

Performance Measures Definitions Guide

Measuring the Performance of
the National Network of
Fusion Centers

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Table of Contents

Introduction.....	5
Fusion Center Performance Program.....	5
Logic Model Approach.....	6
National Network of Fusion Centers Logic Model.....	7
Development of Performance Measures.....	9
Performance Measure Definitions: Outcomes.....	10
1. Enriched Partnerships and Decision-Making.....	10
2. Enhanced Threat and Domain Awareness.....	12
3. Better Targeted Information Gathering, Analysis, and Dissemination.....	14
4. More Effective Law Enforcement Activities.....	15
5. Improved Systemic Intelligence Capability.....	17
6. Improved Support to Operational Response.....	19
Performance Measure Definitions: Outputs.....	21
7. Intelligence & Information Products and Services.....	21
8. Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Protections.....	24
9. Strategic Plans and Budgets.....	26
10. Communications Policies and Systems.....	27
11. Security Policies and Systems.....	28
Conclusion.....	30
Appendix A: Definitions of Logic Model Elements.....	31
Inputs.....	31
Grant Funding.....	31
Personnel.....	31
Equipment.....	31
Training and Exercises.....	31
Technical Assistance.....	31
Data and Data Systems.....	32
Intelligence and Other Information.....	32
Facilities.....	32
Guiding Documents.....	32

Other Stakeholder Resources:	32
Processes	32
Outputs	34
Intelligence and Information Products and Services.....	34
Investigative Case Support.....	34
Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Protections	34
Strategic Plans and Budgets	34
Communications Policies and Systems.....	35
Security Policies and Systems.....	35
Direct Outcomes	35
Enriched Partnerships and Decision-Making.....	35
Enhanced Threat and Domain Awareness	35
Better Targeted Information Gathering, Analysis, and Dissemination.....	35
More Effective Law Enforcement Activities	36
Improved Systemic Intelligence Capability	36
Improved Support to Operational Response	36
Intermediate Outcomes and Impact	37
Appendix B: Glossary.....	38
Appendix C: Performance Measures Implementation/Grant Requirement Status.....	46

Introduction

The National Prevention Framework acknowledges a host of ongoing support activities that enable terrorism prevention efforts. The support activities include those programs, initiatives, and information sharing efforts that directly support local communities in preventing terrorism, including understanding, recognizing, and preventing crimes and other activities that are precursors or indicators of terrorist activity and violent extremism. Additionally, these support activities position the whole community to be prepared to execute the core capabilities necessary to prevent an imminent terrorist threat. The National Network of Fusion Centers (National Network) functions as a distributed information sharing architecture that supports the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of terrorism and criminal threat-related information among Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT), and private sector partners.

Located in state and major urban areas throughout the country, fusion centers are uniquely positioned to empower front-line law enforcement, public safety, fire service, emergency response, public health, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and private sector security personnel to understand the local implications of national intelligence and to identify and disrupt activities that may be indicators of, or potential precursors to, criminal and terrorist acts. Fusion centers provide interdisciplinary expertise and situational awareness to inform decision-making at all levels of government and facilitate information sharing to assist law enforcement and homeland security partners in preventing, protecting against, and responding to threats in the homeland.

Fusion Center Performance Program

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A), State & Local Program Office (SLPO), is leading efforts on behalf of the federal government and the National Network to develop and implement a performance management framework, referred to as the Fusion Center Performance Program (FCPP), to capture objective, standardized data to evaluate the value and impact of individual fusion centers and the National Network as a whole in supporting national information sharing and homeland security outcomes. The FCPP consists of three interconnected elements:

- Measuring the capability and performance of the National Network through a structured, standardized annual assessment;
- Hosting and participating in prevention-based exercises that test fusion center capabilities against real world scenarios; and
- Mitigating identified gaps in order to increase capabilities, improve performance, and sustain fusion center operations.

In 2010, fusion center directors and the federal government jointly identified four Critical Operational Capabilities (COCs), which together reflect the operational priorities of the National Network, and four Enabling Capabilities (ECs), which provide a foundation for the fusion process. In 2011, DHS I&A, in coordination with federal and SLTT partners, developed and conducted an annual assessment of fusion centers to evaluate their progress in achieving the

COCs and ECs and to collect additional data to better understand the characteristics of individual fusion centers and the National Network as a whole. Concurrently, these same partners began developing an initial set of five performance measures designed to capture key outcomes of the fusion process. These initial performance measures were finalized in early 2012, focusing on a handful of the shared benefits of the National Network, as well as shared responsibilities associated with supporting and sustaining the National Network over time. Baseline National Network performance data was collected as part of the 2012 Fusion Center Assessment and reported in the *2012 Fusion Center Final Report* (2012 Final Report).

Building on the initial five performance measures, DHS I&A and its federal and SLTT partners have since worked to develop a more comprehensive set of performance measures that convey a broader range of National Network impacts and benefits. The foundation for this expanded set of performance measures is the Logic Model for the National Network of Fusion Centers.

Logic Model Approach

A logic model is a graphical display of the component elements of a program that visually conveys the cause-effect relationship between these elements. It provides an overall understanding of how program inputs translate into activities, outputs, and outcomes. In establishing these linkages, the logic model defines indicators of success, which become the basis for program performance measures.¹

DHS and its partners identified the logic model as a potential tool to develop National Network performance measures based on academic literature reviews and case studies that indicated success among other government entities that used logic models for similar purposes. Logic models have been successfully employed by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program, and myriad state and local government offices and programs. Use of the logic model allowed DHS to mitigate some of the inherent challenges associated with measuring the performance of the National Network, including:

1. *The diversity of the National Network:* No two fusion centers are the same. Each is unique in size, geographic area of responsibility (AOR), staff composition, and resourcing. Developing performance measures that account for the diversity of the National Network requires the identification of common themes and approaches that apply to all or most fusion centers. The logic model accounts for this diversity by establishing a common frame of reference and a common language to describe what the National Network as a whole does to protect the Homeland.
2. *The diversity of fusion center customers:* Fusion centers are owned and operated by state and local governments and must meet the needs of these stakeholders to remain viable. However, fusion centers can also support federal mission partners in national-level objectives related to counterterrorism, homeland security, and other topics. The challenge of measuring value across these varying stakeholder communities, each

¹ Mucha, M., (2008) Organizational alignment with logic models. *Government Finance Review*; 24 (5), 51-54.

with their own interests and requirements, does not preclude effective performance management.² The logic model captures the National Network's operations at a high enough level to encompass most customer requirements, but with enough specificity to allow for the development of a full set of performance measures that capture the discrete functions of the National Network.

3. *The intangible nature of the terrorism prevention mission area:* Measuring terrorism prevention is difficult. Without first-hand knowledge of a potential terrorist's decision making process, there is little chance of understanding if an action taken by a fusion center prevented a terrorist attack from occurring. However, the National Network logic model defines proxy outcomes, such as increased situational awareness, that result directly from fusion center actions and that could logically improve the effectiveness of preventive activities.³ Measuring these proxy outcomes provides quantifiable data to evaluate the impact and value of fusion centers on the broader counterterrorism and homeland security missions, without presuming to establish direct links to prevention that are difficult to verify.⁴

National Network of Fusion Centers Logic Model

Logic models graphically depict how program inputs result in desired outcomes by identifying how program elements relate to each other. Program elements typically used in logic models include inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes. The specific program elements associated with the National Network Logic Model include the following:⁵

Inputs are the resources that an agency, organization, or entity has invested into the program or activity being measured.⁶ These resources include funding, employee hours, and infrastructure. In the case of the National Network, the logic model must account for the inputs provided by federal, SLTT, and private sector stakeholders in order to reflect the shared responsibility, and ultimately the shared benefits, of these partners in supporting and sustaining the National Network.

Processes are the work (activities, initiatives, and procedures) that the program does on an ongoing basis to fulfill its mission. In the case of the National Network, the core business

² Dennis Rosenbaum. *Evaluating Multi-Agency Anti-Crime Partnerships: Theory, Design, and Measurement Issues*, *Crime Prevention Studies*, Volume 14, pp.171-225.

³ Grossman, Michael. *Perception or Fact: Measuring the Effectiveness of the Terrorism Early Warning Group*, Naval Postgraduate School.

Herranz Jr., Joaquin. *The Logic Model as a Tool for Developing a Network Performance Measurement System*, *Public Performance and Management Review*. Vol 34, no 1, September 2010, p56-80.

⁴ In October 2011, the National Academy of Public Administration noted that the approach demonstrating the degree to which fusion centers have achieved COCs is worthwhile (*Improving the National Preparedness System: Developing More Meaningful Grant Performance Measures*). They also noted that it is difficult to measure the effectiveness and success of prevention activities.

⁵ See Appendix A for expanded definitions of program elements of the Logic Model for the National Network of Fusion Centers.

⁶ Harry Hatry, *Performance Measurement: Getting Results, Second Edition*, Urban Institute Press, 2006.

activity is the fusion process,⁷ which individual fusion centers execute by applying the COCs and ECs.

Outputs are the products or services delivered as a result of a process—in this case the fusion process.⁸ An output is usually something tangible and quantifiable that is measured as an amount of work accomplished, or “how many.” For the National Network, this includes numbers analytic products produced, Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) validated and submitted, or Requests for Information (RFI) responded to.

Outcomes are the effect or results of a program, typically compared the program’s intended purpose. Outcomes inform stakeholders and audiences about the meaning and significance of processes and their corresponding outputs. An outcome may also connect the relationships between various outputs and draw a conclusion. Of note, outcomes may progress in stages over time as processes and outputs become more mature.

Outcomes represent the value that the National Network produces for its customers. The outcomes generated through the fusion process should enable public safety officials, first responders, and law enforcement personnel to do their jobs more effectively and efficiently, and should provide decision makers with knowledge to guide resource allocation at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Fusion centers should demonstrate, in measureable terms, the influence they have on the larger Homeland Security Enterprise⁹. For the purposes of this logic model, outcomes are defined as direct or intermediate.


- **Direct outcomes** are aspects of customer operations or stakeholder conditions that are more immediately and visibly improved by program outputs.
- **Intermediate outcomes** are those aspects of customer operations or stakeholder conditions that are improved by program outputs and direct outcomes.

⁷ The fusion process is the overarching process of managing the flow of information and intelligence across levels and sectors of government and private industry. It goes beyond establishing an information/intelligence center or creating a computer network. The fusion process supports the implementation of risk-based, information-driven prevention, response, and consequence management programs. The fusion process turns information and intelligence into actionable knowledge.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ The Homeland Security Enterprise encompasses the federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private sector entities and individuals, families, and communities who share a common national interest in the safety and security of America and the American population.

National Network of Fusion Centers Logic Model



The National Network Logic Model was developed through an iterative engagement process involving a range of federal and SLTT partners and non-governmental associations, such as the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, representing key stakeholder communities. A team composed of performance management experts from the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute and state and major urban area fusion center subject matter experts defined program elements and mapped how these elements relate to each other to achieve programmatic outcomes. The team also examined performance measurement practices in other law enforcement and intelligence organizations. After several in-depth meetings, discussions, and interviews, participants developed a draft logic model, which was subsequently approved and finalized by the fusion center regional co-chairs and the National Network's key federal stakeholders.

