



U.S. Department of Homeland Security

# FY 2019-2021 Annual Performance Report

*With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people,  
our homeland, and our values.*

## Appendix B: Relevant GAO and OIG Reports





# About this Report

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security Annual Performance Report (APR) for Fiscal Years (FY) 2019-2021 presents the Department's mission programs, progress summaries, performance measure results and FY 2020 and FY 2021 targets. It also summarizes information on other key initiatives in the DHS Performance Management Framework related to the Strategic Review and our Agency Priority Goals. This report presents information on other key management initiatives, and a summary of our performance challenges and high-risk areas identified by the DHS Office of the Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office. The report is consolidated to incorporate our annual performance plan and annual performance report.

For FY 2019, the Department's Performance and Accountability Reports consist of the following three reports:

- DHS Agency Financial Report | Publication date: November 15, 2019
- DHS Annual Performance Report | Publication date: February 10, 2020
- DHS Report to our Citizens (Summary of Performance and Financial Information) | Publication date: February 15, 2020

When published, all three reports will be located on our public website at:

<http://www.dhs.gov/performance-accountability>.



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## Introduction

Independent program evaluations provide vital input to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as they offer insight to the performance of our programs and identify areas for improvement. These evaluations are used across the Department to look critically at how we conduct operations and to confront some of the key challenges facing the Department.

This appendix provides a list of the more significant DHS program evaluations conducted in FY 2019 by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG). For each report, the report name, report number, date issued, summary, and a link to the publicly released report are provided.

Detailed information on the findings and recommendations of GAO reports is available at:

<https://www.gao.gov/reports-testimonies/by-agency/by-branch/Executive/Department%20of%20Homeland%20Security>.

Detailed information on the findings and recommendations of DHS OIG reports is available at:

<https://www.oig.dhs.gov/reports/audits-inspections-and-evaluations>

## Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office

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### GAO Reports

#### Combating Nuclear Terrorism: DHS Should Address Limitations to Its Program to Secure Key Cities

**Number:** [GAO-19-327](#)

**Date:** 5/13/2019

**Summary:** There are three major limitations to the Securing the Cities program. DHS does not collect enough information to fully track cities' use program funds, has not enforced planning requirements for sustaining threat detection and deterrence capabilities, and has not documented or communicated program changes with cities.

Collection of itemized expenditures, performance metrics and program milestones achievements, or threat simulation drills could better ensure these funds were spent consistent with program goals and assess their performance on the program. Unless DHS analyzes risks related to sustainment, works with cities to address these risks, and enforces sustainment-planning requirements for cities in the program in the future, program participants could see their radiological detection programs and related capabilities deteriorate. If DHS does not clearly communicate to cities how the program will operate under potential changes, cities could face difficulties planning for the future and achieving the program's detection and deterrence objectives.

#### Biodefense: The Nation Faces Long-Standing Challenges Related to Defending Against Biological Threats

**Number:** [GAO-19-635T](#)

**Date:** 6/26/2019

**Summary:** There are a number of challenges related to the nation's ability to detect and respond to biological events that transcend what any one federal department or agency can address on its own. These challenges include no existing strategy to assess enterprise-wide threats, lack of situational awareness and data integration, lack of justification for the need to use threat detection technologies, the need for increased biological laboratory safety and security. There was no existing mechanism across the federal government that could leverage threat awareness information to direct resources and set budgetary priorities across all agencies for biodefense, the DHS' National Biosurveillance Integration Center has suffered from longstanding challenges related to its clarity of purpose and collaboration with other agencies, challenges are present in clearly justifying the need for and establishing the capabilities of the BioWatch program, and there is a need for improvement related to the safety, security, and oversight of high-containment laboratories. A review of the National Biodefense Strategy and associated plans, issued in September 2018 to address these ongoing challenges, is underway to determine if any improvement is evident after its implementation.

## Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

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### GAO Reports

#### Department of Homeland Security: Review of the Fiscal Year 2017 Entry/Exit Overstay Report

**Number:** [GAO-19-298R](#)

**Date:** February 22, 2019

**Summary:** Each year, millions of foreign visitors, or nonimmigrants, legally enter the United States on a temporary basis under specific nonimmigrant categories. Overstays are nonimmigrants who remain in the United States beyond the expiration of their authorized period of stay, regardless of whether they ultimately depart. Within DHS, multiple components play a role in identifying and addressing suspected overstays. Among other duties, CBP inspects all people seeking entry or applying for admission into the United States to determine their admissibility and compliance with U.S. law. CBP has an electronic process for identifying overstays suspected or known to have remained in the country beyond the expiration of their authorized period of stay. Federal law requires that DHS implement a program to collect data, for each fiscal year, regarding the total number of nonimmigrants who overstayed and report annually to Congress; DHS first responded to this mandate with a report on overstay rates in FY 2015. Following separate instructions in statute, this GAO report and related products assessed the DHS report identifying the total population of nonimmigrants who entered the United States through air and sea ports in FY 2017 for whom no evidence exists to indicate an on-time departure. The Department's FY 2017 overstay report identified the number of air and sea overstays during the fiscal year as about 702,000 overstays out of about 52.7 million admissions—1.33 percent. To assess the DHS report on FY 2017 overstays, GAO reviewed agency documents; consulted previous reports from DHS, OIG, and GAO; and conducted interviews with DHS officials who prepared the FY 2017 report, including CBP officials. While noting certain limitations to the report's summary results—including the estimated overstay rate—GAO validated the logical soundness of the Department's metric for measuring the air and sea overstay population in the United States and concluded that DHS has taken steps to continually monitor and improve the quality of the data in the underlying databases.

#### Border Security: DHS Should Improve the Quality of Unlawful Border Entry Information and Other Metric Reporting

**Number:** [GAO-19-305](#)

**Date:** March 21, 2019

**Summary:** According to DHS, the United States has approximately 6,000 miles of land borders, 95,000 miles of coastline, and more than 300 ports of entry where travelers and cargo complete inspections and processing for entry. GAO noted that securing U.S. border areas forms a key part of DHS's mission, and the ability to measure border security efforts provides essential support for managing these responsibilities effectively and efficiently. The FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act requires DHS to report annually on 43 border security metrics, and for GAO to conduct regular reviews of the data and methodology in these reports. GAO found that the Department's FY 2017 report on border security metrics included 35 of 43 metrics required by

statute; the Department did not report on the remaining eight measures because they remained in development, under review, or because of incomplete data collection. GAO found that about half of the 35 metrics generally included elements as called for by the NDAA, while 17 metrics differed from requirements in the law. For example, DHS only provided information on the southwest border for some metrics, when a methodology to estimate unlawful crossings of the northern border remained incomplete. DHS components responsible for collecting data for these measures generally have processes in place to ensure data reliability and the quality. DHS also identified and disclosed limitations for some, but not all, of the data elements and metrics used. DHS concurred with all four GAO recommendations, including that DHS develop and implement a process to systematically review the reliability of metric data; identify and communicate limitations of the metrics; and include the results of sensitivity analyses and measures of statistical uncertainty for metrics derived from statistical models.

### **Border Security: Assessment of the Department of Homeland Security's Border Security Improvement Plan**

**Number:** [GAO-19-538R](#)

**Date:** July 16, 2019

**Summary:** Within DHS, CBP leads law enforcement efforts related to border security. The DHS Appropriations Acts of 2017 and 2018 each required DHS to submit to Congress and GAO a risk-based plan for improving border security. GAO reviewed the 2017 and 2018 Border Security Improvement Plans to determine the extent to which the plans included the elements required by law; the 2018 DHS plan incorporated the 2017 plan by reference. GAO's analysis indicates that the 2018 Border Security Improvement Plan includes some, but not all, of the elements required by the 2018 Act. For example, as required, the plan includes CBP's border initiatives, which it links to its goals and objectives. However, the plan does not include an assessment of the effects of infrastructure deployment on communities and property owners. In addition, the Department's plan lists 47 open border-security recommendations from GAO and 31 recommendations from DHS OIG. GAO identified nine other relevant recommendations to the Department. GAO also found that the DHS 2018 plan did not include schedules and associated milestones for addressing all the recommendations it listed. The plan states that CBP has consulted with federal stakeholders concerning the environmental impacts of border barriers but provides no details on the results. GAO also notes that the plan does not include certification or confirmation that all activities conducted under the plan comply with federal acquisition rules, requirements, guidelines, and practices. The Department concurred with GAO's recommendation that the Secretary should ensure that the FY 2019 plan includes elements required by statute or discloses why the plan did not include any such element.

### **Unaccompanied Children: Agency Efforts to Reunify Children Separated from Parents at the Border**

**Number:** [GAO-19-163](#)

**Date:** October 9, 2018

**Summary:** GAO recounted that on April 6, 2018, the Attorney General issued a memorandum on criminal prosecutions of immigration offenses, which--according to Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) officials--considerably increased the number of minor children separated by



DHS from their parents, after families attempted to cross the U.S. border illegally. On June 20, 2018, the President issued an executive order generally directing the detention of alien families together. On June 26, 2018, a federal judge ordered the government to reunify separated families. DHS has formal responsibility for the apprehension of individuals at the border, including families, and the transfer of unaccompanied children (UAC) to HHS. In turn, HHS has formal responsibility for coordinating the placement and care of UAC. The Congressional requester asked GAO to examine processes for tracking and reunifying separated families. This report discusses (1) DHS and HHS planning efforts related to the Attorney General's April 2018 memo; (2) DHS and HHS systems for indicating separation of children from parents; and (3) DHS and HHS actions to reunify families in response to the June 2018 court order. GAO reviewed agency policies and procedures; filings in the relevant court case as of August 23, 2018; and interviewed DHS and HHS officials. GAO also visited four Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) shelters in July 2018 to interview staff responsible for the separated children. This report makes no recommendations, but GAO previously recommended that DHS and HHS improve their process for transferring UAC from DHS to HHS custody; see GAO-15-521.

