

Hamil, Deb

Page 1 of 1

PD0371

August 25, 2008

Hi.

This is Deb Hamil, [REDACTED] Kansas. I've been trying to get through for several days now, have not been able to do that. I want to protest it being presented into Manhattan, Kansas. I do not think that's a safe place for it. I think it's the worst place for it as a matter of fact, and I'm totally against it being placed in Manhattan, Kansas.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Hamilton, James

Page 1 of 1

WD0159

From: [REDACTED] James Hamilton [REDACTED]

Sent: Saturday, August 02, 2008 11:42 AM

To: NBAFProgramManager

Subject: NBAF in Athens, Georgia

Dear NBAF Program Manager,

I've been following with great interest the plans and debate regarding the Athens site for NBAF.

I understand the need for such a facility, but safety must take precedence over all other considerations.

1| 21.2 | As we know, and despite all kinds of safety efforts, accidental releases do occur (often due to human error)--they have in the past in a number of "secure" facilities of various kinds, and they will continue to do so in the future. It's the height of irresponsibility *not* to plan for *every* contingency*. "Virtually impossible for accidental releases" is simply not a high-enough standard; accidents must be factored in to location choice.

2| 5.0 | Locating NBAF in Athens would not be planning for these "unforeseeable" accidents. By contrast, it should be located in as remote and isolated an area as possible--e.g. off the mainland.

3| 12.2 | My other concerns include the huge need for water in an area already suffering through a two-year drought (a problem that will only get worse as the population continues to grow), and the minimal impact beyond the initial construction phase on the local economy.

4| 25.2 | In sum, I oppose locating NBAF in Athens or in any mainland location.

Sincerely,

James Hamilton

[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 21.2


DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the potential consequences from a NBAF accident or pathogen release as the result of human error and acknowledges commentor's statement that safety at the NBAF is not guaranteed. DHS also notes that the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen from the NBAF is extremely low. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. The need for an evacuation under an accident conditions is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives and preference for a remote location for siting NBAF.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1, the NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue Site would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water approximately 0.76% of Athens 15.5 million gallons per day usage. Section 3.7.3.1.1 describes the potential potable water sources, the Middle and North Oconee Rivers and the Jackson County Bear



Creek Reservoir.

Comment No: 4

Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Hammond, David

Page 1 of 1

WD0835

From: [REDACTED] on behalf of David Hammond [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 7:07 PM

To: NBAFProgramManager

Subject: NBAF in Athens, Georgia

1 | 5.2 | Georgia in not only in the "Bible Belt", it is dead center in the "Booster Belt". And Athens, GA is the capitol of "Boosterland". ANYthing, no matter how inappropriate for the region is sought after for the sake of someone's resume. Boosterism is what has brought the threat of this NBAF facility to our city. This is the same rampant boosterism which brought the 1996 Olympic Games to Atlanta, games which were so poorly conceived that the City of Atlanta and the State of Georgia will never live down the tackiness of them. Violating our community with this research facility is quite another matter. Locate this facility elsewhere.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Hancock, IV, F. Wills

Page 1 of 1

WD0735

From: Wills Hancock [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 2:01 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF EIS

1|24.3 | I have been a life long resident of [REDACTED] and I am in support of the location of the Bio-Defense
| Facility in Butner, NC.

F.Wills Hancock, IV
[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.3

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Hanson, Bill

Page 1 of 1

WD0302

From: Bill Hanson [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, August 16, 2008 1:30 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: RE: Manhattan, KS NBAF site selection

To: James V. Johnson

1|24.4 | My name is Bill Hanson. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] I am writing to express my wife's and my support of the location of the NBAF at the proposed site in Manhattan.

I am 68 years old with a Masters Degree + in Educational Administration with 13 years of experience in public education and 17 years experience with the US Department of Agriculture in Manhattan, KS, Kansas City, MO and Washington, DC. I was born and raised on a diversified farm in Kansas and owned/operated that farm for a few years. We maintained herds of dairy cattle, beef cattle and hogs during my pre-college years and during the time I owned the farm. As a result, I am very supportive of the research efforts to be conducted at the NBAF facility and my wife and I are not concerned about the slim "release" issues which have been raised at all sites.

