

Carter, DVM, PhD, DACVM, Wayne

Page 1 of 1

WD0494

From: Wayne Carter [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 22, 2008 1:02 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF Support for Kansas

1|24.4 Dear NBAF Program Manager,
I am writing you to express my strong support for the Kansas NBAF Proposal. I am actively involved in research and development in the animal nutrition area and work extensively with Kansas State University and the University of Kansas in many aspects of biomedical research and biosciences. Bioscience research in Kansas is growing exponentially and bringing in new industry and research collaborators every day. We are in the heartland of the United States and expressly interested in ensuring the safety of our food supply and maintaining our growing agricultural economy.

Please appreciate the broad-based support in Kansas for this proposal and please appreciate that we will ensure NBAF is successful in its mission.

Regards,
Wayne

[Wayne O. Carter, DVM, PhD, DACVM](#) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

This communication, including any/all attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipient and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any review, reliance or distribution by others or forwarding without express permission is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender and delete all copies.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Casey, Sarah

Page 1 of 3

WD0850

From: [REDACTED]
 Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 8:47 PM
 To: NBAFProgramManager
 Cc: [REDACTED]
 Subject: Proposed Bio Lab in Butner, NC

To DHS:

My husband and I are in the process of building a house in [REDACTED] NC, and have learned, through copious amounts of "say NO to the Bio Lab" signs displayed in residents yards, of Butner's prospect of becoming home to the new Bio Lab.

After learning even more from your website, we are prepared to forfeit our down payment, and look for housing elsewhere, if this site is approved for the new location.

- 1) 2.0 We are former residents of Suffolk County, New York, and we have experienced first hand, the governments lack of "standard operating procedures" to ensure safety and redundancy. We have experienced first hand, the government's ability and willingness to cover up compromised safety situations, and their willingness to deny any knowledge that potential problems existed that could have prevented those compromised situations. As a former employee of Brookhaven National Laboratory, in Upton, NY, I have witnessed firsthand, on multiple occasions, the lack of so called high security. I do not think the general public of Granville County can possibly appreciate the lack of procedures, and the lack of commitment to adhere to procedures 24 hours a day, unless they have worked at a government facility that poses such "potential" threats to the general public. I absolutely do not and will not intentionally raise my children downwind of the incinerator stacks that blow hazardous waste into the air around the clock. If the facility is being erected to study and learn about air born viruses that can spread from animal to human, then out of self admittance to the need to study and learn about them, how can you assure the public that you know enough about them to ensure proper disposal of contaminated materials? Residents of Suffolk County, NY were promised the same, yet 20 years into operation, there was a sudden call to test and shut down water supply areas that affected the Mastic and Mastic Beach Area of Long Island, due to high levels of contaminants in the water from Brookhaven Lab that were supposedly disposed of safely.
- 2) 18.3 Plum Island and Brookhaven Lab have buildings in total disrepair, once state of the art facilities, now in need of serious updating. But where is the funding to do so? It never gets appropriated, or if it does, it never makes it to the intended troubled spot. And if it is handed over to the private sector, we are now talking about a group of stockholders whose main interest is the bottom line. I cannot see safety being a priority over profits if privately held, as it is the very nature of safety and profits to be in direct conflict at all times. I think we have seen quite enough of how that plays out. Our privately held airlines are the least safe in the world, with poorer countries running safer flights. We have also seen how our government "strictly oversees" privately held management companies of National interest (Private Security forces in Iraq?)
- 3) 2.0 You cannot promise ensured continued safety, funding for maintenance, training, etc. indefinitely into the future, when such things are very much dependent on the current political makeup in Washington that will be voting for/against it. Unless of course, you have a crystal ball of who will run our three branches of government in the future. I do not have much faith in the
- 4) 5.1
- 5) 15.3
- 6) 2.0
- 7) 2.0

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentors statement. Chapter 2 of the NBAF EIS addresses safety and the redundancy of critical operational systems. Sections 3.8, 3.14, Appendices B, D, and E of the NBAF EIS present a detailed assessment of the risk posed from an NBAF accident.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 18.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. As discussed in Section 3.13.2.2 of the NBAF, incineration is only one of several technologies being considered for the disposal of animal carcasses and pathological wastes. Table 3.13.2-4 summarizes and compares three of the technologies (i.e., incineration, rendering, and alkaline hydrolysis) being considered. As discussed in this section, the final design for the NBAF will probably include more than one technology for the treatment of these wastes. Because the method of carcass and pathological waste disposal has not yet been determined, Section 3.4 of the EIS (Air Quality) assumed that incineration, the treatment technology with the greatest potential to negatively impact air quality, will be used in order to assess the maximum adverse effect. Similarly, because alkaline hydrolysis would have the greatest impact on sanitary sewage capacity, the evaluation in Section 3.3 (Sanitary Sewage) assumed that alkaline hydrolysis is used for carcass disposal.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Disposal and decontamination (killing or inactivation of bacteria and fungi and viruses, respectively) procedures have a long and proven history of effectiveness when facilities are well maintained and procedures followed. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art biocontainment features and operating procedures to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, identifies the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences; this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. Section 3.13 of the NBAF EIS describes the processes that would be used to control and dispose of liquid and solid waste from the NBAF and Sections 3.3 and 3.7 of the NBAF EIS describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential effects of spills and runoff. Since the method of carcass disposal has not yet been determined, the effects of both alkaline hydrolysis and incineration were included in the analysis presented in Section 3.13 of the NBAF EIS. Incineration has the potential to affect air quality, so the evaluation in Section 3.4 (Air Quality) assumed only incineration would be used to assess the greatest adverse effect. Alkaline hydrolysis would have the greatest effect on sanitary sewage capacity, Section 3.3, so the sanitary sewage effects were determined using this method.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding facility maintenance ensuring safe operations. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety

and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. DHS would maintain the NBAF and ancillary facilities in compliance with applicable environmental, safety, and health requirements and provide adequate funding for safe operation and maintenance. With regard to PIADC, it is over 50 years old, nearing the end of its intended lifecycle and is becoming more costly to maintain. However, in addition to proposing to construct and operate the NBAF, DHS is currently investing money to improve and upgrade the laboratory facilities at PIADC.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding safe facility operations. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. In addition, a site-specific emergency response plan will be developed and coordinated with the local Emergency Management Plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns about long-term funding for NBAF to ensure safe operations. The U.S. Congress and the President are responsible for determining funding priorities for government programs. DHS spends funds in accordance with congressional intent. DHS would maintain the NBAF and ancillary facilities in compliance with applicable environmental, safety, and health requirements and provide for safe operation and maintenance.

Comment No: 7 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes commentor's concern that NBAF employment practices include proper pre-employment screening and ongoing employee training. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC). With regard to employee training, Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, discusses the requirement that all laboratory staff would receive pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics.

Casey, Sarah

Page 2 of 3

WD0850

cont.) 7| 2.0 training and background checks for the proposed employees of the facility either. Employed as General Schedule Employees, we all know that it practically takes an act of Congress to fire an employee that is not performing the job, or worse yet, compromising the safety of the facility to the public. We also know that a large percentage of GS employees obtain their positions because of points they, or their parent or spouse have accumulated through service for their country, NOT because they are the best qualified applicant. A protocol that I am in support of when the general public safety is not at risk. In this case, the general public safety is very much at risk, so I would want some type of guarantee that the best, most experienced candidate will be getting the positions, regardless of whether or not they have served their country.

8| 19.3
9| 19.1
10| 19.3,2.0,21.3
11| 2.0
As for overall safety, I don't think you will ever convince the general public that our government has a handle on it. There have been seven "known of" accidents at Plum Island, where viruses "escaped" their redundantly safe Lab. Had those accidents happened on the mainland, it would have been catastrophic. In fact, it would have only taken one accident. If one accident...just one, occurs at Butner, and if that accident involves viruses that are infectious to humans, I would like to know how Homeland Security would intend to handle the situation and confine it from the 1.25 million people who live close by? Memories of Katrina rattle my confidence, as even today, my parents are still down there helping to rebuild with help only from charities and churches. If an accident occurs at this facility, will anything actually be done to contain it, or will we just waste millions of tax payers dollars holding congressional hearing and investigations to try and find a person or department to place the blame, all of course to no avail, because all parties involved will refuse to answer the questions?

12| 5.1
13| 21.3
I am not a scientist of any type, nor am I an elegant writer as you all can now attest to, but I am a tax paying citizen - an honest one at that as I believe in taxes - and I am tired, exhausted actually, of my government going off half cocked without good information, and without the support of its people. Need you be reminded that you are in fact the tax payers employees? I cannot imagine that any citizen in this country, Butner, NC or elsewhere, be in support of such a facility erected on the mainland. Especially when you have so many isolated islands at your disposal. And why Butner? Butner and Creedmore are quickly becoming suburbs of Raleigh's densely populated Triangle area. Even in a failed housing market, houses, schools and roads are being built to accommodate the rapidly growing population of the area. An "accident" here, just from the population alone, would be very hard to contain and potentially catastrophic.

I have lived in four other countries in this world, and traveled to many as the daughter of an airline pilot, and for all my likes of other cultures, I have always been glad and proud to call the US my country. I have held my family's service to this country in high regard. I have voted in local, state and national elections, and have driven people to the polls because of the importance I place on the privilege. And unfortunately, over the past two terms of this administration, I feel I have witnessed a catastrophic failure in leadership, morality, consideration for the welfare of the general public, and overall trust between this country's government and its citizens. It has been heartbreaking to say the least, and leaves me to believe that this letter of comment will probably only induce a sarcastic chuckle of disregard. Still, I have an obligation to my children and forefathers to express my opinion.

14| 5.0
15| 5.1
Sadly, I would not be at all surprised if we found out in the future that this facility move to the mainland didn't somehow put money in the pockets of this administration. Hopefully I am incorrect, but I really cannot see any other reason to build such a facility in and around heavily populated areas. I read the DHS's reasons for picking the proposed sights, and they seem rather shallow and unfounded to me. Plum Island has never had a problem paying highly qualified scientist to employ there, so having a formidable workforce nearby is ridiculous. Not to mention that students (as mentioned in the papers) of the Bio tech field, are not what I would call an

Comment No: 8 Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes commentor's concern that the NBAF will be staffed with the appropriate personnel to safely and efficiently operate the NBAF. DHS and USDA have minimum standard qualifications for technical personnel and require stringent training in laboratory safety. In addition to the scientific and administrative staff of the laboratory, the proposed NBAF would employ technicians, veterinary staff, building engineers and security. All laboratory staff would have thorough training in handling hazardous infectious agents, understanding primary and secondary biocontainment functions of standard and special practices, and an understanding of biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Laboratory staff would be supervised by trained and experienced scientists. The NBAF safety and biosafety staff would review and approve of proposed protocols and SOPs for the laboratory prior to use. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS. Laboratory staff working in the proposed NBAF would use the standards and procedures recommended for all institutions engaged in biological research.

Comment No: 9 Issue Code: 19.1

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. As examined in Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Since 1954, there has been one accidental release of FMD from biocontainment (but not off Plum Island) and that occurred in 1978 when some cattle that were maintained by the research facility in outdoor confinements became infected. This release did not spread from the island. In addition, there have been five incidences involving a compromise of biocontainment, however, no pathogens were released. DHS is aware of the historic biosafety lapses at PIADC and will consider these events to improve the structural and engineered safety of the final NBAF design and to incorporate lessons learned from incidents of human error into the operating procedures. Appendix B of the NBAF EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 10 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the impact of an accident on the local population, businesses and infrastructure. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. The chances of an accidental release are low. Although some accidents are

more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. Also, see responses to comment Nos. 7,8 and 9.

Comment No: 11 Issue Code: 2.0

In the event of an accident at the NBAF, DHS would follow site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans developed prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 12 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 13 Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the impact of a pathogen release on the local population. Also, see responses to comment Nos. 7,8,9, and 10.

Comment No: 14 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. As described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's site selection criteria included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or semi-urban areas. Nevertheless, it has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

Comment No: 15 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's opinion.

Casey, Sarah

Page 3 of 3

WD0850

- 16| 15.3.8.3 | experienced workforce. Having the power and water supply already in place to build and
 17| 19.3 | maintain the site, seems to me to be again, an issue of money, rather than safety. And erecting in
 18| 25.3 | the town of Butner, nestled within a growing population of 1.25 million people located 20 miles
 or less from the site, seems anything but well thought through.
 Well, I could ramble my frustration forever, but I think you get the gist of my lack of support for
 this. I await news of the decision, to see if we will abandon or new construction. I hope Butner is
 not chosen, as I was looking forward to raising my children in [REDACTED]
 Sincerely,
 A concerned future resident!

Comment No: 16 Issue Code: 8.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS held a competitive process to select potential sites for the proposed NBAF as described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. A team of federal employees representing multi-department component offices and multi-governmental agencies (i.e., DHS, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Department of Health and Human Services) reviewed the submissions based primarily on environmental suitability and proximity to research capabilities, proximity to workforce, acquisition/construction/operations, and community acceptance. Ultimately, DHS identified five site alternatives that surpassed others in meeting the evaluation criteria and DHS preferences, and determined that they, in addition to the Plum Island Site, would be evaluated in the EIS as alternatives for the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 17 Issue Code: 19.3


DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative. Also, see response to Comment No. 14.

Comment No: 18 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Cecil, J. Harley and Jo Ann

Page 1 of 2



MD0096
J. Harley Cecil

US Department of Homeland Security
Science & Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100, 245 Murray Lane SW, Bldg 410
Washington, D. C. 20258

Dear Decision-Makers at Homeland Security:

1 | 5.1 I am writing to you in regard to your proposal to move the tragedies
of Plum Island to a location on the mainland. I certainly hope you will
2 | 5.0 consider the dangerous problems of Plum Island and will not move the
problems ANYWHERE close to people.

3 | 13.3 If you should choose to build the lab on the proposed site at Butner,
N. C., the lab will be close to our human and animal populations and
several surrounding water supplies: Falls Lake, the water supply for the
4 | 12.3 near-by capital city of Raleigh, N. C. ; Lake Michie, which supplies the
Durham, N. C. community; Holt Lake the water supply for Creedmoor,
N. C. and Butner, N. C.

5 | 15.3 Lake Holt is not just the water supply for the private residential
community. Additionally, it is the water supply for more than 6,000
institutionalized persons with special needs in SEVEN different State
and Federal Institutions in our immediate South Granville County area.

The institutions serve helpless people who are mentally retarded and
mentally ill, as well as more able persons who live together in prisons,
State and Federal. None of these institutionalized people will be able to
control or escape their circumstances in case of a disaster.

