

Tawzer, Candace

Page 1 of 1

WD0495

From: Candace Tawzer [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 22, 2008 1:13 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: "I support NBAF in Kansas"

Hello,

1) 24.4

My name is Candace Tawzer, and I work for Hill's Pet Nutrition, Inc, in [REDACTED]. I live in [REDACTED] as well, and would love to see the NBAF facility built in the state of Kansas. I believe Kansas is uniquely qualified to conduct this research because of our long-standing expertise in human and veterinary medicine and the biosciences. The growth of Kansas in the Biosciences in recent years has been amazing.

Please know that as a resident of Kansas, I fully support NBAF coming to Kansas.

Thanks
Candace Tawzer

[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Taylor, Dan

Page 1 of 1

WD0351

From: Dan Taylor [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 10:19 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Considerations for NBAF lab

¹[24.2] I believe the Athens, GA site would make the best location for the new NBAF labs. The primary considerations I think of are impact to the community, availability of skilled workers, availability of emergency response and potential risks to the environment. With Atlanta, GA only hours away, you have the CDC available, multiple top tier medical universities and plenty of skilled workers. The CDC is close enough to help possible contamination threats. There is also the University of GA minutes away who has BSL-3 facilities. Athens, GA is not prone to extreme environmental conditions like some of the other sites being considered. While an outbreak would be devastating in any location, Athens does not have the close population or wide spread livestock or crop. The state of Georgia is quickly making a name for itself with an influx of BioTech industries and thus has a lot of economic and local government support.

I realize that living in Athens, GA makes me a bit biased. I grew up and lived in Decatur, GA only a few miles from Emory University and the CDC. And I was never afraid of what lives within those walls. The NBAF labs will contain nature's best and most powerful weapons. People should be afraid of the diseases, but not their surroundings. Put the right people in the right conditions and you create a safe environment to study these threats and prepare the country and the environment for possible future outbreaks.

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.2

DHS notes the commentor's support for the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Taylor, Desirae

Page 1 of 1

WD0486

From: Desirae Taylor [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 22, 2008 12:17 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: RE: NBAF

1) 24.4 | I support NBAF!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4
DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Taylor, Janice

Page 1 of 1

WD0490

From: Janice Taylor [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 22, 2008 12:35 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: I support NBAF in Kansas

1| 24.4 | To whom it may concern,
I just wanted to encourage you to continue to push for NBAF to be located in Kansas. This is an exciting area of research and I think there are many benefits that Kansas can see from having this center located in our state.
Regards,
Janice Taylor

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4
DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Taylor, Willie

Page 1 of 3

MD0128



United States Department of the Interior

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Washington, D.C. 20240

AUG 20 2008

In Reply Refer To:
ER 08/670

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Attn: Mr. James V. Johnson
Mail Stop #2100
245 Murray Lane, SW, Building 410
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson:

The Department of the Interior has reviewed the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility. The Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS) Long Island Field Office (LIFO) has reviewed the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) Draft EIS as it relates to alternatives concerning the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), Plum Island, New York. The Department's comments are provided below concerning federally listed species and migratory birds.

As described in the executive summary of this Draft EIS, the DHS has proposed to augment the United States' existing research capabilities through construction and operation of a biosafety level (BSL)-3 and BSL-4 National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility at one of six alternative sites. The Draft EIS has not identified a preferred alternative at this time, but examined the construction and operation of a BSL-3 and BSL-4 facility on Plum Island. The exact dimensions and scale of the project were not specifically identified in the Draft EIS at this time other than to state that it would be located in a 24-acre project boundary.

Plum Island is an 840-acre island located about 12 miles southwest of New London, Connecticut, and 1.5 miles from the northeast tip of Long Island, New York. It is government-owned and is currently the site of the PIADC. The proposed construction area for the NBAF is an approximately 24 acre site directly east of the PIADC, which is on the western shore of the island. The Draft EIS has identified the proposed project

1 | 26.1

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes Service's comment. The information cited by the Service is for Plum Island in general. The site-specific information regarding vegetative cover at the Plum Island Site is located in Section 3.8.6.1.1 of the NBAF EIS. Additional information regarding biological resources is located in Section 3.8.6.

Taylor, Willie

Page 2 of 3

MD0128

2

cont. | 1 | 26.1

boundary as consisting of existing disturbed lands, but land cover maps provided in the Draft EIS describe it as a mix of deciduous forest, woody wetlands, barren lands (rock, clay, sand), and grasslands and herbaceous cover.

Endangered Species Act Comments

The DHS is consulting with the LIFO pursuant to the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (87 Stat. 884, as amended; 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.) regarding the potential impacts of the proposed project on federally listed species. The DHS has indicated that the proposed upgrades at the PIADC would have no adverse effects on the federally listed piping plover (*Charadrius melodus*), roseate tern (*Sterna dougallii dougallii*), sandplain gerardia (*Agalinus acuta*), and seabeach amaranth (*Amaranthus pumilus*). Based on the proposed construction site and operational activities of the NBAF, no further consultation with the FWS is necessary. The FWS will continue to coordinate with DHS personnel on continuing existing surveys for endangered species which are undertaken by the FWS in cooperation with Audubon New York on Plum Island.

Migratory Bird Comments

cont. | 1 | 26.1

As mentioned in the Draft EIS, Plum Island is located in an Audubon Important Bird Area, providing breeding, wintering, and migratory stopover habitat for a number of species protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (40 Stat. 755; 16 U.S.C. 703 et seq.). Plum Island is also included in the Orient Point - Islands Complex which is a FWS-identified Significant Coastal Habitat. As such, we recommend that the DHS clarify the information contained in Figure 3.2.2.1.1-1 which depicts the existing land cover in the proposed project boundary showing several different land covers (mentioned above) with statements in the Draft EIS that the project boundary contains disturbed barren lands. Clarification of this would assist us in providing additional comments on potential impacts to migratory and resident bird species and their habitats. Further, at such time when the DHS develops site-specific project plans related to the design of the NBAF building and ancillary structures, the FWS requests further coordination to explore measures to reduce the potential for avian collisions with these structures.

2 | 13.1

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Draft EIS. We hope that our comments are useful. If you have any questions or require further assistance with these comments, please contact Steve Papa of the Long Island Field Office at (631) 776-1401. For all

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 13.1

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding avian collisions at the Plum Island Site. Security requirements at the proposed NBAF would require continuous outdoor nighttime lighting. Nighttime lighting has the potential to impact wildlife through astronomical and ecological light pollution. Unshielded lighting can shine upward and interfere with bird migration, disorienting birds and causing them to collide with structures. Most concerns involve lighting associated with high-rise buildings and tele-communication towers; however, even residential lighting can affect some birds. The USFWS advocates the use of shielded lighting to minimize adverse impacts on migratory birds. Shielded fixtures direct light downwards and can be used to keep light within the boundaries of the site. The NBAF would employ the minimum intensity of lighting that is necessary to provide adequate security. Mitigation measures, such as the use of shielded lighting, will be considered in the final design of the NBAF. Compared to high-rise buildings and tele-communication towers, the height of the facility would be low (maximum of 90 feet). Given the relatively low profile of the building and the use of mitigation measures, construction of the proposed NBAF would not be likely to cause a significant number of bird collisions. However, DHS would consult with the USFWS during the design phase to minimize the potential for collisions, and would consider the use of additional mitigation measures such as the installation of window film, if deemed necessary.

Taylor, Willie

Page 3 of 3

MD0128

3

other inquiries, please contact Ken Havran of the Department's Office of Environmental Policy and Compliance at (202) 208-7116.

Sincerely,




Willie R. Taylor
Director
Office of Environmental Policy
and Compliance

Taylor, MSPH, Hope

Page 1 of 2

NCD001



Statement of Hope C. Taylor
DHS Public Hearing, July 29, 2008

115.3 I speak to you today with profound concern, both as the executive director of a statewide environmental justice organization, and as the owner operator of a small dairy goat herd who has farmed at a location less than 7 miles from the proposed Butner site for 15 years. Our organization is committed to providing technical and strategic assistance to grassroots groups and allying ourselves with impacted communities, particularly those which are most vulnerable, such as the over six thousand hospital patients and prisoners within three miles of the proposed site who are never even mentioned in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, and those which have faced disproportionate threats over the years. We'll provide more extensive and technical comments to the Agency later, but today I want to talk about what kind of neighbor this facility, its management and staff would be.

212.0 A year ago, I remarked that I feared for our very democracy in this region of North Carolina if Homeland Security were to choose this site for its proposed NBAF. And those around all of the proposed mainland sites have every reason to fear the uprooting of their way of life. Any DHS facility would give me pause, given the history of distrust, lack of transparency and patronizing, controlling, negligent behavior by the agency. Let me give you a personal example of this that I have already experienced, in the process of seeking in good faith, to have the DEIS documents sent to me, using DHS's own standard forms.

After the DHS Town Meeting in February, I filled out a DHS form to request documents be sent to my Durham office, added requests for two other local residents in other spaces provided on the form, and sent them in a clearly return-addressed business envelope. Because there was a record of unreliable DHS responsiveness, I wanted to know that the request arrived, and so sent the letter as registered mail. Somehow, I wasn't surprised that I didn't receive the return slip and was getting ready to contact the NBAF manager by phone nearly six weeks later, when my original envelope returned, in very strange condition, to Clean Water for NC's Asheville office. Here is that envelope with my requests for

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS is aware of the presence of the health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are well aware of the proposed action. A site-specific emergency response plan will be developed and coordinated with the local emergency management plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF. An emergency response plan would include stipulations for any special-needs populations including institutionalized populations. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement and regrets any confusion regarding information requested by the commentor. Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program. DHS has conducted public meetings in excess of the minimum required by NEPA regulations; to date, 24 public meetings have been held in the vicinity of NBAF site alternatives and in Washington, D.C. to solicit public input on the EIS, allow the public to voice their concerns, and to get their questions answered DHS has also provided fact sheets, reports, exhibits, and a Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). Additionally, various means of communication (mail, toll free telephone and fax lines, and NBAF Web site) have been provided to facilitate public comment. It is DHS policy to encourage public input on matters of national and international importance.