Development of Performance Measures

The same group of experts that developed the draft National Network Logic Model was engaged to define performance measures based on the logic model. The group focused on defining measures that would capture key quantitative outputs and qualitative direct outcomes. The group did not start with a specific targeted number of measures in mind and did not specifically consider the practical implications of data collection as part of the initial measure definition effort. Instead, they focused on defining "ideal" performance measures, or measures that most accurately and completely capture the intent of the logic model and the expected outcomes that the National Network influences.

It is important to note that these performance measures are not intended to capture every output or outcome achieved by fusion centers. These measures focus on common National Network

outputs and outcomes as defined by the logic model. Additionally, implementation of these performance measures will occur over the course of multiple evaluation cycles. Timelines for implementation of these measures are dependent upon the ability of the National Network to track, collect, and report performance data. Those measures for which data collection is possible will be collected against. Fusion centers and federal partners will work together to determine how and when to implement data collection mechanisms for the remaining measures.

The next section includes definitions for each performance measure, grouped by the output and outcome categories defined in the National Network Logic Model. Each measure definition includes the specific measure language; an explanation of the context, intent, and meaning of the measure; and a description of the data collection approach for the measure. Unless otherwise noted, the reporting timeframe for all measures is one year (from August 1 to July 31).

Performance Measure Definitions: Outcomes

1. Enriched Partnerships and Decision-Making

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when the quality of the products and services they provide results in sustained relationships with key customer groups due to consistently high levels of satisfaction with their outputs which facilitates informed decision making.

To achieve this outcome, fusion centers must build wide-ranging information sharing partnerships with entities across multiple disciplines to ensure the perpetual exchange of timely and relevant intelligence. Likewise fusion center services must be timely and tailored to both the standing and emergent needs of requestors sufficient to accomplish desired end states and deliverables. The National Network demonstrates the existence of enriched partnerships when quality product development, multi-directional information flow, expanded service offerings, and sustained customer satisfaction reflect a collaborative, results-driven, and enduring relationship that directly impacts strategic and tactical decision making.

1.1 Percentage of key customers¹⁰ reporting that fusion center products and services are timely for mission needs

Explanation: Key customer perceptions of fusion center products and services reflect the relative value of the National Network in supporting federal, state, and local mission

¹⁰ DHS worked with partner agencies to group fusion center customers into categories reflecting common requirements and common evaluative perspectives. One of these groups is defined as “key customers”. For the key customer set, DHS coordinated with the National Governors Association (NGA) to survey selected partner groups, including state and territorial Homeland Security Advisors (HSAs), police executives, and senior executives from state criminal investigative agencies. DHS also worked with the Office of Partner Engagement within the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Directorate of Intelligence to survey FBI field offices. DHS acknowledges that this does not reflect all fusion center customer groups. DHS focused on these customer sub-groups both because of their relative impact on fusion center support and sustainment, and because data collection mechanisms already existed to capture their perspectives on fusion center products and services. DHS may expand customer groups surveyed in the future.

requirements, including providing timely products to key customers. This performance measure captures key customer perceptions of the timeliness of the products and services developed by the fusion center or centers in their respective areas of responsibility (AOR).

Collection Approach: DHS will conduct an annual survey of key customer groups to collect data for this performance measure. Respondents will evaluate the timeliness of fusion center products and services using a five-point Likert scale where one (1) is the low rating and five (5) is the high rating. For each individual key customer group (e.g. Homeland Security Advisors), the number of respondents who select three (3), four (4), or five (5) on the Likert scale will be divided by the total number of respondents within that individual key customer group to determine the percentage within that key customer group reporting that fusion center products and services are timely for mission needs. Finally, the percentages for each individual key customer group will be averaged together to determine the overall percentage of key customers reporting that fusion center products and services are timely for mission needs.

1.2 Percentage of key customers reporting fusion center products and services are relevant

Explanation: Key customer perceptions of fusion center products and services reflect the relative value of the National Network in supporting federal, state, and local mission requirements, including providing products and services that are relevant to key customer information needs. This performance measure captures key customer perceptions of the relevance of the products and services of the fusion center or centers in their respective AOR.

Collection Approach: DHS will conduct an annual survey of key customer groups to collect data for this performance measure. Respondents will evaluate the relevance of fusion center products and services using a five-point Likert scale where one (1) is the low rating and five (5) is the high rating. For each individual key customer group (e.g. Homeland Security Advisors), the number of respondents who select three (3), four (4), or five (5) on the Likert scale will be divided by the total number of respondents within that individual key customer group to determine the percentage within that key customer group reporting that fusion center products and services are relevant. Finally, the percentages for each individual key customer group will be averaged together to determine the overall percentage of key customers reporting that fusion center products and services are relevant.

1.3 Percentage of key customers who indicate they are satisfied with fusion center products and services

Explanation: Key customer perceptions of fusion center products and services reflect the relative value of the National Network in supporting federal, state, and local mission requirements, including providing an overall level of support to key customers that justifies continued support for and investment in fusion centers. This performance measure captures key customer perceptions of the overall level of support provided by the fusion center or centers in their respective AOR.

Collection Approach: DHS will conduct an annual survey of key customer groups to collect data for this performance measure. Respondents will evaluate their satisfaction with fusion

center products and services using a five-point Likert scale where one (1) is the low rating and five (5) is the high rating. For each individual key customer group (e.g. Homeland Security Advisors), the number of respondents who select three (3), four (4), or five (5) on the Likert scale will be divided by the total number of respondents within that individual key customer group to determine the percentage within that key customer group reporting satisfaction with fusion center products and services. Finally, the percentages for each individual key customer group will be averaged together to determine the overall percentage of key customers reporting satisfaction with fusion center products and services.

1.4 Percentage of key customers reporting that fusion center products and services influenced their decision making related to threat response activities within their area of responsibility (AOR)

Explanation: Key customer perceptions of fusion center products and services reflect the relative value of the National Network in supporting federal, state, and local mission requirements, including providing products and services that help key customers make informed, threat-based operational and resource allocation decisions. This performance measure captures key customer perceptions of the extent to which fusion center products and services provided information about threats within their AOR that helped inform their decision making.

Collection Approach: This measure is scheduled for future implementation.

1.5 Number of law enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical services (EMS) entities with Fusion Liaison Officers (FLOs)

Explanation: Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) programs provide a scalable way for fusion centers to engage with law enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical services management entities. FLOs serve as a conduit for the flow of homeland security and crime-related information between their agency and the fusion center to facilitate regional information exchange, enabling the fusion center to disseminate threat information to other SLTT entities within their jurisdictions. FLOs can be from a wide variety of disciplines, can provide the fusion center with subject matter expertise, and may support awareness and training efforts. This performance measure will assess the reach of the National Networks' FLO programs.

Collection Approach: Fusion centers will provide data related to this performance measure through the annual Fusion Center Assessment. Fusion centers will report the number of law enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical services entities represented in their FLO programs.

2. Enhanced Threat and Domain Awareness

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they provide stakeholders with both general domain awareness and the more-specific, accurate threat picture that allows them to make resource decisions to ultimately anticipate and disrupt criminal and terrorist activities.

To achieve this outcome, fusion centers must develop, leverage, and share information or

intelligence to provide stakeholders with an accurate threat picture. The National Network demonstrates an environment of enhanced threat and domain awareness through sound analytic tradecraft that produces intelligence to assist law enforcement and homeland security partners in preventing, protecting against, and responding to threats in the homeland.

2.1 Percentage of states whose fusion centers reported involvement in Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA)

Explanation: The purpose of this performance measure is to gauge the level of fusion center involvement in state Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA)¹¹ development. Fusion centers are focal points at the state and local level for the receipt, analysis, dissemination, and gathering of threat information. As such, fusion centers are best positioned to contribute to the threat component of the THIRA process and help communities identify capability targets and resource requirements necessary to address anticipated and unanticipated risks.

Collection Approach: Fusion centers will provide data related to this performance measure through the annual Fusion Center Assessment. Fusion centers will report whether or not they participated in the annual state THIRA. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing those states and territories which had at least one fusion center participate in the THIRA divided by the total number of states and territories participating in the assessment.

2.2 Number of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) originating from information received and validated by a fusion center

Explanation: The value of the National Network is most evident when the information received from fusion centers is used in the development of products at the federal level. The purpose of this performance measure is to determine the number of DHS Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) developed and disseminated with information that originated from or was validated by a fusion center.

The use of fusion center information in developing national level intelligence products is indicative of a two-way flow of threat information and a mutually beneficial partnership between DHS and the National Network. A high number of DHS IIRs that originate from fusion center information or are validated by a fusion center indicates that the content of fusion center products is relevant to DHS priorities and needs.

Collection Approach: This measure is scheduled for future implementation.

¹¹ The *Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA)* is a tool that allows a jurisdiction to understand its threats and hazards and how the impacts may vary according to time of occurrence, season, location, and other community factors. This knowledge helps a jurisdiction establish informed and defensible capability targets. Those entities, mainly State Administrative Agencies (SAA), that receive Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) preparedness grants, are required to complete a THIRA annually. These grants include funds distributed under the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG), or Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grant program.

2.3 *Number of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) originating from information received and validated by a fusion center*

Explanation: This performance measure determines the frequency with which fusion center products or reporting are cited in Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) IIRs. The use of information originating from or vetted by fusion centers in developing FBI IIRs is indicative of a flow of information and a mutually beneficial partnership between the FBI and the National Network.

Collection Approach: This measure is scheduled for future implementation.

2.4 *Percentage of key customers reporting that fusion center products and services resulted in increased situational awareness of threats within their area of responsibility (AOR)*

Explanation: Key customer perceptions of fusion center products and services reflect the relative value of the National Network in supporting federal, state, and local mission requirements, including increasing situational awareness of threats within key customer AOR. This performance measure captures key customer perceptions of the degree to which fusion center products and services helped increase their awareness of threats within their AOR.

Collection Approach This measure is scheduled for future implementation.

3. Better Targeted Information Gathering, Analysis, and Dissemination

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when their products and services align directly to the defined needs of their key customers and stakeholders. Fusion centers must focus their limited resources on gathering, analyzing, and sharing information consistent with the enduring strategic goals and objectives of these key customers and stakeholders, as well as their emergent tactical information needs.

To achieve this outcome, fusion centers must develop and leverage better targeted information gathering, analysis, and dissemination protocols in both the strategic and tactical contexts. Additionally, fusion centers must create and adhere to structured policies, processes, and mechanisms to engage key customers and stakeholders, to define their requirements, and to ensure that fusion center products and services meet these requirements. The National Network demonstrates better targeted information gathering, analysis and dissemination by delivering the right products to the right people at the right time effectively and efficiently.