### **Unaccompanied Children: Agency Efforts to Identify and Reunify Children Separated from Parents at the Border**

**Number:** [GAO-19-368T](#)

**Date:** February 7, 2019

**Summary:** This GAO testimony recounted that on April 6, 2018, the Attorney General issued a memorandum on criminal prosecutions of immigration offenses, which—according to HHS officials—considerably increased the number of minor children separated by DHS from their parents, after families attempted to cross the U.S. border illegally. On June 20, 2018, the President issued an executive order generally directing the detention of alien families together. On June 26, 2018, a federal judge ordered the government to reunify separated families. DHS has formal responsibility for the apprehension and transfer of UAC to HHS. In turn, HHS has formal responsibility for coordinating the placement and care of UAC. This testimony discusses: (1) DHS and HHS planning efforts related to the Attorney General's April 2018 memo; (2) DHS and HHS systems for indicating separation of children from their parents; and (3) DHS and HHS actions to reunify families in response to the June 2018 court order. GAO adapted this testimony from an October 2018 report; see GAO-19-163. This testimony also includes updated data reported by the government on the number of children separated from their parent's subject to the court's reunification order, and the number of those children in ORR custody as of December 11, 2018. GAO previously recommended that DHS and HHS improve their process for transferring UAC from DHS to HHS custody; see GAO-19-163. DHS and HHS concurred with the recommendation and have taken actions in response but have not fully implemented the recommendation.

### **Drug Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces Should Enhance Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug Activities**

**Number:** [GAO-19-441](#)

**Date:** July 9, 2019

**Summary:** GAO noted that the U.S. government has identified illicit drugs and the criminal organizations that traffic them as significant threats to the United States, citing data from the



Centers from Disease Control and Prevention indicating that more than 70,000 people died from drug overdoses in 2017. Both the Department of Defense (DOD) and DHS have created joint task forces to strengthen interagency efforts to combat illicit drug flows, particularly in the maritime domain. Congressional requesters asked GAO to review the structure of these task forces and their ability to coordinate and conduct missions effectively. Among other objectives, this report (1) assesses the extent to which the task forces coordinate effectively to minimize duplication, and (2) examines how the task forces measure the effectiveness of their missions and activities. GAO reviewed and assessed documentation about the task forces' missions, coordination, and performance assessments. GAO compared these lines of effort to best practices seen in prior work, departmental guidance, and federal internal control standards. GAO also met with task force officials to discuss and observe planning and coordination activities. GAO is making three recommendations, including that JIATF-West establish a very compact set of consistent measures of overall performance, and that DHS develop outcome-based performance measures for all JTFs' activities. DOD and DHS concurred with the three recommendations.

## DHS OIG Reports

### CBP Should Improve Its Air Coordination in the Rio Grande Valley Sector

**Number:** [OIG-19-02](#)

**Date:** October 18, 2018

**Summary:** In March 2017, the President of the National Border Patrol Council testified to Congress that Air and Marine Operations (AMO) flew “very little” at night and that Coast Guard pilots had to fly missions for Border Patrol agents in the Rio Grande Valley sector. OIG found that AMO flew routinely at night to support Border Patrol in the Rio Grande Valley sector. Coast Guard’s primary mission involves conducting flights over water, so flight hours represented less than one percent of the Rio Grande Valley sector flight hours supporting Border Patrol missions over land. CBP should improve its air coordination to respond to the highest priority of USBP requests. If CBP continues to implement a recently opened operations center and develop metrics to gauge the effectiveness of air coordination, those efforts should improve the effectiveness of air support in the Rio Grande Valley sector and enhance unity of effort among CBP components. CBP concurred with the recommendation, and it will create a joint working group between AMO and USBP to continue to implement the operations center. CBP will also establish performance metrics and evaluate whether the operations center improves air coordination in the Rio Grande Valley sector.

### DHS Training Needs for Hiring 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers

**Number:** [OIG-19-07](#)

**Date:** November 26, 2018

**Summary:** On January 25, 2017, the President issued two Executive Orders directing the Department of Homeland Security to hire an additional 15,000 law enforcement officers. OIG conducted this review to determine whether the Department and its components—specifically Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC), Border Patrol, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—have the training strategies and capabilities in place to train 15,000 new

agents and officers. All three of these DHS organizations have developed hiring surge training plans and strategies. However, OIG found challenges exist due to uncertain funding commitments and overextended throughput capacity, particularly as they affect training resource projections and expansion capabilities to meet hiring goals. OIG also identified crosscutting concerns with current training conditions that will likely become more serious with increased demand. Additionally, FLETC, Border Patrol, and ICE each apply a different approach to managing and implementing their instructor programs. This impacts the effectiveness and cost of instructors, as well as the application of best practices. Furthermore, in the absence of any instructor rotation policy, ICE's Homeland Security Investigations relies heavily on temporary duty instructors with abbreviated assignments. This approach proves expensive, while also ineffective in terms of ensuring consistent, safe instruction. If these combined challenges and conditions continue, they may impede consistency and lead to a degradation in training and standards. The Department concurred with all three of OIG's recommendations to address these concerns.

### **CBP's Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry**

**Number:** [OIG-19-10](#)

**Date:** December 3, 2018

**Summary:** The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 requires CBP to establish standard operating procedures (SOPs) for searching, reviewing, retaining, and sharing information in communication, electronic, or digital devices at U.S. ports of entry. The Act also requires OIG to conduct audits to determine the extent to which CBP conducted searches of electronic devices in accordance with the SOPs. OIG found that because of inadequate supervision to ensure that CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) properly documented searches, OFO cannot maintain accurate quantitative data or identify and address performance problems related to these searches. In addition, OFO did not consistently follow best practices for these searches because of inconsistent guidance between headquarters and ports of entry. OFO also did not adequately manage technology to effectively support search operations and ensure the security of data. Finally, OFO has not yet developed performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of a pilot program, begun in 2007, to conduct advanced searches, including copying electronic data from searched devices to law enforcement databases. CBP concurred with all five OIG recommendations to address these findings.

### **CBP Did Not Maximize Its Revenue Collection Efforts for Delinquent Debt Owed from Importers**

**Number:** [OIG-19-11](#)

**Date:** December 4, 2018

**Summary:** OIG found that CBP failed to ensure the timely collection, write-off, and processing of delinquent debt from importers during fiscal years 2014–2016. Instead, CBP settled for collecting funds from importer surety bonds, which yielded less than 1 percent of the more than \$189 million owed from importers. The Tariff Act of 1930 requires CBP to collect all duties owed including interest thereon. Additionally, The Debt Collection and Improvement Act of 1996 requires CBP to maximize its collections of delinquent debts owed to the Government. These laws entail quick action to enforce recovery of debts and the use of all appropriate collection tools. CBP did not exhaust all administrative efforts in its collection duties. Additionally, CBP's inability to properly track debt prevented the processing of more than \$84 million of the delinquent debt

during fiscal years 2014–2016. As of FY 2017, CBP had more than \$4.3 billion of cumulative uncollectible duties, taxes, and fees—some dating back almost 40 years. CBP concurred with OIG’s four recommendations and described planned corrective actions.

### **Management Alert—CBP Needs to Address Serious Performance Issues on the Accenture Hiring Contract**

**Number:** [OIG-19-13](#)

**Date:** December 6, 2019

**Summary:** In July 2018, OIG initiated an audit to determine whether CBP had awarded and managed a \$297 million hiring contract with Accenture according to Federal, departmental, and component requirements. The audit responded to multiple OIG Hotline complaints related to the performance and management of the Accenture hiring contract. In November 2017, CBP awarded Accenture a contract to help meet the demands of recruiting and hiring agents and officers under the President’s January 25, 2017 Executive Order. Accenture agreed to recruit enough highly qualified frontline candidates to satisfy the Executive Order and complete CBP’s 12-step hiring process. CBP designed the contract to pay Accenture based on its performance and delivery of qualified applicants. OIG found that in its first year, CBP’s contract with Accenture took longer to deploy and delivered less capability than promised, with Accenture nowhere near satisfying its 7,500-person hiring goal over the next 5 years. Further, CBP has used significant staffing and resources to help Accenture do the job for which CBP hired the contractor, and OIG expressed concern that CBP may have paid Accenture for services and tools not provided. CBP concurred with all four of OIG’s recommendations to improve the contractors’ transparency and accountability.

### **Border Patrol Needs a Staffing Model to Better Plan for Hiring More Agents**

**Number:** [OIG-19-23](#)

**Date:** February 28, 2019

**Summary:** OIG found that Border Patrol lacks the data and procedures needed to determine whether the Component meets workload requirements related to investigative and law enforcement activities. Although directed to do so by Congress in 2011, as of this report neither CBP nor Border Patrol has completed or submitted a satisfactory workforce staffing model as required. OIG attributes this lack of planning to Border Patrol decisions not to prioritize or assign adequate resources to develop and implement such a model to guide hiring and operations. Without a complete workforce staffing model and accurate data, Border Patrol senior managers cannot definitively determine the operational need or best placement for the 5,000 additional Border Patrol agents mandated in a January 2017 Executive Order. Additionally, Border Patrol officials do not consistently schedule agents’ work duties or accurately document actual work hours and duties completed. These deficiencies occurred due to a lack of standard operating procedures, training, and oversight of the information entered into Border Patrol’s Enforcement Tracking System. As a result, Border Patrol may not deploy agents already in place in the most efficient and economical manner. In fiscal year 2017, Border Patrol agents received approximately \$55.2 million for 1.3 million hours of work that with no supporting documentation that this effort supported mission needs. OIG concluded that Border Patrol must have reliable data for accurate determination of the agency’s operational and workload requirements, currently and in the future.

The Department concurred with both OIG recommendations, intended to help Border Patrol manage its workforce in a more efficient and economical manner.

### **Management Alert—DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding among Single Adults at El Paso Del Norte Processing Center**

**Number:** [OIG-19-46](#)

**Date:** May 30, 2019

**Summary:** OIG notified the Secretary of urgent issues requiring immediate attention and action. Specifically, OIG recommended that the Department take immediate steps to alleviate dangerous overcrowding at the El Paso Del Norte Processing Center, consistent with OIG's inspection duties under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. The Office of the Secretary concurred with OIG's single recommendation to alleviate overcrowding at the El Paso Del Norte Processing Center but gave a target completion date of November 30, 2020. Because corrective action would critically affect detainees' immediate health and safety needs of detainees--since they could not remain confined in standing-room-only conditions for weeks until construction of additional tents—OIG considered the recommendation open and unresolved. OIG clearly indicated plans for spot inspections of the southern-border facilities, including the possibility of a follow-up visit to El Paso sector sites to monitor overcrowding. Consistent with OIG's responsibilities under the Inspector General Act, OIG provided copies of this alert to Congressional committees of jurisdiction.

### **CBP's Global Entry Program is Vulnerable to Exploitation**

**Number:** [OIG-19-49](#)

**Date:** June 24, 2019

**Summary:** OIG redacted specific details in this report as Sensitive Security Information. Reviewing the results of the Global Entry program's vetting of a statistically valid sample of approved Global Entry applications, OIG estimated that the program could have approved a substantial number of applicants who did not actually meet the program's eligibility requirements. OIG attributed this degree of risk to application reviews by CBP which did not comply with applicable guidance, and to insufficient verification guidance generally. Additionally, during the airport arrival process CBP granted some Global Entry members expedited entry without verifying the authenticity of their kiosk receipts. CBP officers also did not properly respond to a breach of the Daily Security Code. Finally, CBP does not effectively monitor Global Entry to ensure members continue to meet program requirements. CBP's Office of Field Operations did not conduct the required number of internal audits and did not use its Self-Inspection Program Worksheet effectively. CBP concurred with all six OIG recommendations and initiated corrective actions to address OIG's findings.

### **Management Alert—DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding and Prolonged Detention of Children and Adults in the Rio Grande Valley**

**Number:** [OIG-19-51](#)

**Date:** July 2, 2019

**Summary:** OIG notified the Secretary of urgent issues requiring immediate attention and action. Specifically, OIG recommended that the Department take immediate steps to alleviate dangerous overcrowding and prolonged detention of children and adults in the Rio Grande Valley, consistent



with OIG's inspection duties under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. OIG staff observed dangerous overcrowding at four of five Border Patrol facilities visited, and prolonged detention at all five Border Patrol facilities visited in this region. OIG found that these conditions did not comply with the Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search standards which govern CBP's interaction with detained individuals. OIG acknowledged that ICE and HHS have formal responsibility for longer-term custody of illegal immigrants and unaccompanied children, respectively. In addition, OIG noted that at the time of this report, the influx of illegal immigrants had overwhelmed these agencies' facilities, leaving both children and adults in the Border Patrol's custody longer than ever planned. OIG also found that conditions at Border Patrol facilities had escalated the security concerns raised in OIG's May 30 *Management Alert*. The Department's response to the *Alert* described the situation on the Southern border as "an acute and worsening crisis," adding that "[the U.S.] immigration system is not equipped to handle a migration pattern like the one we are experiencing now." DHS also noted several stopgap actions taken by CBP to care for children and adults in custody despite overflow conditions, including: the erection of soft-sided structures; obligating funds to cover medical services for those in custody; transporting detained individuals to hospitals; expanding local medical-services contracts; and rescuing and providing emergency medical care to immigrants in life-threatening situations. Consistent with OIG's responsibilities under the Inspector General Act, OIG provided copies of this alert to Congressional committees of jurisdiction.

### **Management Alert—CBP Did Not Adequately Protect Employees from Possible Fentanyl Exposure**

**Number:** [OIG-19-53](#)

**Date:** July 16, 2019

**Summary:** OIG notified CBP's Chief Accountability Officer of urgent issues requiring immediate attention and action. Specifically, during an ongoing audit of CBP's secure facilities to store seized drugs, OIG found that CBP did not adequately protect its staff from the dangers of powerful synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, roughly ten times more lethal than heroin per unit mass. Specifically, CBP has not always made medications designed to treat narcotic overdose available in case of accidental exposure. OIG attributes this shortfall to the absence of an official CBP policy requiring standard workplace practices for handling fentanyl and safeguarding personnel against exposure to this drug. In addition, CBP does not require mandatory training for its staff to provide an understanding of the hazards of fentanyl and methods to combat accidental exposure. OIG found that the absence of these safeguards leaves CBP staff at increased risk of injury or death in case of exposure. Based on the information provided in CBP's response to OIG's draft *Alert*, OIG requested notification from CBP upon full implementation of OIG's recommendation—including evidence that CBP has completed agreed-upon corrective actions—submitted within 30 days of this *Alert*. Consistent with OIG's responsibilities under the Inspector General Act, OIG provided copies of this alert to Congressional committees of jurisdiction.

### **Investigation of Alleged Violations of Immigration Laws at the Tecate, California, Port of Entry by U.S. Customs and Border Protection Personnel**

**Number:** [OIG-19-65](#)

**Date:** September 26, 2019

**Summary:** Following a referral from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) to DHS on August 23, 2018, OIG reviewed three allegations of immigration-law violations at the Tecate, California, Port of Entry. We substantiated, in whole or in part, all three factual allegations referred to DHS by OSC. First, OIG found that contrary to Federal law and CBP policy, Component officials at the Tecate, California, Port of Entry returned some asylum applicants from inside the United States back to Mexico and instructed those individuals to go to other ports of entry to make their asylum claims. However, OIG did not substantiate the allegation that CBP managers instructed officers to do this, or that these actions followed the Port's standard practice. Second, OIG found that Tecate and other ports of entry use a practice known as "metering" or "queue management" to prevent overcrowding at the ports. OIG identified three concerns with how CBP implemented this practice at Tecate, including that the Port generally refers most asylum seekers to go to other ports, despite representing Tecate as open to "all travelers." Finally, we found that officials at the Tecate port of entry do not create records when they instruct individuals to go to other ports to make their asylum claims. OIG also noted that DHS provided a copy of OIG's report to OSC on September 17, 2019.

### **Limitations of CBP OFO's Screening Device Used to Identify Fentanyl and Other Narcotics**

**Number:** [OIG-19-67](#)

**Date:** September 30, 2019

**Summary:** Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid drug roughly 100 times stronger than morphine, approved for medical use in the U.S. since 1968, but also responsible—in all chemical forms—for more than 20,000 U.S. overdose deaths in 2016, according to statements from the National Institute on Drug Abuse. OIG reported that since 2016, CBP's OFO has spent nearly \$25.6 million on 279 small-scale chemical screening devices capable of identifying fentanyl and other illicit narcotics, but not at lower purity levels, i.e. ten percent or less. OIG expressed concern about these devices' range of sensitivity because, at the southwest border, OFO predominantly seizes fentanyl at low purity levels. OIG cited OFO's explanation that they purchased the new screening devices without comprehensive testing considering public-health and -safety concerns about the dangers of fentanyl and purchased the new screening devices as a stopgap measure. OIG also found that OFO does not have adequate policies for deploying, using, and updating the small-scale chemical screening devices used to identify fentanyl, because OFO management did ensure that OFO updated guidance on non-intrusive inspection technology when acquiring the screening devices. As a result, OIG concluded that even after purchasing these screening devices, OFO cannot ensure the protection of the United States from criminals smuggling fentanyl with purity levels less than or equal to 10 percent, thereby increasing the risk of fentanyl or other illicit narcotics entering the country. CBP concurred with all four OIG recommendations, intended to help OFO officers better identify fentanyl and other illicit narcotics at ports of entry. Finally, OIG reports that CBP has implemented or will take actions to address these recommendations.

## Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

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### GAO Reports

#### **Emergency Communications: Office of Emergency Communications Should Take Steps to Help Improve External Communications**

**Number:** [GAO-19-171](#)

**Date:** 12/12/2018

**Summary:** The DHS Office of Emergency Communications (OEC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) collaborate on grant guidance to help public-safety stakeholders use federal funds for interoperable emergency communications. GAO interviewed and surveyed statewide interoperability coordinators and identified that there are needs for improved communication. Training opportunities are missed due to the lack of communication and advertisement. OEC has not assessed its methods of communication, resulting in OEC potentially not using the best tools and approaches to provide timely information on training opportunities, workshops, and other emergency communications information to the public-safety community.

#### **Information Security: Agencies Need to Improve Implementation of Federal Approach to Securing Systems and Protecting against Intrusions**

**Number:** [GAO-19-105](#)

**Date:** 12/18/2018

**Summary:** The 23 civilian agencies covered by the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 (CFO Act) have often not effectively implemented the federal government's approach and strategy for securing information systems causing federal systems to be at risk. Seventeen of the CFO Act agencies reported that their agencies' information security programs were not effectively implemented, material weaknesses or significant deficiencies in information security internal controls are present, and many of the elements of the government's cybersecurity cross-agency priority goal were not met. Managing enterprise risks was also an issue, with 10 of the CFO Act agencies not managing risks and ultimately deemed at risk, with a few of these agencies at high risk. Implementation of capabilities to detect and prevent intrusions has not occurred for most of the CFO Act agencies, increasing the vulnerability of federal systems and the information they process to malicious threats.

#### **Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress and Challenges in DHS's Management of Its Chemical Facility Security Program**

**Number:** [GAO-19-402T](#)

**Date:** 2/27/2019

**Summary:** DHS has made progress addressing challenges of managing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program, however, some challenges still remain. The key aspects of the program that progressed and/or still have challenges are identifying high-risk chemical facilities, assessing risk and prioritizing facilities, reviewing and approving facility site security plans, inspecting facilities and ensuring compliance, and conducting stakeholder and first responder outreach. Improvements to the CFATS program include a revision of the methodology

used to determine the risk of facilities holding toxic chemicals to now calculate the risk of a toxic release, the CFATS risk assessment methodology has been revised to include threat, vulnerability, and consequence to better cover the range of security issues, and the backlog for reviewing plans has been eliminated and processing time for new plans has decreased. Further review is needed to ensure that DHS has implemented procedures for managing facilities' compliance with their approved security plans and implemented the ability to share information with first responders and emergency planners.

## **Federal Protective Service: DHS Should Take Additional Steps to Evaluate Organizational Placement**

**Number:** [GAO-19-122](#)

**Date:** 1/8/2019

**Summary:** GAO was asked to review issues related to organizational placement options for the Federal Protective Service (FPS). This report examines (1) the potential effects of FPS's placement in selected agencies and (2) steps DHS has taken to assess placement options for FPS. GAO identified five key organizational placement criteria based on prior work and identified eight agencies as potential placement options. GAO found that none of the eight agencies GAO selected met all the key organizational placement criteria; thus, any of the organizational placement options could result in both benefits and trade-offs. DHS should identify the expectations for changing FPS's placement and take steps to fully evaluate placement options. DHS concurred with the recommendations and outlined steps it plans to take to address them.

## **Federal Protective Service's Organizational Placement: Considerations for Transition to the DHS Management Directorate**

**Number:** [GAO-19-605T](#)

**Date:** 6/11/2019

**Summary:** Placing FPS in the DHS Management Directorate was not an option GAO assessed in its January 2019 report. However, GAO did assess the option of making FPS a "standalone" entity reporting directly to the Deputy Secretary of DHS. GAO found that this placement met the first criteria (mission, goals, and objectives) and the third criteria (organizational culture) but did not completely meet the other criteria. For example, FPS had joint responsibility for coordinating facility protection with other federal agencies. DHS did not have joint responsibility for coordinating facility protection with FPS. GAO recommended DHS fully evaluate placement options for FPS. DHS concurred, and officials stated they conducted an assessment.

GAO's prior work on implementing an organizational change provides valuable insights for making any transition regarding FPS. These insights include key questions to consider such as "What are the goals of the consolidation?" and "How have stakeholders been involved in the decision-making?" In addition, GAO has identified key practices for organizational transformation, practices that include ensuring that top leadership drives the transformation and establishing a communication strategy to create shared expectations, among others. These questions and practices could provide insights to DHS and FPS as they implement FPS's new placement.



## **Federal Information Security: Agencies and OMB Need to Strengthen Policies and Practices**

**Number:** [GAO-19-545](#)

**Date:** 7/26/2019

**Summary:** During fiscal year 2018, many federal agencies were often not adequately or effectively implementing their information security policies and practices. For example, most of the 16 agencies GAO selected for review had deficiencies related to implementing the eight elements of an agency-wide information security program required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) (see figure). Further, inspectors general (IGs) reported that 18 of the 24 Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act of 1990 agencies did not have effective agency-wide information security programs. GAO and IGs have previously made numerous recommendations to agencies to address such deficiencies, but many of these recommendations remain unimplemented.

With certain exceptions, OMB, DHS, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology were generally implementing their government-wide FISMA requirements, including issuing guidance and implementing programs that are intended to improve agencies' information security. However, OMB has not submitted its required FISMA report to Congress for fiscal year 2018 and has reduced the number of agencies at which it holds CyberStat meetings from 24 in fiscal year 2016 to three in fiscal year 2018—thereby restricting key activities for overseeing agencies' implementation of information security. Also, OMB, in collaboration with the Council of Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency, did not include a metric for system security plans, one of the required information security program elements, in its guidance on FISMA reporting. As a result, oversight of agencies' information security programs was diminished.

## **DHS OIG Reports**

### **The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively**

**Number:** [OIG-19-15](#)

**Date:** 12/11/2019

**Summary:** An inspection was conducted to determine whether FPS inspector positions are properly classified and whether FPS effectively managed the use of overtime. It was determined that FPS inspectors were appropriately classified as non-exempt and their *Fair Labor Standards Act* overtime pay is not subject to the biweekly premium cap. Although properly classified as non-exempt, inspectors' excessive use of overtime does raise significant concerns. Although FPS released new requirements in December 2017 and the use of overtime has declined, FPS needs to develop more detailed overtime guidance and communicate it to the workforce more effectively. The four recommendations include determining the propriety of overtime payments, developing detailed guidance on the use of overtime and WebTA, monitoring and tracking overtime, and retaining documentation as required.

### **Progress Made, But Additional Efforts are Needed to Secure the Election Infrastructure**

**Number:** [OIG-19-24](#)

**Date:** 2/28/2019

**Summary:** The audit objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Department's efforts to coordinate with states on securing the Nation's election infrastructure. Despite Federal requirements, DHS has not completed the plans and strategies critical to identifying emerging threats and mitigation activities and establishing metrics to measure progress in securing the election infrastructure. Senior leadership turnover and a lack of guidance and administrative staff have hindered DHS' ability to accomplish such planning. Until such issues are addressed and resolved, DHS cannot ensure effective guidance, unity of effort, and a well-coordinated approach to securing the Nation's election infrastructure. It was recommended that DHS provide resources to ensure an organized strategy, improve services, expand outreach, and enhance information sharing.

### **Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2018**

**Number:** [OIG-19-34-UNSUM](#)

**Date:** 3/21/2019

**Summary:** DHS's enterprise-wide security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems was evaluated. It was determined that DHS' information security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems is effective this year as the Department achieved "Level 4 – Managed and Measurable" in three of five cybersecurity functions, based on current reporting instructions for intelligence systems. However, deficiencies in DHS' overall patch management process and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's weakness remediation and security awareness training activities were identified. One recommendation was made to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency to address the deficiencies identified.

### **DHS Needs to Improve Cybersecurity Workforce Planning**

**Number:** [OIG-19-62](#)

**Date:** 9/23/2019

**Summary:** An audit was performed to assess DHS' progress in fulfilling the requirements of the *Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act*. DHS has not fully met requirements in the Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act to assess its cybersecurity workforce and develop a strategy to address workforce gaps. Without a complete workforce assessment and strategy, DHS is not well positioned to carry out its critical cybersecurity functions in the face of ever-expanding cybersecurity threats. Lacking an assessment, DHS cannot provide assurance that it has the appropriate skills, competencies, and expertise positioned across its components to address the multifaceted nature of DHS' cybersecurity work. In addition, the Department may not have an understanding of its future hiring or training needs to maintain a qualified and capable workforce to secure the Nation's cyberspace. It was recommended that the Chief Human Capital Officer assign staff resources, establish a centralized approach, and ensure cross-component commitment needed for DHS' implementation of the Act.

## Departmental Management and Operations (DMO)

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### GAO Reports

#### High Risk: Important Progress Made, but More Work Needed to Strengthen DHS Management

**Number:** [GAO-19-475T](#)

**Date:** 4/3/2019

**Summary:** As GAO reported in its 2019 high-risk update, DHS has continued its efforts to strengthen and integrate its acquisition, information technology, financial, and human capital management functions. The two key areas where additional work is needed are DHS's capacity and demonstrated progress. With regard to capacity, DHS needs to make additional progress identifying and allocating resources in the areas of acquisition, information technology, and financial management. With regard to demonstrated progress, DHS should show the ability to achieve sustained improvement across 30 outcomes that GAO identified, and DHS agreed were needed to address the high-risk area.

#### Priority Open Recommendations: Department of Homeland Security

**Number:** [GAO-19-360SP](#)

**Date:** 4/19/2019

**Summary:** In April 2018, GAO identified 19 priority recommendations for the DHS with DHS implementing 4 of those recommendations. Priority recommendations are open GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or ensure that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent, among other benefits. In April 2019, GAO identified 11 additional priority recommendations for DHS, bringing the total number to 26. These recommendations involve the following areas: improving FEMA's management of the National Flood Insurance Program, analyzing the costs associated with future southwest border barrier segments, pursuing the acquisition of a new Coast Guard electronic health records system, establishing a plan for closing Coast Guard boat stations determined to be duplicative, facilitating adoption of the National Institute of Standards and Technology's Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, directing the Assistant Secretary for DHS's Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office to develop a strategy and implementation plan for countering chemical weapons of mass destruction and improving the U.S. Customs and Border Protection's monitoring of radiological shipments.

#### Department of Homeland Security: Continued Leadership Is Critical to Addressing a Range of Management Challenges

**Number:** [GAO-19-544T](#)

**Date:** 5/1/2019

**Summary:** DHS leadership is responsible for implementing numerous recommendations that GAO has made to the department and its component agencies. Current vacancies in top leadership positions could pose a challenge to addressing high-risk areas and priority recommendations that U.S. Department of Homeland Security

span DHS's diverse missions, which include preventing terrorism and enhancing security, managing our borders, administering immigration laws, securing cyberspace, and responding to disasters. Leadership commitment is pivotal in addressing GAO high-risk areas where DHS has a role, such as ensuring the cybersecurity of the nation, the National Flood Insurance Program, and limiting the federal government's fiscal exposure by better managing climate change risks.

## DHS OIG Reports

### Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2018 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting

**Number:** [OIG-19-04](#)

**Date:** 11/15/2018

**Summary:** The independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP issued an adverse opinion on DHS' internal control over financial reporting of its financial statements as of September 30, 2018. The report identifies the significant deficiencies in internal control such as Information Technology Controls and Financial Systems; Financial Reporting; Entity-Level Controls; Property, Plant, and Equipment; Custodial Activities: Entry Process, Refunds and Drawbacks, and Seized Property and Grants Management. Sixty-one recommendations were made by KPMG LLP, that, when implemented, would help improve the Department's internal control.

### DHS Needs to Improve the Process for Identifying Acquisition Planning Capability Needs

**Number:** [OIG-19-19](#)

**Date:** 1/30/2019

**Summary:** The audit objective was to determine to what extent the Department and its components have controls in place to identify capability needs prior to acquiring goods and services. DHS does not hold Components accountable for failing to follow guidance and has not provided adequate direction on how to implement the guidance. As a result, the Department cannot be assured that capability needs are properly identified. Inconsistent analyst reviews affect the Department's ability to make informed decisions about components' assessments of capability needs. It may result in components expending additional resources to develop capability documents and may delay the Department's acquisition of needed goods and services. Furthermore, without proper documentation, issues identified during capability document reviews may not be addressed prior to validation.

### Audit of Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2017 Conference Spending

**Number:** [OIG-19-39](#)

**Date:** 5/22/2019

**Summary:** The audit objective was to determine whether DHS' spending on selected hosted or sponsored conferences for fiscal year 2017 was appropriate, reasonable, necessary, and in compliance with the *Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017*. It was determined that deficiencies occurred because of insufficient resources, competing priorities, inconsistent review of expenses, and the lack of required policies and procedures. Seven recommendations were made to improve conference spending reporting.



## **Department of Homeland Security's FY 2018 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments**

**Number:** [OIG-19-43](#)

**Date:** 5/24/2019

**Summary:** The objective was to determine whether DHS complied with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA) and Executive Order 13520 and evaluate the accuracy and completeness of DHS' improper payment reporting. DHS' processes and procedures for estimating its annual improper payment rates were reviewed. Based on the review, it was determined that DHS did not adequately oversee the components' testing and reporting supporting their improper payment rates. It was recommended that DHS strengthen its oversight and review procedures for IPERA risk assessments and follow the Office of Management and Budget's requirements to comply with IPERA.

## **DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program**

**Number:** [OIG-19-42](#)

**Date:** 5/24/2019

**Summary:** The purpose was to determine the Insider Threat Program's progress in monitoring, detecting, and responding to malicious insider threats on unclassified DHS systems and networks. Before continuing its planned expansion of the Insider Threat Program, DHS needs to address several deficiencies that may hinder program effectiveness and efficiency. Necessary actions have not been taken to ensure DHS programs are appropriately planned, developed, and implemented for efficient and effective delivery of capabilities. Four recommendations were made to the DHS Chief Security Officer to address planning, policy, and acquisition deficiencies prior to further expansion of the Insider Threat Program.

## **Audit of DHS' Issuance and Management of Other Transaction Agreements Involving Consortium Activities**

**Number:** [OIG-19-44](#)

**Date:** 5/30/2019

**Summary:** The audit objective was to determine to what extent DHS has controls for issuing and managing other transaction agreements (OTAs) involving consortium activities. The Department's current OTA policy, last updated in July 2018, contains minimal guidance addressing controls and oversight of consortia OTAs. Without periodically reassessing consortia OTAs' continued use, DHS cannot ensure it is receiving the most effective research or is using its staffing resources efficiently. A recommendation was given to DHS to update its OTA policy to require periodic reassessment of existing OTAs to ensure it is receiving the most effective research and using its staffing resources efficiently.

## **DHS Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Misconduct and Discipline**

**Number:** [OIG-19-48](#)

**Date:** 6/17/2019

**Summary:** The audit was conducted to determine whether the Department of Homeland Security has sufficient processes and procedures to address conduct issues. DHS does not have sufficient policies and procedures to address employee misconduct; does not effectively manage the misconduct program throughout the Department, lacking data monitoring and metrics to gauge program performance. Without oversight through defined policies and program management, DHS cannot make informed decisions to improve the program and ensure all components manage the misconduct process consistently. Additionally, this shortcoming could lead to costly litigation due to inappropriate or unenforceable disciplinary determinations. Eight recommendations were made to ensure effective Department oversight of efforts to address conduct issues.

### **Inadequate Oversight of Low Value DHS Contracts**

**Number:** [OIG-19-50](#)

**Date:** 7/2/2019

**Summary:** The audit was conducted to determine whether components properly solicit, award, and manage acquisitions costing less than \$300 million. The audit reviewed \$153.2 million of the \$2.4 billion in contract actions that DHS awarded. It was determined that components lacked a comprehensive contract management process for maintaining contract files, and reviews conducted by procurement personnel did not ensure that contract personnel performed the required procurement processes. Additional findings included that components lost procurement documents, mismanaged contracts, and did not adhere to contract policy requirements. These problems resulted in misspent funds and impaired the government's ability to take action when contractors did not comply with the procurements. Two recommendations were made to address challenges with the solicitation, award, and management of contracts less than the \$300 million acquisition threshold.

### **Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2018**

**Number:** [OIG-19-60](#)

**Date:** 9/19/2019

**Summary:** The objective was to determine whether DHS' information security program and practices adequately and effectively protected data and information systems supporting DHS' operations and assets for Fiscal Year 2018. DHS' made progress to improvements in information security risk, configuration management practices, continuous monitoring, and more effective security training. By addressing the systems lacking authority to operate and security weaknesses and lack of automated mechanisms to test all system contingency plans or identify alternate facilities to recover processing in the event of service disruptions; DHS can further improve its security program ensuring its systems adequately protect the critical and sensitive data they store and process.

## Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

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### GAO Reports

#### Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Post-Disaster Contracts to Support Response and Recovery

**Number:** [GAO-19-281](#)

**Date:** April 24, 2019

**Summary:** Federal contracts play a key role in timely response and recovery efforts following disasters. After hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria and the 2017 California wildfires, federal agencies obligated at least \$5 billion in post-disaster contracts—which are awarded after disasters hit—to support disaster response and recovery efforts. This report addresses, among other objectives, the extent to which (1) federal agencies obligated funds on post-disaster contracts in response to these events, and (2) selected agencies experienced challenges in the planning of selected contracts. Based on a review of 23 contract files from FEMA, United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Defense Logistics Agency, and the U.S. Coast Guard, GAO identified challenges in the planning of selected contracts. GAO also found that contracting officers at FEMA, USACE, and the U.S. Coast Guard did not consistently write justifications for awards to non-local vendors outside the disaster area, as required. FEMA developed guidance to address this, but the Coast Guard and USACE have not issued guidance or tools to address this requirement. GAO made 10 recommendations – 2 to FEMA – to improve communication and coordination with the Coast Guard and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and to assess its workforce needs.

### DHS OIG Reports

#### FEMA's Oversight of the Integrated Public Alert & Warning System (IPAWS)

**Number:** [OIG-19-08](#)

**Date:** November 19, 2018

**Summary:** Following the January 13, 2018, false missile alert in Hawaii, Congress requested the OIG examine FEMA's role in the incident. OIG concluded that FEMA has limited responsibility for the sending and canceling of state and local alerts. Although FEMA maintains IPAWS as a messaging platform, state and local alerting authorities must obtain commercially-available emergency alert software to generate a message which passes through IPAWS for authentication and delivery. However, OIG found that FEMA does not require that this software perform functions critical to the alerting process, such as the ability to preview or cancel an alert. Instead, FEMA only recommends that software vendors include these capabilities as "best practices." FEMA also does not require that software vendors provide training to alerting authorities on how to use their chosen software. As a result, alerting authorities have experienced difficulties in various aspects of the alerting process. OIG made two recommendations to improve FEMA's IPAWS Program Management Office's oversight. FEMA concurred with the recommendations and is implementing corrective actions to enhance the effectiveness of the IPAWS Program Management Office.

## **Oregon's Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2013 through 2015**

**Number:** [OIG-19-31](#)

**Date:** March 13, 2019

**Summary:** FEMA's Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) provides grant funds to aid public safety personnel acquiring specialized training, exercises, and equipment necessary to safely respond to and manage all-hazards incidents. The audit objective was to determine whether Oregon distributed and spent HSGP funds in compliance with the law, program guidance, and state homeland security plans. The state generally complied with applicable Federal laws and regulations but found instances where it did not fully comply with the FMEA's 2013–2015 Notice of Funding Opportunity guidance. The Office of Inspector General made 10 recommendations, which, when implemented, should help strengthen program management, performance, and oversight. FEMA concurred with all 10 recommendations and plans to take corrective action.

### **Management Alert – FEMA Did Not Safeguard Disaster Survivors' Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (REDACTED)**

**Number:** [OIG-19-32](#)

**Date:** March 15, 2019

**Summary:** The OIG is conducting an ongoing audit of FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance to determine whether FEMA violated the Privacy Act of 1974 and DHS's policy by releasing sensitive personally identifiable information of survivors of hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria and the California wildfires in 2017. What Office of Inspector General found was the privacy incident occurred because FEMA did not take steps to ensure it provided only required data elements to stakeholders. This alert contained two recommendations, of which FEMA concurred with.

### **Additional Controls Needed to Better Manage FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program**

**Number:** [OIG-19-37](#)

**Date:** March 29, 2019

**Summary:** The OIG is conducting an ongoing audit of FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance program to determine the extent FEMA is meeting disaster survivors' transitional shelter needs after the California wildfires and Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017. The OIG determined that FEMA does not require disaster survivors to notify the agency when they vacate hotels participating in the TSA program, thus allowing the hotels to continue to bill FEMA for unoccupied rooms. Additionally, FEMA does not include its Office of the Chief Security Officer Tip Line information on the TSA Terms and Conditions form used by hotels and disaster survivors; nor does it require hotels to provide disaster survivors with copies of the completed forms. FEMA agreed with our initial findings and has initiated actions to improve the TSA program. OIG provided no additional recommendations in this report.

## **Missouri's Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2012 through 2015**

**Number:** [OIG-19-36](#)

**Date:** March 29, 2019



**Summary:** FEMA's HSGP provides grant funds to aid public safety personnel acquiring specialized training, exercises, and equipment necessary to safely respond to and manage all-hazards incidents. The audit objective was to determine whether Missouri distributed and spent HSGP funds in compliance with the law, program guidance, and state homeland security plans. The state generally complied with applicable Federal laws and regulations but found instances where it did not fully comply with FEMA's FYs 2013–2015 Notice of Funding Opportunity guidance. Insufficient monitoring to ensure compliance with Federal requirements and verification and validation of property information recorded by subrecipients for accuracy and completeness were a couple of the deficiencies identified. There were also instances of untimely reporting and obligation of funds. The Office of Inspector General made seven recommendations to help strengthen program management, performance, and oversight. FEMA concurred with all seven recommendations and plans to take corrective action.

### **Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on FEMA's 50 Percent Repair-or-Replace Rule Decisions**

**Number:** [OIG-19-45](#)

**Date:** May 29, 2019

**Summary:** During the recovery phase of declared disasters, FEMA compares repair versus replacement costs to evaluate the feasibility of repairing damaged facilities. Using a "50 Percent Rule" FEMA determines whether a facility can be restored to perform the same functions as before the disaster. Prior Office of Inspector General reports identified 10 errors FEMA should avoid when making repair-or-replace decisions. Together with the lessons learned, the actions FEMA already took may help minimize the risk that taxpayer dollars are wasted on ineligible replacement costs. This report contains no recommendations.

### **FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Demonstrate the Importance of Fraud Prevention and Awareness in FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs**

**Number:** [OIG-19-55](#)

**Date:** July 24, 2019

**Summary:** FEMA's disaster assistance programs are highly susceptible to fraud, waste, and abuse, which poses significant risk to taxpayer dollars. The OIG conducted the audit to determine the extent to which FEMA has instituted effective mechanisms to demonstrate the importance of fraud prevention in its disaster assistance programs. What it found was that FEMA instituted several effective mechanisms to demonstrate the importance of fraud prevention in its disaster assistance programs, but it needs to take additional, proactive steps to create and sustain a culture of fraud prevention and awareness. The OIG made five recommendations to demonstrate its commitment to fraud prevention in carrying out its disaster assistance programs. FEMA concurred with all of them.

### **FEMA's Longstanding IT Deficiencies Hindered 2017 Response and Recovery Operations**

**Number:** [OIG-19-58](#)

**Date:** August 27, 2019

**Summary:** Information technology (IT) is a critical asset to support FEMA’s disaster response and recovery operations. This audit assessed the extent to which FEMA has implemented federally mandated IT management practices and identified challenges to ensuring FEMA’s IT systems adequately support mission operations. The OIG concluded that FEMA has not implemented federally mandated IT management practices essential for effective oversight of its IT environment. Specifically, FEMA has not established an IT strategic plan, architecture, or governance framework to facilitate day-to-day management of its aging IT systems and equipment. The OIG presented four recommendations to address FEMA’s longstanding IT management and planning challenges, and better align IT resources with agency and mission priorities. FEMA concurred with all of them.

### **FEMA Did Not Sufficiently Safeguard Use of Transportation Assistance Funds**

**Number:** [OIG-19-66](#)

**Date:** September 30, 2019

**Summary:** FEMA approved \$64.6 million for transportation assistance for vehicles considered damaged or destroyed by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in FY 2017 but did not adequately document applicants’ eligibility for transportation assistance because FEMA’s policies and procedures do not require documenting comprehensive insurance and second vehicle verifications. FEMA also potentially paid applicants more than the predisaster market value of their vehicles. Lastly, FEMA did not verify applicants spent transportation assistance funds to address critical transportation needs. The OIG made three recommendations that, when implemented, will help ensure FEMA is spending Federal funds for transportation assistance properly. FEMA concurred with only one of the recommendations.

## Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

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### GAO Reports

#### **Department of Homeland Security: Review of Report on Agency Estimates of Foreign Nationals Unlawfully Residing in the U.S.**

**Number:** [GAO-19-640R](#)

**Date:** September 10, 2019

**Summary:** GAO recounted that the Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 directed DHS to report to Congress no later than 180 days after enactment about improving the Department's collection and use of data to estimate the number of people illegally present in the United States. Under U.S. immigration law, various types of immigration benefits that provide lawful immigration status or presence in the United States on a temporary or permanent basis. Foreign nationals in the United States without such valid immigration status or protection are present in the United States unlawfully. DHS responded to the mandate from Congress with a March 2019 report prepared by the Department's Office of Immigration Statistics. The 2018 Explanatory Statement also required GAO to review the DHS report and provide a preliminary briefing to Congress no later than 90 days after committees of jurisdiction received the DHS report. This product transmits GAO's assessment of the Department's report, examines limitations that DHS identified in estimates of the unlawfully resident population, and indicates how DHS plans to improve these estimates. DHS uses a residual estimation methodology to estimate the foreign-born population unlawfully residing in the United States. This method consists of subtracting the estimated legally resident foreign-born population—calculated using DHS administrative records—from the estimated total foreign-born population, obtained from the American Community Survey administered by the U.S. Census Bureau. The Department's March 2019 report identified eight possible approaches that DHS or other entities could take to improve estimates of the unlawfully resident population. Some approaches address limitations identified by DHS and stakeholders as the most significant. Others aim to improve DHS data systems to strengthen DHS's population estimates and improve overall immigration reporting and analysis by DHS. In addition to ongoing work internal to the Department, DHS proposed coordinating with outside entities to implement four of the five approaches where DHS does not have work already underway.

### DHS OIG Reports

#### **Oversight Review of the Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Professional Responsibility, Investigations Division**

**Number:** [OIG-19-14](#)

**Date:** December 6, 2018

**Summary:** OIG conducted this review as part of the planned periodic review of the DHS Component internal-affairs offices by the OIG, in keeping with the oversight responsibilities mandated by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. OIG found that in most instances, ICE Office of Professional Responsibility investigative offices accurately maintained equipment

records and complied with vehicle and availability pay requirements. In addition, OIG found that these offices accounted for all firearms accurately. OIG found that investigative staff complied diligently with the DHS Management Directive relating to the referral of allegations. At the same time, OIG noted deficiencies in compliance with evidence-inventory requirements and observed inaccuracies in ammunition records. OIG also found a systemic absence of training on certain firearms and problems with the timeliness of submitting investigative reports. Finally, OIG reported that supervisors did not always review cases on a quarterly basis. OIG made 12 recommendations to improve operational management and help ensure that ICE Office of Professional Responsibility investigative activities comply with applicable standards. ICE concurred with 10 of 12 recommendations, and proposed steps to improve operational management and compliance with applicable standards. ICE non-concurred with two recommendations, and OIG committed to work with ICE to resolve these recommendations.

### **ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet Performance Standards**

**Number:** [OIG-19-18](#)

**Date:** January 29, 2019

**Summary:** OIG reported that ICE contracts with 106 detention facilities to detain removable aliens. In this review, OIG sought to determine whether ICE contracting tools hold immigration detention facilities to applicable detention standards, and whether ICE imposes consequences when contracted immigration detention facilities do not maintain standards. Specifically, OIG noted that ICE has used Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASP) to ensure that facilities meet relevant performance standards. At the same time, OIG found that detention-facility contracts let by ICE consistently fail to include a QASP, reporting that only 28 of 106 contracts reviewed contained one. OIG found that because a QASP contains the only documented instructions for preparing a Contract Discrepancy Report and recommending financial penalties, contracts omitting a QASP produce uncertainty for ICE about issuing Contract Discrepancy Reports and imposing financial consequences in cases of contractor non-performance. OIG found that between October 1, 2015, and June 30, 2018, ICE imposed such financial penalties only twice, despite documenting thousands of instances of the facilities' failures to comply with detention standards. OIG found that Instead of holding deficient facilities accountable through financial penalties, ICE issued waivers to such facilities, exempting them from compliance with standards. In addition, OIG found that ICE has no formal policies and procedures governing this waiver process; that officials have granted such waivers without clear authority; and that ICE does not ensure that key stakeholders have access to approved waivers. Further, OIG found that Contracting Officer's Representatives' organizational placement and overextension of responsibilities impede effective monitoring of facility contracts. OIG also reported that ICE does not adequately share information about ICE detention contracts with key officials. ICE officials concurred with all five recommendations, and proposed steps to update processes and guidance regarding contracting tools used to hold detention facility contractors accountable for failing to meet performance standards.

## ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens

**Number:** [OIG-19-28](#)

**Date:** March 11, 2019

**Summary:** ICE repatriates thousands of aliens every year. In this review, we sought to identify barriers to the repatriation of detained aliens with final orders of removal. OIG's case review of 3,053 aliens not removed within 90 days of receiving a final order of removal revealed that the most significant factors delaying or preventing repatriation lie outside the scope of ICE's control. Specifically, OIG found that detainees' legal appeals often prove lengthy; removals depend on foreign governments cooperating to arrange travel documents and flight schedules; detainees may fail to comply with repatriation efforts; and detainees' physical or mental health conditions can also delay removals. In addition, OIG found that internally, ICE's challenges with staffing and technology also diminish the efficiency of the removal process. OIG noted that ICE struggles with inadequate staffing, heavy caseloads, and frequent officer rotations, detracting from the quality of case management for detainees with final orders of removal. OIG also found that ICE Air Operations manages complex logistical movements for commercial and charter flights through a cumbersome and inefficient manual process. OIG found that while ICE has developed a tool to track and report statistics for removal operations, these measures remain incomplete, and do not track information needed for fact-based decisions on visa sanctions. OIG made five recommendations to improve ICE's removal operations staffing, flight reservation system, and metrics related to visa sanctions. ICE officials concurred with all five recommendations and proposed steps to address staffing, training, web-based case management and tracking, and decision-making processes.

## Concerns about ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Four Detention Facilities

**Number:** [OIG-19-47](#)

**Date:** June 3, 2019

**Summary:** In response to concerns raised by immigrant rights groups and complaints to the OIG Hotline about conditions for detainees held in ICE custody, we conducted unannounced inspections of four detention facilities to evaluate their compliance with ICE detention standards. Overall, inspections of four detention facilities revealed violations of ICE's 2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards, which set requirements for facilities housing detainees. Although the conditions varied among the facilities, our observations, detainee and staff interviews, and document reviews revealed several common issues. OIG observed immediate risks or egregious violations of detention standards at facilities in Adelanto, California, and Essex County, New Jersey--such as inadequate medical care and unreported security incidents--OIG issued individual reports to ICE after visiting these two facilities. All four facilities had issues with expired food, which puts detainees at risk for food-borne illnesses. At three facilities, OIG found that segregation practices violated standards and infringed on detainee rights. Two facilities failed to provide recreation outside detainee housing units. OIG saw dilapidated and moldy bathrooms in two facilities' detainee housing units. At one facility, detainees did not receive appropriate clothing and hygiene items, so that OIG could not ensure that detainees could properly care for themselves. Lastly, one facility inspected by OIG allowed only non-contact visits despite accommodations for in-person visitation. OIG observations confirmed concerns identified in detainee grievances, which indicated unsafe and unhealthy conditions to varying degrees at all the



facilities we visited. ICE concurred with the report recommendation and described corrective actions to address the issues identified in this report.

### **A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations**

**Number:** [OIG-19-57](#)

**Date:** July 31, 2019

**Summary:** For this review, the Justice Department's (DOJ) OIG and DHS OIG jointly evaluated cooperation between the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and ICE's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) on Southwest border criminal investigations. Evaluators defined cooperation as deconflicting investigative targets to avoid duplicative investigations; deconflicting law-enforcement operations to promote officer safety; and sharing relevant investigative information. The IGs conducted this joint review following a February 2016 request from the then-Chairs of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, and the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. As part of this review, evaluators deployed an anonymous online survey to all 2,948 agents (1,245 FBI and 1,703 HSI) assigned to Southwest border locations in 2017. The IGs received 980 survey responses (291 FBI and 689 HSI), a 33 percent aggregate response rate. Evaluators conducted interviews with 246 DOJ and DHS personnel, primarily from the FBI, HSI, and U.S. Attorney's Offices, in Southwest border locations across Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas. The IGs also traveled to ten Southwest border cities in Texas. Based on this audit work, evaluators made five recommendations to improve cooperation between the FBI and HSI along the Southwest border. ICE concurred with three of the five recommendations. ICE did not concur with recommendations to develop a deconfliction policy specifically along the Southwest border, or to develop an agreement governing FBI and HSI operations on overlapping criminal investigative areas, respectively.

## Science and Technology (S&T)

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### GAO Reports

#### **DHS Is Developing and Testing Security Technologies, but Could Better Share Test Results**

**Number:** [GAO-19-636](#)

**Date:** September 12, 2019

**Summary:** DHS Science and Technology Directorate's (S&T) has one research and development (R&D) effort focused on surface transportation, the Surface Transportation Explosive Threat Detection (STETD) program, which is developing technologies to secure mass transit systems. TSA, the federal agency that has security oversight over the Nation's transportation systems, collaborates with S&T to develop and test surface transportation security technologies. What GAO found, however, was that S&T has not used milestones that fully adhered to DHS guidance and that TSA could better share test results with mass transit stakeholders. GAO recommended that S&T incorporate DHS milestone guidance for its STETD program, and that TSA develop a mechanism to routinely and comprehensively share security technology information with mass transit operators.

### DHS OIG Reports

#### **S&T Is Not Effectively Coordinating Research and Development Efforts across DHS**

**Number:** [OIG-19-59](#)

**Date:** 9/18/2019

**Summary:** This audit was conducted to determine whether S&T's Integrated Product Team (IPT) process coordinated R&D efforts across the Department. The IPTs were established as the central mechanism to identify, track, and coordinate department-wide priority R&D efforts. The IPT processes were not followed as intended, possibly preventing S&T from providing the Secretary of Homeland Security and Congress with an accurate profile of the Department's R&D activities or funding needs for a wide range of missions, including securing the border, detecting nuclear devices, and screening airline passengers. A recommendation was made to improve S&T's coordination of R&D activities across DHS.

## Transportation Security Administration (TSA)

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### DHS OIG Reports

#### DHS' and TSA's Compliance with Public Law 114-278, Transportation Security Card Program Assessment

**Number:** [OIG-19-16](#)

**Date:** December 14, 2018

**Summary:** On December 16, 2016, Congress passed Public Law 114-278, Transportation Security Card Program Assessment, to address concerns from the Government Accountability Office about the need to improve the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) program. The goal of the TWIC program is to prevent access to secure areas at ports by known and suspected terrorists or criminals who might pose a security risk to our maritime transportation sector. TSA's Security Threat Assessment process serves to: (1) identify any known or suspected ties to terrorism; (2) evaluate any criminal history for disqualifying factors; and (3) ensure legal immigration or citizenship status. TSA only partially complied with requirements mandated by the public law. Of the six required actions, TSA partially complied with two and fully complied with four. The Office of Inspector General did not provide any recommendations.

#### FAMS' Contribution to International Flight Security is Questionable

**Number:** [OIG-19-17](#)

**Date:** 12/19/2018

**Summary:** (U) As a follow-up to our 2017 report on TSA's Federal Air Marshal Service's (FAMS) domestic flight operations, the OIG conducted this audit to determine the extent to which FAMS can interdict an improvised explosive device during flight. We identified vulnerabilities with FAMS' contribution to international flight security. Details related to FAMS operations and flight coverage presented in the report are classified or designated as Sensitive Security Information. We made two recommendations that, when implemented, should help TSA's overall efforts to strengthen aviation transportation security. We also identified \$394 million in funds that could be put to better use.

#### Covert Testing of Access Controls to Airport Secure Areas

**Number:** [OIG-19-21](#)

**Date:** 2/13/2019

**Summary:** (U) The objective was to determine whether TSA implemented proper procedures to safeguard the secure areas of our Nation's airports and whether airports, aircraft operators, and contractors were complying with TSA's security requirements to control access to these areas. The OIG identified vulnerabilities with various airport access control points and associated access control procedures. Details related to our testing results presented in the report are classified or designated Sensitive Security Information. We made six recommendations related to standard operating procedures, deployment of new technology, identification of industry best practices, and training. The recommendations, when implemented, should help TSA and airports better safeguard secure airport areas. TSA management concurred with all six recommendations.

## **TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security Officers**

**Number:** [OIG-19-35](#)

**Date:** March 28, 2019

**Summary:** Transportation Security Officers (TSO) are integral to improving aviation security at our Nation's airports by identifying prohibited objects in bags, in cargo, and on passengers; however, TSA has not addressed all the challenges associated with retaining TSOs. Improved transparency and communication of job expectations, a standardized approach to training, and a more thorough evaluation of applicants for capability as well as compatibility when hiring would save costs and provide a more stable, mature, and qualified workforce to better secure the Nation's aviation transportation system. The Office of Inspector General made nine recommendations, all of which TSA concurred.

## **TSA's Data and Methods for Classifying Its Criminal Investigators as Law Enforcement Officers Need Improvement**

**Number:** [OIG-19-56](#)

**Date:** July 26, 2019

**Summary:** TSA's methods for classifying its Office of Inspection criminal investigators as law enforcement officers were adequate and valid, but the data TSA used were not adequate or valid. The timesheet data TSA used to validate that its criminal investigators met this requirement were not adequate and valid as the data were not always timely submitted and approved. Applicable laws and regulations require TSA's criminal investigators spend at least 50 percent of their time performing criminal investigative duties to be classified as law enforcement officers. The Office of Inspector General made four recommendations that, when implemented, should help TSA improve data used to classify its Office of Inspection criminal investigators as law enforcement officers.

## U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

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### GAO Reports

#### **Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: DHS Implementation of U.S. Immigration Laws**

**Number:** [GAO-19-376T](#)

**Date:** February 27, 2019

**Summary:** The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), an insular area and commonwealth of the United States located near Guam, with a population of roughly 55,000 and a land mass of 183.5 square miles across fourteen islands. The 1976 covenant defining the political relationship between the CNMI and the United States exempted the CNMI from certain federal immigration laws but preserved the U.S. government's prerogative to apply federal law in these exempted areas. The Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008 (CNRA) amended a joint resolution approving the covenant, and generally established federal control of CNMI immigration beginning in 2009. After enactment of CNRA, DHS began implementing, among other things, a foreign worker permit program to address CNRA provisions specific to the CNMI. DHS also began using the Department's discretionary authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act to allow the temporary presence in CNMI of certain groups of individuals. Congress has amended the CNRA several times with provisions affecting the total number of permits allocated and the distribution of permits. Legislation under consideration at the time of this GAO testimony would further modify the CNRA to establish a CNMI resident status for certain individuals. Among its other provisions, the CNRA allows CNMI employers to petition for H-2 visas for temporary workers without counting the visas against a numerical restriction. Drawing from work ongoing at the time, this testimony discusses DHS's implementation of: (1) selected CNRA provisions regarding foreign workers, among others, in the CNMI and (2) its discretionary parole authority under the INA as applied in the CNMI. GAO updated information from previously issued products, reviewed relevant legal documents, and analyzed DHS data.

#### **Immigration Benefits: Additional Actions Needed to Address Fraud Risks in Program for Foreign National Victims of Domestic Abuse**

**Number:** [GAO-19-676](#)

**Date:** September 30, 2019

**Summary:** USCIS administers elements of the Violence against Women Act (VAWA) relevant to DHS, including a self-petition program for foreign national victims of battery of extreme cruelty committed by certain U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents (LPRs). In fiscal year 2018, foreign nationals filed nearly 13,000 VAWA self-petitions alleging domestic abuse by a U.S. citizen or LPR family member. The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by VAWA and administered by USCIS, provides immigration relief for self-petitioners under VAWA, allowing such victims to obtain classification as an immigrant and ultimately apply for LPR status. Congressional requesters asked GAO to review fraud risks in the self-petition process and how, if at all, DHS assists U.S. citizens or LPRs who may have been falsely identified as domestic abusers. This report examines the extent to which (1) USCIS has adopted relevant leading practices in GAO's Fraud Risk Framework for the VAWA self-petition program; and (2) DHS aids U.S. citizens or LPRs who may



have been falsely identified as domestic abusers in the self-petition process, including steps taken by DHS following a suspected fraud. GAO reviewed documents, interviewed officials, analyzed program data, and assessed the agency's approach to managing fraud risks against GAO's Fraud Risk Framework. DHS concurred with all three GAO recommendations: One of these calls for USCIS to conduct regular fraud risk assessments to determine a fraud risk profile for the program and develop an antifraud strategy with specific control activities.

## DHS OIG Reports

### Data Quality Improvements Needed to Track Adjudicative Decisions

**Number:** [OIG-19-40](#)

**Date:** May 14, 2019

**Summary:** OIG found that USCIS has not implemented an effective process to track adjudicative decisions and ensure data integrity in its Computer Linked Application Information Management System (CLAIMS3). Federal standards and DHS requirements stress the importance of internal controls over data reliability and system access to achieve effective and efficient operations. However, USCIS cannot reliably trace adjudicative decisions recorded in CLAIMS3 back to the Immigration Services Officers responsible for those decisions. OIG analysis of CLAIMS3 data from fiscal years 2015–2017 indicated that the agency could track no more than 66 percent of adjudicative decisions during this period. OIG found that this shortfall in traceability resulted from the lack of a single policy across USCIS service centers and field offices about which CLAIMS3 users may records benefit decisions in the system. Additionally, USCIS did not implement adequate monitoring and system access controls to prevent intrusions and potential fraud. Instead, USCIS staff in other job categories have the same user access and privileges as sworn Immigration Services Officers. These issues lead to data-integrity issues and vulnerability to fraud. Further, OIG found that the CLAIMS3 system itself lacks reliability in supporting key management operations because of inadequate system functionality and quality control, adding that CLAIMS3 does not support accurate management and productivity reporting necessary for sound management decision making. USCIS concurred with all eight OIG recommendations to address data-reliability and -monitoring issues.

## U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)

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### GAO Reports

#### **Coast Guard Acquisitions: Addressing Key Risks Is Important to Success of Polar Icebreaker Program**

**Number:** [GAO-19-255T](#)

**Date:** November 29, 2018

**Summary:** The Coast Guard—a Component of DHS—embarks on the acquisition of its new polar icebreakers to address capability gaps in the Arctic and Antarctic regions but faces a number of key acquisition and funding risks. In March 2018, GAO concluded that the Coast Guard did not have a sound business case when it established the cost, schedule, and performance baselines for its heavy polar icebreaker acquisition program, because of risks in four key areas: design, technology, cost, and schedule. In September 2018, GAO recommended, among other things, that the polar icebreaker program update program baselines following a preliminary design review, conduct a technology readiness assessment, re-evaluate its cost estimate, and develop a schedule according to best practices. DHS concurred with all of GAO’s recommendations and identified actions it plans to take to address them.

#### **Military Justice: DOD and the Coast Guard Need to Improve Their Capabilities to Assess Racial and Gender Disparities**

**Number:** [GAO-19-344](#)

**Date:** May 30, 2019

**Summary:** House Report 115-200, accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, included a provision for GAO to assess the extent that disparities may exist in the military justice system. This report assesses the extent to which (1) the military services collect and maintain consistent race, ethnicity, and gender information for service members investigated and disciplined for Uniform Code of Military Justice violations that can be used to assess disparities, and (2) there are racial and gender disparities in the military justice system, and whether disparities have been studied by DOD. GAO’s analysis of available data found that Black, Hispanic, and male service-members were more likely than White or female members to be the subjects of investigations recorded in databases used by the military criminal investigative organizations, and to be tried in general and special courts-martial in all of the military services when controlling for attributes such as rank and education. GAO also found that race and gender were not statistically significant factors in the likelihood of conviction in general and special courts-martial for most services, and minority service members were either less likely to receive a more severe punishment than White service members or there was no difference among racial groups; thus, disparities may be limited to particular stages of the process. GAO made 11 recommendations, including that the services develop the capability to present consistent race and ethnicity data, and DOD include demographic information in military justice annual reports and evaluates the causes of disparities in the military justice system. DOD and the Coast Guard generally concurred with GAO’s recommendations.

## DHS OIG Reports

### United States Coast Guard's Reporting of Uniform Code of Military Justice Violations to the Federal Bureau of Investigation

**Number:** [OIG-19-22](#)

**Date:** February 21, 2019

**Summary:** This report was conducted in response to the active shooter incident that occurred on November 6, 2017 where 26 people were killed when a former Air Force service member was able to purchase firearms because the Air Force failed to enter him into the FBI's National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) database as required, based on a previous conviction. The OIG found that the U.S. Coast Guard failed to enter 16 service members who committed offenses that made them prohibited individuals to the NICS. The OIG made eight recommendations to enhance Coast Guard's policies and strengthen internal controls. Coast Guard concurred with all our recommendations and described the corrective actions it has taken and plans to take. At the time of publication, OIG considered seven recommendations resolved and open and one recommendation closed.

### Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2018 Drug Control Performance Summary Report

**Number:** [OIG-19-27](#)

**Date:** March 8, 2019

**Summary:** The Office of National Drug Control Policy's (ONDCP) Circular, *Accounting of Drug Control Funding and Performance Summary*, requires each National Drug Control Program agency to submit to ONDCP Director a detailed accounting of all funds expended for National Drug Control Program activities during the previous fiscal year. The Office of Inspector General contracted an independent entity, Williams Adley & Company – DC, LLP (Williams Adley), to conduct the review and concluded that the Coast Guard's FY 2018 Performance Summary Report conformed with the criteria in the Circular. Williams Adley did not make any recommendations as a result of its review.

## U.S. Secret Service (USSS)

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### GAO Reports

#### Action Needed to Address Gaps in IT Workforce Planning and Management Practices

**Number:** [GAO-19-60](#)

**Date:** November 15, 2018

**Summary:** In addition to its role of protecting the President, the U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service) also plays a leading role in investigating and preventing financial and electronic crimes. In 2009, the component initiated the IITT investment—a portfolio of programs and projects that are intended to, among other things, improve systems availability and security in support of the component’s business operations. What GAO found was that the Secret Service Chief Information Officer (CIO) fully implemented 11 of 14 selected IT oversight responsibilities, and partially implemented the remaining 3. The CIO partially implemented the responsibilities to establish a process that ensures the Secret Service reviews IT contracts; ensure that the component’s IT policies align with DHS’s policies; and set incremental targets to monitor program progress. As a result of the review, GAO made 13 recommendations, including that the Secret Service establish a process that ensures the CIO reviews all IT contracts, as appropriate; and identify the skills needed for its IT workforce. DHS concurred with all recommendations and provided estimated dates for implementing each of them.

## Acronyms

AMO – Air and Marine Operations  
 CBP – U.S. Customs and Border Protection  
 CFATS – Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards  
 CFO – Chief Financial Officer  
 CFO Act – Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990  
 CIO – Chief Information Officer  
 CISA – Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
 CLAIMS3 – Computer Linked Application Information Management System  
 CNMI – Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands  
 CNRA – Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008  
 CWMD -- Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction  
 DHS – Department of Homeland Security  
 DOD – U.S. Department of Defense  
 DOJ – Department of Justice  
 FAMS – Federal Air Marshal Service  
 FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigations  
 FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency  
 FISMA – Federal Information Security Management Act  
 FLETC – Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers  
 FPS – Federal Protective Service  
 FY – Fiscal Year  
 GAO – U.S. Government Accountability Office  
 GSA – General Services Administration  
 HHS – Department of Health & Human Services  
 HSAM – Homeland Security Acquisition Manual  
 HSGP – Homeland Security Grant Program  
 HSI – Homeland Security Investigations  
 ICE – U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IPAWS – Integrated Public Alert & Warning System  
 IPERA – Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010  
 IPT – Integrated Product Team  
 IT – Information Technology  
 LPR – Lawful Permanent Resident  
 NICS – National Instant Criminal Background Check System  
 OEC – Office of Emergency Communications  
 OFO – Office of Field Operations  
 OIG – Office of Inspector General  
 OMB – Office of Management and Budget  
 ONDCP – Office of National Drug Control Policy  
 ORR – Office of Refugee Resettlement  
 OSC – U.S. Office of Special Counsel  
 OTA – Other Transaction Agreement  
 QASP – Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan  
 R&D – Research and development  
 SOP – Standard Operating Procedure  
 S&T – Science and Technology Directorate  
 STETD – Surface Transportation Explosive Threat Detection  
 TSA – Transportation Security Administration  
 TSO – Transportation Security Officers  
 TWIC – Transportation Worker Identification Credential  
 UAC – Unaccompanied Children  
 U.S. – United States  
 USACE – United States Army Corps of Engineers  
 USCG – U.S. Coast Guard  
 USCIS – U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services  
 USSS – U.S. Secret Service  
 VAWA – Violence Against Women Act







Homeland  
Security



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