

Anonymous PD0231, Anonymous PD0231

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PD0231

August 22, 2008

1| 5.0 Hello. I am a private citizen. I am calling today to voice my opposition to the National
2| 25.4 Bio and Agro Defense Facility being placed on the mainland and especially in
Manhattan, Kansas. The Environmental Impact Statement is deficient in the analysis of
the worst case scenario of an intentional release of a bio hazard for each location.

1 cont.| 5.0 Placing it in the heartland of the USA is an illogical and irresponsible action. There are
no barriers....natural barriers to contain any accidental or intentional release of germs.
3| 21.4 Germs could spread 360 degrees. This is especially irresponsible considering the other
facilities in and near town. Fort Riley has soldiers coming and going from around the
globe including military personnel from foreign countries some which have factions
4| 21.4 hostile to the USA. It is unknown to most what types of security clearance these foreign
military personnel have that come to Fort Riley. A release from the facility coinciding
with deployment of military stationed at Fort Riley could spread a disease around the
globe.

1 cont.| 5.0 The location of the facility in Manhattan is also a concern as it would be in close
proximity to high density student housing, day-care centers, residential areas and
livestock rearing and breeding areas. The Government Accounting Office concluded that
DHS lacks evidence to conclude that foot and mouth disease research can be safely done
on the U.S. mainland. There is no doubt...there no doubt would be much more deadly
diseases studied at any new facility.

5| 21.4 The history of the lab on Plum Island shows repeated accidental releases of foot and
mouth disease and other hazardous germs. The reason evidence linking Dr. Irvine to the
deliberate release of anthrax shows that no amount of security could...would prevent...
would likely prevent a worker at such a facility from deliberately releasing a substance if
they are so minded. The releases on Plum Island were attributed to human errors and
were not due to insufficient containment technology. The anthrax release was an
intentional release by a government scientist employed to study it. There are no
guarantees that the same failures would...will not be repeated. In fact, Murphy's Law
guarantees that these errors will happen again and again. It is not a matter of "if" but
"when" we have a biohazard release.

Since the anthrax laced letters of 2001, U.S. bio defense has blown up out of all
proportion to any rational assessment of the bio weapons threat. The lesson of the
anthrax letters isn't that we're in danger of a bio weapons attack from a terrorist it's that
U.S. bio defense itself has become a threat.

1 cont.| 5.0 I urge you to keep these facilities off the mainland to protect the citizens of the USA.
Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. DHS believes that
experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols,
such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the
NBAF to be safely operated in populated areas such as Manhattan. An example is the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4


DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the presence of military personnel from foreign
countries at Fort Riley. Section 3.14 addresses accident scenarios, including external events such as
a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use
Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated
in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and
weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to
establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety.
Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-
consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse
consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the potential for exposure of military personnel to a
pathogen release from the NBAF operation. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS investigates the chances
of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential
accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural
phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely
to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release
are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is
to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition
to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this
analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to
either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an
accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding a criminal action perpetrated by an NBAF employee.
A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed
outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The



purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. As further set out in Section 3.14.3.4, all employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures.

Anonymous PD0232, Anonymous PD0232

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PD0232

August 22, 2008

1| 25.4 | As a resident of Kansas I do not wish to have the bio lab in Kansas due to our weather being so erratic and destructive. I don't think they can build any facility that will withstand some of our tornados. And we do not need this out in our area.

2| 21.4 |

Please leave it in Plum Island.

3| 24.1 |

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period.

In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

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PD0234

August 22, 2008

1) 25.4 I am a resident ██████████ Kansas and I want to express my opposition against NBAF Level-4 lab in...in Manhattan, Kansas. In relation to the environmental impact study, I have several concerns that I don't feel are adequately addressed. 1) How are they going to protect from human error (which is what most commonly happens) of any type of disease material escaping the facility? 2) How are they going to handle mechanical failure, an electrical outage, a fire or some type of explosion after...or other type of accident at the lab? How are they going to protect this community against natural disasters such as a tornado or earthquake which are prone to this area?

6) 21.4 How are they going to protect us if there is an enemy or terrorist attack on the facility. Is it going to be guarded? Is it going to be safe? How are they going to prevent spread into the community from an infected lab worker? I mean can this be guaranteed 100 percent safe? Or one of most concern, what about a malicious act by someone that works within the lab just as what has been...has happened with anthrax. I mean how are you going to protect this community that the same thing does not happen here.

10) 5.0 I do not believe that this lab should be placed on the mainland or in Manhattan, Kansas. The risks are from human error, terrorism, accidents, natural disasters and bio security and I do not believe that they have been adequately addressed to protect the people. I think the main thing that people seem to be looking at is economics. Well, economics mean nothing if there is a leak or some type of disaster. The costs are just unfathomable.

1 cont. | 25.4 So again, I vote, I mean not that that this is a vote, but I am very much against the lab being placed in Manhattan, Kansas. If there is any place, it should be placed on an island, where it is now and even if it costs more money to put it there, spend the money because having a leak here, in the heart of cattle country, would be more devastating.

12) 5.0

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commenter's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commenter's concern regarding the prevention of human error during NBAF operations. As described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Training and inherent biocontainment safeguards reduce the likelihood of a release. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commenter's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years.

This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period.

In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 11.4

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding earthquakes. Section 3.6.1 of the NBAF EIS describes the methodology used to assess each site's potential seismic consequences, and Section 3.6.4 specifically describes the Manhattan Campus Site. The NBAF would be built to meet or exceed all applicable building codes for seismic safety. Section 3.14.3.2 further addresses NBAF design criteria and accident scenarios associated with natural phenomena events such as earthquakes.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding a potential terrorist attack on the NBAF. Section 3.14 addresses accident scenarios, including external events such as a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process.

Comment No: 7 Issue Code: 23.0

Security at NBAF would be provided by a series of fencing, security cameras, and protocols. In addition, a dedicated security force would be present on-site. Additional security could be provided via cooperation with local law enforcement agencies. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the

most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety.

Comment No: 8 Issue Code: 21.4


DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding infected worker leaving the NBAF. The types of exposure pathways for the various pathogens to be studied at the NBAF and potential consequences were evaluated in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents,, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Appendix B of the NBAF EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory-acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. As described in Section 2.2.2.1, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 9 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding a malicious and criminal act perpetrated by a NBAF employee. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS addresses accident scenarios, including internal and external events, such as, an "insider" criminal act and terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety.

Comment No: 10 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated in populated areas such as Manhattan. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.



Comment No: 11 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives including the Manhattan Campus Site. The potential economic effects of an accidental release are discussed in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 12 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative based on risks to livestock. The NBAF would be designed and constructed using modern biocontainment technologies, and operated by trained staff and security personnel to ensure the maximum level of worker and public safety and least risk to the environment in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

Anonymous PD0235, Anonymous PD0235

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PD0235

August 22, 2008

1| 25.4 | Yes. I am opposed to NBAF locating in Manhattan, Kansas.

Tom Thornton, the head of the Kansas Bioscience Authority which is leading the Kansas NBAF efforts states that the State farming and ranching background is more suitable for research into these diseases. Absolutely opposite!

2| 15.4 | We, the farming and ranching community, have more to risk. Our livelihood, our years of hard work to only loose everything - our livestock, our empty pastures, our generations of hard work, and nothing to pass on to our future generations over one possible mishap. It would take one mistake and only one mistake and that certainly can happen and it does happen. Certainly, Tom Thornton and all the other promoters, especially the politicians have nothing to personally lose. They only have a...want a name for themselves now. But let one mistake happen and they will all disappear from the area. It's pure greed, nothing but greed.

1 cont.| 25.4 | Absolutely no to NBAF in Kansas! We do not want it here.

My husband is a livestock producer. We have pasture lands. We have sons that farm – they have children. We want to pass this on. We are the third generation and we want to pass on to the fourth and fifth generation. But we will not be able to do it if NBAF comes to Kansas.

3| 24.1
4| 5.0 | Please keep it at Plum Island. We do not need it on the mainland.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern about an accident risk. The potential economic effects of an accidental release are discussed in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. The NBAF would be designed and constructed using modern biocontainment technologies, and operated by trained staff and security personnel to ensure the maximum level of worker and public safety and least risk to the environment in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative based on risks to the livelihood of farmers and ranchers.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0236, Anonymous PD0236

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PD0236

August 22, 2008

1) 25.4 | I'm calling to register my opposition to NBAF in Kansas. I'm a sixth generation
cattleman and farmer in the state of Kansas.

2) 5.0 | All of the proponents say it should be here because of the pharmaceutical labs are here.
3) 21.4 | What a bunch of baloney! The labs are here because this is where the cattle are. Why...
4) 15.4 | who would be so dumb as to bring FMD into the midst of the cow herd and to have one
crazy kook accidentally release it and then destroy the hard work and livelihood of many
generations of cattlemen?

The proponents have nothing to loose. And if some accident happens they could move
on and leave the rest of us to suffer the consequences. The government workers and
university people hogged the afternoon session in Manhattan, Kansas. They even had
VIP parking! They...the proponents claimed to speak for the whole city and for the
whole state implying that everyone was for it. Nothing could be further from the truth.
What a circus and orchestrated demonstration it was.

5) 24.1 | Keep this thing on Plum Island where it belongs.

No NBAF in Kansas.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum
Island Site Alternative based on risks to livestock. The NBAF would be designed and constructed
using modern biocontainment technologies, and operated by trained staff and security personnel to
ensure the maximum level of worker and public safety and least risk to the environment in
accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding an FMD virus release perpetrated by a psychotic or
disgruntled NBAF employee.. Section 3.14 addresses accident scenarios, including internal and
external events, such as, an "insider" criminal act and terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk
Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in
accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to
identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to
recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of
operations of the NBAF and public safety. Additionally, Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a
variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential
accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural
phenomena accidents,, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more
likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental
release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk
assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive
acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse
consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and
administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a
release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative. A discussion of
health and safety is included in Section 3.14 of the NBAF DEIS and, Section 3.10.4 discusses the
economic effects of the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative to the surrounding community.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0237, Anonymous PD0237

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PD0237

August 22, 2008

1| 25.4
2| 24.1
3| 5.0
4| 5.0

Yes, I would like to voice my opposition in having this facility built in Kansas. I think the facility should be ...should stay on Plum Island—upgraded there. I don't think this facility needs to be in the heartland of America where it can...where diseases are worked with, that we don't really know what all is going to be worked on.

1 cont.| 25.4

We've lived here all of our life in ██████████ Kansas and really would not like to see this facility built here. I know there is a lot of the government facilities are pressing forward with this. But I think the majority of the public is...does not want this facility built here. And (inaudible) we'd like to voice our opinion opposing this. Again, I think it belongs on Plum Island. And we hope you keep it in consideration in leaving it where it's at. Just upgrade the facility there.

2 cont.| 24.1
3 cont.| 5.0

5| 21.4
2 cont.| 24.1
3 cont.| 5.0

It's quite alarming, disturbing, scary not knowing. Nothing is perfect and knowing that human error, as ever so slight, could cause a catastrophe. So please, please consider this along with your others...and keep the facility on Plum Island where it really should be – not in the middle of America.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative and support for upgrading PIADC. However, the proposed NBAF requires BSL-4 capability to meet mission requirements (DHS and USDA). PIADC does not have BSL-4 laboratory or animal space, and the existing PIADC facilities are inadequate to support a BSL-4 laboratory. Upgrading the existing facilities to allow PIADC to meet the current mission would be more costly than building the NBAF on Plum Island, as discussed in Section 2.4.1 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to siting NBAF in the U.S. heartland.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the potential consequences from a NBAF accident as the result of human error. As described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Training and inherent biocontainment safeguards reduce the likelihood of a release. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

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PD0239

August 22, 2008

1|25.4 | I am objecting, please, to the placement of the NBAF facility in Manhattan, Kansas in the heartland. And it's just too risky in my opinion.

2|5.0 | And I'm asking that it not come to Manhattan, Kansas. I also think it should not be on the mainland but rather should be on an island in case of human or other error.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives, in particular, the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative based on safety concerns. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated in populated areas such as Manhattan. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

Anonymous PD0240, Anonymous PD0240

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PD0240

August 22, 2008

- 1| 24.1 | Yes, I am a resident of Manhattan, Kansas and a student at Kansas State University. And
I think that the NBAF would be better placed on the Plum Island location. I think the
money that you were going to put into the facility here in Kansas should be used to fix
2| 5.1 | the Plum Island one up. I think that putting the facility on the mainland would be a very
3| 5.0 | bad idea.
- 4| 25.4 | So please consider that. Nobody in Manhattan wants it. Please leave it on Plum Island.
- Thank you for your consideration.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative and support for upgrading PIADC. However, the proposed NBAF requires BSL-4 capability to meet mission requirements (DHS and USDA). PIADC does not have BSL-4 laboratory or animal space, and the existing PIADC facilities are inadequate to support a BSL-4 laboratory. Upgrading the existing facilities to allow PIADC to meet the current mission would be more costly than building the NBAF on Plum Island, as discussed in Section 2.4.1 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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PD0241

August 22, 2008

1| 25.4
2| 24.1

I am a resident of Manhattan, Kansas and I do not want your facility here in Manhattan, Kansas. It can stay in Plum Island. I do not want my future of my child to be destroyed by your facility or anybody else within the State of Kansas.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives, in particular, the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative based on safety concerns. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated in populated areas such as Manhattan. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.1

Please refer to response to Comment No. 1.

Anonymous PD0243, Anonymous PD0243

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PD0243

August 23, 2008

1) 24.4 | I'm a student at [REDACTED] and I support NBAF in
Kansas.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4
DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0244, Anonymous PD0244

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PD0244

August 23, 2008

1|26.4 I am a retired professor at Kansas State University who has worked for 42 years within a quarter mile or half a mile of the proposed site. I have read the EIS and found it full of flaws including the fact that Topeka is 600 miles from Manhattan. If you can't get the geographical details of your proposed site correct, what else can we expect?

2|5.0 Also, the dangers have not been considered. There's no reference at all to the GAO report of May 22nd that says that there's been sloppy handling in some of these and that ideally none of these labs at this level should be on the mainland.

Only two countries have them on the mainland, the rest have put them on islands. And as even one of the proponents has suggested there could be widespread devastation in the United States if the one near Winnipeg in Canada should have an accident.

3|21.4 We've already had the experience of one deranged scientist in the Anthrax scare. We can't fund it and we cannot supply the qualified personnel to run the labs we have.

4|1.0 The Dingell statement along with the Democrat and the Republican who head the Oversight Committee that would be involved with NBAF have already called for a suspension of all new labs. We think in view of the sloppiness of the EIS report and the inadequacies of it that that view should be considered strongly. They follow this. This is their area. And if they think we need to get it right at the other labs first, that's what we should do.

5|4.4 I hope that this extended period of three weeks, at a time when both the Governor and Senator Pat Roberts knew that there would be at least 30,000 fewer people in Manhattan is...I think this is a disgrace. They hold public meetings on a campus that people are having difficulty accessing at a time of the year when most of the people are gone.

6|21.4 This...as coming under the radar and it makes it very suspicious. It could have been the best lab possible and still the circumstances of the way it has been presented, that no questions asked ... available for the citizens to ask. All of these things have made this situation intolerable. I think in a worst case scenario ... that some accidents ... our zoo

7|4.4 is only a mile or two from the facility. We have lots of wildlife in this area. But even if the lab should start, I think so many people have been left out of the process that I really

fear that we could have major disruptions in the building of this lab that would compromise the security and safety of the people involved. There's just too many people who feel that they've been left out of the process.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the error in Section 3.6.4.1. The correct number is "60" and the error has been corrected.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. As described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's site selection process incorporated site selection criteria that included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or sem-urban areas. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

DHS notes the commentator's views on risk. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentator's concern regarding a pathogen release perpetrated by a psychotic or disgruntled NBAF employee. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS address accident scenarios, including internal and external events, such as, an "insider" criminal act and terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Additionally, Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 1.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. Currently, there are several factors that will affect the decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where. The EIS itself will not be the sole deciding factor. The decision will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS and support documents; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable Federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the Federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.


Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 4.4

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the location and timing of the NBAF EIS public meeting held in Manhattan, Kansas. Upon completion of the NBAF Draft EIS, it was published without delay and public meetings were then scheduled in each of the communities being evaluated for siting the NBAF during the ensuing 60-day public comment period. DHS gave preference to holding meetings at locations in each community proximal to the proposed NBAF site and at appropriate meeting venues offering sufficient space to accommodate anticipated attendance levels. DHS recognizes that it is not possible to hold a public hearing at a time and place that is convenient to every interested person, and therefore provides alternate means of submitting comments to provide multiple opportunities to participate in the NEPA process. In addition to oral comment at the public meetings, DHS also accepted comments submitted by mail, toll-free telephone and fax lines, and online through the NBAF Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). All comments, both oral and written, received during the comment period were given equal consideration and have been responded to in this NBAF Final EIS.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern about an accident at NBAF and proximity to a zoo. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife (including susceptible zoo animal) populations residing within the area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 7 Issue Code: 4.4



Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program. DHS has conducted public meetings in excess of the minimum required by NEPA regulations; to date, 23 public meetings have been held in the vicinity of NBAF site alternatives and in Washington, D.C. to solicit public input on the EIS, allow the public to voice their concerns, and to get their questions answered DHS has also provided fact sheets, reports, exhibits, and a Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). Additionally, various means of communication (mail, tollfree telephone and fax lines, and NBAF Web site) have been provided to facilitate public comment. It is DHS policy to encourage public input on matters of national and international importance.

Anonymous PD0245, Anonymous PD0245

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PD0245

August 23, 2008

1|24.4

I support the NBAF in Kansas.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0247, Anonymous PD0247

Page 1 of 1

PD0247

August 23, 2008

1) 25.4
2) 5.0

I don't think it'd be a good idea to have the facility in Manhattan. It appears to me that an offshore or off the mainland location would be best for...I think for obvious reasons. But, anyway both my wife and I are concerned about it and would be opposed to having it here in Manhattan.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives, in particular, the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated in populated areas such as Manhattan. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

Please see response to Comment No. 1.

Anonymous PD0248, Anonymous PD0248

Page 1 of 1

PD0248

August 23, 2008

¹|25.0 | I wish to voice strong opposition to the NBAF that is supposed...that level 4 lab that is...built....don't know what that means. Ah... (disconnected)

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.0
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the NBAF.

Anonymous PD0249, Anonymous PD0249

Page 1 of 1

PD0249

August 23, 2008

1| 5.0

I just want to leave the message that I feel this lab is really a bad idea for any place in the mainland. Manhattan, Kansas is one of the places that is selected. It will only be a...
(disconnected)

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Anonymous PD0252, Anonymous PD0252

Page 1 of 1

PD0252

August 23, 2008

1| 25.4

Hi. Yes, I just wanted to give some comments on NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas. I think there's too many issues that haven't been thought out as to where it's going to be located if they bring it here, I think it's a bad idea. And I think there's way better locations in this country or, for that matter, outside of this country to locate NBAF as opposed to Manhattan, Kansas.

Just wanted to let you know that.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0259, Anonymous PD0259

Page 1 of 1

PD0259

August 24, 2008

1|25.2| Athens, Georgia. No, we don't want it. Area's too populated. Where you want to put it's too pretty. Leave us alone.

Thanks. Bye.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0260, Anonymous PD0260

Page 1 of 1

PD0260

August 24, 2008

1) 25.4 | Hi. I'm from Manhattan, Kansas and I just cannot, cannot comprehend bringing
 2) 5.0 | something that dangerous as the NBAF to Manhattan or to the states or to the mainland.
 We need to confine it to an area off the edge of the mainland. I hear that Plum Island has
 had several livestock foot and mouth disease mistakes. But that it has been confined
 3) 21.4 | there. If it got loose in rural America it would be terrible not to mention the zoonotic and
 all the other things that could be carried out by workers.

4) 21.4 | It's not the building. It's not the government. It's the fact that worker error. It happens,
 2 cont. | 5.0 | it happens everywhere no matter how safe you think you're gonna be. And it needs to be
 in an isolated area.

So please, please take under consideration our comments.

Thank you so much. Goodbye.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0


DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives, in particular, the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative based on safety concerns. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated in populated areas such as Manhattan. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding an accident at NBAF. The specific objective of Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the potential consequences from a NBAF accident as the result of human error. As described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Training and inherent biocontainment safeguards reduce the likelihood of a release. Section 3.14 and Appendix E, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, including external events such as a terrorist attack. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify



the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Anonymous PD0261, Anonymous PD0261

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PD0261

August 24, 2008

1| 25.2 | Hello. I am a resident of Oconee County, Georgia and I just wanted to voice my
 2| 12.2 | opposition to NBAF being located in eastern Clark County. I just think that the area is
 3| 5.0 | pristine. It's bordering on the Oconee River, adjacent to the Botanical Gardens and I just
 worry about the location – the proximity to the Oconee river should any toxins be
 released and I just wanted to let my opinion be known – that I don't think it's a good idea
 and I would wish that it could remain a little further away from population such that we
 have here.

4| 24.1 | I would like for it to stay on Plum Island.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's water quality concerns and DHS acknowledges current regional drought conditions. The NBAF EIS Sections 3.7.3.2 and 3.7.3.3 describe potential construction and operational surface water and stormwater consequences. Section 3.13 describes liquid and solid waste management options available to the proposed NBAF's construction and operation. DHS also notes the concerns about the possibility of toxic substances contaminating the source of Athens' drinking water. To control this risk, and as stated in Section 2.2.2.5, the NBAF would develop a Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures Plan (SPCC) that specifies operating procedures to prevent spills, control measures to contain spills, and countermeasures to contain, cleanup, and mitigate the effects of a spill reaching a water body. Additionally, as stated in Section 3.1 disposal of medical, hazardous, and industrial solid waste is governed by federal and state regulations promulgated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The NBAF will be required to comply with each and every applicable waste management regulation.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.0

As described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's site selection criteria included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or semi-urban areas. Nevertheless, it has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0263, Anonymous PD0263

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PD0263

August 24, 2008

1| 5.0 I'm a resident of Manhattan, Kansas and I prefer not to have the facility located anywhere
2| 25.4 on the mainland, mainly in the Manhattan area. We do not want that here.

3| 5.0 I think it's detrimental to health and to the animals and the industry that we have in
Manhattan. I hope that you will choose the off...off the...I hope you will choose to redo
the facility where the facility is now and not put it on land. But in particular, please do
not put it in Manhattan, Kansas.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives, particularly the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives, in particular, the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative based on safety concerns. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated in populated areas such as Manhattan. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

Anonymous PD0264, Anonymous PD0264

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PD0264

August 24, 2008

1| 25.4
2| 24.1

I am a resident of Manhattan, Kansas and I definitely believe that the NBAF should not be located in Manhattan. It would be better off to be kept on Plum Island where it has been in the past. It's just too dangerous.

3| 2.0

And I guess I don't trust the Federal government when they say it is safe to have it located this close to residents and so forth. I remember the early days of atomic testing when they would turn out the little kids to watch this and all the dust would settle on them and so forth.

It's just not a good thing and I don't think it's safe to have it here.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives, in particular, the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative based on safety concerns. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated in populated areas such as Manhattan. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS state that the specific objective of the hazard identification is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Appendix B describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF then site-specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed the NBAF. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6.

Anonymous PD0265, Anonymous PD0265

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PD0265

August 24, 2008

1|24.4 | I support NBAF in Kansas.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commenter's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0266, Anonymous PD0266

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PD0266

August 24, 2008

1|25.4

I am opposed to the NBAF in Kansas - in Manhattan, Kansas. We do not need this facility in the middle of the state's farming and ranching community.

The opponents of this facility are not just farmers and ranchers though. They are town's people, retired college professors, both animal science and other professors within the university who do not have to worry about their jobs but they know what one mistake would do to our community.

2|24.1

Keep this facility on Plum Island. We do not need it in Manhattan, Kansas. Please, no NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas.

Thank you for your time.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative based on risks to livestock. The NBAF would be designed and constructed using modern biocontainment technologies, and operated by trained staff and security personnel to ensure the maximum level of worker and public safety and least risk to the environment in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulations.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0267, Anonymous PD0267

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PD0267

August 24, 2008

1| 5.0
2| 21.0
3| 25.2

Hello. Was not a bio lab put on an island for safety? And now they want to put it in the middle of a populated area where they now research cattle. There are always some leakages. And, I say no to a bio lab in Athens, Georgia. I think our officials are just looking at the money, not safety. No to a bio lab!

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives, in particular, the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative based on safety concerns. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated in populated areas such as Manhattan. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern about an accident at NBAF. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Anonymous PD0269, Anonymous PD0269

Page 1 of 1

PD0269

August 24, 2008

1| 25.4

I would just like to vote no for NBAF in the city of Manhattan in Kansas.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.