3.1 *Percentage of fusion center analytic products tagged to Homeland Security (HSEC) Standing Information Needs (SINs)*

Explanation: Standing Information Needs (SINs) provide a formal, structured framework for categorizing issues and topics of interest. Homeland Security (HSEC) SINs refer to the enduring all-threats and all-hazards information needs of DHS and its federal, SLTT, and private sector stakeholders and homeland security partners. This performance measure is intended to measure the degree to which fusion center analytic products are being tagged (i.e., marked with specific

categorization) to HSEC SINS. This performance measure thus evaluates the degree to which fusion centers are meeting the information needs of the Federal Government, to include information necessary for developing the national risk profile and providing national level threat and domain awareness.

Collection Approach: Fusion centers will provide data related to this performance measure through the annual Fusion Center Assessment. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2013, fusion centers were required to post all releasable analytic products on Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) Intelligence (Intel)¹² community of interest to comply with Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) guidance. As a part of this process, fusion center personnel will tag all distributable analytic products to the appropriate HSEC SINS. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the number of distributable analytic products posted to HSIN Intel tagged to HSEC SINS by the total number of distributable analytic products posted to HSIN Intel.

3.2 Percentage of fusion center analytic products tagged to fusion center Standing Information Needs (SINs)

Explanation: To fulfill a similar role as HSEC SINS, fusion centers develop their own local SINs through close coordination with customers and stakeholders. They use SINs to help focus information gathering and sharing efforts and to guide analytic production to meet the needs of customers within their AOR. This performance measure evaluates the degree to which fusion centers are meeting the needs of customers within their AOR through the tagging of analytic products with fusion center SINs. For the purposes of this measure, fusion center SINs refers to draft or approved AOR-specific SINs.

Collection Approach: Fusion centers will provide data related to this performance measure through the annual Fusion Center Assessment. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2013, fusion centers were required to post all distributable analytic products on HSIN Intel to comply with HSGP guidance. As a part of this process, fusion center personnel may tag all analytic products to the appropriate fusion center SINs. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the number of distributable analytic products posted to HSIN Intel tagged to fusion center SINs by the total number of distributable analytic products posted to HSIN Intel.

4. More Effective Law Enforcement Activities

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they provide products and services that contribute directly to the efforts of local, state, and federal law enforcement officials. Specifically, fusion centers should enable and enhance investigative efforts that seek to reduce the threat of crime and terrorism in their jurisdictions and across the country.

To achieve this outcome, fusion centers must build effective two-way information sharing partnerships with local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations. The National Network demonstrates more effective law enforcement activities when fusion centers participate in broad-

¹² HSIN Intel is a centralized mechanism for the Homeland Security Enterprise to post and share intelligence information relating to the security of the homeland. It facilitates the sharing, dissemination and notification of key Sensitive But Unclassified intelligence information between Federal and SLTT stakeholders.

ranging information sharing partnerships that provide actionable criminal and terrorism threat information that law enforcement organizations use to initiate or enhance investigations.

4.1 Number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) vetted and submitted by fusion centers that result in the initiation or enhancement of an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Explanation: Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR)¹³ serves as an important source of information on those behaviors that are reasonably indicative of terrorist or other criminal activity. Fusion centers play a critical role in the SAR management process by collecting, vetting, and analyzing SAR and by submitting approved SAR to the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI) SAR Data Repository (SDR) for further federal review and analysis. This performance measure is intended to capture the contributions fusion centers make to both the NSI and the broader federal law enforcement mission by identifying the number of SAR submitted by fusion centers that result in a preliminary or full investigation by the FBI, including Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), or enhance an ongoing investigation.¹⁴

Collection Approach: The NSI Program Management Office (PMO) will provide data, derived from the FBI's Guardian Management Unit (GMU), for reporting on this measure.

4.2 Percentage of requests for information (RFI) from the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) for which fusion centers provided information for a TSC case file

Explanation: The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) was established under the auspices of the FBI to consolidate the government's approach to terrorism screening, to maintain a current, accurate and thorough database on known and suspected terrorists (KST), and to share this information with other government entities as provided in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 6.¹⁵ The TSC and fusion centers routinely exchange information on KST encounters in fusion center AORs. This performance measure tracks the extent to which fusion centers provide information in response to TSC requests for information (RFIs) and reflects the extent to which fusion centers are supporting the federal counterterrorism mission.

Collection Approach: The TSC will track and report data for this measure. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the number of responses from fusion centers to TSC RFIs (to include negative responses) by the total number of RFIs sent by the TSC to fusion centers.

¹³ Expanded definition of SAR available in [Information Sharing Environment Functional Standard Suspicious Activity Reporting V1.5](#)

¹⁴ A Preliminary Investigation may be opened on the basis of any "allegation or information" indicative of possible criminal activity or threats to the national security. A Full Investigation may be opened if there is an "articulable factual basis" of possible criminal or national threat activity. Expanded definitions of Preliminary and Full Investigations are available in [FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide \(DIOG\)](#) and [The Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations \(AGG DOM\)](#)

¹⁵ Signed in September 16, 2003, HSPD-6 created and provides guidance for the TSC.

4.3 Number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) vetted and submitted by fusion centers that result in a Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) Watchlist encounter

Explanation: This measure quantifies the number of SAR vetted and submitted by fusion centers that result in an event whereby an individual screened against the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) indicates a positive, potential, or inconclusive match to a Known or Suspected Terrorist (KST). TSC will update existing KST records with new terrorist identifiers and information that will provide the broader CT analytic community with new information stemming from the encounter.

Collection Approach: The NSI PMO will provide data, derived from the FBI's Guardian Management Unit, for reporting on this measure.

5. Improved Systemic Intelligence Capability

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they develop and implement fully functioning intelligence business processes. The National Network has the greatest impact when these business processes are integrated across the broader Homeland Security Enterprise.

To achieve this outcome, fusion centers must develop and leverage collaborative and effective information gathering, analysis, and dissemination processes within their AOR, across the National Network, and with federal partners. The National Network demonstrates an improved systemic intelligence capability when fusion center personnel have access to classified and unclassified threat information and seamlessly collaborate with federal partners to analyze intelligence and leverage each other's strengths.

5.1 Number of analytic products co-authored by at least one fusion center and at least one federal agency

Explanation: Information sharing and coordination across jurisdictional boundaries is critical to efforts to identify and mitigate threats to the homeland. In particular, analytic collaboration between fusion centers and the Federal Government leverages the collective expertise of multi-disciplinary partners across all levels of government to strengthen analytic conclusions. This performance measure will assess the degree of collaboration between the National Network and Federal partners by measuring the number of analytic products authored by at least one fusion center and at least one federal agency. For the purposes of this measure, "co-authored" is defined as making a contribution to the product beyond providing information, to include involvement in deriving the analytical conclusions of the product, authoring a portion of the language in the product, or including fusion center and federal agency seals or bylines on the product.

Collection Approach: Fusion centers will provide data related to this performance measure through the annual Fusion Center Assessment. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2013, fusion centers were required to post all distributable analytic products on HSIN Intel to comply with HSGP

guidance. As a part of this process, fusion centers will report the total number of analytic products developed jointly with one or more fusion center and one or more federal agency.

5.2 Number of analytic products co-authored by two or more fusion centers

Explanation: The National Network has the capability to channel the collective specialization of individual fusion centers. To help determine the value of this collective effort, this measure identifies the number of analytic products authored by more than one fusion center. Fusion center analytic products include both tactical (operational) and strategic analytic products but are separate and distinct from situational awareness products.

Collection Approach: Fusion centers will provide data related to this performance measure through the annual Fusion Center Assessment. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2013, fusion centers were required to post all distributable analytic products on HSIN Intel to comply with HSGP guidance. As a part of this process, fusion centers will report the total number of analytic products co-authored by two or more fusion centers.

5.3 Number of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) analytic products that cite information originating from fusion centers

Explanation: A goal of the National Network is to promote greater information sharing and collaboration among federal, state, and local intelligence and law enforcement entities. A strong partnership between fusion centers and their federal partners is critical to the safety of our Nation and therefore a national priority. This performance measure determines the frequency that fusion center information is cited in DHS analytic products.

Collection Approach: This measure is scheduled for future implementation.

5.4 Number of fusion center analytic products that cite source information originating from Intelligence Community (IC) products or reports

Explanation: The National Network functions as a critical nexus between the IC and SLTT agencies, enabling the fusion of homeland security, law enforcement, and terrorism information to better inform the national threat picture and that of the fusion center areas of responsibility. Beyond serving as an information clearinghouse, fusion centers should overlay national intelligence with local, regional, and statewide information and, through analysis, develop timely intelligence products for their customers. This performance measure is intended to measure the frequency that fusion center analytic products reference IC products or reports.

Collection Approach: This measure is scheduled for future implementation.

5.5 Number of fusion center analytic products that cite source information originating from at least one other fusion center's products or reports

Explanation: Just as measuring the number of fusion center analytic products that reference IC products or reports assesses how well the National Network is integrated with its federal

partners, fusion centers also utilize each other's assets as a part of a unified intelligence system. This measure quantifies that through the number of fusion center analytic products that reference at least one other fusion center's products or reports.

Collection Approach: This measure is scheduled for future implementation.

5.6 *Percentage of State, Local, Tribal, Territorial (SLTT) fusion center analysts with Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) Intel accounts who log into HSIN Intel at least once a month*

Explanation: The federal government directly supports the National Network by providing access to federal information systems. This includes systems designed to enable the receipt of classified and unclassified information from federal partners and the further dissemination of threat information to other SLTT entities within their jurisdictions. HSIN Intel is one of the primary systems sponsored by DHS to enable information sharing between fusion centers and federal partners. This performance measure identifies the percentage of fusion center analysts who have HSIN Intel accounts who log into their accounts at least once a month.

Collection Approach: This measure is scheduled for future implementation.

6. Improved Support to Operational Response

The capabilities fusion centers develop to support traditional counterterrorism and all-crimes analysis translate easily and effectively into non-traditional mission areas. Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they can apply their capabilities across the full spectrum of homeland security mission areas, as they have the ability to access and receive information and intelligence from a wide variety of sources. This capability can be used to develop intelligence products that will better inform decision makers who are involved in prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery activities.

To achieve this outcome, fusion centers must have broad engagement with their non-law enforcement partners and must develop robust, flexible, and adaptive intelligence capabilities to address a range of mission areas and non-traditional customer needs. The National Network demonstrates improved support to operational response when fusion centers add meaningful intelligence products and information support to all-hazards planning and response efforts, including for pre-planned events as well as both natural and manmade disasters.

6.1 *Percentage of federally designated special events in which fusion centers played a direct role*

Explanation: Fusion centers develop AOR-specific expertise and partnerships that are invaluable in supporting day-to-day AOR-specific mission requirements. However, their expertise and partnerships are also applied to support operational planning and monitoring of pre-planned special events, including National Special Security Events (NSSE) and Special Events Assessment Rating (SEAR) Level 1-3 events, as designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security. This performance measure evaluates the extent to which fusion centers play

a direct role in NSSEs and SEAR Level 1-3 events in their AOR. For the purposes of this measure, a direct role is defined as providing onsite support at a federal, state or local event operations or intelligence coordination center, or producing an analytic product or threat assessment specifically tailored to the event.