I did attend the afternoon session of your recent visit to the K-State campus and appreciate very much your conduct of that session and with the information you provided. Thank you for taking the time to provide accurate information to the members of the K-State community.

Sincerely,

Bill Hanson, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Happe, Kelly

Page 1 of 1

WD0739

From: K Happe [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 2:12 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF, Athens, GA

To whom it may concern,
 I write today to express strong opposition to the proposed NBAF facility in Athens, GA. As an informed citizen, I do not believe project managers have adequately addressed environmental and safety concerns; the recently released EIS does not in any way alleviate said concerns.

On the issue of national security, I believe there are better ways to prevent an attack that might endanger our food supply (for instance, decreasing our reliance on meat and/or eating locally raised animals from much smaller ranches). That being said, even if it is the case that very dangerous pathogens must be studied, there are safer locations to consider so that in the case of an accident, the risk to the population at large is considerably lower. Although the risk of an outbreak is very low, it cannot be said to not exist at all. And despite low risk, the damage that could be done is very high, thus necessitating extraordinary measures to protect citizens. Our current research labs have had their fair share of safety lapses - there is no reason to think these sorts of lapses won't happen again.

In summary, setting aside the issue of the MERITS of an NBAF facility, there are better LOCATIONS to consider that are not in such close proximity to large numbers of persons and farms, and locations with a reliable water supply. I join thousands of other residents who are STRONGLY opposed to NBAF and will continue to make those concerns known.

Signed,
 Kelly Happe
 [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.


Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the mission of NBAF. Chapter 1, Section 1.1 of the NBAF EIS identifies DHS's mission as the study of foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The goal or benefit of NBAF is to prevent these animal diseases from spreading in the United States through research into the transmission of these animal diseases and the development of diagnostic tests, vaccines, and antiviral therapies. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen.

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the impact of a pathogen release on the local population, livestock industry, businesses and infrastructure. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. The chances of an accidental release are low. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations, including institutionalized populations, residing within the local



area. The need for an evacuation under an accident conditions is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Harbour, Laurel

Page 1 of 1

WD0839

From: Harbour, Laurel J. [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 7:20 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility

To whom it may concern,

1| 5.4 | Kansas is the best choice for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility. The state is home to Kansas
2| 8.4 | State University, which is recognized world wide for its expertise in zoonotic and infectious
3| 5.4 | diseases. This scientific expertise is complemented by the presence of the Kansas City Animal Health
Corridor, which includes over 120 animal health companies. In addition, as an agricultural state, Kansas
has large number of livestock. This permits the state to do research and to test effective measures to
protect our agricultural economy. Kansas has already joined with the private sector to test plans directed
at the safety and health of its livestock industry. For example, the Ford County exercise brought together
scientists, federal and state government officials, feedlot owners and packers. Based on the merits,
Kansas should be selected for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility.

Thank you for considering my views on this issue.

Sincerely,

Laurel Harbour

Mail Gate made the following annotations on Mon Aug 25 2008 18:20:55

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail message including attachments, if any, is intended for the person or entity to which it is addressed and may contain confidential and/or privileged material. Any unauthorized review, use, disclosure or distribution is prohibited. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact the sender by reply e-mail and destroy all copies of the original message. Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Harder, Robert

Page 1 of 1

WD0610

From: Robert C. Harder [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, August 23, 2008 4:36 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF LAB at K-State, Manhattan,KS

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

1|25.4 | This message is to express opposition to the NBAF lab being located in Manhattan,
 2|1.4; | KS at Kansas State University. With the research geared to deadly diseases, it seems
 3|21.4 | foolhardy to locate such a lab in the heart of Manhattan, KS. Any kind-of accident that
 4|5.1 | might happen will have an immediate impact on the neighborhood where the lab will be
 located. The lab is currently on Plum Island, why not leave it there. The GAO has
 indicated that because of the nature of the scientific work of the lab; an island lends
 itself to being an ideal location.

