Executive Summary

Effective defense and security of the homeland depends on timely and accurate intelligence/information about those who want to attack us and the targets they intend to attack. In June 2004, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge asked Governor Romney, a member of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) and Chair of the State and Local Officials Senior Advisory Committee, to define the appropriate role for state, tribal, local, and private sector entities in the collection, analysis, dissemination, and use of this intelligence/information – and how those efforts should be coordinated with those of the Federal Counterterrorism Community.

The Intelligence and Information Sharing Working Group was comprised of members from the HSAC and its four (State and Local Officials, Emergency Response, Academe and Policy Research and Private Sector) Senior Advisory Committees. The Working Group was supplemented with additional state and local subject matter experts from state, tribal, local, first responders, and private sector entities.

The Working Group quickly realized that as both collectors and consumers of intelligence/information, it is critical that state, tribal, local and private sector efforts be coordinated with those of the Federal Counterterrorism Community.

The Working Group during its deliberations reached the following findings:

- The manner in which our modern day Intelligence Community operates was established during the Cold War and designed to confront foreign-based, state-sponsored adversaries.

- Effective prevention efforts must be information-driven and risk-based.

- State, Tribal, Local and the Private Sector are now “consumers” of accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence.
As collectors of intelligence State, Tribal, and Local entities are now partners with the Federal Intelligence Community.

Statewide intelligence/information fusion centers should be an important part of national intelligence/information sharing efforts.

The Working Group has issued recommendations that include:

- Federal, state, tribal, and local authorities must work together with the private sector to assess threat, vulnerability, risk and consequence.
  - The Federal Government should gather and consolidate each statewide assessment into a national assessment of threat, vulnerability, risk, and consequence. This assessment should be continually updated.
  - The Federal Government should establish a continuity-based, assessment methodology to keep assessment reviews consistent and appoint a single point of contact.
  - The needs and the capabilities of private sector entities must be taken into account – particularly those of “key” private sector entities which own and operate that which is determined by the Department of Homeland Security part of the nation’s “critical infrastructure.”
    - Legal and regulatory obstacles to public/private information sharing should be identified and resolved.

- The Federal government needs to develop a reliable and organized conduit for providing information to states, tribes, and localities.
  - There should be a single pipeline that integrates intelligence/information provided by multiple federal sources.
    - Intelligence/information should be provided based on the needs of the user (state, tribal and local governments) -- not those of the provider.
• The Federal Government should emphasize providing current and actionable and unclassified information. The emphasis should not be on providing security clearances and forcing related security costs on state and local governments and officials.

  • To the greatest extent possible, the Federal Government should provide unclassified intelligence/information that can be used to develop intelligence/information-driven prevention and response plans.

  • The Federal Government should not expand the legal definition of the Federal intelligence/information Community to include state, tribal, and local entities.

• The Federal Government should take steps to ensure domestic intelligence/information activities are carried out in a consistent fashion.

  • Efforts to design communication and information technology (IT) architecture should be driven by operational requirements and national guidelines and standards.

• State, tribal, and local governments need to collect, analyze, disseminate and use intelligence/information as part of their day-to-day operations.

  • There are significant concerns over potential costs associated with expanded and new responsibilities.

  • Federal grant funds should be allowed to be used to off-set costs of intelligence/information analysts involved in terrorism-related intelligence/information activities.

  • Smaller communities may need to rely on regional collaboration and/or state assistance to carry out analytical activities.

• The department of Homeland Security should gather and share “best practices.”

  • Intelligence/information sharing is most effective when:
    o Personnel from different agencies are collocated;
    o Efforts are organized around a shared focus on a defined topic (organization, special event, activity, etc);
• Roles and responsibilities are clearly defined;
• Requirements of each level of government are clearly defined; and
• Emphasis placed on results – not process maintenance and protecting turf.

- Each State should establish an information center that serves as a 24/7 “all-source,” multi-disciplinary, information fusion center.

- The Department of Homeland Security, working with all stakeholders, should establish minimum guidelines for establishing and operating “statewide (or major urban area) fusion centers.”

- Large urban areas, UASI regions, intrastate regions, and/or inter-state regions may also want to consider establishing similar capabilities.

- Operation of fusion centers should be based on statewide plans that clearly defines how each level of government will work together.

- These initiatives should also take into account role and needs of the private sector.

The Working Group recognizes that there is a historic opportunity to enhance existing intelligence/information sharing between all levels of government – and that the threat to the nation demands that we proceed expeditiously. We must also proceed thoughtfully and consider all of the implications before asking already heavily burdened state, local, tribal and private sector entities to take on new responsibilities without the appropriate level of federal funding. The Working Group believes that if the Federal Counterterrorism Community implement’s these recommendations state, local, tribal private sector partners and the Nation will be well served.