I worked 30 years at Murdoch Center, a State institution for persons
with mental and physical handicaps. Many of the residents there are in
wheelchairs and some are completely bedridden. I am well aware of

Telephones _____ E-Mail _____

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. DHS held a competitive process to select potential sites for the proposed NBAF as described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. A team of federal employees representing multi-department component offices and multi-governmental agencies (i.e., DHS, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Department of Health and Human Services) reviewed the submissions based primarily on environmental suitability and proximity to research capabilities, proximity to workforce, acquisition/construction/operations, and community acceptance. Ultimately, DHS identified five site alternatives that surpassed others in meeting the evaluation criteria and DHS preferences, and determined it has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas and in areas with abundant wildlife. State-of-the-art biocontainment facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF that they, in addition to the Plum Island Site, would be evaluated in the EIS as alternatives for the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 13.3

DHS notes the commentators concern regarding the presence of human and wildlife populations in the vicinity of the Umstead Research Farm Site. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. DHS would have site-specific Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. The potential impacts of an accidental release on wildlife are addressed in Section 3.8.9. Although the NBAF EIS acknowledges the potential for significant impacts on wildlife in the event of an accidental release, the risk of such a release is extremely low (see Section 3.14). Furthermore, the purpose of NBAF is to combat diseases that could have significant effects on wildlife. Research at the NBAF would include the development of vaccines for wildlife that could prevent adverse impacts from a foreign introduction.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentator's concerns regarding possible impact to the area's water resources. The NBAF will be operated in accordance with the applicable protocols and regulations pertaining to hazardous materials handling, spill prevention, and hazardous waste management. Section 3.13.8 of the NBAF EIS describes the waste management processes that would be used to control and

dispose of NBAF's liquid and solid waste at the Umstead Farm Research Site and Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spills and runoff affects.

Comment No: 5

Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS is aware of the presence of the health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are well aware of the proposed action. Once the ROD has been signed and prior to the initiation of NBAF operations, a site-specific emergency management plan will be developed that will be coordinated with the local emergency response agencies and will include contingency plans for potentially affected residents and institutions. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the possible economic effect would be significant for all sites. The potential economic effects of an accidental release at the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative are discussed in Section 3.10.9.5 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. The number of jobs and labor income that would be directly and indirectly created by NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site are discussed in Section 3.10.7 of the NBAF EIS.

Cecil, J. Harley and Jo Ann

Page 2 of 2

MD0096

5 cont. | 15.3
6 | 21.1
5 cont. | 15.3
7 | 6.3
5 cont. | 15.3
8 | 5.3
2 cont. | 5.0

their helplessness, even in everyday happenings. There is no way they could escape the circumstances, in case of a disaster in the lab. For our community, I cringe to think about Plum Island's water supply being sabotaged by striking maintenance workers in 2003; or, any kind of accident happening. And accidents do happen!!

Two of Butner's seven institutions are within 1 mile of Butner's proposed project for the lab; three are within 2 miles; and two are within 3 miles.

It is our understanding that the proposed project will add 250 jobs, with an average yearly salary of \$51,000, to the community. This hardly offsets the inherit danger of a plant that could be detrimental to those of us living in the communities of Butner, Raleigh, Creedmoor, Durham and Oxford, North Carolina.

If community acceptance is a requirement for the site you choose, then Butner is certainly not a very good candidate. Throughout our communities, there are strong negative feelings about the proposed lab being located here. Many residents in the communities have "NO BIO LAB" signs in their front yards.

At two community meetings, in regard to the lab possibly coming to Butner, there were outbursts of applause as speakers expressed their concern about the lab being built in South Granville County. When attendees were given an opportunity to speak, none spoke in favor of the lab coming to Butner. At one of the gatherings, a crippled ex-marine hobbled to where the gathering could see him and said, "Why can't you put this thing out in a desert somewhere?" He got a BIG applause!!!

I urge you not to build this proposed lab anywhere on the proposed mainland locations, where human lives can be threatened.

Sincerely yours,


J. Harley Cecil

August 20, 2008

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 21.1

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding a criminal action perpetrated by an NBAF employee. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics.

Comment No: 7 Issue Code: 6.3

DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

Comment No: 8 Issue Code: 5.3

DHS notes the commentor's statement. Several factors will affect the decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where. The EIS itself will not be the sole deciding factor. The decision will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS and support documents; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable Federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the Federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment. The Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, with other Department officials, will consider the factors identified above in making final decisions regarding the NBAF. A Record of Decision (ROD) that explains the final decisions will be made available no sooner than 30 days after the NBAF Final EIS is published.

Chapman, April

Page 1 of 1

WD0372

From: info@athensfaq.org on behalf of April Chapman [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 4:34 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF in Athens, Georgia

Dear Sirs...By reading and researching at the UGA library, I found that there had been small outbreaks of mad cow disease in humans or variant CJD in the USA and that Athens, Georgia was one of those locations...(also in Allentown,Penn., heartland of South Carolina,Nassau and Ulster county in New York.) I read about cover-ups in the USDA lab in Athens, Georgia and missing brain tissue from the ONE cow that the government would admit might have mad cow disease. The articles talked about secret firings of scientists and human error as early as 1979 here in Athens. Do I trust this idea of a mega facility when UGA and USDA can not control small labs? NO. Most of us who lived in Athens who are regular citizens and are not connected w/ the University of Georgia are shocked that this proposal has gotten this far. So many of us do not want this facility and for many good reasons. Our city council obviously answers to the University of Georgia. We the regular people of this town do not want your facility here. the University is getting too big for its britches....Thank you. April Chapman

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 2.0
DHS notes the commentor's concerns.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.2
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Charles, Patricia

Page 1 of 1

WD0255

From: Charles, Patricia [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, August 13, 2008 6:59 PM
To: nbafprogrammanager@dhs.gov
Subject: Plum Island

1|25.1; I do not support Plum Island being raised to a bio-safety level 4 facility. With the recent news of terrorists
 2|21.1; having information about this facility it places nearby residents at increased danger. Please reconsider
 1 cont. | this decision.

25.1 Patricia Charles
 [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.1

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the risk of a potential accident or terrorist event. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. As described in Chapter 3 and summarized in Section 2.5 of the NBAF EIS, the impacts of activities during normal operations at any of the six site alternatives would likely be minor. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Appendix B to the NBAF EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections in the United States and world-wide. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS, addresses accident scenarios, including external events such as a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only) (TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process. Security would be provided by a series of fencing, security cameras, and protocols. In addition, a dedicated security force would be present on-site. Additional security could be provided via cooperation with local law enforcement agencies.

Chastain, Susannah

Page 1 of 1

WD0048

From: Susannah Chastain [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2008 5:16 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF

1|25.2 | Hello... I am writing this at 4:55 am, as I cannot quit thinking about NBAF and my home. I have three children, the oldest of whom is three; and I DO NOT want NBAF to be relocated to our home in Athens, Georgia.

2|5.0 | I have so many concerns and reasons why I feel this, but after reading the DHS report, I feel it is completely simple. The Plum Island site is the only one with an assigned "no or low overall risk rank." How can DHS justify putting this facility any other place? I've been to meetings and have read so many things regarding NBAF and am very irritated that we are even spending money looking for alternate sites. Why? Because the scientists don't prefer living on Plum Island? Is this the only reason to relocate?

1 cont. | PLease, please do not choose Athens, Georgia. Please do not choose any of the locations on the
 25.2; | mainland. The risk, however minuscule, is not worth it. Please have NBAF stay on PLum Island where
 3|25.2; | it belongs. (ON AN ISLAND!!)
 4|24.1

Thank you. Susannah Chastain

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 show that even though Plum Island has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites. The lower potential effect is due both to the water barrier around the island and the lack of livestock and suseptible wildlife species.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Chin, Edward

Page 1 of 1

WD0535

From: Edward Chin [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2008 11:13 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Athens, GA

August 25, 2008

TO: U.S. Department of Homeland Security

FROM: Edward Chin, [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Draft Environmental Impact Statement

- 1| 25.2 | I am strongly opposed to the establishment of a National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Athens, GA. I am a professor emeritus at the University of Georgia and have lived in Athens for almost 40 years. My reasons are simple and straightforward, and these are just a few.
- 2| 12.2 | (1) The area has been under drought conditions for several years, and water restrictions are still in force. Installation of a major research facility will add a further burden on an already limited resource.
- 3| 2.0 | (2) Officials will not provide details of "under the table giveaways to sweeten the pot." Ostensibly, this is not to let competitors provide matching "bribes," but I consider it as imposing commitments on the public without prior disclosure.
- 4| 21.2 | (3) The facility cannot help but upgrade Athens' potential as a site for terrorist attacks. This, we do not need.
- 5| 27.0 | (4) I have talked to several friends who are residents of Long Island where the current facility is located. It is disturbing to learn that the local communities there are delighted at the prospect of losing the facility.
- 6| 15.2 | I cannot help but note that the project is backed enthusiastically by politicians and business people, who will support any project to improve the economy, no matter the environmental costs and risks. In the area, home foreclosures and unemployment have resulted in over 7000 homes being on the market at the present, hence the support of politicians and builders. The project is also supported by the University of Georgia which is motivated by the possibility of giving their research scientists advantage in obtaining research funding. It is not likely that non-supportive faculty members would risk incurring the wrath of the university administration by expressing opposition to the project.

Thank you for the opportunity to offer comments.

Edward Chin

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.2


DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and DHS acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site alternative would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water, an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the state and local government's cost associated with constructing the NBAF. Funding for the design, construction, and operations for the NBAF will come from the Federal Government. Proposals for offsets to the site infrastructure (part of the construction costs) were requested by the Federal government. The decision as to what to offer (land donation, funding, other assets) is solely as the discretion of the consortium, state and local officials as part of the consortium bid site package. The amount of funding and how the funding is paid for (bonds, taxes, etc) is determined by the state and local government officials and not the decision of the Federal government.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the risk of a potential accident or terrorist event. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. As described in Chapter 3 and summarized in Section 2.5 of the NBAF EIS, the impacts of activities during normal operations at any of the six site alternatives would likely be minor. Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, and 3.14 (Health and Safety), and Appendices B, D, and E of the NBAF EIS, provide a detailed analysis of the consequences from an accidental or deliberate pathogen release. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS, addresses accident scenarios, including external events such as a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-



consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process. Security would be provided by a series of fencing, security cameras, and protocols. In addition, a dedicated security force would be present on-site. Additional security could be provided via cooperation with local law enforcement agencies.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 27.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 15.2

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Chumley, PhD, Forrest

Page 1 of 2

WD0561

From: ██████████ Forrest Chumley [chumley@edenspace.com]
Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2008 6:07 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Why I support NBAF in Kansas.

August 24, 2008

TO: Jamie Johnson, NBAF Program Manager

FROM: Forrest Chumley, VP for Crop Development, Edenspace Systems Corporation and
 Chairman of the Board, Kansas Wheat Alliance

SUBJECT: Why I support NBAF in Kansas.

Dear Mr. Johnson,

The time is approaching for DHS to make a final decision on where to locate the National Bio and Agro Defense Facility. As an active member of the ag sciences research and development community in Manhattan Kansas, I am writing to express my strong support for locating NBAF in our town. For the future safety and security of the American people and our nation's food supply, it is essential for NBAF to succeed in its mission. Here in Kansas, we offer the right combination of resources to ensure that NBAF will not falter. Our community is behind NBAF, including the many agricultural and biomedical scientists who live and work here, as well as average citizens who understand the NBAF mission and support it with their votes and tax dollars. People in Kansas, particularly in Manhattan where Kansas State University is located, understand the importance of agriculture and know the continuous improvement that must be achieved to insure a safe and abundant food supply. We also know the potential for new zoonotic diseases to appear or for agbioterrorism to deal a blow to the system that delivers the food, feed and fiber that are the base of our nation's economy. We will feel a great sense of pride knowing that our town and our state are contributing in new ways, welcoming and working alongside the talented NBAF staff who will come to Kansas. This kind of support seems to be unique among the various locations competing for NBAF, and we hope this is recognized by decision makers at DHS. I support NBAF in Kansas because this is the place where it will have the best opportunity to thrive and fulfill its mission. When December comes, I hope to hear the right decision has been made. Thank you for considering my thoughts and opinions.

Sincerely,

Forrest G. Chumley, Ph.D.

Vice President for Crop Development
 Edenspace Systems Corporation
 1500 Hayes Drive
 Manhattan KS 66502
 785-587-8200

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

1) 24.4

Chumley, PhD, Forrest

Page 2 of 2

WD0561

chumley@edenspace.com
www.edenspace.com

CONFIDENTIAL COMMUNICATION: This message contains confidential and privileged material, and is for the sole use of the intended recipient. Use or distribution by an unintended recipient is prohibited, and may be a violation of law. If you believe that you received this in error, please do not read it, reply to the sender, and confirm that you have deleted all copies. Thank you.

Church, Marion L Johnson

Page 1 of 1

WD0441

From: Marion Church [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 11:00 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF

1|24.3 | To All Concerned: Please register my SUPPORT OF NBAF in Butner, North Carolina. Thank you very much! Marion L. Johnson Church [REDACTED] North Carolina

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.3
DHS notes the commentor's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Clapp, Roger Clifford

Page 1 of 1

WD0738

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 2:12 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: FLORA, MISSISSIPPI ideal site for NBAF

To Whom It May Concern:

I am a husband of a professional, father of four professionals, retired Colonel USAFR, retired state trial court judge (Chancellor, 20th Chancery Court District of Mississippi), Eagle Scout and environmentalist at heart, serving on the Stewardship of Creation Committee and the Ecclesiastical Court for the Episcopal Diocese of Mississippi. As a veteran and former USAF Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer on the operations staff of The Adjutant General of Mississippi, I appreciate the daunting task faced by the Dept. of Homeland Security, and I stay moderately informed to current challenges through news media and my son, a career special agent in the US Coast Guard.

1|24.5

I consider the NBAF to be one of the most important facilities in our ongoing and increasingly vital war against terrorism. Its location in nearby FLORA, MISSISSIPPI would be ideal in every imaginable aspect, and I am totally and unequivocally in favor of the selection of the Flora vicinity for reasons of national security as well as local interests. If there is anything that I can do to sway a decision to locate the NBAF in Flora, Mississippi, I hope I will be quickly contacted and enlisted among the many enthusiastic supporters in this area.

Respectfully,
ROGER CLIFFORD CLAPP

[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.5
DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Clayton, J. Shane

Page 1 of 1

WD0333

From: Shane Clayton [shane@moresqft.com]
Sent: Monday, August 18, 2008 4:43 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Athens Site

1|24.2 | I am writing to say that I support that Athens site and prior obligations kept me from coming to
2|15.2 | speak for the site at the meeting last week. I feel that this will aid the athens Economy and be a
great boost for the area. Also, athens is perfect because of the short distance to the CDC and
many other research institutions.

J. Shane Clayton
Square Feet Real Estate
706-549-8871
shane@moresqft.com

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.2

DHS notes the commentor's support for the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 15.2

DHS notes the commentor's statement. The economic effects of the NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative are included in Section 3.10.3.

Clayton, Joann

Page 1 of 2

MD0021

August 10, 2008

U. S. Department of Homeland Security
 Science and Technology Directorate
 James V. Johnson
 Mail Stop # 2100
 245 Murray Lane
 SW Building 410
 Washington, D.C. 20528

Mr. James V. Johnson:

1| 5.0

After watching the United States Government Accountability Office Testimony and reading the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, I am convinced this High-Containment Biosafety Laboratory would be dangerous anywhere on the mainland. Foot and Mouth disease would ruin this country financially.

It concerns me that Homeland Security are blinded when it comes to all the facts that have been presented. Have you even read the GAO Report? It has been proven over and over that sometime in the future there will be an accident. You are suppose to be looking after the well being of all citizens and not the N. C. Consortium, who think they have all the answers and the most to gain, no matter what. During these troubled times we do not need more problems to deal with.

2| 25.3
 3| 12.3
 4| 20.3

I am totally against locating this lab at The Unsteady Research Farm Site in Bunter, N. C. It will be too close to streams and lakes that supplies drinking water to surrounding areas. Also, with the many institutions in the area and prisons, evacuation would be impossible.

5| 21.3
 6| 21.3

We have plenty of mosquitoes, as well, during wet seasons near The Umstead Research Farm Site that could spread viruses. There would have to be arial spraying, because of such a wide area to cover. Do we kill off all the deer and wildlife in the area to keep diseases from spreading? What provisions have been made in case of a plane crash or

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's watershed concerns. Section 3.13.8 of the NBAF EIS describes the NBAF's liquid and solid waste management assessment and available control and disposal options. Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 of the NBAF EIS describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spills and runoff effects.


Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 20.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. A site-specific emergency response plan will be developed and coordinated with the local emergency management plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 21.3

The DHS notes the commentor's concern with the risks associated with a pathogen release. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art biocontainment features and operating procedures to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, and 3.14 (Health and Safety), and Appendices B, D, and E of the NBAF EIS, provide a detailed analysis of the consequences from a accidental or deliberate pathogen release. Pathogen release scenarios include for example, an analysis of the potential consequences of Rift Vally Fever (RVF) virus becoming established in native mosquito populations. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. As described in Section 3.8.9.1 of the NBAF EIS, depopulation control measures could be undertaken given a worst-case scenario to prevent a widespread outbreak among wildlife and domestic livestock, should an accidental release of the foot and mouth disease virus occur. However, the RVF response plan would also include a mosquito control action plan. The potential consequences of pesticide use would be evaluated during the preparation of a site-specific response plan.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 21.3



DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the handling and transport of packages containing pathogens and the impacts associated with a transportation related pathogen release. The general regulations governing the required NBAF transport of packages containing pathogens, and a discussion of the low risk associated with the shipment of infectious materials is provided in Section 3.11.9 of the NBAF EIS. More detailed information on the regulatory requirements, packaging / handling procedures, documentation / labeling procedures, and notification requirements for the transport of pathogens is provided in Section 2.2.2.3 of the NBAF EIS. Additionally, an analysis of accidental releases during transportation is provided in the NBAF EIS under Section 3.14, Health and Safety. Information regarding the existing road conditions and potential effects to traffic and transportation from the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative is provided in Section 3.11.7 of the NBAF EIS.

Clayton, Joann

Page 2 of 2

MD0021



vehicle crash with the virus on board?

Taxpayers have the burden of keeping up such a lab, not to mention road construction, but have no say so or control of the lab site or what goes on in the compound.

7| 24.1

The only logical place for this lab is on Plum Island; N. Y. surrounded by water or not built at all. We do not want it in Butner, N. C.

Thank you,



Comment No: 7 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative and support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Cobb, Joni

Page 1 of 1

WD0344

From: joniccobb@gmail.com on behalf of joni cobb [jiccobb@ktecpipeline.com]
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 8:32 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: nbaf in Kansas

Dear Sir or Madam:

1|24.4 | I am writing in support of locating the new NBAF facility in Manhattan, Kansas. Kansas is
uniquely qualified to address the needs inherent in the efforts to protect our nation's food supply
and agriculture economy. We have for generations been pioneers in agriculture and have
leverages this open and innovative spirit to become leaders in food security, as well. As a Kansas
1 cont. | resident and entrepreneurial leader, I wholly support and endorse this effort in Kansas.
24.4 |

Best regards,

Joni Cobb

--

Joni Cobb
President
KTEC PIPELINE
www.ktecpipeline.com
913.219.1199 (direct)
913.307.0004 (office)

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Cobham Neighbor, Cobham Neighbor

Page 1 of 1

CD0904

From: kim [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 2:12 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager

1| 25.2

The DEIS clearly shows that the Athens, GA site is neither safe nor compatible from an environmental standpoint for the construction of NBAF.

Please do not act irresponsibly in the face of such overwhelming evidence. NBAF should not be in Athens.

We are strongly opposed to NBAF - please NO to NBAF in Athens!

Cobham Neighbor

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2
DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Cochran, Thad

Page 1 of 2

AUG. 4. 2008 3:11PM SENATOR WICKER NO. 8975 P. 8
MSD004

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

May 1, 2008

The Honorable Michael Chertoff
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
MS 3150
Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Secretary Chertoff:

We are writing to express our full support of the Gulf States Consortium's proposal to make Flora, Mississippi home to the Department of Homeland Security's proposed National Bio and Agro-defense Facility (NBAF). We believe that Mississippi and its citizens are well-prepared to host this important facility.

We understand our nation's pressing need to replace the aging Plum Island Animal Disease Center, upgrade the Department's bio-safety capabilities, further explore the threats these diseases could pose to humans, and establish external relationships with universities and other partners who can be beneficial to the mission of the Department.

The Gulf States Consortium offers nationally recognized expertise in related fields from several Mississippi universities, Iowa State University, and Tulane University. We intend to fully support these universities' efforts to work together to protect our nation's livestock and food supply from dangerous animal diseases.

The Consortium has also offered a competitive in-kind package of incentives to demonstrate its commitment to partnering with the Department to make this facility a reality. Likewise, we are committed to working with our colleagues in Congress to ensure that the Department's vision for NBAF is carried out to completion.

To date Congress has appropriated \$46 million to conduct the NBAF site selection process. The Department has indicated that it intends to announce the final site location of NBAF in October 2008. Considering the uncertainty that is likely within the federal government during the remainder of this Presidential election year, the significant delays that have already taken place in the NBAF site selection process, and given the importance of this state-of-the-art facility to our national security, we strongly urge you to ensure that a selection is made no later than October of this year. We would prefer to avoid any delay or redundancy in the selection process that might occur as a result of a new administration's transition into office.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the Senator's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 4.0

DHS notes the Senators' statement. The NBAF EIS was prepared to provide a thorough analysis of the aspects of NBAF construction and operations at the six site alternative locations. DHS conducted a thorough and open public outreach program in support of the NBAF EIS that exceeded minimum NEPA requirements. All comments received during the 60-day comment period, both oral and written, were given equal consideration in finalizing the NBAF EIS, regardless of how they were submitted. DHS's responses to those comments are included in this Comment Response Document. A record of decision that explains the final decisions will be made available no sooner than 30 days after the NBAF Final EIS is published.


Cochran, Thad


Page 2 of 2

AUG. 4. 2008 3:11PM SENATOR WICKER NO. 8975 P. 9
MSD004

Thank you for your attention to this matter. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we may be of any further assistance.

Sincerely,

 THAD COCHRAN United States Senator	 ROGER WICKER United States Senator
 CHARLES GRASSLEY United States Senator	 TOM HARKIN United States Senator
 MARY LANDRIEU United States Senator	 DAVID VITTER United States Senator



Coffee, Guy

Page 1 of 1

WD0389

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 1:48 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Opinion of a Kansas citizen on NBAF

1|25.4 | Dear Sir/Madam: As a long time citizen of Kansas living in Manhattan, KS, I strongly oppose this facility being built here.

Guy Coffee
[REDACTED]

Guy Coffee
[REDACTED]

Get ideas on sharing photos from people like you. Find new ways to share. [Get Ideas Here!](#)

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Cogliano, Franklin

Page 1 of 1

PD0021

July 22, 2008

11 25.1 | My name is Franklin Cogliano. I'm a resident of [REDACTED] New York, and I just wanted to state that I am against, and I do not want the BSL....the levels to increase at Plum Island.

So that was my comment.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Cohea, Terri

Page 1 of 1

WD0284

From: Cohea, Terri [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 15, 2008 11:28 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Flora Bio Lab

To Whom It May Concern:

- 1|24.5 I would like to thank you for the opportunity to express my feelings on bringing the bio lab to Flora, MS. My husband and I are really excited about the prospect of having a facility of that size and importance in our home town. My husband has lived in [REDACTED] for 40 years and I've lived here for 35 years so we love this town very much but we know that it needs a "shot in the arm" financially. This facility would bring much needed revenue into
- 2|15.5 Flora but it would also offer job opportunities for many people here and in the surrounding counties. I feel it would also bring some very positive feedback to the state of Mississippi and let the rest of the country sit up and take notice of how wonderful my state is.
- 3|21.5 We have no reservations at all about any dangers of living near the lab because we have been to all of the meetings and understand fully that there isn't a danger. Where the lab would be built is approximately 5 miles from our house and we would think no more about it being there than we would another grocery store or such.
- 1 cont. |
24.5 In closing I would really like to ask that Flora be closely considered for the placement of your lab because it would be very welcome and appreciated.

Warm Regards,

Terri Cohea
 Consumables Sales
 ACS Image Solutions

[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.5

DHS notes the commentor's statement. The economic effects of the NBAF at the Flora Industrial Park Site Site are discussed in Section 3.10.5 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the NBAF and understanding that the proposed research would be safely conducted at the Flora Industrial Park Site.

Cohen, Pete

Page 1 of 2

08-28-08 11:11 CLAFLIN BOOKS AND COPIES ID=7857761809 P.01

Clafin Books and Copies FD0024
 1814 Clafin Road
 Manhattan, KS 66502
 (785) 776-3771
 Fax (785) 776-1009

Cover Sheet.....	Free	FAX COVER SHEET
Within 785 Area Code.....	\$1.00	
Outside 785 Area Code.....	\$2.00	
All Following Pages (under 15).....	.99	

Company Name: Dept. of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate

Attention: James V. Johnson

Fax #: 1-866-508-6223

From: Pete Cohen  Lawson

Date: August 20, 2008 Total # of Pages Including This Page 2

Comments: _____



Cohen, Pete

Page 2 of 2

08-26-08 11:11 CLAFLIN BOOKS AND COPIES ID=7857761009 P.02
FD0024

[REDACTED] Kansas
August 19, 2008

To: Jay Cohen
Department of Homeland Security

Comment on the Environmental Impact
Statement re siting the proposed NBAF

Dear Mr. Cohen:

1|25.4; I'm writing from a county adjacent to Manhattan, Kansas, to oppose the siting
2|5.0 of the proposed NBAF particularly there, or elsewhere on the mainland.

3|21.4 During the pre-hearing hour at Manhattan I spoke one-to-one with a number
of the traveling scientists. They patiently told me about the processes and pathogens,
and all agreed there is a risk of pathogen escaping long before any vaccines or cures
can be developed. A lot of history agrees.

The question is the nature of the risk. Escaping pathogens need a host. To
congregate what are now exotic pathogens in an area that is widely and densely
populated with their chief victims seems to me irrational.

Not everyone seems to recognize the corollary risk of quarantine disruptions--
people barred from homes or work, the precautionary deaths of pets and years of
breeding, the over-taxing of personnel and equipment, the expanding of
quarantines where pathogens find the spreading easy.

The braggadocio at Kansas State University about how a research facility
"survived" a tornado that was low on the scale and missed by a quarter mile is
indicative of the immediate self-interest that can skew safety.

Human error doesn't occur just among operators. It can occur among
planners. And putting the NBAF amid our herds and winds would be a big one.
2 cont. | When playing with fire an island location seems worth the cost.
5.0

Sincerely,

Pete Cohen

fax: [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commenter's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.


Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commenter's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commenter's concerns regarding the impact of a pathogen release on the local population, livestock industry, businesses and infrastructure of the Manhattan, Kansas area. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. The chances of an accidental release are low. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Appendix B to the NBAF EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections in the United States and worldwide. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. The need for an evacuation in response to an accident is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

DHS notes the commenter's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind



pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period. In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado.

Coleman, Teresa

Page 1 of 3

WD0080

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2008 4:47 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Comments on NBAF location in Athens, Georgia
Attachments: nbaf.doc

Document attached. Thank you for your time and consideration.

Teresa R. Coleman
[REDACTED]

Coleman, Teresa

Page 2 of 3

WD0080

Re: Comments on National Bio-/Agro-Defense Facility-- Athens, Georgia site

To Whom It May Concern:

Thank you for this opportunity to share my opinion on the possible selection of the Athens, Georgia site for the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility. Contrary to comments made by some who are strongly in favor of this site, although I am opposed to this site selection I do feel I am educated on the important research that would be done at this facility and feel I am informed on the issues being discussed. However, for the following reasons, I am **strongly opposed** to this site for this facility:

- 1) This site is located in an area that is too close to very populated areas. With the UGA campus and numerous subdivisions, businesses, schools, etc., within a five mile radius, even if the risk is small for any outside contamination from this site, any risk is too large.
- 2) An additional risk to this area is that this site would become a target for terrorists. I am not an alarmist, but I am a realist. Bio-terrorism is talked about on a daily basis. With the number of foreign students and professors at the University of Georgia, a door is already open to bring terrorists to this area under the pretense of being students, researchers or educators. Also, we read about the possibility of inside terror cells in this country. This would be a possible target no matter where it is located, but Athens and the surrounding area is too populated to take this risk.
- 3) The environment is very much a concern. This property sits on the Middle Oconee River and is adjacent to the State Botanical Gardens. Considering this, why in the world would a lab facility of this nature even consider being located near either of these? I don't think there is a single positive response that could be given this question. This is a beautiful site and I can understand the interest of the site selection committee from an aesthetic point of view... but not for a facility of this size and nature.
- 4) The homes anywhere near this facility will immediately lose value. I have not talked to a single individual who would want to live anywhere near it. I am sure the employees of this facility would not mind living near it since they would be in the facility in their heavily contained suits everyday, but I don't think they would really want their children playing outside and feel comfortable they are breathing clean air, especially when it has been stated that all animals studied would be incinerated. That air has to go somewhere. Also, with the enormous amount of bugs and mosquitoes we have in this area and the possibilities of their being disease carriers, anything of this nature should just not be considered here.
- 5) As stated above, this is one of the most beautiful pastoral sites remaining in Athens. Why destroy it with this type facility? I realize something will be built on this site in the future. In my opinion, this is just not the appropriate type facility. The size and nature of this type facility is just not wanted by anyone except the researchers at UGA, the politicians and local business leaders who are trying to get economic growth for this area. That is their job and they have done a great job in promoting this site. Quite frankly, these people do not care what type facility is put here as long as they can achieve economic growth that will bring in more tax dollars by adding high paying jobs... not to mention political favor from the other powers that be. Also I believe the researchers at UGA would like to have this facility here in order to bring in the recognition they are wanting to fill their already inflated egos.... along with some pretty amazing grant funds. These same researchers and deans will move on to other areas

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding safe facility operations. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the risk of a potential accident or terrorist event. As described in Chapter 3 and summarized in Section 2.5 of the NBAF EIS, the impacts of activities during normal operations at any of the six site alternatives would likely be minor. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. %Appendix B to the NBAF EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections in the United States and worldwide. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS, addresses accident scenarios, including external events such as a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process. Security would be provided by a series of fencing, security cameras, and protocols. In addition, a dedicated security force would be present on-site. Additional security could be provided via cooperation with local law enforcement agencies.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 7.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the visual effects of the NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue Site, which are described in Section 3.2.3 of the NBAF EIS. DHS recognizes that the NBAF would be a distinctive visible feature and would alter the viewshed of the area.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 15.2

A discussion of the effects of the NBAF on property values is included in Section 3.10 of the NBAF EIS, which concluded that there is no empirical evidence that a facility such as the NBAF would reduce property values in the study area. As discussed for the South Milledge Avenue Site in Section 3.10.3.3, the housing market would be able to meet the increase in housing demand (326 employees in total), relative to the estimated growth of the existing population between 2007 and 2012 (13,663). It is possible that with the relocation of highly skilled workers to the immediate area, property values could increase due to an increase in demand.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 9.2


The potential effects of NBAF operations on air quality are discussed in Section 3.4 of the NBAF EIS and includes the potential effects from incineration. Site-specific effects at the South Milledge Avenue Site are discussed in Section 3.4.3. Carcass/pathological waste disposal, including incineration, is discussed in Section 3.13. Conservative assumptions were used to ensure the probable maximum effects were evaluated. Once the final design is determined, a more refined air emissions model will be used during the permitting process. The final design will ensure that the NBAF %does not significantly affect% the region's ability to meet air quality standards.

Comment No: 7 Issue Code: 18.2

Because the method of carcass disposal has not yet been determined, the effects of alkaline hydrolysis, rendering, and incineration were included in the NBAF EIS (see Section 3.13 for a description of the methods). Incineration has the potential to affect air quality, so the evaluation in Section 3.4 (Air Quality) assumed only incineration would be used to assess the greatest adverse effect. Alkaline hydrolysis would have the greatest effect on sanitary sewage capacity, as discussed in Section 3.3, so the sanitary sewage effects were determined using this method.

Comment No: 8 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding an accidental release of a vector, such as a mosquito, from the NBAF. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts each of which has the potential to release a vector. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release of a vector are low. An analysis of potential consequences of a pathogen (e.g. Rift Valley fever [RVF] virus) becoming established in native mosquito populations was evaluated in Section 3.8.9 and Section 3.10.9 as well as in Section 3.14 (health and Safety) of the NBAF EIS. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. The RVF response plan would also include a mosquito control action plan. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be



conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.

Comment No: 9 Issue Code: 15.2

DHS notes the commenter's concern. In Section 3.10, the NBAF EIS evaluates only the foreseeable economic effects of the proposed action. Secondary economic growth could occur but can not be predicted.

Coleman, Teresa

Page 3 of 3

WD0080

as soon as the next president is in the seat at UGA. Others of us will remain in this area the rest of our lives.

In closing, I am a realtor and work in commercial real estate. I drive by this location daily. I am totally in favor of smart growth. However, I think growth in any community should not only be about the economic benefit to the community. Safety, environment, water issues, traffic congestion are all matters to be considered. I am not against the nature of this facility. I just do not think this facility, in this area, is good, smart growth. In considering all of the sites you have selected as a possible location for this facility, I have to believe one of them is much more appropriate than the Athens site. Again, thank you for this opportunity to share my concerns on this matter.

10| 19.2
11| 12.2
12| 17.2
13| 5.0

Sincerely,

Teresa R. Coleman

Comment No: 10 Issue Code: 19.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The NBAF EIS was prepared to provide a thorough analysis of the aspects of NBAF construction and operations at the six alternative sites. The potential impacts of NBAF operations on environmental resources, health and safety, and on local transportation are discussed in Chapter 3 of the NBAF EIS. The discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14.

Comment No: 11 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the proposed water use and existing water supply. Section 3.3 includes an evaluation of infrastructure including potable water, and Section 3.7 includes an evaluation of water resources.

Comment No: 12 Issue Code: 17.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern. A discussion of existing road conditions and potential effects to traffic and transportation from the operation of the NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative, to include planned improvements to the primary corridors serving the NBAF, is provided in Section 3.11.3 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 13 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Colgan, D.V.M., M.S.M., Marilyn

Page 1 of 1

WD0756

From: Marilyn Colgan [Marilyn_Colgan@HILLSPET.com]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 3:17 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF
Importance: High

1| 24.4

I would like to express my support of the National Bio and Agro-defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas. As a veterinarian and livestock producer, I believe that Kansas is uniquely qualified to conduct this research because of our long-standing expertise in human and veterinary medicine and the biosciences.

Marilyn Colgan

Marilyn A. Colgan, DVM, MSM Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc. | Veterinary Development Manager
P.O. Box 148 | Topeka, KS 66601-0148 | 📞: 785.286.8633 or 785.368.5443 | 📠: 785.286.8010 or 785.368.5263 | ✉️:
marilyn_colgan@hillspet.com

This communication, including any/all attachments, is for the sole use of the intended recipient and may contain confidential and/or privileged information. Any review, reliance or distribution by others or forwarding without express permission is strictly prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender and delete all copies.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Colley, Dan

Page 1 of 2

WD0303

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, August 16, 2008 1:32 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Cc: Dan & Mary Colley
Subject: Comments concerning the South Milledge Avenue site, Athens/Clarke County, Georgia

Comments:

I am an Athens/Clarke County resident. I have lived here for over 6 years and I am employed by the University of Georgia. I was previously employed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia, and before that by the Veterans Administration Medical Center and Vanderbilt University School of Medicine in Nashville, Tennessee. I am an immunologist with 40 years of experience working with BSL-2 pathogens, primarily various protozoans and helminths, and some bacteria.

1|24.2 | I am writing in support of the South Milledge Avenue site for the proposed siting of NBAF. I believe that this site is entirely suitable and has many advantages over the other proposed sites. While I am, as all citizens should be, strong in my concern that NBAF be constructed and run properly and with extreme due diligence, I believe that will be the case, as it is already with those federal health-related facilities with which I am familiar (CDC, USDA, NIH facilities). I believe the EIS demonstrates that this is the current approach.

Athens/Clarke County already house some critical facilities that pave the way for NBAF, such as UGA's College of Veterinary Medicine BSL-3AG unit, with several BSL-3 units also in place, and the Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory of USDA. My own unit, the Center for Tropical and Emerging Global Diseases, deals primarily with parasite pathogens and will not directly benefit from or contribute to NBAF. However, this unit and all others in the biomedical sciences at UGA will provide an excellent atmosphere for those who will be working at NBAF. The collegiality that can develop between federal and local units is something that I have experienced previously both in Nashville (VAMC & Vanderbilt) and Atlanta (CDC & Emory).

Most of the opposition against NBAF has stemmed from misinformation and misunderstanding. At the recent Public Meetings (14 August 2008) much was said about water usage by NBAF. This is a specious argument, in that Athens is in the midst of building multiple apartment and home developments that would use just as much water as NBAF, and yet nothing is said to stop those developments, and in fact some of the most vocal of the opposition are

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.2

DHS notes the commentor's support for the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Colley, Dan

Page 2 of 2

WD0303

general contractors involved in such ongoing schemes.

I regularly canoe on the Middle Oconee River, and generally take out at the Whitehall Bridge - which is very close to the South Milledge Avenue site. Having read the EIS, I am not concerned over the placement of NBAF so near to this area that I use for recreation. Having lived in the Atlanta area I know that CDC's BSL-4 facility has done nothing to lower property values in the Decatur area. In fact, while I was at CDC I could not afford to live in Decatur, and instead had to live in Tucker, based on the high property values close to CDC.

I hope that the irrational voices of a few Athens/Clarke County residents will not be seen as more than it is, an campaign based on misinformation and misunderstanding. Our town would be an excellent site for NBAF, based on the need, the understanding, the access, the educational/research community, and the reasonableness of most of its citizenry to be educated. This does not mean there should not be concerns that NBAF is done right. It must be done right. It is my experience, having dealt with infectious diseases my entire career, that this will be built and managed correctly, and that we can educate most others to understand the risks and the realities of dealing with them properly.

1|24.2 | I stand in strong support of the South Milledge Avenue site for NBAF and hope you will very seriously consider its many advantages.

Sincerely yours,

Dan Colley

Colton, C.

Page 1 of 1

MD0020

August 7, 2008

RE: Bio – Lab proposed for NC

To Whom It May Concern:

1) 25.3 I own a home in Stem North Carolina and am opposed to Bio Lab because I
2) 15.3 believe it is dangerously close to Falls Lake and nearby communities and I
strongly feel it will decrease the value of our home which we bought earlier
this year. We cannot afford this in any way, especially in light of the
drastically declining housing market and bad economy.

Thank you for your consideration.

Mrs. Colton



Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.3

The effects of the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative on housing is discussed in Section 3.10.7 of the NBAF EIS. As stated in the NBAF EIS, the housing market would be able to meet the increase in housing demand (326 employees in total), relative to the estimated growth of the existing population between 2007 and 2012 (188,278). It is possible that with the relocation of highly skilled workers to the immediate area, property values could increase due to an increase in demand, and there is no empirical evidence that a facility such as the NBAF would reduce property values in the study area. Therefore, the overall effect of the NBAF on housing market conditions would be negligible.

Congrove, James

Page 1 of 1

PD0039

August 4, 2008

1|24.4 My name is Jim Congrove. I live at [REDACTED] Kansas which is about 80 miles east of Manhattan, Kansas. I am calling to support the location of the research facility at Manhattan, Kansas. I have studied the Draft Environmental Impact Statement and I believe, with all the safeguards that will be put in place, that this would be a safe facility and there would be minimal impact or risk involved with the livestock industry in the surrounding areas.

My wife and I are both graduates of Kansas State University. We are active participants in alumni events and also in research and extension activities as sponsored by Kansas State University. We are also, even though we live 80 miles from the campus, we are there several times during the year to attend sports events and also other events at the campus. So, we are well aware of the proposed location.

We have livestock on our farm here where we live. We also own livestock in a beef feeding facility at Ramona, Kansas, which is approximately 50 miles southwest of Manhattan. We believe that, as I stated earlier, that the risk to the livestock industry and on our livestock in particular, there's a minimal risk involved and we believe the Kansas State University location would be very suitable.

Kansas State has demonstrated a experience in this type of research with the facility that they built here just a couple of years ago, and are conducting research on livestock diseases already, which we think would be an important consideration in determining where to locate this facility.

1 cont. |24.4 In summary, we are very much in support of locating the NBAF facility at Manhattan, Kansas. And my name is Jim Congrove. I live at [REDACTED] Kansas. Address is [REDACTED] Kansas [REDACTED]

Thank you for the consideration.

Bye.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Conley, Timothy

Page 1 of 1

WD0263

From: info@athensfaq.org on behalf of Timothy Conley [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, August 14, 2008 11:19 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF in Athens, Georgia

Dear NBAF Program Manager,

- 1|25.2 | As a parent in the Athens, GA community and frequent user of the Georgia State Botanical Gardens, I STRONGLY oppose the proposal to locate NBAF in our area.
- 2|2.0 | Number 1, NBAF represents an outgrowth of the paranoid US Military Industrial problem. A presence such as this is unhealthy for the happy town of Athens which fosters artistic, academic and athletic excellence, learning, safety for our children and general well-being. It is not welcome here.
- 3|6.2 | Number 2, NBAF will not work here because of it's proposed proximity to the State Botanical Gardens of Georgia which is one of our town's (and state's) prized treasures. The grounds of the Botanical Gardens are free of industrial noise and pollution and we definitely must keep it that way.
- 4|21.0 | Additionally, the proposal for NBAF insists that the facility will be secure and accident-proof, but we all know better. Humans are not immune to mistakes and failure. Sooner or later there would be contamination or escape of the pathogens and subsequent crisis. Again, not welcome.
- 5|12.2 | Lastly, Clarke County, and Georgia overall, cannot afford the water consumption that this facility would require. Already this state and town are at crisis levels of drought such as last summer when our reserve bottomed out at 30 days of water left for the whole town. We simply cannot allow this facility here for that reason alone.
- 6|23.0 | The DEIS clearly shows that the Athens, GA site is neither safe nor compatible from an environmental standpoint for the construction of NBAF.
- 1 cont. | I am strongly opposed to NBAF and will continue to actively work against any effort to bring NBAF to our
25.2 | community.

Good luck elsewhere,
 Timothy Conley

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Chapter 1, Section 1.1 of the NBAF EIS identifies DHS's mission which is to study foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The goal or benefit of NBAF is to prevent these animal diseases from spreading in the United States through research into the transmission of these animal diseases and the development of diagnostic tests, vaccines, and antiviral therapies.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 6.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern and acknowledges the proximity of the South Milledge Avenue Site to the State Botanical Garden. As described in Section 3.8.3.1.1 of the NBAF EIS, 80% of the site consists of pasture, and the adjacent lands consist of forested lands and small, perennial headwater streams. Approximately 30 acres of open pasture, 0.2 acres of forested habitat, and less than 0.1 acres of wetlands would be affected by the NBAF. However, construction and normal operations of the NBAF would have no direct impact on the State Botanical Garden as indicated in Sections 3.8.3.2 and 3.8.3.3. Only minimal indirect effects would occur from operations due to increases in light and noise.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS acknowledges commentor's statement that safety at the NBAF is not guaranteed. DHS also notes that the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen from the NBAF is extremely low. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory

characteristics. Training and inherent biocontainment safeguards reduce the likelihood of a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water, an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's opinion. The NBAF EIS was prepared to provide a thorough analysis of the aspects of NBAF construction and operations at the six site alternative locations. The potential impacts of NBAF operations on environmental resources, health and safety, and on local transportation are discussed in Chapter 3 of the NBAF EIS.