Taylor, MSPH, Hope

Page 2 of 2

NCD001

2 cont.] documents, nothing more, exactly as it arrived in our office, clearly marked that
2.0 to check for any particulate matter such as anthrax spores. Simply because it was
sent registered mail to Mr. Jamie Johnson. In a subterfuge to provide an excuse
for the much-delayed return, part of the address taken directly from the DHS
website has been crossed out and an "insufficient address" yellow label attached.
The fate of my request for documents is a masterstroke of paranoia and
incompetence. It's an emblem of what we can expect in a thousand ways, large
and small, if this agency sets up shop in our region, aside from the actual
physical threats of exotic diseases, along with the kind of mishandling, poor
maintenance and violations of bio-safety procedure that would put us at risk.

3|13.3 To talk of "significant" benefits to local wildlife and livestock around a mainland
site, when everyone knows those animals face likely destruction either as a
preventative or response measure after a release, to bring diseases into contact
with multiple new species, in a new geographic setting exerting exactly the kind
of evolutionary pressure that biologists have documented as creating new lethal
human transmissible strains, are just a couple of the major flaws with the very
concept of a mainland site. But to plan to add a substantial new wastewater
4|12.3 discharge from a biohazard facility to an impaired stream flowing into a
drinking water supply for 400,000 people, and to put at risk thousands of people
unable to participate in this siting process or be protected by evacuation or
quarantine, are just a couple of the added shameful conditions that the NC
Consortium was willing to put up with to get a site "convenient" for researchers
at local universities.

5|21.3 I spoke with a biotech researcher recently who wanted the NBAF at this site
because "researchers had a right to live someplace nice, too." I pointed out that
there were thousands of residents within a few miles and some of us had animals
specifically vulnerable to diseases studied. "Well," he said, "maybe we shouldn't
allow dairy farms within 15 miles of our cities and towns." Residents of
Granville and nearby counties take note: DHS and potential NBAF researchers
apparently have seen the threat, and it's US.

6|5.0 DHS cannot justify a mainland site anywhere for this facility, should never be
allowed to manage such a facility, which only invites international perception
that it will be for bioweapons research and production. We call on DHS to
2 cont.] withdraw its proposal for any mainland site and completely revisit the whole
2.0 concept of the NBAF, and for Congress to overturn the President's directive to
Homeland Security for such a facility and completely re-evaluate the need for
such a mission and the appropriate agency to manage it.

Comment No: 3

Issue Code: 13.3

DHS acknowledges the commentor's concern regarding potential wildlife impacts at the Umstead Research Farm Site. The susceptibility of native wildlife to foreign animal diseases necessitates additional research to further evaluate the potential adverse effects of foreign animal diseases on North American wildlife. Knowledge of susceptible species would facilitate the preparation of response plans, and the development of vaccines for wildlife would be part of the NBAF mission. Introduction of a foreign animal disease into the U.S., whether unintentional or intentional (as an agent of bioterror, for example), might go undetected for a relatively long period of time. Once detected, the necessary time required for response mobilization would further delay containment of the outbreak. Delays in detection and response would increase the potential for a widespread outbreak among wildlife populations. In the event of a widespread outbreak, the availability of effective vaccines for wildlife could prevent devastating impacts on wildlife populations and could be the only means of preventing the extirpation of endangered or otherwise vulnerable native species. The development of response plans and vaccines that focus on susceptible species would enhance the capability to protect native wildlife against the foreign introduction of disease such as Foot and Mouth disease and Rift Valley fever. The potential response measures that could be employed in the event of an accidental release are described in Section 3.8.9 of the NBAF EIS. Table 3.8.9-1 describes the potential response strategies that could be considered in the event of an accidental release. Depopulation or population reduction is one of ten potential FMD response strategies developed by the National Park Service. However, the National Park Service recommends the use of other strategies or combinations of strategies to avoid depopulating wildlife (see Table 3.8.9-1). A more likely scenario would include one or more of the non-lethal measures described in Table 3.8.9-1.

Comment No: 4


Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's watershed concerns. The NBAF EIS Section 3.13.8, Waste Management describes the process that would be used to control and dispose of liquid wastes and Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describes standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spill and runoff affects. A site-specific emergency response plan would be developed and coordinated with the local emergency management plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF.

Comment No: 5

Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. As described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's site selection criteria included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or semi-urban areas. Nevertheless, it has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design,



construction, and operation of the NBAF.