1Cont.|25.4 | Why make the decision of the location of the lab to please a politician? Do the right
 thing and protect the citizens.

Robert C. Harder, [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4


DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 1.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Chapter 1, Section 1.1 of the NBAF EIS identifies DHS's mission as the study of foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The goal or benefit of NBAF is to prevent these animal diseases from spreading in the United States through research into the transmission of these animal diseases and the development of diagnostic tests, vaccines, and antiviral therapies. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the impact of a pathogen release on the local population, livestock industry, businesses and infrastructure. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. The chances of an accidental release are low. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, site specific protocols would



then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations, including institutionalized populations, residing within the local area. The need for an evacuation under an accident conditions is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS show that even though Plum Island has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

Hardwick, Carol

Page 1 of 1

08/25/2008 MON 15:11 FAX

0001/601

FD0076



August 22, 2008

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
Mr. James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW
Building 410
Washington, DC 20528
FAX: 1-866-508-NBAF (6223)

RE: National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF)

Gentlemen:

I just wanted to let you know that we all welcome the new National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) to the Metro Jackson, Mississippi, area for many different reasons.

Our college graduates have had a limited number of career opportunities in this field and many times leave the area to pursue meaningful employment when they would much rather stay close to home. We would love an opportunity to bring them back home. We have one living in Atlanta and one that is senior in college.

1|24.5

There is a great deal of land in the area that can be used for development of this facility and spin-off bio companies.

The people of this community welcome this facility, and this would afford those working at the facility to enjoy the great quality of life we have in the Jackson area. There is much to do in Jackson—golf, tennis, fishing, hiking, boating, camping, biking and more. Because of the mild winters, they can be enjoyed year round.

We have great research facilities in Mississippi and the MetroJackson area which could have a mutually beneficial relationship with the facility.

Please know that Mississippi is ready for this and willing to help in any way to make it a reality.

Sincerely,

Carol Hardwick
Executive Director

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Hargrave, Derick

Page 1 of 1

WD0285


From: Derick Hargrave [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 15, 2008 11:53 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF

James V. Johnson,

1|24.4 | This is just a short email to show my support for the NBAF to be located in Manhattan, KS at K-State. Me being a food science graduate and now a professional in the food industry, along with being raised on a farm outside of Manhattan, have an obvious interest in the work that will be done there. I feel the support structure that K-State and Manhattan provide is second to none of all the final locations.

Thanks,

Derick Hargrave



Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4
DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Hargrove, Richard and Geneva

Page 1 of 1

WD0216

From: Richard Hargrove [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 08, 2008 2:13 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: "No to NBAF"

1|25.2;
 2|21.2;
 3|17.2; Please don't bring NBAF to Georgia. We don't like the certainty of danger, likely congestion, devaluation
 4|15.2; of our property, water usage in drought area.
 5|12.2 Geneva Hargrove

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Chapter 1, Section 1.1 of the NBAF EIS identifies DHS's mission as the study of foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The goal or benefit of NBAF is to prevent these animal diseases from spreading in the United States through research into the transmission of these animal diseases and the development of diagnostic tests, vaccines, and antiviral therapies. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 17.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern about the traffic congestion in the area of the South Milledge Avenue Site and the future impact of the NBAF operation on the area's transportation infrastructure. A discussion of the planned improvements to the area's primary transportation corridors of South Milledge Avenue and Whitehall Road to alleviate current and future traffic congestion resulting from the NBAF operation at the South Milledge Avenue Site is located in Section 3.11.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. All planned improvements are per the recommendations of the Department of Transportation and the Public Works Department as of 2007.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 15.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern. A discussion of the effects of the proposed NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue Site on property values was included in Section 3.10.3, which concluded that there is no empirical evidence that a facility such as the NBAF would reduce property values in the study area. It is possible that with the relocation of highly skilled workers to the immediate area, property values could increase due to an increase in demand.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and DHS acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site alternative would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water, an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.

Hargrove, Richard and Geneva

Page 1 of 2

WD0328

From: Richard Hargrove [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 18, 2008 2:42 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NbaF Athens

Dear Sir or Madam:

This refers specifically to the Athens, Georgia DEIS and why it is not convincing:

- 1|26.0 | 1) It contradicts itself on a number of important facts. For a product that represents "more than 50 unbiased scientists," this was shoddy work or else was intentionally misleading.
- 2) The Executive Summary is more propaganda than summary, some of it not dealing with or inconsistent with the most important elements of the main body of the DEIS.
- 3) It uses circular reasoning to minimize dangers: the assumption is that little danger is presented during "normal operation." What about during "abnormal operations"? As Grady Thrasher noted during the meeting on the 14th of August: "When nothing's happening, nothing happens." Your separation of "normal operations" from documented cases of harm was clever but demonstrated the bias of your "neutral investigators." (See Philosophy 101)
- 4) The commercial and institutional interests are pros at getting their message out, while homeowners write letters to the editor. There is no measure of community acceptance, because the majority of citizens have not been asked. Requests for referenda have not been granted. This is a cruel joke.
- 5) The special interests are primarily motivated by money, even if a single event should be devastatingly harmful in human or economic terms. Their unwillingness to confront the safety issues is basically dishonest and irresponsible.
- 2|21.0 | 6) I agree with the statement of the Connecticut Attorney General, with reference to Plum Island, "This vastly heightened risk level poses unacceptable costs and dangers."
- 7) Please consider that new leaders are likely to be in place before construction is scheduled.
- 8) Litigation will be undertaken as a last resort but our resolve is unabating.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's statements.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern about the risk to health and safety from the NBAF operation. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art biocontainment features and operating procedures to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, 3.14, and Appendices B, D, and E of the NBAF EIS, provide a detailed analysis of the consequences from an accidental or deliberate pathogen release. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

Hargrove, Richard and Geneva

Page 2 of 2

WD0328

Thank you for attention to this statement. If any part of it should be replicated, please use the document in its entirety.

Richard Hargrove
[REDACTED]

Hargrove, Richard and Geneva

Page 1 of 1

MD0038

U.S. Dept. Homeland Security Science
and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW, Building 410
Washington, D.C. 20528

Re: Athens, Georgia NBAF proposal
CONFIDENTIAL


Dear Sir:

1| 25.2 Comment was called for by your recent report. Concerns which I share with many others in not wanting NBAF in Athens, Georgia include the following:

- 2| 17.2 1) Your report does not show the need for more roads. The two-lane roads (Milledge and Whitehall) are congested presently, especially after 4:00 p.m. Stalled traffic would inconvenience homeowners in Athens-Clarke and Oconee County and employees of the facility. If you have depended on estimates by [REDACTED], you should know he has consistently and incorrectly dealt with the size of the facility proposed, the traffic on roads, economic impact, property values, and water needed by proposed NBAF operations.
- 3| 15.2 2) The counties and cities that would be impacted are presently trying to cut taxes. It is not likely that infrastructure changes and additions you would need will be underwritten by citizens in the area. These counties have not been willing to offer referenda to ascertain the level of citizen support for such a project, which I believe is quite low except for vocal business owners hard hit by the recession.
- 4| 24.1 3) The University of Georgia in supporting the proposal is a self-serving, empire-building institution that has discouraged its employees from speaking against the proposal. This school shouldn't be supporting a project against the will of its constituents.
- 4) Plum Island should continue as the site for dealing with infectious disease study despite the efforts of Democrats to get rid of it. The Athens area already hosts mosquito and tick problems, including Lyme disease. The State Botanical Gardens would lose appeal with NBAF as a neighbor.

I appreciate the candor of your report, and I trust that this will be received as being equally frank.

Sincerely,



(Dr.) Richard Hargrove

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 17.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern about the traffic congestion in the area of the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative and the future impact of the NBAF operation on the area's transportation infrastructure. A discussion of the planned improvements to the area's primary transportation corridors of South Milledge Avenue and Whitehall Road to alleviate current and future traffic congestion resulting from the NBAF operation at the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative, is located in Section 3.11.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. All planned improvements are per the recommendations of the Department of Transportation and the Public Works Department.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 15.2

Funding for the design, construction, and operations for the NBAF will come from the Federal Government. Proposals for offsets to the site infrastructure (part of the construction costs) were requested by the Federal government. The decision as to what to offer (land donation, funding, other assets) is solely at the discretion of the consortium, state and local officials as part of the consortium bid site package. The amount of funding and how the funding is paid for (bonds, taxes, etc) is determined by the state and local government officials and not the decision of the Federal government.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative and support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Hargrove, Richard and Geneva

Page 1 of 1

WD0767

From: Richard Hargrove [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 3:55 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: No to NBAF location in Athens, Georgia

1| 5.2 |
2| 12.2 |
3| 5.2 |

Not enough water for you and us. Please don't come.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.2
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.2
DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and DHS acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site alternative would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.2
See response to Comment No. 1.

Hargrove, Richard and Geneva

Page 1 of 2

WD0363

From: Richard Hargrove [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 3:16 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
1|25.2| **Subject:** Opposition to NBAF in Georgia
Attachments: next job.wpd

Dear Sir or Madam:

The statement attached will be published in the OCONEE LEADER newspaper on August 28.

Thank you for attention to this matter.

Richard Hargrove

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Hargrove, Richard and Geneva

Page 2 of 2

WD0363

Assault on Simonton Bridge Road

It is understandable that ACC Commissioner Hoard's committee and other persons in Athens are anxious to preserve the lovely streets and homes on Milledge. This would help maintain the property values in that neighborhood and please all citizens.

Some of us feel the same way about Simonton Bridge Road, with its pastoral views and rural character. The construction of a four-lane highway from Whitehall road to Main in Watkinsville would be disruptive for years, destroy much beautiful land, reduce home values, and hurt business. Under these circumstances, it might be equally preferable to make upper Milledge the NBAF location. Why one and not the other?

It would seem only fair, then, that a coin should be flipped with NBAF going to the winner. An upper Milledge location would be convenient to university empire builders and scientists so eager to study infectious diseases. Sewer and water lines are already present, and it would be easy to add an incinerator. The old mansions of Upper Milledge could be converted to dormitories for construction workers, as a contribution by Athens to economic development.

Why is this not funny?

Hargrove, Richard and Geneva

Page 1 of 1

WD0400

From: Richard Hargrove [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, August 20, 2008 10:21 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Bedrock

Dear Sir or Madam:

1|11.2 | A geological study is needed at the proposed site for NBAF in Athens, Georgia. Two major considerations:

- 1) Possibility of earthquake damages
- 2) Bedrock that would make costs double. This fact should be recognized, as it has been recorded, for later investigation.

Geologist George Koch, Jr., a Harvard Ph.D. is a specialist for the U.S. Government and others in assessing risk.

2|25.2 | These are among the reasons that have produced my opposition to this location for NBAF.

Thank you.

Richard Hargrove

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 11.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding earthquakes. Section 3.6.1 of the NBAF EIS describes the methodology used to assess each site's potential seismic consequences, and Section 3.6.3 specifically describes the South Milledge Avenue Site. The NBAF would be built to meet or exceed all applicable building codes for seismic safety. Section 3.14.3.2 further addresses NBAF design criteria and accident scenarios associated with natural phenomena events such as earthquakes

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Hargrove, Richard and Geneva

Page 1 of 1

WD0768

From: Richard Hargrove [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 3:58 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Not in Athens

1|25.2: No to NBAF in Athens. Too many mosquitos and cattle.
 2|21.2

Thank you,

Geneva Hargrove

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding an accidental release of a vector, such as a mosquito, from the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for outside insect vector penetration, laboratory-acquired infections, vector escape and accidental releases. Section 2.2.1.1 (Biosafety Design) of the NBAF EIS, provides a discussion of the biosafety fundamentals, goals and design criteria for the NBAF operation. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts each of which has the potential to release a vector. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release of a vector are low. DHS would have site-specific Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. An analysis of potential consequences of a pathogen (e.g. Rift Valley fever virus) becoming established in native mosquito populations surrounding the South Milledge Avenue Site is specifically addressed in Section 3.8.9 and Section 3.10.9.1 as well as in Section 3.14.4.1 (Health and Safety). Section 3.10.9.1 discusses the relative suitability of the regional climate of the South Milledge Avenue Site to promote mosquito survival and virus spread based on the extensive discussion contained in Section 3.4.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. As such, the RVF response plan would include a mosquito control action plan, and the potential consequences of pesticide use in mosquito control would be evaluated during the preparation of a site specific response plan.

Hargrove, W.

Page 1 of 1

MD0040

Dear Mr. Johnson,

1/25.2

Only the university and the chamber
of commerce want NBAF in Athens. Please
don't come.

W. R. Hargrove

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Harper, Frances

Page 1 of 1

WD0700

From: William & Frances Harper [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 11:21 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NO to NBAF in ATHENS, GA

1|25.2 NO to NBAF in ATHENS, GA

I really am alarmed that deadly diseases would be studied in such a populated area.

2|21.2 An ISLAND would be much, much safer!

Athens, GA, has had TWO TORNADOS and a mild EARTHQUAKE since we moved here!

This is NOT safe, as the contents of the lab would be IMPOSSIBLE to guarantee!

PLEASE do this research, but do it away from populated areas.
 It just makes sense.
 Thanks and God bless.
 Frances Harper,
 [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Risks to human populations at each alternative site were evaluated and discussed in Section 3.14 (Health and Safety) and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS. Modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. State-of-the-art biocontainment facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF. DHS also notes the commentor's concern regarding potential natural disaster impacts to the NBAF. Sections 3.4, 3.6, and 3.14.3.2 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, address NBAF design criteria and accident scenarios associated with natural phenomena events such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period.

In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado. current design of the NBAF defines the seismic capacity of the facility to meet a 0.19-g seismic event and a 119 mph wind (156 mph for Plum Island). While the proposed NBAF sites show a relatively low probability of a significant seismic event with a return period on the order of 50 years, Executive Order 12699 issued in January 1990 requires high-hazard government facilities to be designed to meet or exceed seismic events with return periods of 2,500 years.

Harrington, Julia

Page 1 of 1

WD0161

From: Julia Harrington [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, August 02, 2008 3:28 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: No to the Athens NBAF

1 | 25.2

Athens does NOT want the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, (NBAF)

Reveal your inner athlete and share it with friends on Windows Live.

http://revealyourinnerathlete.windowslive.com/?locale=en-us&ocid=TEXT_TAGLM_WLYIA_whichathlete_us

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Harris, Alice**Page 1 of 1****PD0206**

August 22, 2008

1| 24.3 My name is Alice Harris and I'm calling from North Carolina concerning the possibility
of the NBAF coming to the Butner area in Granville County, North Carolina. I am very
much in favor of this coming to our area. And I think its needed period for our well
being but also in this area we're very stressed for jobs and we need that type of
2| 15.3 environment for people to find places to work and we need scientific people. We are
very close, as you well know, located to the Research Triangle Park also to North
Carolina Hospital in Chapel Hill as well as Duke University Medical Center. And it's
3| 8.3 just something that this area really needs. And there are a few people making a lot of
noise at duplicate events and gatherings and the same ones opposing this instead of
getting more and more people to oppose—it's the same few. This is certainly not the
majority of the people in this area who would like to see this facility located at Butner,
North Carolina.

Thank you very much for your consideration.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.3

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative. The quality of
life and employment profile of the four-county region is discussed in Section 3.10.7 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 8.3

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Harris, Calvin

Page 1 of 1

08/25/2008 14:13 6018536542 MCEDA PAGE 01/01
FD0074

U. S. Department of Homeland Security
Science and Technology Directorate
James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW Building 410
Washington, DC 20528
August 25, 2008

To Whom It May Concern:

I am Calvin Harris a native and resident of [redacted] Mississippi. I would like to say up front that I strongly support the NBAF Laboratory being built here in [redacted] Mississippi. I am retired military and a member of the [redacted] Economic Development Authority. I see NBAF being located here as a win/win situation. You all will get a great and committed work force, a community that really wants you here along with a great location for your laboratory. The people of Mississippi are willing to do whatever is necessary to bring the NBAF laboratory to the state. For the people of [redacted] and surrounding area this is an excellent opportunity for sustained economic growth and development. A state-of-the-art facility like this would also boost the standing of our universities and the state of Mississippi in the research and development arena. So, all sides would win.

1|24.5

Being a 24 year veteran of the military and having worked around hazardous material, including nuclear wounds I have a 100 percent confidence level that you will take all precautions to protect us the public, along with your families and yourselves. I lived within 10 miles of your Level IV facility in San Antonio, Texas for over ten years without any problems.

I attended the public meeting held in [redacted] and fewer than five percent of the attendees had any concerns. They weren't protesting, they were just had a few questions. I CAN TELL THAT YOU ALL ARE WELCOME IN MISSISSIPPI, SO PLEASE BUILD THE LAB HERE.


Sincerely,
Calvin Harris

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.5
DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Harris, Gary

Page 1 of 1

PD0145

August 21, 2008

1| 5.0

Yes this is Gary Harris and I was reporting on the wanting to move that lab. That lab needs to stay out of the inland as far as I'm concerned. I'm a cattle producer in Kansas and there's lots and lots of cattle in Kansas and I can see that a bad weather situation could escape that virus and be a very bad deal in the middle of the United States inland. It'd be best to stay out of the inland. I am strongly against moving this lab.

2| 21.4

Thank you for your time.

Bye.

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential natural disaster impacts to the NBAF. Sections 3.4, 3.6, and 3.14.3.2 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, address NBAF design criteria and accident scenarios associated with weather-related events such as tornadoes, hurricanes, and flooding. DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period. In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado.

DHS also notes the commentor's position and concern for locating NBAF on a mainland site. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated on the mainland.

Harris, Harris

Page 1 of 1

PD0097

August 18, 2008

1|25.4 | My name's Harris. I live in Colorado. I think this facility they're trying to put in
| Manhattan, Kansas, especially someone over at Homeland Security is trying to put there,
| is totally contradictory to what their...what their program should be.

Thanks.

Bye.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative. As described in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's mission is to study foreign animal, zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) and emerging diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. NBAF will research the transmission of these animal diseases and develop diagnostic tests, vaccines, and antiviral therapies for foreign animal, zoonotic and emerging diseases. By proposing to construct the NBAF, DHS is following policy direction established by the Congress and the President.

Harris, Robert

Page 1 of 1

WD0211

From: Lisa & Robert Harris [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, August 07, 2008 9:01 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Proposed Butner, NC site for NBAF

Dear Sirs and Madams:

1|25.3 | My name is Robert Harris. I am a lifelong resident of the [REDACTED] NC area. I am writing, respectfully, to state my firm opposition to the proposed siting of the NBAF in Butner, NC.

2|12.3 | Butner is just 30 miles from [REDACTED] and even closer to a large part of the Triangle area, a major population center. Butner is also located in the watershed for Falls Lake, the main drinking water source for [REDACTED] and several other municipalities in Wake County.

3|21.0 | While I understand that DHS contends that the NBAF will be safe, there can be no guarantee of safety in a lab dealing with these extraordinarily dangerous agents. Just one accident could well have unimaginable consequences. If the NBAF needs to be built at all, it should be sited in a desolate wasteland, certainly not in Butner.

1 cont. | I do some work in Butner, and I can tell you that I have not met a single person
25.3 | who wants the NBAF there. On the contrary, the entire community appears mobilized against it.

Please take heed of public opinion and drop your consideration of the Butner site for the NBAF.

Thank you for your time.

Robert J. Harris
 [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's watershed concerns. Section 3.13.8, Waste Management describes the process that would be used to control and dispose of liquid wastes and Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describes standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spill and runoff affects.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS acknowledges commentor's statement that safety at the NBAF is not guaranteed. DHS also notes that the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen from the NBAF is extremely low. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.

DHS also notes the commentor's position and concern for locating NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated.