Tracing the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors of Lone-Actor Terrorism

A Routine Activity Analysis of Five Lone-Actor Terrorist Events

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Executive Summary

• In this report, we explore the implications of shifting the focus from individual qualities (who we think terrorists “are”) to a consideration of the situational qualities of lone-actor terrorist behavior – in other words, what lone-actor terrorists do in the commission of a terrorist attack and how they do it.

• Rather than focusing on individual characteristics of the criminal, situational crime prevention attempts to understand the how and what of crime: from an analysis of the offender to a greater consideration of the social and behavioral qualities of the offense.

• We propose here a framework for analysis of terrorist events that may help identify the rate-limiting features of terrorist behavior that, in turn, may be useful in planning ways for ultimately managing and controlling the extent of terrorism.

• Specifically, we use routine activity theory to look at the rhythm, tempo, and timing of events and how this may help in predicting, understanding, and preventing terrorism.

• We suggest that by identifying situational attributes and qualities of lone-actor terrorist activity, it may be possible to design interventions that reduce and displace lone-actor terrorist activity.

• A vital part of controlling lone-actor terrorist attacks is the ability to articulate the steps lone-actor terrorists take from the beginning to the end of attacks, how lone-actor terrorist events occur and what we can do to prevent or control them.

• This involves an attempt to characterize the natural history of a lone-actor terrorist event in terms of a process or series of stages. It also outlines the thought process of predatory crime, which includes a search process for precriminal situations and the strategic use of certain tactics to achieve criminal goals.

• We provide five detailed routine activity analyses of lone-actor terrorist events conducted by David Copeland, Mohammed Taheri-Azar, Timothy McVeigh, Roshonora Choudhry and Anders Breivik. Some aspects of these cases mirror one another while others involved noticeably different behaviors. Such differences are perhaps unsurprising because together they illustrate that terrorist events are complex, develop over a long period of time, and involve a high-level of planning and organization.

• To a large extent, the case studies also reflect the large number of roadblocks and hurdles that a lone-actor terrorist encounters and must overcome in the successful commission of an attack. Such hurdles may reflect why terrorism has historically been a largely group-based phenomenon.

• Prevention strategies with a long-term focus should therefore be broad and wide-ranging in order to increase the perceived costs involved for lone-actor terrorists in engaging in potentially lethal forms of violence and thereby lessen their incentives to do so.
INTRODUCTION

This report seeks to take a closer examination of the offenses committed by lone-actor terrorists. In doing so, we draw heavily from established conceptual frameworks in criminology, notably Routine Activity Theory. As noted by Horgan (2005:109), it is useful to view each terrorist offence as comprising of a series of stages “almost with a natural history from inception to completion.” In turn, this report provides five routine activity analyses of lone-actor terrorist events. These analyses act as illustrations of the major features of successfully executed terrorist attacks by individuals lacking group support. Using the framework outlined in Horgan (2005), we disaggregate each event into four specific stages; (a) decision and search activity, (b) preparation, (c) event execution, and (d) post-event activity and strategic analysis.

The decision and search activity phase includes endeavors such as target selection. Targeting is not a random exercise, but rather is usually the result of careful deliberation and can be affected by contemporary political and security climates as well as individual capabilities (Horgan, 2005:111).

The preparation phase addresses the operational, logistical and organizational issues affecting the violent event. Whereas the decision phase sets a broad strategic agenda, the preparation phase covers tactical concerns. Choosing the correct tactic for particular operations may be influenced by a number of concerns, including technological feasibility, cost-effectiveness, deterrent value, the post-event image of the individual and his/her motives to wider constituents and supporters, the dangers of unwanted results (e.g. extreme repression by counter-terrorists or the possibility of the wrong people being killed) and the ability to overcome security measures (Dolnik and Bhattacharjee, 2002). The direct manifestation of violence may be a function of the individual’s ability to procure or develop different types of weaponry or explosives. From a logistics standpoint, this phase usually sees organizational decision makers choosing individual(s) with the specific skillsets and experience to engage in the event and equipping the individual(s) with the weaponry to do so. With lone-actor terrorists, however, the preparation phase
may look different because they cannot rely upon routine activities that may be perfected by groups over time or a terrorist group’s network of specialized talent. Surveillance of targets, building a bomb, testing the device, procuring weaponry and concealing or hiding physical evidence also fall within this phase. If present, these activities illustrate not only premeditation, but also other facets that concern the temporal and sequential flow of the preparation of a terrorist attack.

The event execution stage is the sole phase that the terrorist plays out in public. It may involve a number of discrete events, such as maintaining security pre-event (e.g. priming an IED in secrecy). Other events include the transport of the individual and/or IED to the location of the planned attack, or in the case of a shooting attack, storage of the offending weapon post-attack. It also includes aspects of decision-making that concern the time of day to commit the offence and considerations of risk and opportunity in the commissioning of a terrorist offence.

The final phase of post-event activity and strategic analysis includes ensuring that the lone actor can escape after the event without being arrested or killed as well as conducting a review of the whole attack. The adaptations present in follow-up attacks may reflect aspects of the offender’s strategic analysis.

The rest of this report applies these four phases to lone-actor terrorist attacks conducted by David Copeland, Roshonora Choudhry, Timothy McVeigh, Mohammed Reza Taheri-Azar and Anders Breivik. It concludes with an outline of potential phase-specific intervention and prevention strategies.

David Copeland’s nail bombing campaign occurred between the 17th and 30th of April, 1999. In total, three bombs targeted minority communities across London. The bombings

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1 In this section, direct quotes are taken from Copeland’s confession statement that was made to police after his arrest. Large segments of the statement were made publicly available by a BBC documentary entitled “The Nailbomber” which aired 30th June 2000. The page numbers refer to the transcript of the documentary.
occurred over three successive weekends, killed three (including a pregnant woman), and injured a further 129. The following routine activity analysis is largely concerned with Copeland’s first bombing, which targeted an area in London with a large black population. Copeland’s subsequent bombings are dealt with in the ‘post-event activity and strategic analysis’ phase, as they included many adaptations reflecting Copeland’s strategic analysis of the original attack.

DECISION AND SEARCH ACTIVITY PHASE

Copeland told police that he first came up with the idea of using violence when a bomb went off at the Olympic Games in Atlanta in 1996. The Notting Hill carnival occurred around the same time as that bombing; according to Copeland he “thought why, why, why can’t someone blow that place up? That’d be a good one, you know, that would piss everyone off” (p. 9). Copeland noted that this initial thought “kept going round, floating round my head, day after day after day. And then after a while I became that thought, you know, I was going to do it. I was going to get it out of my head, and the only way to get rid of it was to do it” (p. 3). During the two years previous to Copeland’s terrorist attacks, he was involved with far-right political groups in the United Kingdom. Originally a member of the British National Party from May 1997, he left within four months insisting that the group was not extreme enough due to its unwillingness to engage in a “paramilitary struggle.” He then joined the National Socialist Movement and went on to become its regional leader for Hampshire weeks before the bombing campaign began.

Unpacking Copeland’s motives is a difficult task, and necessarily limited in the absence of direct contact to enable the collection of first-hand data. However, we can explore some relevant themes. In his confession statement to police, Copeland highlighted his motive of “Murder, mayhem, chaos, damage, to get on the news. It’s a top story really. My main intent was to spread fear, resentment and hatred throughout this country” (p. 2). Copeland denied that he fanaticized about killing people, but he did confess that he fantasized about “the chaos and disruption” caused by his IED attacks (p. 18). At his subsequent trial, however, Copeland’s political motives came to the forefront. There,

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2 This carnival celebrates London’s multi-cultural diversity.
Copeland stated that his motives were “Terrorism, fear, to terrorize people. It was my destiny. Political reasons, I am a Nazi.” The intention of the first two bombings was to stir up a race war. Copeland’s confession statement admitted to disliking ethnic minorities and he further cites his belief in the “master race” (p. 13). Copeland, inspired by the *Turner Diaries*, thought his actions would lead to a racial war. “If you’ve read the *Turner Diaries*, you know the year 2000 there’ll be the uprising and all that, racial violence on the streets. My aim was political. It was to cause a racial war in this country. There’d be a backlash from the ethnic minorities, then all the white people will go out and vote British National Party” (p. 9). Copeland planned to be “just be the spark. That’s all I will plan to be, the spark that would set fire to this country” (p. 23). Also, Copeland’s third bombing was aimed at an entirely different minority group than the previous bombings. Whereas the first two bombings carried a racial element, the third bombing targeted homosexuals. Some framed this last bombing as personal, rather than political. In Copeland’s own words: “I’m just very homophobic. I’ve got a thing about homosexuals. You know, I just hate them” (p. 14). Finally, Copeland was also interested in infamy. He reported that he “wanted to be famous in some sort of way. If no one remembers who you are, you never existed.” Following his initial two bombings, Copeland admitted to keeping “press cuttings on my wall to get off on it, to see my handiwork being noticed” (Cheston, 2000).

**PREPARATION STAGE**

During the two years between joining the British National Party (BNP) and starting his bombing campaign, Copeland read *The Turner Diaries*, and downloaded bomb-making manuals from the Internet. Copeland originally tried to use a recipe from *The Terrorist’s Handbook*, a manual that he downloaded in April 1997. He purchased ammonium nitrate and the required detonators; he also managed to steal a large canister of nitric acid. However, the manual failed to provide an exhaustive list of all of the necessary explosive compounds, and Copeland found it “too complex” to manufacture and procure the missing chemical compounds by himself. Frustrated, Copeland temporarily gave up. In June 1998 he downloaded a second manual, *How to Make Bombs Part 2*. At first he tried to build a fertilizer bomb; he purchased liquid ammonium from a local medical supply
store and ordered rocket fuses, but again he failed to manufacture a fully functioning device. Copeland then turned to smaller devices and again used the second manual to learn how to make a pipe bomb. The necessary ingredients were easy to find. For the flash powder, he bought 1,500 sterling pounds worth of fireworks in two shops in Farnborough. Alarm clocks for timing devices, Tupperware boxes, sports bags (for concealment purposes) and thousands of six-inch nails were obtained from various hardware stores. Approximately six weeks before the initial bombing attack, Copeland experimented with three smaller devices, detonating them late at night at a local park called Rushmoor Common. The device itself involved a plastic pipe filled with flash powder and sealed with glue. The pipe was then placed in a box and surrounded by approximately 1,500 nails. The addition of the nails was to supplement the smaller explosive power of the pipe bomb compared with Copeland’s earlier aspirational IEDs. All of Copeland’s subsequent devices were identical and their main immediate goal, according to Copeland, was to “smash into windows, stick into people, maim people and kill people” (p. 10).

In the two weeks prior to the initial bombing, Copeland stopped reporting for work.

**EVENT EXECUTION STAGE**

On the evening of April 16th, Copeland constructed the IED. The next morning he set the timer for 5:30pm and primed the device. Next Copeland left his studio apartment on bike and took a train from Farnborough to Clapham Junction, which arrived at 3pm. Because of the two and a half hour lag between his arrival and the bomb’s intended detonation time, Copeland decided to stall for some time and went to a nearby café for twenty minutes. Copeland then transported the IED, which was primed and taped to the inside of a sports bag, to Brixton by taxi. It was his first time in the area, and he walked the length of the High Street for an hour as he scouted for an appropriate spot, store or marketplace to leave the bag. In later interviews, Copeland mentioned that he was surprised so many white people frequented the area: “I always thought Brixton was…I mean I’d stand out like a sore thumb. I didn’t. It’s quite multi-cultural now. That surprised me. I thought about it and then I thought…well…I’m here now. I’d say one in
ten people could have been white. But I didn’t care about hurting them anyway. If they want to live there, it’s up to them” (p. 3).

While he walked High Street, Copeland decided on a location, but again stalled for more time by going into a library for a short moment, and a nearby bar to use the restroom. Copeland left the bag on the corner of Electric Avenue at 5pm, at the entrance to a store called Iceland and in close proximity to a bus shelter. This spot was chosen for two reasons. First, Copeland felt it was “a good place to get away from” (when Copeland was arrested, he insisted to a psychiatric nurse that he had “logically and rationally” planted the devices). Second, he felt it would maximize the likelihood of casualties: “I put it there to get the people walking by, and the people at the bus stop.” After he dropped off the device, Copeland walked south down Brixton Road. He then took a taxi back to Clapham Junction and then caught a train back to Farnborough station before cycling home. Street traders spotted the bag, looked inside and guessed the contents were a bomb. One street trader took the IED out of the bag and placed it on a stack of wooden pallets. They contacted police, who arrived at 5:25pm. By chance, as the police arrived, the IED detonated and injured fifty people.

At the trial that followed, Copeland stated that he took no effort to avoid CCTV cameras and did not worry about being caught because he “had no life anyway” and wanted to be famous.

**POST-EVENT ACTIVITY AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS**

A full seven days later, Copeland’s second bombing occurred in an area of East London that was home to a large Bangladeshi community. Prior to the attack, Copeland again cycled to Farnborough station, travelled into London by train (this time to Waterloo station) and took a taxi to Brick Lane at 3:10pm. He had planned the detonation to occur

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3 After the fact, the taxi driver on that day remembers that Copeland appeared overdressed for what was a very hot day: “He had a shirt buttoned up right to the neck and a baseball cap covering his head.” For the duration of the journey, Copeland held his money in his hand. Upon payment, the taxi driver noticed that the cash was “saturated with sweat.”
at the exact time as the week previous, 5:30pm, but had to delay it due to forgetting his train ticket and having to return home.

Repeating an error of the first attack, Copeland targeted an area he had never been to before. Hoping to strike the usually busy market at Brick Lane, Copeland had not realized that the market was not open on Saturdays but instead was only open on Sundays: “I presumed there was going to be a market of some sort up there, but it wasn’t” (p. 11). Copeland was undecided about whether to go ahead with the attack or not. “So then I was in two minds whether to disassemble the device and go, you know, come back Sunday. Then I just…you know, decided. I walked up Brick Lane looking for somewhere to plant it. It was about an hour to go before detonation. I didn’t want to be seen planting the device, so I went down Hanbury Street. There was [sic] two big vans and I slipped in between them and walked out, they masked my escape. It was like an aborted mission you could call it” (p. 11). By leaving it between two vans, Copeland also thought it “would blow up a few cars – cause a bit of smoke, a bit of fire.”

Again, Copeland used a sports bag to conceal the IED. A member of the public spotted the bag, placed it in the trunk of his car and attempted to contact the police. As the individual dialed 999, the IED detonated. A *Guardian* newspaper source stated, “putting the bomb in the car meant the damage from flying nails was reduced considerably.” In total, thirteen were injured. Immediately after the explosion, Copeland dialed 999 and keyed in C18, a reference to Combat 18.

Perhaps realizing that reconnaissance was a problem in his first two attacks, he went to Soho, the eventual location for his third attack, twice: once straight after the Brick Lane bombing and again on Thursday the 29th of April. The first time in Soho, his mission was to locate a bar used by homosexuals. He decided that the Admiral Duncan was the bar to attack because it was “a queer pub full of men hugging each other.” At his trial, Copeland also stated that he targeted a homosexual bar because he not only hated homosexuals but also because he wanted to irritate Britain’s political elite. “I knew it would piss everyone
off, especially like Blair and Mandelson\textsuperscript{4} and them lot” (p. 14). While in Soho, those investigating the attacks on Brick Lane/Hanbury Street released the CCTV stills of their suspect (who had yet to be identified). Copeland heard about the CCTV stills on a radio broadcast in a Soho sex shop. Knowing he may soon be caught, Copeland changed plans and brought his next bombing forward by a day (from the 1\textsuperscript{st} of May to the 30\textsuperscript{th} of April). He immediately returned to his rented studio, collected the necessary bombing materials and took a train back into London. There, he booked into an Airways bed and breakfast in London using a pseudonym.

On the morning of the 30\textsuperscript{th}, Copeland left the bed and breakfast at 11am and checked into a different one that was nearby, The Vegas. There, he constructed the IED. He left for the bar on foot but as before had left himself too much time. He stopped off at a different bar along his route to Soho. When he entered the target bar at 5:50pm, it was full. Aware that the previous two IEDs had been moved by members of the public, Copeland decided to wait with the concealed device as long as possible. Copeland stated that he “watched it [the device] and made sure no-one saw it” (p. 16). Witnesses report that Copeland appeared uneasy and frequently checked his watch. He ordered a soft drink at the bar and spoke with another man who had approached him asking if he was waiting for someone. Copeland replied, “I’m just waiting for my boyfriend.” He left at 6:05pm, leaving the sports bag behind. He told the man that he was leaving in order to get some money and that he would return shortly. The IED detonated at 6:25pm. Copeland watched the breaking news from his hotel bedroom before returning home that evening. This bombing killed three and injured a further seventy-nine. That night, co-workers identified Copeland through the CCTV images and alerted the police. Copeland was subsequently arrested at his apartment at 1am on the morning after the third bombing.

Within days of the first bombing, anonymous calls to the police separately claimed the bombings on behalf of Combat 18, the White Wolves, the English National Party and the

\textsuperscript{4} Mandelson was a member of Prime Minister Blair’s Cabinet and was “outed” as homosexual in 1998.
English Liberation Army. Copeland later complained of the “thugs who were trying to steal [his] glory”.

Were it not for the arrest, Copeland had further plans. In subsequent debriefs, he mentioned that he planned to bomb Southall, an area in West London with a large Asian community.

MOHAMMED REZA TAHERI-AZAR

On March 3rd, 2006, Taheri-Azar attempted to ‘run over’ students attending University of North Carolina (UNC) – Chapel Hill with a vehicle. In total, he injured nine. There were no fatalities.

DECISION AND SEARCH ACTIVITY PHASE

Taheri-Azar’s decision to turn to violence seems largely a response to U.S. foreign policy and developed over the course of two years. His letter of responsibility claimed that “due to the killing of believing men and women under the direction of the United States government, I have decided to take advantage of my presence on United States soil…to take the lives of as many Americans and American sympathizers as I can in order to punish the United States for their immoral actions around the world”. He cited religious justification for his actions: “In the Qur’an, Allah states that the believing men and women have permission to murder anyone responsible for the killing of other believing men and women. I know that the Qur’an is a legitimate and authoritative holy scripture since it is completely validated by modern science and also mathematically encoded with the number 19 beyond human ability. After extensive contemplation and reflection, I have made the decision to exercise the right of violent retaliation that Allah has given me to the fullest extent to which I am capable at present”. Although Taheri-Azar did not manage to cause any fatalities through his attack, according to his letter of responsibility his intention was to “murder citizens and residents of the United States of America…by running them over with my automobile and stabbing them with a knife if the opportunities are presented to me by Allah”.

5 Taheri-Azar left this letter in his apartment for police to find, the contents of which are widely available online.
PREPARATION PHASE

Taheri-Azar began his preparations for the eventual attack two months prior to the attack. He initially wanted to join the U.S. military in order to use their weapons against a U.S. target. In a letter to a local media outlet following his arrest he stated, “ideally… I wanted to fly an airplane over Washington, D.C. and drop a nuclear bomb on the city”. As a part of this plan, he allegedly twice met Army recruiters at his office and applied to a number of clinical psychology graduate schools to prepare for a position as a fighter pilot. Within a month, this plan was abandoned.

By February of 2006, his second plan involved a shooting attack inside the Lenoir Dining Hall at the UNC – Chapel Hill campus. Taheri-Azar provides two different accounts of why this plan was abandoned. In his letter of responsibility he states that he applied for a permit for a handgun but “the process of receiving a permit for a handgun in this city is highly restricted and out of my reach at the present, most likely due to my foreign nationality”. In a letter to local media after his arrest, however, Taheri-Azar states that although he visited a gun store in Raleigh, North Carolina, and obtained the necessary application documents for a gun permit from the Orange County Sheriff’s Department in Hillsborough, he changed his mind “about attacking with a gun because they seem to jam very easily,” or “malfunction and acquiring one would have attracted attention to me from the FBI in all likelihood”.

Taheri-Azar finally decided to engage in a vehicular assault “by running over several people in a concentrated target zone”. He also acquired two cans of pepper spray, a five-inch knife, and viewed Navy Seals training videos. All of these actions were geared towards aiding Taheri-Azar in the case of a physical confrontation immediately following the vehicular assault.

Taheri-Azar decided to attack students at the University of North Carolina because it was close to his home. He was also familiar with the location—he graduated from UNC the previous December. Taheri-Azar also chose to time his attack to coincide with lunch in order to maximize the number of potential fatalities and injuries. His letter of
responsibility claimed that, “I have chosen the particular location on the University campus as my target since I know there is a high likelihood that I will kill several people before being killed myself or jailed and sent to prison if Allah wills”.

Shortly before the attack, Taheri-Azar penned a letter claiming responsibility for the attack. The day before the attack itself, Taheri-Azar rented a Jeep Cherokee for the specific purpose of using it in the attack. He chose this vehicle because it “runs things over and keeps going”.

**EVENT EXECUTION PHASE**

Between 11:30am and 11:53am, Taheri-Azar left his apartment and drove toward campus. At 11:53am Taheri-Azar drove the rented Jeep Cherokee onto UNC – Chapel Hill’s campus. He drove toward “The Pit”, a student hub, and accelerated aiming to hit nearby students. After his first attempt, he made a 90-degree turn around the dining hall and proceeded to try to assault more students. Taheri-Azar drove two more miles, near the University Mall, and then phoned a police dispatcher and turned himself in. Later, Taheri-Azar stated that he turned himself in “to assure the world that I wasn’t some insane person who went on a killing rampage suddenly”.

**POST-EVENT ACTIVITY AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS**

Overall, Taheri-Azar was disappointed in the attack’s outcome. He stated disappointment that “there weren’t more people in the area”. There is little other publicly available information on how Taheri-Azar analyzed his event after the fact.
TIMOTHY MCVEIGH
Executed by Timothy James McVeigh, on April 19\textsuperscript{th} 1995, the Oklahoma City Bombing killed 168 people and injured over 500. This remained the deadliest terrorist act on American soil until the events of September 11\textsuperscript{th}, 2001.

DECISION AND SEARCH ACTIVITY PHASE
McVeigh had a long-standing interest in firearms. Trained to shoot by his grandfather from an early age, McVeigh would later consume many gun-related publications, and frequented military stores and gun shows talking to others about weaponry and gun rights. Over time, he became gradually more immersed in the survivalist movement and radical right-wing literature. He read *The Turner Diaries* dozens of times, cajoled others into reading it and began to adopt its message.

In May 1988, McVeigh decided to join the army and participated in U.S. Army basic training at Fort Benning, Georgia. There, McVeigh formed a close bond with two of his later co-conspirators in the attack in Oklahoma City: Terry Nichols and Michael J. Fortier. McVeigh and Nichols, in particular, withdrew from others in their unit. McVeigh’s interest in survivalism continued during his time in the army. After being transferred (alongside Nichols and Fortier) to Fort Riley, Kansas, McVeigh rented a storage unit which he stocked with 100 gallons of fresh water, weaponry, ammunition, rations and other supplies.

McVeigh was deployed during Operation Desert Storm. In battle he killed two Iraqi soldiers. In later interviews, McVeigh suggested these killings contributed to his suffering from post-traumatic stress. The underlying reasons behind the war and the depth of power asymmetry in the battle itself bothered him. He also became convinced the United Nations was planning to take over the world. Upon returning from Operation Desert Storm, McVeigh became a decorated soldier (Bronze Star, the Army Achievement

\footnote{The day of the bombing, McVeigh was arrested. Inside his getaway vehicle, officers found an envelope with slips of paper McVeigh had clipped from books and newspapers. One such slip of paper contained a paragraph from the *Turner Diaries* that read “The real value of our attacks today lies in the psychological impact, not in the immediate casualties.”}
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Medal, the Southwest Asia Service Medal and the Kuwait Liberation Medal). He discharged from the Army in 1991, disillusioned by his failure to join the Army’s Special Forces. This in turn led to a growing dislike of the U.S. government. After being discharged, McVeigh became increasingly paranoid that the government intended to take away his rights, especially the right to bear arms. McVeigh’s anger toward the government increased following the FBI siege at Ruby Ridge during the summer of 1992, and grew further during the standoff between the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas (an event McVeigh drove to and witnessed first-hand). One month after witnessing the fatal raid and fire at Waco (alongside Nichols), McVeigh told Fortier and his wife it was time to act violently against the government.

At McVeigh’s trial, the prosecution’s opening statement outlined that “Waco really sparked his anger; and as time passed, he became more and more and more outraged at the government, which he held responsible for the deaths….And he told people that the federal government had intentionally murdered people at Waco….He described the incident as the government’s declaration of war against the American people. He wrote letters declaring that the government had drawn… ‘first blood’… at Waco; and he predicted there would be a violent revolution against the American government. As he put it, blood would flow in the streets.” While on death row, McVeigh confirmed the prosecution’s arguments. In a letter to Fox News Correspondent Rita Cosby, McVeigh explains that “foremost, the bombing was a retaliatory strike, a counter attack, for the cumulative raids (and subsequent violence and damage) that federal agents had participated in over the preceding years (including, but not limited to Waco)….This bombing was also meant as a pre-emptive (or proactive) strike against these forces and their command and control centers within the federal building.” In a separate letter shown to the Observer newspaper, McVeigh stated further that when the “branches of government concluded that the federal government had done nothing fundamentally wrong during the raid…the system not only failed the victims who died during the siege but also failed the citizens of this country. This failure in effect left the door open for more Wacos.” He then “reached the decision to go on the offensive – to put a check on
government abuse of power, where others had failed in stopping the federal juggernaut running amok....Borrowing a page from U.S. foreign policy, I decided to send a message to a government that was becoming increasingly hostile, by bombing a government building and the government employees within that building who represent that government.”

**PREPARATION PHASE**

McVeigh’s plan required more than 5,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, approximately 1,200 pounds of nitro methane racing fuel, 350 pounds of Tovex, and 16 55-gallon drums; this contributed to a total of 7,000 pounds. McVeigh realized this was far too much to assemble on his own, so he persuaded Fortier and Nichols to help him. At some point, McVeigh and Nichols experimented with smaller explosives on Nichols’ farm in Michigan. Much of McVeigh’s knowledge came from a mail order bomb-making manual entitled *Home Made C4*, which he purchased in the Spring of 1993. According to the prosecution, “This book provides essentially a step-by-step recipe as to how to put together your own fertilizer fuel-based bomb. And the book even provides helpful hints as to where to acquire the various ingredients, the components.” The locations where McVeigh eventually purchased ammonium nitrate fertilizer and nitro methane were both suggested in this book.

On September 30th, 1994, McVeigh and Nichols purchased a ton of ammonium nitrate from the McPherson branch of the Mid-Kansas Co-op using the names “Mike Havens” and “Terry Havens.” They needed two tons but feared such a large purchase would create suspicion. On October 2nd, McVeigh and Nichols stole explosives from the Martin Marietta Aggregates Rock Quarry in Kansas, near Nichols’ home. In total, they stole more than 500 electric blasting caps, seven cases of Tovex explosives (which would later serve as a booster to help ignite the IED’s main charge), and 80 spools of shock tube, or ignition cord. Using his real name, McVeigh rented a storage locker in Kingman, Arizona on October 4th, 1994 for the stolen explosives. This was largely funded through

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7McVeigh later cut the electric blasting caps from the plan because he felt the risk of static electricity accidentally setting off the bomb was too high.
McVeigh’s actions on the gun show circuit, where he sold anti-government T-shirts, hats, bumper stickers, and guns (often illegally). On October 18th, Nichols bought the second ton of ammonium nitrate using the same pseudonym at the same store as the September 30th purchase. The ammonium nitrate was then kept at a rented storage unit in Herington, Kansas.

Originally, McVeigh wanted to use anhydrous hydrazine, a potent rocket fuel, to mix with the ammonium nitrate fertilizer. After making several calls to chemical companies using a phone card under the alias Daryl Bridges, McVeigh was unable to find a sufficient supply of anhydrous hydrazine at an affordable price. Realizing he could use a different chemical, McVeigh changed his plan to nitro methane, a motor-racing fuel. On October 21st, McVeigh attended a drag race in Dallas, Texas. There he met with Racing Fuels employee Tim Chambers, and asked for fuel so that he and his friends could ride motorcycles back home. McVeigh purchased three fifty-five-gallon drums of nitro methane for between $925 and $2,775 (dependent upon which source is used).

On November 5th, 1994, McVeigh convinced Terry Nichols to rob a gun dealer in Arkansas who had once been a friend of McVeigh. Nichols stole an estimated $60,000 in valuables and weapons from Roger Moore, justified by McVeigh as capital for the bomb expenses. Nichols stored the stolen guns in a locker in Council Grove, Kansas. Heavily influenced by the attack on the J. Edgar Hoover FBI building in Earl Turner’s *The Turner Diaries*, McVeigh decided to bomb a government building. Unlike Turner’s location in Washington DC, McVeigh wanted to hit the heartland of America. His initial list included possible targets in Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Texas. Ultimately, he decided on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City because he understood that it held offices for the ATF, Drug Enforcement Administration, and Secret Service, thereby providing maximum federal government causalities. Additionally he believed the U-shaped glass building would be easily damaged with a bomb placed inside the “U.” On December 15th, McVeigh and Fortier set out to Kansas to pick up the stolen guns from the locker in Council Grove. On the way there, they drove
through Oklahoma City to scope out the Murrah building and surrounding area for suitable locations for the getaway car.

Now that McVeigh had chosen a location, he needed to choose a day. April 19th was chosen for two reasons. First and foremost, it was exactly two years to the day after the tragic incident at Waco. Secondly, it was exactly 220 years after the “shot heard round the world” at the Battle of Lexington and Concord, the first military battle between the Patriots and the Loyalists in the American Revolutionary War.

McVeigh needed a fake drivers license to rent the Ryder truck, which Michael Fortier’s wife, Lori Fortier, helped him laminate. The alias on the license was Robert D. Kling, born April 19, 1972. On April 14, 1995 around 4pm, McVeigh checked into the Dreamland Motel in Junction City, Kansas; he used his real name but gave the Nichols’ farm as his address. Since McVeigh was having problems with his current Pontiac station wagon, he decided to purchase a new getaway car. McVeigh purchased a 1977 Mercury Marquis from Tom Manning at the Firestone Service Center for $250 in Junction City, Kansas. McVeigh left Nichols’ home address and telephone number on the bill. McVeigh then used his phone card to reserve a twenty-foot Ryder truck from Elliot’s Truck Agency. During the phone call, McVeigh stated that he needed a vehicle capable of carrying 5,000 pounds. He used the alias “Bob Kling” for the one-way rental to Omaha, Nebraska. On April 15th, McVeigh completed the requisite paperwork for his truck rental and paid $280.32 in cash. He did not buy insurance. On April 16th, Nichols drove to Oklahoma City to meet McVeigh and help him with the getaway car. McVeigh parked the car in an alley very close to the Murrah Building and placed a sign that said, “Not abandoned. Please do not tow. Will move by April 23 (needs battery and cable).” Then McVeigh rode with Nichols back to Kansas. On April 17th, McVeigh picked up the Ryder truck at 4:20pm, and returned to the motel in Junction City.

On April 18th at 9am, McVeigh drove the truck to the storage unit at Geary Lake, Kansas, where he met Nichols. There the two men set to work creating the bomb. They mixed the nitro methane with each of the fifty-pound bags of ammonium nitrate fertilizer in the 55-
gallon drums, using a bathroom scale for measuring. McVeigh placed the barrels in a “T” configuration so that he would not break an axle or flip the truck over. Once everything was mixed, McVeigh began working on the dual-fuse system. He drilled two sets of holes through the cab and the cargo box. Then he ran plastic fish-plank tubing through the holes, creating a two-minute fuse and a five-minute fuse as backup. At the end of each fuse, he placed non-electric blasting caps. He also placed blasting caps onto two lines of shock tube so that when the caps exploded they would instantly spark the Tovex, which was placed in the center drum at the intersection of the T. The bomb took over three hours to construct. At one point, work had to stop because there were passersby. McVeigh then made his way to Oklahoma City, disposing of the clothes he wore while mixing the explosives along the way. He stayed overnight in a roadside motel.

**EVENT EXECUTION PHASE**

The bombing occurred the following morning, April 19th. The original plan was for the bomb to detonate at 11am. On the morning of the bombing, McVeigh decided that waiting that long was too risky, so he moved the time forward to 9am. McVeigh felt that by 9am, there would be a requisite number of bystanders who could be killed in the bombing. McVeigh’s intention to maximize the number of killings came through in his alleged statement to his defense attorneys that he “would not have gotten the point across to the government” without a heavy casualty toll. At 7am, he left the motel where he had stayed overnight. He entered Oklahoma City at approximately 8:50am. Shortly after, he pulled his truck to the side to ignite the five-minute fuse. A block from the Murrah building, he stopped at a traffic light and lit the two-minute fuse. He accelerated slowly, fearing that sudden movement would prematurely detonate the bomb. The front parking area of the Murrah building was empty so he parked in front of the building, checked the fuses, locked the truck, and walked away.

McVeigh walked about 150 yards before he felt the explosion. The explosion created a crater twenty feet wide and eight feet deep. The bombing killed a total of 168 people: 163 were inside the building during the explosion. At least 500 people were injured.
POST-EVENT ACTIVITY AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

McVeigh made it to the Mercury Marquis and was on the road by 9:10am, eight minutes after the bombing. At approximately 10:20am, McVeigh was pulled over 80 miles north of the bombing by trooper Charles Hanger for driving without a license plate. Hanger searched the car and arrested McVeigh for carrying an unregistered gun. McVeigh was held at the Noble County Jail in Perry, Oklahoma. Meanwhile, the police had found the vehicle ID number from the Ryder truck’s axle and traced it back to Robert Kling. Two days later, McVeigh was transferred to federal custody on federal bombing charges.

There is very little evidence of McVeigh’s post-event strategic analysis. McVeigh’s published letters, to a large extent, do not go into much detail about this issue. Operationally, he viewed the bombing as successful. Strategically, he was unsure of the long-lasting impact of the bombing. McVeigh felt that he left his fellow Americans with “the choice to try to learn from me or…choose to remain ignorant, and suffer the consequences.”

ROSHONARA CHOUDHRY

On May 14th, 2010, Roshonara Choudhry stabbed Stephen Timms, a Labour Party Member of Parliament, causing him serious bodily injury. 8

DECISION AND SEARCH ACTIVITY PHASE

In the subsequent trial, the court heard a draft letter of Choudhry’s addressed to her mother that was found on Choudhry’s computer. The letter stated that she hated living in Britain and did not want to spend the rest of her life in a non-Muslim country. She said that she could not live under the British Government, which she described as an “enemy of Islam”, and that she could not pay taxes to it or work as a teacher in its education system.

8 This case study largely relies upon both court reporting from both the BBC and the Guardian and Telegraph newspapers.
Investigators established that Choudhry began downloading Anwar al-Awlaki’s videos and sermons in the autumn and winter of 2009. She began spending an abundance of time in her bedroom; her parents believed that she was studying, but in reality she was downloading extremist material, including more than 100 hours of al-Awlaki’s sermons. It was supposedly during this time that Choudhry decided to engage in a violent attack. During her police interview, Choudhry responded to a question concerning the transition from immersing herself in religion to committing violence. Choudhry’s response stated; “Because as Muslims we’re all brothers and sisters and we should all look out for each other and we shouldn’t sit back and do nothing while others suffer. We shouldn’t allow the people who oppress us to get away with it and to think that they can do whatever they want to us and we’re just gonna [sic] lie down and take it”. Choudhry referred to a specific YouTube video of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam that made her understand that “even women are supposed to fight” and that she had an obligation to turn toward violence. According to the police interviews, Choudhry made this realization at some point in April and soon after began her preparations for the attack

**PREPARATION PHASE**

As part of her preparations, Choudhry devised a list of Members of Parliament who voted for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. She researched the backgrounds of London-based Members of Parliament using the website ‘They Work For You’, which includes information on voting records. She appears to have concentrated her research on Labour ministers Jim Fitzpatrick, Margaret Hodge, Nick Raynsford and Stephen Timms. Detectives later declared that Timms was her “sole and easiest target”. The decision to attack Timms was made three to four weeks prior to the attack itself. Timms was Choudhry’s local Member of Parliament. Her online research showed that Timms regularly voted with his political party (which held power at that time). Choudhry later told detectives that, “he just voted strongly for everything, as though he had no mercy. As though he felt no doubts that what he was doing was right even though it was such an arrogant thing to do and I just felt like if he could treat the Iraqi people so mercilessly, then why should I show him any mercy?”
Choudhry had met Timms twice previously. The first occasion occurred three years prior to the attack on a trip organized by her secondary school; she was 17. On the second occasion, Choudhry met Timms at his offices and sought a grant to continue her £3290 a year English degree at King’s College London. She felt entitled to a grant because her father was unemployed and her family was relying on social welfare. Timms rejected her request, and according to Newham Councilor Lucky Mish, Choudhry got “very angry”.

Weeks before the attack, Choudhry bought two new knives: a three-inch blade, which was eventually used in the stabbing, and a five-inch blade, which was kept in her handbag as back-up in case the first broke during the attack. Before the attack, Choudhry stored both knives in a shoebox underneath her bed.

**EVENT EXECUTION PHASE**

Choudhry made an appointment to see Timms at his office at the Beckton Globe community center at 2:45pm on May 14th, 2010. On the day of the attack, Choudhry left her home in East Ham at 1:45pm. She took the 101 bus to a NatWest bank, where she set straight her financial affairs. Choudhry used her academic prize money and savings to pay off her student loan because she was afraid that her family would become liable once she was arrested for the attack. She also emptied her bank accounts fearing the British state would take the money upon her conviction.