Comment No: 6

Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Taylor, MSPH, Hope

Page 1 of 13

WD0876

From: Hope Taylor [REDACTED]
 Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 11:56 PM
 To: NBAFProgramManager
 Subject: Clean Water for NC comments on NBAF DEIS, Overall Comments

~~~Clean Water for North Carolina~~~  
 2009 Chapel Hill Rd. Durham, NC 27707  
 (919) 401-9600, [www.cwfn.org](http://www.cwfn.org)

James V. Johnson,  
 U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
 Science and Technology Directorate, Mail Stop #2100  
 245 Murray Lane, SW; Building 410; Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Johnson:

Please accept the following comments on behalf of Clean Water for North Carolina, a statewide environmental justice organization with members in over 40 counties, including over 100 in Granville, Wake and Durham Counties which would be most directly impacted by the siting of a proposed NBAF at the Umstead site.

- 1) 1.0 We strongly oppose not only the proposed Butner site, but all of the proposed sites for this DHS facility. The mission is not fully justified to the public, and the level of trust of the agency for safe management of such a facility would make it impossible to obtain public support long enough to complete siting and construction. The No Action Alternative IS the appropriate alternative for DHS to accept, given the completely insufficient justification for the Proposed Action for such a facility as an effective approach to ensuring safety of the U. S. food supply, especially under the administration of the Dept. of Homeland Security.
- 2) 2.0
- 3) 18.3 In particular, the Dept. of Homeland Security has failed to justify the safety of transport, storage, study and treatment and disposal of wastes involving such organisms as Foot and Mouth Disease and Rift Valley Fever in mainland settings or settings with multiple, highly mobile and plentiful disease vectors present. The new expanded mission described for the NBAF cannot be carried out given both the results presented in the Draft EIS even allowing for its many shortcomings, presented in more detail below.
- 4) 5.1 Further, the current BSL-3 and BSL-3Ag research at the current Plum Island facility must be subject to extensive independent audit, including on-site review by international biosafety officials from allied nations to see if such activities can be safely

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 1.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the NBAF. As described in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's mission is to study foreign animal, zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) and emerging diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The NBAF would enable research on the transmission of these animal diseases and support development of diagnostic tests, vaccines, and antiviral therapies for foreign animal, zoonotic and emerging diseases. By proposing to construct the NBAF, DHS is following policy direction established by the Congress and the President.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's opinion. The NBAF's mission is defensive and would not involve offensive bioweapons research or development. The international treaty, known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, to which the United States is a signatory, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of such weapons. DHS's mission is to study foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The purpose of the NBAF would be to develop tests to detect foreign animal and zoonotic diseases and develop vaccines (or other countermeasures such as antiviral therapies) to protect agriculture and food systems in the United States. As stated in section 2.2.2 of the NBAF EIS, the NBAF may be operated as a Government Owned/Government Operated Facility or as a Government Owned/Contractor Operated Facility.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 18.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding safety related to the transportation, storage, study, treatment, and disposal of infectious wastes. The risks associated with releases of infectious wastes addressed in Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, 3.14, and Appendices B, D, and E of the NBAF EIS. These sections provide a detailed analysis of the consequences from an accidental or deliberate pathogen release. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site-specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas.

Table 3.13.2.2-2 in the NBAF EIS lists the waste streams, origins, and pretreatment methods applicable to the liquid waste streams generated by the operation of the NBAF and ultimately destined for the sanitary sewer. Similarly, Table 3.13.2.2-3 lists the waste streams, origins, and pretreatment methods applicable to the waste solids that will be generated by the operation of the NBAF and ultimately destined for offsite disposal. These tables include all of the liquid and solid residuals from all of the different types of carcass disposal methodologies being considered. As

shown on these tables, all of the potentially infectious wastes generated by the facility will be sterilized and, or decontaminated onsite in accordance with requirements found in Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL). The BMBL also requires physical and biological validation that decontamination processes are performing as required. Unless there is an accident or incident, the sanitary sewage released to the South Granville Water And Sewer Authority (SGWASA) would meet SGWASA acceptance criteria and pretreatment requirements.

Comment No: 4

Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's statement. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include the Institutional Biosafety Committee, which will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS. Should a decision be made to build NBAF and the site selected, DHS would begin transition and operational planning which would include consideration of policies and procedures for public participation, education, and also public advisory initiatives. After DHS determines the viability and nature of such a public advisory and oversight function, appropriate roles and responsibilities would be defined.

## Taylor, MSPH, Hope

## Page 2 of 13

WD0876

cont. | 4 | 5.1

continued at Plum Island even with facility upgrades.

5 | 21.3

The existence of such a facility in any community can be quite reasonably anticipated to result in additional attention and potential targeting by domestic and foreign terrorists or saboteurs, and a major shift in local security, quality of life and freedom of movement and exercise of democratic rights. None of these impacts is credibly reviewed in any part of the Draft EIS, but they represent aspects of community health that, once lost, may never be recovered.

cont. | 2 | 2.0

We believe that research arguably in violation of the International Convention on Biological Weapons may be currently or previously carried out at Plum Island and other high level BSL labs, run both by the federal government and private interests. The American public can have no confidence that full disclosure of organisms studied, potential modes of release, security evaluations of both permanent and contract personnel and ambient monitoring are being carried out to protect public health, local and regional economies and food safety. Under the direct administration of the Dept. of Homeland Security, and particularly with the acknowledged likely GOCO contracting of security and other functions to private entities, the public confidence will necessarily be far too low to support the Proposed Action if fully informed of the risks and benefits.

6 | 4.3

The only reason that the NC NBAF proposal and other state proposals have progressed as far toward actual siting as they have, is that the entire process of soliciting and facilitating proposals by state consortia was carried out in a remarkably commercial manner, with selected contacts and stakeholders given limited information about the risks of such facilities and an exaggerated portrayal of potential economic benefits vs the costs from at least early 2006 until the time of Scoping Meetings in September of 2007. The fact that years of federal, state and private time and resources have been used to promote these proposals, with little hope of complete siting and construction represents and enormous waste of resources based on highly faulty information. Surely, with the extent of local opposition and even municipal votes of non-support or opposition around the site that DHS originally ranked highest for community acceptance, DHS must realize how fundamentally unreliable its solicitation process has been and wasteful it has been for all concerned. Until the Agency has established a reasonable level of well-founded public trust and been able to fully articulate and justify a well thought out mission that doesn't place "convenience" of nearby research facilities above all other factors, there is simply no point in further pursuit of an NBAF facility.

The GAO Report, "DHS Lacks Evidence" reveals a simple case of the emperor having no clothes. The Agency simply accepted a completely inadequate study done by the FDA as justification for its decision to move the Plum Island mission and new BSL-4 facilities to a mainland site. A complete failure to analyze the nature of the releases of Foot and Mouth that have occurred internationally, and especially the intrinsic

Comment No: 5

Issue Code: 21.3


DHS notes the commentor's concern that the NBAF would be a prime terrorist target. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS address accident scenarios, including external events such as a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) (designated as For Official Use Only) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process. Section 3.10 addresses capabilities and services of fire protection, law enforcement, and medical facilities each of which has emergency and accident response capabilities. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, then site specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies, that would consider the local response capabilities, diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the area.

Comment No: 6

Issue Code: 4.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the site selection process, which is described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS held a competitive process to select potential sites for the proposed NBAF as described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. A team of federal employees representing multi-department component offices and multi-governmental agencies (i.e., DHS, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Department of Health and Human Services) reviewed the submissions based primarily on environmental suitability and proximity to research capabilities, proximity to workforce, acquisition/construction/operations, and community acceptance. Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program. DHS has conducted public meetings in excess of the minimum required by NEPA regulations; to date, 24 public meetings have been held in the vicinity of NBAF site alternatives and in Washington, D.C. to solicit public input on the EIS, allow the public to voice their concerns, and to get their questions answered DHS has also provided fact sheets, reports, exhibits, and a Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). Additionally, various means of communication (mail, telephone and fax lines, and NBAF Web site) have been provided to facilitate public comment. It is DHS policy to encourage public input on matters of national and international importance.

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives and reference to the U.S. Government Accountability Office report (May 2008) as justification. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable it to be safely operated on the mainland. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS show that



even though Plum Island has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites. The lower potential effect is due both to the water barrier around the island and the lack of livestock and susceptible wildlife species.

## Taylor, MSPH, Hope

## Page 3 of 13

WD0876

cont. | 6 | 4.3

prevention of worst case release scenarios by an isolated location appears to be characteristic of the level of planning for the proposed NBAF. Despite repeated statements that the “box within a box” containment technology of modern facilities will prevent such releases, the actual causes suggest that structural and technological containment may be seriously thwarted by an extensive range of possible human errors, still as likely today as in past incidents. Mitigation is simply not achievable for all types of errors, much less any possible deliberate behaviors by disgruntled or mentally ill research or support staff.

The 2002 study on which DHS based its decision that the NBAF could safely import and study highly lethal and transmissible animal and zoonotic diseases fails to even study the variety of ways in which internal controls in large animal biocontainment facilities are subject to being compromised. At no time following repeated requests for a commitment to ambient monitoring for all diseases under study at the NBAF has the agency ever discussed the need for such monitoring, and only responded sarcastically at a Feb. 28<sup>th</sup> town hall meeting in Butner that “given the amount of support we have here, it might not be a bad idea,” implying that communities that didn’t even summon any opposition were denied even consideration of such precautionary measures.

7 | 23.0

Due to the unique risks associated with BSL-3 Ag facilities, where the facility itself is considered the primary containment area, researchers come directly in contact with the host animals for the organisms they are studying, thus removing an entire layer of both personal protection and creating a higher likelihood of accidental transmission outside the laboratory by researchers. The detailed and redundant decontamination protocols require enormous time and discipline from researchers, further increasing the likelihood of a lapse.

The extremely high viral loads in some animals to be studied and respiratory and excretory release of virus, puts researchers in the facility and other animals they may contact, at much higher risk than a standard BSL-3, with little technical research on the detailed extent of removal of different viruses from air emitted from the facility. The planned presence and breeding of vector insects at the facility further increases the risk of an internal or external release, potentially resulting in infection of vectors with more than one disease virus at a time.

