

Anonymous PD0043, Anonymous PD0043

Page 1 of 2

PD0043

August 6, 2008

Yes, hello I am a citizen of ██████████ North Carolina, ██████████ to Butner, North Carolina. I have reviewed your EIS. I have attended your town hall meetings back in February, and the EIS meeting at the end of July. Based on my own personal review of the meetings and the documentation, I am greatly opposed to locating the NBAF in Butner, North Carolina. I think it is time that you scratch Butner from your list of potential sites. You have recently, as of yesterday, August 5th, lost the support of the Raleigh City Council. They were undecided in their position, and as of yesterday, the Raleigh City Council unanimously adopted a resolution formally opposing locating the NBAF in Butner.

1) 25.3

Additionally, U.S. Representative Brad Miller, whose congressional district includes Wake and Granville counties, announced Tuesday, August 5th, that he is withdrawing his support for locating the NBAF in Butner. Additionally, Senator Doug Berger has withdrawn his support for locating the NBAF in Butner.

I think the community is speaking loudly and clearly to the Department of Homeland Security. We do not want the NBAF in Butner, and we will not support it.

I have been happy to see, at the meetings, that the citizens have come out. They have spoken peacefully, and they have not caused any problems or outbreaks. They have approached this professionally, and I think it makes the message loud and clear. We will not support you. It will be peaceful, but you will not have our community support in locating the NBAF in Butner.

I thank you for your time. I thank you for your investigation into the communities...of your five communities on your list. Clearly, Butner should stand out to you as the worst opportunity and the least likely to have community support.

2) 1.0

I do understand that this research needs to be done. You cannot look into these bio labs without understanding what's going on in the world, and the threats we face today.

3) 24.1

As a citizen, I am willing to support another location, preferably off the mainland USA. I think your best hope at this point is to revive, and reevaluate your plans for Plum Island. I think you will achieve your highest level of community acceptance if you do put the NBAF on Plum Island. I understand that space is a limitation, but you're going to have to get your best engineers on this job and figure out a way to make that work.

I even foresee that if Butner is scratched from the list of potential sites, that possibly the strong organization and community spirit might back other communities that are being considered for the NBAF location.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 1.0

DHS notes the commentor's support for conducting biological research.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Anonymous PD0043, Anonymous PD0043

Page 2 of 2

PD0043

1 cont. | 25.3 | Again, please strike Butner from the list. There is no community acceptance here and we
4 | 5.0 | will support you in the future when you bring your plans back and they do not include
mainland USA.

Thank you very much.

Anonymous PD0048, Anonymous PD0048

Page 1 of 1

PD0048

August 7, 2008

1| 25.4 | I am a concerned citizen from ██████████ Kansas and I'm adamantly opposed to the
2| 5.0 | NBAF being cited in Manhattan. The GAO report states unequivocally it should not be
located on U.S. mainland, and that's my position.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Anonymous PD0052, Anonymous PD0052

Page 1 of 1

PD0052

August 9, 2008

I'm just curious on this new bio security lab that's going on, and that you want to put in, as a cattle rancher about an hour away from Manhattan.

1|21.4 | Who's going to be responsible if we have an outbreak, if a disease leaks, something that's airborne, like foot and mouth or something that can wipe out maybe a two hundred mile radius within 24 to 48 hours? Who's going to pay me for my losses? Somebody should compensate if you think this is a good thing. I don't understand, we've got a safe, secure place where it's been, and have yet to have anybody, even Congressmen, explain to me, other than it's good money for the economy of the State, well if we loose the cattle industry in the State of Kansas, the economy - that new lab is not going to keep it alive. It's not going to help keep the economy going. I guarantee that. So, I don't understand why we need to have something like that here.

3|25.4 | I've yet to have anybody explain to me why it's good to put the most severest diseases in the heart of our beef producing country or near livestock producing area, and put them out here. It's like leaving a fox in charge of the hen house. And until somebody can justify me as to where it's actually beneficial compared to where it's been over there in New York where it's safe and it would...and I've heard about the one in New York. There's been...a couple, three times there was outbreaks, but where it's isolated. That saves on a natural disaster, and I don't know. It don't make sense.

3 cont. | We have elected officials that suppose to help look out for our cause and prevent this and, 25.4 | it seems like money, big money, gets in the way of common sense.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern that NBAF operations could result in an accidental release of foot and mouth disease virus. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The consequence analysis is related specifically to the accidental or intentional release of a pathogen and was developed and presented in a qualitative and/or high-level quantitative manner.

The determination of criminal or civil liability arising from an accidental or intentional release of a pathogen is beyond the scope of this EIS. It is also not possible to accept or reject a claim for damages until the specific facts of an incident are known and the applicable local, state or Federal law is applied.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The potential effects to livestock-related industries is discussed in Section 3.10. As noted in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D, the major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free. The mainland sites have similar economic consequences regardless of the livestock populations in the region.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0053, Anonymous PD0053

Page 1 of 1

PD0053

August 11, 2008

Hi,

- 1|25.4 | I live in Manhattan, Kansas. I want to tell you I'm very much opposed to the NBAF. I've done lots and lots of reading about it, and wondered if you guys read the GAO, May 22, 2008 report about high containment bio safety laboratories? I mean, it's obvious that it is not safe, and it really disturbs me that you haven't looked....that you don't have any information on what it would be like to test your HEPA filters and your disposal systems with the large, number of..large animals that you are proposing to.
- 2|18.4 |
- 3|21.4 | It's very poorly thought out, and very dangerous to put this in the heartland where there are half a million livestock.
- 1 cont. | I hope you will reconsider and I hope someone will put the brakes on your plan.
25.4

Thank you.

Bye.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 18.4

DHS notes the commentors concern. However the waste streams that concern the commentor, HEPA filters and animal carcasses, are currently generated in other BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities, treated onsite if they could be infectious, and subsequently disposed in appropriate waste management facilities. As shown on Table 3.13.2.2-3 in the NBAF EIS, HEPA filters from BSL-3E, BSL-3Ag, and BSL-4 areas in the NBAF could be autoclaved if they are not heat sensitive. If they are heat sensitive, they could undergo gas decontamination or disinfection in dunk tanks. As discussed in Section 3.13.2.2, they would then be disposed in an appropriate offsite waste management facility. Section 3.13.2.2 explains that a number of different technologies including incineration, alkaline hydrolysis, and rendering are being considered for the on-site treatment of euthanized animal carcasses. All of these technologies are currently being used for this purpose at other facilities. The sources of information used to prepare the information in Section 3.13 of the NBAF EIS are cited in the section. Chapter 4 provides the list of references cited in the section.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern about placing NBAF near livestock. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The consequence analysis is related specifically to the accidental or intentional release of a pathogen and was developed and presented in a qualitative and/or high-level quantitative manner.

Anonymous PD0054, Anonymous PD0054

Page 1 of 1

PD0054

August 11, 2008

1|25.3 | I'm calling for GNAT in the Butner, North Carolina area, and I m calling to say I do not
| approve of this NBAF coming to Butner - no way, shape, form, or fashion.

2|5.0 | I hope you have gotten the message by now. After reading the report, after looking at the
| GAO report on the computer, it's no way in the world that this thing would be safe on the
| mainland.

1 cont.| | Please put me down as do not come to Butner.
25.3

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS show that even though Plum Island has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites. The lower potential effect is due both to the water barrier around the island and the lack of livestock and susceptible wildlife species.

Anonymous PD0062, Anonymous PD0062

Page 1 of 1

PD0062

August 13, 2008

1| 25.4 | I'm a citizen that lives near Manhattan, Kansas and I do not want to see BF come to
2| 5.0 | Manhattan. In fact, I don't want to see it go anywhere on the mainland USA.

3| 24.1 | Leave it on Plum Island where it's isolated, and they're familiar with it.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's preference for siting the NBAF in a more isolated location such as the current Plum Island location. The NBAF EIS fully analyzes the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0066, Anonymous PD0066

Page 1 of 1

PD0066

August 13, 2008

1|24.1; I'm calling from Clay Center, Kansas, and I would hope that they build the new bio
defense lab on Plum Island and nowhere on the mainland. If they are going to build it on
2|25.4 the mainland, I would hope that they would not build it at Manhattan, Kansas, as my wife
and I live 35 miles from there, and we would not like to see it built that close to where we
live.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.4

See response to Comment No. 1.

Anonymous PD0067, Anonymous PD0067

Page 1 of 1

PD0067

August 13, 2008

(This call was extremely difficult to hear. Most of it was inaudible)

Hey,

1|25.2; (Inaudible)...Botanical Gardens Award, and I am opposed to the National Bio Agro
2|6.2; Defense facility. I feel this facility would have a tremendous negative affect on the
Gardens. And I think people in the State of Georgia and around the United States enjoy
these gardens for this facility to have to be.

Please protect these Botanical Gardens.

Thank you

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 6.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern and acknowledges the proximity of the South Milledge Avenue Site to the State Botanical Garden. As described in Section 3.8.3.1.1 of the NBAF EIS, 80% of the site consists of pasture, and the adjacent lands consist of forested lands and small, perennial headwater streams. Approximately 30 acres of open pasture, 0.2 acres of forested habitat, and less than 0.1 acres of wetlands would be affected by the NBAF. However, construction and normal operations of the NBAF would have no direct impact on the State Botanical Garden as indicated in Sections 3.8.3.2 and 3.8.3.3. Only minimal indirect effects would occur from operations due to increases in light and noise.

Anonymous PD0070, Anonymous PD0070

Page 1 of 1

PD0070

August 14, 2008

Yes,

1|5.1; I'm a resident of Manhattan, Kansas and I'd like to express my opposition to the NBAF
2|21.4 Level-4 lab being placed here. I do not think it should be placed on the mainland,
especially in Kansas, with all the livestock that we have.

I do not want to risk loosing my livestock operation and I believe this lab should be placed on Plum Island.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the impact of an accident on livestock. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and the site specific consequences of each accident scenario to human populations, agriculture and livestock and wildlife. The chances of an accidental release are low. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area, to include agricultural livestock. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Anonymous PD0077, Anonymous PD0077

Page 1 of 1

PD0077

August 15, 2008

1|25.4. Hello, I'm calling to voice my opinion about the NBAF being located in Manhattan,
2|21.0. Kansas. I am against it being located in this place. There is too much danger of things
3|24.1 going wrong, particularly human error. If it has to be placed anywhere, I'd like to see it
on Plum Island.

Thank you for taking my thoughts into consideration.

Good bye.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the potential consequences from a NBAF accident or pathogen release as the result of human error. As described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Appendix B of the NBAF EIS provides a comprehensive list of BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratory accidents results, and consequences of the accidents Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, including external events such as a terrorist attack. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. The need for an evacuation under an accident conditions is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0082, Anonymous PD0082

Page 1 of 1

PD0082

August 15, 2008

Yes,

1|25.2 | I'm calling in regard to the proposed site for the bio lab in Athens, Georgia. I actually am someone that lives within about a 3 to 5 minute distance from the proposed site, and I would like to strongly request that this particular site not be chosen.

2|6.2 | I have lived in this neighborhood for about 17 years and have spent hours and hours walking with my children and my grandchildren at the Botanical Gardens, which adjoins that property, and have spent many times driving past that site which is a beautiful piece of property with rolling hills and there's a horse farm that the University owns right there.

3|21.2 | It's just a lovely piece of land and I am very concerned about the fact that there are so many families and students that live close by to where the proposed facility would be and the danger and risks involved to those of us that are neighbors.

4|5.0;
1 cont. | It just seems like a project of this great dimension would be much better served to be in an area that is more desolate and wide open and barren in nature with no risks to, you know, the surrounding community.

25.2 | I know that there's a number of sites that are being proposed and I'm just very much hoping that this is not going to be the site selected.

Anyway, thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 6.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the visual effects of the NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue Site, which are described in Section 3.2.3 of the NBAF EIS. DHS recognizes that the NBAF would be a distinctive visible feature and would alter the viewshed of the area.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding a potential accident during NBAF operations. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Training and inherent biocontainment safeguards reduce the likelihood of a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.0

Other locations to construct the NBAF were considered in Section 2.4.3 of the NBAF EIS. These alternatives were considered but eliminated from detailed study in the EIS based on the evaluation criteria calling for proximity to research programs that could be linked to the NBAF mission and proximity to a technical workforce. These alternatives included remote locations such as an island, desert, or arctic habitat distant from populated areas or inhospitable to escaped animal hosts/vectors.

Anonymous PD0083, Anonymous PD0083

Page 1 of 1

PD0083

August 16, 2008

Hello,

1|25.4; I live in Manhattan, Kansas. I am against having the NBAF located here. I feel like the
2|21.4 safety is not guaranteed. I do not want to ruin the place I live, where everything I own
centers.

My children live here. My grandchildren live here. My job is here. My home is here. I
want to protect what we have. I do not trust that what is planned and expected to be built
is fail safe, and I don't want my life to be ruined.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS acknowledges commentor's concern about safety. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Training and inherent biocontainment safeguards reduce the likelihood of a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.

Anonymous PD0084, Anonymous PD0084

Page 1 of 1

PD0084

August 16, 2008

Hello,

1|25.4 | I would like to comment on the NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas. I am a producer of
| agriculture in that area and I do not want to see it located in Manhattan.

2|21.4 | I think the risk is too great, especially since we're close to Fort Riley military reservation.
| We've already got a target on our backs for being next to them, and I'd really hate to see
| another one put there.

| Please think of the agriculture producers in this area and the risks that they run.

| Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the risk of a potential accident or terrorist event. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. As described in Chapter 3 and summarized in Section 2.5 of the NBAF EIS, the impacts of activities during normal operations at any of the six site alternatives would likely be minor. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. %Appendix B to the NBAF EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections in the United States and world-wide. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS, addresses accident scenarios, including external events such as a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process. Security would be provided by a series of fencing, security cameras, and protocols. In addition, a dedicated security force would be present on-site. Additional security could be provided via cooperation with local law enforcement agencies.

Anonymous PD0090, Anonymous PD0090

Page 1 of 1

PD0090

August 18, 2008

Hi,

1|25.4 | I would like to voice my opposition against the bio science lab that's proposed to be
located in Manhattan, Kansas, and I'm a resident of Junction City, Kansas.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0095, Anonymous PD0095

Page 1 of 1

PD0095

August 18, 2008

1| 25.4 | I am calling to comment on the NBAF facility for Manhattan, Kansas. As a resident in Riley County, I am opposed to having such a facility located at this present site.

2| 21.4 | My concern is the safety issue and what happens if pathogens are released into the community. We are in the middle of a large cattle industry and livestock production area, and I have great concerns about that possibility in spite of all the reassurances of safety.

3| 24.1 | I remain concerned and would like to see the facility remain on Plum Island where...or some other island location where there is somewhat of a safety barrier that's already geographically in place.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentator's concern about safety and livestock. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and human health consequences of potential accidents. Modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. State-of-the-art biocontainment facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0099, Anonymous PD0099

Page 1 of 1

PD0099

August 19, 2008

1|25.4 I would like for you to oppose and not bring the new NBAF lab to Kansas at Kansas State University. This creates a lot of danger if this is put on the land. In-land faces the U.S.,
2|21.0 and I think that the danger and the cost of having a disaster with it on the mainland would far outweigh any advantage that could be gained locally or nationally.

3|5.1 Not only oppose this at Manhattan, but any in-land site, and let's keep it on Plum Island. Our forefathers were smart enough to do this. Let's learn this from them and continue to keep it where it has a little bit of confinement.

4|21.4 Also it would make a bigger risk for the mid-part of the U.S. if terrorists would happen to attack with Kansas State University, and the Fort Riley, and also with the new lab in the same area, they could wipe out the whole thing in one deal with a terrorist or somebody that maybe would happen to get away with a little bit of the germs.

Also for the human diseases that could come from this and all that it would do to families and the whole economy of the United States with the livestock if any of the foot mouth disease or other diseases would get out.

3 cont. | So please continue to keep this on Plum Island for the safety of the whole United States
5.1 | of America.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentator's opinion that the risks of siting and operating the NBAF at any of the proposed mainland site would outweigh the advantages. Section 3.14 and Appendix E investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., a safety protocol not being followed as compared to an earthquake destroying the facility or a terrorist attack), the analysis shows that the chances of a release of pathogens are low at every site. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify both the likelihood of and the consequences from accidents or intentional acts that could result in a pathogen release. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. While the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, the economic effect would be significant for all sites. Chapter 3, Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. DHS cannot guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident; however, the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen from the NBAF is extremely low. The economic impact of an accidental release, including the impact on the livestock-related industries, is presented in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D. The major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a potential ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives, in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentator's concern that the NBAF would be a terrorist target. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS addresses accident scenarios, including external events such as a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process.

Anonymous PD0104, Anonymous PD0104

Page 1 of 1

PD0104

August 19, 2008

Yes,

1|25.4 | I was calling in regard to the possible site location of Manhattan, Kansas, Kansas State University, and I would like to express the fact that I am not in favor of having it come to our community.

2|21.4 | I think that the whole area is a animal area and I think it's very unsafe to have something to this degree in a area that could affect so much livestock at one time.
 Not only could it affect the economy, it could affect our food supply and it would affect the financial stability of all of the ranch and farmers in this area.

1 cont. | Please don't pick Manhattan.
 25.4

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding potential risks of NBAF to livestock, food supply, and local farms. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

Anonymous PD0105, Anonymous PD0105

Page 1 of 1

PD0105

August 19, 2008

1|5.0 | I am calling to express my strong opposition to the location of the NBA (message ended by caller).

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the NBAF location.

Anonymous PD0112, Anonymous PD0112

Page 1 of 1

PD0112

August 19, 2008

- 1|25.4 | I am voting no for the NBAF to come to Manhattan, Kansas. I do not believe it is something that we need to have here in this town.
- 2|24.1 | I think it should stay on Plum Island, New York. That way other citizens are protected from a catastrophe that might happen.
- 3|21.4 | Manhattan, Kansas has lots of young adults that do not need to be exposed to this kind of thing, if an accident were to happen. So, Manhattan, Kansas is not appropriate...I do not think, for this type of facility to be in.
- 1 cont.| I know you're looking for a big town, but this really is not a large town that would
25.4 | support this kind of thing. And I just vote no for Manhattan, Kansas.
- 2 cont.| Please keep it in Plum Island.
|24.1 | Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative based on safety concerns. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated in populated areas such as Manhattan. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the siting, construction and operation of the NBAF at the proposed Manhattan, Kansas site. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Anonymous PD0113, Anonymous PD0113

Page 1 of 1

PD0113

August 19, 2008

1|25.4 | I live in Kansas which is in the middle of cattle country, and hog country, and goat and sheep, and I am against National Bio and Agro Defense facility at Kansas State University.

2|21.4 | It looks to me like it doesn't make much sense having something that could harm, no matter how hard you try to keep it from happening, animals - agricultural animals, in the middle of agricultural country.

1 cont. | So, I am against this.
25.4

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the potential consequences to livestock from a NBAF accident. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9, of the NBAF EIS the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley Fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

Anonymous PD0114, Anonymous PD0114

Page 1 of 1

PD0114

August 20, 2008

1|25.4; I'm calling as a member of No NBAF in Kansas. We don't need this facility here. We
2|21.4 should never bring foot and mouth disease and those deadly pathogens to Manhattan, Kansas.

3|2.0 The other part of it is, if the DHS can't run this any better than they did hurricane
Katrina, then I don't have any faith in that at all.

4|5.1 It should not be put in the mainland, but it should be on Plum Island.

Thanks a lot.

Bye.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the potential consequences from a NBAF accident at the proposed Manhattan, Kansas site. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's opinion regarding DHS's ability to operate the NBAF.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives, in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0116, Anonymous PD0116

Page 1 of 1

PD0116

August 20, 2008

1|25.4; I'm saying no to the NBAF facility that they want to build in Manhattan, Kansas.
2|5.1 | My feeling is that germ research should remain on Plum Island.
Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.1
DHS notes the commentor's preference for research remaining on Plum Island.

Anonymous PD0119, Anonymous PD0119

Page 1 of 1

PD0119

August 20, 2008

Hello,

- 1|25.4 | I'm calling from Manhattan, Kansas, where one of the site's to be considered for the NBAF, and I do not want it here. I think most people who want it, just want it for the prestige and the money.
- 2|21.4 | I think it's dangerous. I feel what a shame to have spent so much money looking for a place and getting people so hyped up about this. I mean our politicians are drooling about it.
- 3|5.1 | But I just think all the money that has been spent is just really a waste. And I think it should be left at Plum Island where it's been and just fix that up. I know that seems to be more expensive than building a new one, but I really don't want it in Manhattan, Kansas.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's opinion regarding the potential danger posed by NBAF operations. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative and support for upgrading the PIADC. However, the proposed NBAF requires BSL-4 capability to meet mission requirements (DHS and USDA). PIADC does not have BSL-4 laboratory or animal space, and the existing PIADC facilities are inadequate to support a BSL-4 laboratory. Upgrading the existing facilities to allow PIADC to meet the current mission would be more costly than building the NBAF on Plum Island, as discussed in Section 2.4.1 of the NBAF EIS.

Anonymous PD0120, Anonymous PD0120

Page 1 of 1

PD0120

August 20, 2008

Hello,

1|25.4 | I do wish to present comments on the draft. I've seen part of the draft. It doesn't even
 know where Manhattan, Kansas is...puts us 600 miles west of Topeka. And the more I
 learn about it and the spread of Lyme Disease, and West Nile, the less I think that it will
 be a boom to Manhattan.

2|21.4; | It's going to be sited in a very dangerous spot. I don't think you're going to have the
 3|8.4 | water or independent sewage lines that you're going to need. And I think it will be a
 terrific danger to the entire community.

1 cont. | I vigorously oppose it, and I'm part of an organization that does too.
 25.4 |

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the potential consequences from a NBAF accident. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 8.4

The impacts of implementing the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative on potable water supply and sanitary sewer infrastructure were evaluated by DHS and are discussed in Section 3.3.4.3.1. As discussed in this section, the potable water conveyance infrastructure currently meets the design requirements for the NBAF operations. In addition, the City of Manhattan is planning a major potable water treatment plant and well field improvement project which would increase the potable water supply capacity to approximately 30 mgd and is scheduled for completion by 2009.

The impacts of implementing the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative on sanitary sewer infrastructure were also evaluated by DHS and are discussed in Section and 3.3.4.3.4 of the NBAF EIS. As discussed in this section, the current sanitary sewage conveyance infrastructure will require specified improvements to meet NBAF design requirements. The specified improvements include the design and installation of a new wastewater treatment plant that will incorporate and exceed the wastewater discharge projections for the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0126, Anonymous PD0126

Page 1 of 1

PD0126

August 20, 2008

Yes,

1| 24.4

I think that it is very important that the NBAF comes to Manhattan, Kansas for several reasons. One of them is Kansas is a very much agricultural state, very dependent upon farming, animal health...we're one of the leaders in animal health, as a matter of fact, and the food chain, since we produce a lot of the beef in the Nation. It's very important that we're on the cutting edge of this.

I also am a cattle owner and I think that, and I'm very concerned that our food chain is pure and does not have any contaminants in it. Not only for what we keep...what I eat or for what I feed my family, but for what we sell and market to other countries and just to other places in the United States.

I think that our labor....it would be good for our labor. We have a very strong work ethic in the State of Kansas, very hard working folks. They're not afraid to get dirty...get down and get dirty and I think that's real important.

1 cont.| 24.4

I just think that it would be a really good thing for it to be located in Manhattan, Kansas.

Thank you for listening.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.