She then took a second bus to Timms’ constituency office at the Globe community center in Beckton, East London. Choudhry asked to see Timms himself, rather than his assistant. She then waited for her appointment. At the beginning of the appointment, she approached the desk where Timms sat. In Choudhry’s words she “purposefully walked round the side of the desk so I could get close to him. He pointed for me to sit down on the chair but instead I walked towards him”. Timms noticed that Choudhry’s left hand was outstretched; presuming it was because she wanted to shake hands, he moved to reciprocate. In her words, she then “pulled the knife out of my bag and I hit him in the stomach with it. I put it in the top part of his stomach like when you punch someone”. Choudhry explained that she aimed for this area because it was soft and she feared being
too weak to force the knife into another area. She then managed to stab Timms a second time before she was pulled from him and overpowered by his staff. When asked why she stabbed him twice, Choudhry told detectives “I was not going to stop until someone made me. I wanted to kill him… I was going to get revenge for the people of Iraq”.

**POST-EVENT ACTIVITY AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS**

In her interview with police on the day of the attack, Choudhry was asked how she felt about what she had done that day. She replied; “I feel like I did what I’d planned to do… I feel like I’ve ruined the rest of my life. I feel like it’s worth it because millions of Iraqis are suffering and I should do what I can to help them and not just be inactive and do nothing while they suffer”. Because of the attack, Choudhry felt that she had “fulfilled my obligation, my Islamic duty to stand up for the people of Iraq and to punish someone who wanted to make war with them”.

**ANDERS BREIVIK**

Anders Breivik’s coordinated attacks occurred on July 22nd, 2011 in Oslo and Utøya Island, Norway. In total, 77 were killed and approximately 320 were injured.9

**DECISION AND SEARCH ACTIVITY PHASE**

Breivik described himself as a member of the Knights Templar of Europe. In the initial interview on the evening of his terrorist attacks, Breivik emphasized that the Knights Templar were not Nazis, supported the Israeli state, and only wanted political Islam out of Europe. Breivik’s intention was for the Knights Templar to take power in Europe within 60 years through conservative revolution.

Breivik was alleged to have been involved in this ideological movement for 10 years. Initially, he only wanted to contribute financially to the Norwegian Defense League, an anti-Islamic group. According to the psychiatric report, his “goal was to raise 30 million

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9 For the purposes of this case study, we primarily used both an English transcript of Breivik’s original psychiatric assessment and Breivik’s manifesto. Where the psychiatric assessment is used, we cite the report’s authors, Husby and Sorheim. Where the manifesto is cited, it is in format of (Breivik, 2011: page number).
kroners before he was 30 years old. When he was 26 years old, he had saved 6 million and he realized that he would not be able to reach the goal. He then decided to write a compendium consisting of three books” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 28). Breivik alleges that violence would not have been necessary, but the mainstream media censored his beliefs and did not publish his statements. He mentioned two newspapers, Dagbladet and Aftenposten, as being primarily culpable (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 24). The psychiatric report states “he thought he could win in a democratic manner, but the day he lost faith in this, he considered violence as the only option” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 26). Breivik saw his violent actions as being “just the beginning [of the] civil war…between Communists and nationalists.” His actions, according to the psychiatric report, were viewed as the “fireworks for something that will happen” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 14-15).

His manifesto projects 73 years of conflict and situates his violence as a component of phase one, which was due to continue until 2030. During this phase, “our only objective…is to create awareness about the truth and contribute consolidation/recruitment” (Breivik, 2011: 1351). The goal of repeated small-scale attacks is to “sap the will of the current E.U. regimes to continue the fight or at least will force them to open their eyes…and identify the Islamization of Europe as a threat to all Europeans” (Breivik, 2011: 1352).

On a strategic level, there were many motives for engaging in violence according to Breivik. “The operation was necessary for revenge, and it was a preemptive attack to prevent more activity from those individuals who betray Norway. The operation also functions as a warning. Most importantly, the operation expresses my love for my own people and country, and is my contribution to getting rid of the evil in the country” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 121). According to Breivik, these actions would precede European nationalists successfully seizing power between 2030 and 2070 and later

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10 In 2003, Breivik also attempted to gain nominations for the city council elections but failed, coming 20th or 23rd in the ballot. He later left the Progress Party. The Progress Party is currently the second-largest political party in Norway and considers itself ideologically libertarian. Breivik claims in his manifesto that he gradually “lost faith in the democratic struggle to save Europe from Islamification” (2011: 1414).
safeguarding European economic interests and engaging in a mass deportation of all Muslims from Europe before 2090.

**PREPARATION PHASE**

In total, Breivik claims that he planned the operation for two years, but that many aspects went wrong.

Evidence suggests that Breivik considered appropriate targets at great length. Broadly, he drew up four categories of individuals, all of whom he labeled as ‘traitors’. In Breivik’s terminology, Category A traitors encompassed twelve individuals, most of whom were members of government. They included Jonas Gahr Store (Norway’s Minister of Foreign Affairs), and Jens Stoltenberg (Norway’s Prime Minister) as well as other key high-profile Labour party ideologues. Category B traitors consisted of 4,500 people. They included cultural Marxist/multicultural politicians, E.U. parliamentarians, journalists, editors, teachers, lecturers, university professors, school or university board members, publicists, radio commentators, fiction writers, cartoonists, artists, celebrities, technicians, scientists, doctors and Church leaders. “Stereotypical socialists, collectivists, feminists, gay and disability activists, animal rights activists, environmentalists etc. are to be considered on an individual basis only” (Breivik, 2011: 930). Category C consisted of 85,000 individuals in Norway, and the criteria for inclusion were that they facilitated Category A and B traitors in their actions and also possessed some political influence. Category D appears more exclusive and included “union leaders, chief of police, fire chiefs and industry leaders” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 145). They had “little or no political influence but are facilitating category B and C traitors…through various means” (Breivik, 2011: 931). Those attacked on Utøya Island were Category C traitors in Breivik’s eyes. In his words, “we have a mandate to execute category A and B traitors. We do not really have the mandate to execute category C traitors” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 22).

Breivik provided two contradictory reasons as to why he did not focus on assassinating a Category A individual. First, he thought that it would be too difficult because Category A
individuals are often well protected; Breivik stated that it was necessary to go further down the list of acceptable targets for this attack. Second, he estimated that killing the Prime Minister would take one month of preparation, including surveillance. Although the Prime Minister was a Category A target, Breivik felt that the value of killing one person would be too small, and according to the psychiatric report, “that for someone with his intellect and intelligence, it would be a waste of resources to spend time planning the murder of just one person” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 25).

Breivik consistently referred to the bombing in Oslo and the shootings at Utøya Island as “Plan B.” Plan A involved placing car bombs at a Government Building, Gunerius (a major shopping mall in Oslo), the Labour Party Headquarters and the royal castle. If he survived these bombings, the plan was then to shoot as many people as possible at the Blitz anarchist community, the offices of the Dagsavisen newspaper and finally the Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti) headquarters. Plan A, which was his main plan from December 2010 until December 2011, could not be implemented due to time and effort constraints related to making the requisite amount of explosives.

Breivik had considered other attacks such as taking over the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation in order to broadcast propaganda, detonating the Halden nuclear reactor and blowing up the royal castle by itself. These plans were abandoned due to the need for extra personnel and doubt about whether the royal family was a legitimate target (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 119).

Ultimately, Breivik decided to engage in Plan B, a coordinated attack against government buildings and a political party conference. The goal of the government building attack was to “kill as many as possible” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 120). Breivik claimed that the intent of the original bombing was to kill between 200 and 500 people, and that he would consider anything less than 12 killings to be a failure. He also claimed that if he heard on the radio that several hundred were dead he would “have driven to Gronland (police station) to surrender” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 119). He claimed, “in order to get international press, there must be a large impact…one must exceed a certain limit.”
As mentioned above, Breivik’s second target in the coordinated attacks was a political party conference. The time of the year necessitated it to be at Utøya because by the time Breivik dropped his plan for four car bombings, the conferences of the major political parties had already taken place. Theoretically, he could have waited for the conferences to take place in 2012, but he was having liquidity problems. “There were bills for fertilizer, rent, lease, and I would have to buy food, and then the PC broke down. I could not afford a bad credit rating, because then I would not be able to lease a car. I could not wait any longer” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 122).

Breivik saw the students at Utøya Island as legitimate targets because he viewed them as “extreme Marxists…These are not innocent people. This is the Labor Party’s…youth organization. They have been in power in Norway. They have arranged the Islamization of Norway” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 14). Breivik stated that choosing Utøya Island was “ingenious…since it was like stabbing the Labour Party in its heart” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 26). He continued that “the operation was not to kill as many as possible, but to give a strong signal that cannot be misunderstood…as long as Labour follows its ideological line, continuing to deconstruct Norwegian culture and mass import Muslims, they must take responsibility for this treachery” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 29). From an operational perspective, Utøya Island was also ideal because it was “isolated,” “police would have problems” accessing the site, there would be access to “730 activists at one time” and there would be “no civilians present” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 120). Breivik also recognized that targeting Utøya Island was problematic because “some of the people there were only potential traitors and it’s not ideal with people under 18” years of age (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 120).

In preparing for the attacks, Breivik mentions that a main strength of his was the fact that he had no contact with extreme right-wing circles in Norway; this allowed him to stay clear of police attention (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 24). Breivik also became socially withdrawn from significant others, becoming “completely absorbed” by the game World
Breivik states that this social withdrawal was a “natural” and “pragmatic” decision to ensure “secrecy” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 108). He was also careful in his Internet usage, as he avoided “websites that use very strong symbols” and hid his IP address (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 114).

Between February 2007 and November 2009, Breivik wrote his manifesto, which he viewed as a radicalizing tool. “All it takes is access to the compendium. If you read it from the first word to the end, you will be radicalized. The [compendium] is both a tool and an application. The entire standard difficult recruitment process is being replaced. This is much more effective because the compendium is structured so that you are automatically radicalized” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 101). Further, Breivik alleged, “the work is the first step, a groundbreaking start. It cannot be read without the reader being radicalized” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 109). In the manifesto, he refers to the attacks as the “marketing operation” (Breivik, 2011: 8). The manifesto itself covers the following topics: the rise of cultural Marxism/multiculturalism in Western Europe, why the Islamic colonization and Islamization of Western Europe began, the current state of the Western European Resistance Movements (anti-Marxists/anti-Jihad movements), and finally solutions for Western Europe and how the resistance should move forward in the coming decades. The opening pages of the manifesto outline that it “presents advanced ideological, practical, tactical, organizational and rhetorical solutions and strategies for all patriotic-minded individuals/movements. The book will be of great interest to you whether you are a moderate or a more dedicated cultural conservative/nationalist” (Breivik, 2011: 4). In total, approximately half of the manifesto is written in Breivik’s words while the rest encompass a compilation of works by others.

Between February 2010 and July 2010, Breivik made a prototype of body armor, and stored “four bulletproof vest inserts, a pair of self-made bulletproof pants, a bulletproof vest, and bulletproof shoes” as well as smoke grenades in a box near the Swedish border.

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11 Breivik’s manifesto encourages future offenders to tell close friends and family that the offender has become focused on playing online games such as World of Warcraft because it can partly justify your patterns of activity (isolation/travel) while planning for an attack (Breivik, 2011: 841).
A Routine Activity Analysis of Five Lone-Actor Terrorist Events

(Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 115). He referred to this period of time as his “armor acquisition phase” (Breivik, 2011:1420). In August 2010, Breivik began to acquire weapons and ammunition. Originally he travelled to Prague but failed to find any contacts and “lost the motivation” to acquire weapons on the trip; he returned home within ten days (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 118) and cancelled his plans to travel to Berlin and/or Copenhagen to acquire weaponry (2011: 1422). Because he was a member of the Oslo pistol club, he was allowed to buy a Ruger Mini 14. All of the guns eventually used in the attack were purchased between late 2010 and early 2011 (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 77) apart from the shotgun which he had legally owned for seven years previous (2011: 1422). He opted for guns that were “light, mobile, and rich in content” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 118).

By October 2010 and until the beginning of 2011, Breivik entered what he referred to as the “explosion acquisition phase.” During this time, he studied bombs and acquired the ingredients needed to make them. Between October and January 2011, he acquired items such as sulfur powder, sodium nitrate, aspirin, aluminum powder, and fertilizer sensitizers from Polish, Norwegian and Chinese suppliers he found online as well as Ebay and local drug stores. In December 2010, he bought a fuse and various chemical substances (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 118). Breivik’s manifesto reckoned this phase was “the most vulnerable phase of them all” because of security concerns regarding the purchase of all of these bomb-making materials (Breivik, 2011: 1423).

In January and February 2011, Breivik claims to have done “a lot of shooting and a lot of training” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 118). During this time, he used the pistol club’s facilities for target practice twice weekly. He also began “training like Rambo” in the gym and started using anabolic steroids. During this period he also bought other ingredients for the IED including caustic soda and acetone (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 119). Between February 15th and 26th, Breivik created a 12-minute movie trailer promoting the manifesto. That month Breivik also became aware of the need for “an operational base” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 120). On April 10th, Breivik rented a 23-acre farm in Hedmark for 10,000 kroner a month. He took out a one-year rental contract. The
farm was big enough to allow for a 3,000 kilogram delivery of fertilizer and not raise suspicion. He used the cover of using the farm for “test production of sugar beet” (Breivik, 2011: 1437). On April 27th, he ordered the fertilizer, which was to be delivered the following week. On May 2nd, he left all of the equipment and clothing he needed at the farm. On May 7th, he moved full-time onto the farm. He would have moved in sooner to start the production process but was delayed because of illness and the incumbent tenants being slow to move out (Breivik, 2011: 1453).

Breivik refers to May and June of 2011 as the “chemistry phase.” On May 3rd, he installed a ventilation hood and fan on the farm. On May 4th, he “finished creating the metal skeletons for the blast devices” (Breivik, 2011: 1455). On May 5th, Breivik grinded aspirin tablets at first with a mortar and pestle and later with a dumbbell. On May 6th, Breivik began to synthesize acetylsalicylic acid from the ground down aspirin. This proved problematic because the instructions he followed did not work. He “began to somewhat panic…and began to lose heart” (Breivik, 2011: 1455). This delayed him for three days until a YouTube video provided a viable alternative solution which he tested successfully on May 9th. Because of this delay, Breivik became concerned that the owners of the farm might catch him creating the IED. He then spent May 10th and 11th formulating an evacuation plan and packed an evacuation kit. May 12th to 16th involved further acetylsalicylic acid production and the purchase of extra materials to speed up the process. The main instrument (hot plate stirrer) used in this process broke down however, so Breivik was forced to work on other components of the IED. May 16th to 20th involved boiling the sulfuric acid outside. At one point, a neighbor interacted with Breivik as he boiled the sulfuric acid. Breivik remarked in his manifesto: “I’m going to stick to nighttime boiling from now on to reduce my exposure to any unwanted surprises. I was very lucky today, something I cannot take for granted in the future”. At this time, the plan was to engage in four car-bombings, but it proved too time consuming. Breivik began grinding the fertilizer on May 23rd using newly purchased dumbbells. This process failed and delayed Breivik by a further four days until May 27th when he began to test 12 newly purchased blenders. By May 31st, Breivik decided to settle on grinding 60% of the weight he originally intended. On June 6th, he completed crushing the fertilizer. On June 7th, he
purchased a new hot plate stirrer and returned to synthesizing the acid until June 10th, when he tested the acid and found it to be either inert or of low purity. He spent June 11th researching alternative procedures online but was disrupted by a power outage that lasted through the evening. The following day he decided to produce the much more complex material Diazodinitrophenol (DDNP) from a different batch of acid. This device was successfully tested on June 13th at a “very isolated site” (Breivik, 2011: 1459). Breivik immediately left the area but returned hours later to check which compounds had detonated. Around June 15th, he adapted his plan to involve a one-ton car bombing against a government building, when he realized that he could not make multiple one-ton bombs. His actions were nearly uncovered again between June 19th and June 21st when the farm owner’s wife made a trip to the location and ended up staying overnight. After she left, Breivik continued to develop his DDNP batch until June 25th when another important piece of equipment broke. This slowed down progress and he did not complete the task until June 30th.

In total, in the four weeks prior to the attacks, Breivik spent seven to eight hours a day in the final production of the bomb. The primary and secondary boosters took one week, and the chemical mixture took over two weeks to complete. Breivik loaded the explosives into the car a week before the attacks.

On July 2nd, Breivik began reconnaissance of his attack plans. Between July 5th and 19th, Breivik put together the final components of the IED. These newer explosive mixtures were tested in a location that was an 11-hour drive away from the farm on July 22nd.

Breivik claims that the whole operation cost 130,000 Euro (Breivik, 2011: 9). Much of this funding came through Breivik’s personal wealth. He had previously earned several million kroner from outsourcing electronic services. He also sold fake diplomas online (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 36), advertising space on various apartment buildings (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 37) and mobile phone covers (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 43).
There is evidence to suggest that Breivik took drugs before the event. Upon being apprehended, he announced that he had taken a combination of ephedrine, caffeine and aspirin (Breivik referred to this combination as an ‘ECA-Stack’) in order to enhance performance. His manifesto outlines that the ECA-Stack “will significantly increase your strength, agility and focus…up to 30-50% for 1 to 2 hours after taking one capsule. This enhancer, in combination with a steroid cycle, will increase your physical and mental abilities by up to 100%, transforming you into an unstoppable one-man army when used in combination with proper training and a full range of body armor and weapons” (Breivik, 2011: 898). In the words of the psychiatric report, “he had taken the substance in order to achieve as much as possible during the operation” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 13). Breivik was tested for a higher than normal concentration of ephedrine. According to the psychiatric report, “higher doses and higher blood concentrations may give intoxication symptoms where increased confidence, increased risk-taking and loss of critical skills may occur” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 63). The doctors who examined Breivik stated further that he “may have been under the influence of caffeine to such an extent that a moderate intoxication effect cannot be ruled out” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 65). Breivik also claims to have taken two forms of anabolic steroids from the spring of 2011 until the day of the attacks, and a mixture of ephedrine, caffeine and aspirin for nine weeks prior. Breivik refers to the use of these drugs as a “military strategy” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 113) and they were largely purchased online (Breivik, 2011: 899).

**EVENT EXECUTION PHASE**

Breivik left his rented farm the night before the attacks and stayed at his mother’s house.

Breivik’s initial plan was to distribute his manifesto at 3am, conduct the bombing at 10am, and be on Utøya Island at 11am in order to execute Gro Harlem Brundtland, a Norwegian politician who was due to give a talk to the young people at Utøya. The plan was delayed, however. According to Breivik, “This delay was disastrous for the whole thing” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 28). The original delay occurred because his installation of a high-speed modem and the configuration of Microsoft Outlook on his PC took longer than expected.
After these installations were complete, he drove his car into Oslo and parked it at Hammserborg Square. He left his equipment in the vehicle and did some reconnaissances at Grubbegaten Street. He walked to Domkirkeplassen and took a taxi back to his mother’s house. Breivik then “realized that I did not have much time. I started to realize that most people had left the government building already.” The delay ultimately reduced the number of possible victims in Oslo because of the large numbers of Norwegians who leave work on Friday at 2pm. It also stopped Breivik from getting to Utøya in time in order to assassinate Brundtland. At his mother’s house, he uploaded a film he had made to YouTube and wrote the last message in his manifesto at 2:45pm. At 3:05pm, Breivik distributed his more than 1,500-page manifesto to approximately 8,000 people via email.

Breivik largely cultivated these email addresses through Facebook between October 2009 and March 2010. According to Breivik, “Utøya Island and the government building was all about publishing the manifesto, to reach the 350,000 militant nationalists who are the audience” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 100).

At 2:30pm, Breivik consumed the mixture of ephedrine, caffeine and aspirin for the purpose of raising performance, left his mother’s apartment and walked to the rented car that held the bomb and which he had parked nearby. In the car, he changed “from civilian to military clothing” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 123). In order to prevent premature detonation of the IED, Breivik wrapped the detonators in foam rubber containers. He drove the car to the government building.

At 3:13pm, he was 200 meters from the target. At that point, he parked the car and attached blue lights to the roof of the car. He sat in it for two minutes and put on his bulletproof vest and a helmet with a visor. At 3:15pm he drove the remaining 200 meters and parked again. He then lit the fuse, left the car, and carried a Glock pistol in his hand and walked quickly away. By 3:20pm, he reached Hammersborg Square where he had previously parked another rented car and began to drive toward the ferry. At 3:25pm, the bomb exploded, killing 8 people and injuring 209.
At 4:55pm, Breivik arrived at Utoykaia in Tyriofjorden, 40 kilometers northwest of Oslo. From there he was transported to Utøya by ferry. He arrived at 5:18pm and began shooting at 5:22pm. Breivik was heavily armed for the shooting attack. He took a Benelli Super Nova, a Ruger Mini 14 caliber 5.56 (with ten pieces of 30-shot magazines) and a Glock 34 (with six cartridge clips – four of which had 30-shot magazines). He left his shotgun behind in the car because all of the equipment was too heavy to carry. He also wore an Israeli protective vest to protect himself if he was shot at. Breivik fortified the vest with additional protective panels to negate armor-piercing ammunition.

Breivik stated that he had intended to set fire to all of the buildings on Utøya Island. For this task, he brought eight liters of diesel fuel. This plan was foiled, however, when he lost his lighter during the shootings.

At 6:01pm, Breivik made the first of nine calls to police looking to surrender. On six occasions, he failed to make a connection. He alleges that he failed to make his message clear in the three connected calls because of “incompetent persons” on the other end of the line. For these calls, he used a mobile phone without a SIM card. He initially decided to make the call because he thought, “the operation was completed” and because he could not “find more targets and had…been searching a long time” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 138). Despite making these calls, Breivik continued to shoot people. In total, 69 were shot and killed at Utøya, and a further 110 were injured.

**POST-EVENT ACTIVITY AND STRATEGIC ANALYSIS**

Over the course of his debriefing interviews, Breivik distinguished between the combat success and the media success of the attacks. In the early interviews, Breivik was doubtful about his media success. He conceded that few of his co-ideologues would defend his “bestial actions” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 16), and that the day of the actions was “the worst day of his life” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 17). He acknowledged further that the events were “completely awful” and that he was “not proud” of what he “was forced to do” in response to Labour Party policies (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 20). Much
of this early antipathy towards his own actions was due to the fact that he defined these victims as “Category C traitors” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 22).

On the other hand, however, he saw the attacks as a combat success, and stated that the fight will continue via “the pen from jail” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 23). On the whole, Breivik stated that the success of the violent actions could only be “measured by the spreading of the compendium” (Husby & Sorheim, 2011: 131).

On a practical level, Breivik’s manifesto concludes with the statement, that “if I had known then, what I know today…I would have managed to complete the operation [building the IEDs] within 30 days instead of using almost 80 days”.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

This report has provided a sequential breakdown of five successfully executed lone-actor terrorist events. Some aspects of these cases mirror each other, while others involved noticeably different behaviors. These differences are perhaps unsurprising; together they illustrate that lone-actor terrorist events are complex, develop over a long period of time, and involve a high level of planning and organization.

Similarities and differences were noticeable across the first three phases. For example, during the decision and search activity phase, Copeland, Breivik and McVeigh all operated within a broader political movement, became exasperated with the movement’s means, and later viewed themselves as the progenitors for wider movements of violent co-ideologues. Choudhry, on the other hand, downloaded, consumed and planned her attack in isolation from co-ideologues.

There were also similarities and differences in how the perpetrators viewed themselves and their actions. Copeland saw himself as the “spark” of future attacks, and Breivik saw himself as “just the beginning” of a civil war between Communists and Nationalists. Taheri-Azar and Choudhry, however, saw themselves as one piece of a historical number of actors who turned to violence for the sake of their ideology. Breivik and McVeigh
framed their violence as “pre-emptive” of future hostile government actions against their beliefs and co-ideologues. McVeigh also framed his actions as revenge for contemporary government policies; both Taheri-Azar and Choudhry also largely shared this view. McVeigh considered violence to be a “retaliatory strike, a counter attack” that would “put a check on government”, whereas Choudhry’s violent action was to show her fellow Muslims that she would not “allow the people who oppress us to get away with it”. Taheri-Azar framed his violence as a response to the “killing of believing men and women under the direction of the United States government”. In terms of inspiring and justifying their acts, both Copeland and McVeigh cited *The Turner Diaries*, while Taheri-Azar and Choudhry cited religious texts. Breivik, on the other hand, developed his own manifesto, which cited a broad range of historical and contemporary thinkers.

Finally, the timeframe between the beginning of the decision and search activity phase and the eventual event execution varied between less than 6 months (Choudhry), two years (Taheri-Azar and Breivik) and three years (Copeland and McVeigh). This suggests that in many cases the development of a lone-actor terrorist attack occurs over a long period of time, but that this time can be lessened dramatically when individuals choose to conduct more technically primitive attacks.

During the preparation phase, each of the five lone actors adapted ordinary household or personal effects that were purchased at regular shopping outlets into either a weapon or a component of a weapon. Copeland purchased components from medical supply stores, hardware stores and fireworks distributors. McVeigh purchased his components from co-ops and a motor-racing company employee; he also stole a number of other materials from a rock quarry. Breivik purchased many materials for both his bomb and gun attacks online.

There is also evidence to suggest that each individual considered the optimal targets to attack. McVeigh’s initial list included possible targets in Arkansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Texas. Choudhry devised a list of Members of Parliament who voted for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Taheri-Azar first considered attacking Washington, D.C., and
Breivik considered attacking many people and locations, including members of Norway’s political elite, government buildings, shopping malls, political party conferences, newspaper offices, the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, a nuclear reactor and the royal castle.

Copeland, Breivik and McVeigh all relied upon bomb-making manuals and tested their IEDs prior to the attack. Both Breivik and Copeland’s testing occurred between five and six weeks prior to their initial attacks. While four of the individuals acted alone in all stages of their plots, McVeigh solicited help from others in the manufacturing of homemade explosives. Taheri-Azar and Choudhry planned more primitive attacks (vehicular assault, knife attack) that did not require much, if any, expertise, training, testing or technical skill. In terms of transportation, Taheri-Azar, Breivik and McVeigh rented vehicles used in their attacks, whereas Choudhry and Copeland used public transportation in travelling to their attacks.

In terms of attack timing, McVeigh planned his event to coincide with the two-year anniversary of the Waco standoff, the other events appeared to occur either through necessity (e.g. Breivik experiencing liquidity problems) or because all of the aspects of the plot happened to crystalize at that time (e.g. Copeland). Finally, most of the perpetrators chose attack locations that they had previous knowledge of, either through having conducted previous business there (Taheri-Azar, Choudhry), or through prior surveillance (Breivik, McVeigh). This appears to be important for a successful attack, as Copeland’s problems during his first two bombings were largely a result of ill-considered targets and poor surveillance. While the intent of Breivik, McVeigh, Taheri-Azar and Copeland was to kill as many people as possible, Choudhry’s preparations were quite different as they involved plotting against one high-profile figure.

The event execution phase highlights consistent differences between the five cases. The technical sophistication varies markedly between quite unsophisticated attacks (Taheri-Azar, Choudhry) to repeated attacks using basic IEDs (Copeland), to sophisticated large-scale bombings (McVeigh) and multi-method attacks (Breivik). The offenders also
differed in their intention to get away from the scene of the attack. McVeigh chose the Murrah Federal building specifically because of its proximity to various possible getaway routes. Copeland’s first attack location was chosen on the day of the attack because he felt that it was “a good place to get away from”. Breivik and Taheri-Azar both expected to be killed in the commissioning of their attacks, and Choudhry anticipated being arrested following hers.

To a large extent, the case studies also reflect the large number of roadblocks and hurdles that a lone-actor terrorist encounters and must overcome in the successful commission of an attack. Oftentimes, this requires abandoning a more ambitious original plan for something less complicated. Copeland struggled in his original attempts at bomb-making because the manuals he relied upon did not provide exhaustive lists of the necessary ingredients and he found it “too complex” to manufacture and procure the missing chemical compounds by himself. After originally giving up on his intent to commit violence, he subsequently downscaled the size of the IED he wanted to use and began constructing far smaller devices. Taheri-Azar initially wanted to join the U.S. military, “fly an airplane over Washington, D.C. and drop a nuclear bomb on the city”. He abandoned this plan, however, within a month after meeting with Army recruiters and applying to clinical psychology graduate schools in preparation for a position as a fighter pilot. He also abandoned plans to engage in a shooting attack when he felt he that could not obtain the necessary permits and worried that the purchase of weapons would attract the attention of the FBI. The quantity of explosives needed by McVeigh necessitated stealing from a rock quarry; even with stealing some of the ingredients, his initial explosive mix needed to be abandoned because of cost and the unavailability of anhydrous hydrazine. Breivik abandoned his original plan of placing car bombs at a Government Building, Gunerius (a major shopping mall in Oslo), the Labour Party Headquarters and the royal castle due to time and effort constraints related to making the requisite amount of explosives. Breivik’s other plans including attacking the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation or detonating the Halden nuclear reactor were abandoned due to the need for extra personnel. Breivik also failed to procure weaponry on his trip to Prague. Further, faulty bomb-making recipes and equipment failure hampered Breivik’s
preparation of explosive materials, and ultimately forced him to downscale the number and size of the IEDs he had planned to develop.

A final problem, shared by Copeland and Breivik, concerned the issue of the timing and execution of the event. For Copeland’s first bombing, he arrived two and a half hours ahead of the intended detonation time. Although this allowed him time to scout the area for an appropriate target, once he placed the IED it left a considerable amount of time for members of the public to notice it and move it (which also occurred during Copeland’s second attack). Copeland’s next attack, a week later, was due to occur at the same time as his first attack (5:30pm) but was delayed due to difficulties with his train ticket. The attack was also intended to target a busy market but Copeland showed up on a day when the market was closed, reducing the number of casualties he could cause. Breivik’s bombing was originally planned for 10am but was delayed by over five hours because of a problem with the installation of a high-speed modem and the configuration of Microsoft Outlook on his PC (the purpose of which was to distribute his manifesto). In Breivik’s words, “this delay was disastrous for the whole thing” because it lessened the number of those the bomb would ultimately wound and kill.

These hurdles may reflect why terrorism has historically been largely a group-based phenomenon—the pooling of talent, resources, expertise and experience in a group setting likely helps mitigate the difficulties in successfully committing a terrorist attack. Such resources are absent for many lone-actor terrorists, which may help explain why lone-actor terrorism has an even lower base rate than group-based terrorism. With the exception of Choudhry, the lengthy nature of each of the cases’ preparation phases (in terms of the number of steps and the time it took to complete them), may also mean that many more lone-actor terrorist plots are conceived of but are subsequently abandoned due to difficulties in financing, acquiring weaponry or developing reliable IEDs. Developing an understanding of these potential roadblocks, as well as how they function, may aid future investigations that seek to disrupt future potential lone-actor terrorist plots.
The operational usefulness of routine activity analysis is in the implication that there is a need for different counterstrategies dependent upon the stage of the lone-actor terrorist event. In other words, through sequentially breaking down these events, we may be able to get a better sense of what may be needed to manage, control and alter the situations and contexts in which terrorist events emerge. Prevention strategies with a long-term focus should therefore be broad and wide-ranging in order to increase the perceived costs involved for lone-actor terrorists in engaging in potentially lethal forms of violence and thereby lessen their incentives to do so.

Though exploratory, and certainly an area for far greater future consideration, the function of Table 1 is to provide a list of measures (based on the routine activity analyses above) that could help in detecting, disrupting and deterring the development and/or execution of lone-actor terrorist events. It is not an exhaustive list, nor is it a list that will provide solutions to all problems. Rather, the intention is to facilitate rigorous thinking about how aspects of situations and contexts can be designed or managed to hinder a potential lone-actor terrorist. We categorize this summary of recommendations using Clarke and Eck’s (2005) problem triangle (Figure 1). As depicted, the triangle is composed of an inner triangle that consists of an offender, a place and a target or victim. Each of these must converge for the crime or event to occur (i.e., there must be an offender to commit the crime, a target of the crime itself, and a place for it to occur).

The outer triangle consists of the actors responsible for regulating each of the components in the inner triangle. Handlers supervise the offender, guardians supervise the target and managers supervise the crime location. Handlers are individuals that are influential in the lives of potential offenders (e.g., friends, family, and peers), but can also include police investigators, amongst others. Guardians include police, security, counter-terrorism operators, as well as others tasked with protecting people and property from harm and crime. Guardians can also include those present at the location of the target. Without guardians, targets become more easily attacked. Managers constitute those individuals who either own a location or who regulate access to a site. By attributing intervention points across a spectrum of actors who can counter lone-actor terrorists, this
The problem triangle aims to show who has jurisdiction over each offensive action taken by the terrorist. Further, if a jurisdiction is shared, Table 1 illustrates how responsibilities could be coordinated amongst the actors.

**Figure 1: Problem Triangle**

Finally, as depicted below in Table 1, perhaps the most effective intervention points may occur within the preparation phase of the terrorist event, as opposed to the execution phase. This is due to: (a) there being more individual activities occurring within this phase, (b) it being a temporally longer phase, and (c) there potentially being more people exposed to what is developing. It also shows that countering lone-actor terrorist threats may entail intelligence work, military or law enforcement activities, forensic analysis, neighborhood and community policing, as well as regulatory legislative action.
### Table 1: Lone-Actor Terrorist Event Script and Intervention Points

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Offender Actions</th>
<th>Handler Actions</th>
<th>Guardian Actions</th>
<th>Manager Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decision and Search</td>
<td>Deciding to engage in violence as a strategy</td>
<td>Conduct risk assessment of current vulnerabilities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deciding to replicate previous offenders</td>
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<td>a) Counter with narratives of previous lone-actor terrorist offenders</td>
<td>Increase vigilance after other lone-actor terrorist events</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>b) Increase vigilance after other lone-actor terrorist events</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Leaving other political means behind</td>
<td>Encourage other activists to report individuals who espouse violent intentions</td>
<td>Assess 'risk' of reported individuals</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stating intention to act violently to significant others (e.g., friends, family)</td>
<td>Encourage significant others to report individuals</td>
<td>Assess the ‘risk’ of reported individuals</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Stating extremist ideology to third-parties (e.g. media)</td>
<td>Encourage outlets to report letters espousing extremist propaganda or agendas</td>
<td>Assess the ‘risk’ of reported individuals</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Grievance formation</td>
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<td>Preparing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deciding location of attack</td>
<td>Harden targets</td>
<td>Increase vigilence</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Choosing between violent tactics</td>
<td>a) Harden targets</td>
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<td>b) Increase difficulty in procuring weapon components</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Choosing a specific target</td>
<td>Harden targets</td>
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<td>Attempting to recruit co-offenders</td>
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<td></td>
<td>a) Provide adequate resources and avenues to facilitate disengagement</td>
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<td>b) Encourage significant others and unsuccessfully recruited co-offenders to</td>
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<td>report suspicious activity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Collecting weapon components</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Encourage significant others and third parties to report suspicious activity</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>a) In the case of IEDs, strengthen regulations that limit the purchase of</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>particular chemicals</td>
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<td>b) Educate sales clerks to detect and report suspicious purchases</td>
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<td>c) In the case of IEDs, mark commercial explosives/detonators/casings/timer</td>
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<td>components etc. with unique codes so that supplies can be traced back to supplier</td>
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<td>Phase</td>
<td>Offender Actions</td>
<td>Handler Actions</td>
<td>Guardian Actions</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Preparation, continued    | Manufacturing explosives              | Encourage significant others to report suspicious activity | a) Promote fake recipes to frustrate efforts of inexperienced bomb-makers and increase costs  
b) Educate hospital staff and encourage them to report suspicious chemical burns and related injuries  
c) Develop forensic capabilities to trace manufacturing of explosives to supply evidence  
d) Limit access to bomb-making manuals | Increase security and monitoring at public locations (e.g., storage units)         |
|                           |                                       |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           | Storing weapon components             |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           |                                       |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           | Constructing IEDs                    | Provide channels for significant others to report suspicious activities |                                                                                  | Conduct surveillance of former/ suspected bomb-making sites                     |
|                           |                                       |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           | Testing IEDs                         |                                              | a) Educate the public regarding suspicious activity  
b) Encourage public reports to police  
c) Conduct surveillance |                                                                                  |
|                           |                                       |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           | Acquiring vehicles                   |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           |                                       |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           | Loading explosives into vehicle       |                                              |                                                                                  | Educate the public regarding suspicious looking vehicles (vehicles that appear laden down with explosives) |
|                           |                                       |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           | Conducting Dry-Runs                  | Conduct surveillance                         | Conduct surveillance                                                             | Conduct surveillance                                                             |
| Event                     |                                       |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
| Execution                 | Purchasing additional weaponry       | Conduct surveillance of online purchasing   |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           | (including protective vests/clothing) |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           | Traveling to attack location          | Increase video surveillance                 | Increase video surveillance                                                     |                                                                                  |
|                           | Parking and abandoning car           | Educate public workers to facilitate the reporting of suspicious vehicles | a) Train and educate the public and special personnel to increase vigilance  
b) Create/enforce parking restrictions and control zones |                                                                                  |
|                           | bomb/getaway vehicle                 |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           | Priming of device                    | Conduct EOD Render Safe Procedures          | Encourage public reports to police                                             |                                                                                  |
|                           |                                       |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
| Post-Event Activity and   | Publishing a manifesto/making a      | Provide video surveillance                   |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
| Strategic Analysis        | public statement of motive           |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           | In the case of avoiding capture,     |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           | conducting repeat attacks            |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           |                                        |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |
|                           |                                        |                                              |                                                                                  |                                                                                  |

A Routine Activity Analysis of Five Lone-Actor Terrorist Events
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