Collection Approach: Fusion centers will provide data related to this performance measure through the annual Fusion Center Assessment. I&A will obtain a list of all federally designated NSSEs and SEAR Level 1-3 events from the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) and will pre-populate the online self-assessment tool with this list. Fusion centers will indicate which special events they had direct roles in supporting. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the total number of designated events directly supported across the National Network by the total number of events designated.

6.2 Percentage of federally declared disasters in which fusion centers played a direct role

Explanation: Fusion centers have developed expertise to support a wide range of missions that extend beyond terrorism and criminal threat analysis. Many fusion centers have an “all hazards” mission that involves gathering, analyzing, and sharing information on natural and manmade disasters impacting their AOR. This performance measure assesses fusion center involvement in supporting the response to federally declared disasters. The extent to which fusion centers support such incidents indicates how fusion centers are applying expertise, skills, and resources to support non-traditional missions and mission partners. For the purposes of this measure, a direct role is defined as providing onsite support at a federal, state or local event operations or intelligence coordination center, or producing an analytic product or threat assessment specifically tailored to the incident, providing or participating in threat briefings related to the incident, and responding to incident-related RFIs.

Collection Approach: Fusion centers will provide data related to this performance measure through the annual Fusion Center Assessment. I&A will obtain a list of all federally declared disasters from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and will pre-populate the online self-assessment tool with this list. Fusion centers will indicate which of these disasters they provided direct support for. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the total number of federally declared disasters supported across the National Network by the total number of federally declared disasters.

6.3 Percentage of state declared disasters in which fusion centers played a direct role

Explanation: This performance measure assesses fusion center involvement in supporting the response to disasters, although disasters declared by State or territorial governors rather than by the federal government. The extent to which fusion centers support such incidents indicates how fusion centers are applying expertise, skills, and resources to support non-traditional missions and mission partners. For the purposes of this measure, a direct role is defined as producing an analytic product or threat assessment specifically tailored to the incident, providing or participating in threat briefings related to the incident, and responding to incident-related RFIs.

Collection Approach: This measure is scheduled for future implementation.

6.4 *Percentage of recommendations identified through Fusion Center Readiness Initiative (FCRI) exercises acted upon and addressed by the specified fusion center(s)*

Explanation: Exercises are a key mechanism for evaluating fusion center capabilities in an operational context. Exercise after-action evaluations and improvement plans provide a means to identify fusion center strengths, areas for improvement, and necessary corrective actions. This performance measure evaluates fusion center progress in addressing recommendations and corrective actions identified in after-action evaluations developed for exercises conducted under the auspices of I&A's Fusion Center Readiness Initiative (FCRI). The FCRI plans, develops, and coordinates periodic exercises focused on the operational application and demonstration of National Network capabilities.

Collection Approach: This measure is scheduled for future implementation.

Performance Measure Definitions: Outputs

7. Intelligence & Information Products and Services

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they provide timely, actionable information and intelligence that overlay national intelligence with locally gathered information. These products and services are designed to enhance customers' situational awareness and support operational activity, ultimately informing decision making processes.

7.1 *Number of situational awareness products developed and disseminated by fusion centers*

Explanation: Situational awareness products are a category of products developed by fusion centers to describe an event or incident of interest to customers (e.g., incident reports, Be-On-the-Look-Outs (BOLOs)), or to convey raw, unanalyzed information (e.g., Intelligence Information Report, Homeland Security Intelligence Report, compilations of Suspicious Activity Reporting, or compilations of tips and leads). This performance measure tracks the total number of situational awareness products developed by fusion centers. The amount of situational awareness production across the National Network demonstrates the degree to which fusion centers have implemented capabilities to translate raw data and reporting into products designed to improve situational awareness at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report how many situational awareness products they produced during the reporting period.

7.2 *Number of analytic products developed and disseminated by fusion centers*

Explanation: Analytic products are a category of products developed by fusion centers that contain assessments, forecasts, associations, links, and/or other outputs from the analytic process.

These products may be disseminated for use in the improvement of preparedness postures, risk mitigation, crime prevention, target hardening, or apprehension of offenders, among other activities. This performance measure tracks the total number of analytic products developed and disseminated by fusion centers. The amount of analytic production across the National Network demonstrates the degree to which fusion centers have implemented capabilities to fuse raw data and reporting to draw defensible conclusions about the nature and meaning of a threat or threats in their AOR.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2013, fusion centers were required to post all releasable analytic products on HSIN Intel to comply with HSGP guidance. Fusion centers will report how many analytic products they developed and disseminated during the reporting period.

7.3 Number of tips and leads processed by fusion centers

Explanation: Fusion centers are in a unique position to gather locally generated information from a range of sources and share it with federal partners and other law enforcement agencies to support prevention and protection activities. Such information can relate to criminal or illicit activity, but may not necessarily or obviously relate to terrorism. This performance measure tracks the number of tips and leads processed by fusion centers, where processing includes receiving, evaluating, and cataloging the tip or lead for later retrieval and use. This measure specifically excludes Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) vetted and submitted by fusion centers, which is tracked via a separate performance measure.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report the number of tips and leads their center processed during the reporting period.

7.4 Number of fusion center searches conducted on Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) within the Nationwide SAR Initiative - SAR Data Repository (NSI SDR)

Explanation: The Federal Government directly supports the National Network by providing information technology systems designed to help fusion centers track, search, and analyze SAR. The FBI eGuardian system allows authorized users to securely search SAR data contained within the single Nationwide SAR Initiative – SAR Data Repository (NSI SDR). This performance measure tracks the total number of searches conducted by fusion centers through the NSI SDR.¹⁶

Collection Approach: The NSI will provide data, derived from the NSI SDR, for reporting on this measure.

¹⁶ January 31, 2014, Shared Space and eGuardian systems were replaced by the NSI SDR. The 2013 assessment period occurred prior to the NSI SDR implementation. For the 2013 assessment period, data was collected based on the following measure “Number of fusion center searches in eGuardian and Shared Space.”

7.5 Number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) submitted by fusion centers

Explanation: The NSI provides a tool to help prevent terrorism and other related criminal activity by establishing a national capacity for gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing suspicious activity that is reported to authorities. This performance measure tracks the National Network's combined SAR submissions.

Collection Approach: The NSI PMO will provide data, derived from the NSI SDR, for reporting on this measure.

7.6 Number of responses to fusion center-to-fusion center requests for information (RFIs)

Explanation: This performance measure tracks fusion center-to-fusion center coordination as a means of evaluating the functional effectiveness and responsiveness of the National Network. Specifically, it identifies the total number of requests for information (RFIs) sent by any designated fusion center to any other designated fusion center(s), and responded to within requested timelines. Qualifying RFIs are distinguished from other routine fusion center-to-fusion center exchanges by their operational rather than administrative nature. Qualifying RFIs include discrete requests for information, products, or services, including, but not limited to, name traces, database checks, threat or risk assessments, raw reports, subject matter expertise, finished intelligence products, or joint production.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report the number of RFIs received from other fusion centers and responded to during the reporting period.

7.7 Number of responses to federal requests for information (RFIs)

Explanation: This performance measure tracks the number of fusion center responses to RFIs from federal partners. This includes RFIs originating from federal personnel who are embedded within the responding fusion center and from federal personnel located at other locations. Qualifying RFIs are distinguished from other routine requests by their operational rather than administrative nature. Qualifying RFIs include discrete requests for information, products, or services, including, but not limited to, name traces, database checks, threat or risk assessments, raw reports, subject matter expertise, finished intelligence products, or joint production.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report the number of RFIs received from federal agencies and responded to during the reporting period.

7.8 Number of responses to requests for information (RFIs) from agencies within fusion center area of responsibility (AOR)

Explanation: This performance measure tracks the number of responses to RFIs that originated from state and local agencies (not including other fusion centers) within fusion centers AOR. This can include law enforcement, public safety, fire service, emergency management, public health, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and the private sector.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report the number of RFIs received from agencies within their AOR and responded to during the reporting period.

8. Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) Protections

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they safeguard the nation while protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties (P/CRCL) of its citizens. To achieve these protections, fusion centers must build effective and robust P/CRCL policies and protections, including implementation of an approved privacy policy, compliance reviews, well-trained P/CRCL officers, and strong outreach to stakeholders.

8.1 Percentage of fusion centers that conduct a Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) compliance review based upon the compliance verification tool

Explanation: This performance measure assesses the quality of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties (P/CRCL) policies across the National Network, and by extension, the National Network's ability to protect P/CRCL. Specifically, this measure evaluates whether fusion centers have conducted a review of their P/CRCL policies to ensure compliance with all applicable P/CRCL protection laws, regulations, and policies, as defined by the "Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Compliance Verification for the Intelligence Enterprise" tool.¹⁷ This tool was developed jointly by Global, in coordination with the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, to provide guidance on implementing appropriate P/CRCL safeguards within a fusion center. This review does not need to take place annually but a review is necessary after any substantial changes to a fusion center's P/CRCL policy.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report whether or not they conducted a compliance review based upon the "Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Compliance Verification for the Intelligence Enterprise" compliance verification tool at any time, and whether or not subsequent reviews were conducted during the reporting period based on a substantial change to their P/CRCL policy. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the number of fusion centers indicating that they completed the compliance review by the total number of fusion centers in the National Network.

8.2 Percentage of fusion centers that conduct Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) audits

¹⁷ *Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Compliance Verification for the Intelligence Enterprise* developed through the U.S. Department of Justice's Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global).

Explanation: This performance measure assesses the degree to which fusion centers have implemented mechanisms to evaluate the effectiveness of P/CRCL protection processes and procedures.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report whether or not their fusion center conducted a P/CRCL audit during the reporting period. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the number of fusion centers indicating that they P/CRCL audits by the total number of fusion centers in the National Network.

8.3 *Percentage of Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) audit findings for which fusion centers took corrective actions*

Explanation: This performance measure assesses the effectiveness of fusion center P/CRCL accountability and corrective action tracking processes by evaluating the extent to which negative audit findings are acted upon within fusion centers. Timely action by fusion centers to address findings demonstrates their commitment to protecting P/CRCL by ensuring that protections are fully integrated into their business processes and operations.

Collection Approach: This measure is scheduled for future implementation.

8.4 *Percentage of fusion center Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) Officers who received P/CRCL training for their position*

Explanation: P/CRCL Officers are designated by fusion centers to act as the primary points of contact for all issues pertaining to P/CRCL, including development, implementation, and monitoring of P/CRCL policies and processes and staff P/CRCL training, among other functions. P/CRCL Officers must have the appropriate training and tools to carry out these responsibilities effectively. This performance measure tracks the percentage of fusion center P/CRCL Officers who receive position-specific training.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report whether or not their fusion center's P/CRCL Officer has received position-specific training. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the number of fusion centers indicating that their P/CRCL Officer receives P/CRCL training for their position by the total number of P/CRCL Officers in the National Network.

8.5 *Percentage of fusion centers that provide annual Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) training to all fusion center staff*

Explanation: In order to ensure the effective implementation of fusion center P/CRCL policies, all fusion center staff must receive recurring training on these policies, including the Constitutional basis for P/CRCL protections; relevant federal, state, and local P/CRCL laws and regulations; and the specific P/CRCL protection processes and operating procedures within their fusion center. This performance measure tracks the extent to which fusion center staff across the National Network receive annual training on their center's P/CRCL policy.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report whether or not they provide annual P/CRCL training to their staff. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the number of fusion centers indicating that they provide P/CRCL training to all fusion center staff by the total number of fusion centers in the National Network.

8.6 Percentage of fusion center analytic products reviewed by Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) Officers for P/CRCL issues

Explanation: P/CRCL Officers play an important oversight role within fusion centers. By reviewing fusion center business processes, products, and services for P/CRCL considerations, P/CRCL Officers can help ensure that fusion centers adhere to applicable P/CRCL laws and regulations, while avoiding impinging on the Constitutional protections afforded to U.S. persons. Specifically, P/CRCL Officers can review fusion center analytic products prior to release to identify and help mitigate potential P/CRCL issues. This performance measure tracks the extent to which fusion center P/CRCL Officers review fusion center analytic products for P/CRCL issues.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report the total number of analytic products developed during the assessment period, as well as the number of these products reviewed by P/CRCL Officers for P/CRCL issues. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the number of fusion center analytic products reviewed by P/CRCL Officers for P/CRCL concerns by the total number of analytic products developed across the National Network.

9. Strategic Plans and Budgets

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they develop strategic plans that enable more efficient and effective planning and allocation of capability resources which are sustained or enhanced over time. Strategic plans help fusion centers demonstrate their commitment to long-term success and endurance by defining and preparing for future opportunities and uncertainties. Linking strategic priorities to operational budgets further enables long-term planning and helps to justify funding requests.

9.1 Percentage of fusion centers that develop an annual report providing updates on progress in achieving strategic goals and objectives

Explanation: Annual reports allow fusion centers to highlight to customers and stakeholders their major programmatic achievements and performance outcomes, which helps support continued investment in fusion centers. Annual reports provide an accounting of the value achieved through combined investments in people, projects, and infrastructure, and drive fusion center planning, programming, and budget execution. This performance measure tracks the extent to which fusion centers develop annual reports.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report whether or not they developed annual

reports providing updates on progress in achieving strategic goals and objectives. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the number of fusion center that develop annual reports by the total number of fusion centers in the National Network.

9.2 Percentage of fusion centers providing all performance data for the Fusion Center Performance Program (FCPP)

Explanation: As part of the Fusion Center Performance Program (FCPP), DHS requires objective, standardized data to evaluate the value and impact of individual fusion centers, and the National Network as a whole, in supporting national information sharing and homeland security outcomes. This data contributes to a coordinated federal, state, and local effort to support and sustain the National Network over time. This performance measure tracks the extent to which fusion centers have provided all FCPP-related performance data through the annual Fusion Center Assessment process.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. DHS will identify how many fusion centers provided all requested performance data. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the number of fusion centers that provided all FCPP-related performance data by the total number of fusion centers in the National Network.

10. Communications Policies and Systems

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when their communications plans and protocols, such as briefings, tours, and responses to open records inquiries, result in activities that ensure collaborative relationships with their respective stakeholders. Well executed communications plans enhance awareness of the fusion center's purpose, mission, functions, and value among customers and will help build and strengthen relationships through engagement and transparency.

10.1 Number of programmatic briefings, tours, and other engagements¹⁸

Explanation: Outreach activities allow fusion centers to directly engage with key customers and stakeholders, including the public, to communicate their mission, purpose, and value. Conducting programmatic briefings, tours, and other types of engagements as part of a coordinated communication and outreach strategy can help build trust and confidence and encourage support for sustained investment across the National Network. This performance measure tracks the number of briefings, tours, and other communication and outreach engagements conducted by fusion centers during the reporting period.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report the number of programmatic briefings, tours, and other engagements conducted during the reporting period.

¹⁸ The activities relevant to this measure include programmatic and mission-oriented briefings. This does not include intelligence-related briefings such as threat briefings or other similar engagements.

10.2 Number of open records inquiries (e.g. Freedom of Information Act requests) responded to by fusion centers

Explanation: Fusion centers are subject to numerous government transparency laws and regulations—sometimes referred to as “sunshine” or open records laws—that require reporting on official meetings, records, and other actions. Fusion centers provide this information for public review and/or inspection when requested through appropriate channels. This performance measure tracks the number of open records inquiries that fusion centers responded to during the reporting period.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report the number of open records inquiries responded to during the reporting period.

11. Security Policies and Systems

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they develop and implement appropriate security policies, procedures, and protocols to address physical, personnel, and information security within their centers. Effective security practices provide federal partners with assurance that the information shared with fusion centers is safeguarded and shared appropriately. Security assurance enables and enhances trusted partnerships and facilitates relevant information sharing and collaborative activities.

11.1 Of the fusion centers that fall under Department of Homeland Security (DHS) security purview, percentage of fusion centers that undergo an annual Security Compliance Review (SCR) based on DHS standards

Explanation: DHS conducts Security Compliance Reviews (SCRs)—a formal security audit—at those fusion centers that fall within DHS security purview. This includes any fusion centers where DHS has sponsored personnel security clearances or the installation of the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) Secret-level information system. It does not include fusion centers that are co-located with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) offices where the FBI oversees security. SCRs track fusion center compliance with applicable security policies and procedures and identify areas where fusion centers require attention in order to achieve full compliance with these policies and procedures. DHS typically conducts SCRs on a three-year cycle, so each fusion center subject to an SCR undergoes a review once every three years. Conducting periodic SCRs at those centers governed by DHS security protocols helps ensure the appropriate protection and safeguarding of facilities, systems, personnel, and information, including classified National Security Information stored at fusion centers. This performance measure tracks the annual DHS SCR rate, which reflects the DHS annual SCR schedule published by the DHS Chief Security Officer.

Collection Approach: The DHS Chief Security Officer will track and report data for this measure. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the number of SCRs conducted by the total number of SCRs scheduled during the assessment period.

11.2 Of the fusion centers that participated in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Security Compliance Review (SCR) during the assessment period, percentage of findings identified in the SCR report for which fusion centers took corrective actions within the timeframe identified

Explanation: DHS conducts Security Compliance Reviews (SCRs)—a formal security audit—at those fusion centers that fall within DHS security purview. This includes any fusion centers where DHS has sponsored personnel security clearances or the installation of the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) Secret-level information system. SCRs track fusion center compliance with applicable security policies and procedures and identify areas where fusion centers require attention in order to achieve full compliance with these policies and procedures. Not all SCRs identify areas requiring attention. This performance measure tracks the total number of “required actions”¹⁹ identified in any SCRs conducted during the assessment period, as well as the number of “required actions” that were fully addressed by the subject fusion centers during the assessment period and deemed resolved by the DHS Chief Security Officer.

Collection Approach: The DHS Chief Security Officer will track and report data for this measure. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the number of corrective actions completed divided by the total number of required actions stemming from SCR findings.

11.3 Percentage of State, Local, Tribal, Territorial (SLTT) fusion center personnel requiring SECRET clearances who have them, or have submitted requests to the appropriate granting authority for them

Explanation: Fusion center personnel with a valid “need to know,” as determined by fusion center directors, are eligible to be granted SECRET or higher level security clearances by appropriate clearance-granting authorities, including DHS and the FBI. Clearances allow fusion center personnel to access classified National Security Information to support fusion center operations and to facilitate the timely exchange of information with cleared partners. This performance measure tracks the number of fusion center personnel across the National Network who are deemed to have a valid “need to know,” and who have either been granted a final SECRET or higher clearance by DHS or the FBI, or who have been nominated for a SECRET or higher clearance.

Collection Approach: DHS will use the annual Fusion Center Assessment to collect data related to this performance measure. Fusion centers will report the number of fusion center personnel with a valid “need to know” who have been granted SECRET or higher level security clearances or who have been nominated for such clearances. The final percentage will be calculated by dividing the number of fusion center personnel requiring clearances who have been granted clearances – to include interim clearances – or who have submitted requests for clearances by the total number of fusion center personnel requiring clearances.

¹⁹ Fusion centers are required to correct any “required actions” identified in the SCR within 60 days of receiving the final SCR report.

Conclusion

The performance measures developed collaboratively by DHS with Federal and SLTT partners offer a comprehensive and more complete framework to evaluate the performance of the National Network. Congruent with the logic model, these measures show linkages between the outputs of fusion center operations and the overall impact the National Network is having as a part of the Homeland Security Enterprise.

The FCPP measures all program elements of the fusion process, as reflected in the logic model. The Fusion Center Cost Assessment, as part of the annual Fusion Center Assessment, gathers data and reports on the inputs of the National Network from Federal and SLTT partners and the private sector. The capability-centric Fusion Center Assessment examines the critical operational capabilities and enabling capabilities of the National Network, which correspond to the elements called “processes” in the National Network logic model. The performance measures measure the outputs and direct outcomes and by proxy, the intermediate outcomes and impact of the National Network. The Fusion Center Readiness Initiative sponsors exercises which help inform this entire process, including capabilities and performance.

In order to implement the performance management framework, fusion centers and Federal partners will need to provide data which, when analyzed, will allow for the performance measure results to be reported. SLPO is directing ongoing research to assess proposed methods of data collection for the performance measures. In addition, it is developing a common data infrastructure using a diverse range of surveys, Fusion Center Assessment data, and existing data. Once this process is completed it will allow the FCPP to capture objective, standardized data to evaluate the value and impact of the National Network in supporting national information sharing and homeland security outcomes.

As discussed above, these performance measures are not intended to capture every output produced by every fusion center. They are focused on common National Network outputs and outcomes. Data will be reported through the Final Report at the National Network level, not for individual fusion centers. Moreover, the 2013 data will provide a baseline against which future years’ data will be compared. SLPO may use this year’s baseline data to set performance targets in future years, but there are no specific targets for this first year of data collection.

That said, SLPO will analyze this year’s initial performance data to the extent possible to identify performance gaps network-wide and in individual centers for purposes of gap mitigation. Given the diversity of fusion center roles and activities, simply reviewing disaggregated data without context may be more misleading than illuminating. For that reason, SLPO intends to perform this analysis by designing an analytic framework linking fusion center performance data with other fusion center data (such as data on inputs and processes as well as outputs and outcomes) to identify correlations in performance trends. That will enable SLPO to work with individual centers as necessary to mitigate any identified gaps and thus improve the overall effectiveness of the National Network. As more data comes in during future years’ assessments, SLPO will continue to improve its ability to design gap mitigation programs well-targeted to addressing specific performance gaps. Eventually, SLPO intends to develop these performance measures into return-on-investment metrics for the system as a whole that will link system performance to funding and help support future grant justifications.

Appendix A: Definitions of Logic Model Elements

Inputs

DHS sees fusion center sustainment as a shared responsibility between partners at all levels of government. As such, the logic model distinguishes among federal resources, SLTT resources, and private sector resources. Most types of resources identified in the logic model are the same for Federal and SLTT partners.

Grant Funding

Fusion centers have emphasized the importance of federal grants in their budgets, arguing grant funding is indispensable to building and maintaining their operations. The primary program through which fusion centers access federal funding is the FEMA Homeland Security Grant Program. That program is not dedicated solely to fusion centers, however. Fusion centers also receive federal funding through a variety of other programs, including the Department of Justice's Justice Assistance Grants.

Personnel

SLTT agencies provide the core staff for fusion centers. Types of personnel vary depending on the mission scope and types of jurisdictions involved in the center, and personnel can be assigned full-time, part-time or on an as-needed basis depending on evolving threats and requirements.

Among the most common types of SLTT personnel assigned to fusion centers are:

- Analysts
- Criminal investigators, including specialized personnel such as highway patrol, narcotics officers, financial crimes investigators, and violent crimes investigators
- Representatives of fire services, emergency medical services, public health agencies, corrections agencies, critical infrastructure, and other public safety and private sector stakeholders
- Support personnel, such as those handling administration, information technology, communications, graphics, security, and privacy

Equipment

As with personnel, SLTT agencies receive federal assistance in covering the costs of equipment, including basic office equipment and technology. Technology supplied by federal partners includes software (such as relational databases and geographic information systems), hardware (including installation and maintenance costs for federal networks and secure video teleconference capabilities), projectors, and secure telephones.

Training, Exercises, and Technical Assistance

Federal partners develop and deliver training for fusion centers on subjects such as critical thinking and analytic methods, intelligence writing and briefing, and other skills. Fusion centers may participate in any number of other training programs and homeland security exercises developed at the Federal and SLTT levels. DHS and the Department of Justice jointly run a Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program that provides a range of services to fusion centers. Topics covered in the program include development of concepts of operations, technology implementation, security plans and policy development, communications planning and outreach, and counterterrorism awareness training.

Data and Data Systems

Fusion centers' ability to receive classified and unclassified information hinges on their access to the systems where that information resides. Fusion centers have access to classified information via the DHS Homeland Secure Data Network and/or the FBI Network. Fusion centers also have access to multiple federal and SLTT sensitive-but-unclassified systems, including FBI's Law Enforcement Online and DHS's HSIN. Federal data systems such as the NSI SDR and the front end interfaces connected to the NSI SDR also provide key platforms for fusion centers to submit, review, and search suspicious activity information. Fusion centers also use data available through SLTT agencies' systems as appropriate, such as local records management systems, crime data networks, geographic information systems, motor vehicle registration and other databases.

Intelligence and Other Information

Fusion centers gather intelligence and other information related to terrorism, crime, and other threats from within their AOR. They also receive such information from federal partners.

Facilities

As fusion centers are owned and operated by state and local agencies, those agencies are typically responsible for identifying and maintaining the physical facilities housing fusion centers, although many are co-located with a federal agency, such as the FBI.

Guiding Documents

SLTT authorities produce plans, policies, and standard operating procedures that provide critical guidance to fusion center operations.

Other Stakeholder Resources:

Examples of resources provided by other stakeholders include fusion center personnel funded by private sector partners, access to university subject matter experts, and resources provided by community groups.

Processes

The processes in the logic model represent the ways in which the inputs involved in fusion centers develop the centers' outputs. The processes in this model equate to the intelligence cycle, as represented by the four critical operational capabilities (COCs) and enabling capabilities (ECs) that fusion center directors and federal partners identified to guide fusion centers' work in capability development.

The four COCs represent the "operational priorities" of the National Network and reflect fusion centers' key roles in the homeland security intelligence cycle. They work together in an ongoing, cyclical fashion. Fusion centers receive threat information from the Federal Government and gather local information from agencies and the public in their AORs. They analyze information in a local context, making new connections and perhaps developing new questions and conducting further inquiry. Analysts then develop intelligence products, and centers disseminate them to relevant customers. The products and services customers receive from fusion centers then may heighten stakeholder awareness and lead to additional locally generated information or federal information, which in turn leads to further analysis, production and dissemination.

The processes are:

- Receive: The ability to receive classified and unclassified information from federal partners. Fusion centers access National Terrorism Advisory System alerts and other threat information from federal partners through federal portals and systems; they can then use that information in their analytic products and/or disseminate it to SLTT and private sector partners. This capability requires fusion centers to have appropriate policies and processes for receiving unclassified and classified federal information, personnel cleared and trained to handle the information, and access to federal systems to receive such information.
- Analyze: The ability to assess local implications of threat information through the use of a formal risk assessment process. Fusion centers overlay national intelligence with local, regional, and statewide information and, through analysis, develop timely intelligence products for their customers. Fusion centers should have policies, plans (including an analytic production plan), customer feedback processes, and information management technology. These assets help properly trained analysts add local context to time-sensitive threat information, develop products such as threat and risk assessments, and contribute to statewide and national risk assessments.
- Disseminate: The ability to further disseminate threat information to other SLTT entities within their jurisdictions. Dissemination should be organized, targeted, and timely so the information can contribute to better-informed prevention, protection, and response actions. Fusion centers should therefore have documented plans, policies, and/or procedures specifying the type of information and manner of delivery necessary for each stakeholder. Unclassified dissemination mechanisms include e-mail and HSIN Intel.
- Gather: The ability to gather locally generated information, aggregate it, analyze it, and share it with federal partners as appropriate. Such information can come from local agencies and the public and often takes the form of tips and leads and suspicious activity reporting. The role of many fusion centers in gathering SAR gives them an important role in the NSI. The capability to gather local threat information also underscores the importance of fusion center documentation of SINS. Centers should engage stakeholders to identify their information needs, incorporate them into their SINS, and then use the SINS to guide information gathering.

The four ECs provide a foundation for the fusion process by ensuring fusion centers have the policies, strategies, technology, infrastructure, and other elements necessary for proper day-to-day operations and long-term growth. They are:

- Protection of Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL): Fusion center protection of P/CRCL involves development and implementation of an approved privacy policy, compliance reviews, appointment of well-trained fusion center privacy officers, and outreach to the public and other stakeholders.
- Sustainment Strategy: Fusion centers are encouraged to engage in strategic planning and

performance measurement efforts to guide resource allocation, evaluate effectiveness, and demonstrate value. Such efforts include development of strategic plans and budgets linked to them, participation in cost assessments and financial audits, and exercises to evaluate capabilities.

- **Communications and Outreach:** By developing and implementing a communications and outreach plan, fusion centers can engage more proactively and consistently with stakeholders to communicate the mission, purpose, and value of fusion centers. Appointing a public affairs or public information officer can also help ensure successful communications.
- **Security:** Security policies, plans, and procedures are necessary to protect fusion center facilities, information, systems, and personnel. Other important ways fusion centers can help ensure security include appointment of designated security officers, provision of security training to their personnel, and access to security clearance information.

Outputs

Fusion center outputs represent the direct result of the use of center resources (inputs) to perform their day-to-day functions (processes). Fusion center outputs are often written products and intelligence or investigative services but also include the product of the ECs: supporting policies, plans, systems, and activities that enable the success of those products and services.

Intelligence and Information Products and Services

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they provide timely, actionable information and intelligence that overlay national intelligence with locally gathered information. These products and services are designed to enhance customers' situational awareness and support operational activity, ultimately informing decision making processes.

Investigative Case Support

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they provide investigative case support that leverages access to information and systems, subject matter expertise, and apply analytic tradecraft to assist in the investigation of ongoing cases. Such investigations may pertain to all-crimes activity, not solely to terrorism.

Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Protections

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they safeguard the nation while protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties (P/CRCL) of its citizens. To achieve these protections, fusion centers must build effective and robust P/CRCL policies and protections, including implementation of an approved privacy policy, compliance reviews, well-trained P/CRCL officers, and strong outreach to stakeholders.

Strategic Plans and Budgets

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they develop strategic plans that enable more efficient and effective planning and allocation of capability resources which are sustained or enhanced over time. Strategic plans help fusion centers demonstrate their commitment to long-term success and endurance by defining and preparing for future opportunities and uncertainties. Linking strategic priorities to operational budgets further enables long-term planning and helps to justify funding requests.

Communications Policies and Systems

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when their communications plans and protocols, such as briefings, tours, and responses to open records inquiries, result in activities that ensure collaborative relationships with their respective stakeholders. Well executed communications plans enhance awareness of the fusion center's purpose, mission, functions, and value among customers and will help build and strengthen relationships through engagement and transparency.

Security Policies and Systems

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they develop and implement appropriate security policies, procedures, and protocols to address physical, personnel, and information security within their centers. Effective security practices provide federal partners with assurance that the information shared with fusion centers is safeguarded and shared appropriately. Security assurance enables and enhances trusted partnerships and facilitates relevant information sharing and collaborative activities.

Direct Outcomes

Outcomes describe the value and effect of the National Network's outputs. Most directly, National Network outcomes should improve the ability of public safety, first responders, and other stakeholders to play their operational roles in securing the homeland.

Based on research and discussions with fusion center stakeholders, the following direct outcomes from the outputs of the National Network were identified:

- Enriched partnerships and decision-making
- Enhanced threat and domain awareness
- Better targeted information gathering, analysis, and dissemination
- More effective law enforcement activities
- Improved systemic intelligence capabilities
- Improved support to operational response

Enriched Partnerships and Decision-Making

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when the quality of the products and services they provide results in sustained relationships with key customer groups due to consistently high levels of satisfaction with their outputs which facilitates informed decision making. To achieve this outcome, fusion centers must build wide-ranging information sharing partnerships with entities across multiple disciplines to ensure the perpetual exchange of timely and relevant intelligence. Likewise fusion center services must be timely and tailored to both the standing and emergent needs of requestors sufficient to accomplish desired end states and deliverables. The National Network demonstrates the existence of enriched partnerships when quality product development, multi-directional information flow, expanded service offerings, and sustained customer satisfaction reflect a collaborative, results-driven, and enduring relationship that directly impacts strategic and tactical decision making.

Enhanced Threat and Domain Awareness

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they provide

stakeholders with both general domain awareness and the more-specific, accurate threat picture that allows them to make resource decisions to ultimately anticipate and disrupt criminal and terrorist activities. To achieve this outcome, fusion centers must develop, leverage, and share information or intelligence to provide stakeholders with an accurate threat picture. The National Network demonstrates an environment of enhanced threat and domain awareness through sound analytic tradecraft that produces intelligence to assist law enforcement and homeland security partners in preventing, protecting against, and responding to threats in the homeland.

Better Targeted Information Gathering, Analysis, and Dissemination

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when their products and services align directly to the defined needs of their key customers and stakeholders. Fusion centers must focus their limited resources on gathering, analyzing, and sharing information consistent with the enduring strategic goals and objectives of these key customers and stakeholders, as well as their emergent tactical information needs. To achieve this outcome, fusion centers must develop and leverage better targeted information gathering, analysis, and dissemination protocols in both the strategic and tactical contexts. Additionally, fusion centers must create and adhere to structured policies, processes, and mechanisms to engage key customers and stakeholders, to define their requirements, and to ensure that fusion center products and services meet these requirements. The National Network demonstrates better targeted information gathering, analysis and dissemination by delivering the right products to the right people at the right time effectively and efficiently.

More Effective Law Enforcement Activities

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they provide products and services that contribute directly to the efforts of local, state, and federal law enforcement officials. Specifically, fusion centers should enable and enhance investigative efforts that seek to reduce the threat of crime and terrorism in their jurisdictions and across the country. To achieve this outcome, fusion centers must build effective two-way information sharing partnerships with local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations. The National Network demonstrates more effective law enforcement activities when fusion centers participate in broad-ranging information sharing partnerships that provide actionable criminal and terrorism threat information that law enforcement organizations use to initiate or enhance investigations.

Improved Systemic Intelligence Capabilities

Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they develop and implement fully functioning intelligence business processes. The National Network has the greatest impact when these business processes are integrated across the broader Homeland Security Enterprise. To achieve this outcome, fusion centers must develop and leverage collaborative and effective information gathering, analysis, and dissemination processes within their AOR, across the National Network, and with federal partners. The National Network demonstrates an improved systemic intelligence capability when fusion center personnel have access to classified and unclassified threat information and seamlessly collaborate with federal partners to analyze intelligence and leverage each other's strengths.

Improved Support to Operational Response

The capabilities fusion centers develop to support traditional counterterrorism and all-crimes analysis translate easily and effectively into non-traditional mission areas. Fusion centers provide the most benefit and have the greatest impact when they can apply their capabilities

across the full spectrum of homeland security mission areas, as they have the ability to access and receive information and intelligence from a wide variety of sources. This capability can be used to develop intelligence products that will better inform decision makers who are involved in prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery activities. To achieve this outcome, fusion centers must have broad engagement with their non-law enforcement partners and must develop robust, flexible, and adaptive intelligence capabilities to address a range of mission areas and non-traditional customer needs. The National Network demonstrates improved support to operational response when fusion centers add meaningful intelligence products and information support to all-hazards planning and response efforts, including for pre-planned events as well as both natural and manmade disasters.

Intermediate Outcomes and Impact

Intermediate outcomes develop in the longer term and in conjunction with the effects of outputs from other organizations and networks in the homeland security enterprise. The intermediate outcomes identified are:

- Enhanced intelligence and information sharing among federal, state, and local partners nationwide
- Better informed national risk picture
- Reduced risk in fusion center areas of responsibility

Any of the direct outcomes has the potential to contribute to one or more of the intermediate outcomes. The intermediate outcomes, in turn, collectively contribute to the overall intended impact of the National Network: *protecting the homeland*.

Appendix B: Glossary

Below are definitions of key terms found throughout this document. For definitions and descriptions of the logic model elements specific to the National Network of Fusion Centers, please see Appendix A: Definitions of Logic Model Elements. Definitions derived from sources outside SLPO are cited with footnotes.

Analytic Products: Reports or documents that contain assessments, forecasts, associations, links, and/or other outputs from the analytic process that may be disseminated for use in the improvement of preparedness postures, risk mitigation, crime prevention, target hardening, or apprehension of offenders, among other activities. Fusion centers develop tactical and strategic analytic products. Tactical analytic products assess specific, potential threats related to near-term timeframes or major events. They involve issues needing immediate information capabilities to assist decision making on current operations. Strategic analytic products include assessments providing an overall picture of the intent and capabilities of specific terrorist or criminal groups, including likely tactics, techniques, and procedures. Strategic analytic products might also include trend analysis and forecasting.

Area of Responsibility (AOR): The geographic area a fusion center is responsible for covering. This may be an entire state, a region within a state, or a region that crosses state lines. The extent of the AOR strongly influences the range of stakeholders (federal, state, local, private sector) with whom a fusion center works and to whom it delivers intelligence and information.

Critical Infrastructure: Assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination thereof.

Critical Operational Capabilities (COCs): The operational priorities of the National Network of Fusion Centers; the ability to (1) receive, (2) analyze, (3) disseminate, and (4) gather information.

Disaster and Emergency: As used in this document, “federal disaster or emergency events” refer to emergencies and major disasters as defined in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (“The Stafford Act”). The Stafford Act (Section 102) defines “emergency” as “any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.” It defines “major disaster” as “any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.”²⁰

²⁰ Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, and Related Authorities (p. 2), Federal Emergency Management Agency, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/stafford_act.pdf

As used in this document, “state disaster or emergency events” refer to emergencies or disasters declared by governors or other officials as authorized by state law. For the purposes of Measure C under “Improved Support to Operational Response,” this term excludes state disasters and emergencies that were also federal disasters or emergencies.²¹

eGuardian: The FBI’s unclassified reporting system, external but linked to the FBI’s classified counterterrorism incident management system - the Guardian Threat Tracking System; provides FSLTT agencies with the means to enter, review, approve and submit SAR for FBI JTTF evaluation. *Note: Winter 2014, Shared Space and eGuardian systems were replaced by the NSI SDR.*

Emergency: See “Disaster and emergency.”

Enabling Capabilities (ECs): The four capabilities that provide a foundation for the fusion process through P/CRCL protections, sustainment strategy, communications and outreach, and security.

Federal Disaster Event: See “Disaster and emergency.”

Front-End User Interface Application: Entry point into the NSI SDR. Examples include eGuardian, the SAR Vetting Tool (SVT), a local records management system, or future Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) portals or applications.

Fusion Center: A collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.

Fusion Center Assessment: The annual process by which SLPO gathers data on fusion center capabilities and (starting in 2012) performance. It typically begins with a self-assessment by fusion centers, followed by a validation phase, including data quality reviews and interviews with fusion center directors.

Fusion Center Liaison Officer: Individuals who serve as the conduit for the flow of homeland security and crime-related information between the field and the fusion center for assessment and analysis. FLOs can be from a wide variety of disciplines, can provide the fusion center with subject matter expertise, and may support awareness and training efforts.

Fusion Center Performance Program (FCPP): The performance management framework that SLPO is developing and implementing on behalf of the National Network of Fusion Centers. The purpose of the FCPP is to capture objective, standardized data to evaluate the value and impact of individual fusion centers, and the National Network as a whole, in supporting national information sharing and homeland security outcomes. The FCPP consists of three interconnected elements:

²¹ See, for example, *State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) Activation Level*, Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, <http://www.tnema.org/ema/current/>; and *Disaster Declaration Process*, Illinois Emergency Management Agency, <http://www.illinois.gov/ready/SiteCollectionDocuments/DisasterDeclarationProcess.pdf>

- Measuring the capability and performance of the National Network through a structured, standardized annual assessment (the Fusion Center Assessment);
- Hosting and participating in prevention-based exercises that test fusion center capabilities against real world scenarios; and
- Mitigating identified gaps in order to increase capabilities, improve performance, and sustain fusion center operations.

Fusion Center Readiness Initiative: The component of the FCPP that oversees exercises testing fusion center capabilities and performance and producing after-action evaluations that fusion centers should use to guide improvements.

Guardian Threat Tracking System: The FBI's internal threat and suspicious activity tracking system that resides on a classified enclave.

Homeland Security Advisor (HSA): The official responsible for implementing a state's homeland security mission. Appointed by a state's governor, the HSA serves as the state's primary representative to DHS and might act on the governor's behalf during a disaster or emergency.²²

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support Centers (ISC): HIDTA ISCs are sponsored by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and aim to support the disruption and dismantlement of drug-trafficking and money-laundering organizations through the prevention or mitigation of associated criminal activity.

Homeland Security Information: Any information possessed by a Federal, State, or local agency that (a) relates to the threat of terrorist activity; (b) relates to the ability to prevent, interdict, or disrupt terrorist activity; (c) improves the identification or investigation of a suspected terrorist or terrorist organization; or (d) improves the response to a terrorist act. [Section 892(f)(1) of the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. 482(f)(1))]²³

Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN): A Department of Homeland Security-managed national secure and trusted web-based portal for information sharing and collaboration between federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, private sector, and international partners engaged in the homeland security mission. HSIN is made up of a growing network of sites, called Communities of Interest (COI). COIs are organized by state organizations, Federal organizations, or mission areas such as emergency management, law enforcement, critical sectors, and intelligence.

Homeland Security Standing Information Needs (HSEC SINs): Refers to the enduring all-threats and all-hazards information needs of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector stakeholders and homeland security partners.

²² Carmen Ferro, David Henry, and Thomas MacLellan, *A Governor's Guide to Homeland Security*, National Governors Association, November 2010, <http://www.emcog.org/sitedocs/1011GOVGUIDEHS.pdf>

²³ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *ISE Profile and Architecture Implementation Strategy, Version 2.0*, June 2009, http://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/ISE-PAIS_V2.0_0.pdf

Information Sharing Environment (ISE): An approach that facilitates the sharing of terrorism information, which approach may include any methods determined necessary and appropriate for carrying out this section [1016]. [IRTPA 1016(a)(2)]

Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Privacy Guidelines: Principles for federal departments and agencies to follow to ensure that the information privacy rights and other legal rights of Americans are protected as personally identifiable terrorism-related information is acquired, accessed, used, and stored in the Information Sharing Environment (ISE.)

Information Sharing Environment (ISE) Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR): An ISE-SAR is a SAR that has been determined, pursuant to a two-part process, to have potential terrorism nexus (i.e., to be reasonably indicative of criminal activity associated with terrorism). ISE-SAR business, privacy, and civil liberties rules serve as a unified process to support the reporting, tracking, processing, storage, and retrieval of terrorism-related suspicious activity reporting across the ISE.²⁴

Intelligence Community: A federation of Executive Branch agencies and organizations that work separately and together to conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of U.S. national security. These organizations are (in alphabetical order): Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Coast Guard, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, and Navy Intelligence.²⁵

Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs): DHS and the FBI use this term to refer to a type of raw intelligence product that they disseminate.²⁶ Fusion centers are often a source of information for DHS IIRs.

Inputs (logic model element): Resources that an agency, organization, or entity has invested into the program or activity being measured.²⁷ These resources include funding, employee hours, and infrastructure.

Intelligence: Actionable inference or a set of related inferences derived from some form of inductive or deductive logic. By combining information, analysis, and interpretation, intelligence helps to document a threat, ascertain its probability of occurring, and define a responsive course of action, all in a timely manner.

²⁴ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *ISE Profile and Architecture Implementation Strategy*, Version 2.0, June 2009, http://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/ISE-PAIS_V2.0_0.pdf

²⁵ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *U.S. National Intelligence an Overview: 2011*, http://cryptocomb.org/IC_Consumers_Guide_2011.pdf

²⁶ Federal Bureau of Investigation, *The Intel-Driven FBI*, <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/intel-driven/intelligence-overview>

²⁷ Harry Hatry, *Performance Measurement: Getting Results, Second Edition*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 2006.

Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF): JTTFs are multi-jurisdictional task forces established to conduct terrorism-related investigations. JTTFs focus primarily on terrorism-related issues, with specific regard to terrorism investigations with local, regional, national, and international implications.

Logic Model: Graphical representation of how program inputs result in desired outcomes; identifies how program elements relate to each other. Program elements typically used in logic models include inputs, processes, outputs, and outcomes.

National Network of Fusion Centers: The 78 designated fusion centers, which are located in every state (except Wyoming), the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and several major urban areas.

Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI): The Nationwide SAR Initiative is jointly managed by DHS and FBI and provides for a standardized SAR process including stakeholder outreach, privacy protections, training, and facilitation of technology—for identifying and reporting suspicious activity in jurisdictions across the country and also serves as the unified focal point for sharing SAR information.

NSI SDR: Nationwide SAR Initiative SAR Data Repository, the single database where all shared Information Sharing Environment (ISE)-SARs reside. The SDR is populated and searched through a front-end user interface application.

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A): I&A is a component of DHS and the national Intelligence Community (IC). It ensures that information related to homeland security threats is collected, analyzed and disseminated to the full spectrum of homeland security customers in DHS, at State, local, tribal, and territorial levels, in the private sector and in the IC.

Open Records Inquiry: For purposes of these performance measures, this term refers to requests for information made under the authority of federal or state laws providing a process for public access to certain government data. A key example of such a law on the federal level is the Freedom of Information Act.

Outputs (logic model element): The products or services delivered by a program's inputs through the use of the program's processes.²⁸

Outcomes (logic model element): The effects or results that a program has, typically compared to its intended purpose. For the purposes of the National Network of Fusion Centers logic model, outcomes were trifurcated into stages:

- **Direct outcomes** are aspects of customer operations or stakeholder conditions that are more immediately and visibly improved by program outputs.
- **Intermediate outcomes** are those aspects of customer operations or stakeholder conditions that are improved by program outputs and direct outcomes.
- The **Impact** reflects a change in a condition or status related to strategic goals and

²⁸ Harry Hatry, *Performance Measurement: Getting Results, Second Edition*. Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press, 2006.

objectives.

Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) audit: A formal review measuring how well a fusion center's business processes are protecting P/CRCL.

Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) compliance review: A review of fusion centers' P/CRCL policies to ensure compliance with all applicable P/CRCL protection laws, regulations, and policies, as defined by the "Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties Compliance Verification for the Intelligence Enterprise" tool developed through the U.S. Department of Justice's Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global).

Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) Officer: The person designated by fusion center leadership as responsible for development and implementation of P/CRCL policies at the center.

Processes (logic model element): The work (activities, initiatives, and procedures) that the program's inputs perform on an ongoing basis to produce outputs, support outcomes, and fulfill the program's mission.

Requests for Information (RFIs): A request initiated by the fusion center or a fusion center stakeholder (e.g., law enforcement agency or DHS) that could include, but is not limited to, requests for information or intelligence products or services such as name traces, database checks, assessments, subject matter expertise assistance, or finished intelligence products.

Return on Investment (ROI): For the FCPP's purposes, ROI refers to the benefit the fusion center network provides to homeland security relative to the network's cost.

Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) Centers: provide services and resources supporting regional law enforcement efforts to successfully resolve criminal investigations and prosecute offenders while providing critical officer safety event deconfliction. RISS supports efforts against organized and violent crime, gang activity, terrorism, human trafficking, identity theft, and other regional priorities.

Secret: Information that, if it is made public, could be expected to cause serious damage to national security.²⁹

Security Compliance Review or Audit: A formal effort to assess adherence to policy rules and regulations pertaining to security.

Situational Awareness: In the fusion center context, customer understanding of current or potential mission-relevant threats and vulnerabilities, as well as the resources and options available to address them.

²⁹ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *U.S. National Intelligence an Overview: 2011*, http://cryptocomb.org/IC_Consumers_Guide_2011.pdf

Special Event: Known, upcoming or ongoing major events that require public safety preparedness planning, including but not limited to National Special Security Events. Examples include major sporting events, political conventions, organized public celebrations, etc.

Standing Information Needs (SINs): A formal, structured framework for categorizing enduring issues and topics of interest about the homeland security threat or operational environment.

State Disaster Event: See “Disaster or emergency.”

Strategic Analysis: See “Analytic products.”

Suspicious Activity: Official documentation of reported or observed activity and/or behavior that, based on an officer’s training and experience, is believed to be indicative of intelligence gathering or preoperational planning related to terrorism, criminal, or other illicit intention.

Suspicious Activities Reporting (SAR): Official documentation of observed behavior reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.

Tactical Analysis: See “Analytic products.”

Terrorist Screening Center: The TSC was established by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 which directed that a center be established to consolidate the government’s approach to terrorism screening and to provide for the appropriate and lawful use of terrorist information in screening processes. The TSC began operations on December 1, 2003.

Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA): A tool that allows a jurisdiction to understand its threats and hazards and how the impacts may vary according to time of occurrence, season, location, and other community factors. This knowledge helps a jurisdiction establish informed and defensible capability targets. Those entities, mainly State Administrative Agencies (SAA), that receive FEMA preparedness grants are required to complete a THIRA annually. These grants include funds distributed under the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG), or Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grant program.

Threat: Natural or man-made occurrence, individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or property.

Threat Information: Information or intelligence pertaining to natural or man-made occurrences, individuals, entities, or actions that have or indicate “the potential to harm life, information, operations, the environment and/or property.”³⁰

Tips and Leads: Information provided from fusion center stakeholders, the general public, or other sources regarding potentially criminal or illicit activity, but not necessarily or obviously related to terrorism.

³⁰ DHS Lexicon: Terms and Definitions, Revised December 2008.

Watchlist: A federal, state, local, tribal, or territorial agency’s database of known or suspected terrorists.³¹

Watchlist Encounter: An event in which an individual is identified during a screening process to be a “positive match”, “potential match”, or “inconclusive match”, to an individual who has been designated in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) as a known or suspected terrorist (KST).

³¹ Timothy J. Healy, Director, Terrorist Screening Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Testimony Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 9 December 2009, <http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-terrorist-screening-center-and-its-role-in-combating-terrorist-travel>.

Appendix C: Performance Measures Implementation/Grant Requirement Status

Performance Measures	Implementation Status	HSGP Grant Requirement
1.1 Percentage of key customers reporting that fusion center products and services are timely for mission needs	Implemented	No
1.2 Percentage of key customers reporting fusion center products and services are relevant	Implemented	No
1.3 Percentage of key customers who indicate they are satisfied with fusion center products and services	Implemented	No
1.4 Percentage of key customers reporting that fusion center products and services influenced their decision making related to threat response activities within their area of responsibility (AOR)	Future Implementation	No
1.5 Number of law enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical services (EMS) entities with Fusion Liaison Officers (FLOs)	Implemented	No
2.1 Percentage of states whose fusion centers reported involvement in Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA)	Implemented	FY2014
2.2 Number of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) originating from information received and validated by a fusion center	Future Implementation	No
2.3 Number of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) originating from information received and validated by a fusion center	Future Implementation	No
2.4 Percentage of key customers reporting that fusion center products and services resulted in increased situational awareness of threats within their area of responsibility (AOR)	Future Implementation	No
3.1 Percentage of fusion center analytic products tagged to Homeland Security (HSEC) Standing Information Needs (SINs)	Implemented	FY2014
3.2 Percentage of fusion center analytic products tagged to fusion center Standing Information Needs (SINs)	Implemented	No
4.1 Number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) vetted and submitted by fusion centers that result in the initiation or enhancement of an	Implemented	No

	investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)		
4.2	Percentage of requests for information (RFI) from the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) for which fusion centers provided information for a TSC case file	Implemented	FY2014
4.3	Number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) vetted and submitted by fusion centers that result in a Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) Watchlist encounter	Implemented	No
5.1	Number of analytic products co-authored by at least one fusion center and at least one federal agency	Implemented	No
5.2	Number of analytic products co-authored by two or more fusion centers	Implemented	No
5.3	Number of Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) analytic products that cite information originating from fusion centers	Future Implementation	No
5.4	Number of fusion center analytic products that cite source information originating from Intelligence Community (IC) products or reports	Future Implementation	No
5.5	Number of fusion center analytic products that cite source information originating from at least one other fusion center's products or reports	Future Implementation	No
5.6	Percentage of State, Local, Tribal, Territorial (SLTT) fusion center analysts with Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) Intel accounts who log into HSIN Intel at least once a month	Future Implementation	No
6.1	Percentage of federally designated special events in which fusion centers played a direct role	Implemented	No
6.2	Percentage of federally declared disasters in which fusion centers played a direct role	Implemented	No
6.3	Percentage of state declared disasters in which fusion centers played a direct role	Future Implementation	No
6.4	Percentage of recommendations identified through Fusion Center Readiness Initiative (FCRI) exercises acted upon and addressed by the specified fusion center(s)	Future Implementation	No
7.1	Number of situational awareness products developed and disseminated by fusion centers	Implemented	No
7.2	Number of analytic products developed and disseminated by fusion centers	Implemented	No

7.3	Number of tips and leads processed by fusion centers	Implemented	No
7.4	Number of fusion center searches conducted on Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) within the Nationwide SAR Initiative - SAR Data Repository (NSI SDR)	Implemented	No
7.5	Number of Suspicious Activity Reports (SAR) submitted by fusion centers	Implemented	No
7.6	Number of responses to fusion center-to-fusion center requests for information (RFIs)	Implemented	No
7.7	Number of responses to federal requests for information (RFIs)	Implemented	No
7.8	Number of responses to requests for information (RFIs) from agencies within fusion center area of responsibility (AOR)	Implemented	No
8.1	Percentage of fusion centers that conduct a Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) compliance review based upon the compliance verification tool	Implemented	FY2012
8.2	Percentage of fusion centers that conduct Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) audits	Implemented	No
8.3	Percentage of Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) audit findings for which fusion centers took corrective actions	Future Implementation	No
8.4	Percentage of fusion center Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) Officers who received P/CRCL training for their position	Implemented	No
8.5	Percentage of fusion centers that provide annual Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) training to all fusion center staff	Implemented	FY2014
8.6	Percentage of fusion center analytic products reviewed by Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) Officers for P/CRCL issues	Implemented	FY2014
9.1	Percentage of fusion centers that develop an annual report providing updates on progress in achieving strategic goals and objectives	Implemented	No
9.2	Percentage of fusion centers providing all performance data for the Fusion Center Performance Program (FCPP)	Implemented	No
10.1	Number of programmatic briefings, tours, and other engagements	Implemented	No
10.2	Number of open records inquiries (e.g. Freedom of Information Act requests) responded to by fusion centers	Implemented	No

11.1 Of the fusion centers that fall under Department of Homeland Security (DHS) security purview, percentage of fusion centers that undergo an annual Security Compliance Review (SCR) based on DHS standards	Implemented	No
11.2 Of the fusion centers that participated in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Security Compliance Review (SCR) during the assessment period, percentage of findings identified in the SCR report for which fusion centers took corrective actions within the timeframe identified	Implemented	No
11.3 Percentage of State, Local, Tribal, Territorial (SLTT) fusion center personnel requiring SECRET clearances who have them, or have submitted requests to the appropriate granting authority for them	Implemented	No