8 | 15.3

While the document repeatedly and with no credible explanation states that the NBAF would provide “Significant” benefits to the region’s economy and the health of domestic animals and wildlife, the chances that such benefits would actually come to a local domestic or wildlife population as opposed to being more widely applied is disingenuous. Moreover, in the case of any release of Foot and Mouth, a standard containment response is a combination of quarantine and destruction of animals. This would be a far more likely scenario than that local animal populations would particularly benefit from the research carried out at an NBAF on a possible Foreign

Comment No: 7

Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor’s statement. As discussed in Section 2.2.1.1 of the NBAF EIS, modern biosafety design substantially diminishes the chances of a release as the primary design goal is to provide an adequate level of redundant safety and biocontainment that would be integrated into every component of the building. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14.

As described in Section 2.2.2 of the NBAF EIS, the proposed NBAF would be either a government owned–government operated (GOGO) or government owned–contractor operated (GOCO) facility. The GOCO model has been replicated many times over the past 50 years, primarily by the Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies. If it is decided that the NBAF would be GOCO, a PMP would be prepared for the facility. As also stated in Section 2.2.2, inspection of the NBAF by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and APHIS would occur a minimum of once over a three-year period. However, standard operating procedures would require more frequent monitoring.

The potential impacts of an accidental release on wildlife are addressed in Section 3.8.9. Although the EIS acknowledges the potential for significant wildlife impacts in the event of an accidental release, the risk of such a release is extremely low (see Section 3.14). The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. An analysis of potential consequences of a pathogen (e.g., Rift Valley fever virus) becoming established in native mosquito populations, particularly in warm, humid climates, was evaluated in Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, and 3.14. The potential response measures that could be employed in the event of an accidental release are described in Section 3.8.9 of the NBAF EIS. Table 3.8.9-1 describes the potential response strategies that could be considered in the event of an accidental release. Depopulation or population reduction is one of ten potential FMD response strategies developed by the National Park Service. However, the National Park Service recommends the use of other strategies or combinations of strategies to avoid depopulating wildlife (see Table 3.8.9-1). A more likely scenario would include one or more of the non-lethal measures described in Table 3.8.9-1. In the event that depopulation or population reduction was determined to be the most appropriate course of action, hunting with firearms would be the likely method for implementing this strategy. The response to an accidental release of a mosquito-borne pathogen such as Rift Valley fever could include the aerial application of insecticides. The use of insecticides could lead to direct adverse impacts on insect fauna, as well as indirect impacts on other wildlife species through disruption of the food chain. Although the NBAF EIS acknowledges the potential for significant impacts on white-tailed deer in the event of an accidental release, the risk of such a release is extremely low (see Section 3.14). It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas and in areas with abundant wildlife. State-of-the-art biocontainment facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF. Furthermore, the purpose of NBAF is to combat diseases that could have

significant effects on wildlife. Research at the NBAF would include the development of vaccines for wildlife that could prevent adverse impacts from a foreign introduction.

As discussed in Section 2.2.2 of the NBAF EIS, standard operating procedures would be established based on the data compiled from the construction documents, commissioning process, regulatory agencies, and their own experience with simulated system failure scenarios. These scenarios would occur during the commissioning process to help prepare the maintenance and research staff to respond in a timely and effective manner should the failure occur during normal operation of the facility. One example of biocontainment laboratory operation and maintenance procedures that would be required is daily inspections of essential containment and life support systems that must be completed and documented before laboratory work is initiated to ensure that the laboratory is operating according to established parameters. Practical and effective protocols for emergency situations would be established. These protocols would include plans for medical emergencies, facility malfunctions, fires, animals escaping within the laboratory, and other potential emergencies. Training in emergency response procedures would be provided to emergency response personnel and other responsible staff according to institutional policies. Many of the training and testing requirements are to maintain certification and licensure to operate a laboratory, which generally take up to a year beyond the construction phase to complete. The BMBL is the primary guidance source to ensure a safe and effective testing and training program for successful state-of-the-art biocontainment laboratory facilities.

Comment No: 8

Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The economic impact of an accidental release is presented in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. While the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, DHS acknowledges that the possible economic effect would be significant for all sites. The primary economic effect of an accidental release would be the banning of U.S. livestock products regardless of the location of the accidental release, which could reach as high as \$4.2 billion until the U.S. was declared foreign animal disease-free.

## Taylor, MSPH, Hope

## Page 4 of 13

|                | WD0876                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| cont.  8  15.3 | Animal Disease outbreak.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| cont.  7  23.0 | <p>The inherent additional risks and failures of accountability and transparency associated with a GOCO arrangement are not evaluated or even discussed in the DEIS.</p> <p>The DEIS states that " CDC or APHIS would inspect the laboratories at least once over a 3-year period. This inspection is not required prior to approval of the application." One of the few grounds for security that a host community would have of the effective function of all safety systems, the physical integrity of the building and the adherence to meticulous protocols would be a frequent schedule of independent inspections. Once every three years demonstrates a remarkable degree of complacency about a wide range of potential physical faults and human errors that a laboratory has little hope of catching quickly with routine self inspections.</p> |
| cont.  3  18.3 | Given the large volumes of wastes with potentially very high virus loads, simply monitoring the completeness of disinfection by heat levels can never be considered adequate. As the organisms are not ones regulated by the Clean Water Act or Clean Air Act, it is simply unacceptable to release wastes to a publicly owned treatment works, particularly one with a highly challenged history of non-compliance in its own pretreatment program. A highly precautionary approach of repeated biological monitoring and higher redundant containment around treatment basins used for repeated heat or other treatments is a bare minimum to prevent contamination of groundwater, air or surface water, especially as all carcass disposal methods will potentially further increase virus loads to air or wastewater.                                 |
| 9  17.3        | Given the wide range of accident scenarios in which routine commercial shipment of foreign animal disease samples could result in a release, the protocols and methods of transport are remarkably casual, particularly as samples could even contain unidentified disease strains for which appropriate levels of protection would not be well established.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |
| cont.  5  21.3 | Emergency response officials in Durham County recently commented that they simply "do not have the resources" to deal with any kind of accident or release at a facility like NBAF, a significant reason by County Commissioners voted to oppose the lab. Honest officials recognize that a likely scenario is that responders, even with some training in dealing with a biohazard release, would be likely to leave the area with their families and be unable to provide support for local populations who were either evacuated or, more likely, quarantined.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
| 10  12.3       | Potable Water. "Operation would result in use of 39,500,000 gpy of potable water but can be met by currently available capacity." This statement shows little familiarity with the nature of Butner's water supply and its vulnerability to drought. Simply having a treatment plant with sufficient treatment capacity does not ensure that an adequate supply of water in the upper watershed Holt Reservoir would have sufficient supply to                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |

Comment No: 9                      Issue Code: 17.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the handling and transport of packages containing identified and unidentified pathogens. The general regulations governing the required NBAF handling and transport of packages containing pathogens, and a discussion of the low risk associated with the shipment of infectious materials is provided in Section 3.11.9 of the NBAF EIS. Section 2.2.2.3 of the NBAF EIS provides detailed information on the handling and transport of packages containing pathogens. Additionally, an analysis of accidental releases during transportation is provided in Section 3.14, Health and Safety and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS. Information regarding the existing road conditions and potential effects to traffic and transportation from the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative is provided in Section 3.11.7 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 10                      Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns and DHS acknowledges the current regional drought conditions. Described in Section 3.7.7.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Granville Water and Sewer Authority has 3 to 4 million gallons per day of excess potable water capacity and could meet NBAF's need of approximately 110,000 gallons per day, currently less than 0.4% of the Authority's total current capacity. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 210 residential homes. Section 3.13.8 describes the waste management processes that would be used to control and dispose of NBAF's liquid and solid waste. Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spills and runoff affects. Section 3.10.7.1.3 describes local response capabilities and Section 3.14.4.5 describes an accidental release's site specific consequences.

Taylor, MSPH, Hope

Page 5 of 13

WD0876

cont. | 10 | 12.3

ensure operations a facility that would be little able to conserve with its high animal holding capacity, its steam sterilization and other water uses.

11 | 9.3

Air quality impact evaluation in the DEIS failed to acknowledge the potential for air transmission of disease organisms in the event of an air filter or other envelope failure. Also the south Granville area has come very close to non-attainment for ozone, and operation of this facility could pose some potential NOX and particulate impacts, particularly if an incinerator were selected as the means of carcass disposal, and in inversion conditions. Further, air transmission of diseases could be transmission to water bodies due to stormwater runoff and other deposition. None of these potential impacts was evaluated, despite the presence of five significant public water supply reservoirs within a few miles, and the largest water supply source, Falls Lake, immediately downstream of the intended wastewater discharge and close to any sediment flows that could result from erosion during construction.

cont. | 8 | 15.3

The following paragraph represents a completely unrealistic view of the needs for training and the potential to prevent major economic and food security impacts in the event of a release: "Law enforcement and fire protection personnel would be adequately trained by DHS to respond to incidents at the NBAF. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low (see Section 3.14), but the economic effect would be significant. The cattle and pork industries in North Carolina and the area around the site are relatively small, resulting in less potential economic loss from an extreme FMD-related event than has been previously described. Response measures to contain and eliminate the threat would also greatly reduce the potential economic loss.

2 | 20.3

The population around the SGWASA plant, within two miles of the proposed site, does show higher level of low income residents and African-Americans. Further, despite repeated comments starting in the scoping period about the presence of thousands of patients and prisoners within a short distance of the proposed site, none of whom could be safely evacuated or quarantined, the DHS has completely ignored these populations in all considerations. In fact, it has been pointed out that a mere rumor of a release occurring could be sufficient to cause severe hardship and potentially even deaths among these vulnerable populations. This is a severe environmental injustice that the DHS and its contractors continue to ignore.

Specific Chapter 3 Comments

**Mitigation (3.15), Unavoidable Adverse Impacts (3.16)**

Section 3.15

Page 3-502

Comment No: 11

Issue Code: 9.3

DHS notes the commentor's air quality concerns. The potential effects of NBAF operations on air quality are discussed in Section 3.4 of the NBAF EIS and includes the potential effects from incineration. Section 3.4.1 describes the methodology used in assessing potential air quality consequences at each site. Carcass/pathological waste disposal, including incineration, is discussed in Chapter 3 Section 3.13. Conservative assumptions were used to ensure the probable maximum effects were evaluated. Once the final design is determined, a more refined air emissions model will be used during the permitting process. The final design will ensure that the NBAF %does not significantly affect% the region's ability to meet air quality standards. Chapter 3 Section 3.14.4.5 describes site specific consequences from accidental events.

