January 10, 2008

Judge William Webster  
Chair, Homeland Security Advisory Council  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Judge Webster,

On September 18, 2007, the Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Academe and Policy Research Senior Advisory Committee (APRSAC) met at the United States Coast Guard Academy in New London, Connecticut. The purpose of the meeting was to receive briefings on current training and learning programs/opportunities within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) headquarters and components. We have enclosed a copy of the agenda.

The committee made several observations during the briefings on the relationship and role of the Chief Learning Officer (CLO) throughout DHS. The group also examined the relationship between the grants given to universities and how they fit in to the overall training and learning opportunities for DHS employees and related homeland security partners.

The mission of the CLO is to develop and maintain a unified and collaborative DHS community of learning to provide Department employees and stakeholders the quality education, training and development opportunities needed to sustain a high level of individual and organizational performance. George Tanner, the current CLO, gave an overview of several programs and initiatives within his jurisdiction. The APRSAC is pleased to see the advancement of the Department’s “University System,” which consists of the Leadership Institute, Preparedness Center, Homeland Security Academy and the Center for Academic and Interagency Programs.
Dr. Tanner provided a timeline describing when various programs are scheduled to be established or consolidated throughout DHS. The Leadership Institute will develop effective programs and methods that deliver essential leadership training. DHScovery will enable DHS employees to train at their desk. Both efforts are scheduled to consolidate existing component programs within the next two years.

The CLO currently has an Executive Steering Committee consisting of senior leadership, including the seven major components, throughout the department. The CLO works with the Executive Steering Committee to set the courses, structure and focus of DHS training. The APRSAC would like to see the CLO receive additional input from its external partners in the academic community. The APRSAC also believes it would be beneficial for DHS to provide input to academic institutions (community colleges, colleges and universities) regarding their homeland security-related programs to better prepare, educate and train potential future DHS employees for service.

The APRSAC had questions about the CLO's current organizational placement and funding. To be effective, the CLO must have a clearly defined role, and his office must be given the stature it needs to be able to promote and implement change. At the time of our meeting, there was great uncertainty about the budget for the office. As of the time of this writing, the CLO receives no funding in the FY 08 budget. Fully funding the CLO is essential; in the short term, this funding will be especially important for training DHS personnel in preparation for the administration transition in January, 2009.

The APRSAC applauds the education and training efforts conducted at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy and Customs and Border Protection. Those two components offer examples of successful programs in place that are portable and applicable to the Department as a whole. The U.S. Coast Guard Academy has a very organized and well coordinated structure that allows its training to be mission focused. (As noted below, however, it currently lacks behavioral and social science expertise, which the APRSAC believes is a critical omission that should be addressed.) Customs and Border Protection prioritizes its training and values feedback from recent training participants. This feedback from field agents confirms the value of the training and the ability of the CBP to align its training programs with its mission.

The APRSAC received briefings about two additional aspects of DHS training. The National Domestic Preparedness Consortium (NDPC) is the principal vehicle through which Grants and Training (within the Federal Emergency Management Agency) identifies, develops, tests, and delivers training to state and local emergency responders. (As noted below, the APRSAC offers some recommendations about the NDPC.)

The Competitive Training Grant Program (CTGP) provides funding for training initiatives that further DHS's mission to prepare the nation to prevent, respond to, and recover from incidents of terrorism. CTGP was launched in 2004 to develop specialized training to strengthen preparedness among first responders, public officials, and citizens. (As noted below, the APRSAC offers some recommendations about the CTGP.)
The APRSAC submits the following recommendations for the review and approval of the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC). If these meet with HSAC's approval, we ask that they be submitted to Secretary Chertoff for his consideration.

1. **DHS leadership should better define the role and relationship of the Chief Learning Officer (within DHS Headquarters and component organizations) and clearly communicate that role to component leadership.**
   Having a clearly defined role will allow the CLO to avoid duplication of efforts, consolidate programs, foster innovation and review programs for efficiency and the quality of instructors.

