶⁷

While working for the FBI, Monteilh allegedly posed as a new convert and arrived at the Irvine Islamic Center in 2006. He purportedly wore robes and a long beard and used the name Farouk al-Aziz. Monteilh had a criminal record that included serving 16 months in state prison on two grand theft charges. Members of the Islamic Center of Irvine were reportedly alarmed about Monteilh and his talk of jihad and plans for a terrorist attack. The local chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations reported him to the Irvine police and obtained a three-year restraining order against him.³⁶⁸

Monteilh's role as an FBI informant was first revealed in a bail hearing for Ahmadullah Niazi, a U.S. citizen born in Afghanistan, who was accused in a February 2009 indictment of lying about ties to terrorist groups on immigration documents among other charges. Much of the evidence was FBI testimony about Niazi's recorded conversations with an FBI informant, who sources say was Monteilh.³⁶⁹ On September 30, 2010, prosecutors summarily moved to dismiss the case against Niazi, and a judge agreed. The U.S. attorney's office in Los Angeles cited the lack of an overseas witness and "evidentiary issues." Sources familiar with the decision said Monteilh's role—and his potential testimony for the defense—was also a factor.³⁷⁰

An editorial in the *Orange County Register*, the largest circulation newspaper in the Southern California county where Monteilh's activities occurred, made the following points:

Everyone understands the need for legitimate undercover activities in response to credible evidence. But we cannot fathom the justification for fishing expeditions and entrapment.... Muslims are afraid to talk about politics or civil liberties issues within their mosques or even among their friends because of fear that it will draw attention from undercover agents ... there should not be a presumption of guilt among an entire community."³⁷¹

³⁶⁴ Jerry Markon, "Mosque Infiltration Feeds Muslims' Distrust of FBI," *Washington Post*, December 5, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/04/AR2010120403720.html>. Hereinafter: Markon, December 5, 2010.

³⁶⁵ CAIR, "Who We Are," June 2010, <http://www.cair.com/CivilRights/CAIRWhoWeAre.aspx>.

³⁶⁶ Jerry Markon, "Lawsuit Alleges FBI Violated Muslims' Freedom of Religion," *Washington Post*, February 22, 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/22/AR2011022206975.html>.

³⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁶⁸ Thomas Cincotta, "From Movements to Mosques, Informants Endanger Democracy," *The Public Eye*, Summer 2009, <http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n2/movements-to-mosques.html>. Hereinafter: Cincotta, "From Movements to Mosques."

³⁶⁹ Markon, December 5, 2010.

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁷¹ "FBI Creates Climate of Fear" An *Orange County Register* Editorial, March 22, 2009, <http://www.ocregister.com/articles/fbi-18893-ocprint-fear-.html>.

The use of informants can be a controversial issue, especially those with criminal records who may be working on behalf of authorities in exchange for reduced jail time. According to open source reports, confidential informants or undercover agents were used in 20 of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist cases. In eight of those cases, the informants had criminal histories. The use of informants poses the following risks:

Informants do not merely observe and collect data. They make things happen.... Informants can cause confusion and dissatisfaction among members of groups and communities they infiltrate, discrediting leaders, and fostering factionalism as people wonder if any of their colleagues are spies. Their handlers' structure of incentives—raises, promotions, transfers, financial rewards, waived jail time—creates a system where informants consciously or subconsciously create and then destroy terrorist threats that would not otherwise exist. These pressures can push them from passive observer to aggressive actor, with serious consequences for constitutionally protected free speech. Another unplanned result: government loses legitimacy and support in the eyes of targeted communities, if they feel they have been manipulated.³⁷²

Acknowledging the challenge, FBI Director Robert Mueller said in 2009, "Oftentimes, the communities from which we need the most help are those who trust us the least. But it is in these communities that we ... must redouble our efforts."³⁷³ Then-FBI spokesman John Miller has said the agency values its relationships with Muslims and has worked hard on outreach efforts that range from town hall meetings to diversity training for FBI agents.³⁷⁴ Miller said there is no factual basis for claims the FBI infiltrates mosques or conducts blanket surveillance of Muslim leaders. "Based on information of a threat of violence or a crime, we investigate individuals, and those investigations may take us to the places those individual go."³⁷⁵

Former FBI agents and federal prosecutors note that informants are "still one of the government's best weapons to thwart terrorists and that the benefit to national security is likely to far outweigh any embarrassment to the agency." They claim that "although the law places almost no constraints on the use of informants, the agency takes sending an informant into a mosque very seriously and imposes a higher threshold for such requests."³⁷⁶ Former FBI counterterrorism chief Robert Blitzer, states that "What matters to the FBI is preventing a massive attack that might be planned by some people ... using the mosque or church as a shield because they believe they're safe there. That is what the American people want the FBI to do. They don't want some type of attack happening on U.S. soil because the FBI didn't act on information."³⁷⁷

Maher Hathout from the Muslim Public Affairs Council counters by saying that "People cannot be suspects and partners at the same time. Unless the FBI's style changes, the partnership with the Muslim community will not be fruitful."³⁷⁸ The Homeland Security Advisory Council's

³⁷² Cincotta, "From Movements to Mosques."

³⁷³ Quoted in Matthai Kuruvila, "U.S. Muslims Debate How Much to Help FBI," *San Francisco Chronicle*, April 6, 2009, http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-04-06/news/17193854_1_american-muslim-taskforce-muslim-community-american-islamic-relations.

³⁷⁴ Quoted in Samantha Henry, "Some Muslims Rethink Close Ties to Law Enforcement," *Associated Press*, May 4, 2009, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D97VH09O0&show_article=1.

³⁷⁵ Ibid.

³⁷⁶ Gillian Flaccus, "Calif. Case Highlights Use of Mosque Informants," *Associated Press*, March 1 2009, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D96LD2A81&show_article=1.

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Watanabe and Esquivel, March 1, 2009.

Countering Violent Extremism Working Group also cautions that “Law enforcement should be sensitive to the fact that perceptions regarding enforcement actions and intelligence gathering can impact community-oriented policing goals.”³⁷⁹

In considering the tradeoff between security and liberty, policy makers face a choice in those cases where an investigative tactic might inflame members of a particular community: Is the impact of that tactic counterproductive in the long run, or is it necessary, short-term collateral damage?

The Obama Administration’s national CVE strategy mentions the Building Communities of Trust Initiative (BCOT) as a study that can serve as a model for alleviating tension between enforcement and engagement activities. BCOT offers guidance for fostering relationships among three sets of actors—fusion centers, law enforcement, and the communities in which they operate.³⁸⁰ The initiative’s recommendations included items such as

- training of fusion center analysts in cultural sensitivity so that they can distinguish behavior that is constitutionally protected from criminal or terrorist activity;
- encouraging law enforcement to “embrace” community policing by “emphasizing partnerships and problem solving”; and
- encouraging communities to view information sharing with fusion centers and law enforcement as key to crime prevention and counterterrorism.³⁸¹

Policy Considerations for Congress

Implementing the Administration’s CVE Strategy and Developing a Cohesive Domestic Intelligence Program

“The United States has made great strides,” says one federal counterterrorism official, “in what might be called tactical counterterrorism—taking individual terrorists off the streets, and disrupting cells and their operations ... an effective counterterrorism strategy must go beyond this ... (to address) the threat of violent extremism.”³⁸² With the announcement of the CVE strategy, the Obama Administration has begun to address this concern. Additionally, in spite of the progress in “tactical counterterrorism” suggested by the official, some critics have noted that the United States has to develop a more cohesive domestic intelligence program. These areas—CVE and domestic intelligence—may merit oversight from Congress.

³⁷⁹ HSAC CVE Working Group, Spring 2010, p. 6.

³⁸⁰ See Robert Wasserman, *Guidance for Building Communities of Trust*, July 2010, pp. 4-5, http://nsi.ncirc.gov/documents/e071021293_BuildingCommTrust_v2-August%2016.pdf.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*

³⁸² Robert F. Godec, Principal Deputy Director for Counterterrorism at the Department of State, “U.S. Counterterrorism Policy,” an address before the Global Young Leaders Conference, Washington, DC; June 30, 2010, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/143809.htm>.

Implementing the CVE Strategy

The Administration's CVE strategy lacks specifics. The strategy's domestic focus includes general philosophical statements about the importance of protecting civil rights, federal cooperation with local leaders in the private and public sectors, and the insistence that the strategy does not center solely around fighting one particular radical ideology.³⁸³ However, the eight-page document does not detail programs. One radicalization expert described the U.S. strategy as "very aspirational."³⁸⁴ By comparison, the unclassified United Kingdom's counter-radicalization strategy, known as "Prevent," describes specific programs and is over 100 pages long.³⁸⁵

As mentioned elsewhere in this report, federal CVE activity emphasizes engagement with Muslim communities across the country. Beyond recognizing this as a key component of CVE, the strategy does not suggest specific initiatives to combat radicalization. Because of this, a number of areas may call for oversight from Congress.

Intervention with At-Risk Individuals

There appears to be little federally driven guidance to community groups on how to intervene with people vulnerable to radicalization. Such an intervention effort, the Channel Program, has been a key element of the United Kingdom's counter radicalization strategy since 2007. The British government describes Channel as a "multi-agency programme to identify and provide support to people at risk of radicalisation" and involvement in "all forms of terrorism."³⁸⁶ Channel "relies on close collaboration between police, partners and other key stakeholders ... and where necessary, provides an appropriate support package tailored to an individual's needs."³⁸⁷ Channel may be too "aggressive" of a government program to be adopted whole-cloth for the American context.³⁸⁸ However, it is unclear whether the Obama Administration considers some variant of Channel workable or even necessary in the United States.

The U.S. CVE strategy does cite the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) Comprehensive Gang Model as an example of "locally-based initiatives that connect communities and government to address community challenges through collaboration and the development of stakeholder networks."³⁸⁹ OJJDP—a component of DOJ's Office of Justice Programs—describes the model as "one of the few approaches to gangs that encompasses a multidisciplinary response to gangs on multiple levels."³⁹⁰ The preventative model is intended as

³⁸³ Eileen Sullivan, "New White House Strategy to Hit Violent Extremism," *Associated Press*, August 3, 2011, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hLU4EFgXfCXmXryTs3Z3UpSRO8CA?docId=a159313d96c14cff94e4b5a87bc53730>.

³⁸⁴ Temple-Raston, "White House Unveils." For more on what a counter-radicalization strategy for the U.S. should broadly entail see Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization*.

³⁸⁵ Home Office, *Prevent Strategy*, June 2011, p. 108, <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-review?view=Binary>. Hereinafter: *Prevent Strategy*.

³⁸⁶ *Prevent Strategy*, p. 54.

³⁸⁷ Association of Chief Police Officers, *National Channel Referral Figures*, <http://www.acpo.police.uk/ACPOBusinessAreas/PREVENT/NationalChannelReferralFigures.aspx>.

³⁸⁸ Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization*, p. 41.

³⁸⁹ *Empowering Local Partners*, p. 4.

³⁹⁰ OJJDP, *OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model: Planning for Implementation*, May 2009, p. 2. Hereinafter: OJJDP, *Comprehensive Gang Model*.

a blueprint for organizing local counter-gang efforts that do not necessarily result in law enforcement-driven outcomes, such as investigations, arrests, and prosecutions. For intervention, it targets young adult and teen gang members, not entities such as hate groups, prison gangs, or ideologically driven gangs consisting of adults.³⁹¹ The model involves five strategies:

Community Mobilization: Involvement of local citizens, including former gang members and community groups and agencies, and the coordination of programs and staff functions within and across agencies.

Opportunities Provision: The development of a variety of specific education, training, and employment programs targeting gang-involved youth.

Social Intervention: Youth-serving agencies, schools, street outreach workers, grassroots groups, faith-based organizations, law enforcement agencies, and other criminal justice organizations reaching out and acting as links between gang-involved youth and their families, the conventional world, and needed services.

Suppression: Formal and informal social control procedures, including close supervision or monitoring of gang youth by agencies of the criminal justice system and also by community-based agencies, schools, and grassroots groups.

Organizational Change and Development: Development and implementation of policies and procedures that result in the most effective use of available and potential resources to better address the gang problem.³⁹²

The model is designed to focus on youth active in gangs or those who exhibit factors indicating potential gang involvement. It also advocates engagement with the families of such youth. Among its many suggestions, the model discusses interventions such as job training, employment, family counseling, academic tutoring, and anger management classes for young people at-risk. It also calls on law enforcement agencies and courts to move beyond traditional roles in the suppression of gangs—urging them to consider more intervention-oriented activities such as referring youth to social service programs.³⁹³

The CVE strategy provides little detail about how the Comprehensive Gang Model may be applied to keep vulnerable people from radicalizing and becoming terrorists. Congress may wish to consider examining the utility and feasibility of developing a CVE intervention model for the United States.

Identifying Programs and Federal Contacts to Assist Grassroots CVE Efforts

The Administration's CVE strategy stresses that "The best defenses against violent extremist ideologies are well-informed and equipped families, local communities, and local institutions."³⁹⁴ Determining and explaining how local entities—whether public or private—should interact with

³⁹¹ OJJDP, *Comprehensive Gang Model*, p. 6.

³⁹² National Gang Center, "About the OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Model," <http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Comprehensive-Gang-Model/About>. "Suppression" was not emphasized in the Obama Administration's national CVE strategy's description of the Comprehensive Gang Model. The other components of the model were mentioned. See *Empowering Local Partners*, p. 4.

³⁹³ OJJDP, *Comprehensive Gang Model*, p. 6.

³⁹⁴ *Empowering Local Partners*, p. 2.

federal partners may pose quite a challenge. For example, what existing federal grant programs can be harnessed by local actors to develop a CVE intervention program? A publicly available comprehensive list of grant programs that can be harnessed for CVE activities does not exist. Congress may be interested in asking the Obama Administration to formalize a roster or designate a clearinghouse available to local entities to identify such programs.

Even more fundamentally, when radicalization arises as an issue in a locality or a particular community, to which government officials or offices should citizens turn? As mentioned elsewhere in this report, DOJ has pushed the U.S. Attorneys to become larger players in community outreach. Is it appropriate to have the nation's principal litigators be key players in the federal government's CVE outreach efforts? Can the same people responsible for prosecuting terrorism cases effectively broker trust among community members who may be wary of federal law enforcement? More broadly should particular government agencies or officials coordinate counter-radicalization efforts at the state and local level? Congress may wish to explore these questions with Administration officials.

At the national level, it may be of value to have a single federal agency in charge of the government's CVE efforts. One expert has stated as much:

The White House should designate a single agency that serves as the principal hub for collecting, disseminating, and evaluating information on counter-radicalization. Its main function would be to collect, analyze, and share best practices with a wide range of governmental and non-governmental actors, including community leaders and non-profits.³⁹⁵

Congress may wish to consider developing legislation that designates a CVE lead, if the Administration does not.

Countering Extremist Ideas

As the United Kingdom has clearly stated in its counter-radicalization program, extremist ideologies play a role in radicalization.³⁹⁶ Furthermore, the National Security Council's Quintan Wiktorowicz has stated that "We will push back against the full scope of different violent ideologies with an inclusive, positive narrative."³⁹⁷ However, in the United States, mere belief in these notions, no matter how reprehensible they are, is not necessarily illegal. The ACLU's Michael German has stated that the ACLU is "deeply concerned about the potential for government censorship of Internet content based on the [CVE] strategy's proposal for countering violent extremist propaganda."³⁹⁸ The task of countering extremist ideas raises a number of questions regarding the implementation of the CVE strategy that may be of interest to Congress. Should the federal government determine which ideologies are dangerous? If so, which agencies should participate in this effort? If the development of a counter-narrative challenging terrorist ideologies is necessary, how should the federal government partner with state and local

³⁹⁵ Neumann, *Preventing Violent Radicalization*, p. 41.

³⁹⁶ *Prevent Strategy*, p. 7.

³⁹⁷ Temple-Raston, "White House Unveils."

³⁹⁸ "ACLU Lens: Obama Plan to Fight Violent Extremism a Step in the Right Direction, But..." *ACLU Blog of Rights*, August 3, 2011, <http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/aclu-lens-obama-plan-fight-violent-extremism-step-right-direction>.

government and civilian counterparts? How do government entities keep a counter-narrative from being publicly viewed as propaganda?

Measuring Input and Results

In an era of budgetary constraint, Congress may wish to question the Administration about the levels of federal funding devoted to CVE efforts. Are there mechanisms to track federal expenditure in this area? Which federal body is responsible for this? On the other side of these budgetary questions, how will the Administration evaluate the effectiveness of federal CVE efforts? The British have struggled with measurement issues related to their Prevent Strategy. U.K. officials have made “progress ... in measuring outputs but not always in measuring outcomes.”³⁹⁹ In other words, counting the number of engagement events is one thing. It is quite another evaluating their impact.

Enhancing Domestic Intelligence

The production of timely and actionable intelligence is essential to the effort to combat violent extremism. This is important if one considers the concerns of a group of terrorism experts and former and current intelligence and law enforcement officials:

Despite the expansion of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and the proliferation of fusion centers, the United States still lacks a coherent national domestic intelligence collection effort. There is no national estimate of domestic terrorist threats. Creating one could admittedly be a politically perilous undertaking, but without all parts of the federal government having a common understanding of the threat, domestic intelligence efforts will continue to flounder. There is no national, as opposed to local or regional, domestic intelligence-collection plan, no national domestic intelligence collection requirements, no priorities, no national or regional coordination. A national domestic intelligence effort seems unlikely to emerge in the absence of some central direction.⁴⁰⁰

These experts believe that local police are in the best position to collect domestic intelligence and so their role in the national effort—as well as that of federal agencies such as the FBI and DHS—needs to be carefully delineated. The results they say would be “a more coordinated, better connected national domestic intelligence effort [that] would better protect the nation against a continuously morphing jihadist foe, possible surges in terrorist capabilities, and potential future domestic terrorist threats from other directions.”⁴⁰¹ A recent study drove these issues home by stating that aside from large jurisdictions such as New York City, “local police departments remain all but absent from the counterterrorism efforts of America’s intelligence community.”⁴⁰²

Congress, therefore, may also wish to consider requiring the Director of National Intelligence to examine whether and how to develop a national domestic intelligence framework or plan as part of a unified strategy to combat violent extremism within the United States.

³⁹⁹ *Prevent Strategy*, p. 36.

⁴⁰⁰ *America’s Domestic Intelligence is Inadequate*, June 2010.

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰² Mills and Clark, *Running*, p. 1.

In **Appendix A** that follows, details about each of the 40 post-9/11 homegrown jihadist plots and attacks are provided in chronological order.

Appendix A. Summary of Post-9/11 Homegrown Violent Jihadist Terrorist Plots⁴⁰³

Rezwan Ferdaus—Plot to Attack U.S. Capitol and Pentagon—September 2011

On September 28, Rezwan Ferdaus, a U.S. citizen from Ashland, MA, was arrested on terrorism charges. He allegedly plotted to attack the Pentagon and the U.S. Capitol with explosives-laden remote-controlled airplanes. According to DOJ, he also planned a ground assault in conjunction with his aerial attack, intending to use firearms and to involve six conspirators in this phase of his plot. Ferdaus also purportedly attempted to provide Al Qaeda with modified cell phones he believed would be used as detonators for improvised explosive devices intended to harm U.S. soldiers abroad. As described by DOJ, FBI undercover employees acting as members of Al Qaeda supplied Ferdaus with money, fake explosives for the airplanes, firearms, and hand grenades. In turn, (among other things) Ferdaus provided the cell phone detonators to these phony Al Qaeda recruiters as well as a training video on how to construct them.⁴⁰⁴

Ferdaus supposedly began plotting in 2010. In January 2011, he discussed his plans with an FBI informant. In May 2011, he visited the Washington, DC, area to conduct surveillance of his targets and view the site from which he intended to launch his remote-controlled airplanes.⁴⁰⁵ According to the FBI, Ferdaus believed that one of his airplanes could collapse the Capitol dome. It appears that Ferdaus did not view his domestic plot as a suicide mission. The FBI stated that in April 2011, it recorded Ferdaus discussing his desire to go abroad once he completed his attack in the United States. Aside from the undercover aspects of the sting operation, the bureau also relied on Ferdaus's e-mail and telephone records to build its case.⁴⁰⁶

Agron Hasbajrami—Plot to Fight in Pakistan—September 2011

On September 6, 2011, Agron Hasbajrami was arrested at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City as he tried to board a flight to Turkey. Hasbajrami, a legal permanent resident in the United States and an Albanian citizen, allegedly planned to join a jihadist fighting group in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. He also purportedly sent more than \$1,000 to Pakistan to support the efforts of a militant with whom he communicated.⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰³ Appendix A is based on unsealed DOJ indictments and other open source reporting.

⁴⁰⁴ Department of Justice, Press Release, "Ashland Man Charged With Plotting Attack on Pentagon and U.S. Capitol and Attempting to Provide Material Support to Foreign Terrorist Organization," September 28, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2011/massachusetts-man-charged-with-plotting-attack-on-pentagon-and-u.s.-capitol-and-attempting-to-provide-material-support-to-a-foreign-terrorist-organization>.

⁴⁰⁵ Evan Perez, "U.S. Man Charged in Pentagon, Capitol Plot," *Wall Street Journal*, September 28, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204138204576599133895661752.html>.

⁴⁰⁶ *United States v. Rezwan Ferdaus*, Criminal Complaint, United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, September 28, 2011.

⁴⁰⁷ Department of Justice, Press Release, "New York City Resident Indicted for Providing Material Support to Terrorists," September 9, 2011, <http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2011/2011sep09.html>.

Naser Abdo—Plot to Attack Targets Near Fort Hood—July 2011

On July 27, 2011, U.S. Army Private Naser Abdo was arrested near Fort Hood in Texas for allegedly plotting a shooting spree and bombing in the area—near the same place where Army Major Nidal Hasan reportedly killed 13 individuals in 2009. The circumstances surrounding Abdo's plot remain somewhat unclear. Abdo, described in the media as a Muslim soldier in the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, KY, was supposedly absent without leave from the Army after applying for conscientious objector status.⁴⁰⁸ A November 2011 superseding indictment charged Abdo with one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction, one count of attempted murder of officers or employees of the United States, two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a federal crime of violence, and two counts of possession of a destructive device in furtherance of a federal crime of violence.⁴⁰⁹

Abdo allegedly purchased gunpowder, shotgun ammunition, and a magazine for a semi-automatic pistol at a gun store near Fort Hood.⁴¹⁰ An employee at the gun store supposedly brought Abdo to the attention of law enforcement officers. Federal officials have noted that Abdo also possessed a .40 caliber handgun, bomb making materials, and an article on how to construct an explosive device, among other items. The article was from *Inspire*, an English-language magazine produced by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.⁴¹¹

Emerson Begolly—Plot to Encourage Jihadist Acts in the United States—July 2011

On July 14, 2011, Emerson Begolly, a U.S. citizen from New Bethlehem, PA, was indicted for allegedly attempting to encourage jihadists to commit acts of terrorism within the United States and distributing information related to explosives online. In August 2011, he pled guilty to “soliciting others to engage in acts of terrorism within the United States and to using a firearm during and in relation to an assault on FBI agents.”⁴¹² According to DOJ, Begolly posted “links to a 101-page document that contain[ed] information on how to set up a laboratory, conduct basic chemistry, and manufacture explosives.” Begolly had also allegedly bitten two FBI agents attempting to execute search warrants in January 2011. Reputedly, during the altercation, he was in possession of a concealed firearm.⁴¹³

⁴⁰⁸ Peter Finn and Jason Uzman, “AWOL Soldier Accused of Plotting Fort Hood Attack,” *Washington Post*, July 28, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/awol-soldier-accused-of-plotting-fort-hood-attack/2011/07/28/gIQAvm11fl_story.html.

⁴⁰⁹ DOJ Press Release, “Federal Grand Jury Returns Superseding Indictment Against Naser Jason Abdo in Connection with Bomb Plot,” November 8, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/sanantonio/press-releases/2011/federal-grand-jury-returns-superseding-indictment-against-naser-jason-abdo-in-connection-with-bomb-plot?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=san-antonio-press-releases&utm_content=45727.

⁴¹⁰ “Official: Soldier Said He Wanted to Attack Fort Hood Troops,” *CNN.com*, July 29, 2011, <http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/07/28/fort.hood.arrest/>.

⁴¹¹ DOJ Press Release, “Naser Jason Abdo Charged Federally in Bomb Plot,” July 29, 2011; David Goodman, “Soldier Held Amid Claim of Terror Plot at Fort Hood,” *New York Times*, July 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/us/29awol.html?_r=1.

⁴¹² DOJ Press Release, “Pennsylvania Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorist Solicitation and Firearms Offense,” August 9, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2011/pennsylvania-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorist-solicitation-and-firearms-offense>.

⁴¹³ DOJ Press Release, “Pennsylvania Man Indicted for Soliciting Jihadists to Kill Americans,” July 14, 2011, (continued...)

Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh—Plot to Attack Seattle Military Processing Center—June 2011

On June 22, 2011, Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif and Walli Mujahidh, were arrested on terrorism and firearms charges for plotting to attack a Seattle military processing center. Law enforcement first learned of the duo's plotting from a citizen who reported their activities. An FBI sting operation apprehended the two as they took possession of machine guns they had purchased for the plot. The firearms had been rendered inert as part of the sting operation. Assistant Attorney General for National Security Todd Hinnen described the plot as, "driven by a violent, extreme ideology."⁴¹⁴ While the two reportedly had not worked out all of the details of their plot, they allegedly were frustrated by "American war policies" and hoped for an attack that would garner wide attention.⁴¹⁵

Yonathan Melaku—Plot to Shoot Targets in Washington, DC, Area—June 2011

On June 23, 2011, DOJ announced that Yonathan Melaku, an Ethiopian native living in Alexandria, VA, had been charged with destruction of property and firearm violations. These charges stemmed from five shootings at military installations in Northern Virginia between October and November 2010. No one was harmed in the shootings.⁴¹⁶ It is unclear to what extent Melaku, a Marine Corps reservist, was driven by jihadist motivations; however, investigators linked Melaku to a "spiral notebook with numerous Arabic statements referencing the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, 'The Path to Jihad,' as well as a list of several other individuals associated with foreign terrorist organizations."⁴¹⁷ Law enforcement officials also found a video when they searched Melaku's bedroom. It reportedly depicted "Melaku in an automobile driving near what appears to be the U.S. Marine Corps Heritage Museum and repeatedly firing a handgun out the passenger-side window." In the video, he allegedly states, "that's my target. That's the military building. It's going to be attacked," and then he shouts, "Allahu Akbar."⁴¹⁸

(...continued)

<http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2011/pennsylvania-man-indicted-for-soliciting-jihadists-to-kill-americans>.

⁴¹⁴ DOJ Press Release, "Two Men Charged in Plot to Attack Seattle Military Processing Center," June 23, 2011, <http://seattle.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel11/se062311.htm>.

⁴¹⁵ William Yardley, "Officials Say Two Planned Armed Attack in Seattle," *New York Times*, June 23, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/us/24seattle.html>.

⁴¹⁶ DOJ Press Release, "Alexandria Man Charged with Shooting at Military Buildings in Northern Virginia," June 23, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2011/alexandria-man-charged-with-shooting-at-military-buildings-in-northern-virginia>. Hereinafter: DOJ, "Alexandria." See Sean Collins Walsh, "Reservist Charged in '10 Building Shootings," *New York Times*, June 23, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/us/24reservist.html>.

⁴¹⁷ DOJ, "Alexandria."

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.* Because the publicly available information about this case is incomplete, it is not counted as a successful attack in this report. It is unclear whether Melaku wanted to harm anyone.

Ahmed Ferhani and Mohamed Mamdouh—Plot to Attack New York City Targets—May 2011

On May 12, 2011, Ahmed Ferhani (an Algerian native living in Queens, NY) and Mohamed Mamdouh (a naturalized U.S. citizen from Morocco) were arrested for plotting to blow up a synagogue as well as churches in New York City. However, the duo had not chosen a specific target. New York City officials alleged that Ferhani was “driven by a hatred of Jews and a belief that Muslims are mistreated the world over.” He and Mamdouh allegedly had purchased firearms and a hand grenade from an undercover detective posing as a gun dealer. The two were charged under a New York state terrorism statute and do not face federal charges.⁴¹⁹

Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari—Plot to Bomb U.S. Targets—February 2011

On February 23, 2011, FBI agents arrested Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari, a citizen of Saudi Arabia and resident of Lubbock, TX. He was charged with attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. He also allegedly plotted to purchase material to make an improvised explosive device and had researched potential U.S. targets. A chemical supplier provided information to the FBI about a suspicious attempted purchase by Aldawsari.⁴²⁰ Prosecutors have also stated that Aldawsari documented his interest in violent jihad and martyrdom in blog postings and a personal journal.⁴²¹ Allegedly among the targets Aldawsari researched were “the names and home addresses of three American citizens who had previously served in the U.S. military and had been stationed for a time at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.”⁴²² Aldawsari’s lawyers have indicated that they plan to use an insanity defense in the case.⁴²³

Antonio Martinez—Plot to Attack an Armed Forces Recruiting Station in Maryland—December 2010

On December 8, 2010, federal officials charged Antonio Martinez, a Muslim convert, with the attempted murder of federal officers and employees and attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction against federal property. Caught by the FBI in a sting operation, Martinez allegedly planned to attack an Armed Forces recruiting station in Maryland using a sport utility vehicle loaded with what he believed was a bomb.⁴²⁴ In late September 2010, Martinez had allegedly

⁴¹⁹ William K. Rabsbaum and Al Baker, “Suspects in Terror Case Wanted to Kill Jews, Officials Say,” *New York Times*, May 12, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/13/nyregion/two-men-arrested-in-new-york-terror-case-police-say.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.

⁴²⁰ DOJ Press Release, “Texas Resident Arrested on Charge of Attempted Use of Weapon of Mass Destruction,” February 24, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/dallas/press-releases/2011/dl022411.htm>.

⁴²¹ *Ibid.*

⁴²² *Ibid.*

⁴²³ Logan G. Carver, “Terror Suspect Aldawsari To Use Insanity Defense,” *Lubbock Avalanche-Journal*, November 10, 2011, http://lubbockonline.com/crime-and-courts/2011-11-09/terror-suspect-aldawsari-use-insanity-defense#.TsJ4aEfh_y1.

⁴²⁴ Dina Temple-Raston, “Officials Worry About Some Latino Converts To Islam,” *National Public Radio*, August 24, 2011, <http://www.npr.org/2010/12/09/131916271/officials-worry-about-some-latino-converts-to-islam>; DOJ Press Release, “Maryland Man Charged in Plot to Attack Armed Forces Recruiting Center,” December 8, 2010, (continued...)

posted a statement on his Facebook account, “calling for violence to stop the oppression of Muslims.”⁴²⁵ During the course of his plot, he also allegedly tried to recruit others to join him, discussed martyrdom, and praised the now-dead radical U.S.-born imam, Anwar al-Awlaki, among other things.⁴²⁶

Mohamed Osman Mohamud—Plot to Detonate Van Packed with Explosives in Portland, Oregon—November 2010

Mohamed Osman Mohamud, a Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen, was arrested on November 26, 2010, moments after he tried to detonate a van he believed was packed with explosives in Portland’s Pioneer Courthouse Square. The square was crowded with thousands of people who had gathered for an annual Christmas tree lighting event.⁴²⁷

According to federal officials, Mohamud came to the attention of the FBI after a tip from the Muslim community. This led officials to discover an e-mail exchange that occurred in 2009 between Mohamud and an unindicted associate located in Pakistan. The two communicated regularly and in December 2009 it is alleged that they discussed the possibility of Mohamud traveling there to prepare for violent jihad⁴²⁸ presumably targeting U.S. troops.

The FBI subsequently developed a “sting” operation that involved recorded meetings between Mohamud and undercover FBI operatives beginning in the summer of 2010. In an August 19, 2010, meeting with two FBI undercover operatives, Mohamud stated that “he had been thinking of committing some form of violent jihad since the age of fifteen.”⁴²⁹ As part of the sting, the undercover agents went along with Mohamud’s plotting for a terrorist attack. This included a “trial run” where Mohamud and the undercover operatives detonated a bomb in a backpack in a remote Oregon location. In addition, Mohamud bought various bomb components and mailed them to the undercover agents.⁴³⁰

During another meeting with an undercover operative, Mohamud identified Portland’s Pioneer Courthouse Square Christmas lighting event as a potential target for a bomb. When the undercover operative pointed out that “there would be lots of children at such an event ...

(...continued)

<http://www.fbi.gov/baltimore/press-releases/2010/bal20810.htm>.

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

⁴²⁶ Anti-Defamation League, “Baltimore Man Arrested for Attempting to Bomb Army Recruiting Center,” December 9, 2010, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/Antonio_Martinez.htm. Anwar al-Awlaki is a radical imam and key international charismatic figure in jihadist circles. He is a U.S. citizen born in New Mexico in 1971 and has been linked to a number of domestic jihadist plots. He has also been tied to alleged foreign terrorist Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s failed Christmas Day 2009 bombing attempt.

⁴²⁷ Jerry Markon, “FBI Foils Elaborate Bomb Plot in Oregon,” *Washington Post*, November 28, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/27/AR2010112700546.html>. Hereinafter: Markon, November 28, 2010.

⁴²⁸ *United States v. Mohamed Osman Mohamud*, Criminal Complaint, U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, November 26, 2010, p. 2, http://media.oregonlive.com/portland_impact/other/USAFFIDAVIT.pdf (Hereinafter: U.S. v. Mohamud, Criminal Complaint).

⁴²⁹ Ibid, p. 3. Mohamud was 19 years old at the time of his arrest.

⁴³⁰ Winston Ross, “The Oregon Bomb Plot Kid,” *The Daily Beast*, November 28, 2010, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-11-28/oregon-bombing-the-teenager-behind-the-plot/2/>.

Mohamud replied he was looking for a ‘huge mass that will ... be attacked in their own element with their families celebrating the holidays.’⁴³¹

On November 26, undercover operatives showed Mohamud a white van with a dummy explosive device inside that was actually supplied by the FBI. He was reported to have said the device looked “beautiful.”⁴³² They later drove the van to Pioneer Courthouse Square where Mohamud allegedly attempted to detonate the device on two separate occasions using a cell phone. After the second attempt he was taken into custody. Officials stated that at no time did the device pose a danger to the public.⁴³³

At a hearing in Federal District Court in Portland on November 29, 2010, Mohamud plead not guilty to the charges. His lawyers suggested that the government might be “manufacturing crime” and accused authorities of timing the plot for maximum publicity and effect.⁴³⁴ Attorney General Eric Holder was quoted as saying of the case, “I am confident that there is no entrapment here, and no entrapment claim will be found to be successful.”⁴³⁵

Farooque Ahmed—Plot to Bomb Washington, DC, Subway Stations—October 2010

Farooque Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan, was arrested on October 27, 2010, and charged with conspiring with others he believed to be al Qaeda operatives to bomb subway stations in Washington, DC. In fact, his co-conspirators were really undercover law enforcement officers. They provided Ahmed with a Quran with code words for locations of future meetings which were held in various hotel rooms in the Northern Virginia area and recorded by the FBI.⁴³⁶ In April 2011, Ahmed was sentenced to 23 years in prison for his plotting.⁴³⁷

The allegations against Ahmed were contained in an indictment unsealed on October 27, 2010.⁴³⁸ According to the indictment, between April and October of 2010, Ahmed met with individuals he thought were representatives of a terrorist organization at several Northern Virginia hotels. At these meetings, Ahmed agreed to conduct surveillance and assess the security of Washington, DC, Metrorail stations in the Arlington County area. He allegedly wanted to “kill as many military personnel as possible.” Ahmed later gave to undercover operatives posing as terrorists a thumb drive containing video images of some of the stations as well as sketches of the stations.

⁴³¹ U.S. v. Mohamud, Criminal Complaint, p. 4.

⁴³² U.S. v. Mohamud, Criminal Complaint, p. 6.

⁴³³ Markon, November 28, 2010.

⁴³⁴ William Yardley, “Entrapment is Argued in Defense of Suspect,” *New York Times*, November 29, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/us/30mohamud.html>.

⁴³⁵ Ibid.

⁴³⁶ Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “Officials: Muslim Source Turned in Terror Suspect,” *Associated Press* cited on *msnbc.com*, October 28, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39894024/ns/us_news-security. Hereinafter: Apuzzo and Goldman, October 28, 2010.

⁴³⁷ DOJ Press Release, “Virginia Man Sentenced to 23 Years in Prison for Plotting Attacks on D.C. - Area Metro Stations With People He Believed To Be Al-Qaeda Members,” April 11, 2011, <http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2011/04/20110411ahmednr.html>.

⁴³⁸ *United States v. Farooque Ahmed*, 1:10cr 413, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, October 26, 2010, http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Ahmed_indictment.pdf. Hereinafter: U.S. v. Farooque Ahmed, Criminal Complaint.

He also discussed at these meetings the best time and location for an attack in order to cause the most casualties.⁴³⁹

According to court documents, Ahmed told undercover operatives that “he wished to fight in jihad himself, and has trained to do so using various firearms.” He also claimed to have studied martial arts for four years and learned knife, gun, and disarming techniques. He is alleged to have said that he planned to travel to engage in jihad after his upcoming trip for the Hajj pilgrimage. Court documents allege that Ahmed also “discussed his desire to provide financial assistance” to jihadists fighting abroad.⁴⁴⁰

Ahmed immigrated with his family from Pakistan in 1993. He graduated from the College of Staten Island in New York. He is a married father of one who was working for a telecommunications company in Northern Virginia at the time of his arrest. The FBI and White House have said the public was never in danger because FBI agents had Ahmed under tight surveillance before the sting began and until his arrest. Law enforcement officials have also said that the tip that led the FBI to Ahmed came from a source in the Muslim community.⁴⁴¹

Abdel Hameed Shehadeh—Travel Abroad to Wage Jihad— October 2010

Abdel Hameed Shehadeh, a U.S. citizen born in New York City to a Palestinian American family, was arrested on October 22, 2010, in Honolulu, HI. Among the accusations against him was that he tried to join the U.S. military so he could be deployed to Iraq but would desert and fight with anti-American insurgency forces.

A criminal complaint unsealed on October 25, 2010, accused Shehadeh of making false statements in a matter involving international terrorism.⁴⁴² According to the complaint, in early 2008 Shehadeh devised a plan to travel to Pakistan in order to join the Taliban or a similar fighting group. In furtherance of his plan, on June 13, 2008, Shehadeh flew on a one-way airline ticket from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), New York, to Islamabad, Pakistan. Upon landing in Pakistan, Shehadeh was denied entry into the country by Pakistani officials and he returned to the United States. He was questioned by FBI agents and New York Police Department (NYPD) detectives on multiple occasions about the purpose of his trip to Pakistan. He told them that he had traveled to Pakistan in order to visit an Islamic university and to attend a friend’s wedding. The complaint alleges that Shehadeh subsequently admitted to FBI agents in Hawaii that the true purpose of his trip to Pakistan was to join a fighting group such as the Taliban.

According to the complaint, several weeks after Shehadeh was denied entry to Pakistan, he attempted to enlist in the U.S. Army at the Times Square recruiting station in New York City. Shehadeh’s application was denied when it was discovered that he had concealed his prior trip to

⁴³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁰ Affidavit in Support of Application for Search Warrant, Case Number 1:10-sw-569, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, October 26, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/Ahmed_warrant_affidavit.pdf.

⁴⁴¹ Apuzzo and Goldman, October 28, 2010.

⁴⁴² DOJ Press Release, “Hawaii Resident Charged with Making False Statements in a Matter Involving International Terrorism,” October 26, 2010, <http://honolulu.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/hn102610.htm>.

Pakistan. Although Shehadeh claimed that he attempted to enlist for career opportunities and benefits, the complaint alleges that his true motive was to deploy to Iraq, where he intended to desert and fight against the U.S. military alongside Iraqi insurgent forces.⁴⁴³

In addition, the complaint alleges that Shehadeh created and administered multiple websites dedicated to spreading violent jihadist ideology. The content of these websites included, among other things, speeches from known Al Qaeda leaders such as Abu Yahya al-Libi and Ayman al-Zawahiri. In December Shehadeh was indicted for lying to FBI agents.⁴⁴⁴

The New York Times reported that relatives of Shehadeh were surprised by the charges. Although he seemed “confused and lost,” according to one relative, he was nevertheless aware, as was the whole family, that he was being tracked by investigators. “He was trying to outsmart the FBI,” said the relative, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “He thought it was a game.”⁴⁴⁵ A federal court in Brooklyn, NY, ordered Shehadeh held without bail.⁴⁴⁶

Omar Hammami — al-Shabaab Figure — August 2010

In an indictment unsealed in August 2010,⁴⁴⁷ Omar Hammami, an American citizen from Daphne, AL, was accused of supporting al-Shabaab, a designated foreign terrorist organization.⁴⁴⁸ According to public reports, Hammami has appeared in several propaganda videos on behalf of al-Shabaab that have been distributed worldwide. One shows him allegedly instructing recruits in urban warfare. Somali officials believe he is involved with al-Shabaab’s recruitment strategy and financial management. He is also believed to be a ranking member of the al-Shabaab organization with operational responsibilities.⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁴ Mitchel Maddux, “SI Man Indicted on Terror Charges,” December 23, 2010, *New York Post*, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/si_man_indicted_on_terror_charges_S9CIMVjQivkvOrpSDKfJ0J.

⁴⁴⁵ Kareem Fahim and William K. Rashbaum, “Former City Resident is Accused of Trying to Join Terrorists,” *New York Times*, October 26, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/27/nyregion/27terror.html>.

⁴⁴⁶ John Marzulli, “Terrorist Wannabe Charged With Lying About Attempt to Become Taliban Jihadist Held Without Bail,” *New York Daily News*, November 2, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/11/02/2010-11-02_terrorist_wannabe_charged_with_lying_about_attempt_to_become_taliban_jihadist_he.html#ixzz16gGo9JG8.

⁴⁴⁷ *United States v. Omar Shafik Hammami*, 07-00384KD, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama Southern Division, September 24, 2009 (unsealed August 5, 2010), <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/Hammami%20Indictment%208-5-10.pdf>

⁴⁴⁸ Al-Shabaab is a group on the Department of State’s list of designated terrorist organizations. It is waging an insurgency in Somalia.

⁴⁴⁹ DOJ Press Release, “Fourteen Charged with Providing Material Support to Somalia-Based Terrorist Organization al Shabaab,” August 5, 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100805.html>; Spencer S. Hsu, “Arrest of Va. Man Spotlights al-Qaeda’s New American Recruiter,” *The Washington Post*, August 1, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/31/AR2010073102680.html>; Andrea Elliott, “The Jihadist Next Door,” *New York Times Magazine*, January 31, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/magazine/31Jihadist-t.html>; John Goddard, “Terrorist Leader Lived in Toronto,” *The Hamilton Spectator*, Ontario, Canada, January 4, 2010; Brendan Kirby, “Report: Former Daphne High and USA Student Has Been Charged in a Secret Indictment in Mobile with Providing Material to Terrorists,” *Mobile Register*, September 5, 2009, http://blog.al.com/live/2009/09/report_former_daphne_high_and.html; The Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation, “Shabaab al-Mujahideen Releases Footage of ‘Abu Suleim Training Camp,’” September 2009, <http://www1.nefafoundation.org/multimedia-prop.htm>.

As a child, Hammami lived between the Christian world of his American mother and the Muslim beliefs of his Syrian-born father. He converted to Islam in high school, and while a student at the University of South Alabama, led the Muslim Student Association and began adhering to Salafi doctrine. His Salafism sprang in part from a desire to rebel against his father. In 2002, he dropped out of school, and by 2004 he had found his way to Toronto, Canada, where the American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan encouraged him to reconsider his nonviolent Salafi views. One of his friends alleges that Hammami began surfing the web for information on jihad. While in Canada, he married a Somali woman. In 2005 they moved to Cairo, and by late 2006 he was in Somalia in pursuit of violent jihad.⁴⁵⁰

Jehad Mostafa— Attempted Travel to Somalia to Fight— August 2010

Few details are publicly available about Jehad Mostafa, a U.S. citizen who grew up in San Diego, CA, and allegedly left the United States to fight with al-Shabaab in Somalia. The indictment in Mostafa's case mentions little specifically about his alleged terrorist activity but ties him to al-Shabaab between March 2008 and June 2009. News sources suggest that he left the United States in December 2005.⁴⁵¹

Shaker Masri— Attempted Travel to Somalia or Afghanistan to Fight—July 2010

Shaker Masri, a U.S. citizen born in Alabama but raised abroad, was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on August 3, 2010, just before he was allegedly planning to travel to Somalia or Afghanistan to join either al-Shabaab or Al Qaeda. The FBI used a cooperating source who met Masri in November 2008 and subsequently consensually recorded conversations with him for the investigation. According to court documents,⁴⁵² Masri encouraged the cooperating source to "review speeches" by Anwar al-Awlaki.

Zachary Chesser— Attempted Travel to Somali to Fight, Encouraging Violent Jihadists to Kill U.S. Citizens—July 2010

On July 21, 2010, Zachary Chesser, a U.S. citizen from Fairfax County, Virginia, was arrested on terrorism-related charges. According to DOJ, Chesser told FBI agents that on two occasions he tried to travel to Somalia to join al-Shabaab. In his last attempt, Chesser allegedly brought his infant son with him to John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York City to potentially disguise his intentions.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁵¹ Greg Moran, "Former SD Man Among 14 Charged with Aiding Terror Group," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, August 5, 2010, <http://www.sandiegounion-tribune.com/news/2010/aug/05/san-diegan-among-those-charged-aiding-somalian-ter/>; *United States v. Jehad Serwan Mostafa*, Indictment, 09-CR-3726 U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, October 2009 (unsealed August 6, 2010).

⁴⁵² *United States v. Shaker Masri*, Criminal Complaint 10-CR-0655, U.S. District Court Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division, August 9, 2010, <http://jnsfp.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/masri-complaint1.pdf>.

⁴⁵³ DOJ Press Release, "Fairfax County Man Accused of Providing Material Support to Terrorists," July 21, 2010, (continued...)

Three months later, on October 20, 2010, Chesser pled guilty to charges that he communicated threats against the writers of the South Park television show, solicited violent jihadists to desensitize law enforcement, and attempted to provide material support to al-Shabaab.⁴⁵⁴ He received a 25-year sentence.⁴⁵⁵ According to court documents filed with his plea agreement, “Chesser maintained several online profiles dedicated to extremist jihadist propaganda ... took repeated steps in April 2010 to encourage violent jihadists to attack the writers of South Park for their depiction of Muhammad ... solicit[ed] others to desensitize law enforcement by placing suspicious-looking but innocent packages in public places ... and twice attempt[ed] to leave the United States and travel to Somalia for the purpose of joining al-Shabaab and engage in violent jihad as a foreign fighter.”⁴⁵⁶

Federal investigators have linked two others to Chesser’s activities. His wife, **Proscovia Kampire Nzabanita**, pled guilty to making a false statement to an FBI agent during the course of the bureau’s investigation of her husband.⁴⁵⁷ In May 2011, **Jesse Curtis Morton (aka Younus Mohammad)**, a onetime Brooklyn resident and co-founder of the extremist group Revolution Muslim, was also charged with threatening the writers of *South Park* online. He and Chesser allegedly cooperated in drafting an “clarification statement” regarding Chesser’s initial postings targeting the writers of *South Park*. In court documents, DOJ argues that the “clarification statement” was actually a threat.⁴⁵⁸ Morton was reportedly arrested by Moroccan officials in May 2011.⁴⁵⁹

According to the DOJ affidavit, Chesser first showed interest in Islam in 2008 and developed a fascination with extremist views, sending Anwar al-Awlaki e-mails and receiving two replies from the radical cleric. He also started his own YouTube.com account and operated his own blog where he promoted violent jihad.⁴⁶⁰

(...continued)

<http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/07-JulyPDFArchive/10/20100721chessernr.html>; *United States v. Zachary Adam Chesser*, Affidavit, 1:10-MJ-504, U.S. District for the Eastern District of Virginia, July 21, 2010, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1343.pdf. Hereinafter: *U.S. v. Chesser*, Affidavit.

⁴⁵⁴ DOJ Press Release, “Virginia Man Pleads Guilty to Providing Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Encouraging Violent Jihadists to Kill U.S. Citizens,” October 20, 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/October/10-nsd-11174.html>. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, “Virginia Man Pleads.”

⁴⁵⁵ DOJ Press Release, “Virginia Man Sentenced to 25 Years in Prison for Providing Material Support and Encouraging Violent Jihadists to Kill U.S. Citizens,” February 24, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2011/wfo022411a.htm>.

⁴⁵⁶ DOJ Press Release, “Virginia Man Pleads.”

⁴⁵⁷ DOJ Press Release, “Wife of Zachary Chesser Pleads Guilty to Making False Statement,” November 8, 2010, <http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2010/wfo110810b.htm>.

⁴⁵⁸ “Muslim Convert Charged with Threats to ‘South Park’ Creators,” *CNN.com*, May 19, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-19/justice/us.terror.charge_1_online-threats-postings-radical-islamic-group?_s=PM:CRIME. Since November 2010, Revolution Muslim has morphed into a group called “Islam Policy.”

⁴⁵⁹ “Muslim Convert Arrested in ‘South Park’ Case,” *CNN.com*, May 30, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-30/world/us.terror.charge_1_online-threats-revolution-muslim-website?_s=PM:WORLD.

⁴⁶⁰ *U.S. v. Chesser*, Affidavit.

Paul Rockwood, Jr. and Nadia Rockwood—Plot to Kill People on a Hit List—July 2010

On July 21, 2010, Paul Rockwood, Jr., a U.S. citizen and Muslim convert, pled guilty to making false statements to the FBI in connection with a terrorism investigation. On the same day, Rockwood's wife, Nadia Rockwood, also pled guilty to making false statements related to her husband's case.

According to DOJ, Paul Rockwood, Jr. converted to Islam in late 2001 or early 2002 while living in Virginia and followed the teachings of radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.⁴⁶¹ They allege that after he moved to Alaska in 2006, he visited websites to research explosive components, construction of remote triggering devices, such as cell phones, and construction of bombs to be delivered by common mail carriers. Authorities also said that in late 2009, he began discussing using mail bombs and possibly killing targets by gunshot to the head. They said that by early this year, he had formalized his list of targets for execution.⁴⁶²

Paul Rockwood received the maximum sentence of eight years in prison, consistent with his plea agreement. His wife was allowed to return to the United Kingdom and serve five years of probation there and may not return to the United States without prior approval.⁴⁶³

Mohamed Alessa and Carlos Almonte—Attempted Travel to Somalia To Fight—June 2010

On June 5, 2010, two New Jersey residents Mohamed Alessa (a U.S. citizen from a Palestinian American family) and Carlos Almonte (a Dominican American and Muslim convert)—were arrested at JFK in New York prior to boarding separate flights to Egypt. Authorities allege the two had hoped to eventually link up with al-Shabaab in Somalia.⁴⁶⁴ The following day, they were charged with conspiracy to kill Americans abroad. They are alleged to have vowed to “slice up” troops in “a thousand pieces,” according to the criminal complaint which cites conversations secretly recorded by a NYPD undercover officer.⁴⁶⁵ In March 2011, the duo pled guilty to conspiring to murder individuals overseas on behalf of al-Shabaab.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶¹ DOJ Press Release, “Alaska Man Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements in Domestic Terrorism Investigation, Spouse Pleads Guilty to Making False Statements,” July 21, 2010, <http://anchorage.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/ak072110.htm>.

⁴⁶² Mary Pemberton, “Alaska Couple Accused of Terrorism Pleads Guilty to Charges of Lying About Alleged Hit List,” *Associated Press*, July 21, 2010, <http://www.newser.com/article/d9h3qhh80/alaska-couple-accused-of-terrorism-pleads-guilty-to-charges-of-lying-about-alleged-hit-list.html#ixzz0wOUH9tRq>.

⁴⁶³ Colleen Kelly, “Alaskan Couple in Domestic Terrorism Plot Sentenced,” *ktva.com* (Anchorage, Alaska), August 23, 2010, http://www.ktva.com/ci_15870578.

⁴⁶⁴ Richard Esposito, “Terror Raids at JFK Airport Net American Alleged Terror Plotters Headed for Somalia,” *ABC News*, June 6, 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/terror-raids-jfk-airport-net-alleged-terror-plotters/story?id=10839045>.

⁴⁶⁵ *U.S. v. Mohamed Alessa and Carlos E. Almonte*, Criminal Complaint, Magistrate No. 10-8109 (MCA), U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey, June 4, 2010, p. 11, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/32643121/US-v-Alessa-and-Almonte>. Hereinafter: *U.S. v. Alessa and Almonte*, Criminal Complaint.

⁴⁶⁶ DOJ Press Release, “Two New Jersey Men Plead Guilty to Conspiring to Kill Overseas for Designated Foreign Terrorist Organization al Shabaab,” March 3, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/newark/press-releases/2011/nk030311.htm>.

Law enforcement interest in Alessa and Almonte began when an e-mail tip was received by the FBI on October 9, 2006. It suggested that the two young men were engaged in radical behavior, perusing jihadist websites, and discussing terrorist activity.⁴⁶⁷ They were then monitored by authorities for the next four years. Initially it was unclear whether the pair was just engaged in radical talk or actually planning for violent jihad. However, in 2007, the two traveled to Jordan where they wanted to be recruited to fight in Iraq, but were rejected and “were upset at the individuals who failed to recruit them.”⁴⁶⁸ By 2009, the case included an undercover investigator from the NYPD interacting with the two suspects.⁴⁶⁹

In the criminal complaint, the two allegedly participated in several activities that had officials concerned that they were moving further from radicalization to violent extremism. This included lifting weights and rehearsing combat techniques using paintball guns, and gathering equipment, including tactical-brand flashlights and combat boots, among other things.⁴⁷⁰ According to officials, when the duo booked separate flights in June 2010 to Egypt, they were arrested because they were preparing to leave the country to fight overseas.⁴⁷¹

Faisal Shahzad—Attempted Car Bombing in Times Square, New York City—May 1, 2010

On May 1, 2010, Faisal Shahzad—a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Pakistan—parked his Nissan Pathfinder sport utility vehicle (SUV) containing a crude incendiary device along West 45th Street near Times Square in New York City. A t-shirt vendor in the area observed smoke coming from the vehicle and alerted police. The device within the SUV did not explode or ignite and was subsequently rendered safe by the New York City Police bomb squad.⁴⁷²

Shahzad was arrested three days later at JFK after he had boarded an Emirates Air flight bound for Dubai. At a news conference to announce the arrest, Attorney General Eric Holder stated “[i]t was clear that the intent behind this terrorist act was to kill Americans.” Law enforcement officials reported that the information that led to Shahzad’s arrest centered on evidence gathered about the sale of the Nissan Pathfinder that was used in the attempted attack. Police discovered that Shahzad had purchased the vehicle through an Internet listing. Although he gave the seller a false name, police were able to trace back to him a disposable cell phone number that he also gave the seller.⁴⁷³

⁴⁶⁷ Peter Finn and Jerry Markon, “New Jersey Men Arrested Are Latest From U.S. Tied to Terrorist Groups,” *Washington Post*, June 7, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/06/AR2010060600418.html>. Hereinafter: Finn and Markon, June 7, 2010.

⁴⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁹ Ted Sherman, “FBI Followed Every Move of Two N.J. Terror Suspects for Years, Culminating in Airport Arrests,” *Star-Ledger*, June 13, 2010, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/06/authorities_followed_every_mov.html.

⁴⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

⁴⁷¹ Finn and Markon, June 7, 2010.

⁴⁷² New York City Police Department (NYPD) Counterterrorism Bureau, “Times Square Car Bomb,” May 2, 2010.

⁴⁷³ Anne E. Kornblut, Jerry Markon, and Spencer Hsu, “U.S. Citizen from Pakistan Arrested in Times Square Bomb Case,” *The Washington Post*, May 4, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/03/AR2010050300847.html>.

On June 21, 2010, Shahzad pled guilty to 10 terrorism charges that were contained in a superseding indictment handed down by a grand jury in New York and which added five additional counts to the original May 5, 2010, indictment.⁴⁷⁴ He was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, use of a destructive device in connection with criminal violence, transporting and receiving explosives, and damaging and destroying property by means of fire.⁴⁷⁵ Since his arrest, DOJ reports that Shahzad has not only admitted his role in the plot, but continued to cooperate with authorities, and provided valuable intelligence.⁴⁷⁶

Shortly after the failed attack, the Pakistan Taliban group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed responsibility in a message on an audiotape posted on the Internet.⁴⁷⁷ Days later, U.S. officials said that investigators had developed evidence to support the TTP claim.⁴⁷⁸ Pakistani authorities have arrested or detained at least 13 people in Pakistan in connection with the case. One of those arrested was reported to have provided an “independent stream” of evidence that the Pakistani Taliban was behind the attempt and has admitted to helping Faisal Shahzad travel into Pakistan’s tribal belt for bomb training.⁴⁷⁹

In the courtroom where he pled guilty, Shahzad admitted to having received explosives training from the TTP at a camp in Pakistan’s Waziristan region.⁴⁸⁰ However the device found inside the Nissan Pathfinder was crudely constructed. It consisted of three 20-gallon propane tanks, 152 M-88 (consumer-grade) fireworks, one 4-foot by 2-foot metal gun locker filled with 250 pounds of urea-based fertilizer, and two alarm clocks connected by wires.⁴⁸¹ The fertilizer was inert and not usable as an explosive. Had the device been viable, police say it could have produced a “significant fireball” and sprayed shrapnel with enough force to kill pedestrians and knock out windows in the crowded theater district in midtown Manhattan.⁴⁸²

It has been reported that no plea deal in exchange for Shahzad’s guilty plea was made by the U.S. government in the case. The U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York released a letter sent to Shahzad’s attorneys making it clear that there was no plea deal and that their client would

⁴⁷⁴ Benjamin Weiser, “Guilty Plea in Times Square Bomb Plot,” *New York Times*, June 21, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/nyregion/22terror.html>. Hereinafter: Weiser, June 21, 2010.

⁴⁷⁵ *United States of America vs. Faisal Shahzad*, Criminal Complaint 10 MAG 928, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, May 5, 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/shahzad.pdf>.

⁴⁷⁶ See “Times Square Suspect Charged, Admits Role in Failed Attack,” *wync.com*, May 4, 2010, <http://www.wync.org/news/articles/154447>; and DOJ Press Release, “Faisal Shahzad To Appear In Manhattan Court,” May 18, 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May10/shahzadfaisalcourtpr.pdf>.

⁴⁷⁷ NEFA Report, May 2010.

⁴⁷⁸ Anne Kornblut and Karin Brulliard, “U.S. Blames Pakistani Taliban For Times Square Bomb Plot,” *The Washington Post*, May 10, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/09/AR2010050901143.html>.

⁴⁷⁹ Greg Miller, “Pakistan Arrests Man With Militant Ties Who Says He Aided Times Square Bomb Suspect” *The Washington Post*, May 14, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/13/AR2010051305032.html>.

⁴⁸⁰ “Times Square Suspect Had Explosives Training, Documents Say” *CNN.com*, May 5, 2010, <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/04/new.york.car.bomb/?hpt=T2>.

⁴⁸¹ Nine Eleven Finding Answers (NEFA) Foundation, “The 2007 London and 2010 Times Square Bomb Plots,” May 2010, <http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/londontimesq0510.pdf>. Hereinafter: NEFA Report, May 2010.

⁴⁸² Tom Hays and Colleen Long, “NYC Bomb Suspect Nabbed Aboard Dubai-bound plane,” *Associated Press*, in *standard.net*, May 4, 2010, <http://www.standard.net/topics/crime/2010/05/02/nyc-bomb-suspect-nabbed-aboard-dubai-bound-plane>.

face a mandatory life term, the maximum sentence in this case. Shahzad is scheduled to be sentenced in October 2010.⁴⁸³

Two other individuals have been indicted in connection with this terrorist plot:

- **Mohammad Younis**, of Long Island, NY, was arrested in September 2010 and accused of operating an unlicensed money transmitting business which provided funds to Faisal Shahzad. There are no allegations, however, that Younis was aware of the intended use of the money. In the indictment, he was charged with operating an unlicensed money transfer business between the United States and Pakistan and conspiracy to operate an unlicensed money transfer business. In August 2011, he pled guilty to the former charge.⁴⁸⁴
- **Aftab Ali**, a Pakistani citizen residing in Watertown, MA, was charged in a criminal complaint in November 2010 with immigration fraud and making false statements.⁴⁸⁵ The complaint alleges that Ali entered the United States in August 2009 and began working at a gas station without obtaining a work permit. It also alleges that Ali provided \$4,900 to Shahzad in February 2010 as part of a *hawala*⁴⁸⁶ transaction in which Ali's family in Pakistan received an equivalent amount of money in Pakistan. The complaint does not allege that Ali was aware of the intended use of the \$4,900 by Shahzad. In April 2011, Ali pled guilty to charges of unlicensed money transmitting and immigration document fraud. He was sentenced to time served and ordered to be deported.⁴⁸⁷

Colleen LaRose ("Jihad Jane")—Conspiracy to Kill and Material Support to Terrorism—March 2010

On March 4, 2010, a Pennsylvania woman, Colleen LaRose, was charged with providing material support to terrorism, conspiracy to commit murder outside the United States, lying to federal agents, and transferring a U.S. passport for the purposes of facilitating a terrorist act.⁴⁸⁸ LaRose

⁴⁸³ Weiser, June 21, 2010.

⁴⁸⁴ Chad Bray, "Plea in Bomb-Link Case," *Wall Street Journal*, August 19, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903596904576516790620314306.html>; U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, Press Release, "Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Long Island Man with Engaging in Hawala Activity That Funded Attempted Times Square Bomber," September 15, 2010, <http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo091510a.htm>.

⁴⁸⁵ DOJ Press Release, "Pakistani Man Charged with Immigration Fraud and False Statements," November 16, 2010, <http://boston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/bs111610.htm>

⁴⁸⁶ Hawala is an alternative or parallel remittance system. It exists and operates outside of, or parallel to 'traditional' banking or financial channels. It was developed in India, before the introduction of western banking practices, and is currently a major remittance system used around the world. The components of hawala that distinguish it from other remittance systems are trust and the extensive use of connections such as family relationships or regional affiliations. Unlike traditional banking, Hawala makes minimal (often no) use of any sort of negotiable instrument. Transfers of money take place based on communications between members of a network of hawaladars, or hawala dealers. See Interpol, "The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money Laundering, January 2000, <http://www.interpol.int/public/financialcrime/moneylaundering/hawala/default.asp>.

⁴⁸⁷ DOJ Press Release, "Pakistani Man Sentenced on Unlicensed Money Transmitting and Immigration Fraud Charges," April 12, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/boston/press-releases/2011/pakistani-man-sentenced-on-unlicensed-money-transmitting-charges-and-immigration-fraud>.

⁴⁸⁸ *United States vs. Colleen R. LaRose*, Grand Jury Indictment in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of (continued...)

was arrested in October 2009, but her case was kept under seal. She is alleged to have used the Internet to recruit others to “wage violent jihad” where she was known by the aliases, “Jihad Jane” and “Fatima LaRose.” She has also been tied to a plot to assassinate a Swedish cartoonist who depicted the prophet Muhammad atop the body of a dog.⁴⁸⁹ In February 2011, LaRose pled guilty to guilty “to all counts of a superseding indictment charging her with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists, conspiracy to kill in a foreign country, making false statements, and attempted identity theft.”⁴⁹⁰

Three others have been publicly linked to the case. In March 2011, a Colorado woman, **Jamie Paulin-Ramirez**, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.⁴⁹¹ According to the indictment, LaRose recruited Paulin-Ramirez to join the plot to kill the Swedish cartoonist and invited her to Europe to attend a “training camp.”⁴⁹² **Mohammed Khalid**—a citizen of Pakistan, a U.S. lawful permanent resident, and a minor at the time of his reported arrest—also allegedly conspired with LaRose as did Algerian national **Ali Damache**. Damache resided in Ireland at the time of his arrest.⁴⁹³ As part of his alleged support role, Khalid hid a U.S. passport that LaRose had stolen and was purportedly asked by Damache to recruit supporters online. DOJ further asserts that “Paulin-Ramirez married Damache on the day she arrived with her minor child in Europe to live and train with jihadists, even though she had never met Damache in person.”⁴⁹⁴

Five Northern Virginian Men Convicted of Terrorism Offenses in Pakistan—December 2009

Five men from Northern Virginia were convicted of terrorism charges on June 24, 2010, by a special Pakistani anti-terrorism court and sentenced to 10 years in prison.⁴⁹⁵ They were arrested in Sarghoda (near Lahore), Pakistan, in December 2009, where they are alleged to have traveled hoping to work with jihadist groups and battle U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Prosecutors say they

(...continued)

Pennsylvania, filed March 4, 2010, pp. 3-4, <http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2010-03-04-LaRose-Indictment.pdf>

⁴⁸⁹ Charlie Savage, “Pennsylvania Woman Tied to Plot on Cartoonist,” *New York Times*, March 9, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/us/10pennsylvania.html>

⁴⁹⁰ DOJ Press Release, “Pennsylvania Woman Pleads Guilty in Plot to Recruit Violent Jihadist Fighters and to Commit Murder Overseas,” February 1, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2011/ph020111.htm>; Derrick Nunnally et al., “‘Jihad Jane’ Said to Have Confessed,” *Philly.com*, March 18, 2010, <http://www.philly.com/philly/news/breaking/88307227.html>

⁴⁹¹ DOJ Press Release, “Colorado Woman Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists,” March 8, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2011/ph030811.htm>.

⁴⁹² Michael Hinkelman, “Mum’s the Word: Accused Jihadist Nods Her ‘Not Guilty,’” *Philadelphia Daily News*, April 8, 2010, http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?p_action=doc&p_docid=12EF67E54DA7CDC8&p_docnum=1

⁴⁹³ DOJ Press Release, “Two Indicted for Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists,” October 20, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2011/two-indicted-for-conspiracy-to-provide-material-support-to-terrorists?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=fbi-in-the-news&utm_content=39253. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, October 20, 2011. John Shiffman, “Teen Tied to Jihad Jane Allegedly Plotted School Shooting,” *Philadelphia Inquirer*, August 28, 2011, http://articles.philly.com/2011-08-28/news/29938534_1_jihad-jane-mohammed-terror-cases.

⁴⁹⁴ DOJ Press Release, October 20, 2011.

⁴⁹⁵ Shaig Hussain and Brigid Schulte, “5 N.Va. Men Convicted on Terrorism Charges in Pakistan, Given 10 years in Prison,” *The Washington Post*, June 25, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/24/AR2010062400843.html?hpid=topnews>

were in the planning stages of attacks against a Pakistani nuclear plant, an air base, and other targets in Afghanistan as well as “territories of the United States.”⁴⁹⁶ Police reportedly recovered jihadist literature, laptop computers, and maps of parts of Pakistan when the men were arrested near Lahore. The maps included areas where the Taliban train.

The story of the five men from the Alexandria, Virginia area—**Uman Chaudhry, Ramy Zamzam, Ahmad A. Minni, Waqar Khan, and Aman Hassan Yemer**—became public when the Council on American-Islamic Relations got their families in touch with the FBI after the five left the United States without telling their families. The men were arrested at the home of Chaudhry’s father, Khalid Farooq Chaudhry, and the terror allegations began immediately.⁴⁹⁷

Attorneys for the men mounted an aggressive defense contending that the five were tortured by Pakistani jailers.⁴⁹⁸ In addition, they allege that police in Pakistan fabricated incriminating evidence.⁴⁹⁹

The motives for the group’s trip to Pakistan are unclear. Zamzam claimed in a Pakistani court that the young men were in the country for jihad, not terrorism, and wanted to provide medical and financial assistance to Afghan Muslims.⁵⁰⁰ The group reportedly met with representatives from two militant organizations, Jaish-e-Muhammad (tied to Al Qaeda) and Jamaat-ud-Dawa.⁵⁰¹ They were arrested in a house allegedly tied to Jaish-e-Muhammad after failing to link up with any terrorists. It has been reported that the two groups they approached rejected them because they lacked references from other trusted terrorists.⁵⁰² According to a news report citing Pakistani investigators, the five communicated online and visited websites that included footage of reputed terrorist attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Families, neighbors, and friends of the five young men are reported to have had difficulty believing that the five had tried to link up with terrorist groups.⁵⁰³

Al-Shabaab Minnesota Recruits—2007-2011

“Operation Rhino,” is an ongoing FBI investigation of al-Shabaab-related recruitment of individuals in Minnesota—the Minneapolis area has the largest community of Somali Americans

⁴⁹⁶ Jerry Markon, et.al, “Pakistan Charges 5 Northern Virginia Men in Alleged Terrorism Plot,” *The Washington Post*, March 18, 2010, p. A1. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/17/AR2010031700430_pf.html

⁴⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁹ Saeed Shah, “American Jihadi Suspects ‘Set Up’ by Police, Say Lawyers,” *The Guardian* (London), April 11, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/11/us-pakistan-jihadi-suspects-set-up>

⁵⁰⁰ Kamran Haider, “Pakistani Court Rejects Americans’ Bail Request,” *Reuters*, February 17, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61F11Q20100217>; “Americans Detained in Pakistan Defend ‘Jihad’ Plans,” *USA Today*, January 4, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-01-03-pakistan-americans-court_N.htm.

⁵⁰¹ Waqar Gillani, “Pakistani Court Approves Arrests of 5 Americans,” *New York Times*, December 16, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/world/asia/16inquire.html>.

⁵⁰² Margaret Neighbour, “Al-Qaeda ‘Rejected US Muslims Because They Lacked References,’” *The Scotsman*, December 11, 2009, <http://news.scotsman.com/world/AlQaeda-39rejected-US-Muslims.5903482.jp>; Lolita C. Baldor, “Americans Held in Pakistan Straddled 2 Worlds,” *The Guardian*, December 12, 2009, (AP), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8854274>. Hereinafter: Baldor, December 12, 2009.

⁵⁰³ Baldor, December 12, 2009.

in the United States.⁵⁰⁴ Reportedly, some of individuals indicted in the case began their terrorism-related activities in 2007, around the time al-Shabaab stepped up its insurgency against Somalia's transitional government and its Ethiopian supporters. The Minnesota recruits who traveled to Somalia received weapons training alongside individuals from other countries, including Britain, Australia, Sweden and Canada.⁵⁰⁵ The indicted American recruits face a variety of accusations including recruiting and raising funds for the trips, engaging in terrorist acts in Somalia, and perjury. Nine individuals have been arrested by U.S. or foreign law enforcement. Five defendants have pled guilty to charges.⁵⁰⁶

Documents associated with the ongoing federal investigation into the recruitment of these individuals from the Minneapolis area reveal the importance of a local al-Shabaab support network that provided the organization financing and foot soldiers. It included older individuals who helped in the radicalization process and aided in supplying the young men with equipment and money to go to Somalia. At least five individuals appear to have played important roles.⁵⁰⁷

- In July 2011, **Omer Abdi Mohamed** pled guilty to conspiring to provide material support to a conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim abroad. Among his activities, he helped some recruits obtain airplane tickets.⁵⁰⁸
- In October 2011, two women, **Amina Ali and Hawo Hassan**, were convicted as part of a scheme to raise money for al-Shabaab by soliciting funds door-to-door and via teleconferences. According to DOJ, in some instances, Ali raised money by misleading donors into believing the funds were destined for "the poor and needy."⁵⁰⁹ Ali and Hassan are both naturalized U.S. citizens from Somalia.⁵¹⁰
- **Mahamud Said Omar** is a Somali citizen who was granted permanent U.S. resident status in 1994. He is accused of providing money to young men to travel from Minneapolis to Somalia to train with and fight for al-Shabaab. He also allegedly visited an al-Shabaab safe house and provided hundreds of dollars to

⁵⁰⁴ DOJ Press Release, "Minneapolis Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Offense," July 18, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2011/minneapolis-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-offense>. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, July 18, 2011. DOJ Press Release, "Fourteen Charged with Providing Material Support to Somalia-Based Terrorist Organization," August 5, 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/August/10-ag-898.html>. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, August 5, 2010; DOJ Press Release, "Terror Charges Unsealed Against Eight Defendants," November 23, 2009, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-nsd-1267.html>. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, November 23, 2009.

⁵⁰⁵ Anti-Defamation League (ADL), "Al Shabaab's American Recruits: Introduction," June 7, 2010, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/al_shabaab_american_recruits.htm. Hereinafter: ADL, All Shabaab's American Recruits.

⁵⁰⁶ DOJ Press Release, "Fourteen Charged"; "Netherlands Terror Suspect Fights U.S. Extradition," Associated Press in *FOXNews.com*, February 22, 2010, <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/02/22/netherlands-terror-suspect-fights-extradition/>.

⁵⁰⁷ Raffaello Pantucci, "American Jihad: New Details Emerge About al-Shabaab Recruitment in North America," *The Jamestown Foundation*, December 3, 2009, [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=35797&cHash=f6e78a6e93](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35797&cHash=f6e78a6e93).

⁵⁰⁸ DOJ Press Release, July 18, 2011.

⁵⁰⁹ DOJ Press Release, "Two Minnesota Women Convicted of Providing Material Support to al Shabaab," October 20, 2011, http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2011/two-minnesota-women-convicted-of-providing-material-support-to-al-shabaab?utm_campaign=email-Immediate&utm_medium=email&utm_source=minneapolis-press-releases&utm_content=39314; DOJ Press Release, August 5, 2010.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*

fund the purchase of AK-47 rifles for the men.⁵¹¹ Omar was held in a high-security Dutch prison after his arrest at the request of the U.S. government in November 2009. In May 2010, a Rotterdam District Court ruled that Omar may be extradited to the United States.⁵¹² He appeared in U.S. federal court in August 2011.⁵¹³

- **Abdiweli Yassin Isse** is a legal resident of the United States. An October 9, 2009, criminal complaint charged Isse with encouraging others to travel to Somalia to fight Ethiopians. At a gathering of co-conspirators, he purportedly described his plans to wage jihad against Ethiopians. He also raised money to buy airplane tickets for others to make the trip to Somalia for the same purpose. In raising that money, he allegedly misled community members into thinking they were contributing money to send young men to Saudi Arabia to study the Quran.⁵¹⁴
- **Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax** is a Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen. An affidavit filed in support of an October 9, 2009, criminal complaint states that in the fall of 2007, Faarax attended a meeting with co-conspirators at a Minneapolis residence, where he encouraged others to travel to Somalia to fight and told them how he had experienced true brotherhood while fighting a jihad in Somalia.⁵¹⁵ He detailed his own experiences in guerilla combat and reassured his listeners that it was fun and not to be afraid. He further underscored that recruits would get the chance to use firearms.⁵¹⁶

There is some suggestion that interest among young U.S. citizens in joining al-Shabaab may be waning from a high point in 2007-2008 as reports of recruits who had died in terrorist actions reached U.S. Somali communities.⁵¹⁷ The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center has told Congress that at least seven Americans have been killed in fighting in Somalia.⁵¹⁸ In October 2008, **Shirwa Ahmed**, 27, a college student from Minneapolis, became the first known American suicide bomber when he drove an explosives-laden truck into a government building in Somalia, one of five simultaneous attacks that killed 22 U.N. aid workers and others.⁵¹⁹ Additionally, **Farah Mohamed Beledi** was identified as a suicide bomber who died as he tried to detonate his suicide vest in a May 2011 attack in Mogadishu, Somalia.⁵²⁰ Also, according to media reports, al-

⁵¹¹ DOJ Press Release, November 23, 2009.

⁵¹² "Terror Suspect's Extradition to the U.S. to be Appealed," *Associated Press*, June 1, 2010, <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5heU1OoqeTWyr3O1YtURr-yleZv8QD9G2J1QG1>.

⁵¹³ DOJ Press Release, "Man Extradited from Netherlands Appears in Federal Court on Charges of Supporting Terrorists," August 15, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2011/man-extradited-from-netherlands-appears-in-federal-court-on-charges-of-supporting-terrorists>.

⁵¹⁴ DOJ Press Release, November 23, 2009.

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵¹⁶ Criminal Complaint, *U.S. v. Cabdulaahi Ahmed Faarax and Abdiweli Yassin Isse*, (D. Minn. 2009). See Dina Temple-Raston, "Jihadi Cool: Terrorist Recruiters' Latest Weapon," *National Public Radio*, March 26, 2010, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125186382&ft=1&f=1001>.

⁵¹⁷ Eric Schmitt, "Islamic Extremist Group Recruits Americans for Civil War, Not Jihad," *New York Times*, June 6, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/nyregion/07shabaab.html>.

⁵¹⁸ "The Threat from Somalia," *The Washington Post*, November 2, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/01/AR2009110101774.html>.

⁵¹⁹ DOJ Press Release, November 23, 2009.

Shabaab has claimed that **Abdisalan Hussein Ali** purportedly blew himself up while attacking African Union troops in Mogadishu in October 2011.⁵²¹

Nidal Malik Hasan—Fort Hood, Texas, Shooting—November 5, 2009

A mass shooting took place on November 5, 2009, at the Soldier Readiness Center at the U.S. Army's Fort Hood, located outside Killeen, TX. Thirteen people were killed and 43 others were wounded or injured.⁵²² In July 2011, Fort Hood's commander ordered a court-martial for Hasan, who may also face the death penalty if convicted of premeditated murder and attempted premeditated murder charges.⁵²³

The accused perpetrator is Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army major who was serving as a psychiatrist. He is reported to have fired 100 rounds at soldiers processing through cubicles in the center. He was seriously wounded in an exchange of gunfire during the incident. Hasan was armed with an FN Five-seveN® 5.7 millimeter pistol⁵²⁴ and an older model Smith and Wesson .357 revolver. However, law enforcement officials do not believe the latter gun was fired by Hasan.⁵²⁵

Hasan is the son of Palestinian immigrants and was born and grew up in Virginia.⁵²⁶ He is reported to have expressed radical beliefs on several occasions during his Army career. In a 2007 presentation to Walter Reed physicians, Hasan said that the Army should allow Muslim soldiers to claim conscientious objector status to forgo fighting other Muslims. However, there is no record of disciplinary action having been taken by the U.S. Army nor did they ever consider him unfit for duty or a security threat. A Pentagon review found that officers failed to comply with applicable policies in Hasan's career evaluations.⁵²⁷

(...continued)

⁵²⁰ FBI Press Release, "FBI Announces Identity of Transitional Federal Government Checkpoint Suicide Bomber," June 9, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/minneapolis/press-releases/2011/fbi-announces-identity-of-transitional-federal-government-checkpoint-suicide-bomber>.

⁵²¹ Josh Kron, "American Identified as Bomber in Attack on African Union in Somalia," *New York Times*, October 30, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/world/africa/shabab-identify-american-as-bomber-in-somalia-attack.html>.

⁵²² Department of Defense (DOD), Report of the DOD Independent Review, *Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood*, January 2010, p. 1.

⁵²³ Jeremy Schwartz, "Hasan To Face Court-Martial, Possible Death Penalty," *Austin American-Statesman*, July 6, 2011, http://www.statesman.com/blogs/content/shared-gen/blogs/austin/blotter/entries/2011/07/06/hasan_to_face_court_martial_pos.html; Manny Fernandez, "Major Is Arraigned in Fort Hood Killings," *New York Times*, July 20, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/us/21hood.html>.

⁵²⁴ The FN Five-seveN® single-action autoloading pistol is designed and manufactured in Belgium by FN Herstal. It fires the low-recoil 5.7x28mm cartridge.

⁵²⁵ "Ft. Hood Shooter Nidal Hasan Used Private, Legally-Bought Pistol—Not Military Weapon—in Rampage," *Associated Press in New York Daily News*, November 7, 2009, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2009/11/07/2009-11-07_ft_hood_shooter_nidal_hasan_used_private_legallybought_pistol_not_military_weap.html.

⁵²⁶ Elisabeth Bumiller and Scott Shane, "Pentagon Report on Fort Hood Details Failures," *New York Times*, January 16, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/us/politics/16hasan.html>.

⁵²⁷ William H. McMichael, "Review of Ft. Hood Slayings Faults Hasan's Supervisors," *Army Times*, January 25, 2010.

The FBI discovered e-mail correspondence between Hasan and Anwar al-Awlaki, a radical Imam accused of recruiting for Al Qaeda. Over the course of several months, Hasan sent 16 e-mails to Awlaki (who reportedly replied to only two of them). The e-mail exchange was assessed by investigators to be in line with the psychiatrist's research into Muslim U.S. soldiers' reactions to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵²⁸ After the Fort Hood shootings, Awlaki issued a statement dubbing him a hero but denying that he had incited Hasan.⁵²⁹

David Headley—Plots to Attack Offices of Newspaper in Copenhagen and Support Mumbai Terrorist Attacks—October 2009

On March 18, 2010, David Coleman Headley pled guilty to numerous criminal charges including a plot to attack employees of the *Jyllands-Posten* newspaper in Copenhagen, Denmark; helping plan the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack; and providing material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a militant Pakistani Islamist group. As part of the plea agreement, prosecutors would not pursue the death penalty against him if he cooperates with law enforcement and intelligence officials.⁵³⁰

Headley was born Daood Sayed Gilani in Washington, DC, to a Pakistani father and an American mother. He reportedly changed his Muslim name to a Judeo-Christian name to hide his Muslim identity. Arrested in October 2009, Headley allegedly attended LeT terrorism training camps in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003 and also conducted extensive surveillance for both the Copenhagen and Mumbai plots. In late 2005 a LeT handler and another LeT-linked individual conspired with Headley to have him perform advanced surveillance and scouting for the Mumbai attacks. The LeT personnel discussed the idea of opening an immigration office in Mumbai as cover for his scouting activities. Using the sham office as cover, between September 2006 and July 2008, Headley made five trips to the city, photographed and videotaped potential targets following the instructions of LeT. He also received an additional \$3,000 and a GPS device from LeT. In November 2008, LeT attacked Mumbai targets killing 164 individuals.⁵³¹

Headley was also involved in a plot to attack the facilities of Danish newspaper, *Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten*. The plot involved attacking an editor and a cartoonist involved in the publication of controversial editorial cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad which sparked protests throughout the Muslim world. Headley met with an LeT member in Pakistan in 2008 to discuss surveillance of the newspaper. In January 2009 he cased the newspaper and met with its

⁵²⁸ David Tarrant, "Suspects in Dallas Plot, Fort Hood Shootings Were on FBI's Radar, But Only One Was Taken Down," *The Dallas Morning News*, November 22, 2009, <http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/texasouthwest/stories/112209dnentlonewolf.450512f.html>.

⁵²⁹ Andy Soltis, "Fiend Laughed 4 Times, but Not Last," *New York Post*, October, 1, 2011, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/international/fiend_laughed_times_but_not_last_e2Gf2P0zP0luSuiX1K8tgP.

⁵³⁰ Carrie Johnson, "U.S. Citizen, David Coleman Headley Admits Role in Mumbai Attacks," *The Washington Post*, March 19, 2010, p. A16, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/18/AR2010031805407.html>.

⁵³¹ DOJ Press Release, "Two Chicago Men Charged in Connection with Alleged Roles in Foreign Terror Plot That Focused on Targets in Denmark," October 27, 2009, <http://chicago.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/cg102709.htm>; DOJ Press Release, "Chicagoan David Headley Charged with Conspiracy in 2008 Mumbai Attacks in Addition to Foreign Terror Plot in Denmark," December 7, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2009/pr1207_01.pdf; DOJ Press Release, "Chicagoans Tahawwur Rana and David Headley Indicted for Alleged Roles in India and Denmark Terrorism Conspiracies: Ilyas Kashmiri and Retired Pakistani Major Charged in Denmark Plot," January 14, 2010, http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2010/pr0114_01.pdf. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Releases, dated October 27, 2009; December 7, 2009; and January 14, 2010.

representatives. In July and August 2009, he met in Europe with contacts of Ilyas Kashmiri, a member of a terrorist organization in Pakistan, to conduct additional surveillance.⁵³²

Three others alleged to have collaborated with Headley have been charged by U.S. authorities in the Mumbai and Copenhagen plots:

- **Tahawwur Hussain Rana** is a Canadian citizen who immigrated from Pakistan, was trained as a physician, and resided in Chicago until his arrest in October 2009. According to Headley's plea agreement, he shared with Rana—a longtime friend—details of his trips to Pakistan and his association with LeT.⁵³³ In turn, Rana helped Headley disguise his surveillance activity in India.⁵³⁴ Rana also provided cover for Headley's reconnaissance work in Denmark.⁵³⁵ In June 2011, Rana was convicted of conspiracy in the Danish plot and for providing material support to LeT. However, he was acquitted of involvement in the Mumbai plot.⁵³⁶
- **Ilyas Kashmiri** was killed in June 2011, reportedly in a missile strike by a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle.⁵³⁷ He had been a leader of Harakat-ul Jihad Islami a terrorist organization in Pakistan and was believed to be in contact with Al Qaeda leaders. In February 2009, he allegedly met with Headley in Waziristan. He also purportedly reviewed Headley's Denmark surveillance footage and suggested the use of a truck bomb. According to DOJ, he met with Headley again in May 2009 and directed him to link up with his operatives in Europe. He also advised cutting out LeT from the operation. LeT reportedly agreed.⁵³⁸ Kashmiri was charged in the plots.
- **Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed** is a retired major in the Pakistani military and is alleged to have coordinated Headley's travel to Denmark and helped plan the attack. He connected Headley with Kashmiri.⁵³⁹ Like Kashmiri, Syed has been charged in the plot but is not in U.S. custody.

Apparently Headley's life swung widely between the strictures of conservative Islam and the wide-open excesses of the West. Born in 1960 in Washington, DC, he is the son of a Pakistani father, Syed Saleem Gilani, who worked at the Pakistani Embassy. Headley's mother, Serrill Headley, a Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania native, also worked at the embassy. Soon after David/Daoood was born, the family moved to Pakistan. But Serrill left Syed and Pakistan in 1968,

⁵³² Ibid.

⁵³³ *United States v. David Coleman Headley*, Plea Agreement, 09-CR 830-3, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois (undated).

⁵³⁴ Ibid. See "Tahawwra Hussain Rana's Pre-Trial Conference Tomorrow," *zeenews.com* (India), March 28, 2010, <http://www.zeenews.com/news614664.html>

⁵³⁵ DOJ Press Release, "Chicago Businessman Tahawwur Hussain Rana Guilty of Providing Material Support to Terror Group and Supporting Role in Denmark Terrorism Conspiracy," June 9, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/chicago/press-releases/2011/chicago-businessman-tahawwur-hussain-rana-guilty-of-providing-material-support-to-terror-group-and-supporting-role-in-denmark-terrorism-conspiracy>.

⁵³⁶ Ibid.

⁵³⁷ Brian Bennett, "U.S. Has Verified Al Qaeda Operative's Death, Official Says," July 8, 2011, <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/08/world/la-fg-pakistan-kashmiri-20110708>.

⁵³⁸ DOJ Press Releases, dated October 27, 2009; December 7, 2009; and January 14, 2010.

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

because she could not abide by their conservative views of married women. She returned to Philadelphia in the early 1970s and opened up a bar called Khyber Pass.

In 1977, after Pakistan suffered a military coup, Headley's mother brought David/Daoood back to the United States. He struggled to fit in, at times espousing extremist views while developing a heroin habit. In 1985, his mother made him manager of the bar she owned. He reportedly failed at this role and his mother was forced to sell the bar. That same year, he married a bartender whom he divorced in 1987 because of cultural differences. His wife at that time said that David/Daoood was torn between two cultures—calling Indians “infidels,” for example. A Khyber Pass employee remembered him discussing infidels and Islam taking over the world. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) nabbed him twice (1988 and 1997) on heroin smuggling charges, and he worked as an informant for them and served prison sentences.⁵⁴⁰

Tarek Mehanna—Plot to Assassinate Politicians and Attack Shopping Malls—October 2009

Tarek Mehanna, a dual U.S. and Egyptian citizen,⁵⁴¹ from the Boston suburb of Sudbury, MA, was arrested on October 21, 2009, on charges that he plotted to kill two prominent U.S. politicians and shoot people at American shopping malls. He was accused of conspiring with two other men—**Ahmad Abousamra**, a friend from childhood who authorities say is now in Syria, and an unnamed man who is reported to be cooperating with authorities.

Mehanna graduated from the Massachusetts College of Pharmacy in 2008 where his father is a professor. Mehanna and his co-conspirators were said to have found inspiration in the 2002 Washington, DC, sniper attacks.⁵⁴² Mehanna taught math and religion at a Muslim school in Worcester, MA.⁵⁴³

Abousamra is the son of a physician who worked at Massachusetts General Hospital for 21 years and was president of the Islamic Center of New England before moving to the Detroit area in 2007. Abousamra was named in an FBI affidavit filed on October 21, 2009, in federal court in Boston as a conspirator with Mehanna, but was not charged. He allegedly fled to Syria three years ago after being questioned by the FBI. The FBI affidavit alleges Abousamra tried to join a terrorist training camp in Pakistan in 2002 and 2003, but was rejected by the Taliban because of a “lack of experience.”⁵⁴⁴

⁵⁴⁰ Joseph Tanfani, John Shiffman, and Kathleen Brady Shea, “American Suspect in Mumbai Attack Was DEA Informant,” *McClatchy Washington Bureau*, December 14, 2009, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/12/14/v-pring/80622-american-suspect-in-mumbai-attack.html>; Ginger Thompson, “A Terror Suspect With Feet in East and West,” *New York Times*, November 22, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/22/us/22terror.html>.

⁵⁴¹ Denise Lavoie, “Mass. Terror Suspect Taught Kids at Muslim School,” *Associated Press foreign*, in *guardian.co.uk*, October 21, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8766970>. Hereinafter: Denise Lavoie, October 21, 2009.

⁵⁴² Abby Goodnough and Liz Robbins, “Mass. Man Arrested in Terrorism Case,” *New York Times*, October 21, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/us/22terror.html>.

⁵⁴³ Denise Lavoie, October 21, 2009.

⁵⁴⁴ Shelley Murphy and Milton J. Valencia, “Details Emerge on Plot Suspects,” *The Boston Globe*, October 23, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/10/23/details_emerge_on_plot_suspects/. Hereinafter: Murphy and Valencia, October 23, 2009.

Much of the case against Mehanna involves material support to terrorism.⁵⁴⁵ According to DOJ, “Beginning in or about 2001, and continuing until in or about May 2008, Mehanna conspired with Ahmad Abousamra, and others to provide material support and resources for use in carrying out a conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons or damage property in a foreign country and extraterritorial homicide of a U.S. national.”⁵⁴⁶ Specifically, the complaint affidavit alleges that Mehanna and co-conspirators discussed their desire to participate in violent jihad against American interests and that they would talk about fighting jihad and their desire to die on the battlefield. The complaint further alleges that the co-conspirators attempted to radicalize others and inspire each other by, among other things, watching and distributing jihadi videos.⁵⁴⁷

At the time of his 2009 arrest Mehanna was free on bail from an earlier arrest that occurred in November 2008, at Logan International Airport in Boston. In the prior incident, he was charged with lying to federal investigators during a 2006 interview about his ties to Daniel Maldonado, who subsequently pled guilty to participating in terrorism training in Somalia. Maldonado is serving a 10-year prison sentence on that charge.⁵⁴⁸ According to the complaint affidavit, the conspirators had

multiple conversations about obtaining automatic weapons and randomly shooting people in a shopping mall, and that the conversations went so far as to discuss the logistics of a mall attack, including coordination, weapons needed and the possibility of attacking emergency responders. It is alleged that the plan was ultimately abandoned, because of their inability to obtain the automatic weapons they deemed necessary to effectively carry out the attacks.⁵⁴⁹

Hosam Smadi—Plot to Bomb a Dallas, Texas, Skyscraper— September 2009

On September 24, 2009, Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a Jordanian citizen who is reported to have remained in the United States illegally for one year after his visa expired, parked an SUV packed with what he thought were explosives outside Fountain Place, a 60-story office tower at Ross Avenue and Field Street in Dallas, TX. When Smadi dialed a cellphone that he thought would detonate the “truck bomb,” he was arrested by undercover FBI agents who had been posing as fellow anti-American terrorists.

The arrest was part of an FBI sting operation that began after an agent, monitoring an online extremist website, discovered Smadi espousing jihad against the United States. Smadi was charged on October 7, 2009, with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. David Kris, Assistant Attorney General for National Security, reported that “The Criminal complaint alleges that Hosam Smadi sought and attempted to bomb the Fountain Place office tower, but a coordinated undercover law enforcement action was able to thwart his efforts and ensure no one

⁵⁴⁵ U.S. Code, Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B, Section 2339A. For more information on this statute, see CRS Report R41333, *Terrorist Material Support: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 2339A and 2339B*, by Charles Doyle.

⁵⁴⁶ DOJ Press Release, “Massachusetts Man Charged with Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to Terrorists” October 21, 2009. <http://boston.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/bs102109a.htm>. Hereinafter: DOJ, “Massachusetts Man.”

⁵⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁸ Murphy and Valencia, October 23, 2009.

⁵⁴⁹ DOJ, “Massachusetts Man.”

was harmed.”⁵⁵⁰ Undercover FBI agents, posing as members of an Al Qaeda “sleeper cell” were introduced to Smadi, who repeatedly indicated to them that he came to the U.S. for the specific purpose of committing “Jihad for the sake of God.” Smadi clarified that he was interested in “self-jihad” because it was “the best type of jihad.” The investigation determined Smadi was not associated with other terrorist organizations.⁵⁵¹

DOJ also claims that “undercover FBI agents repeatedly encouraged Smadi to reevaluate his interpretation of jihad, counseling him that the obligation of jihad can be satisfied in many ways. Every time this interaction occurred, Smadi aggressively responded that he was going to commit significant, conspicuous acts of violence as his jihad.”⁵⁵²

In late August 2009, while meeting with one of the undercover FBI agents in Dallas, authorities allege that

Smadi discussed the logistics and timing of the bombing, stating that he would have preferred to do the attack on “11 September,” but decided to wait until after the month of Ramadan, which ended on September 20, 2009. At the conclusion of the meeting, Smadi decided that a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) would be placed at the foundation of the Fountain Place office tower. Unbeknownst to Smadi, the FBI ensured the VBIED contained only an inert/inactive explosive device which contained no explosive materials.⁵⁵³

Dallas Mayor Tom Leppert said local authorities were notified of the operation before it happened. “We were clearly communicated to that there was not going to be danger to anybody.”⁵⁵⁴

On May 26, 2010, Smadi plead guilty to one count of attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction. He was sentenced on October 20, 2010, to 24 years in prison.⁵⁵⁵

Michael Finton—Plot to Bomb the Springfield, Illinois, Federal Building—September 2009

On September 23, 2009, Michael C. Finton, who had converted to Islam and changed his name to Talib Islam, was arrested after he drove a van he thought was loaded with explosives—but was actually provided to him by the FBI—to the Paul Findley Federal Building in Springfield, IL. Prosecutors say he parked and locked the vehicle, then moved a few blocks away before twice making cell phone calls he believed would trigger a blast that would kill or injure people inside

⁵⁵⁰ DOJ Press Release, “FBI Arrests Jordanian Citizen for Attempting to Bomb Skyscraper in Downtown Dallas,” September 24, 2009, <http://dallas.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/dl092409.htm>.

⁵⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵⁵² Ibid.

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁴ Jason Trahan, Todd J. Gillman, and Scott Goldstein, “Dallas Bomb Plot Suspect Told Landlord He Was Moving Out,” *The Dallas Morning News*, September 26, 2009, <http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/092409dnmetbombarrest.1b177db8b.html>.

⁵⁵⁵ Jason Trahan, “Dallas Bombing Plotter Hosam Smadi Sentenced to 24 Years in Prison,” *The Dallas Morning News*, October 20, 2010, http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/DN-smadi_20met.ART0.State.Edition1.33928b1.html.

the building. In May 2011, he pled guilty to attempting to bomb the building and was sentenced to 28 years in prison.⁵⁵⁶

Finton reportedly had converted to Islam while in an Illinois prison from 2001 to 2006, serving a sentence for aggravated robbery and aggravated battery. He came to the attention of federal authorities in August 2007 when a search of his vehicle turned up a letter about his dreams of being a *shahid*, or martyr.

According to the affidavit filed in support of the criminal complaint, “after his arrest it was discovered that Finton had written a letter to John Walker Lindh, an American who was captured fighting for the Taliban and is imprisoned on terrorism violations. In a January 2008 interview with the FBI after his release from prison on a parole violation, Finton allegedly explained that he idolized Lindh. The affidavit further alleges that, in March 2008, Finton received funds from an individual in Saudi Arabia that he used to travel to Saudi Arabia the following month. He returned to the United States in May 2008.”⁵⁵⁷

In February 2009, Finton was introduced to an undercover FBI special agent posing as a low-level Al Qaeda operative. Finton expressed his desire to receive military training at a camp and to fight in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, or other locations. The undercover agent told Finton several times that it was Finton’s decision and that he could walk away from the decision anytime. According to the affidavit, Finton indicated that he was excited and had no second thoughts about attending a camp.”⁵⁵⁸

In the ensuing months, the affidavit alleges that Finton discussed possibly targeting locations in the United States and ultimately suggested the Paul Findley Federal Building and Courthouse in downtown Springfield as a primary target. He conducted surveillance of the building and proposed a remotely detonated car bomb for the attack. Further, according to the affidavit, Finton observed that U.S. Congressman Aaron Schock’s office, located at the corner of East Monroe and 6th Streets, would be a secondary target.⁵⁵⁹

On September 1, 2009, Finton met with the undercover FBI officer and was told the vehicle for the attack would be carrying close to one ton of explosives. According to the affidavit, Finton indicated an awareness that the bomb would cause civilian casualties, but expressed his view that such casualties were justified. Unbeknownst to him, the FBI ensured that the vehicle for the attack contained no actual explosive materials.⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁵⁶ DOJ Press Release, “Illinois Man Admits Plotting to Bomb Federal Courthouse and Is Sentenced to 28 Years in Prison,” May 9, 2011, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/May/11-nsd-590.html>; DOJ Press Release, “Illinois Man Arrested in Plot to Bomb Courthouse and Murder Federal Employees Vehicle Bomb Placed at Scene Was Inactive and Posed No Danger to Public,” September 24, 2009, <http://springfield.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/2009/si092409.htm>.

⁵⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

Najibullah Zazi—Plot to Bomb the New York City Subway—September 2009

Najibullah Zazi, a citizen of Afghanistan and a legal resident of the United States, has admitted that he plotted to bomb New York City subway trains in September 2009. Zazi told investigators that he and two friends planned to strap explosives to their bodies, board trains at the Grand Central and Times Square stations—two of the busiest in New York City—and explode their bombs during the crowded rush hour.⁵⁶¹

On February 22, 2010, Zazi pled guilty to conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiracy to commit murder overseas, and providing material support for a terrorist organization. There is no complete picture of Zazi's radicalization process, but there are details regarding his plot. In his youth, he may have listened to the radical messages of Saifur Rahman Halimi—an Imam who advocated jihad, attended the same mosque as Zazi's family, and lived in the same Queens building.⁵⁶² Zazi has admitted that he and others agreed to travel to Afghanistan to join Taliban forces. In August 2008, he and others flew from Newark to Peshawar, Pakistan, and instead of training with the Taliban, Al Qaeda recruited and trained them in the Waziristan region of Pakistan. Al Qaeda asked Zazi and his companions to return to the United States and engage in suicide operations.⁵⁶³

While training, Zazi received instruction on explosives, discussed specific targets, and took detailed notes. He returned to the United States in January 2009 and moved to Colorado, taking a job driving a shuttle bus at Denver International Airport. Between July and early September, he and others purchased chemicals at beauty supply stores in Denver. Investigators suggest that Zazi used the same hotel suite twice to try and produce bomb-making chemicals using handwritten bomb making notes developed while in Pakistan to guide his production of triacetone triperoxide (TATP).⁵⁶⁴ He even supposedly called an individual for production guidance. In the hotel's ventilation system, the FBI gathered residue from the chemicals Zazi had heated. Beauty store surveillance footage also recorded Zazi's activities.⁵⁶⁵ He also searched the website of a Queens store that carried muriatic acid, which can be used to develop TATP.

⁵⁶¹ John Marzulli, "Zazi, Al Qaeda Pals Planned Rush-Hour Attack on Grand Central, Times Square Subway Stations," *New York Daily News*, April 12, 2010. http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/04/12/2010-04-12_zazi_pals_planned_rushhour_attack_on_2_busiest_subway_stations.html.

⁵⁶² Samantha Gross, David Caruso, and Michael Rubinkam, "Radical Influences All Around NYC Terror Suspect," *Associated Press*, October 4, 2009, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=8741604>. For more on Zazi's childhood see, Michael Wilson, "From Smiling Coffee Vendor to Terror Suspect," *New York Times* September 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/26/nyregion/26profile.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print. Hereinafter: Wilson, September 26, 2009.

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁴ TATP (also known as acetone peroxide) has been used by suicide bombers in Israel, as a detonator by the thwarted "shoe bomber" Richard Reid, and as the explosive in the July 7, 2005 London public transport system bombings. TATP is relatively easy to make compared to other explosives. Although it is highly susceptible to heat, friction, and shock, it can be prepared in a basement lab using commercially available materials obtained from hardware stores, pharmacies, or stores selling cosmetics. See *GlobalSecurity.org*. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/tatp.htm>, and Philippe Naughton, "TATP is suicide bombers' weapon of choice," *Times Online* (London), July 15, 2005, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article544334.ece>.

⁵⁶⁵ William K. Rashbaum, "Terror Suspect Is Charged with Preparing Explosives," *New York Times*, September 25, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/25/nyregion/25terror.html>.

On September 8, 2009, Zazi rented a car and departed for New York the next day. Upon arriving in New York City on September 10, Zazi's car was stopped by Port Authority of New York Police at the behest of the FBI as he crossed the George Washington Bridge. It has been reported that to avoid tipping him off, the police pretended the stop was a random drug checkpoint.⁵⁶⁶ Authorities initially stated that they found nothing incriminating. However, court papers indicated that law enforcement subsequently found a laptop in the car containing an image of nine pages of handwritten notes on how to make and handle bombs. When FBI agents interviewed Zazi, he claimed that he drove to New York from Aurora, CO, to deal with an issue involving a coffee cart business his family operated in Manhattan. He then falsely stated he had never seen the notes.⁵⁶⁷ Zazi has subsequently admitted that he planned to finish bomb construction over the September 12-13 weekend, and then target New York's subway lines on September 14, 15, or 16. However when he suspected that the police were on to him, he claimed he shut down the operation.⁵⁶⁸

During this time, the NYPD was showing Zazi's photograph to people in his old neighborhoods in Queens and, at one point, the police towed Zazi's car. *The New York Times* reported that with their interest exposed, "law enforcement agents feared that some part of a plot they had not yet uncovered might be aborted and evidence destroyed. They moved fast, raiding four homes in Queens beginning late in the night on Sept. 20."⁵⁶⁹ Zazi was arrested and charged on September 24, with one count of conspiring with others to use weapons of mass destruction, including bombs or other explosives.⁵⁷⁰

Others arrested in this case are

- **Mohammed Wali Zazi**, Najibullah Zazi's father, a naturalized U.S. citizen, was arrested in the Fall of 2009 for lying to investigators. On February 1, 2010, he was indicted for conspiring to dispose of his son's bomb-making materials and chemicals. In a new eight-count superseding indictment unsealed on November 29, 2010, he was also charged with obstruction of justice, witness tampering, making false statements, and visa fraud.⁵⁷¹ In July 2011, the elder Zazi was found guilty in federal court on one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice and one count of obstruction of justice.⁵⁷²
- **Ahmad Wais Afzali**, a Queens Imam, was arrested for tipping off Zazi to the FBI investigation. Afzali had been a source of information for federal and New

⁵⁶⁶ Sean Gardiner, "Police Let Terrorist Slip Through," *Wall Street Journal*, April 26, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703441404575205954118455716.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_MIDDLENexttoWhatsNewsSecond.

⁵⁶⁷ David Johnston and William K. Rashbaum, "Terror Suspect Had Bomb Guide, Authorities Say," *New York Times*, September 21, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/us/21terror.html>.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁹ "Najibullah Zazi," *New York Times*, February 22, 2010, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/z/najibullah_zazi/index.html.

⁵⁷⁰ Ibid. Zazi was originally arrested on the charge of making false statements to the FBI.

⁵⁷¹ Chad Bray, "Father of NY Bomb-Plotter Faces More Charges," *Wall Street Journal*, November 30, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704679204575646842735976282.html>; and John Marzulli, "Mohammed Wali Zazi, Father of Terror Suspect Najibullah Zazi, Free On Bail," *New York Daily News*, February 18, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/02/18/2010-02-18_terror_suspect_zazis_dad_free_on_bail.html.

⁵⁷² Jessica Dye, "Zazi's Father Guilty in New York Bomb Plot Coverup," *Reuters*, July 22, 2011, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/22/us-usa-zazi-idUSTRE76L4TQ20110722>. Hereinafter: Dye, "Zazi's Father."

York City investigators in the past.⁵⁷³ On March 4, 2010, Afzali, pled guilty to lying to federal officials. He stated in court that he lied about a conversation he had with Zazi tipping him off to the FBI's investigation. Afzali hoped to protect himself, not Zazi. Afzali claimed that during his phone conversation with Zazi, he simply cautioned him not to "get involved in Afghanistan garbage."⁵⁷⁴ During sentencing on April 15, 2010, Afzali told the judge, "Honest to God, it was never my intention to help those idiots for what they do in the name of Islam."⁵⁷⁵ On July 5, 2010, he left the United States as specified in his plea agreement. He may not return without special permission.⁵⁷⁶

- **Naqib Jaji**, Zazi's uncle, was secretly arrested in the case.⁵⁷⁷ In 2010, he pled guilty to obstructing justice in the investigation.⁵⁷⁸
- **Zarein Ahmedzay** and **Adis Medunjanin**, who were classmates of Zazi's at Flushing High School in Queens, NY, were also indicted in the case. They allegedly accompanied Zazi on a flight from Newark to Peshawar, Pakistan, in late August 2008 where it is claimed they received military-style training from Al Qaeda. Ahmedzay and Medunjanin, both U.S. citizens, were charged in a five-count superseding indictment unsealed on February 25, 2010, with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction (explosive bombs) against persons or property in the United States. Specifically, they are charged with conspiring with Zazi to conduct an attack on Manhattan subway lines that would have taken place on Sept. 14, 15, or 16, 2009.⁵⁷⁹ On April 23, 2010, Ahmedzay pled guilty to the charges. On August 6, 2010, Medunjanin pled not guilty to charges in the plot and an additional charge of "trying to take out another car in a desperate suicide bid on the Whitestone Expressway when authorities tried to arrest him in January 2010."⁵⁸⁰
- In March 2011, DOJ announced the unsealing of an indictment charging **Ferid Imam**—a Canadian citizen—with aiding in Zazi, Ahmedzay, and Medunjanin's receipt of training from al Qaeda when the three men traveled to Pakistan in 2008.⁵⁸¹

⁵⁷³ Al Baker and Karen Zraick, "Lawyer Defends Queens Imam Arrested in Terror Inquiry," *New York Times*, September 21, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/21/nyregion/21imam.html>.

⁵⁷⁴ A.G. Sulzberger, "Imam Snared in Terror Plot Admits He Lied to the F.B.I." *New York Times*, March 4, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/05/nyregion/05terror.html>.

⁵⁷⁵ A.G. Sulzberger, "Imam and Informant Tells Why He Lied," *New York Times*, April 15, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/16/nyregion/16imam.html?scp=1&sq=%E2%80%9CImam%20and%20Informant%20Tells%20Why%20He%20Lied,%E2%80%9D%20&st=cse>

⁵⁷⁶ Colleen Long, "Imam Entangled in Terrorism Case Leaves U.S." Associated Press, in *CBSNews.com*, July 6, 2010, [http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/06/national/main6650661.shtml?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+FromTheRoadCBSNews+\(From+The+Road%3A+CBSNews.com\)](http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/06/national/main6650661.shtml?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+FromTheRoadCBSNews+(From+The+Road%3A+CBSNews.com)).

⁵⁷⁷ William K. Rashbaum, "Uncle Who Vouched for Terror Suspect Arrested," *New York Times*, January 27, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/28/nyregion/28zazi.html>.

⁵⁷⁸ Dye, "Zazi's Father."

⁵⁷⁹ DOJ Press Release, "Two Charged with Terror Violations in Connection with New York Subway Plot," February 25, 2010, <http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/nyfo022510a.html>.

⁵⁸⁰ Janon Fisher, "Suspect in Subway Terror Plot Pleads Not Guilty," *New York Post*, August 6, 2010, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/queens/suspect_in_subway_terror_plot_pleads_ul5seb9NDPmxETe4ewlyBK#ixzz0wUo8qs77.

⁵⁸¹ DOJ Press Release, "Indictment Unsealed Charging Additional Member of al Qaeda Plot," March 15, 2011, (continued...)

On July 7, 2010, DOJ announced the indictments of four additional men in the plot and revealed that it was directed by senior al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan, and was related to a scheme by al-Qaeda plotters in Pakistan to use Western operatives to attack a target in the United Kingdom.⁵⁸² The superseding indictment charged **Adnan El Shukrijumah**, **Abid Naseer**, **Tariq Ur Rehman**, and a defendant known as “**Ahmad**,” “**Sohaib**” or “**Zahid**” with several terrorism offenses.⁵⁸³

It is alleged that the plot was organized by el-Shukrijumah and two others—**Saleh al-Somali** and **Rashid Rauf**, who were described as leaders of Al Qaeda’s “external operations” program dedicated to terrorist attacks in the United States and other Western countries.⁵⁸⁴ The Saudi-born, El-Shukrijumah, is a naturalized U.S. citizen who has been sought for several years by U.S. authorities who have offered \$5 million for information leading to his capture.⁵⁸⁵ Specifically he is alleged to have recruited Zazi and Zazi’s co-conspirators, Adis Medunjanin and Zarein Ahmedzay. Al-Somali and Rauf are believed to have been killed in U.S. drone attacks.⁵⁸⁶

Abid Naseer, a British citizen, is alleged to have exchanged coded e-mails with the same account that “Ahmad” was using to communicate with the Zazi cell. He and Tariq Ur Rehman were arrested in Britain in April 2009. A search of their residences yielded large amounts of flour and oil in addition to surveillance photos and maps of public areas of Manchester, England.⁵⁸⁷

Betim Kaziu—Plot to Join Foreign Jihadist Groups—August 2009

In July 2011, Betim Kaziu, a U.S. citizen from Brooklyn, NY, was convicted on charges related to his attempts to join Al Qaeda-linked groups. In February 2009, Kaziu and a friend named **Sulejah Hadzovic** (also a U.S. citizen and Brooklyn native) traveled to Cairo, Egypt, where they planned to link up with either al-Shabaab or other terrorist organizations operating in places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. Believing he had made a mistake, Hadzovic returned home and cooperated with federal officials. Kaziu journeyed to Kosovo where he was apprehended by the Kosovo Police Service in August 2009.⁵⁸⁸

(...continued)

<http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/indictment-unsealed-charging-additional-member-of-al-qaeda-plot>.

⁵⁸² DOJ Press Release, “Charges Unsealed Against Five Alleged Members of Al-Qaeda Plot to Attack the United States and United Kingdom,” July 7, 2010, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/July/10-nsd-781.html>. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, July 7, 2010.

⁵⁸³ The indictment also includes charges related to Medunjanin’s attempt to cause an accident on the Whitestone Expressway, mentioned above.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁵ William K. Rashbaum, “Qaeda Leader Indicted in Subway Plot,” *New York Times*, July 7, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/08/nyregion/08terror.html>.

⁵⁸⁶ Dina Temple-Raston, “Feds: N.Y. Subway Bomb Plot Included U.K. Targets,” *National Public Radio*, July 8, 2010, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128368594>. Hereinafter: Temple-Raston, July 8, 2010.

⁵⁸⁷ Julia Love, “Alleged Al Qaeda Operatives in New York Plot,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 8, 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/08/nation/la-na-ny-terror-20100708>. Hereinafter: Love, July 8, 2010.

⁵⁸⁸ Tom Hays, “NYC Terror Witness Tells of Friendship, Betrayal,” *Associated Press*, July 5, 2011; DOJ Press Release, “Brooklyn Man Convicted of Conspiracy to Kill U.S. Soldiers Abroad and Attempting to Provide Material Support to al Shabaab,” July 7, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/brooklyn-man-convicted-of-conspiracy-to-kill-u.s.-soldiers-abroad-and-attempting-to-provide-material-support-to-al-shabaab>.

Daniel Boyd and Others—Plot to Attack Quantico Marine Base and Conspiracy to Commit Murder Abroad—July 2009

In 2009, Daniel Patrick Boyd, members of his family, and others residing in North Carolina were charged with plotting to attack the U.S. Marine Corps base in Quantico, VA, and for providing material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder persons abroad.

On July 22, 2009, a federal grand jury in North Carolina indicted the following eight individuals, charging them with conspiring to provide material support to terrorists and conspiring to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons abroad:

- **Daniel Patrick Boyd**, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
- **Hysen Sherifi**, a native of Kosovo and a U.S. legal permanent resident located in North Carolina;
- **Anes Subasic**, a naturalized U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
- **Zakariya Boyd**, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
- **Dylan Boyd**, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
- **Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan**, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina;
- **Ziyad Yaghi**, a U.S. citizen and resident of North Carolina; and
- **Jude Kenan Mohammad**, a U.S. citizen, believed to be in Pakistan.

The indictment alleges that Daniel Boyd is a veteran of terrorist training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan who conspired with others to recruit and help young men travel overseas in order to kill.⁵⁸⁹

According to the indictment, during the period from 1989 through 1992, Daniel Boyd traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan where he received military-style training in terrorist training camps for the purpose of engaging in violent jihad. Following this training, he allegedly fought in Afghanistan. From roughly November 2006 through at least July 2009, the indictment alleges that Daniel Boyd and the other defendants conspired to provide material support and resources to terrorists, including currency, training, transportation, and personnel. The defendants also conspired to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons abroad during this period. The object of the conspiracy, according to the indictment, was to advance violent jihad, including supporting and participating in terrorist activities abroad and committing acts of murder, kidnapping, or maiming persons abroad.⁵⁹⁰ The indictment also alleges that Daniel Boyd obtained a variety of weapons in furtherance of the conspiracy to murder persons overseas and provide material support to terrorists.

In a superseding indictment unsealed on September 24, 2009, additional charges were made against Boyd, his son Zakariya, and Hysen Sherifi. They are accused in a plot to attack the

⁵⁸⁹ DOJ Press Release, "Seven Charged with Terrorism Violations in North Carolina," July 27, 2009, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/July/09-nsd-725.html>; DOJ Press Release, "Kosovar National Charged with Terrorism Violations," June 17, 2010, <http://charlotte.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/ch061710.htm>. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, "Kosovar."

⁵⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

Marine Corps Base at Quantico, VA. Charges included conspiracy to murder U.S. military personnel, possession of weapons in furtherance of a crime of violence, and providing weapons to a convicted felon. The superseding indictment alleges, among other things, that as part of the conspiracy, Boyd undertook reconnaissance of the Marine Corps Base in Quantico, and obtained maps of the base in order to plan an attack. It also alleges that Boyd possessed armor piercing ammunition, stating it was “to attack the Americans.”⁵⁹¹

In an April 19, 2010, criminal complaint unsealed in June 2010, a ninth person, **Bajram Asilani**, was charged with being a member of the conspiracy involving the above defendants. He was arrested by authorities in Kosovo on June 17, 2010, at the request of the United States, which sought his extradition to Raleigh, NC, to stand trial.⁵⁹² However, a Judge of the European Union Rule of Law Mission denied the extradition request, ruling that Kosovo does not have an extradition treaty with the United States.⁵⁹³

In February 2011, Daniel Boyd pled guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists and conspiracy to murder, kidnap, maim, and injure persons in a foreign country.⁵⁹⁴ In June 2011, Zakariya Boyd pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.⁵⁹⁵ In September 2011, Dylan Boyd pled guilty to one count of aiding and abetting a conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.⁵⁹⁶

Abdulkhikim Muhammad—Shooting at the Little Rock, Arkansas, Military Recruiting Center—June 1, 2009

On June 1, 2009, Abdulkhikim Muhammad was arrested in connection with a shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR, that killed one soldier and wounded another. The police recovered from Muhammad’s sport utility vehicle (SUV) a Mossberg rifle with a scope and rifle sight, an SKS assault rifle,⁵⁹⁷ and a Lorcin L380 semiautomatic handgun.⁵⁹⁸ The Little Rock resident and Muslim convert who changed his name from Carlos Leon Bledsoe, was charged with capital murder, attempted capital murder, and 10 counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm.⁵⁹⁹ In

⁵⁹¹ DOJ Press Release, “Superseding Indictment in Boyd Matter Charges Defendants with Conspiring to Murder U.S. Military Personnel, Weapons Violations,” September 24, 2009, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/September/09-nsd-1023.html>.

⁵⁹² DOJ Press Release, “Kosovar.”

⁵⁹³ Kelcey Carlson, “Report: Judge Denies Extradition of Triangle Terrorism Suspect,” *wral.com*, June 21, 2010, <http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/7821448/>.

⁵⁹⁴ DOJ Press Release, “Raleigh-Area Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charges,” February 9, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/ce020911.htm>.

⁵⁹⁵ DOJ Press Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge,” June 7, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-charge>.

⁵⁹⁶ DOJ Press Release, “North Carolina Man Pleads Guilty to Terrorism Charge,” September 14, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/charlotte/press-releases/2011/north-carolina-man-pleads-guilty-to-terrorism-charge-1>.

⁵⁹⁷ The Russian-designed Simonov SKS (*Samozariadnyia Karabina Simonova*) is a gas operated, self-loading, semi-automatic rifle that fires the 7.62 mm cartridge.

⁵⁹⁸ The NEFA Foundation, “Target America Series #18: The Little Rock Arkansas Recruiting Station Shooting,” June 2009, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/NEFA_littlerockrecruitingshooting.pdf.

⁵⁹⁹ James Dao, “Man Claims Terror Ties in Little Rock Shooting,” *New York Times*, January 22, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/22littlerock.html>. Hereinafter: Dao, January 22, 2010.

Arkansas state court, in July 2011, Muhammad pled guilty to these charges. He did so to avoid the death penalty.⁶⁰⁰

Muhammad called the June 1, 2009, shooting another “Jihadi Attack.” “I wasn’t insane or post traumatic nor was I forced to do this Act,” he stated in a January 12, 2010, handwritten note to the presiding judge in his court case. In the letter, he claimed ties to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and dubbed himself a soldier for them. His father is a Memphis businessman who doubts that his son had ties to AQAP but could have been radicalized in Yemen.⁶⁰¹ His sister, who was stunned by the shooting, has stated publicly that a week before the shooting he seemed upbeat. In press reporting, his family has described Muhammad as a “happy-go-lucky” teen who had become a “deeply observant Muslim in college.”⁶⁰²

In seven handwritten letters he sent to the Memphis, TN, *Commercial Appeal* newspaper between May-October 2010, Muhammad provided insights into his motivation for the June 2009 shooting:

It’s a war against Islam and Muslims and I’m on the side of the Muslims point blank....The U.S. has to pay for the rape, murder, bloodshed, blasphemy it has done and still doing to the Muslims and Islam. So consider this a small retaliation the best to come Allah willing. This is not the first attack and won’t be the last.⁶⁰³

Muhammad spent 16 months in Yemen starting in the fall of 2007. While he was in the country, he married a woman from South Yemen. He allegedly taught English and learned Arabic while there. Yemeni officials imprisoned him in November 2008 on a visa overstay, and he also supposedly possessed a fraudulent Somali visa.⁶⁰⁴ Yemen deported him to the United States in January 2009.⁶⁰⁵

The FBI is reported to have interviewed him before the shooting, including while he was in prison in Yemen and then again in Nashville soon after he returned.⁶⁰⁶ According to law enforcement officials, the episode in Yemen prompted a preliminary inquiry by the FBI and other American law enforcement agencies into whether he had ties to extremist groups. But that investigation was inconclusive reportedly leaving the FBI with insufficient evidence to wiretap his phone or place him under surveillance.⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰⁰ “Man Pleads Guilty to Recruiting Center Killing, Gets Life,” *CNN.com*, July 25, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-25/justice/arkansas.recruiter.shooting_1_capital-murder-quinton-ezeagwula-carlos-bledsoe?s=PM:CRIME.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid.

⁶⁰² James Dao, “A Muslim Son, a Murder Trial, and Many Questions,” *New York Times*, February 16, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/us/17convert.html>. Hereinafter: Dao, February 16, 2010.

⁶⁰³ Kristina Goetz, “Muslim Who Shot Soldier in Arkansas Says He Wanted to Cause More Death,” *knoxnews.com*, November 13, 2010, <http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2010/nov/13/muslim-who-shot-soldier-arkansas-says-he-wanted-ca/>.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁵ Dao, January 22, 2010.

⁶⁰⁶ See Dao, February 16, 2010; and Dina Temple-Raston, “FBI Encountered Accused Ark. Shooter In Yemen,” *National Public Radio*, June 8, 2009, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=105128523>.

⁶⁰⁷ James Dao and David Johnson, “Suspect in Soldier Attack was Once Detained in Yemen,” *New York Times*, June 3, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/04recruit.html>.

The Newburgh Four—Plot to Bomb Bronx, New York, Synagogue and Jewish Center, and Attack Stewart Air National Guard Base—May 2009

On May 20, 2009, the FBI and the NYPD arrested four men for plotting to blow up a Bronx synagogue and Jewish Center while simultaneously shooting a plane out of the sky. The men allegedly parked car bombs wired to cell phones outside the Riverdale Temple and nearby Riverdale Jewish Center in the Bronx. They were also heading to Stewart Air National Guard Base in Newburgh, NY.⁶⁰⁸ However, the explosives in the car bombs and Stinger missile they intended to use in the attack were phony. The explosives had been supplied by undercover agents posing as Pakistani militants linked to Al Qaeda. The four “were petty criminals who appeared to be acting alone, not in concert with any terrorist organization,” according to the New York City Police Commissioner.⁶⁰⁹

The suspects were three U.S.-born citizens—**James Cromitie, David Williams, and Onta Williams** (no relation to David)—and one Haitian immigrant, **Laguerre Payen**. At least three of the four were said to be jailhouse converts to Islam and were reportedly angry about the deaths of Muslims in Afghanistan.

An FBI cooperating witness played a key role in the quartet’s efforts to obtain the explosives and missile components for the planned attacks. According to the indictment in the case,⁶¹⁰ the four defendants met with the cooperating witness repeatedly beginning in October 2008 and discussed attacking military aircraft at the Air National Guard base. Starting in April 2009, the four selected the synagogue, the Jewish community center, and the air base as targets. They cased their targets, taking photographs and developing plans. Together with the cooperating witness, they purchased cell phones and a handgun for the operation. The cooperating witness also helped them obtain three improvised explosive devices (IED) containing fake C-4 explosives and gave the group an inactive stinger missile, informing them that it came from Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based terrorist group.⁶¹¹

Some questioned whether the Newburgh Four were actually capable of pulling off the terrorist plot without the involvement of the cooperating witness, a Pakistani man named Shahed Hussain, who agreed to work for the FBI to obtain leniency after he was arrested in 2002 for fraud.⁶¹² One commentator has described the Newburgh Four as a group of struggling, disaffected petty criminals, who bonded at a Newburgh mosque over having spent time in prison and were taken in by a Pakistani immigrant looking to win leniency for a crime of his own. “There’s little doubt the bumbling would-be bombers went far enough with the plot to demonstrate that they had the

⁶⁰⁸ *United States v. James Cromitie, David Williams, Onta Williams, Laguerre Payen*, Indictment 09-Cr558, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (undated). http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/990.pdf. Hereinafter: *U.S. v. Cromitie, et al.*

⁶⁰⁹ Javier C. Hernandez and Sewell Chan, “N.Y. Bomb Plot Suspects Acted Alone, Police Say,” *New York Times*, May 21, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/22/nyregion/22terror.html?ref=nyregion>.

⁶¹⁰ *U.S. v. Cromitie, et al.*

⁶¹¹ DOJ Press Release, “Four Arrested for Plot To Bomb Synagogue and Jewish community center and to Shoot Military Planes with Stinger Missiles,” May 20, 2009, <http://newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/nyfo052009.htm>.

⁶¹² Graham Rayman, “The Alarming Record of the FBI’s Informant in the Bronx Bomb Plot,” *The Village Voice*, July 8, 2009, <http://www.villagevoice.com/2009-07-08/news/the-alarming-record-of-the-f-b-i-s-informant-in-the-bronx-bomb-plot/3>. Hereinafter: Rayman, July 8, 2009.

intention to commit terror, and for that they'll pay the price. But the whole tale comes off perhaps more as a sad glimpse into the lives of a loose group of aimless and obscurely embittered Americans than as a dire illustration of the threat of home-grown terrorism.”⁶¹³

Graham Ravman, writing in the *Village Voice*, suggests that the Newburgh Four were smalltime felons who had no grand terrorist ambitions until Hussain plied them with cash and suggestions. Moreover, this was not the first time [Hussain] went undercover to help the government. “He played a similar role four years ago in an Albany case, in which he helped the FBI arrest a man named Mohammed Hossain, a cash-poor pizzeria owner, and his Imam, Yassin Aref, after persuading them to launder \$50,000 in a made-up plot to bring a missile to the United States and assassinate a Pakistani prime minister [the target of the invented plot was actually against the Pakistani United Nations Representative]. . . . In both cases, it is claimed that [Hussain] did not stumble upon active terror cells plotting to bring destruction on American soil [rather he] needed long periods of time to recruit his Muslim contacts, spin elaborate tales about his terror contacts, and develop solid plans of action, all the while providing the defendants with large amounts of resources and cash incentives.”⁶¹⁴

The trial of the four began on August 24, 2010. It had been delayed earlier in the summer by the federal judge in the case saying prosecutors had failed to turn over information that should have been given to the defense. In June 2010, prosecutors turned over to defense attorneys a 2008 memorandum from the FBI written by the lead agent on the case. The agent reportedly wrote that he had told officials at Stewart Airport that James Cromitie, the alleged leader of the Newburgh Four, would be looking over the airport for a potential attack but that he would pose no danger without the assistance of the informant. U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon said the memorandum should have been turned over to the defense months earlier.⁶¹⁵

Defense attorneys at the trial argued that the case crossed the line into entrapment. But the jury rejected the entrapment defense and convicted the four on October 18, 2010.⁶¹⁶

Bryant Neal Vinas—Plot to Bomb Long Island Railroad, Rocket Attack on U.S. Base in Afghanistan—September 2008

In a November 22, 2008, sealed indictment⁶¹⁷ (unsealed on July 22, 2009), Bryant Vinas, an American Muslim convert who grew up on Long Island, NY, was charged with conspiracy to

⁶¹³ Zachary Roth, “The Newburgh Four—And The Government Mole Who Betrayed Them,” *TPM Muckraker*, May 22, 2009, http://tpmmuckraker.talkingpointsmemo.com/2009/05/the_newburgh_four_and_the_government_mole_who_be.php?ref=m1.

⁶¹⁴ Ravman, July 8, 2009.

⁶¹⁵ William Glaberson, “Trial of Newburgh Men Accused of Terror Plot Delayed,” *New York Times*, June 14, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/nyregion/15terror.html>.

⁶¹⁶ Kareem Fahim, “4 Convicted of Attempting to Blow Up 2 Synagogues,” *New York Times*, October 18, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/nyregion/19plot.html>. See DOJ Press Release, “Three Men Each Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 25 Years in Prison for Plotting to Bomb Bronx Synagogues and Shoot Down U.S. Military Planes,” June 29, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/three-men-each-sentenced-in-manhattan-federal-court-to-25-years-in-prison-for-plotting-to-bomb-bronx-synagogues-and-shoot-down-u.s.-military-planes>. The convictions have been upheld on appeal. See Adam Wisnieski and Graham Kates, “Newburgh Four Appeal Denied,” *Riverdale Press*, May 4, 2011, http://www.riverdalepress.com/stories/Newburgh-Four-appeal-denied-48521?page=1&content_source=.

⁶¹⁷ *United States v. John Doe*, Cr. No. 08-823, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, November 22, 2008, (continued...)

murder U.S. nationals, providing material support to Al Qaeda, and receiving military-type training from Al Qaeda. He pled guilty to all three counts on January 28, 2009.⁶¹⁸

The charges stem from Vinas' activities in Pakistan from his arrival in the Fall of 2007 until his arrest by Pakistani police in November 2008 following a tip provided by U.S. authorities. Vinas was subsequently extradited to the United States and has cooperated extensively with counterterrorism officials.⁶¹⁹ Vinas has admitted that he met with Al Qaeda leaders in Pakistan and, between March and July 2008, attended three Al Qaeda training courses focused on weapons, explosives, and rocket-based or propelled weaponry.⁶²⁰ In September 2008, he took part in firing rockets at a U.S. military base in Afghanistan. He told officials, "Although we intended to hit the military base and kill American soldiers, I was informed the rockets missed and the attack failed."⁶²¹ Vinas also testified in court, "I consulted with a senior Al Qaeda leader and provided detailed information about the operation of the Long Island Railroad system, which I knew because I had ridden the railroad on so many occasions ... the purpose of providing information was to help plan a bomb attack on the Long Island Railroad system."⁶²² This led U.S. officials to issue a security alert in November 2008 and beefed up security on the New York area commuter rail system.⁶²³

The arrest of Vinas was kept secret until his indictment was unsealed in July 2009 probably because of the significance of the information he has provided to U.S. counterterrorism authorities. That information has reportedly helped U.S. forces target Al Qaeda camps with drone attacks and understand how Al Qaeda provides its members with training in assassinations, poison, kidnappings, forgery, and advanced bomb-making.⁶²⁴ Vinas has also submitted a witness statement that was entered into evidence in the trial of an alleged Belgian Al Qaeda cell in Brussels.⁶²⁵

Vinas is the son of immigrants from Peru and Argentina, who was raised as a Catholic and loved to play baseball. After 9/11, he joined the Army but was discharged before completing basic training. Reportedly dispirited after returning to Long Island, he met the relative of a friend who was a Muslim convert. Shortly thereafter, Vinas also converted. He eventually began visiting extremist websites and was reported to have become increasingly influenced by another religiously conservative acquaintance. One of the websites led Vinas to the Islamic Thinkers

(...continued)

<http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2009-07-22-Bryant-Neal-Vinas-Court-Docs.pdf>.

⁶¹⁸ *United States against Bryant Neal Vinas*, Cr. No. 08-823 NGG, Unsealing Application, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, July 22, 2009, <http://intelfiles.egoplex.com/2009-07-22-Bryant-Neal-Vinas-Court-Docs.pdf#page=13>.

⁶¹⁹ Sebastian Rotella and Josh Meyer, "U.S.-born Militant Who Fought For Al Qaeda Is In Custody," *Los Angeles Times*, July 23, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/23/nation/na-american-jihad23>.

⁶²⁰ Paul Cruickshank, Nic Robertson, and Ken Shiffman, "From Long Island to Lahore: The Plot to Bomb New York," *CNN.com*, May 21, 2010, <http://edition.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/05/14/bryant.neal.vinas.part2/index.html>. Hereinafter: CNN, May 21, 2010.

⁶²¹ *Ibid.*

⁶²² *Ibid.*

⁶²³ Anti Defamation League, "New Yorker Pleads Guilty to Providing NYC Transit Information to Al Qaeda," July 23, 2009, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/vinas_guilty_plea.htm.

⁶²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶²⁵ CNN, May 21, 2010.

Society, an extremist group in New York reportedly supportive of Al Qaeda. His deeply religious acquaintance was already a member and Vinas began to move within its circles.⁶²⁶

Mitch Silber, the director of intelligence analysis for the NYPD, has expressed the belief that “there has been an acceleration in radicalization in the United States.” He notes that “Vinas is almost a poster child for the process, the unremarkable nature of the people who might go through this process and frankly the potential to link up with Al Qaeda and the danger that presents.”⁶²⁷

Vinas is reported to be in the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service at an undisclosed location in the state of New York.⁶²⁸

Plot to Bomb Jet Fuel Artery at Kennedy International Airport in New York—June 2007

On June 2, 2007, authorities announced they had broken up a plot by four men to blow up a jet fuel artery that runs through residential neighborhoods to the JFK Airport in New York. **Russell Defreitas**, a U.S. citizen originally from Guyana, was arrested as the ring leader of the plot. Defreitas had worked as a cargo handler at JFK until 1995, but was described as hapless and episodically homeless and whom friends say supported himself by selling incense on street corners and collecting welfare.⁶²⁹ According to court documents filed on January 5, 2010, Defreitas allegedly admitted to being the “brain of everything.”⁶³⁰

The others charged in the plot are **Abdul Kadir**, a citizen of Guyana and former member of its parliament, **Kareem Ibrahim**, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago; and **Abdel Nur**, a citizen of Guyana.⁶³¹ The latter three were arrested in Trinidad and eventually extradited to the United States in June 2008. All four were indicted with conspiracy to cause death, serious bodily injury and extensive destruction.⁶³²

The FBI said the alleged plot never got beyond the planning stages⁶³³ and there is some dispute over how serious any attack against the 40-mile pipeline would have been. The pipeline originates in Linden, NJ, crosses Staten Island, and goes underwater to Brooklyn traveling mostly

⁶²⁶ Ibid.

⁶²⁷ Ibid.

⁶²⁸ Claire Suddath, “Bryant Neal Vinas: An American in Al Qaeda,” *Time Magazine*, July 24, 2009, <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1912512,00.html>.

⁶²⁹ Carol Eisenberg, “JFK Terror Plot: Credibility of Case in Question,” *Newsday*, June 6, 2007. Hereinafter: Eisenberg, June 6, 2007.

⁶³⁰ John Marzulli, “‘I Was Brain of It All ...’” *New York Daily News*, January 6, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2010/01/06/2010-01-06_untitled_pipeline06m.html.

⁶³¹ Chris Michaud, “Four Charged in Plot to Blow Up JFK Airport,” *Reuters*, June 2, 2007, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN0238499820070602>. Another individual, Donald Nero, admitted early involvement in the plot but broke with Defreitas and the others, testifying against them. See Thom Weidlich and Cullen Wheatley, “JFK Airport Bomb Plotter From Guyana Gets Four-Year Sentence,” *Bloomberg Businessweek*, October 28, 2011, <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-10-28/jfk-airport-bomb-plotter-from-guyana-gets-four-year-sentence.html>.

⁶³² “4 indicted in terror plot to blow up JFK airport,” *Newsday*, June 29, 2007.

⁶³³ “Four Charged over JFK Bomb Plot,” *BBC News*, June 3, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6715443.stm>. Hereinafter: *BBC News*, June 3, 2007.

along the Long Island Rail Road right-of-way to the airport. Because of their thickness and safeguards, such pipelines are difficult to damage, an official said.⁶³⁴

However, at a news conference announcing the arrests, U.S. Attorney, Roslynn Mauskopf called it “one of the most chilling plots imaginable. Had the plot been carried out, it could have resulted in unfathomable damage, deaths and destruction.”⁶³⁵ But safety experts have criticized the government’s description of the plot’s danger. John Goglia, a former member of the National Transportation Safety Board, describes the plot as a “fantasy,” saying, “You could definitely reach the tank, definitely start a fire, but to get the kind of explosion they were thinking they were going to get ... this is virtually impossible to do.”⁶³⁶

The Washington Post reported that the alleged conspirators were initially detected via information gathered by the CIA in South America and the Caribbean. That led federal and local authorities in the New York region to launch a 16-month sting operation focused on the activities of Defreitas. According to the complaint filed in the case, Defreitas conducted surveillance of the airport four times in January, focusing on fuel tanks, noting security precautions and reviewing an escape plan.⁶³⁷

Defreitas was apparently unaware that one of the plotters with him much of the time was a law enforcement informant who recorded much of what he said. It has been reported that Defreitas said in one recorded conversation, “Any time you hit Kennedy, it is the most hurtful thing to the United States.... To hit John F. Kennedy, wow ... they love John F. Kennedy like he’s the man ... if you hit that, this whole country will be mourning. You can kill the man twice.”⁶³⁸

According to *The Smoking Gun*, which obtained and posted on its website a copy of the criminal complaint in the case, a paid “confidential source” was credited with infiltrating the terror cell and gathering critical information on the alleged plot—via tape recordings, documents, videos, and photographs. The government informant is a longtime New York City drug trafficker who began cooperating with federal investigators after NYPD detectives arrested him on a Bronx street and charged him with possession of about \$2 million in cocaine. A footnote in the criminal complaint notes that the source had two prior drug convictions and was, through his cooperation, seeking leniency in sentencing on the drug trafficking charge.⁶³⁹

In opening arguments for the July 2010 trial of two of the defendants—Defreitas and Kadir—Defreitas’ attorney accused prosecutors of being “overzealous.” The government, he said, took a “poor lonely, bitter old man that talked big game,” and, through an informant, nudged him into incriminating himself. “Without the government, Russell Defreitas is nothing. His words were ‘all

⁶³⁴ Anthony Faiola and Steven Mufson, “NY Airport Target of Plot, Officials Say,” *The Washington Post*, June 3, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/02/AR2007060200606_pf.html. Hereinafter: *The Washington Post*, June 3, 2007.

⁶³⁵ *BBC News*, June 3, 2007.

⁶³⁶ John Goglia quoted in “Plot to Destroy New York Airport Considered Overhyped,” *History Commons*, June 2, 2007, http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=russell_defreitas_1.

⁶³⁷ *The Washington Post*, June 3, 2007.

⁶³⁸ *BBC News*, June 3, 2007.

⁶³⁹ “Meet the JFK Informant,” *The Smoking Gun.com*, June 14, 2007, <http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/years/2007/0614071jfkplot1.html>.

sizzle and no steak.”⁶⁴⁰ After five days of deliberation, however, the jury convicted both men of five counts of conspiring to commit acts of terrorism.⁶⁴¹

In December 2010, Kadir received a life sentence for his involvement in the plot. In February 2011, Defreitas was also sentenced to life in prison. Nur, who had pled guilty to a separate charge of material support to terrorism, received a 15-year sentence in January 2011. Kareem Ibrahim, was tried separately and was convicted of involvement in the conspiracy. He awaits sentencing.⁶⁴²

Plot to Attack Soldiers at Fort Dix, New Jersey—May 2007

Six men were arrested in a plot against Fort Dix, a U.S. Army base in New Jersey. In December 2008, a jury found five of the six guilty of conspiring to kill military personnel but cleared them of attempted murder. Four received life sentences without parole and the other received a 33-year sentence. A sixth man pled guilty to a lesser charge and was sentenced to 20 months in prison. As far as is known, the group had no connection to any foreign terrorist organization.

The arrests were made after a 16-month FBI operation that included infiltrating the group. The investigation began in January 2006 with a tip from an electronics store clerk in Mount Laurel, PA. Two men dropped off an 8-millimeter tape and wanted it converted to a DVD. The tape showed the defendants firing rifles and shouting Islamic battle cries. The clerk called police. FBI agents and two paid informants who had criminal records spent the next 15 months shadowing the suspects, recording conversations and searching their computers. During the investigation, authorities recorded hundreds of conversations with the defendants with help from the two informants.⁶⁴³

The plotters and verdicts in their cases:

- **Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer**, a U.S. citizen born in Jordan. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder and guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy. Sentenced to life in prison without parole.⁶⁴⁴

⁶⁴⁰ Basil Katz, “Trial Opens for Accused NY Airport Bomb Plotters,” *Reuters*, June 30, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE65T6PK20100630>.

⁶⁴¹ A.G. Sulzberger, “Two Men Convicted in Kennedy Airport Plot,” *New York Times*, August 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/nyregion/03kennedy.html?_r=1&ref=russell_m_defreitas.

⁶⁴² John Marzulli, “Brooklyn Jury Convicts Imam Kareem Ibrahim in Kennedy Airport Plot,” May 27, 2011, *New York Daily News*, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-05-27/news/29606238_1_defreitas-and-co-defendant-fuel-lines-and-fuel-abdel-nur; DOJ Press Release, “Russell Defreitas Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring to Commit Terrorist Attack at JFK Airport,” February 17, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2011/russell-defreitas-sentenced-to-life-in-prison-for-conspiring-to-commit-terrorist-attack-at-jfk-airport>; A.G. Sulzberger, “3 Years Later, Trial to Start in JFK Bomb Plot,” *New York Times*, June 29, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/30/nyregion/30terror.html>.

⁶⁴³ Christopher Dela Cruz, “Three convicted in Fort Dix terror plot are sentenced to life in prison” *NJ.com*, April 28, 2009, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/04/judge_sentences_fort_dix_defen.html. Hereinafter: Dela Cruz, *NJ.com* April 28, 2009.

⁶⁴⁴ “Raw Data: Charges in Fort Dix Terror Trial,” *Associated Press* in *FoxNews.com*, December 22, 2008, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,470897,00.html>. Hereinafter: “Raw Data in Fort Dix Trial,” December 22, 2008; and Dela Cruz, *NJ.com*, April 28, 2009.

- **Dritan “Tony” Duka**, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy, guilty of possession or attempted possession of a machine gun and guilty of two counts of possession or attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Sentenced to life in prison without parole.⁶⁴⁵
- **Eljvir Duka**, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, not guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy and guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Sentenced to life in prison without parole.⁶⁴⁶
- **Shain Duka**, illegal immigrant born in the former Yugoslavia. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel, not guilty of attempted murder, guilty of possession or attempted possession of a firearm in furtherance of the conspiracy, guilty of possession or attempted possession of a machine gun and guilty of two counts of possession or attempted possession of a firearm by an illegal alien. Sentenced to life in prison without parole.⁶⁴⁷
- **Serdar Tatar**, a Turkish-born legal permanent resident of the United States. Guilty of conspiracy to kill military personnel and not guilty of attempted murder. Sentenced to 33 years in prison.⁶⁴⁸
- **Agron Abdullahu**, a Kosovo-Albanian who arrived with his family as a refugee from Kosovo (ironically, first arriving in the United States at a refugee center at Fort Dix). He was charged with letting the brothers Dritan, Eljvir and Shain Duka shoot various weapons at a firing range in Pennsylvania. The indictment states that the weapons used were an SKS semi automatic rifle, a Baretta Storm semi automatic rifle, a Mossberg 12-gauge pump and a 9mm Baretta handgun. These were all firearms that Abdullahu owned legally. However, it is a crime for illegal immigrants like the Duka brothers to possess guns. He pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced March 31, 2008, to 20 months in prison.⁶⁴⁹

Daniel Maldonado—Training with Al Qaeda in Somalia—February 2007

An indictment unsealed on February 14, 2007, charged Daniel Joseph Maldonado with receiving training from a foreign terrorist organization and conspiring to use an explosive device outside the United States. According to a Justice Department official, “This case represents the first

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁸ Raw Data in Fort Dix Trial,” December 22, 2008; “The Fifth Man Convicted of Plotting to Kill Military Personnel at Fort Dix in New Jersey Has Been Sentenced to 33 Years in Prison,” *Associated Press* in *FoxNews.com*, April 29, 2009, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,518337,00.html>.

⁶⁴⁹ Geoff Mulvihill, “Man sentenced in Fort Dix plot case” *Associated Press* in *USA Today*, March 31, 2008. http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-03-31-619191134_x.htm.

criminal prosecution of an American suspected of joining forces with Islamic extremist fighters in Somalia.⁶⁵⁰

Maldonado had been captured by the Kenyan military on January 21, 2007, as he fled into Kenya to avoid Ethiopian and Somali forces. He was turned over to American authorities the following month. On April 19, 2007, Maldonado pled guilty to receiving training from a foreign terrorist organization in exchange for prosecutors agreeing not to file any more federal charges against him.⁶⁵¹ In June 2007, Maldonado was sentenced to 10 years in prison.⁶⁵²

According to DOJ, Maldonado admitted that in November 2005 he had traveled from Houston, TX, to Africa, eventually making it to Somalia in December 2006 to join the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)⁶⁵³ and elements of Al Qaeda to fight “jihad” against the Somali Transitional Federal Government. While in Somalia, authorities say Maldonado was provided an AK-47, equipped with military combat uniforms and boots in Mogadishu, and participated in training camps in Kismaayo and Jilib, Somalia. The camps included physical fitness, firearms and explosives training all in preparation to go to the front to fight for the ICU. Al Qaeda members were present at the training camps. The ICU and Al Qaeda worked together to train fighters in the camps to fight jihad to establish an independent Islamic state in Somalia.⁶⁵⁴

The criminal complaint in the case alleges that Maldonado admitted that while training at camps in Somalia, he watched and learned techniques for manufacturing small explosive devices. He also admitted to participating in the interrogation of a spy who was later killed—a flight attendant who had a cell phone camera and was observed taking pictures of jihadis as they arrived by airplane in Kismaayo, Somalia. Maldonado also admitted that he would be willing to become a suicide bomber if he were wounded and could not otherwise fight.⁶⁵⁵

Derrick Shareef—Plot to Attack Shopping Mall in Rockford, Illinois—December 2006

On December 6, 2006, Derrick Shareef, an American Muslim convert, was arrested in Rockford, IL, after he attempted to swap two stereo speakers for four (non-functioning) hand grenades, a

⁶⁵⁰ U.S. Attorney Southern District of Texas, Press Release, “U.S. Citizen Pleads Guilty to Training to Fight Jihad,” April 19, 2007, http://nefaoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Maldonado_DOJPR_GuiltyPlea.pdf. Hereinafter: U.S. Attorney Press Release, April 19, 2007.

⁶⁵¹ “American Citizen Charged With Training in Somalia With Al Qaeda, Learning to Become Homicide Bomber,” *Foxnews.com*, February 14, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,251820,00.html>.

⁶⁵² Shelley Murphy and Milton J. Valencia, “Details Emerge on Plot Suspects,” *The Boston Globe*, October 23, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/10/23/details_emerge_on_plot_suspects/.

⁶⁵³ Following the collapse of the Somali government in the 1990’s, a group of Sharia Courts functioned as quasi-governmental entities. In the late 1990’s, they united to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), a rival administration to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. Until the end of 2006, they controlled most of southern Somalia and the capital, Mogadishu. In December 2006, they lost several battles and were driven from Mogadishu by Somali forces supporting the TFG and the Ethiopian army which intervened to support the TFG against the ICU. Hardline Islamists broke ranks from the ICU and formed other militant groups, such as al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, to continue the war against the government. The less-militant members of the ICU went into exile.

⁶⁵⁴ U.S. Attorney Press Release, April 19, 2007.

⁶⁵⁵ *United States v. Daniel Joseph Maldonado*, Superseding Criminal Complaint, Case Number: H-07-125M, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, February 13, 2007, pp. 4-5, http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/Maldonado_Complaint.pdf.

9mm handgun, and several rounds of (non-functioning) ammunition with an undercover FBI agent posing as a weapons dealer. Prior to his arrest, Shareef had plotted to set off hand grenades in a garbage can at the CherryVale Shopping Mall near Rockford on the Friday before Christmas 2006. Shareef was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction against persons and property and with attempting to maliciously damage and destroy, by means of fire and an explosive, a building and real and personal property used in interstate commerce.⁶⁵⁶

The case began in September 2006, when the FBI assigned a cooperating witness, William “Jamaal” Chrisman, to befriend Shareef. Chrisman had converted to Islam in prison where he served time for armed robbery and car theft convictions.⁶⁵⁷ Chrisman claimed that he decided to help the government because “after 9/11 Muslim scholars in Saudi Arabia and Morocco said that it was incumbent on Muslims to stop terrorists.”⁶⁵⁸ They met at the video store where Shareef was working and hours later moved into Chrisman’s home. According to Chrisman, “He was supposed to move in with his manager. I told him he was better off staying with me, a Muslim staying with a Muslim.”⁶⁵⁹

Shareef was unaware that Chrisman was secretly recording their conversations which included his confiding to Chrisman that he wanted to commit acts of violent jihad against civilians. Shareef also discussed shooting a judge in DeKalb, IL, and attacking local buildings including city hall, the federal courthouse and the shopping center.⁶⁶⁰ Shareef also told Chrisman that he wanted to obtain weapons to commit violent jihad. Chrisman said he had a friend who could do so and would introduce them. However, the “friend” was an undercover FBI agent.⁶⁶¹

On November 30, and December 1, 2006, Shareef and Chrisman cased the CherryVale mall and allegedly plotted a grenade attack. The following day, Shareef and Chrisman made video tapes that included a last will and testament for each. On the video, Shareef again mentioned jihad and said, “This is a warning to those who disbelieve, that we are here for you and I am ready to give my life.”⁶⁶² On December 6, 2006, Shareef and the undercover agent met in the mall parking lot to exchange the speakers for four dud grenades and the handgun and ammunition. After the exchange, Shareef was arrested.

During an FBI interview on December 7, 2006, Shareef told FBI agents that he had been “pushing himself to conduct the attack on the mall” and that “no one could have stopped” him, “not even his mother.” He believed “it was the right jihad.” But he also told the agents that he

⁶⁵⁶ *United States vs. Derrick Shareef*, No. 06 CR 919, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern District, January 4, 2007, http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/indict/2007/us_v_shareef_indictment.pdf.

⁶⁵⁷ Melissa Bailey, “Ode to Osama,” *New Haven Independent*, November 28, 2007, http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/ode_to_osama/.

⁶⁵⁸ Michael Mayko, “FBI Informant Testifies in Terror Case,” *Connecticut Post*, November 30, 2007, quoted in NEFA Foundation, “The Illinois Shopping Mall Plot,” December 2007, p. 2, <http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/ChicagoPlot1207.pdf>. Hereinafter: NEFA Foundation, December 2007.

⁶⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁰ Pierre Thomas and Jason Ryan, “‘Lone Wolf’ Charged With Plotting Attack During Christmas Rush,” *abcnews.com*, December 8, 2006, <http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=2710776&page=1>. Hereinafter: Thomas and Ryan, December 8, 2006.

⁶⁶¹ Affidavit of Jared Ruddy, FBI, filed December 8, 2006 regarding criminal complaint, *United States vs. Derrick Shareef*, No. 06 CR 919, U.S. District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern District, <http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/1208061shareef1.html>.

⁶⁶² Thomas and Ryan, December 8, 2006.

“viewed his arrest by the FBI as a blessing from Allah because the FBI stopped him from doing something that Allah would have chastised him for.” Aware that “he does not have the authority to speak on behalf of Islam,” Shareef asserted that he would “rather spend the rest of his life in jail than live with the torment of having killed innocent people and having acted against Allah’s desires.”⁶⁶³

On November 28, 2007, Shareef pled guilty to one count of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. He was sentenced on September 30, 2008, to 35 years in prison.

Houston Taliban Plot—November 2006

In November 2006, the government alleged that four men—Kobie Diallo Williams, an American Muslim convert; and three foreign national students, Adnan Baber Mirza, Syed Maaz Shah, and Shiraz Syed Qazi—conspired to support the Taliban, unlawfully possess firearms, and to train with firearms to prepare to join the Taliban “to engage in battlefield jihad.”⁶⁶⁴ Specifically they were accused of meeting at shooting ranges and camp sites in Texas on at least eight occasions in 2005 and 2006 “for the purpose of conducting firearms and paramilitary training to hone their skills with weapons and to assist fighters engaging United States forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq.” They were also accused of making a contribution of goods and services to the Taliban.⁶⁶⁵

The government used two informants to build the case against the four. One of the informants told federal agents he was concerned that some of the men were preparing for armed conflict overseas. A 2005 camping trip was part of a government setup using the informants to catch the men.⁶⁶⁶

- **Kobie Diallo Williams**, a former University of Houston student, pled guilty soon after his arrest to conspiring to unlawfully possess firearms and supporting the Taliban. On August 7, 2009, he was sentenced to 4-1/2 years in prison.⁶⁶⁷
- **Syed Maaz Shah**, a Pakistani national studying at the University of Texas, Dallas, was convicted on May 24, 2007, on firearms charges, was sentenced to six years in prison, and will be deported after he has served his sentence.⁶⁶⁸
- **Shiraz Syed Qazi**, a Pakistani national who was a student at Houston Community College, was convicted on January 21, 2007, on a firearms charge

⁶⁶³ *United States v. Hassan Abujihaad*, U.S. District Court for Connecticut, Crim. No. 3:07-CR-57; Exhibit 3, Federal Bureau of Investigation FD-302 of Derrick L. Shareef, Interview conducted December 7, 2006; in NEFA Foundation, December 2007, p. 5.

⁶⁶⁴ Anti Defamation League, “Houston Man Sentenced for Supporting the Taliban,” *adl.com*, May 27, 2010, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/houston_taliban.htm. Hereinafter: ADL, May 27, 2010.

⁶⁶⁵ *United States vs. Kobie Diallo Williams and Adnan Babar Mirza*, H06-421, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, November 22, 2006 (unsealed Nov 28, 2006), http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Williams_Indictment.pdf.

⁶⁶⁶ Mary Flood, “Houston Taliban Supporter Gets 4-1/2 Years in Prison,” *Houston Chronicle*, Aug 7, 2009, <http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/6564474.html>.

⁶⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶⁸ Jason Trahan, “UTD Student Convicted for Having Weapon,” *The Dallas Morning News*, May 24, 2007, <http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/052507dntexterrorcharges.271768e.html>.

and sentenced to 10 months in prison. He was released in September 2007 after credit for time served.⁶⁶⁹

- **Adnan Baber Mirza**, a Pakistani national who was a student at Houston Community College but had overstayed his student visa, was convicted on May 27, 2010, of two conspiracy counts and seven firearms violations. He faces up to five years in prison on each conspiracy count and 10 years on the weapons counts when he is sentenced.⁶⁷⁰

The Liberty City Seven—Plot to Bomb Sears Tower in Chicago—June 2006

On June 22, 2006, seven men—**Narseal Batiste, Patrick Abraham, Stanley Grant Phanor, Naudimar Herrera, Burson Augustin, Lyglenson Lemorin, and Rotschild Augustine**—were arrested for allegedly plotting to blow up the Sears Tower in Chicago, the FBI building in North Miami Beach, and other government buildings in Miami-Dade County. Five of the men are U.S. citizens, Abraham is a legal permanent resident from Haiti, and Lemorin is a Haitian national illegally present in the United States. Each were charged with four counts: conspiracy to provide material support to a terrorist organization, namely Al Qaeda; conspiracy to provide material support and resources to terrorists; conspiracy to maliciously damage and destroy buildings by means of an explosive device; and conspiracy to levy war against the government of the United States.⁶⁷¹

The indictment alleges that Batiste intended to recruit and supervise individuals to organize and train for a mission of war against the United States, which included a plot to destroy by explosives the Sears Tower in Chicago, IL.⁶⁷² It also alleges that Batiste and his co-conspirators attempted to obtain the support of Al Qaeda for their plot.⁶⁷³ The indictment further alleges that Batiste detailed (to an FBI informant posing as an ‘Al Qaeda representative’) “his mission to wage a ‘full ground war’ against the United States in order to ‘kill all the devils we can,’ in a mission that would ‘be just as good or better than 9/11,’ beginning with the destruction of the Sears Tower.”⁶⁷⁴

The arrests resulted from an investigation involving two FBI informants and recordings and videotapes of the conspirators discussing their plot. *The Washington Post* cites court papers that indicate that one of the informants took a key role in the plotting. “Not only did government informants provide money and a meeting place for Batiste and his followers, but they also gave them video cameras for conducting surveillance, as well as cell phones, and suggested that their

⁶⁶⁹ ADL, May 27, 2010.

⁶⁷⁰ Mary Flood, “Ex-HCC Student Convicted of Trying to Help Taliban,” *Houston Chronicle*, May 28, 2010, <http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/7026012.html>.

⁶⁷¹ DOJ, “Transcript of Press Conference Announcing Florida Terrorism Indictments,” June 23, 2006. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Conference, June 23, 2006, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/Miami_Plot.pdf.

⁶⁷² *United States v. Narseal Batiste, et al.*, Case No. 06-20373, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, June 22, 2006, p. 3, http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/U.S._v_Batiste_GovtsResponse.pdf.

⁶⁷³ *Ibid.*, p.4.

⁶⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

first target be a Miami FBI office.”⁶⁷⁵ Both informants were paid for their services and one was given approval of his petition for political asylum in the United States.⁶⁷⁶

Defense attorneys for the Liberty City Seven men called the case an outrageous example of government entrapment claiming they had neither the will nor the means to carry out the crimes.⁶⁷⁷ In 2007, the jury in the first trial of the defendants acquitted Lyglenson Lemorin of all charges, but could not reach a verdict on the others. Lemorin was subsequently taken into immigration custody and was ordered deported in 2009. A second trial was held in 2008 and again the jury failed to reach verdicts against the six remaining defendants.

A third trial was held in 2009. The jury in that trial acquitted Naudimar Herrera of all charges, but convicted alleged ringleader Narseal Batiste on all four counts; Patrick Abraham on three counts; and Stanley Grant Phanor, Burson Augustin, and Rotschild Augustine on two counts each.⁶⁷⁸ In November 2009, Narseal Batiste was sentenced to 13-1/2 years in prison. Burson Augustin and Rotschild Augustine were sentenced to six and seven years, respectively. Stanley Phanor and Patrick Abraham were sentenced to eight and nine years, respectively. In November 2011, a federal appeals court upheld the convictions of all five men.⁶⁷⁹

Ehsanul Islam Sadequee and Syed Haris Ahmed—Plot to Attack Buildings in Washington, DC—April 2006

Two men living in Atlanta, GA—Ehsanul Islam Sadequee, a U.S. citizen born in Virginia, and Syed Haris Ahmed, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, were charged in April 2006 with conspiracy to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization and lying to the FBI. Prosecutors alleged that in 2005, when Ahmed and Sadequee were ages 18 and 20 respectively, they discussed violent jihad on several web forums which later grew into an active conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. Specifically, they were accused of traveling to Canada to discuss potential terrorist targets with members of the “Toronto 18,”⁶⁸⁰ a group alleged by the government of Canada to be members of an Islamic terrorist cell that had plotted a series of attacks against targets in Ontario until their arrests in June 2006.⁶⁸¹

According to a Canadian Security Intelligence Service informant, the two Americans also discussed with the group whether they would be able to hide in Canada if they were to carry out attacks in the United States.⁶⁸² Sadequee and Ahmed were also alleged to have videotaped

⁶⁷⁵ Pincus, September 2, 2006.

⁶⁷⁶ Walter Pincus, “FBI Role in Terror Probe Questioned,” *The Washington Post*, September 2, 2006, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/01/AR2006090101764.html>. Hereinafter: Pincus, September 2, 2006.

⁶⁷⁷ Carol J. Williams, “A Case of Terror or Entrapment,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 30, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/30/nation/na-liberty30>.

⁶⁷⁸ Damien Cave and Carmen Gentile, “Five Convicted in Plot to Blow Up Sears Tower,” *New York Times*, May 13, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/13/us/13miami.html>.

⁶⁷⁹ Curt Anderson, “Court Upholds Convictions of 5 in Fla. Terror Plot,” *Associated Press*, November 1, 2011.

⁶⁸⁰ For an overview and status of the “Toronto 18” cases, see “Toronto 18: Key Events in Case,” *CBC News*, <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2008/06/02/t-toronto-timeline.html>.

⁶⁸¹ DOJ Press Release, “Terrorism Defendants Sentenced in Atlanta,” December 14, 2009, <http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/December/09-nsd-1338.html>. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, December 14, 2009.

⁶⁸² PBS, *Frontline*, “Canada: The Cell Next Door,” January 30, 2007, <http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/about/> (continued...)

potential targets in the Washington, DC, area including the U.S. Capitol and the World Bank headquarters, the Masonic Temple, and a fuel farm. Later, Sadequee sent several of the videos to Younis Tsouli, a propagandist and recruiter for Al Qaeda and Asbid Hussein Khan, a facilitator for Lashkar-e-Taiba, both of whom are serving prison sentences in Great Britain for terrorism-related offenses.⁶⁸³

The two men pled not guilty to the charges, but were convicted in separate trials in August 2009. In December, Sadequee was sentenced to 17 years and Ahmed to 13 years in prison.⁶⁸⁴

Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar—Attempted Vehicular Murder at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill—March 2006

On March 3, 2006, Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar, a naturalized American citizen from Iran, drove his sport utility vehicle (SUV) into a crowd at The Pit, a popular student gathering spot at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The SUV struck several people, although none were injured seriously. Taheri-Azar was charged the next day with nine counts of attempted murder.

It was reported that police found a letter in Taheri-Azar's apartment that said he wanted revenge for the deaths of Muslims overseas that he said were caused by the United States. He said he rented a Jeep Cherokee because it was better equipped for what he planned to do.⁶⁸⁵ The chief of the University's police department confirmed that Taheri-Azar told investigators that he wanted to "avenge the deaths or murders of Muslims around the world."⁶⁸⁶

Taheri-Azar pled guilty to two counts of attempted murder. On August 26, 2008, he was sentenced to 33 years in prison.⁶⁸⁷

Toledo, Ohio Plotters—Travel Abroad to Kill Americans—February 2006

On February 21, 2006, three residents of Toledo, OH—**Mohammad Zaki Amawi**, a dual U.S. and Jordanian citizen; **Marwan Othman El-Hindi**, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Jordan; and **Wassim I. Mazloun**, a legal permanent resident from Lebanon, were charged with conspiracy to kill or maim persons in locations outside the United States, to include U.S. Armed Forces personnel serving in Iraq.⁶⁸⁸ The indictment alleges several overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. These acts included meeting another individual called "the trainer" (who was actually

(...continued)

episodes/602_transcript.html.

⁶⁸³ DOJ Press Release, December 14, 2009.

⁶⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁶ "Driver Charged for Plowing Through Crowd," *msnbc.com*, March 5, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11660817/>.

⁶⁸⁷ *Associated Press*, August 26, 2008.

⁶⁸⁸ U.S.A. vs. Mohammad Zaki Amawi, et al., Indictment 3:06CR0719, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, February 16, 2006, p. 2, http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/indictment_22006.pdf.

an undercover informant) to discuss and plan violent jihadist training. Following those meetings, the informant engaged in an instructional session on the construction and use of improvised explosive devices and timing devices, sought explosives, and participated in weapons training and practiced target shooting on several occasions.⁶⁸⁹

During a news conference announcing the charges, the agent in charge of the FBI's Cleveland office credited the Muslim and Arab American community for passing along the information that ultimately led to the arrest of the three. He said individuals within Toledo's Muslim community contacted the FBI about what he termed the "violent and radical views" the suspects were articulating.⁶⁹⁰

On June 13, 2008, a federal jury convicted all three of conspiring to commit terrorist acts against Americans overseas and providing material support to terrorists. On October 21, 2009, Amawi was sentenced to 20 years in prison, El-Hindi to 12 years in prison, and Mazloun to 8 years, 4 months in prison.⁶⁹¹

Two cousins from Illinois, **Zubair Ahmed** and **Khaleel Ahmed**, who had connections to the three Toledo men, pled guilty on January 15, 2009, to one count of conspiracy to provide material support or resources to terrorists. It was alleged that Marwan Othman El-Hindi introduced the two men to the undercover informant known as "the trainer." During this meeting, the cousins allegedly discussed sniper tactics and surveillance techniques, and said they were willing to travel abroad to carry out terror attacks.⁶⁹² In 2004, both had traveled to Cairo hoping to eventually go to Afghanistan or Iraq, but returned home after Zubair's father, Haris Ahmed, learned of their intentions. On July 12, 2010, Zubair Ahmed was sentenced to 10 years in prison, while Khaleel Ahmed received an 8-year, 4-month sentence.⁶⁹³

Jamiyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS)—Plot to Attack Targets in Southern California—August 2005

Kevin James, Levar Haley Washington, Gregory Vernon Patterson, and Hammad Riaz Samana, were arrested and charged in August 2005 for their involvement in a plot to attack Jewish institutions and other targets in the Los Angeles area, including synagogues, the Israeli Consulate, Los Angeles International Airport, U.S. military recruiting offices, and military bases.⁶⁹⁴

⁶⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 4.

⁶⁹⁰ "Toledo's Arab Community Called 'Crucial' to Terrorism Investigation," *wtol.com*, February 21, 2006, <http://www.wtol.com/Global/story.asp?S=4533250>.

⁶⁹¹ Anti Defamation League, "Three Men Face Terrorism Charges in Ohio," *adl.org*, October 21, 2009, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/Ohio_men_trial.htm.

⁶⁹² Anti Defamation League, "Chicago Cousins Plead Guilty in Terrorism Case," *adl.org*, January 26, 2009, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/ahmed_cousins_guilty.htm.

⁶⁹³ Richard A. Serrano, "Cousins Sentence in Ohio on Terrorism Charges," *latimes.com*, July 12, 2010, <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/wire/sc-dc-0713-ohio-terror.-20100712,0,6294758,print.story>.

⁶⁹⁴ Anti-Defamation League, "Two Sentenced in Los Angeles Terror Plot against Jewish Institutions," *adl.com*, August 24, 2008, http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/los_angeles_sentenced.htm.

- **Kevin James**, the apparent leader of the terror cell, pled guilty to conspiring to levy war against the United States and was sentenced on March 6, 2009, to 16 years in prison.⁶⁹⁵
- **Levar Washington** pled guilty to levy war against the United States through terrorism and conspiracy to possess and discharge firearms and was sentenced to 22 years in prison. He was sentenced to an additional 22 years in prison on August 25, 2008, on related robbery and weapons charges.⁶⁹⁶
- **Gregory Patterson** pled guilty to conspiracy to levy war against the United States through terrorism and conspiracy to possess and discharge firearms and was sentenced to 12 years in prison.⁶⁹⁷
- **Hammad Samana**, a legal U.S. resident from Pakistan, conducted Internet-based research of the targets and was the getaway driver for at least one of the gas station robberies (see below), according to a U.S. federal judge. He was later convicted and sentenced in August 2009 to 70 months in prison.⁶⁹⁸

In 1997, James founded Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheeh (JIS)—Arabic for Assembly of Authentic Islam—a group based on his interpretation of Islam, according to court documents. James' views are apparent in several documents he wrote in prison, including a 104-page document titled the *JIS Protocol*. In this document, James supports the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate in the U.S. and describes "Jihad [as] the only true 'anti-terrorist action' [,] a defensive battle against the aggression of theological imposters led by Zionism."⁶⁹⁹ The document also advocated the killing of "lawful targets," including non-Muslims.

James met Washington in prison in 2004 and introduced him to JIS and its beliefs. Washington, who converted to Islam while he was in prison, recruited Patterson, an employee at Los Angeles International Airport, and a fourth defendant, Hammad Riaz Samana, at the Jamaat-E-Masijudal mosque in Inglewood, California, where they all worshipped. Both Patterson and Samana swore allegiance to Washington and pledged to serve as "mujahideen," according to court documents.⁷⁰⁰

According to the indictment, in July 2005, the men engaged in firearms training and physical training at a park in Los Angeles in preparation for the attacks. In addition, the defendants purchased weapons or otherwise tried to acquire weapons in furtherance of their terrorist conspiracy and made efforts to raise money by robbing gas stations. The indictment alleges that eleven times beginning on May 30, 2005, the defendants—armed with shotguns—robbed or attempted to rob gas stations in several cities and towns in Southern California, including Los Angeles, Torrance, Playa Del Ray, Bellflower, Pico Rivera, Walnut, Orange, Playa Vista, and Fullerton.⁷⁰¹

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁷⁰¹ Ibid.

Part of the funds obtained in these robberies was directly linked by the FBI to Patterson's purchase of a .223 caliber rifle. The men were arrested by the Torrance police after Patterson dropped his cell phone at the scene of one of the robberies in July 2005. Police were able to connect the robberies to the larger terror plot after authorities searched Washington and Patterson's apartment and discovered various Jihadist documents.⁷⁰²

Lodi, California, Case—The Hayats—Travel to Terrorist Training Camp—June 2005

In Lodi, CA, **Umer Hayat** and **Hamid Hayat**, a Pakistani immigrant and his American son, were arrested on June 5, 2005, after allegedly lying to the FBI about the son's attendance at a terrorist training camp in Pakistan. The son, Hamid Hayat was found guilty on April 25, 2006, of one count of providing material support or resources to terrorists, and three counts of making false statements to the FBI in matters related to international/domestic terrorism.

Prosecutors alleged that between October 2003 and November, 2004, Hayat attended a jihadi training camp in Pakistan and ultimately returned to the United States with the intent to wage violent jihad upon receipt of orders.⁷⁰³ Hayat confessed to FBI agents that he had attended a terrorist training camp but his attorneys later argued that his admissions were fabrications intended to appease the federal agents he hoped would let him go home. The nine-week trial was reported to rely on that contested confession and conversations secretly taped by an FBI informant who had been paid \$200,000 to infiltrate Lodi's large Muslim community after the 9/11 attacks.⁷⁰⁴

DOJ issued a press release stating:

According to evidence adduced at trial, between March, 2003 and August, 2003, defendant Hayat, during the course of numerous recorded conversations with a cooperating witness, pledged his belief in [violent] jihad, indicated that jihad was the duty of every Muslim, indicated that he had knowledge of jihadi camps including Jaish-e-Muhammed camps in the Balakot/Mansehar area, pledged to go to a jihadi training camp, and indicated that he, in fact, was going to jihadi training after Ramadan in 2003 (which was to occur at the end of November, 2003).⁷⁰⁵

In his closing comments to the jury, the Assistant U.S. Attorney stated: "Hamid Hayat had a jihadi heart and a jihadi mind."⁷⁰⁶ In interviews, several jurors said Hayat's confession and evidence of what the jury foreman called "un-Americanism" convinced them that he posed a danger.⁷⁰⁷ In September 2006, Hamid Hayat was sentenced to 24 years in prison.

⁷⁰² Ibid.

⁷⁰³ DOJ Press Release, "Hamid Hayat Sentenced to 24 Years in Connection with Terrorism Charges," September 10, 2007, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_nsd_700.html. Hereinafter: DOJ Press Release, September 10, 2007.

⁷⁰⁴ Eric Bailey "Lodi man gets 24 years in terrorism case" *Los Angeles Times*, September 11, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/sep/11/local/me-lodi11>. Hereinafter: Bailey, September 11, 2007.

⁷⁰⁵ DOJ Press Release, September 10, 2007.

⁷⁰⁶ Bailey, September 11, 2007.

⁷⁰⁷ Ibid.

Umer Hayat, Hamid's father, was tried by a separate federal jury in early 2006 for two counts of making false statements to the FBI about having first-hand knowledge of terrorist training camps in Pakistan and that his son had attended a jihadist training camp in Pakistan. That proceeding ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Umer Hayat later pled guilty to making a false statement to the FBI and U.S. Customs and Border Protection about his attempt to carry \$28,000 into Pakistan. He was sentenced to time served.⁷⁰⁸

Albany, New York, Mosque Plot—August 2004

Two Albany, NY, residents, **Yassin M. Aref**, an Imam at the Masjid As Salam mosque in the city, and **Mohammed Mosharref Hossain**, a pizzeria owner, were convicted of conspiring to aid a terrorist group and provide support for a weapon of mass destruction, as well as money-laundering and supporting a foreign terrorist organization. They were sentenced to 15 years in prison. Aref is a refugee from Iraqi Kurdistan and Hossain is an immigrant from Bangladesh who has lived in the United States for over two decades.

The case was the result of a sting operation by the FBI which had been watching the Masjid As Salam mosque since 2002 after one of its founders had been deported following the 9/11 attacks. The FBI had an undercover informant befriend Hossain, a member of the mosque who was reported to be having financial problems with his pizza business. The informant was a Pakistani immigrant facing a long prison sentence and deportation after he had pled guilty to one felony count of engaging in the production and transfer of false government identification documents. After a period of time, Hossain asked the informant for a loan. The informant proposed a scheme to launder through Hossain's pizza shop and real estate holdings the proceeds of the sale of a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile, which was purportedly to be used in a fictitious plot to assassinate Pakistan's United Nation's envoy.⁷⁰⁹

According to court records, the Kurdish Imam, Yassin Aref, was not approached by the informant. Rather, Aref was enlisted by Hossain to witness the transactions under Muslim tradition.⁷¹⁰ However, federal authorities admitted that Aref was the "ultimate target" of the sting operation. Two months after the sting began, American military forces found Aref's name and phone number in a notebook at a bombed out encampment in Iraq that the government contended was occupied by "terrorists."⁷¹¹ The notebook was said to contain a reference in the Kurdish language to Aref as "commander" which led prosecutors to believe that Aref might be connected to the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group. It was also cited by the judge in the case as grounds for denying bail to the defendants.⁷¹²

⁷⁰⁸ DOJ Press Release, September 10, 2007.

⁷⁰⁹ Brendan Lyons, "Mosque Welcomed In Informant," *timesunion.com*, (Albany, NY), August 8, 2004, <http://www.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storyID=273922>.

⁷¹⁰ Brendan Lyons, "Terror Suspect Wants Own Trial," *timesunion.com*, December 10, 2005, <http://www.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storyID=428450&category=REGIONOTHER&BCCCode=LOCAL&newsdate=12/10/2005&TextPage=1>.

⁷¹¹ Brendan Lyons, "Suspects Raise Domestic Spy Issue," *timesunion.com*, January 5, 2006, <http://www.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storyID=436432&category=REGION&newsdate=1/5/2006>. Hereinafter: Lyons, January 5, 2006.

⁷¹² Marc Santora, "Key Evidence Cast in Doubt on a Claim of Terrorism," *New York Times*, Aug 18, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/18/nyregion/18missile.html>.

Later, however, federal prosecutors admitted to making an error and acknowledged that the word in question could be translated as “brother,” rather than “commander.” The U.S. attorney for the Northern District of New York was quoted as saying that the translation discrepancy was not terribly significant. He said the heart of the case had to do with Mr. Aref’s and Mr. Hossain’s failure to turn away from the fake plot even after they knew the intentions of the government informer.⁷¹³

Aref and Hossain were arrested on August 5, 2004, on a 19-count indictment charging them with money laundering. The government subsequently added more charges, including allegations the men conspired to provide material support to a Pakistani terrorist group.⁷¹⁴

The case was not without controversy. Aref and Hossain maintained their innocence throughout their trials. Defense attorneys claimed the two were entrapped. Pakistan angrily protested to Washington over the FBI sting operation describing it as “a bizarre mission.”⁷¹⁵ Albany’s two main daily newspapers—the Albany *Times Union* and the Schenectady *Daily Gazette*—ran editorials at the time of the sentencing asking for extreme leniency.⁷¹⁶ Two of the columnists who had followed the trial closely were also very critical of the prosecution.⁷¹⁷ And several inmates at the Rensselaer County Jail, where Aref and Hossain were being held, wrote letters to the judge in the case vouching for the defendants’ good character and benign influence.⁷¹⁸

After the indictment, an article in *The New York Times* quoted government officials as saying that Aref’s case resulted from evidence gathered by the warrantless National Security Agency domestic wiretapping program. On January 5, 2006, defense attorneys filed a motion to suppress evidence and dismiss the indictment as the fruit of illegal surveillance.⁷¹⁹ The district court denied that motion in a sealed *ex parte* opinion based on a sealed *ex parte* submission by the government. In July 2008, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in New York affirmed the district court’s ruling.

Shahawar Matin Siraj and James Elshafay—Plot to Bomb Herald Square Subway Station in New York City—August 2004

Days before the 2004 Republican National Convention, which was held in New York City, James Elshafay, a U.S. citizen, and Shahawar Matin Siraj, a Pakistani immigrant, were arrested for plotting to bomb the Herald Square subway station in New York City. The station, near Madison Square Garden, is the third busiest in the city’s transit system. The investigation was largely

⁷¹³ Ibid.

⁷¹⁴ Lyons, January 5, 2006.

⁷¹⁵ Jim Lobe, “From One Blunder to the Next,” *Asia Times*, August 11, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/FH11Df04.html.

⁷¹⁶ The FBI responded by running an op-ed piece in the *Daily Gazette* upholding the sting operation as legitimate.

⁷¹⁷ See Carl Strock, “The View from Here,” *Schenectady Daily Gazette*, February 4, 2007, <http://www.nepajac.org/Strock.htm>; and Fred LeBrun, “History Will Remember Albany Terrorism Sting As A Witch Hunt,” *Albany Times Union*, January 12, 2007, <http://www.nepajac.org/FredLeBrun.htm>.

⁷¹⁸ Carl Strock, “Inmates Go To Bat for Aref and Hossain,” *Schenectady Daily Gazette*, March 22, 2007, http://www.yassinaref.com/news/03-22-07_Strock.htm.

⁷¹⁹ *United States v. Aref and Hossain*, Brief of Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the New York Civil Liberties Union, 07-0981-CR, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, August 24, 2007, <http://www.nyclu.org/node/1051>.

conducted by the NYPD's Intelligence Division which used a paid informant, Osama Eldawoody, an Egyptian-born nuclear engineer. Eldawoody testified that he volunteered to troll the city's mosques and Muslim communities out of patriotism and a desire to show that violent extremists are the exception rather than the rule in Islam.⁷²⁰ Prosecutors at the Siraj's trial played tapes secretly recorded by Eldawoody in which Siraj discusses the plot to bomb the subway station "at length and with great zeal."⁷²¹

James Elshafay immediately agreed to cooperate with the government and pled guilty to involvement in the plot. Elshafay testified against Siraj at the latter's trial. He acknowledged taking medication for depression and schizophrenia and described the delusions that landed him in a psychiatric ward just months before he conspired with Siraj to bomb the subway station.⁷²² Elshafay was sentenced to five years in prison.

Siraj rejected a plea agreement and went to trial. His attorneys argued that he was entrapped by the police informant, Osama Eldawoody. They also attacked the credibility of the informant on the grounds that he was paid a total of \$100,000 by the police. However, prosecutors called an undercover detective who testified that he had had frequent conversations with Siraj long before he met Eldawoody. "The conversations, the detective said, were filled with Mr. Siraj's approval of suicide bombings and Osama bin Laden."⁷²³ The jury rejected the defense argument of entrapment and convicted Siraj on four counts of conspiracy, including plotting to bomb a public transportation system. He was sentenced in January 2007 to 30 years in prison.

Iyman Faris—Plot Against Brooklyn Bridge—June 2003

Iyman Faris, a naturalized U.S. citizen born in Kashmir, Pakistan, and living in Columbus, OH, pled guilty on May 1, 2003, to casing the Brooklyn Bridge in New York City for Al Qaeda, and researching and providing information to Al Qaeda regarding the tools necessary for possible attacks on U.S. targets. According to DOJ, "Faris admitted that in April 2002, he researched "gas cutters"—the equipment for severing bridge suspension cables—and the New York City bridge on the Internet. Between April 2002 and March 2003, he sent several coded messages indicating he had been unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain the necessary equipment. Faris admitted to traveling to New York City in late 2002 to examine the bridge, and said he concluded that the plot to destroy the bridge by severing cables was unlikely to succeed because of the bridge's security and structure. In early 2003, he sent a message that "the weather is too hot"—a coded message indicating that the bridge plot was unlikely to succeed.⁷²⁴ He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Time Magazine reports that government officials were led to Faris by **Khalid Shaikh Mohammed**, the high-ranking Al Qaeda operative and alleged mastermind of the 9/11 attacks who is in U.S. custody. Reportedly, after Mohammed's capture in Pakistan, agents discovered the coded, "the weather is too hot" e-mail sent from the U.S. to one of his associates. The e-mail was

⁷²⁰ William K. Rashbaum, "Guilty Verdict in Plot to Bomb Subway Station," *New York Times*, May 25, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/25/nyregion/25herald.html>. Hereinafter: Rashbaum, May 25, 2006.

⁷²¹ William K. Rashbaum, "Staten Island Man Describes Shattered Life, Then Plot to Bomb Subway Station," *New York Times*, May 19, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/10/nyregion/10herald.html>.

⁷²² *Ibid.*

⁷²³ Rashbaum, May 25, 2006.

⁷²⁴ DOJ Press Release, "Iyman Faris Sentenced for Providing Material Support to Al Qaeda," Oct 28, 2003, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/October/03_crm_589.htm.

one of the factors that helped investigators pull Faris' name out of Mohammed during his interrogations by U.S. authorities. Faris was then secretly detained two weeks later. Faris acknowledged that he wrote the e-mail and was referring to the impossibility of an Al Qaeda plot to bring down the sturdy, well-guarded Brooklyn Bridge by cutting its suspension cables.⁷²⁵

Sometime in March 2003, according to DOJ officials, FBI agents persuaded Faris to cooperate with the government. *Time Magazine* quotes law-enforcement officials who say that he was brought to a safe house in Virginia. "Faris sent messages to his bosses via cell phone and e-mail. 'He was sitting in the safe house making calls for us,' says a senior Administration official. 'It was a huge triumph for law enforcement.'"⁷²⁶

Ahmed Omar Abu Ali—Plot to Assassinate President Bush— June 2003

Abu Ali, an American-born Muslim raised in Northern Virginia, was convicted on November 22, 2005, on nine terrorism charges, including conspiracy to assassinate President George W. Bush, conspiracy to commit air piracy, and providing material support to Al Qaeda. Ali was originally arrested by Saudi Arabian authorities in June 2003, while he was studying at the Islamic University of Medina.⁷²⁷ The arrest came one month after an Al Qaeda attack on three residential compounds in Riyadh had killed 27 foreign workers. He was held in Saudi custody for 20 months without charges or access to an attorney. U.S. officials did not request extradition; however, FBI agents participated in some of the interrogations.⁷²⁸

In the summer of 2004, Abu Ali's family brought a civil suit in U.S. District Court seeking a writ of *habeas corpus*. While that suit was pending, Abu Ali was returned to the United States and on February 22, 2005, an indictment was unsealed charging him with six terrorism counts.⁷²⁹ Later, a superseding indictment added additional charges.

The government's case against Abu Ali was based primarily on evidence gathered by Saudi authorities which included a videotaped confession. Although the assassination and hijacking plots never got past the talking stage, it was alleged that between September 2002 and June 2003, Abu Ali had met with several unnamed co-conspirators, two of whom were later revealed to be leaders of an Al Qaeda cell in Medina—**Sultan Jubran Sultan al-Qahtani**, and **Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faq'asi al-Ghamdi**.⁷³⁰ Among the discussions with the co-conspirators were "options for assassinating President Bush: (1) an operation in which Abu Ali would get close enough to the President to shoot him on the street, and (2) an operation in which Abu Ali would

⁷²⁵ Daniel Eisenberg, et al., "The Triple Life of a Qaeda Man," *Time Magazine*, June 30, 2003, <http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1005104,00.html>.

⁷²⁶ Ibid.

⁷²⁷ Larry Abramson, "Jury Finds Abu Ali Guilty on Terrorism Charges," *National Public Radio*, November 22, 2005, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5024013>. Hereinafter: Abramson, *National Public Radio*, November 22, 2005.

⁷²⁸ Spencer Ackerman, "Suspect Policy," *The New Republic*, March 14, 2005, <http://www.tnr.com/article/suspect-policy-0>.

⁷²⁹ *United States v. Abu Ali*, 1:05CR53, In the U.S. District for the Eastern District of Virginia, February 3, 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf/AliIndictment.pdf>. Hereinafter: *U.S. vs. Ali*, February 3, 2005.

⁷³⁰ *United States v. Abu Ali*, No. 06-4334 and No. 06-4521, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Jun 6, 2008, <http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/064334.P.pdf>.

detonate a car bomb.”⁷³¹ At trial, Abu Ali’s attorneys countered that while in Saudi custody their client had been beaten and whipped repeatedly until he agreed to confess.⁷³² But, the judge, jury, and appellate court rejected that argument. A juror said after the trial that Abu Ali’s videotaped confession was “chilling” and showed no sign of coercion.⁷³³

Abu Ali was originally sentenced to 30 years in prison. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the conviction and sent the case back for resentencing. The U.S. District judge increased the sentence to life in prison which he is serving at the federal “Supermax” prison in Florence, CO.

Virginia “Jihad” Network—June 2003

Eleven men from Northern Virginia were charged on June 27, 2003, with a variety of offenses including weapons counts, providing material support to terrorist groups, and for violating the Neutrality Act of 1939,⁷³⁴ which prohibits U.S. citizens and residents from attacking countries with which the United States is at peace. The men were accused of being part of a jihadist network whose objective was to wage holy war against nations deemed hostile to Islam. They were dubbed by some in the media as the “Paintball” terrorists because they were alleged to have used paintball games in the woods near Fredericksburg, VA, in 2000 and 2001 as military training.⁷³⁵

After the indictment, 4 of the 11 men pled guilty and cooperated with the government. In a superseding indictment on September 25, 2003, additional charges were levied against the 7 remaining defendants, including conspiracy to support terrorist organizations, namely Al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba, (LeT) a Kashmiri-based group that has been designated by the U.S. government as a terrorist organization.⁷³⁶ Two of these remaining defendants pled guilty in January 2004.

In 2004 and 2005, charges were brought against two additional Northern Virginia residents. The alleged spiritual leader of the group, **Ali al-Timimi**, was indicted in September 2004 for counseling and inducing several of the other defendants to conspire to levy war against the United States along with other charges. He was found guilty on April 26, 2005, on 10 counts and sentenced to life in prison.⁷³⁷

The Washington Post reported that the heart of the government’s evidence against al-Timimi was a meeting he attended in Fairfax, Virginia five days after the 9/11 attacks. Al-Timimi told his

⁷³¹ *U.S. vs. Ali*, February 3, 2005.

⁷³² Abramson, *National Public Radio*, November 22, 2005.

⁷³³ Jerry Markon, “Falls Church Man’s Sentence in Terror Plot is Increased to Life,” *Washington Post*, July 28, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/27/AR2009072701384.html>.

⁷³⁴ The text of the act may be found within U.S. Department of State Publication 1983, *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941* (Washington, DC: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943, pp. 494-505).

⁷³⁵ “Two ‘Paintball’ Terrorists Sentenced,” *Associated Press* in *foxnews.com*, April 9, 2004, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,116729,00.html>.

⁷³⁶ Jerry Markon and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Indictment Expands Va. ‘Jihad’ Charges,” *The Washington Post*, September 26, 2003, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2730-2003Sep25.html>.

⁷³⁷ U.S. Attorneys’ Office, Eastern District of Virginia; News Release, April 26, 2005, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/73.pdf.

followers that ‘the time had come for them to go abroad and join the mujaheddin engaged in violent jihad in Afghanistan,’ according to court papers.⁷³⁸ Defense lawyers claimed his rhetoric merely reflected his right to free speech. After seven days of deliberation, the jury rejected that argument. At sentencing, the judge said she was satisfied that the case did not “violate any of al-Timimi’s First Amendment rights. This is not a case about speech. This is a case about intent.”⁷³⁹

On September 15, 2005, prosecutors also charged **Ali Asad Chandia** as part of the Virginia Jihad Network conspiracy. Chandia, a former teacher at a Muslim school in Maryland, was accused of assisting an LeT operative, **Mohammed Ajmal Khan**, in procuring military-purpose equipment for use against India. Evidence was presented at trial that Chandia made a three-month trip to Pakistan in 2001-2002 where he met and allied with Khan who is currently serving a nine-year sentence in Britain for his terrorist activities.⁷⁴⁰ Chandia was convicted on June 6, 2006, and sentenced to 15 years in prison.

The following is a summary of the disposition of all of the accused defendants:⁷⁴¹

- **Ali Al-Timimi**—an Iraqi American U.S. citizen, was convicted on April 26, 2005, and sentenced to life in prison for soliciting treason, counseling and inducing others to wage war against the United States, and using firearms and explosives in furtherance of those offenses.
- **Ali Asad Chandia**—a Pakistani American U.S. citizen, was convicted on June 6, 2006, and sentenced to 15 years, for providing material support to the LeT.
- **Masaud Khan**—a Pakistani American U.S. citizen, was convicted on March 4, 2004, and sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to wage war against the United States, providing material support to LeT, and using automatic weapons in furtherance of crimes of violence.
- **Seifullah Chapman**—a U.S. citizen, was convicted on March 4, 2004, and sentenced to 85 years (later reduced to 65 years) in prison for conspiring to provide material support to LeT, violating the Neutrality Act of 1939, using firearms in furtherance of crimes of violence, and using an automatic weapon in furtherance of crimes of violence.
- **Caliph Basha Abdur-Raheem**—a U.S. citizen, was acquitted of all charges on February 20, 2004.
- **Randall Royer**—a U.S. citizen, pled guilty in January 2004 and was sentenced to 20 years in prison for aiding and abetting the use and discharge of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and of aiding and abetting the carrying of an explosive during the commission of a felony.

⁷³⁸ Jerry Markon, “Muslim Lecturer Sentenced to Life,” *The Washington Post*, July 14, 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/13/AR2005071302169.html>.

⁷³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁰ *The Times of India*, “Teacher Jailed for Aiding LeT,” August 26, 2006, <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1929483.cms>.

⁷⁴¹ DOJ Press Release, April 26, 2005, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/73.pdf; U.S. Attorneys’ Office, Eastern District of Virginia; Press Release, “‘Virginia Jihad’ Member Sentenced to 121 Months in Prison,” July 24, 2007, <http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/vae/Pressreleases/07-JulyPDFArchive/07/20070724benkahlanr...7/25/2007>.

- **Ibrahim Al-Hamdi**—a Yemeni national, pled guilty in January 2004, and was sentenced to 17 years in prison for unlawfully possessing a firearm, possessing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and carrying an explosive—specifically, a rocket-propelled grenade—during the commission of a crime.
- **Yong Ki Kwon**—a naturalized U.S. citizen from Korea, pled guilty in August 2003, and was sentenced to 11 years, 6 months for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence, and transferring a firearm for use in a crime of violence.
- **Sabri Benkhala**, a U.S. citizen, was acquitted in March 2004 of charges related to the original June 2003 indictment. He was then granted statutory immunity and testified twice before the grand jury, and submitted to interviews with the FBI. He was subsequently convicted in February 2007 of making materially false statements in 2004, both in his grand jury appearances and to the FBI. He was sentenced to 10 years, 1 month in prison.
- **Khwaja Mahmood Hasan**—a naturalized U.S. citizen from Pakistan, pled guilty in August 2003, and was sentenced to 11 years, 3 months in prison for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States, and using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence.
- **Muhammed Aatique**—a legal resident from Pakistan, pled guilty in September 2003, and was sentenced to 10 years, 2 months, for aiding others in commencing a military expedition against a friendly nation and using and discharging a firearm in relation to a crime of violence.
- **Hammad Abdur-Raheem**—a U.S. citizen (and no relation to acquitted defendant Caliph Basha Abdur-Raheem), was convicted on March 4, 2004, and was sentenced to 52 months in prison for conspiring to provide material support to LeT and violating the Neutrality Act of 1939.
- **Donald Thomas Surratt**—a U.S. citizen, pled guilty in August 2003, and was sentenced to three years, 10 months for conspiring to commit an offense against the United States and transporting a firearm in interstate commerce with reason to know a felony would be committed with it.

Hasan Akbar—Attack on Soldiers at U.S. Army Post in Kuwait— March 23, 2003

On March 23, 2003, two days after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Army Sergeant Hasan Akbar killed two U.S. Army officers and wounded 14 others at Camp Pennsylvania in Kuwait, 25 miles from the Iraq border. At approximately 1:30 a.m., Akbar shut off the generator that lit the camp, then tossed grenades into three tents where officers were asleep or preparing for bed. He is reported to have yelled, “We are under attack.” As soldiers rushed outside, he opened fire with an M-4 automatic rifle.⁷⁴²

Akbar was born Mark Fidel Kools in 1971. His mother said she changed his name to Hasan Akbar after she remarried when he was a young boy. The family into which she married were

⁷⁴² NEFA Backgrounder: Hasan Akbar, January 2010.

members of the Nation of Islam. In 1988, Akbar enrolled at the University of California, Davis, with a double major in aeronautical and mechanical engineering. He graduated nine years later with a bachelor's degree and joined the Army in 1998.⁷⁴³

The attack has been attributed to various motivations. Military criminal investigators reported that Akbar had been recently reprimanded for insubordination and was told he would not join his unit's push into Iraq. An Army spokesman said Akbar had been having "an attitude problem." Another spokesman stated that the motive in the attack "most likely was resentment."⁷⁴⁴

At his April 2005 court martial, Akbar's attorney argued that Akbar was concerned the invasion of Iraq would result in the deaths of Muslims and that U.S. soldiers would rape Iraqi women. He said the prosecution's depiction of Akbar as a cold-blooded killer ignored that the defendant was sufficiently mentally ill—though not insane—to be confused and fearful about the impending invasion of Iraq.⁷⁴⁵

Writing of his fellow soldiers in a diary entry dated February 4, 2003, he stated:

I suppose they want to punk me or just humiliate me. Perhaps they feel that I will not do anything about that. They are right about that. I am not going to do anything about it as long as I stay here. But as soon as I am in Iraq, I am going to try and kill as many of them as possible.

I will have to decide to kill my Muslim brothers fighting for Saddam Hussein or my battle buddies. I am hoping to get into a position so I don't have to take any crap from anyone anymore.⁷⁴⁶

On April 22, 2005, after two and one-half hours deliberation, a military jury at Fort Bragg convicted Akbar of two counts of premeditated murder and three counts of attempted premeditated murder. He was sentenced to death one week later. Akbar is the first American since the Vietnam era to be prosecuted on charges of murdering a fellow soldier during wartime.⁷⁴⁷

Lackawanna Six –Training at Al Qaeda Camp –September 2002

Six American citizens of Yemeni descent were arrested on September 13, 2002, and later charged with providing material support to a terrorist organization. The press dubbed the six suspects—**Sahim Alwan, Yahya Goba, Shafal Mosed, Yasein Taher, Faysal Galab, and Mukhtar al-Bakri**—the "Lackawanna Six" (also the "Buffalo Six" or "Buffalo Cell") because five of them were born and raised in Lackawanna, a suburb of Buffalo, NY.

⁷⁴³ "Akbar Convicted of Murder," *Associated Press*, in *FoxNews.com*, April 22, 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,154220,00.html>. Hereinafter: "Akbar Convicted of Murder," April 22, 2005.

⁷⁴⁴ "Army: U.S. Soldier Acted Out of Resentment in Grenade Attack," *Associated Press*, in *FoxNews.com*, March 24, 2003, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,81898,00.html>.

⁷⁴⁵ "Akbar Convicted of Murder," April 22, 2005.

⁷⁴⁶ Quoted in Daniel Pipes, "Hasan Akbar's Chilling Diary Entries," April 15, 2010, <http://www.danielpipes.org/blog/2005/04/hasan-akbars-chilling-diary-entries>.

⁷⁴⁷ "Akbar Convicted of Murder," *Associated Press* in *Fox News*, April 22, 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,154220,00.html>.

Prosecutors alleged that in the spring of 2001, the men traveled to Afghanistan, where they attended Al Farooq training camp. Three of the men—Taher, Galab, and Mosed—traveled in one group in April 2001, going from Canada to Pakistan via London and the United Arab Emirates. The four others—Alwan, Goba, al-Bakri, and Elbaneh—allegedly traveled from New York to Pakistan in May 2001. Once in Pakistan, they allegedly crossed over the border in Afghanistan to attend the training camp. The men stayed for five to six weeks, except for Alwan, who left after 10 days.⁷⁴⁸ The men later admitted to authorities that while at Al Farooq camp they were trained in the use of automatic weapons, including Kalashnikovs, M-16 rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and explosives. They also met Osama bin Laden.⁷⁴⁹

The Lackawanna Six first came to the attention of authorities in the spring of 2001 when the FBI received an anonymous, handwritten letter apparently from someone in Lackawanna's Yemeni community. The letter said that a group has traveled to "meet bin Laden and stay in his camp for training."⁷⁵⁰ Subsequently, the FBI interviewed one of the men, Sahim Alwan, when he returned from abroad. Alwan, however, told the FBI that he only traveled to Pakistan for religious training.

Another member, Mukhtar Al-Bakri, came under increased surveillance after the U.S. government reviewed and analyzed an e-mail he sent while traveling in Saudi Arabia. The e-mail referred to an upcoming "big meal" that authorities interpreted as a code for an impending terrorist attack.⁷⁵¹ Additional intelligence information was later received that suggested the Lackawanna suspects were the targets of an Al Qaeda recruitment operation.⁷⁵² In the tense atmosphere after the 9/11 attacks, this led to concerns that the group may be a sleeper cell.⁷⁵³

When the FBI learned that al-Bakri had traveled to Bahrain to get married, they asked authorities there to detain him. During an interview with an Arabic-speaking FBI agent, al-Bakri admitted to having attended Al Farooq camp and named the other members of the Lackawanna Six, who were then subsequently arrested on September 13, 2002.

In their joint report, "Chasing the Sleeper Cell,"⁷⁵⁴ *The New York Times* and Public Broadcasting Service's (PBS's) *Frontline* summarized the disposition of the Lackawanna Six and others associated with the case:

- **Sahim Alwan** was a college-educated, married man with three children. After he arrived at Al Farooq camp, Alwan claimed he quickly had a change of heart and begged the camp authorities to let him return home. He was allowed to leave, but first was taken to a personal meeting with bin Laden, in which Al Qaeda's leader

⁷⁴⁸ Susan Candiotti, "Prosecutors: No bail for six accused of helping al Qaeda," *CNN.com*, September 19, 2002, <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/09/18/buffalo.terror.probe/>.

⁷⁴⁹ DOJ Press Release, "U.S. Attorney's Office Successfully Concludes Terrorism Case, With Sixth Conviction of Al Qaeda Supporter," May 19, 2003, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/898.pdf.

⁷⁵⁰ PBS, "Chasing the Sleeper Cell," October 16, 2003, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/etc/synopsis.html>. Hereinafter: PBS, October 16, 2003.

⁷⁵¹ Ibid.

⁷⁵² Ibid.

⁷⁵³ Dina Temple-Raston, "How Great a Threat Were the Lackawanna Six?," *Morning Edition, National Public Radio*, September 10, 2007, based on the book: Dina Temple-Raston, *The Jihad Next Door: The Lackawanna Six and Rough Justice in the Age of Terror*, (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007). <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14285994>.

⁷⁵⁴ PBS, October 16, 2003.

asked about the status of Muslims in the United States. He was also asked by a bin Laden associate to deliver two copies of a videotape showing the bombing of the USS *Cole* to a contact in Pakistan, which he did. After being confronted with information obtained from the arrest and interrogation of Mukhtar al-Bakri, Alwan confessed to the FBI and in April 2003, pled guilty to material support of terrorism. He was sentenced to nine and a half years in prison.

- **Yahya Goba** did not grow up in Lackawanna. He was born in The Bronx, was raised for a while in Yemen, and moved to Western New York in the late 1996. In his March 2003 guilty plea, Goba admitted having trained to use firearms, including a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, as well as explosives. He also said that Osama bin Laden had spoken at the camp of men “willing to become martyrs for the cause.” In December 2003, Goba was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
- **Shafal Mosed** pled guilty in March 2003 to providing material support to Al Qaeda and was sentenced to eight years in prison.
- **Yasein Taher** pled guilty in May 2003 to providing material support to Al Qaeda and was sentenced to eight years in prison.
- **Faysal Galab** was the first of the Lackawanna Six to pled guilty to material support of terrorism in January 2003. In his plea, he admitted to traveling to the camp, knowing that the trip was illegal, and receiving weapons training. He also acknowledged Osama bin Laden had spoken at the camp. He was sentenced to seven years in prison.
- **Mukhtar al-Bakri** was arrested on his wedding night in a hotel room in Manama, Bahrain. During his FBI interview, he was the first to admit that the group had not attended religious training in Pakistan, but rather traveled to the terrorist training camp in Afghanistan. His confession paved the way for the FBI to bring charges against the Lackawanna men. He also admitted that he trained in the use of weapons and explosives at an Al Qaeda camp. In June 2003, he was the last of the six to pled guilty to material support and was sentenced to 10 years in prison.

Three other men were also implicated in the Lackawanna Six case. Authorities believe the three played roles in the recruitment of the Lackawanna Six:

- **Kemal Derwish** was born in Buffalo and raised in Saudi Arabia. He reportedly had trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and fought with Muslims in Bosnia. U.S. intelligence sources say the Saudi government deported Derwish in 1997 for alleged extremist activities. He spent a year in Yemen before heading back to his hometown of Lackawanna in 1998 where he began giving informal talks at a local mosque. The group met in his apartment, where he reportedly told them that attacks on Muslims around the world obligate them to train for jihad to defend their Muslim brothers. Authorities believe that the trip by the group to Afghanistan grew out of religious discussions led by Derwish. He was reportedly killed in 2002 by a CIA Predator drone that was tracking **Qaed Salim Sinan al Harethi**, known as “Abu Ali,” and believed to be one of the planners of the USS *Cole* bombing.⁷⁵⁵

⁷⁵⁵ Ibid.

- **Juma Al Dosari** is described as a Muslim fighter and itinerant Imam from Saudi Arabia, who is believed to have fought with Derwish in Bosnia. Upon his arrival in Lackawanna, the reportedly charismatic Al Dosari gave a sermon railing against Arab governments who do nothing while Muslims die on a daily basis. According to people in the community, the leaders of the Lackawanna mosque were so troubled by Al Dosari's militant tone that he was not invited back. Two weeks after the 9/11 attacks, Al Dosari left Lackawanna to fight with the Taliban in Afghanistan. He was captured sometime in the fall of 2001 and declared an enemy combatant. He was subsequently sent to the special prison camp at the U.S. Naval Base on Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. His interrogation there led to the information that the Lackawanna Six were the targets of an Al Qaeda recruitment operation. In 2007, after five years of the detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, he was released to Saudi Arabia, with no charges against him.⁷⁵⁶
- **Jaber A. Elbaneh**, a Yemeni American also attended Al Farooq training camp with al-Bakri, Alwan and Goba. At the camp, Elbaneh told Alwan that he wanted to fight with the Taliban and was willing to become a martyr. He never returned to the U.S. after his trip to Afghanistan and eventually fled to Yemen. In May 2003, the U.S. government unsealed an indictment charging him with providing material support to Al Qaeda. The FBI also put him on its list of world's most wanted terrorism suspects.⁷⁵⁷ It has been reported that he is in Yemeni custody, but because there is no extradition treaty between the United States and Yemen, it is not clear whether he will be returned for trial.⁷⁵⁸

Jose Padilla—Alleged “Dirty Bomb” Plot—May 2002

Jose Padilla, a former Chicago gang member and convert to Islam, was arrested on May 8, 2002, at O'Hare Airport in Chicago for suspicion of planning to explode a radiological dispersion device, or “dirty bomb” (an explosive containing radioactive material) in the United States. A month later, he would become the first American citizen arrested on U.S. soil to be declared an “enemy combatant,” and then was held indefinitely without trial or charging him with a crime. This led to a legal confrontation between the Bush Administration and Padilla's attorneys as well as various civil liberties groups that lasted several years and reached all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The constitutional issues involved the extent to which the President, as commander-in-chief, has the authority to take extraordinary measures for the security of Americans even if those measures infringe on an accused citizen's access to legal counsel and relief from unlawful detention (*habeas corpus*).⁷⁵⁹

The government's initial suspicions about Padilla were based on information provided to interrogators by **Abu Zubaydah**, a senior official of Al Qaeda who was in American custody at an undisclosed location overseas. He did not name Mr. Padilla but described him physically and referred to him as a Latin American man who went by a Muslim name. Intelligence agents then

⁷⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁵⁸ Dan Herbeck, “Yemen Holds Lackawanna 6 Figure,” *Buffalo News*, Jan 20, 2010, <http://www.buffalonews.com/2010/01/20/929584/yemen-holds-lackawanna-6-figure.html>.

⁷⁵⁹ For a detailed discussion, see CRS Report RL33180, *Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal Court*, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.

were able to link the name given by Abu Zubaydah to “an Arab alias not mentioned by the detainee.” That “alias” led the agent to Mr. Padilla’s Florida driver’s license. The photo on that license was shown to “a detainee,” presumed to be Abu Zubaydah, who confirmed that Mr. Padilla was the “Latin American” he had been describing.⁷⁶⁰

Padilla remained in custody for one month after his arrest in May 2002 on a material witness warrant. But, Justice Department officials faced a deadline to release him pursuant to laws that protect U.S. citizens from indefinite detention. They were also confronted with the challenge of making a case against Padilla that would stand up in court without bringing Abu Zubaydah or other captured Al Qaeda officials into an American courtroom.⁷⁶¹ Instead, on June 9, 2002, President George W. Bush approved Padilla’s reclassification as an “enemy combatant,” which would not entitle him to trial in civilian courts. He was transferred after midnight to the brig of a South Carolina naval base, where he was held incommunicado, not even allowed visits from his attorney, for over 3-1/2 years, most of which was spent in solitary confinement.⁷⁶²

In announcing Padilla’s May arrest, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced at a June 10, 2002, news conference, “We have disrupted an unfolding terrorist plot to attack the United States by exploding a radioactive dirty bomb.” He added that the government’s suspicions about Padilla’s plans came from “multiple, independent, corroborating sources.”⁷⁶³

But shortly thereafter, CBS News reported that FBI sources were “backing off” Ashcroft’s assertion that there was a specific, developed, and real plan to use a “dirty bomb” in the United States. According to one law enforcement official speaking on condition of anonymity, “FBI’s investigation has produced no evidence that Padilla had begun preparations for an attack and little reason to believe he had any support from Al Qaeda to direct such a plot.”⁷⁶⁴

Dale Watson, who was then FBI’s executive assistant director for counterterrorism, read the complete file on Padilla and later said, “My recollection was that this was a rather weak case. There was some information, but it needed a lot more work on the investigative side to flesh out all the facts.”⁷⁶⁵

On June 1, 2004, DOJ responded to a written request by Senator Orrin Hatch, then the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, “asking the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense to supply whatever information [they] could about American citizens being held as enemy combatants here in the United States.”⁷⁶⁶ In addition, then-Deputy Attorney General James Comey held a news conference where he laid out a detailed summary of the government’s case

⁷⁶⁰ Deborah Sontag, “Terror Suspect’s Path From Streets to Brig,” *New York Times*, April 25, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/us/terror-suspect-s-path-from-streets-to-brig.html>. Hereinafter: Sontag, April 25, 2004.

⁷⁶¹ This factor was acknowledged by then-Deputy Attorney General James Comey. See “Transcript of News Conference on Jose Padilla,” *CNN.com*, June 1, 2004, <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/01/comey.padilla.transcript/>. Hereinafter: Transcript of News Conference, June 1, 2004.

⁷⁶² *New York Times*, “Times Topics: Jose Padilla,” March 6, 2009, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/p/jose_padilla/index.html.

⁷⁶³ Dan Collins, “Dirty Bomb’ Suspect A Nobody?” *CBS News*, Aug 14, 2002, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/08/27/attack/main519996.shtml>.

⁷⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁵ Sontag, April 25, 2004.

⁷⁶⁶ Transcript of News Conference, June 1, 2004.

against Padilla. The case was largely derived from statements made by Padilla himself while he was interrogated in military custody, but which Comey claimed was substantiated by other sources. At the news conference, Comey traced Padilla's travel through Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He identified Al Qaeda officials he met, which included not only Abu Zubaydah, but Al Qaeda military commander Mohammed Atef and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. He also described the training Padilla received and terrorist plots discussed including one to blow up apartment buildings in the United States using natural gas as well as an attack using a dirty bomb.⁷⁶⁷

Comey also noted that the government could not make a case against Padilla through the criminal justice system when he was originally arrested two years before "without jeopardizing intelligence sources."⁷⁶⁸ But, he went on to say that the questioning of Padilla was not undertaken to try and make a criminal case against him. "It was done to find out the truth about what he knew about Al Qaeda and threats to the United States."⁷⁶⁹

Soon after Padilla was declared an enemy combatant, his appointed counsel filed a *habeas corpus* petition on his behalf. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which held that Padilla had filed his habeas petition in the wrong court. In 2004, Padilla's counsel filed a new *habeas corpus* petition in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina. The District Court ruled that Padilla's detention had not been authorized by Congress and was therefore unlawful. The government appealed to the Fourth Circuit. On September 9, 2005, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Richmond, VA, reversed the trial court's decision and held that the president was authorized to detain enemy combatants under the Authorization of Use of Military Force passed by Congress in the wake of September 11. Padilla then filed a petition for *certiorari*⁷⁷⁰ in the United States Supreme Court.⁷⁷¹

In November 2005, while the Supreme Court was considering Padilla's petition for review, the Bush Administration suddenly announced that criminal charges had been filed against him in federal court in Miami. The new indictment made no mention of the dirty bomb or most of the other original charges. Instead, Padilla was charged with being part of a "North American support cell" that worked to support violent jihad campaigns in Afghanistan and elsewhere overseas from 1993 to 2001.⁷⁷²

The government then asked the Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals to vacate its decision upholding Padilla's confinement.⁷⁷³ The Fourth Circuit refused to vacate its order or approve of Padilla's transfer from military to civilian custody. In an opinion by Judge J. Michael Luttig, the Fourth Circuit worried about "an appearance that the government may be attempting to avoid

⁷⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁰ Certiorari is the name given to certain appellate proceedings for re-examination of actions of a trial court, or inferior appeals court.

⁷⁷¹ *Padilla v. Hanft*, American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia, November 30, 2006, <http://www.acluva.org/docket/padilla.html>.

⁷⁷² See Michael McGough, "How Do You Solve a Problem Like Padilla?" *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, January 2, 2006, <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06002/631159-108.stm#ixzz0pA44Cy40>. Hereinafter, McGough, January 2, 2006.

⁷⁷³ For more information on this case, see CRS Report R41156, *Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees: Major Court Rulings*, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.

consideration of our decision by the Supreme Court.”⁷⁷⁴ Judge Luttig also “chastised the administration for using one set of facts to justify holding Padilla without charges and another set to persuade a grand jury in Florida to indict him.”⁷⁷⁵

Padilla’s attorneys, in the meantime, sought to have the criminal charges against him dismissed on the grounds that the psychological damage he suffered during his confinement from abuse and extreme isolation had left him incompetent to stand trial. The judge in the case denied the motion, without ruling on the merits of the defense accusations of abuse. The criminal trial began in September 2006.⁷⁷⁶

Padilla was convicted on August 16, 2007, along with two co-defendants, **Adham Amin Hassoun** and **Kifah Wael Jayyousi**, of conspiracy to murder, kidnap and maim people in a foreign country. In January 2008, Padilla was sentenced to 17 years and 4 months in prison while his co-defendants were given shorter sentences.⁷⁷⁷ In September 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Atlanta vacated his sentence, deeming it too lenient.⁷⁷⁸

Portland Seven—Attempted Travel to Afghanistan to Support the Taliban—October 2001

In the days following the 9/11 attacks, six men reportedly met at various times in the Portland, OR, area, where they made plans to travel to Afghanistan to fight against the Armed Forces of the United States. They also conducted weapons training on two occasions at a gravel pit in Washougal, WA. A seventh person, October Martinique Lewis, admitted that she transferred funds for the purpose of assisting her ex-husband who was one of the conspirators. The group, who came to be known as the “Portland Seven,” called themselves, *Katibat al Mawt*—“The Squad of Death.”⁷⁷⁹ They were⁷⁸⁰

- **Habis Abdulla Al Saoub**, a Jordanian-born man and reputed militant jihadist, was considered to be the *de facto* leader of the group.
- **Patrice Lumumba Ford** is a U.S. citizen who converted to Islam during a trip to China. He has been described as an intelligent, gentle, exemplary young man, well-known in Portland’s African American community. But prior to the events of 9/11, was so upset by this country’s Middle Eastern policy that he sent an e-mail

⁷⁷⁴ *Padilla v. Hanft*, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, CA-04-2221-26AJ, December 21, 2005, p. 4.

⁷⁷⁵ McGough, Jan 2, 2006.

⁷⁷⁶ Amanda Ripley, “The Case of the Dirty Bomber” *Time Magazine*, Jun 16, 2002, <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,262917,00.html#ixzz0p9fME32v>.

⁷⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷⁸ Lizette Alvarez, “Sentence for Terrorist Is Too Short, Court Rules,” *New York Times*, September 19, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/us/jose-padillas-prison-sentence-too-short-appeals-court-says.html?hp=&pagewanted=print>.

⁷⁷⁹ Deborah Howlett, “The Two Sides of One Law, The Two Lives of One Man,” *Newark Star-Ledger*, July 24, 2005, <http://web.archive.org/web/20070503154313/http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/index.ssf?/news/ledger/stories/patriotact/parthree.html>. Hereinafter: Howlett, July 24, 2005.

⁷⁸⁰ Nick Budnick, “The Making of a ‘Terrorist,’” *Williamette Week Online*, October 16, 2002, <http://www.wweek.com/story.php?story=3246>.

to Portland Mayor Vera Katz's office that was troubling enough in its anti-Semitism to be forwarded to the police.

- **Ahmed Ibrahim Bilal** and **Muhammad Ibrahim Bilal** are American-born brothers of Saudi descent.
- **Jeffrey Leon Battle** is a former cosmetics salesman who moved to the Portland area from Houston.
- **Maher "Mike" Hawash** is a software engineer and naturalized American citizen from the West Bank who grew up in Kuwait.
- **October Martinique Lewis**, Battle's ex-wife, moved with him from Houston.

Al Saoub, Ford, and Battle first came to the attention of law enforcement authorities on September 29, 2001, after they were seen engaged in shooting practice in a gravel pit in Skamania County, Washington, near Washougal. The group was discovered by a deputy sheriff who was acting on a tip from a neighbor who had heard gunfire in the pit. Deputy Mercer let the men go after taking their names and reported the incident to the FBI.⁷⁸¹

Sometime after February 2002, the FBI reportedly linked a confidential informant with a member of the group, Jeffrey Battle. The informant was reported to be Khalid Mustafa, a small-time criminal who agreed to become a confidential FBI informant after being charged with drug and weapons offenses. Mustafa befriended Battle at the mosque where he prayed and then secretly recorded numerous conversations with Battle that included details about the group's trip to China. Battle is also recorded on tape talking about retaliating against Jews in Portland, "So if every time they hurt or harm a Muslim over there, you go into that synagogue and hurt one over here."⁷⁸²

Hundreds of e-mail exchanges between Battle and other members of the Portland Seven provided further evidence of the conspiracy. The e-mails were reportedly obtained through provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) that allow prosecutors access to the data files of Internet service providers. In court documents, prosecutors acknowledged having taped at least 271 conversations and obtained 31 separate orders from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act court.⁷⁸³

In October 2002, five of the men were indicted on multiple charges of aiding or attempting to join Al Qaeda. Maher Hawash was arrested in March 2003 on a material witness warrant and initially held without charges. He was subsequently charged with conspiring with the others to travel to China and join the Taliban. Lewis, the ex-wife of co-defendant Jeffrey Battle, was charged with money laundering.

Hawash pled guilty on September 6, 2003, to conspiracy to provide material support to the Taliban and agreed to cooperate with federal prosecutors. At his sentencing in February 2004, he said, "I do not blame anyone else but myself. This action was done by me, based on a misguided judgment at the time, a high emotional time for me in my life."⁷⁸⁴ He was sentenced to seven years in prison and was released in early 2009.

⁷⁸¹ Ibid.

⁷⁸² Howlett, July 24, 2005.

⁷⁸³ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid.

Muhammad and Ahmed Bilal, pled guilty on September 18, 2003, to conspiracy to contribute services to the Taliban, as well as federal weapons charges.⁷⁸⁵ They received 8- and 10-year sentences respectively.

October Martinique Lewis pled guilty on September 26, 2003, to six counts of money laundering for transferring money from the United States to a place outside of the country for the purpose of assisting her ex-husband, Jeffrey Battle, in willfully supplying services to the Taliban.⁷⁸⁶ She received a three-year sentence.

Jeffrey Battle and Patrice Lumumba Ford pled guilty on October 16, 2003, to the first of a 15-count indictment, a charge of conspiracy to levy war against the United States. Both defendants admitted that they and the other defendants flew to China in an unsuccessful attempt to gain entry into Pakistan, en route to Afghanistan. They also admitted in their plea that the purpose of the conspiracy was to travel to Afghanistan to fight alongside Al Qaeda and the Taliban against American and allied forces. They were each sentenced to 18-year prison terms.⁷⁸⁷

Habis al Saoub reportedly joined an Al Qaeda cell and was killed by Pakistani forces in Afghanistan in October 2003.

⁷⁸⁵ DOJ Press Release, "Two Defendants in 'Portland Cell' Case Plead Guilty to Conspiracy to Contribute Services to the Taliban, Federal Weapons Charges," September 18, 2003, <http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel03/portland092203.htm>.

⁷⁸⁶ DOJ Press Release, "October Martinique Lewis Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering in Portland Cell Case," September 26, 2003, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_crm_532.htm.

⁷⁸⁷ DOJ Press Release, "Jeffrey Battle, Patrice Lumumba Ford Sentenced to 18 Years in Prison for Seditious Conspiracy," November 23, 2003, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_pjus/is_200311/ai_2497879968/.

Appendix B. Figures

**Figure B-1. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11:
Terrorist Profile and Training**

		no	unclear	yes					
Plots and Attacks ^a		Lone Wolf	Muslim Convert(s)	Suicidal or Sought Martyrdom	Radicalized in Prison	Intended or Actual Plotting or Training Abroad			
May 2009-October 2011	Rezwan Ferdaus	○	○	○	○	●			
	Agron Hasbajrami	○	○	●	○	●			
	Naser Abdo	●	○	○	○	○			
	Emerson Begolly	○	●	○	○	○			
	Abdul-Latif and Mujahidh	○	●	○	○	○			
	Yonathan Melaku	●	○	○	○	○			
	Ferhani and Mamdouh	○	○	○	○	○			
	Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari	●	○	●	○	○			
	Antonio Martinez	○	●	○	○	○			
	Mohamed Mohamud	○	○	○	○	●			
	Farooque Ahmed	○	○	○	○	●			
	Abdel Shehadeh	○	○	○	○	●			
	Omar Hammami	○	●	○	○	●			
	Jehad Mostafa	○	○	○	○	●			
	Shaker Masri	○	○	●	○	●			
	Zachary Chesser	○	●	○	○	●			
	The Rockwoods	○	●	○	○	○			
	Alessa and Almonte	○	●	○	○	●			
	Faisal Shahzad	○	○	○	○	●			
	Colleen LaRose	○	●	●	○	○			
	Northern Virginia Five	○	○	○	○	●			
	al-Shabaab Recruiting	○	○	●	○	●			
	Ft. Hood (Nidal Hasan)	●	○	○	○	○			
	David Headley	○	○	○	○	●			
	Tarek Mehanna	○	○	○	○	●			
	Hosam Smadi	○	○	○	○	○			
	Michael Finton	○	●	○	○	○			
	Najibullah Zazi	○	○	●	○	●			
	Betim Kaziu	○	○	●	○	●			
	Daniel Boyd, et al	○	●	○	○	●			
	Abdulkim Muhammad	●	●	○	○	○			
	Newburgh Four	○	●	○	○	○			

		no	unclear	yes				
Plots and Attacks* (continued)					Muslim Convert(s)	Suicidal or Sought Martyrdom	Radicalized in Prison	Intended or Actual Plotting or Training Abroad
September 11, 2001-April 2009	Bryant Neal Vinas	○		●	●	●	○	●
	JFK Airport Pipeline Plot	○			○	○	○	○
	Fort Dix Six	○			○	○	○	○
	Daniel Maldonado	○		●	●	●	○	●
	Derrick Shareef	○		●	●	○	○	○
	Houston Taliban Plot	○		●	●	○	○	●
	Liberty City Seven	○		●	●	○	○	○
	Mohammed Taheri-Azar	●			○	○	○	○
	Sadequee and Ahmed	○			○	○	○	●
	Toledo, Ohio Plotters	○			○	○	○	●
	JIS Plotting in So. California	○		●	●	○	●	○
	Lodi Case (the Hayats)	○			○	○	○	●
	Albany Plot	○			○	○	○	○
	New York City Subway Plot	○		●	●	○	○	○
	Lyman Faris	○			○	○	○	●
	Ahmed Omar Abu Ali	○			○	○	○	●
	Virginia Jihad Network	○		●	●	○	○	●
	Hasan Akbar	●			○	●	○	○
	Lackawanna Six	○			○	○	○	●
	Jose Padilla	○		●	●	○	○	●
	Portland Seven	○		●	●	○	○	●

Source: CRS analysis of open source material related to homegrown jihadist plots and attacks after 9/11 through October 2011.

Notes: a. Listed in chronological order. The four attacks are highlighted in **bold and italics**.

Figure B-2. Homegrown Jihadist Terrorist Plots and Attacks Since 9/11: Targets, Endgames, and Investigative Tools

		Target		Endgame			Investigation Tools ^b	
		U.S.	Foreign	Firearm(s)	Explosive(s)	Foreign Fighter	Informant/ Undercover Agent	Internet/ Email Monitoring
Plots and Attacks ^a								
May 2009-October 2011	Rezwan Ferdaus	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
	Agron Hasbajrami	○	●	○	○	●	●	●
	Naser Abdo	●	○	●	●	○	○	○
	Emerson Begolly	●	○	●	●	○	○	●
	Abdul-Latif and Mujahidh	●	○	●	●	○	●	○
	Yonathan Melaku	●	○	●	●	○	○	○
	Ferhani and Mamdouh	●	○	●	●	○	●	○
	Khalid Ali-M Aldawsari	●	○	○	●	○	○	●
	Antonio Martinez	●	○	○	●	○	●	●
	Mohamed Mohamud	●	○	○	●	○	●	●
	Farooque Ahmed	●	○	○	●	○	●	●
	Abdel Shehadeh	○	●	○	○	●	○	●
	Omar Hammami	○	●	○	○	●	○	○
	Jehad Mostafa	○	●	○	○	●	○	○
	Shaker Masri	○	●	○	○	●	●	●
	Zachary Chesser	○	●	○	○	●	○	●
	The Rockwoods	●	○	●	●	○	○	○
	Alessa and Almonte	○	●	○	○	●	●	●
	Faisal Shahzad	●	○	○	●	○	○	○
	Colleen LaRose	○	●	●	●	○	○	●
	Northern Virginia Five	○	●	○	○	●	○	○
	al-Shabaab Recruiting	○	●	○	○	●	○	○
	Ft. Hood (Nidal Hasan)	●	○	●	○	○	○	●
	David Headley	○	●	●	●	○	○	●
	Tarek Mehanna	●	○	●	○	●	○	●
	Hosam Smadi	●	○	○	●	○	●	○
	Michael Finton	●	○	○	●	○	○	○
	Najibullah Zazi	●	○	○	●	○	○	●
	Betim Kaziu	○	●	○	○	●	○	○
	Daniel Boyd, et al	●	●	●	○	●	○	●
	Abdulahakim Muhammad	●	○	●	○	○	○	○
	Newburgh Four	●	○	○	●	○	●	○

		no unclear yes					Investigation Tools ^b	
		Target		Endgame			Informant/ Undercover Agent	Internet/ Email Monitoring
Plots and Attacks ^a		U.S.	Foreign	Firearm(s)	Explosive(s)	Foreign Fighter		
September 11, 2001-April 2009	Bryant Neal Vinas	●	●	○	●	●	○	●
	JFK Airport Pipeline Plot	●	○	○	●	○	●	○
	Fort Dix Six	●	○	●	○	○	●	○
	Daniel Maldonado	○	●	○	○	●	●	○
	Derrick Shareef	●	○	○	●	○	●	●
	Houston Taliban Plot	○	●	○	○	●	●	○
	Liberty City Seven	●	○	○	●	○	●	○
	Mohammed Taheri-Azar	●	○	Drove SUV into Crowd			○	○
	Sadequee and Ahmed	●	○	●	●	○	●	●
	Toledo, Ohio Plotters	○	●	○	○	●	●	○
	JIS Plotting in So. California	●	○	●	●	○	○	○
	Lodi Case (the Hayats)	●	○	●	●	○	●	○
	Albany Plot	●	○	○	●	○	●	○
	New York City Subway Plot	●	○	○	●	○	●	○
	lyman Faris	●	○	Plot to Blow Torch Bridge Cables			○	○
	Ahmed Omar Abu Ali	●	○	●	●	○	○	○
	Virginia Jihad Network	○	●	○	○	●	●	○
	Hasan Akbar	●	○	●	●	○	○	○
	Lackawanna Six	○	●	○	○	●	○	○
	Jose Padilla	●	○	○	●	○	○	○
	Portland Seven	○	●	○	○	●	●	●

Source: CRS analysis of open source material related to homegrown jihadist plots and attacks after 9/11 through October 2011.

Notes: a. Listed in chronological order. The four attacks are highlighted in **bold and italics**. b. As indicated in open source reporting. It is possible that the use of these tools in some cases remains classified information and thus is not reflected in this figure.

Author Contact Information

Jerome P. Bjelopera
Specialist in Organized Crime and Terrorism
jbjelopera@crs.loc.gov, 7-0622

Acknowledgments

Mark A. Randol, former CRS Specialist in Domestic Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism, was one of the original authors of this report.