Comment No: 12

Issue Code: 20.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. A site-specific emergency response plan will be developed and coordinated with the local Emergency Management Plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety are evaluated in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives, and the probability of a release requiring a quarantine or evacuation is very low. DHS would offer coordination and training to local medical personnel regarding the effects of pathogens to be studied at the NBAF. Emergency management plans will also include training for local law enforcement, health care, and fire and rescue personnel. The impacts analysis specifically included consideration of environmental justice concerns to include an assessment of the potential for disproportionately high and adverse effects to minority or low-income populations, as further described in Section 3.1 of the NBAF EIS. No disproportionately high and adverse effects to environmental or human resources are evident for the proposed Umstead Research Farm Site from normal facility operations.

## Taylor, MSPH, Hope

## Page 6 of 13

WD0876

13| 26.0 **Infrastructure and Utilities**

Potential for NBAF utility needs to exceed capacity of local providers

"Local utility providers may need to upgrade their public utility. In some cases, upgrades are already planned and would accommodate NBAF requirements; in other cases, the provider would have to upgrade the utility and has agreed to do so, where necessary.

Utility upgrades would rectify the impact of potential capacity exceedances of local public utilities."

COMMENT: This is NOT mitigation, in that it does not provide any mechanism or funding from the DHS to actually mitigate this circumstance of inadequate local infrastructure. Instead, all such improvements must be locally funded, mitigation is entirely based on such funding.

Page 3-504/5

cont.| 10| 12.3 **Erosion and sedimentation to surface waters**

"During construction, erosion control measures would be implemented in accordance with applicable permits and a SWPPP. Such measures would be site specific but are likely to include BMPs such as filter fabric fences, drop inlet protection, natural covered swales, and/or sedimentation ponds. Use of these measures would be required in the construction contract. Post-construction, the NBAF design includes landscaping with functional storm water management uses and the maintenance/retention of a healthy soil structure. These construction and design features would help to reduce the likelihood of project-related soil erosion."

COMMENT: Completely inadequate mitigation to indicate BMP's to prevent erosion and sedimentation. State Land Quality program for such oversight is notoriously understaffed and ineffective in inspection and enforcement of sediment and erosion plans, not matter how well designed. Oversight of projects lead by government entities (DHS in this case) tends to be even weaker than construction by private entities. Inspections and enforcement from state DENR Regional offices also tend to be weaker with distance from the offices, and Granville County site would be almost 1 hour from Raleigh Regional Office, slowing response time to complaints and reducing expected inspection schedule. The "screening" of the site from public will also reduce the public's ability to observe sediment and erosion practices and plan violations preventively or downstream impacts of inadequate practices and violations in the form of sediment in creeks draining the site.

Comment No: 13

Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's opinion.

## Taylor, MSPH, Hope

## Page 7 of 13

WD0876

cont| 10| 12.3

No local jurisdiction or funding for erosion and sedimentation and no experience at the county level. Clean Water for NC has frequently experienced little or very poor WQ response to sedimentation events, so DHS and contractors could not be expected to be held accountable for plan violations OR effects of sedimentation on downstream waters.

Page 3-505

**Stormwater Runoff**

"The design of the NBAF includes measures to reduce storm water runoff due to increased impervious surface. For example, design measures include pervious pavement in both parking lots and pedestrian walkways, capturing and using roof runoff for landscape watering, and grading of parking lots to filter storm water through landscaped areas. These design features are consistent with the LID approach. The goal of LID design is to minimize runoff volume and preserve existing flow paths by managing runoff and detaining storm water prior to discharging to a municipal storm water conveyance system."

COMMENT: Minimizing stormwater runoff from the site is NOT adequate, due to the potential for release of organisms from a containment breach, whether failure of primary or secondary structural containment, failure of air filters due to faulty installation, inadequate replacement or maintenance, or due to accidental removal from containment by carrying of organisms on clothing, skin, shoes or breath of researchers, support staff or visitors. Stormwater measures must prevent the possibility of any stormwater release from the site. All stormwater must be captured and subjected to redundant pre-treatment and prior analysis for all organisms under study.

Page 3-505

**Potential Groundwater contamination during construction**

"A SPCC plan would be prepared that would describe potential spill sources, locations, volumes, flow directions, and response/mitigation tactics. Response/mitigation tactics would be site specific but are likely to include BMPs and good engineering practices that minimize or prevent either horizontal or vertical pollutant transport. Adherence to this plan would be required in the construction contract."

COMMENT: The potential for groundwater contamination exists not only during construction, but during operations as well, both with chemically and radiologically hazardous substances used for studies, as well as biohazardous materials handled before, during and after animal experiments at the NBAF. BMP's and a response and mitigation plan do not assure that no spills will occur that present a risk of groundwater contamination. Given the fracture geology of this region, any contaminants could

## Taylor, MSPH, Hope

## Page 8 of 13

WD0876

cont.] 10] 12.3

spread quickly and unpredictably to off site groundwater, potentially impacting private or public drinking water wells, or being released to local surface waters from groundwater discharge to streams. The NBAF must include inside and outside perimeter shallow and deep aquifer monitoring wells, with at least twice annual monitoring for all organisms under study and all toxic or hazardous substances used or stored on site at levels reportable under Tier II to EPA, State CERCLA and the Local Emergency Planning Committee. Under no circumstances will the NBAF be exempt from full accountability for such reporting timely, as well as other requirements indicated by the LEPC and all units responsible for any emergency response at the site or nearby institutions, residents or businesses.

Page 3-505

**Biological Resources: Impacts to on- or off-site wetlands and aquatic resources and species that may use these resources from spills and runoff during construction or operation**

"Wetlands, streams, and aquatic habitats would be avoided through design and siting. Depending on the site, however, some project features such as a utility line, access road, or perimeter fence could cross a wetland or aquatic resource that cannot be avoided. In such a case, proper permits would be obtained; compensation for impacts may be required. During construction, BMPs such as filter fabric fences, drop inlet protection, natural covered swales, and/or sedimentation ponds would be employed to minimize the potential for impacts to wetlands or other aquatic resources, both on- and off-site.

Use of

these measures would be required in the construction contract. Post construction, vegetated buffer strips would be maintained around any surface waters on-site to intercept potential sedimentation. Additional measures outlined in a SWPPP and SPCC would be followed. Design measures consistent with the LID approach would be used, such as pervious pavement in both parking lots and pedestrian walkways, capturing and using roof runoff for landscape watering, and grading of parking lots to filter storm water through landscaped areas to minimize runoff."

COMMENT: Note that avoidance of wetlands disturbances are only ensured for the NBAF site itself and not for very extensive infrastructure development (extensive water and wastewater lines, electrical and gas supply and access roads) that would be required for the Umstead site, or even for the perimeter fence itself. See also comments above for erosion and sedimentation impacts and stormwater. BMPs will not be adequate to avoid significant impacts, and in any case, can be expected to be poorly implemented, inspected and that violations will be significantly unenforced, based on prior experience with Div. of Land Quality and Div. of Water Quality in North Carolina.

## Taylor, MSPH, Hope

## Page 9 of 13

WD0876

Page 3-506

cont.[7] 23.0

**Potential adverse effects to wildlife due to accidental release**

"The NBAF includes many features specifically designed to reduce the potential release of pathogens and therefore avoid potential impacts. Such features include perimeter fencing, HEPA filtration for air exhaust and air intake systems, design of critical zones as a sealed "box-within-a-box" with interlocks at all points of access, and hardened structural systems to mitigate progressive collapse that would help withstand seismic and/or other external threats. Additionally, adherence to operational procedures, which could include measures such as use of sterile mosquitos, and BMBL guidelines would further reduce release potential.

In the event of a release, plans would be developed that identify mitigation measures to minimize impacts to wildlife and livestock. Based on existing plans developed by the USDA and NPS, such measures could include establishment of various zones of response (e.g., infected zone, buffer zone, control zone, and outer surveillance zone); coordination with federal, state, and local agencies; assessment of the risks posed by wildlife based on density and distribution, social organization, habitat, contact with domestic livestock, and the length of time that wildlife could have been exposed to the virus; determination of the required level of management and control measures, potentially including population reduction or procedures to prevent or limit wildlife and livestock interaction; and implementation of mosquito control measures."

COMMENT: Design features mentioned to prevent release are structural and dependent on frequent inspection and redundant checks to ensure maintenance and avoidance of structural, filtration or interlock failures. Such inspections must be frequently performed (at least quarterly) by independent agencies and not left to onsite government or contract staff. In addition, local emergency responders who have been trained in bio-safety procedures and standards must be allowed to participate in these inspections at least annually in order to report to responding units, local officials and the public the status of all systems and procedures at the facility.

The fact that an arthropod colony will be developed and maintained on the site only increases the risk that already infected vectors could be a source of release of organisms to wildlife and potentially to domestic and human populations. No reproductively capable arthropods can be safely maintained on the NBAF site, instead all disease vector organisms must be bred offsite, completely sterilized and shipped to the site free of all infection. As soon as exposure to study organisms has occurred, animals to be studied via exposure through these a known number of these vectors must be exposed within 2 days and all insects captured, accounted for and killed.

## Taylor, MSPH, Hope

## Page 10 of 13

WD0876

cont.[7] 23.0

The planning for containment and elimination of exposed animals must long pre-date the installation of any animals, disease organisms or insect vectors at the site and must be pre-approved by the local elected officials, emergency management and a local advisory body. It is completely inadequate to develop such plans "In the event of a release."

Page 3-506

8| 15.3

**Socioeconomics: Potential adverse effects to agricultural and hunting economy due to accidental release**

"The NBAF includes many features specifically designed to reduce the potential release of pathogens that could result in economic impacts. Such measures include perimeter fencing, HEPA filtration for air exhaust and air intake systems, design of critical zones as a sealed "box-within-a-box" with interlocks at all points of access, and hardened structural systems to mitigate progressive collapse that would help withstand seismic and/or other external threats. Additionally, adherence to operational procedures, which could include measures such as use of sterile mosquitos, and BMBL guidelines would further reduce release potential."

COMMENT: While the above named measures would reduce the likelihood of potential release, they would not eliminate it altogether, even in routine operations, much less under the impact of a major storm event, explosion due to pressure, sabotage or attack. The resulting impact to agriculture, public health and recreational tourism would potentially be at least regional in the southeast and potentially nationwide if foot and mouth or another highly contagious disease organism were to escape. The estimated economic impacts are a serious underestimate of over two-fold even for statewide impacts, and could exceed by one to two orders of magnitude the estimated economic impact if the entire region or nation's food supply and export capacity is damaged due to widespread quarantine and need to destroy animals.

Page 3-507

**Existing Hazardous, Toxic, and Radiologic Waste: Exposure of construction workers to existing contaminants**

"additional hazardous, toxic, and radiologic waste evaluations may be undertaken prior to construction. Based on the results of the evaluation, measures would be identified that should be used to mitigate the construction or operational impacts due to former waste management practices. Such measures could include Health and Safety Plan, Soil Management Plan, additional remediation, and specialized worker training."