2. **Congress should fully fund the Management Directorate budget to support CLO activities.**

3. **The CLO should conduct an inventory of all current training and leadership opportunities provided by the Department, either directly or through the grant process.**

4. **The CLO should fully develop and regularly evaluate the curricula of the University System.**

5. **The CLO should create clear metrics to measure achievement of mid-term and long-term goals and should regularly evaluate training and education activities with these metrics.**

6. **The Department and Congress should ensure that all training programs are operationally relevant.**
   - Given multiple demands on DHS employees, Congress should minimize training mandates that are not vital to mission accomplishment.
   - The Department's success is fundamentally measured at the operational level. The closer first-hand understanding Washington-based and upper-management SES, etc. employees have with those field activities, the clearer the connection will be between the mission and management of the Department.

7. **DHS should better engage internal and external partners in learning and training efforts, including our nation’s community colleges and universities**
   - Collaborate with internal and external partners to develop a homeland security discipline.
   - Add relevant external partners (from the academic community, think tanks, state & local government) to the CLO Executive Steering Committee.
   - DHS should improve the coordination between the CLO and the training grants office in FEMA. The CLO should review relevance to the homeland security mission and evaluate the quality of the
programs, including reviewing the quality of trainers/faculty. If such programs are determined to be deficient, they should be revamped or eliminated.

8. DHS should better integrate social and behavioral sciences (including psychological and community response to disasters and crises, as well as risk assessment/analysis and risk communication) into instruction and training of DHS employees (including the U.S. Coast Guard Academy) and partner training programs.

9. Based on the number of senior positions within DHS there is an urgent need to provide a senior executive leadership program designed to enhance the Department's unity of effort. CLO should develop a mandated 3-5 day senior executive course for all SES 1 - 3 personnel. The course should be conducted at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy that will further enhance the overall stature of the Department as a stand alone department.

Thank you, on behalf of the APRSAC, for your attention to these issues and recommendations.

Sincerely,

Dr. Jared Cohon
President
Carnegie Mellon University

Dr. Ruth David
President and CEO
Analytic Services Inc.
Dear Judge Webster,

The Emergency Response Senior Advisory Committee (ERSAC) submits the following recommendations to the Homeland Security Advisory Council for consideration and further submission to the Secretary.

A. Medical Surge Capacity

Findings & Recommendations:

The requirements found within the National Preparedness, Homeland Security Presidential Directive Eight (HSPD-8) and Public Health and Medical Preparedness, Homeland Security Presidential Directive Twenty One (HSPD-21) call for medical preparedness, including the surge capacity for Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) first responders and hospital treatment facilities. Responsibility for ensuring this capability rests with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), but different elements of the response and management of required resources are spread among various federal agencies including Health and Human Services (HHS), the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the Department of Defense (DOD).

There continues to be strong evidence that Emergency Medical Service (EMS) response operations and hospitals are largely forgotten sectors in homeland security preparedness efforts. This unfortunate and precarious situation is not a secret. The neglect of addressing capacity woes for EMS responders and hospitals must be addressed in a sustainable, meaningful and coherent manner. DHS and FEMA should be the lead federal organization in ensuring there is sufficient medical surge capacity in the Nation.
The most frequently cited issues and concerns requiring immediate attention for Medical Surge Capacity include, but are not limited to the seven findings listed below:

**Finding #1: The EMS and hospital sectors comprise a complex mixture of organizations and agencies.**

Many entities are public sector EMS agencies, others are affiliated with local fire departments, and many are for-profit organizations providing 911 services to communities. Many of the smaller organizations—often comprised of volunteers—operate on very limited budgets. This makes working with the EMS and hospital sectors particularly challenging and underscores the importance of employing a flexible approach that allows for a variety of local and regional arrangements. One example is that there is not a sufficient funding source for non-fire EMS organizations. Recent expansion of the FIRE Act granted limited access to “volunteer EMS” organizations to apply for funding. However, the grants are severely limited to 2% of the funding allocated. Serious consideration must be given to establishing sustainable readiness funding and training programs to allow organizations to reach required capacity and readiness and then maintain it.

**Recommendation #1:**

The Secretary and Congress should require that funding and readiness evaluations of EMS and hospital organizations be based on the medical surge services they are required to perform, either directly or by mutual aid plans/agreements. The readiness and capacity of these organizations to perform their response functions should be the only factors for allocation of funding.

**Finding #2: There are few standards that define what goals are to be met in developing a “surge capacity.”**

In the absence of clear standards there is great uncertainty about what levels of preparedness are to be achieved and how assessments of current capabilities can be measured. The absence of standards also causes uncertainty about what the priorities should be for investing and how funding can be most effectively utilized. The Metropolitan Medical Response System guidelines call for 1,000 and 10,000 casualty preparedness requirements, but with most hospitals in private hands, little is being done to establish standards.

**Recommendation #2:**

The Secretary should require the uniform use of existing standards where they are sufficient and the development of clear new standards where necessary to clearly state medical surge capability.

**Finding #3: EMS and Hospital Exercising**

Current exercise programs fail to adequately incorporate and test EMS and hospitals in exercises. Until these vital components are truly tasked and funded to conduct and participate in full scale disaster and terrorism exercising, the United States will not have a benchmark of current capacity and capabilities upon which to promulgate coherent and effective strategies for response.
Recommendation #3:
DHS/FEMA should fully support and require testing by evaluations and ongoing exercise(s) of the EMS and hospital care capabilities for maximum surge based on the existing planning scenarios. The scenarios include the full range of responder personal protection, decontamination and hospital bed (treatment) capability including isolation, decontamination and burn care. Such exercises should be as inclusive as possible and community-based to reflect the true impact of an incident. The findings from such exercises should be promptly addressed by the best and most efficient means to bring the Nation's capability to the required standard.

Finding #4: Little attention has been given to providing personal protective gear, decontamination, training and communications equipment to EMS response personnel, especially among non-fire EMS organizations. The absence of equipment and training for non-fire EMS personnel could seriously compromise an effective response to a chemical or biological attack or disaster. Continued failure to address this issue could result in significant loss of life to EMS responders and have significant negative impact on response to a terrorist attack.

Recommendation #4:
DHS/FEMA should require the priority identification and correction of fully equipping and training EMS responders for CBRN-D and communications shortfalls for all EMS personnel in all organizations.

Finding #5: The distribution system for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) needs to be enhanced to link public health clinics, hospitals and other distribution sites. There is widespread uncertainty at the local level that the logistical networks have been developed to effectively manage antibiotic distribution or vaccine administration during a mass casualty event.

Recommendation #5:
DHS/FEMA should require field testing, demonstration and training of the existing planned Strategic National Stockpile distribution system for this response.

Finding #6: Hospital Specialty Beds.
The hospital system in the United States continues to struggle with capacity issues during day to day operations. The impact of a high volume patient yield incident could collapse the system. Specialty services and beds such as burn units do not have sufficient capacity. Coherent sustainable national strategies must be developed with requisite support provided to the hospital sector or augmented separately to achieve these national priorities.

Recommendation #6:
The Secretary should require the evaluation of adequacy and sufficiency in numbers of hospital specialty services and beds. Such evaluation should include the testing by exercising based on the national planning scenarios.
Finding #7: Emergency Support Function #8 – Health and Medical Services Annex.

ESF #8 is a very broad and complex function with many responsibilities for health and medical services. For instance, ESF #8 requirements span from sanitation issues to medical surveillance; from critical care medicine to veterinarian services; from mental health intervention to mortuary services. The breadth of services and the unique characteristics of every functional area within ESF#8 make each component mission critical and exceedingly complex. Consideration should be given for creating a separate (additional) ESF or an explicitly defined group within the National Response Framework that specifically addresses EMS response and critical care medicine support and related coordination issues. The promulgation of this new ESF or defined sub-group, with one federal agency tasked for this responsibility, will also clarify the issue of “who is in charge” of providing support and coordination for this area within the federal government.

Recommendation #7:
The Secretary should require the explicit assignment of the EMS function within ESF#8 to a specific federal agency.

B. Response Capabilities

Findings & Recommendations:

Finding #8: The National Preparedness Guidelines final version released in September 2007 is only a listing of “best practices” and does not meet existing requirements.

These directives specify that this document must be “risk based”, tied to national standards and guidelines, and detailed enough to measure capabilities at the local, state, regional and federal levels. FEMA Preparedness and DHS Policy have together developed a suggested new approach to the HSPD-8 Target Capabilities List (TCL) that seeks to meet this requirement. The new TCL attempts to clearly define specific capabilities and assess shortfalls based essentially upon clearly understood and relevant criteria, such as a jurisdiction’s population, population density, or the presence of significant and relevant critical infrastructure.

This new TCL is currently in the pilot development stage and has the potential to describe and define measurable “Preparedness” at all levels. While the new version of the TCL is promising in its relative clarity and overall structure, it should be recognized that this initiative comes on the heels of several recent attempts to assess “readiness” or preparedness at the state and local level. Before any general roll out of the new TCL is attempted, the pilot initiatives should be completed. The current approach for the several pilots is to build consensus and then build the program out to implementation. Use of web-based technology
will allow each location to build their own TCL with meaningful roll-up capabilities and metrics to report on each capability. The TCL update is scheduled to be a three year process.

**Recommendation #8:**
The Secretary should fully support and expedite the rewrite and pilot implementation of the HSPD-8, Target Capabilities List (new TCL) by FEMA Preparedness and DHS Policy. The new TCL program pilots for several locations should also be expedited to ascertain the value of the TCL to local and state jurisdictions and the level of effort required to complete the assessment.

C. **Recent Mass Evacuations**

**Findings & Recommendations:**

**Finding #9:** Mass evacuation remains a fundamental challenge in many emergencies. The recent California firestorms led to the evacuation of approximately a half million persons. While the specific circumstances surrounding evacuations during major fires are substantially different from other planned evacuations (precautionary hurricane evacuations for example), there may be value gained from a comprehensive study of lessons learned from the California experiences. Investigation should include the coordination between all the response ESFs at all levels and their interaction with the field responders for an evacuation of more than 100,000 persons for more than 10 days. Mass evacuation was also a component of the recent TOPOFF4 Exercise, further indicating the importance of this strategy in major emergencies.

**Recommendation #9:**
That the DHS Secretary charter through DHS S&T and the Homeland Security Institute, a study and analysis to review large evacuations - more than 100,000 persons for more than 10 days - based on the recent California wild-land fires to identify what lessons might be learned and best practices applied in future evacuation planning and operations. This effort should include the coordination between ESFs, mutual aid and EMAC, and engage relevant local, state, federal and non-profit personnel as appropriate.

Sincerely,

Dr. Richard Andrews
Chair, Emergency Response Senior Advisory Committee
Homeland Security Advisory Council
Dear Judge Webster,

The Private Sector Senior Advisory Committee (PVTSAC) met on August 10, 2007 at the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC). The focus of the meeting was State Fusion Centers because of the potential role these Centers play as part of information sharing with the private sector. In addition to hearing what the MCAC does, we heard from fusion center representatives from Arizona, Illinois and Washington.

Information sharing with the private sector continues to be a major area of interest for the PVTSAC for the same reasons that resulted in creating the Homeland Security Information Sharing between Government and the Private Sector Report of August 2005. The focus the Department has placed on information sharing is clearly apparent with resources having been applied against all seven of the Information Sharing Report recommendations. That said however, the full potential of those recommendations has yet to be achieved. It is in that spirit, from the meeting in Maryland and against a backdrop of continuous improvement, that we offer the following observations and recommendations to the HSAC.

Observations:

- The private sector continues to want to interface with the Department, but the interface points are not consistent. Further, the majority of members of the private sector lack clarity about how they should interface for either sharing or receiving information. This is a complex set of interactions because of the diversity of the private sector and the levels of government involved at the federal, state and local level that directly impact Homeland Security.
• Fusion Centers hold the promise of supporting recommendations 1 thru 5 of the Information Sharing Task Force Recommendations if those Centers effectively integrate and involve the private sector as well as provide them with information.
• There is no one operating model or common language for Fusion Centers. Each appears to have established its own model based on State direction and implementation plans. Some appear to be State based organizations, while others appear to operate on a regional basis. In addition, they each use their own words or acronyms creating confusion with the members of the private sector that would like to interface with them. There was at least one case where a regional entity, that identified itself as a Fusion Center, wanted to charge private sector members a fee for being a member of the Center.
• The requirements and thus the model for sharing information with large or multi-state businesses is most likely different than the model for sharing with smaller, locally based businesses.
• Infrastructure Protection efforts only affect a small portion of the private sector. The result is that while interested in information protection, the private sector continues to be focused on information sharing so that it can support Homeland Security and should there be an event that requires action, be tied into the circumstance and be ready to respond as necessary.

Recommendations:

1. The Department should continue its efforts on the first five recommendations from the Information Sharing Task Force Report of August 2005. Recommendations six and seven are essentially complete. (see attached list of recommendations)
2. Relative to Fusion Centers, the Department should lead the development of a common framework that will simplify and centralize both the Government and Industry roles relative to information sharing. The following elements should be included:
   a. Structure and information processes
   b. Minimum standards for fusion center “franchise” operations
   c. Common Fusion Center “branding” and media plan to get the word out about Fusion Centers
   d. Standardize terminology on names and process for fusion centers
   e. Information Network for sharing information
   f. Relative to the private sector, focus on what they need both in terms of information and tools.
3. The Department should use the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and Trade Association/Industry groups to help get the word out about Fusion Centers and their capabilities.
4. Recognize that like most Information Sharing actions, Fusion Centers will have to consider the best way to interface with the Private Sector. Consistent with Recommendation #2 of the Information Sharing Task Force Report, Fusion Centers should use a tiered approach for information sharing based on the size of the private sector entity.
5. Fusion Centers should work with the private sector to determine how best to interface with company Chief Security Officers. This should include how to interface with and utilize personnel who serve on Sector Coordinating Councils. A key consideration for
Fusion Centers is whether or not the Sector Coordinating Council structure is the best structure and if so, how it can be improved.

6. The Department should implement a pilot project focusing on the requirements process for private sector (much like the I&A effort currently underway with five State Fusion Centers focusing on state and local requirements).

7. The Department should consider how to use seized property as a way to help fund Fusion Centers rather than from the general fund.

8. In order to take full advantage of the Fusion Center capabilities including data analysis tool, information sharing, and private sector information protection, the Department needs to ensure that capabilities like the Safety Act and Protected Critical Infrastructure Information legislation are used so that private sector participation is not impeded by those who would use FOIA to garner sensitive but not yet classified information.

The PVTSAC remains committed to helping the Secretary and the Department as we continue to work to keep our nation secure. We look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Herb Kelleher
Chairman
PVTSAC

Rick Stephens
Vice Chairman
PVTSAC
Dear Judge Webster,

On September 26, 2007, the Homeland Security Advisory Council’s State and Local Officials Senior Advisory Committee (SLSAC) met in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. We were privileged to hear from both former Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating and former Oklahoma City Assistant Fire Chief Jon Hansen regarding the act of homegrown terrorism that took place on April 19, 1995, at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building.

Additionally, the SLSAC members received briefings and discussed the following issues: (1) REAL ID; (2) State, local, and tribal requirements-based information sharing; (3) State and local fusion centers and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) support of them.

As the product of our briefings and discussions, the SLSAC submits to you the following eight (8) recommendations for Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) consideration and subsequent submission to Secretary Chertoff.

1. REAL ID Findings and Recommendations

REAL ID is a 9/11 Commission recommendation that establishes federal minimum standards to secure the issuance of driver’s licenses and state identification cards.

- **FINDING**: REAL ID is not a national identification card. Driver’s licenses and state identification cards will remain State-issued.

- **FINDING**: REAL ID does not create a national database. Additionally, the Federal government will have no greater access to information than it already does under existing laws.
• **FINDING:** REAL ID is supported by the Fraternal Order of Police.

• **FINDING:** REAL ID is supported by the Drug Free America Foundation as a way to “add teeth” to enforcement of the Combat Meth Act of 2005.

• **FINDING:** REAL ID is supported by the American public. 82% of respondents in a September poll by Public Opinion Strategies agreed with creation of national standards to secure license issuance.

• **RECOMMENDATION 1:** That the Nation move forward with the implementation of REAL ID by all 50 States and six territories as an effective tool in combating terrorism, improving public safety, reducing and significantly minimizing identity theft.

• **RECOMMENDATION 2:** That Congress provide states with appropriate funding to support the implementation of REAL ID.

• **RECOMMENDATION 3:** That DHS immediately release its “retooled” guidelines creating the REAL ID licenses.

• **RECOMMENDATION 4:** That Congress, States (executives and legislatures), and DHS continue to work together to assure the timely implementation and long-term sustainment of REAL ID.

2. Information Sharing/Fusion Center Findings and Recommendations

SLSAC members were very pleased to learn about the “Five State (New York, Massachusetts, Florida, Illinois, and California) Fusion Center Pilot Project” and the fact that it is focused on DHS providing homeland security intelligence and information reporting based on the specific homeland security information requirements of state, local, and tribal authorities. SLSAC members (and the HSAC) have repeatedly advocated for “requirements based” reporting standards and are encouraged to see movement in that direction.

• **FINDING:** Requirements-based reporting will allow state, local, and tribal authorities to ask the questions (share their specific homeland security requirements) with DHS and then have DHS respond to them consistent with the intelligence cycle. It will also provide an objective, “customer-based,” metric of the quality of the Department’s information sharing efforts and provide for the continuous improvement of its information sharing operations.

• **RECOMMENDATION 5:** Replicate as quickly as possible the “Five State (New York, Massachusetts, Florida, Illinois, and California) Fusion Center Pilot Project” and increase the ability for all state fusion centers to submit and continuously update at least their top-ten intelligence and Homeland Security information requirements to DHS for timely tasking, collection, analysis, and actionable response.
• RECOMMENDATION 6: Under Secretary Allen should emphasize to his team that it is essential – a national priority – to continuously improve relationships with state, local, and tribal authorities. We believe the paradigm shift from DHS initiative reporting to one of requirements – allowing us the (state and locals) to “ask questions” – is an empowering advancement in that direction that will benefit the entire nation.

• RECOMMENDATION 7: DHS representatives assigned to state and local fusion centers be the collection managers for the state’s specific homeland security requirements and that they (like the Department) be held principally accountable to produce quality Homeland Security related Intelligence and Information products.

  o In states where there is no DHS Representative currently assigned, that one be promptly assigned to them from the Department’s Fusion Center Program Office.

• RECOMMENDATION 8: DHS should immediately provide simultaneous/concurrent Homeland Security intelligence and information products at the “write for release”/unclassified level for cleared state, local, and tribal authorities when SECRET documents are distributed. This will assure maximum distribution of homeland security intelligence and information reporting to both the public and “troops in the field.”

• RECOMMENDATION 9: State legislatures should be better informed about state fusion center operations and the Federal Government programs that support them. We also recommend that those state legislatures that currently do not fund their fusion centers consider doing so to assure their operational continuity within states, localities, and regions.

  o Each state legislature should appoint legislative leaders to work with their governor on Homeland Security matters, including establishing sustained support/funding for fusion centers.

The SLSAC is committed to advocating and providing the HSAC and the Secretary the realities from outside the Beltway. We remain committed to work together to make our nation safer, stronger and better prepared.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Don Knabe
Supervisor, Los Angeles County
Chair, State and Local Officials Senior Advisory Committee
Homeland Security Advisory Council