## Taylor, MSPH, Hope

Page 11 of 13

WD0876

cont. | 12 | 23.0

COMMENT: Characterization of each site is extremely cursory, not based on most detailed information and requiring further on-site extensive studies. In particular, contaminants from known RCRA sites, groundwater contamination near known or suspected military disposal sites and extremely limited search for unexploded ordnance will all require more detailed characterization and potential cleanup and removal of all hazards to prevent exposure of both construction workers and workers during operation of an NBAF, as well as prevention of disturbance and spreading of contaminants to nearby residents. With an extensive military and agricultural history for this site, it is possible that extensive contamination yet uncovered will need to be remediated to prevent such impacts. Both types of land use have been shown to create an increased risk of soil and groundwater contamination at or near historic facilities, with minimal records to guide contractors or government officials carrying out a site characterization.

Page 3-507

cont. | 3 | 18.3

**Waste Management: Potential for NBAF liquid waste stream to exceed acceptance criteria at local sewage treatment facility and to exceed capacity of local providers**

"Pre-treatment of liquid waste streams, such as pH adjustment, may be necessary and would be implemented to meet sewage acceptance criteria, therefore avoiding potential impacts. At some sites, the local sewer system or wastewater treatment facility may need to be upgraded to accommodate the liquid waste stream from the NBAF. In some cases, upgrades are currently planned or are underway. The upgrades could include installation

of additional capacity at the wastewater treatment facility, installation of larger pipes from the NBAF to the treatment facility, or installation of connecting pipe from the NBAF to the sewer system. The local utility would make the upgrades. Utility upgrades would rectify the impact of potential capacity exceedances of local public utilities."

COMMENT: It is not simply a matter of the potential for waste streams to "exceed acceptance criteria" at local sewage treatment facility that must be considered. There is indeed the potential to exceed critical effluent concentrations for BOD, nitrogen and other typical parameters already captured in the SGWASA permit with the addition of this facility to its influent facilities, especially with discharge to a federally recognized impaired low flow stream and downstream public drinking water supply reservoir suffering from low dissolved oxygen, excess algal growth due to high nutrient inputs, and toxicity. Still more critical is the addition of waste streams, as yet uncharacterized as to their full volume and impact due to several disposal options for animal carcasses, with organisms that are completely unregulated under the Clean Water Act. It is utterly unjustifiable on the basis of public health, economics and liability, to ask a publicly owned and operated wastewater treatment works to accept and treat in such waste

## Taylor, MSPH, Hope

## Page 12 of 13

WD0876

cont. | 3 | 18.3 streams. No possible utility upgrade could reduce the potential for release of dangerous contaminants unregulated under the Clean Water Act and for which the operators have no means of treatment or analysis of pre-treated influent wastes or prevention of mixing with other waste streams. Consequently the facility cannot be held accountable for safe treatment of such wastes.

Page 3-508

cont. | 7 | 23.0 **Health and Safety: Worker Health and Safety During Operations**

"Compliance with CDC/NIH requirements and OSHA standards including procedural controls and use of primary containment barriers (e.g., biosafety cabinets, special process equipment, and safety suits)."

COMMENT: Inspections are infrequent and not always unannounced, violations are unenforced, inadequate public disclosure of occurrences of security and operational procedures. Primary containment is not always adequate to prevent releases, given high likelihood of human error in use of facilities and equipment.

Health and Safety: Public Safety During Operations

"Compliance with CDC/NIH requirements and OSHA standards including procedural controls and use of secondary containment barriers (e.g., robust facility design, HEPA filtration, and fire suppression)."

COMMENT: Inspections are infrequent and not always unannounced, resulting in inadequate maintenance and repair of secondary containment, inadequate supervision and security practices. Violations are without regulatory consequences, inadequate public disclosure of occurrences of security and operational procedures. Even secondary containment is not always adequate to prevent releases, given high likelihood of human error in operations, maintenance, oversight and use of facilities and equipment.

Page 3-510-511

Umstead would be the ONLY site out of the proposed alternatives that would have to construct new sewer, gas, electricity AND water lines to the proposed site (all of the other sites have at least 1-3 of the necessary lines available at their proposed site). It seems likely that North Carolina would have to pay for some of these connections/constructions. Also, we would be constructing all lines/connections in currently undeveloped land (I wonder how these new lines/infrastructure would affect the undeveloped wilderness?). See Pages 10-11 of Executive Summary.

Taylor, MSPH, Hope

Page 13 of 13

WD0876

cont. | 7/23.0

DHS will not release any proposed "mitigation measures" (for the event that an organism was released into the surrounding environment) until after they have selected a site. This certainly places the onus on the critical public to hypothesize what measures would need to be in place to mitigate any potential release into our North Carolina site, and also suggests that the creators of the EIS have not fully considered the extent of the effects such a release could cause into this, or any other area.

Yours truly,

Hope C. Taylor, MSPH  
Executive Director

Terhune, Don

Page 1 of 1

PD0086

August 16, 2008

Yes,

1|25.4 | This is Don Terhune. I'm calling from ██████████ Kansas and I wish to express my opinion on the NBAF installation that was thought about being moved here.

2|21.4 | I am against it and the reason for being against it is not that I don't think the facility itself could not be made safe, but I am afraid that the people working in the facility are a big variable and cannot really be guaranteed that these people can be always up-and-up and not maybe come up with somebody who is a little bit off or has a grudge or whatever.

A good instance is the case of the scientist who was involved with the anthrax problem there. Nobody thought for years that this man had anything to do with the...sell...with the giving out anthrax and as a result people died. And this is a very respectable scientist, I assume. This is why I'm saying it's the scientists; it's the people that we cannot be sure about.

And in this area where we have a lot of people in the cattle industry, I'm afraid you're right in the heart of where the danger could be very, very influential in causing a drastic situation.

1 cont.|25.4 | Really that's all I had to say. Again, I'm against the installation being put here in  
3|5.0 | Manhattan, and as a matter of fact, possibly someplace on the coastal areas would be best because we at least are not centered in the middle...in the heartland.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2                      Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding a malicious and criminal act perpetrated by an NBAF employee. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS address accident scenarios, including internal and external events such as an "insider" criminal act and terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) (designated as For Official Use Only) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety.

Comment No: 3                      Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's position and concern for locating NBAF in a coastal location away from the heartland. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated on the mainland. As described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's site selection criteria included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or semi-urban areas. Nevertheless, it has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

**Terrillo, Jennifer**

**Page 1 of 1**

WD0085

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**From:** April Gomes [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, July 16, 2008 7:39 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** NBAF

1| 25.2

My name is Jennifer Terrillo, I do not want a bio terror lab in Athens, GA.  
[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Teuanova, Robbie

Page 1 of 1

MSD002



## National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Draft Environmental Impact Statement Comment Form

Personal information is optional as this document is part of the public record and may be reproduced in its entirety in the final National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement.

Name: Robbie Teuanova

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

Organization: \_\_\_\_\_

Address: \_\_\_\_\_

City: \_\_\_\_\_ State: \_\_\_\_\_ Zip Code: \_\_\_\_\_

Comments: I really think this will be very good for our city and its state.

(Continued on back for your convenience)

NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY  
Science and Technology Directorate/Office of National Laboratories

1/24.5

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Tharrington, W. Dennis

Page 1 of 1

WDL022

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**From:** Dennis Tharrington [dennis@ncol.net]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 02, 2008 4:08 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** Comment on the NBAF Draft Environmental Impact Statement

Dear Sirs:

1|27.0 I represent the Henderson Vance Economic Development Partnership. We have been observing the debate about the Bio-Defense Facility proposed for Butner, NC. Our board has had several discussions concerning the placement of this facility in Butner. The board is composed of Vance County Commissioner representatives, City Council representatives, and a variety of "regular" folks that represent a cross-section of residents in our county.

We previously endorsed locating the facility in Butner, NC, but some of us are disturbed to see members of the Granville County Commission withholding their endorsement of the project. We don't understand their hesitation, but our local county commissioners don't want to "override" another county's representatives. Therefore, we would like to change our position to one of neutrality. If our brethren in Granville have a change of heart or become more openly supportive of the facility, we would have no problem changing to support at that time.

Having stated the board's position, I feel like the consummate politician.

Respectfully submitted,

W. Dennis Tharrington  
Partnership Chairman

Comment No: 1      Issue Code: 27.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Thibault, Dean

Page 1 of 1

WD0540

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**From:** Dean & Mary Thibault [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Sunday, August 24, 2008 11:37 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** NBAF- Manhattan, Ks

Gentlemen,

1| 24.4 My name is Dean Thibault, a resident of [REDACTED] Ks. I wish to offer my endorsement of the NBAF facility being located in Manhattan. I am a lifetime resident of Kansas, a graduate of Kansas State University and a 35 year career banker in the state of Kansas, the last 10 years in [REDACTED]. I am highly interested in the safety and security of these United States and feel it is in the best interests of our country to place the NBAF facility in Manhattan. Manhattan is best suited for the work of NBAF being in the animal health corridor of the country and it provides a wonderful community for the scientific staff to live and raise their families. I hope you will place Manhattan at the top of your list!! Dean R.Thibault

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Thomas, Britt

Page 1 of 1

WD0543

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**From:** Britt Thomas [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, August 25, 2008 7:46 AM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** National Bio & Agro Defense Research Facility

To Whom It May Concern:

1|24.5 | I am in support of the project coming to Flora, MS. It would be a huge boost to the job market and local economy.

***Britt Thomas***

Assistant Project Manager  
Laws Construction



Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Thomas, Ernest

Page 1 of 1

PD0222

August 22, 2008

1| 24.5

Hi. My name is Ernest Thomas and I am calling in support of the Flora, Mississippi site. You couldn't find a better site. We're all in this area, I live right here in the central Mississippi area, and we're 110 percent behind it. And we need...we've got plenty of technicians and things that would love to go to work.

And we look forward to having y'all as our neighbors.

Thank you very much.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Thomas, Marie

Page 1 of 1

PD0125

August 20, 2008

Hi,

1| 24.5 My name is Marie Thomas. I'm a resident of [REDACTED] Mississippi. I went to high school in Madison, Mississippi, and I'm calling in support of the NBAF project to locate in Flora, Mississippi.

We have great students, great workforce, and people who are ready and willing to accept NBAF.

We hope that you will choose us and we look forward to help protect our Nation.

Thank you for considering Flora and we want you to be here.

Bye, bye.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Thomas, Patricia

Page 1 of 1

WD0346

From: [REDACTED]  
 Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 9:24 AM  
 To: NBAFProgramManager  
 Subject: support for Athens, GA

Dear Program Manager:

1|24.2 | I am a tax-paying, home-owning resident of Athens, GA, who would welcome NBAF to this community. I believe bringing this crucial national research facility here will benefit both "town and gown."

2|15.2 | This is a town that needs new jobs, and although many of the highly paid researchers would come from elsewhere, their arrival would benefit skilled construction tradespeople and service workers as well. There would also be new jobs for Athenians at the lab. We need more people with steady paychecks, who can stimulate all sectors of the local economy.

On the UGA side (and I am a member of the faculty), I believe that increasing the critical mass of research scientists here will strengthen UGA's research portfolio and help us move up a few rungs in the scientific world. The combination of NBAF and a new medical school would be especially synergistic. New collaborations would spring up, new companies would be created and more jobs created.

My sense is that the loudest opponents of the lab do not represent the majority of the citizens -- and that these people have jobs and aren't worried about how they are going to buy groceries or repair their cars. We have many poor and underemployed people in our town, and my sense is that they would welcome a large facility that creates new employment opportunities. Athens Tech is also an excellent resource -- it could easily prepare high school graduates to hold technical jobs in laboratories.

1 cont. | Please keep Athens in the running.  
 24.2

Sincerely,  
 Patricia Thomas

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 24.2

DHS notes the commentor's support for the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2                      Issue Code: 15.2

DHS notes the commentor's support for the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative. The number of short-term and permanent jobs are discussed in Section 3.10. It is expected that approximately 2,700 direct temporary jobs would result from construction of the NBAF, with many of the jobs being filled locally. Approximately 483 permanent jobs, including the initial 326 direct jobs, would result from operation of the NBAF, with much of the scientific work force relocating to the region.

**Thomas, Stony**

**Page 1 of 1**

**PD0142**

August 21, 2008

1|24.5

Hello, my name is Stony Thomas and I am a resident of Madison County and I'm calling on behalf of Mississippi as the choice for the NBAF facility. I think that we have a great location. I think we have great resources and I think that, you know it's...it'd be a great opportunity for Mississippi to support protecting our country against bioterrorism. The people of Mississippi fully support this. I personally support it. A lot of the people that I know support it. So please keep us in consideration. I think that we are the best choice and should be your first choice.

Thank you for this opportunity, for allowing me to give my opinion.

Bye.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Thompson, Bennie

Page 1 of 1

**BENNIE G. THOMPSON**  
SECOND DISTRICT, MISSISSIPPI

COMMITTEE ON  
HOMELAND SECURITY  
CHAIRMAN

WASHINGTON OFFICE:  
2432 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-2402  
(202) 225-5876  
(202) 225-5898: FAX  
E-Mail: [benniethompson@mail.house.gov](mailto:benniethompson@mail.house.gov)  
Home Page: <http://www.house.gov/thompson>

**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
Washington, DC 20515-2402  
August 5, 2008

**MSD001**  
THE COMMISSION ON  
CONGRESSIONAL MAILING  
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James V. Johnson  
U. S. Department of Homeland Security  
Science and Technology Directorate  
Mail Stop #2100  
245 Murray Lane, SW, Building 410  
Washington, DC 20528

Mr. Johnson:

I would like to express my strong support for the need of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF).

The United States agricultural and food infrastructure is potentially susceptible to terrorist attack or accidental risks posed by biological pathogens. To partially meet the research needs and to shore up this vulnerability, the Department of Homeland Security and Congress have been working together to authorize and appropriate funds to construct a new facility, the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). NBAF, a Department of Homeland Security facility, will serve as an integrated human, foreign animal and zoonotic disease research center to bolster our Nation's biodefenses.


The Nation currently lacks bio-containment laboratories with the necessary biosafety levels - three and four, the two highest risk-containment levels that also have sufficient space to conduct research on large animals. The highest safety levels require elaborate safety measures for entering and exiting rooms and the use of protective suits. The facility would consist of state-of-the-art biocontainment laboratories and be of a sufficient size in terms and acreage and lab capacity.

NBAF will fill our nation's research gap, provide a unique capability, and fulfill the guidance in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-9 to develop a plan "to provide safe and secure laboratories to conduct foreign animal and zoonotic disease research.

As Chair of the House Committee on Homeland Security, I lend my unwavering support for DHS moving forward with the site selection process of the National Bio and Agro-defense Facility. I have championed the need for NBAF in the House Committee on Homeland Security and actually authored the legislation in the House that establishes NBAF.

As U.S. Representative of Mississippi's Second District, I support the Mississippi Consortium in its efforts to put forth a comprehensive proposal that not only meets the needs of the Department of Homeland Security, but also encompasses the needs of the local community and reflects the diversity of the Great State of Mississippi.

Sincerely,



Bennie G. Thompson  
Member of Congress

|                                                                                                                                                         |                                                                                                              |                                                                                                               |                                                                                                                    |                                                                                                                           |                                                                                                                                                                 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 107 WEST MADISON STREET<br>P.O. Box 610<br>BOLTON, MS 39041<br>(601) 896-9003<br>(601) 896-9036: FAX<br>(800) 385-9003: IN ST. | <input type="checkbox"/> 509 HIGHWAY 82 WEST<br>GREENWOOD, MS 38930<br>(662) 455-9003<br>(662) 453-0118: FAX | <input type="checkbox"/> 910 COURTHOUSE LANE<br>GREENVILLE, MS 38701<br>(662) 335-9003<br>(662) 334-1304: FAX | <input type="checkbox"/> 3807 MEDGAR EVERS BOULEVARD<br>JACKSON, MS 39213<br>(601) 946-9003<br>(601) 982-8337: FAX | <input type="checkbox"/> 263 EAST MAIN STREET<br>P.O. Box 396<br>MARKS, MS 39246<br>(662) 326-9003<br>(662) 326-9003: FAX | <input type="checkbox"/> MOUND BAYOU CITY HALL<br>P.O. Box 679<br>106 GREEN AVENUE, SUITE 106<br>MOUND BAYOU, MS 38762<br>(662) 741-9003<br>(662) 741-9002: FAX |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

Comment No: 1                      Issue Code: 24.0  
DHS notes the Congressman's support for the NBAF project and the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2                      Issue Code: 24.5  
DHS notes the Congressman's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Thompson, Cathy

Page 1 of 1

MD0070

## Name and complete address:

Cathy Thompson  
[REDACTED]

## Comment:

- 1) There is a failure to show that when the facility ages, there will be funds for upgrades and safety systems.
- 2) Failure to show security of the facility.
- 3) Failure to disclose all the organisms that will be studied at the facility and if they will be released for public information
- 4) Does not discuss water runoff to rivers & drinking water sources and air quality with the destruction of the animal remains
- 5) Failure to discuss who will train volunteers and people on staff in the surrounding areas and other counties.
- 6) Failure to discuss who will monitor the facility other than the government. Need 3 or 4 sources
- 7) Failure to discuss that if there is a small accident will residents be notified at the time of the accident.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commenter's concerns about long-term funding for the NBAF to ensure safe operations. The U.S. Congress and the President are responsible for determining funding priorities for government programs. DHS spends funds in accordance with congressional intent. DHS would maintain the NBAF and ancillary facilities in compliance with applicable environmental, safety, and health requirements and provide for safe operation and maintenance.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commenter's concern for security of the NBAF. Regardless of location, the NBAF would have the levels of protection and control required by applicable DHS security directives. A Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only) was prepared that evaluated site-specific security issues and will be considered in the decision making process on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where. Security would be provided by a series of fencing, security cameras, and protocols. In addition, a dedicated security force would be present on-site. Additional security could be provided via cooperation with local law enforcement agencies.

DHS notes the commenter's concern that all possible pathogens to be studied at the NBAF are not listed in the NBAF EIS. The pathogens to be studied at the NBAF as provided in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS include Foot and Mouth Disease virus, Classical Swine Fever virus, Vesicular Stomatitis virus, Rift Valley Fever virus, Nipah virus, Hendra virus, and African Swine Fever virus. Should the NBAF be directed to study any pathogens not included in the list of pathogens included in the NBAF EIS, DHS and USDA would conduct an evaluate of the new pathogen(s) to determine if the potential challenges and consequences were bounded by the current study. If not, a new risk assessment would be prepared and a separate NEPA evaluation may be required.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commenter's watershed concern. The NBAF EIS Section 3.13.8 describes the Waste Management processes that would be used to control and dispose of NBAF's liquid and solid waste. Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spills and runoff affects.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 9.3

The potential effects of NBAF operations on air quality are discussed in Section 3.4 of the NBAF EIS and includes the potential effects from energy generation, traffic, and incineration. Site-specific effects at the Umstead Research Farm Site are discussed in Section 3.4.7. Carcass/pathological waste disposal, including incineration, is discussed in Section 3.13. Air emissions were estimated using SCREEN3, a U.S. EPA dispersion modeling program. Conservative assumptions were used to ensure the probable maximum effects were evaluated. Once the final design is determined, a more refined air emissions model will be used during the permitting process. The final design will ensure that the NBAF does not significantly affect the region's ability to meet air quality standards.

Comment No: 5                      Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. A site-specific emergency response plan will be developed and coordinated with the local emergency management plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF. DHS would offer coordination and training to local medical personnel regarding the effects of pathogens to be studied at the NBAF. Emergency management plans will also include training for local law enforcement, health care, and fire and rescue personnel.

Comment No: 6                      Issue Code: 3.0

DHS notes the commentor's question regarding whether oversight of NBAF operations would include representatives from local municipalities. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include the Institutional Biosafety Committee, which will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS. Should a decision be made to build NBAF and the site selected, DHS would begin transition and operational planning which would include consideration of policies and procedures for public participation, education, and also public advisory initiatives. After DHS determines the viability and nature of such a public advisory and oversight function, appropriate roles and responsibilities would be defined. DHS notes the commentor's question regarding public access to monitoring data. Consideration of provisions for public access to environmental monitoring data is not within the scope of the NBAF EIS. As stated throughout the NBAF EIS, waste treatment and other processes of concern have not been finalized and, as such, conservative assumptions were used to ensure the probable maximum effects were evaluated for each affected resource area. Any further detailed discussion of wastewater and air pollution control and associated monitoring technologies would be highly speculative and will not be known until the NBAF design is finalized. Ultimately, monitoring requirements will be at least partially dependent on the environmental permitting and associated reporting requirements imposed by federal, state, and local agencies. Of course, all environmental monitoring data would be subject to public review in accordance with the public record access provisions administered by the appropriate regulatory agencies.

Comment No: 7                      Issue Code: 21.0

See Comment No. 6. Procedures to notify the public regarding incidents at the NBAF will include input from the Institutional Biosafety Committee, which will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS.

Thompson, Curtis

Page 1 of 1

MD0067

Name: Curtis E. Thompson



1) What will the potential from the this site being built be to the reservoirs from stormwater runoff. There are many lakes and ponds in the immediate area and surrounding counties. Failure to respond to this question

1) 12.3

2) Failure to respond # on how all the residents from the hospitals, schools, and prisons ~~will~~ would be moved from the area in case of an accident from the facility.

2) 15.3

3) Who is going to pay for the training of the first responders. It should not be from the county or state.

3) 21.0  
4) 2.0

4) Who is going to pay for an accident if it gets out into the public such as in Great Britain. The government is already broke so what are we going to do (Borrow) more money from Iraq like we are trying to say not to do the same things they are doing.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's watershed concern. The NBAF EIS Section 3.13.8 describes the Waste Management processes that would be used to control and dispose of NBAF's liquid and solid waste. Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spills and runoff affects.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Any evacuation would be a very low probability event. A site-specific emergency response plan will be developed and coordinated with the local Emergency Management Plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF. The emergency response plan would be developed and would include stipulations for any special-needs populations including institutionalized populations. DHS would offer coordination and training to local medical personnel regarding the effects of pathogens to be studied at the NBAF. Emergency management plans will also include training for local law enforcement, health care, and fire and rescue personnel.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern about apportionment of financial liability in the event of a pathogen release. However, it is not possible to determine in advance who might be responsible for an incident. DHS will follow applicable local, state, and federal law, whether in asserting or defending against a claim for damages should a pathogen be released from the NBAF. Chapter 3, Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. DHS cannot guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident; however, the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen from the NBAF is extremely low. The economic impact of an accidental release, including the impact on the livestock-related industries, is presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. The major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a potential ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 2.0

See response to Comment No. 3.

Thompson, Ernest

Page 1 of 1

WD0010

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**From:** [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Thursday, June 26, 2008 12:27 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Cc:** Ethompson17@nc.rr.com  
**Subject:** Priority mailing from DHS

To whom It May Concern:

113.0 | I received by priority mail today from DHS a letter sharing general information about The National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Draft Environmental Impact Statement. The letter said that a copy of the NBAF DEIS, Executive Summary and/or compact disk was enclosed for my information and review. The enclosed compact disk was blank ( no data). Once again this clearly points to the ineptness of Home Land Security and why the United States would benefit greatly if this agency would ceased to exist. Thanks for wasting \$4.80 of tax payers money to send two sheets of paper and a blank disk.

---

Gas prices getting you down? Search AOL Autos for fuel-efficient [used cars](#).

Comment No: 1      Issue Code: 3.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. A replacement CD was sent immediately upon notification.

Thompson, Neil

Page 1 of 1

WD0673

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**From:** Neil Thompson [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Monday, August 25, 2008 8:44 AM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** NBAF in Kansas

Sir/Madam

1|24.4 | As a resident of Kansas, president of Hill's Pet Nutrition and a board member of the KC Animal health Corridor, I strongly support Kansas as the location for the new NBAF facility.

| This area is rich in human medicine and veterinary talent. A better location would be difficult to imagine!

Sincerely

Neil Thompson

Comment No: 1      Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Thompson, Trey

Page 1 of 1

WD0267

---

**From:** Trey Thompson [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Thursday, August 14, 2008 12:40 PM  
**To:** NBAFProgramManager  
**Subject:** Athens, GA

1|24.2 | ATTENTION:  
We need this facility in Athens!  
Bring it on!  
Thx!  
Trey

I. M. Thompson, III, CIC



Comment No: 1      Issue Code: 24.2  
DHS notes the commentor's support for the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Thompson, PhD, Thomas

Page 1 of 1

MD0119

August 1, 2008

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
 Science and Technology Directorate  
 James V. Johnson  
 Mail Stop #2100  
 245 Murray Lane, SW  
 Building 410  
 Washington, DC 202528

Dear Mr. Johnson:

I am writing in response to the proposed placement of the NBAF at the Butner, NC site. I have read the DEIS executive summary and I understand the process by which it was concluded that the cumulative environmental effects for this site would be considered "minor". Of note, the Health and Safety Effects for all sites is rated as "negligible" due to the presumption that the high degree of safety precautions would result in perfect operation with no human error. While I would contend that history suggests such optimism is ill-founded (note for instance this recent story of Air Force officers falling asleep while in charge of codes for nuclear missiles:

[www.cnn.com/2008/US/07/24/missile.error/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/07/24/missile.error/index.html)), let's assume that within the confines of the NBAF there is never a serious mistake that could harm the public. Further, assume that this is true wherever the site is built. The real danger, it seems to me is outside the fences of the NBAF. There, dangerous (if not deadly) chemicals and organisms will be transported along road and rail. Road and rail accidents happen daily. If such chemicals or organisms were to spill and evacuation were necessary (such as in the Apex chemical fire just south of this area 2 years ago: [www.rgplaw.com/Apex.htm](http://www.rgplaw.com/Apex.htm)) the Butner site would almost certainly result in a true disaster because this area is home to several thousand persons with developmental disabilities, mental illness, or criminal histories who could not easily be moved or adequately cared for in an emergency situation. The close proximity of these institutions to the site should be considered to be a significant Health and Safety Risk in your assessment. The supporters of the Butner site do not comprehend the risk to the people who live in this area should evacuation for any reason be necessary. The Butner site, in my opinion, is ill-suited for the NBAF.

Sincerely,



Thomas J. Thompson, Ph.D.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the safe operation of the NBAF. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur and consequences of those accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 17.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the handling and transport of packages containing pathogens. The general regulations governing the required NBAF handling and transport of packages containing pathogens, and a discussion of the low risk associated with the shipment of infectious materials is provided in Section 3.11.9 of the NBAF EIS. Section 2.2.2.3 of the NBAF EIS provides detailed information on the handling and transport of packages containing pathogens. Additionally, an analysis of accidental releases during transportation is provided in Section 3.14, Health and Safety and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS. Information regarding the existing road conditions and potential effects to traffic and transportation from the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative is provided in Section 3.11.7 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 20.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern that NBAF operations could result in an accident. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Once the ROD has been signed and prior to the initiation of NBAF operations, a site-specific emergency management plan will be developed that will be coordinated with the local emergency management plan and will include contingency plans for potentially affected residents and institutions.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Thornsberry, D.V.M., R.

Page 1 of 3

08/25/2008 MON 12:49 FAX 001/003  
FD0071

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Website: www.r-calfusa.com  
E-mail: r-calfusa@r-calfusa.com

---

To: Mr. James V. Johnson From:  Bill Bullard, C.E.O.

Company: Department of Homeland Security  Candace Bullard, Office Manager


Fax: 1-800-568-6223  Shae Dodson, Communications Coord.

Phone: \_\_\_\_\_  Laurel Masterson, Member Svc Coord.

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Thornsberry, D.V.M., R.

Page 2 of 3

08/25/2008 MON 12:50 FAX

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August 25, 2008

Department of Homeland Security  
 Science and Technology Directorate  
 Mr. James V. Johnson: Mail Stop 2100  
 245 Murray Lane, SW, Building 410  
 Washington, DC 20528

**RE: R-CALF USA Comments Regarding Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate; Notice of Availability (NOA) for the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the Proposed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF)**

The Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund – United Stockgrowers of America (R-CALF USA) appreciates this opportunity to submit its views regarding the Department's Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the proposed National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF). This submission responds to the Department's request for comments published in the *Federal Register* on June 27, 2008 (Volume 73, Number 125).

R-CALF USA represents thousands of U.S. cattle producers on domestic and international trade and marketing issues. R-CALF USA, a national, nonprofit organization, is dedicated to ensuring the continued profitability and viability of the U.S. cattle industry. R-CALF USA's membership consists primarily of cow/calf operators, cattle backgrounders and independent feedlot owners. Its members are located in 47 states, and the organization has numerous local and state association affiliates, from both cattle and farm organizations. Various main-street businesses are associate members of R-CALF USA.

In its request for comments, the Department seeks relevant information on whether to relocate the animal disease research facility at Plum Island, N.Y., to one of five mainland locations, or whether to rebuild the Plum Island facility, or whether to take no action at all.

R-CALF USA believes there is only one option that makes sense, and that is to rebuild the facility at Plum Island. To relocate the facility to a mainland area near livestock would be irresponsible. There is always the potential of accidental release of pathogens, and an accidental release of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) would devastate the U.S. cattle industry and likely result in closed export markets, as well. In 1978, according to media reports, FMD escaped from the Plum Island facility, but because of the facility's distant locale from domestic livestock, only the research cattle in pens at the facility had to be destroyed. Other than that, according to USDA reports, 1929 was the last time FMD struck the U.S., and R-CALF USA believes the U.S.

1) 24.1  
 2) 5.0  
 3) 21.0  
 4) 15.0

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the safe operation of the NBAF. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur and consequences of those accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 15.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the economic effect would be significant for all sites. Appendix D of the EIS cites numerous studies and simulations by USDA and others that estimate the potential economic losses from an outbreak of FMD in the United States. All scenarios evaluated assume, for example, that an outbreak of FMD would result in a temporary export ban of US meat products. The results of these studies are summarized in Appendix D.

Thornsberry, D.V.M., R.

Page 3 of 3

08/25/2008 MON 12:50 FAX

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FD0071

government should do all in its power to prevent the introduction of FMD and other foreign animal diseases into the United States.

It is our understanding that the FMD virus can be carried on a worker's breath or clothes, or vehicles leaving a lab. It is so contagious that it has been confined to Plum Island since research began on Plum Island in 1954. We also understand that FMD researchers are not permitted to own animals at home that would be susceptible and that they must wait at least one week after work before attending outside events, such as fairs or circuses.

An accidental release could be caused by human error, as well as by a natural disaster. Just this summer the campus of Kansas State University, in Manhattan, Kan., - a proposed NBAF site - was struck by a tornado, which resulted in significant damage. Floris, Miss., - another proposed NBAF site - risks being hit by a hurricane. We all remember the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. Even though the possibility exists for a hurricane to strike Plum Island, N.Y., it is far enough offshore that any escaped pathogens likely would not infect the U.S. cattle herd.

5| 21.0  
6| 21.0

The American people should not have the burden of proving whether such mainland research is safe or unsafe, particularly when the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its 33-page comprehensive analysis dated May 22, 2008, already has reported that the Department lacks evidence to conclude that FMD research can be done safely on the U.S. mainland.

2 cont.| 5.0

Again, R-CALF USA urges the Department to construct a new NBAF facility on Plum Island and to keep the hazardous research on FMD as far away as possible from domestic livestock.

1 cont.| 24.1

Thank you for the opportunity to submit our views on this important subject.

Sincerely,



R.M. Thornsberry, D.V.M.  
President, R-CALF USA Board of Directors

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the NBAF. The purpose and need for the proposed action is discussed in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS can not guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident. However, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, modern biosafety design substantially diminishes the chances of a release as the primary design goal is to provide an adequate level of redundant safety and biocontainment that would be integrated into every component of the building. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential natural disaster impacts to the NBAF. Sections 3.4, 3.6, and 3.14.3.2 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS address NBAF design criteria and accident scenarios associated with natural phenomena events such as tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. The NBAF would be designed to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site.

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period. In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado.