

July 24, 2008, Washington, DC, Washington, DC

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1 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
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3
4 NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY
5 DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
6 (NBAF DRAFT EIS)
7
8
9 PUBLIC MEETING
10 DATE: July 24, 2008
11 1:30 p.m.
12 GRAND HYATT WASHINGTON
13 1000 H STREET, N.W.
14 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
15
16
17 Catherine Coghill, Moderator
18 PANEL MEMBERS:
19 Mr. James Johnson, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
20 Mr. Charles Pergler, Tetra Tech, Inc.
21 Dr. Steven L. Kappes, U.S. Department of Agriculture
22
23 REPORTED BY: Carla L. Andrews, CSR
24
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


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1 to in the final EIS. Please keep in mind you do not
 2 have to make your comments today. You can provide
 3 comments at a later date through any of the mechanisms
 4 listed on the slide as long as we receive them by
 5 August 25.

6 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, Jamie. At this
 7 point, we are to the questions and answers portion of
 8 the agenda. This is a 20-minute period. If anyone has
 9 any questions that they would like answers to
 10 specifically tied to the NEPA process or the
 11 presentation that was just given, please fill free to
 12 come to the microphone. If you would like, state your
 13 name and post your question. And we will work through
 14 and answer. Yes, sir.

15 MR. BECK: Chris Beck with House Community on
 16 Homeland Security. In the discussion, you talked about
 17 consequences and specifically for three diseases. One
 18 of the most concern is Foot and Mouth Disease.

19 You mentioned that the consequences were
 20 lower at the Plum Island site and then kind of seemed
 21 to me sort of characterized the other five together.
 22 Is there any breakout of difference between the other
 23 five sites as far as consequences for that disease
 24 specifically?

25 MR. PERGLER: There is a difference in terms

24

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley Fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley Fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

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1 of the numbers of livestock and the types of wildlife
2 present. But overall -- and I am going to look to our
3 prime analyst Randy Jenke to support this. There
4 really are no significant differences between the five
5 mainland sites.

6 MR. KARNOVITZ: Do you want me to address
7 one? Just really quickly, while we are summarizing the
8 document --

9 MR. PERGLER: This is Alan Karnovitz. He is
10 the prime socioeconomics analyst.

11 MR. KARNOVITZ: The main source for that
12 estimate, which we relied on, was a recent simulation
13 that was done by Lawrence Livermore Labs that was
14 commissioned by DHS to run an existing model that they
15 had. And as Chuck just stated, I believe it is
16 somewhere around 80 percent or 90 percent, depending on
17 the site, of a loss to the U.S. economy from an FMD
18 breakout is the ban on exports. The remaining
19 estimated loss is primarily attributable to the
20 destruction of livestock within the state in which the
21 outbreak took place.

22 Therefore, a state like Kansas had a greater
23 number for that component of the total loss. But if
24 you look at the chart, the losses accruing from the
25 export ban dominates to total loss estimates. So there

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1 are some differences, but they are also almost dwarfed
2 or trivialized by the export ban itself and the
3 duration of the export.

4 MR. BECK: And is that in the draft EIS?

5 MR. KARNOVITZ: Yes, it is. There is a chart
6 in there.

7 MR. PERGLER: Thank you very much.

8 MS. COGHILL: Next question, please.

9 MS. PRESCOTT: My name is Kathy Prescott, and

10 I am from Athens, Georgia. And in the DEIS, I am
11 confused about the executive summary table contained in
12 the executive summary because it seems to contradict a
13 lot of the information in the text of the DEIS. You
14 speak about cumulative effects as ranking these
15 environmental effects. You know, you go from
16 negligible to minor to significant. And I am confused
17 about how the executive summary table was accomplished
18 because it is misleading to just go to the table and
19 run down the specific sites and say, oh, air quality is
20 negligible affected like in Athens, Georgia when you
21 discuss that it is moderately affected on the page just
22 previous to the table. And I am wondering what the
23 process for breaking down this summary table, which is
24 what most people are going to go to, to look at. They
25 are not going to read a thousand something page

1|26.0

26

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. DHS prepared the NBAF EIS in accordance with the provisions of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and CEQ's regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1500 et seq.). The primary objective of the EIS is to evaluate the environmental impacts of the no action and site alternatives for locating, constructing and operating the NBAF. As summarized in Section 3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS analyzed each environmental resource area in a consistent manner across all the alternatives to allow for a fair comparison among the alternatives. DHS attempted to present the information in such a manner to allow the reader to clearly follow and evaluate the information. The summary table presents an adjectival assessment of the potential effects of the proposed NBAF on the environmental and human resources of each affected site alternative. The table and the text in the NBAF EIS have been modified to rectify inconsistencies.

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1 document. And I am curious to know how you arrived at
2 those rankings.

3 MR. PERGLER: That's an excellent comment for
4 us to look at to revise the draft to the final. Often
5 times, summary tables are subjective because we are
6 digesting a wealth of information. We have had
7 internal discussions to what you just said as well. If
8 you could provide that comment during the formal
9 scoping comment, we will take it into a great deal of
10 consideration and look at how we can revise it so that
11 we can get rid of perhaps what you would consider the
12 misleading statements. Thank you.

13 MS. COGHILL: Yes, ma'am.

14 MS. MOODY-SMITH: My name is Susanne
15 Moody-Smith. I am a resident of Gramble County, North
16 Carolina. I have some questions. I am still not real
17 clear on the Foot and Mouth outbreak, the study that
18 was cited by the gentleman with the first question. I
19 don't remember his name. I just remember he worked for
20 DHS. I am assuming that's the Crimson Sky Report that
21 ended with riots in the street, National Guard running
22 out of bullets, or is that a different study?

23 MR. PERGLER: Let me just clarify.

24 MS. MOODY-SMITH: That is not my question. I
25 understand that Crimson Sky --

27

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes commentator's concern. The potential economic effects resulting from an accidental release of FMD is discussed in Appendix D and Chapter 3, Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF DEIS. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the possible effects would be significant for all sites. The primary economic effect of an accidental release would be the banning of U.S. livestock products regardless of the location of the accidental release, which could reach as high as \$4.2 billion until the U.S. was declared foreign animal disease free.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 19.0

DHS notes the commentator's misunderstanding regarding the Lawrence Livermore Lab study cited in the public hearing.

1|21.0

2|19.0

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1 MR. PERGLER: Okay. That was part of the
2 scope. It is a part of our team and not DHS. He is an
3 independent reviewer. And the study referenced is a
4 study done just recently by Lawrence Livermore.

5 MS. MOODY-SMITH: Oh, so there has been
6 another study since Crimson?

7 MR. PERGLER: Yes.

8 MS. MOODY-SMITH: So if Foot and Mouth does
9 break out in Gramble County or Athens, Georgia, I know
10 that those two sites do have 45, quote, deer per acre
11 in the areas surrounding those sites. I don't know the
12 density at the other sites. But I imagine Georgia has
13 got a few -- I mean, Mississippi has got a few. I
14 imagine there are deer pretty much across the country,
15 aren't there?

16 Again, not my question. I am wondering how
17 you will contain the disease that can be carried on the
18 grass on your feet. In other words, will you
19 exterminate all of our deer? Will you exterminate all
20 the goats? If there is any sort of public outburst
21 because of possible food shortages or having their
22 livelihoods and their farms destroyed by somebody
23 coughing on the wrong animal that left your facility,
24 will they be reimbursed? I mean, exactly how are you
25 going to deal with 45 deer per acre?

28

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 13.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the potential effects of an accidental release on white-tailed deer populations. The potential response measures that could be employed in the event of an accidental release are described in Section 3.8.9 of the NBAF EIS. Table 3.8.9-1 describes the potential strategies for response that could be considered in the event of an accidental release. Depopulation or population reduction is one of ten potential FMD response strategies developed by the National Park Service. However, the National Park Service recommends the use of other strategies or combinations of strategies to avoid this strategy (see Table 3.8.9-1). A more likely scenario would include one or more of the non-lethal measures described in Table 3.8.9-1. Although the NBAF EIS acknowledges the potential for significant impacts on white-tailed deer in the event of an accidental release, the risk of such a release is extremely low (see Section 3.14). It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas and in areas with abundant wildlife. State-of-the-art biocontainment facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF. Furthermore, the purpose of NBAF is to combat diseases that could have significant effects on wildlife. Research at the NBAF would include the development of vaccines for wildlife that could prevent adverse impacts from a foreign introduction.

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1 MR. JOHNSON: Let me see if I can address
2 that. Part of our working with USDA, they have the
3 responsibility coordinating FMD outbreaks, whether it
4 comes in from another country or in the highly unlikely
5 event of the scenario that you have just described,
6 what happens and how do we respond to it. I would like
7 for Dr. Bill White to just walk through the process of,
8 you know, controlling the animal movement and the
9 vaccines so we can answer her question.

10 MR. WHITE: Sure. Thank you. My name is
11 Dr. Bill White, and I am a veterinarian at USDA,
12 Athens, Plum Island. And Athens is the unit of USDA
13 that's responsible for responding to an emergency
14 disease like Foot and Mouth Disease. If it were to,
15 for some reason, escape the NBAF or be imported for
16 some reason, we are the agency that would respond to
17 that. There is a national response plan in place for
18 this contingency. As far as the effects on wild deer,
19 in general, wherever FMD has occurred throughout the
20 world in wildlife, it has burned itself out. So that
21 sort of assessment will only be made at the time to see
22 how much interaction is there between effective
23 livestock and whitetail deer, for example. It may be
24 that we may need to do nothing, for example, as was
25 done in the UK in 2001 or if indeed we do see symptoms

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1 of Foot and Mouth Disease in whitetail deer, it may
2 require eradication of some type. We are just not sure
3 yet what that would require.

1 Cont.|21.0;
3 Cont.|13.0

4 MS. MOODY-SMITH: How many types of
5 eradication are there of deer -- for wild deer? How
6 many types and what are the types of eradication for
7 wild deer?

8 MR. WHITE: Well, eradication of white deer
9 would be stamping out. That would be, as you know --

3 Cont.|13.0

10 MS. MOODY-SMITH: By what methods? My
11 husband spends most of his methods shooting them one at
12 a time.

13 MR. WHITE: It would be hunting. And part of
14 the risk of actually hunting potentially infected
15 whitetail deer, if they are infected, is actually
16 spreading the disease further. So that sort of risk
17 would have to be factored into what will we do with
18 whitetail deer.

19 MS. MOODY-SMITH: So it just depends on if
20 they get over it how you will proceed?

21 MR. WHITE: It depends on whether they are
22 infected, I think, more than if they get over it.

23 MS. MOODY-SMITH: Or it burns itself out?

24 MR. WHITE: Yeah.

25 MS. MOODY-SMITH: And that would take how

30

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1 long and what would keep them from infecting animals?
2 I mean, they jump in and out of my wood pasture all the
3 time.

4 MS. COGHILL: Excuse me. You have some very
5 important questions that you are posing. We just want
6 to make sure that we give everybody else equal
7 opportunity if they have a question.

8 MS. MOODY-SMITH: Am I holding you all up? I
1Cont,|21.0 9 still don't understand how you are going to get rid of
10 the deer if you need to. I am still trying to get an
11 answer to that question. I apologize if I am taking
12 too long.

13 MS. COGHILL: No, no. What would be very
14 helpful is what we have to do under the National
15 Environmental Policy Act is take all the questions you
16 posed to us and look at that and then answer all of
17 those and do further analysis to produce the --

18 MS. MOODY-SMITH: Answer mine.

19 MS. COGHILL: Excuse me. -- the final.

20 MS. MOODY-SMITH: Answer mine. I want to
21 know how it will be -- how they will be eradicated. I
22 don't understand the procedures. You have given me
3 Cont,|13.0 23 if's and maybe's. But -- so will you send people out
24 to shoot them? Will they be poisoned? How will --
25 worse case scenario, they are all broken out,

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1Cont,|21.0;
3Cont,|13.0

1 blistering, can't walk, running around with other
2 animals, and carrying it all over the place. What are
3 you going to do with them? Are you going to poison
4 them? Are you going to shoot them? What?

5 MR. WHITE: That's a good question. I don't
6 see poisoning as an option. Shooting, I think, would
7 be the option. But an assessment would have to be made
8 on the ground what is the level of contact between
9 affected livestock and treating whitetail deer and are
10 there indeed regions of whitetail deer. If there are
11 regions of whitetail deer, then some sort of
12 stamping-out program would have to be done and circles
13 drawn around the possible infected area to know which
14 area --

15 MS. MOODY-SMITH: Circles of what?

16 MR. WHITE: Well, you look for the infected
17 premise, and then you go maybe with a 10 kilometer
18 circle around that to do surveillance. You send
19 people out on the ground and you look for disease both
20 in livestock, which is our main concern, and then also
21 wildlife like whitetail deer.

22 MS. MOODY-SMITH: Okay. Thank you.

23 MR. PERGLER: If I could just say one thing
24 here because what you have presented is a perfect
25 example of a comment that if you can give it to us in

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1 formal scoping comment saying please identify in the
 2 final EIS the method of eradication should this occur,
 3 we actually do in the EIS address two plans on what --
 4 on control measures. But, again, the more specific in
 5 detailed your question or comment is the better we can
 6 modify the EIS to address your concern. Thank you.

7 MS. MOODY-SMITH: Thank you.

8 MS. COGHILL: Yes, sir.

9 MR. CHAVIS: My name is Ian Chavis from Akin,
 10 Gump. The gentleman from the EIS team said towards the
 11 end of the presentation that all of the information
 12 generated during the process will be used to make the
 13 ultimate decision by EIS. But you also mentioned that
 14 there would be some other analyses or other studies
 15 that will also be considered. So I guess I have a
 16 two-part question. One, I think you mentioned the cost
 17 analysis, the cost study being one. The first question
 18 is, what are those other studies and will those studies
 19 be made available and be made part of the NEPA record.

20 MR. JOHNSON: I can address that. NEPA
 21 requires us to do an environmental assessment of the
 22 potential impacts on that federal action on the
 23 environment. So the decision-makers need to understand
 24 what those environmental impacts are under, as we
 25 described them, the normal operation standard of

126.0;
 24.0

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 26.0

All materials used in analysis and preparation of the NBAF EIS will be included in the Administrative Record. In addition, DHS made available on its website (www.dhs.gov/nbaf), on or about August 11, 2008, the key supporting documents which are expected to assist the DHS decision maker in making a final decision about NBAF. These documents include the Site Cost Analysis, Site Characterization Study, and Plum Island Facility Closure and Transition Cost Study, and other documents.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 4.0

DHS notes the commentor's request for other information and studies that would be considered in DHS's final decision on NBAF. As described in Section 2.6 of the NBAF EIS, DHS will consider the following reports, in addition to the NBAF EIS, in formulating the Record of Decision: Threat Risk Assessment (TRA), Site Cost Analysis, Site Characterization Study, and the Plum Island Facility Closure and Transition Cost Study. The Cost Analysis, Site Characterization Study, and the Plum Island Facility Closure and Transition Cost Study and other support documents were made available on DHS's NBAF Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>) in early August 2008. The TRA has not been released and is not publicly available due to NBAF security considerations. With the exception of the TRA, these studies, along with the references used in preparation of the NBAF EIS, are part of the Administrative Record and can also be accessed through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process.

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1 accident scenarios so he can decide how we wants to
2 mitigate those impacts depending on which site and
3 which option is chosen. Along with that, the
4 decision-maker needs to be aware of other things that
5 go into that decision, such as cost, site
6 characterization. We are also looking at, for example,
7 if we decide to build a NBAF right next to the Plum
8 Island facility, what would it cost to transition
9 people to the new facility or to the -- you know, the
10 facility on the mainland site. We have to have all
11 those factors, so we are not just making a decision in
12 a vacuum, if you will. So those supporting documents
13 are now part of the NEPA record. There are other
14 studies that were going on. Certainly, if people want
15 to request copies, they can. But those are not part of
16 the NEPA record. And those documents are not for
17 public comment.

18 MR. CHAVIS: And how would one get copies of
19 those studies or make that request?

20 MR. JOHNSON: You have to go through the FOIA
21 process.

22 MR. CHAVIS: Through the FOIA process to the
23 Department of Homeland Security?

24 MR. JOHNSON: Correct.

25 MR. CHAVIS: Okay. Thank you.

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1 MS. COGHILL: Thank you very much. Yes,
 2 sir.
 3 MR. THRASHER: My name is Grady Thrasher. I
 4 am from Athens, Georgia. And I have a question about
 5 what appears to be a disingenuous presentation in the
 6 EIS in the summary table. You have the various
 7 potential impacts on the environment. And the summary
 8 says they are even negligible or they are not
 9 negligible or whatever. And then at the bottom, all
 10 the way across it says, benefits and its significance,
 11 significance, significance. So I thought, wow, this is
 12 really going to benefit the environment and are they
 13 going to stop erosion or air pollution or something.
 14 And what you have is, well, there may be things
 15 developed, such as vaccines and countermeasures that,
 16 you know, would cure foreign animal diseases. Well, of
 17 course, that's the purpose of NBAF, but that is very
 18 speculative. And it is looking out way over the
 19 future.
 20 I understand that you have been studying Foot
 21 and Mouth Disease for 50 years and have not come up
 22 with an effective cure or countermeasure for it. So I
 23 believe you are misleading the public when they say,
 24 Well, look, we have done a study and it is going to be
 25 a significant benefit to the environment in Athens,

35

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 26.0
 The summary table presents an adjectival assessment of the potential effects of the proposed NBAF on the environmental and human resources of each affected site alternative. The table has been modified based on comments received during the public comment period.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 9.0
 DHS notes the commentor's concerns. The NBAF EIS Section 2.5 provides a comparison summary of the effects for each site alternative by resource; however, more detail by site and resource is found in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 Section 3.4 summarizes the preliminary air assessment and Section 3.4.1 describes the methodology used to assess each site's potential air effects. Once a site is selected, disposal method(s) determined, and design complete; a complete emission inventory will be developed and refined air dispersion modeling executed if necessary to show compliance with the NAAQS and state specific SIPs if applicable. The final design will ensure that the NBAF does not significantly affect the region's ability to meet air quality standards. Sections 3.3 and 3.7 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spills and runoff affects.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 11.0
 DHS notes the commentor's statement regarding the Comparison of Environmental Effects Table in the NBAF EIS Executive Summary. The portion of the Summary of Environmental Effects Table in the Executive Summary and Section 2.5 that the commentor is referring to described the potential benefit from the NBAF under normal operation. As the commentor noted, these are indeed the benefits that would be realized from the NBAF in preventing or minimizing the effects of a FAD outbreak. DHS feels it is important to include this information to assist the reader in understanding the intended benefits to the economy, biological resources, and health and safety as well as any adverse effects resulting from construction and operation activities.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 1.0
 DHS's mission is to study foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The purpose of the NBAF would be to develop tests to detect foreign animal and zoonotic diseases and develop vaccines (or other countermeasures such as antiviral therapies) to protect agriculture and food systems in the United States.

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1Cont.26.0

1 Georgia by putting this and all the other effects on
2 the environment are going to be minimal or whatever. I
3 am not sure your statement that it is going to have
4 beneficial effects is really responsive to NBAF. And
5 that's my question.

6 MR. PERGLER: That is -- I am taking that as
7 a comment. And we hear you. We are going to take a
8 hard look at the presentation and content for the
9 executive summary. And so when you see the final,
10 judge us on how well we did our homework and responded
11 to you. Thank you.

12 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, sir.

13 MR. KAPPES: I would like to point out that
14 you are correct that we have worked on Foot and Mouth
15 Disease for the last 50 years, but we have made
16 significant progress. We are currently evaluating an
17 effective vaccine with a company. DHS and the USDA
18 jointly are working on that, and it looks to be very
19 successful. And we are in the process of developing a
20 vaccine for all seven different stereotypes. So we
21 fortunately have made tremendous progress in the last
22 few years.

23 MR. COGHILL: At this point in time we are to
24 the close of the question and answer period. I want to
25 thank everybody. That's very valuable information that

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1 was put forward. Right now we would like to open it up
2 to the formal comments period of the meeting and listen
3 to what folks who signed up what their comments are. I
4 just like to remind everybody that please come to the
5 microphone when your name is called. I have the
6 sign-in sheets of folks when they showed up and what
7 time slot they signed up to speak. I will be calling
8 your name from this sheet. Please come to the
9 microphone, speak your name and your organization if
10 you would like to provide that for the record. And
11 please remember that you each have three minutes.

12 Again, I will work with the yellow and red
13 cards so we are not interfering with your statement.
14 But if you could please respect that because clearly
15 there is quite a few folks who would like to speak.

16 The first person is Kathy Prescott.

17 MS. PRESCOTT: My name is Kathy Prescott.

18 Again, I am from Athens, Georgia, one of the six sites
19 for this proposed NBAF. I would like to tell you about
20 a really big seller in Athens right now -- rain
21 barrels. We are in a 100-year drought, and people are
22 collecting rainwater off of their roofs to water their
23 plants. Yet, the DEIS says, rainwater in Athens, no
24 problem. The executive summary table says effects on
25 water in Athens by NBAF will be minor.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and DHS acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site alternative would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water, an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.. The South Milledge Avenue Site alternative would have access to 3 surface water resources: the North Oconee River, the Middle Oconee River, and the Jackson County Bear Creek Reservoir. The access to 3 surface water resources will help ensure the availability of water in the event that any one of those sources becomes inadequate.

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1Cont|12.2:

1 Another popular item in Athens is the
 2 mosquito pellet. They are for the rain barrels. We
 3 had so many mosquitoes in Athens, Georgia that the fire
 4 stations give these pellets away for free. We have
 5 PSA's describing how best to avoid breeding mosquitoes
 6 around our homes. Yet, now we discover in the DEIS
 7 that NBAF will have an insectary to breed mosquitoes by
 8 the thousands to serve as vectors for diseases, some of
 9 which are fatal to humans. But the DEIS says, No
 10 problem. Well, a little bit more of a problem in areas
 11 that have mosquitoes since a breach could cause a
 12 disease, particularly Rift Valley Fever, to become
 13 established in the environment. But we were told the
 14 health and safety effects of NBAF on Athens are
 15 negligible.

3|19.2

16 We also learned in the DEIS that incineration
 17 is a possible means of carcass disposal. It would be,
 18 quote, a major Title V air emissions source. Athens is
 19 in violation of EPA's standards for ozone and
 20 particulate matter right now. The DEIS only refers to,
 21 quote, state compliance continues to be a challenge,
 22 unquote. But air quality in Athens, effects in Athens,
 23 minor. The most egregious information, however, came
 24 in February at our DHS Town Hall meeting called to
 25 answer our questions. Dr. Larry Barrett from Plum

4|9.2

38

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 19.2

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding safe facility operations. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. An analysis of potential consequences of a pathogen (e.g., Rift Valley fever virus [RVF]) becoming established in native mosquito populations, particularly in warm, humid climates, was evaluated in Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, and 3.14 of the NBAF EIS. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures (SOP) and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the NBAF. RVF and foot and mouth disease SOPs and response plans would likely include strategies that are similar. However, the RVF response plan would also include a mosquito control action plan. The potential consequences of pesticide use would be evaluated during the preparation of a site-specific response plan.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 9.2

DHS notes the commentor's observations regarding the assessment of Athens area air quality and potential impacts from NBAF operations. Section 3.4.1 of the NBAF EIS describes the methodology used in assessing potential air quality consequences. Section 3.4.3.3.2 describes an emission inventory relative to the South Milledge Avenue Site based on the current state of NBAF design, and Section 3.4.3.1.2 summarizes the 2006 Ambient Air Surveillance Report produced by the Ambient Monitoring Program of Georgia's Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division. Should a decision be made to build NBAF and following site selection and final design, a complete emission inventory would be developed and refined modeling performed as necessary in accordance with state-specific air quality permitting requirements and specifically to show compliance with the NAAQS and the Georgia SIP, if applicable.

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4Cont.19.2;
3Cont.19.2

1 Island sat there and volunteered, and I quote because I
2 have the tape, If you look at the eight diseases that
3 we are going to work with in this facility, there is
4 only one of those diseases that is transmitted through
5 aerosol FMD, unquote.

6 According to the DEIS, Dr. Barrett left out
7 the three zoonotic diseases that are spread through
8 aerosol that can be fatal to humans and two diseases
9 completely omitted from any public discussion we now
10 find listed in the NBAF feasibility study -- Avian Flu
11 and Newcastle. Dr. Barrett also made a point of
12 telling us about how small the animals in NBAF will be.
13 The DEIS directly contradicts him. 1430 pounds cattle,
14 1400 pound bison. That's a lot of infected meat. The
15 citizens of Athens have been mislead and are tired of
16 DHS's blatant disingenuousness.

5|26.0

17 To use your very overuse term, we will
18 leverage all the ill-wills caused by DHS's, quote,
19 highly competitive acquisition strategy that has
20 already disrupted our community. And we will use all
21 legal means to keep NBAF away from Athens, Georgia.

6|25.2

22 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, Kathy. The next
23 person to speak, next lined up is Grady Thrasher.

24 MR. THRASHER: My name is Grady Thrasher.

25 And, again, I am from Athens, Georgia. My wife Kathy

39

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. Dr. Barrett is the Director of the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) is correct in stating that only one of the diseases at PIADC, foot and mouth disease (FMD) can be transmitted through aerosol means. At the NBAF, FMD virus along with three other pathogens, Hendra virus, Nipah virus, and Rift Valley fever virus can be transmitted through aerosol means.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

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1 Prescott and I represent the Concerned Citizens of
2 Athens and the surrounding communities. We do not
3 represent the pandering politicians' disingenuous
4 academics and other financially interested gain
5 speakers that comprise the Georgia consortium. We
6 represent the people, the communities whose consent has
7 never been sought and whose consent never will be given
8 to the National Bio and Agro Defense Facility being
9 developed in the midst of our pleasant, peaceful, and
10 progressive town. Do not mistake politeness or even
11 natural congeniality of our people for passivity or
12 absence of resolve. Our purpose is to prevent NBAF
13 from being located in our community. Our purpose is to
14 inform the public of the truth behind the propaganda
15 and to expose the conflicted interest and perverse
16 logic of those who would seek to degrade our fragile
17 environment and place our population and much of our
18 economy at risk for the convenience and financial
19 benefit of a few.

20 In our opposition to NBAF in Athens, we will
21 not back down, nor will we step aside. To bring NBAF
22 to Athens, DHS will have to climb a mountain of legal
23 briefs and live with a lifetime of public resentment.
24 NBAF is not compatible with the character of our town.
25 We find your willingness to put us at risk

1|25.2
2|15.2
1Cont.|25.2

40

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.2
DHS notes the commentor's statement.

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1Cont.25.2

1 irresponsible and repugnant to the proper role of
 2 government. Please understand this for we want it to
 3 be abundantly clear, the vast majority of the people of
 4 Athens, Georgia do not want NBAF in their community.
 5 We will fight you by every lawful means every step of
 6 the way should you choose to impose NBAF on Athens.

324.1

7 The DEIS clearly shows that the safest location for
 8 NBAF, if anywhere at all, would be Plum Island, a
 9 800-acre island you are already on. The DEIS failed to

426.0

10 show any compelling reasons for incurring greater risk
 11 of placing NBAF anywhere on the U.S. mainland. Why
 12 does DHS persist in this effort? Thank you.

13 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, sir. The next
 14 speaker, Ms. Winters.

125.3

15 MS. WINTERS: My name is Judy Winters, and I
 16 am from Butner, North Carolina. You have to bear with
 17 me, I am kind of nervous at this. But, basically, I
 18 came here today with a petition from the residents of
 19 Butner, Scale, and Greenhorn with signatures of over 42
 20 residents. Basically, the majority of the residents
 21 now have more concerns since the release of the DEIS.

217.3:

22 For instance, in Butner the main route to the site,
 23 Central Avenue, was not even evaluated for cumulative
 24 impacts, environmental effects. It was only mentioned
 25 twice in the report and only in proximity, not for

41

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 17.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern about the traffic congestion in the area of the Umstead Research Farm site and the future impact of the NBAF operation on the area's transportation infrastructure. A discussion of the planned improvements to the area's primary transportation corridors of Range Road (SR 1121) and Old Route 75 to alleviate current and future traffic congestion resulting from the NBAF operation at the Umstead Research Farm site is located in Section 3.11.7.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. All planned improvements are per the recommendations of the Granville County Comprehensive Transportation Plan of October 1, 2007. An evaluation of cumulative impacts for traffic the area of the Umstead Research Farm site is located in Section 3.11.7.3.1 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

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2Cont.17.3;
3Cont.26.0

1 effects of the environment. But, yet, we are told four
2 years of construction and traffic will be significant
3 but, yet, the environment is not at all analyzed. The
4 Highway 75 where the NBAF will be located, the DEIS
5 stated that 2.2 cars travel that road per day. It is
6 3,000 feet from one of the larger federal facilities in
7 the United States. I think it is safe to say 2.2
8 cars -- more than 2.2 cars travel that road.

4|18.3

9 Waste disposal. We still do not understand
10 what type of waste disposal will be used. We don't
11 know if we will have an incinerator. We don't know if
12 it is a tissue digester. Some of these are so many
13 unknowns. And, basically, I think now that the DEIS is
14 released, I am happy to say there is more opposition
15 now than ever. Thank you.

1Cont.25.3

16 MS. COGHILL: Thank you.

17 MS. WINTERS: Where would you like me to
18 leave these petitions?

19 MS. COGHILL: I was going to ask if that's
20 something you can leave with us. That would be great.

21 The next speaker that's signed up is Susanne
22 Moody-Smith. Would you like to come to the
23 microphone? Thank you.

24 MS. MOODY-SMITH: By the way, I think you all
25 left out orange on your colors. I would like to point

42

Comment No: 4Issue Code: 18.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Section 3.13.2.2 of the NBAF EIS describes the origins of, pretreatment applicable to, and final disposition all of the waste streams that would be generated by the operation of the NBAF EIS. Sanitary sewer wastes are summarized on Table 3.13.2.2-2, waste solids are summarized on Table 3.13.2.2-3, and three technologies being considered for the disposal of carcass/pathological wastes (incineration, alkaline hydrolysis, and rendering) are compared on Table 3.13.2.2-4. As discussed in Section 3.13.2.2, the final design for the NBAF will probably include more than one technology for the treatment of carcasses and pathological wastes. Factors that may be considered in making this technology decision include individual site requirements and restrictions, air emissions, liquid and solid waste stream by-products, and operation and maintenance requirements.

Because the method of carcass and pathological waste disposal has not yet been determined, Section 3.4 of the NBAF EIS (Air Quality) assumes that the treatment technology with the greatest potential to negatively impact air quality, incineration, will be used to assess the maximum adverse effect. Section 3.4.1 describes the methodology used in assessing potential air quality consequences at each site. Potential construction emissions were extrapolated from a similar facility's construction approach to ozone precursors, nitrogen oxide, and volatile organic compounds. For operations, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency dispersion modeling program, SCREEN3, was used to predict potential bounding case emissions at each site based on the current state of facility design. Should a decision be made to build the NBAF and following site selection and final design, a complete emission inventory would be developed and refined modeling performed as necessary in accordance with state-specific air quality permitting requirements. Similarly, because alkaline hydrolysis would have the greatest impact on sanitary sewage capacity, Section 3.3 of the EIS (Infrastructure) assumes that alkaline hydrolysis will be used to assess the maximum sanitary sewage impacts. Following site selection, specialized studies would be performed to ensure that wastewater would meet the acceptance criteria of the South Granville Water and Sewer Authority (SGWASA).

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1 out that your plans sound great. Unfortunately, none
 2 of them are finalized. It is all conceptual. And I
 3 can say till now till the cows come home that I am
 4 going to do something state of the art and I might even
 5 achieve that. But in two weeks, it is not going to be
 6 state of the art anymore. And all we learn from state
 7 of the art is something else that can go wrong.

8 You have the safest site already in your
 9 possession by your own assessment. Also, a point of
 10 serious concern for those of us that value the
 11 residents in Murdock Center and in our psychiatric
 12 hospital in John Upstead, is the fragility of our
 13 patients that have absolutely no say. I don't believe
 14 you have received any comments from them. These people
 15 are so fragile that some of them will die if they are
 16 moved.

17 DHS does not have a strong background in
 18 effective evacuation. I don't want to be the next site
 19 that Air Force 1 is circling over going, ain't it a
 20 shame. You do not have public support in Gramble
 21 County. I believe Judy has demonstrated that. You do
 22 not have public support. And the more you release --
 23 the more information you release, the less support you
 24 have. I was told by you that you would consider public
 25 support. So you need to understand that you don't have

43

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. DHS would maintain the NBAF and ancillary facilities in compliance with applicable environmental, safety, and health requirements and provide adequate funding for safe operation and maintenance, including insuring that the NBAF maintained up to date equipment and operational procedures.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.1


DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 20.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern that NBAF operations could result in an accident. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Once the ROD has been signed and prior to the initiation of NBAF operations, a site-specific emergency management plan will be developed that will be coordinated with the local Emergency Management Officer and will include contingency plans for potentially affected residents and institutions. DHS is aware of the presence of the health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are aware of the proposed action. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated and are presented in Section 3.14. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives."

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 19.2

DHS notes the commentor's lack of confidence in the DHS and concerns regarding safe facility operations. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Chapter 3, Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, then site-specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and



wildlife populations residing within the area.

Comment No: 5

Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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5Cont.125.2

1 it in Gramble County. I was also assured by you.
2 Actually, it was someone's else question, but I was
3 listening very intently, that you would not use force
4 against the opposition -- anyone that tried to stop you
5 from putting this thing in. I am going to explain to
6 you that there are people that are willing to stand in
7 front of the bulldozers, and I am one of them.

8 And, also, I think one thing that you all
9 might not have considered when you considered some of
10 these sites in the Bible Belt, we do know our Bible
11 stories. And we are very, very well aware that David
12 can whoop go Goliath's butt. Thank you very much.

13 MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Those are all the
14 folks that have asked to speak this evening or, excuse
15 me, this afternoon. We do have a little bit of time we
16 wanted to offer up if anyone else hasn't signed in to
17 speak. If you all would like to do that, that's
18 certainly an option for folks who haven't commented.
19 Again, I would like to reiterate if you would like to
20 provide your comments in writing, they are going to be
21 considered just as equally as those that are provided
22 verbally here today.

23 MR. JOHNSON: There are no more comments. As
24 Cathy has said, we would appreciate getting them after
25 the meeting or sometime before August 26 and 25.

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1 Again, these are number a ways of how we can -- folks
2 can make comments. We encourage you to do that and
3 also go on our website. All the comments are important
4 to us. And we look forward to engaging more as we go
5 on the road the next three weeks. So if there is no
6 further comments or questions, I will officially
7 adjourn the meeting. Some of the subject matter
8 experts, myself, will be around if you would like to
9 talk to us. So we thank everyone again for coming.
10 And with that, we will adjourn the meeting. Thank you.

(At 2:15 p.m., the meeting was concluded.)

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NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (NBAF DEIS) MEETING
EVENING SESSION
BUTNER, NORTH CAROLINA

PRESENTERS:

Mr. James Johnson, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Dr. Steve Kappes, U.S. Department of Agriculture
Mr. Chuck Pergler, Tetra Tech, Inc.

Moderator: Catherine Coghill

At Butner, North Carolina

Tuesday, July 29, 2008

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1 Secretary Jay Cohen. We expect a Record of
2 Decision to be made in December of 2008. If a
3 site is selected, construction will begin in
4 2010, and the facility will be operational by
5 2015.

6 Your comments are important. As I said
7 before, the comment period ends August 25th,
8 2008. There are many ways for you to submit
9 comments. Any comments received by August 25th
10 will be addressed and responded to in the final
11 EIS.

12 Please keep in mind that you do not have
13 to make your comment tonight. You can provide
14 comment at a later date through any of the
15 mechanisms you see here in the slide, as long as
16 we receive them by August 25th. Thank you.

17 MS. COGHILL: All right. That
18 concludes the presentation. What we'd like to
19 do now is open up the floor to questions that
20 you have specifically to the presentation that
21 was just given.

22 So, the process that we're asking everyone
23 to work with us on is if you have a question,
24 please come to the microphone and just pose one
25 question. If you'd like to state your name and

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1 our organization, that's fine. If you would
2 prefer not to, that's fine.

3 And what I am going to do just to make
4 sure that you are heard and we hear the question
5 correctly and we respond directly to you, is I'm
6 going to repeat the question once it's
7 presented. We do have 20 minutes for this
8 period, and if folks can just be cognizant of
9 that, clearly there's a lot of folks here who
10 may need to ask something.

11 So, with that, the first person to the
12 microphone, please. Yes, ma'am.

13 MS. TRAPSKI: Hi. I'm Susan Trapski of
14 Durham. My question is, I believe that the
15 gentlemen from USDA said that the BSL-4
16 employees would need to wear suits. Earlier in
17 the open house, one of the -- the people who
18 was doing the -- the research, the feasibility,
19 told me that the diseases that would be studied
20 would not be able to hurt the prisoners or the
21 people who are living in the school that would
22 not be able to be moved quickly.

23 That's sounds like a contradiction to me.
24 Maybe someone can explain.

25 MS. COGHILL: Okay. The question that

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS is aware of the presence of the health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are aware of the proposed action. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated and are presented in Section 3.14. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 19.3

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

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1 Susan had is that she'd like clarification on
2 the information that was given. The gentleman
3 who presented from USDA stated that the BSL-4
4 employees would be wearing suits. And she'd
5 like an understanding of how or -- that does or
6 does not affect the community at large.

7 MR. KAPPES: As I indicated, we will be
8 working on zoonotic diseases. And so, it is
9 correct that a BSL-4 lab would require personal,
10 protective equipment, which is the suit. Can
11 you tell us which individual that you talked to?

12 MR. TRAPSKI: It was Mr. Janke. Am I
13 saying the name correctly? I -- I believe that
14 I heard you say that evacuating the prisoners
15 would not be necessary, because none of the
16 diseases studied -- maybe you can clarify what
17 you said.

18 I could have simply have misunderstood.

19 MS. COGHILL: Can someone, please,
20 hand Randy the microphone. Thank you.

21 MR. JANKE: Yeah, at -- at no time
22 did I say that there would be no necessity to
23 evacuate prisoners, nor -- in fact, I chose not
24 to talk about that, because I had mentioned that
25 during the risk analysis, we presented the

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1 information to DHS in the draft EIS.

2 It talks about the unmitigated and the
3 mitigated risks, the potential for release and
4 the consequences thereof. When it comes to
5 emergency response, I made it very clear -- and
6 for anybody that is wondering right now,
7 emergency response was considered a mitigative
8 type of action after a release.

9 We specifically did not look at how that
10 emergency action would take place. And at no
11 time in any wording of the EIS, do we say the
12 methods that either USDA or DHS would employ.
13 And I think during the presentation and even
14 previous presentations, it was made clear that
15 those are operational considerations that will
16 have to be determined once a final design was in
17 place.

18 So, I apologize for the misunderstanding.

19 MS. TRAPSKI: Thank you.

20 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, Susan. Next
21 person, please.

22 UNIDENTIFIED: It would be so helpful
23 if you guys could explain what will happen after
1|21.3: a release. I mean, are we talking about
2|19.3: evacuation? Are we talking about \$69,000,000 in


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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 21.3

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commenter's concerns regarding the impact of an accident and subsequent potential evacuation on hospitalized population. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. The chances of an accidental release are extremely low. Appendix B to the NBAF EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections in the United States and world-wide. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site then site-specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of population, including hospitalized persons, residing within the local area. The need for an evacuation under an accident condition is considered to be very low probability event. An evacuation would not be necessary if FMDV were accidentally released from NBAF, since FMDV is not a public health threat. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.



A site-specific emergency response plan would be developed and coordinated with the local emergency management plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF. The type of, duration, and geographical extent of quarantine would be determined by the appropriate authorities depending on the pathogen released and contamination level.

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1 the county being cost. What happens?

2 MS. COGHILL: Okay. The -- the
3 question is what will happen after a release.

4 MR. JOHNSON: Let me see if I can
5 answer that. A release where -- or a highly
6 unlikely event of a release, or introduction of
7 Foot and Mouth Disease or any foreign animal
8 disease into the country is something that
9 requires a response.

10 So, we have a well-defined system for
11 reporting, detecting and responding to outbreaks
12 of Foot and Mouth Disease, whether it's in the
13 unlikely event it gets out of the lab, like Plum
14 Island, or comes into the country. That we have
15 had -- we have a national plan that involves
16 three steps.

17 And I would like for Dr. Bill White in the
18 USDA -- the USDA has been working on this for a
19 number of years. The Animal, Plants and Health
20 Inspection Service is responsible for responding
21 to an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease.

22 And we have a very deliberate set of
23 sequences. But Bill, maybe give the real simply
24 high level bullet so we can understand.

25 DR. WHITE: Okay. Thank you for the

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1 question. I'm Bill White from USDA and APHIS.
2 One of our responsibilities is to address these
3 concerns about foreign animal diseases. We have
4 a national response plan for Foot and Mouth
5 Disease.

6 If it gets in the United States, we will
7 jump quickly on it. We have special
8 veterinarians who are trained to react to this.
9 The actual program itself, how do we get rid of
10 it? In livestock, it would probably involve the
11 population of those that are affected.

12 And if it's -- we can't contain it quickly
13 to a small area, vaccination may or may not be
14 required. Does that answer your --

15 MS. COGHILL: Thank you.

16 UNIDENTIFIED: I don't think you're
17 satisfying the --

18 DR. WHITE: Okay.

19 UNIDENTIFIED: I mean, how come the
20 evacuation question came up, like, 1000 times
21 this afternoon.

22 DR. WHITE: Okay. What -- as far as
23 that evacuation -- thank you -- Foot and Mouth
24 Disease, the most important disease we're going
25 to work with at the NBAF, it's only an animal

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1 disease. It's not a human disease.

2 There's no human evacuation required

3 whatsoever. Okay.

4 UNIDENTIFIED: (Someone calls out in
5 the audience) What about the other --

6 MS. COGHILL: Excuse me. Let's listen
7 to their dialogue and respect what they have to
8 say and what the answers are. Thank you.

9 UNIDENTIFIED: The obvious question is
10 cont. |
21.3 | what about the pathogens that affect humans.

DR. WHITE: As far as the pathogens
12 that affect humans, for example, Rift Valley
13 fever, NEPA and so on, that is -- that is a
14 concern if there is a major release through HEPA
15 filters or some other sort of massive release
16 instance. Okay.

17 If -- if -- it's not going to -- there
18 won't be enough virus release, you know, through
19 leaks in the walls, and so on to cause any
20 infection in people.

21 UNIDENTIFIED: They want to know if
22 cont. |
19.3 | they've got half an hour to get seven and a
23 | half thousand people out of the hospital. Tell
24 | 'em yes or no.

25 DR. WHITE: No. It's not going to be

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1 necessary. This is one thing that I think we
 2 should put to rest right now. It's not going
 3 to be necessary for the community to evacuate if
 4 there is a release of Rift Valley Fever or one
 5 of the other viruses that they'll be working
 6 with at the NBAF.

7 We faced the same question, for example,
 8 in the town meetings. They were also worried
 9 about getting on the Long Island Expressway and
 10 trying to get through New York City. And this
 11 is a blue call incident. This is just -- we are
 12 working with small, small volumes of virus.

13 If there is a release, it would be so
 14 small that it won't infect one person.

15 MS. COGHILL: Thank you very much for
 16 your question, sir. The gentleman over here on
 17 the left-hand side of the room was next. You'd
 18 like to pass?

19 UNIDENTIFIED: (Nods affirmatively.)

20 MR. COGHILL: Okay.

21 MR. PIKE: I want to get this right,
 22 but can the Department of Homeland Security, and
 23 will the Department of Homeland Security enter
 24 into a guarantee that is supported by
 25 congressional approval and the executive branch

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 2.0

DHS's mission is to study foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The purpose of the NBAF would be to develop tests to detect foreign animal and zoonotic diseases and develop vaccines (or other countermeasures such as antiviral therapies) to protect agriculture and food systems in the United States. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that future work would be conducted on strictly human pathogens. The pathogens to be studied at the NBAF as provided in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS include Foot and Mouth Disease virus, Classical Swine Fever virus, Vesicular Stomatitis virus, Rift Valley Fever virus, Nipah virus, Hendra virus, and African Swine Fever virus. Should the NBAF be directed to study any pathogens not included in the list of pathogens included in the NBAF EIS, DHS and USDA would conduct an evaluate of the new pathogen(s) to determine if the potential challenges and consequences were bounded by the current study. If not, a new risk assessment would be prepared and a separate NEPA evaluation may be required."

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1 cont. | that you will only examine foreign animal
2.0 | disease?

3 | Will you guarantee that that's all you're
4 | going to be studying at this facility ten years
5 | from now, two years from now or fifty years from
6 | now?

7 | MR. JOHNSON: That is -- that is our
8 | mission, is animal diseases.

9 | MR. PIKE: No, I want a guarantee.

10 | MR. JOHNSON: I'll give you -- I'll
11 | give you --

1 cont. | MR. PIKE: Can you, as the head of this
2.0 | department, enter into an agreement right now,
 | supported by Congress and the executive branch,
15 | that you will never study anything other than
16 | foreign animal disease? Yes or no.

17 | MR. JOHNSON: I will give you my --
18 | right now, I can't engage with Congress. Human
19 | diseases are a CDC mission. That's what they do
20 | in Atlanta, Georgia and other places. We're
21 | focused on the animals disease portion.

22 | So, I can give you my commitment that --
23 | you know, I can't speak for Congress itself, but
24 | I think they would appropriate money for the
25 | NBAF facility. There are plenty of other

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1 facilities. The CDC is a very big agency. They
2 have a huge mission, focusing on human diseases.

3 Now, there is no facility that's equipped
4 to handle the large livestock/large animal for
5 animal diseases and zoonotic diseases that go
6 from animal to human. But the root of it is
7 the animals and where we're lacking in research
8 facilities.

9 So, I can you -- I can't speak for
10 Congress, but I can give you my commitment.

1 cont. | MR. PIKE: So, the answer is, no, you
20 | cannot guarantee that it won't study human
13 | disease, such as anthrax --

14 MR. JOHNSON: Anthrax is not --

15 MR. PIKE: -- weapons of mass
16 destruction or anything else.

17 MR. JOHNSON: Anthrax, Ebola, it's not
18 part of our mission.

19 MR. PIKE: Yet.

20 MR. JOHNSON: And -- nor do I foresee
21 it being part of this mission.

22 MR. PIKE: Yet.

23 MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Next?

1|23.0 | MS. SMITH: Suzanne Smith, again. I
| was hoping that I could get Dr. White to

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding depopulation measures to control a disease outbreak. As described in Section 3.8.9.1 of the NBAF EIS, depopulation control measures could be undertaken given a worst-case scenario to prevent a widespread outbreak among wildlife and domestic livestock, should an accidental release of the foot and mouth disease virus occur. Section 3.14 and Appendix E investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur and consequences of those accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Depopulation or population reduction is one of ten potential FMD response strategies developed by the National Park Service. However, the National Park Service recommends the use of other strategies or combinations of strategies to avoid this strategy (see Table 3.8.9-1). A more likely scenario would include one or more of the non-lethal measures described in Table 3.8.9-1. Although the NBAF EIS acknowledges the potential for significant impacts on white-tailed deer in the event of an accidental release, the risk of such a release is extremely low (see Section 3.14). It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas and in areas with abundant wildlife. State-of-the-art biocontainment facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF. Furthermore, the purpose of NBAF is to combat diseases that could have significant effects on wildlife. Research at the NBAF would include the development of vaccines for wildlife that could prevent adverse impacts from a foreign introduction.

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1 cont. | reiterate what he -- the ques- -- the answer to
23.0 | my question in Washington concerning deer
3 | eradication.

4 | MR. JOHNSON: You're questioning --
5 | you're saying --

1 cont. | MS. SMITH: How deer eradication would
23.0 | be handled in Granville County should a whiff of
Foot and Mouth, the high -- most highly
9 | contagious disease known to the world get out of
10 | the --

11 | MR. JOHNSON: If the disease would get
12 | into the country, you want to --

13 | MS. SMITH: So, how would deer
1 cont. | eradication, specifically, be handled in
23.0 | Granville County?
15 |

16 | DR. WHITE: Thank you, Ms. Smith.
17 | This is becoming routine. Okay. Foot and Mouth
18 | Disease, it's the most contagious virus in
19 | livestock. Okay. White-tailed deer can be
20 | affected. If -- if the virus were to somehow
21 | escape the NBAF and get in the white-tail
22 | population, there are probably two approaches:
23 | one, is do nothing, because wherever Foot and
24 | Mouth Disease has occurred in wildlife anywhere
25 | in the world, it's burned itself out. Okay.

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1 The second approach is there will be
2 surveillance done.

3 And -- and surveillance not really
4 intensive, because we don't want deer to scatter
5 if they've got the disease, but there will be
6 surveillance done. And if it's looks like they
7 are co-mingling with cattle and transmitting the
8 disease to cattle, then we may have to take an
9 action.

10 And that action would be de-population,
11 once again. We don't -- you might have heard
12 this morning about poisoning deer. We don't --
13 we don't poison. We de-populate the site. We
14 do de-population.

15 MS. SMITH: Are you aware that the
16 deer in this area jump in and out of the
17 pastures constantly, and that they do already
18 travel quite a ways, and that -- like I said,
19 we've got a lot of people out here trying to
20 eradicate 'em on their own.

21 DR. WHITE: Right.

22 MS. SMITH: And they are proliferating
23 like crazy. And are you saying that we would
24 -- that poison would not be an answer? Because
25 I can guarantee you, you're not going to shoot

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1 'em all.

2 DR. WHITE: No, I -- I agree with you.

3 In this case, the cure would be worse than the

4 disease. So, in this situation, we'd probably

5 just let them go. Let -- let the --

6 MS. SMITH: Probably?

7 DR. WHITE: -- disease burn itself out.

8 Well, it's --

1 cont. | MS. SMITH: What is the worst case
23.0 | scenario?

11 DR. WHITE: Worst case scenario?

12 MS. SMITH: Unh-hunh (yes). They're

1 cont. | all -- they're all blistered, and they're
23.0 | jumping in and out of cow pastures and goat
15 | pastures and -- worst case scenario, which -- I
16 | guarantee you if you don't -- can't -- count the
17 | deer that --

18 DR. WHITE: I would think worst case

19 scenario is that we would gate -- fence in, all

20 livestock. And we're not going to try to kill

21 every single white-tail deer in Granville

22 County. It's just not possible.

1 cont. | MS. SMITH: Specifically, what would
23.0 | you use to -- to eradicate?

25 DR. WHITE: To eradicate them, honey.

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1 MS. SMITH: Good luck.

2 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, Suzanne.

3 We're halfway through the question and answer
4 period, folks. So, clearly, we want to make
5 sure those who still have questions have time to
6 ask those questions. Yes, sir? Please, go
7 ahead.

8 MR. BALL: Thank you. My name is
9 David Ball. My understanding of the charts we
10 saw in the back and much of what we've heard
11 tonight is -- is that they are part of the
12 attempt to decide which of the sites would be
13 the best site.

14 Since we are clearly dealing with extremely
15 dangerous things here, and since we're clearly
16 dealing with unpredictable things that we will
17 be dealing with in the future, because nobody
18 knows what kind of stuff you're going to have to
19 study in 10 or 15 or 20 years; and then with
20 technology the way it is, there's no way to
21 predict it.

14.0 Other than safety, are there any other
proper considerations to bring in to play other
24 than safety, when you're deciding where to put
25 this facility?

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 4.0

Several factors will affect the decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where. The EIS itself will not be the sole deciding factor. The decision will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS and support documents; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable Federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the Federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.

The Department of Homeland Security Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, with other Department officials, will consider the factors identified above in making final decisions regarding the NBAF. A Record of Decision that explains the final decisions will be made available no sooner than 30 days after the NBAF Final EIS is published.

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1 MR. JOHNSON: The question is other
2 than safety, are there any other considerations
3 where to put this facility?

4 The answer is yes. Safety in the risk
5 assessment we've done and the EIS is of paramount
6 importance to us. But we do consider other
7 factors that go into the decision.

8 As I mentioned earlier, we have public
9 participation. It is a part of that process.
10 The cost to build and operate this facility is a
11 factor. Site characterization is a factor,
12 security and technical feasibility.

13 So, we look at the range of information
14 that's in those factors and try to make an
15 informed decision. The other thing that goes
16 into play is when we were doing our screening of
17 the sites, we factored in what was important in
18 terms of collaboration with research. You know,
19 if we're going to have a facility for the next
20 50 years, we want to be able to make sure we
21 have some proximity for researchers and
22 universities and vet schools, so we can be able
23 to have a collaboration and to be able to
24 recruit scientists and --

25 MR. BALL: At what point -- and maybe

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1 cont.
40

this is the question I should have asked. At what point would we know the weight that's given to safety of a community versus the weight that's given to things that you've mentioned, such as convenience and that sort of thing?

At what point could we see a nice Powerpoint point slide saying, safety is just 30 percent, and we have these other 70 percent; or what we'd like to see is, safety is 99 percent and somebody's convenience -- if I were a researcher who's got to fly across the country to do his work, that's a very small part.

Is there any point in this process where we could actually see the decision making, know all the factors that go into the decision making; or are we just supposed to think, well, they did some safety studies, so I guess they must know what they're doing in safety?

I assume your safety people do know what they're doing with safety. What I would like to know is what Homeland Security -- how much they weight those safety considerations, because it doesn't seem to me that anything else is as important.

MR. JOHNSON: Okay. I will address

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1 that by saying that by saying that safety,
2 bio-safety, bio-security is of the utmost
3 importance to us. A case in point is Plum
4 Island. We currently operate -- DHS is
5 currently responsible for operating Plum Island.

6 And when we took over the facility in
7 2003, we spent a lot of money upgrading Plum
8 Island to make sure that it was safe and secure
9 and can operate in a safe manner; not just for
10 the workers but around the public. I envision
11 fully that we will take that mind set for NBAF.

12 No matter where it's built, it has to be
13 and will be a safe and secure facility. We will
14 apply the layers of safety, the layers of
15 security, depending on the risks that we're
16 trying to mitigate. So, I in no way want to
17 undermine the -- or for anybody to feel that
18 we're not going to put safety first.

19 For me, it's the highest priority. Again,
20 we have to factor in other things as well, but
21 safety is our priority.

22 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, David.
23 Folks, we have five minutes left of the Q and
24 A. Let's move it along. Ma'am, I think you
25 were next.

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1 MS. FIGUEROA: Yes. I'm Helen
 2 Figueroa, and I'm a parent of a child at Murdoch
 112.3 Center. But my questions are more related to
 the groundwater, how you're going to keep
 5 control of -- of not getting the groundwater in
 6 this area affected, because the main water
 7 supply for Wake County and other counties in
 8 this area is very close to this community.

9 And the other one is, why would you choose
 10 an area with such a large population, because
 11 there's a large, you know, prison -- every --
 12 all these populations and -- that the
 13 groundwater would be a concern. And I just --
 14 I mean, I, personally, live in Chapel Hill.

15 And most of the people I talked to it
 16 about today, they don't want it in their
 17 backyard, so why should we expect another
 18 community to have it in their backyard?

19 MS. COGHILL: So, your question is,
 20 what is the impacting effect on groundwater, and
 21 why are we looking at such an area with a large
 22 population. Thank you.

23 MS. FIGUEROA: And especially, a
 215.3 population of people that -- that don't have a
 voice.

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's groundwater concerns. The NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.7.7.1.3 describes the Umstead Research Farm Site's groundwater resources and the NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Sections 3.7.7.2.3 and 3.7.7.3.3 describe construction and operation consequences on the groundwater resources. The NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.13.8 describes solid and liquid waste management for the Umstead Research Farm Site. Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spills and runoff affects.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS is aware of the presence of the health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are well aware of the proposed action.

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1 MR. JOHNSON: I think that --
 2 (Interruption by audience applause.) With
 3 respect to the groundwater, all water leaving
 4 the facility has to be, and will be treated.
 5 All the waste water -- we have a bio or effluent
 6 waste treatment system that we would treat all
 7 the water to meet the state and local permits
 8 before it's released.

9 So, we have a very clear set of procedures
 10 that we follow. With respect to the population
 11 of the people, as I've said before, no matter
 12 where we build it, it's going to be safe and
 13 secure. There is precedent for a bio-lab that
 14 was built in urban communities, and they have
 15 operated there safely for years.

16 And so, we feel that there is precedent of
 17 this type of work being done on the mainland.

18 MS. COGHILL: Sir, you're next.

19 DR. MELAMED: I'm Dr. Joseph Melamed.
 20 I'm a physician. I live in Oxford, and I
 21 practice in this area. My question is about
 22 Foot and Mouth Disease. On September 15th,
 23 1978, there was a news release that said, "Foot
 24 and Mouth Disease has been diagnosed in cattle
 25 in pre-experimental animal holding facilities at

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 21.1

The evaluation of an accidental release of foot and mouth disease virus is presented in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS and includes national-scale economic consequences as well as local economic consequences.

As described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's site selection criteria included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or semi-urban areas. Nevertheless, it has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF.

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1 cont. | the Plum Island Animal Disease Center," which I
21.1 | think most people here are probably aware that
3 | there was an outbreak at that time.
4 | And the only reason, presumably, that it
5 | didn't make it to the mainland was because it
6 | was on the island. In 1982, the Federal Review
7 | Board -- begun after the Foot and Mouth Disease
8 | outbreak -- issued its annual report in which
9 | they said, quote, "We believe there is a
10 | potentially dangerous situation, and that
11 | without an immediate massive effort to correct
12 | efficiencies, a severe accident could result.
13 | "Lack of preventive maintenance, pressures
14 | by management to expedite programs have resulted
15 | in compromising safety."
16 | We know that in 2001, there was an
17 | outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in England
18 | from the Pirbright Laboratory, which resulted in
19 | a massive slaughter of cattle.
20 | Ten million cattle and sheep had to be
21 | slaughtered to contain that outbreak. And,
22 | thankfully, the U.S. Congress passed a law in
23 | 1948, Public Law 48-496, which states that, "No
24 | live virus of Foot and Mouth Disease may be
25 | introduced for any purpose into any part of the

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1 mainland of the United States, except the
 2 coastal islands, separated therefrom by waters
 3 navigable for deep water navigation, and which
 4 shall not be connected at the mainland by any
 5 tunnel."

2|5.3; | In light of those accidents, and the
 3|2.0 | existing federal law, how do you expect to
 8 | legally bring Foot and Mouth Disease to Butner,
 9 | and how do you justify it?

10 | MR. JOHNSON: The question on the law,
 11 | I think it would be good to update folks, in
 12 | case they haven't been following it, but the
 13 | Congress did pass a Farm Bill that says that the
 14 | Secretary of Agriculture shall issue a permit to
 15 | the Secretary of Homeland Security to any
 16 | successive facility to Plum Island.

17 | And there was no -- it was not tied to
 18 | Plum Island or a body of water. So, that gives
 19 | the Secretary the -- you know, the flexibility
 20 | to do that, if in -- but there has been an
 21 | update to that --

3 cont. | DR. MELAMED: That law has not been
 2.0 | repealed, correct?

24 | MR. JOHNSON: What's that?

25 | DR. MELAMED: The law that I quoted

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Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS show that even though the Plum Island Site Alternative has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites. Security concerns will be considered in the selection of the preferred alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's position and concern for locating NBAF on a mainland site. DHS prepared the NBAF EIS in accordance with the provisions of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and CEQ's regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1500 et seq.). NEPA requires all reasonable alternatives to be considered and that includes consideration of mainland sites. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated on the mainland.

Prior to passage of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (H.R. 6124 [2008 Farm Bill]) which became law on May 22, 2008, the United States Code (21 U.S.C. Section 113a) stipulated that live FMD virus could not be studied on the U.S. mainland unless the Secretary of Agriculture made a determination that such study was necessary and in the public interest and issued a permit for such research to be conducted on the mainland. Section 7524 of the 2008 Farm Bill directs the Secretary of Agriculture to issue a permit to the Secretary of Homeland Security for work on the live virus of FMD at any facility that is a successor to the Plum Island Animal Disease Center and charged with researching high-consequence biological threats involving zoonotic and foreign animal diseases. The permit is limited to a single successor facility.

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1 has not been repealed, correct?

2 MR. JOHNSON: The law has not been -- ?

3 DR. MELAMED: Repealed.

4 MR. JOHNSON: I think it's been voted

5 in with the Farm Bill.

3 cont. | DR. MELAMED: Yeah, but the Farm Bill

2.0 |

-- the Farm Bill did not repeal the prohibition

8 on studying Foot and Mouth Disease on the

9 mainland.

10 MR. JOHNSON: My understanding is the

11 Farm Bill was passed and has been signed by the

12 President and voted on by members of Congress,

13 but --

14 DR. MELAMED: But it -- it didn't

15 repeal the prohibition on studying Foot and

16 Mouth Disease on the mainland.

17 MR. JOHNSON: Yes.

3 cont. | DR. MELAMED: Yes?

2.0 |

-- MR. JOHNSON: It did. We can check

20 the Farm Bill. I want to address for a second,

21 for instance, the justification as to why we're

22 going through the EIS now. As Chuck Pergler

23 said, you can see the impact, the consequences

24 of FMD are slightly less if we were on Plum

25 Island than on the mainland.

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1 And that's part of the information we are
 2 gathering in going through the EIS. So, we are
 3 going through a rigorous process to determine
 4 that. No decisions have been made, and so,
 5 we're assessing information just like you are.

4|4.0 DR. MELAMED: I'm glad you brought up
 the EIS. If I might ask one more short
 8 question, I understand that up to 50 different
 9 pathogens may be stored at this facility, and
 10 that only three were studied in the EIS.

11 I know of one in particular that's a BSL-4
 12 virus, the Hendra virus, which apparently was
 13 not part of the EIS. And I'm just wondering
 4 cont. how we can expect -- why we should have
 4.0 confidence in this environmental report if it's
 16 omitted so many pathogens that may be stored
 17 here.

18 MR. PERGLER: Of the pathogens studied
 19 -- again, I go back to the presentation. We
 20 selected three pathogens that we felt bounded
 21 our analysis. We do have Hendra and Nipah
 22 Virus. Both are BSL-4. We chose to carry out
 23 the study with the Nipah virus because that was
 24 the more challenging of the two.

25 So, in effect, our analysis of Nipah would

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Comment No: 4Issue Code: 4.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding pathogens which could be stored at NBAF. As described in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS anticipates that NBAF research would initially focus on five pathogens including African swine fever, classical swine fever, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, FMD virus, Japanese encephalitis, and RVF virus, Hendra, virus, and Nipah virus. The NBAF research mission would be based on current pathogen and disease risk assessments, subject to change as threats and risk assessments change. The human health and safety and economic effects of an accidental release of FMD virus, RVF virus, and Nipah virus are presented in Section 3.10 and Section 3.14 and in Appendix D and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS. The diseases caused by these three pathogens sufficiently cover the spectrum of outcomes likely to occur if any pathogens to be studied at the proposed NBAF were to be released to the environment. However, should a decision be made to construct and operate NBAF, the North American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank, currently located at PIADC, would be transitioned to NBAF along with pathogen repository maintained by the PIADC Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory (FADDL). FADDL maintains the ability to identify/diagnose up to 30 foreign animal diseases (FADs). The FADDL-maintained pathogen repository consists of very small quantities of pathogens which are not studied or actively researched but which are maintained in a secure state for the exclusive purpose of aiding disease diagnosis.

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1 cover Hendra as well, because the impacts would
2 either be equal to or less than Nipah.

3 DR. MELAMED: Thank you.

4 MS. COGHILL: Folks, we're at the end
5 of the Q and A period. We're accommodating
6 folks and -- and filling them in on the time
7 slot to make sure that they can speak. There is
8 one woman who would like to present some
9 information.

10 And we're asking that she do that -- she
11 has a comment slot on the agenda, so we're going
12 to go through it that way. At this point in
13 time, the first person -- I have you on the list
14 to talk.

15 At this point in time, the first person is
16 Darryl Moss, who signed up to speak. I'd like
17 to call him to the microphone to go ahead and
18 start this meeting.

19 And just a reminder, sir, it would be
20 great it if you could help us set everything for
21 this evening. Please keep your comments to
22 three minutes, as we have quite a long list all
23 the way till the end of the evening.

24 MR. MOSS: I'll be very brief and to
25 the point.

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1 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, sir. I
2 appreciate it.

3 MR. MOSS: Good evening, my name is
4 Darryl Moss. I'm Mayor of Creedmoor. And
5 again, I appreciate the opportunity to have some
6 input into this process on behalf of our
7 community. On September 18th, I was asked to
8 publicly voice my support for the NBAF.

9 Like other local elected officials, I had
10 been briefed on the benefits of the NBAF being
11 sited in Butner with issues such as jobs,
12 economic development, et cetera. That night, I
13 chose to publicly oppose the NBAF, primarily,
14 because of what I did not know.

15 Tonight, I, again, speak in opposition to
16 the NBAF; however, this time because of what I
17 do know. The DEIS does not demonstrate a
18 commitment to the health, safety and welfare of
19 our community. As was mentioned earlier, there
20 is no preferred alternative to Plum Island for
21 the missions.

22 No existing labs there to meet the mission,
23 which means a new site could be preferred at
24 some point. As the gentleman also stated, this
25 is a high-risk facility, a risk that we do not

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 19.3

-DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the siting, construction and operation of the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur and consequences of those accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives and support for the Plum Island Site Alternative. A Preferred Alternative is one that an agency believes would best fulfill its statutory mission and responsibilities, giving consideration to economic, environmental, technical, and other factors. DHS identified its Preferred Alternative in Section 2.6 of the NBAF EIS.

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1 cont. | want our federal and/or state government to take
25.3 | on us. Thank you.

3 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, sir. The next
4 person is Terry Turner, followed by Anne
5 Whitfield. If you could, both please come to
6 the microphone. That would be great. Also, as
7 a reminder, if you have any questions in your
8 comments, please be aware that the way the
9 meeting is set up, we're not going to respond to
10 them at that point in time.

11 We're here to hear what you have to say,
12 and then take the transcription and work with
13 that to get to the final document. Thank you.
14 Go ahead, sir.

15 MR. TURNER: Okay. My name is Terry
16 Turner. I live right down the road. Again, I
17 want to thank you for finding Butner. It's been
18 awhile. And you continue to toot your own horn
19 about the DEIS, in light of all the inaccuracies
20 that you've heard today, and your failures to
21 answer essential questions, especially the
22 failure to address the question of
23 institutionalized populations near the proposed
24 site.

2|23.0 | Also, concerning the wildlife and

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern that NBAF operations could result in an accident. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are well aware of the proposed action. Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Once the ROD has been signed and prior to the initiation of NBAF operations, a site-specific emergency management plan would be developed that would be coordinated with the local Emergency Management Officer and would include contingency plans for potentially affected residents and institutions.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentors support of an island alternative.

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2 cont. livestock, I'm wondering why you go against
 23.0 conventional wisdom of this nation and other
 3 nations to conduct Foot and Mouth research
 4 somewhere with a layer of protection. Does not
 5 Germany do theirs on an island?
 6 Australia contracts theirs out to foreign
 7 countries, and Canada does it where there no
 8 susceptible animal population. I once asked
 9 you, how do you contain a mosquito. Apparently,
 10 you do it with spraying insecticides.
 11 And I'm sure they are -- these pesticides
 12 are as safe as DDT and Agent Orange were. I
 13 have lived and worked in Butner long enough to
 14 see foundations crack, water drain and sewer
 15 lines break. I've seen sewers overflow. I've
 3|21.3 seen ice storms knock out power and back up
 power where they never thought they'd have a
 18 problem.
 19 I've seen life safety generators that are
 20 constantly maintained and tested fail when they
 21 were needed. These sort of things will happen
 22 if you build here. I guarantee it. And despite
 23 -- when you emphasize community support, despite
 4|25.3 what you might hear from the Consortium, our
 communities don't want your NBAF.

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Comment No: 3Issue Code: 21.3

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

Comment No: 4Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commenter's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 MS. COGHILL: Anne Whitefield is the
2 next person to speak, followed by Helen Fischer
3 and Jane Hoppenworth. Anne, you have the floor.

4 MS. WHITEFIELD: Anne Whitefield, from
Durham. I'm a teacher and a mother. And I'm
12.0 | sorry to say I don't trust my government. I've
7 followed, for years, double speak, outright lies
8 and coverups, and particularly recently.

9 I wonder, for instance, why we haven't
heard more about the freon disease, mad cow
24.0 | disease it's known as, spongiform encephalitis.
12 This has been documented in this country, but I
13 don't hear anything tonight, and I haven't in
14 the media heard anything about this long-term
15 devastating illness, which you may eventually
16 use the facility to investigate. That's all.

17 MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Helen
18 Fischer, Jane Hoppenworth and Ms. Lyon -- Minnie
19 Lyon is next.

20 MS. FISCHER: We are being told we
21 need a new bio-safety level 4 lab to replace the
22 current level 3 lab on Plum Island, New York.
23 The Department of Homeland Security, another
24 construct of the current administration, adds
25 yet another layer of administration with no

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS state that the specific objective of the hazard identification is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Appendix B describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF then site-specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed the NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 4.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Mad cow disease is not designated to be studied at the NBAF. Therefore, there is no discussion or evaluation of mad cow disease in the NBAF EIS. The pathogens to be studied at the NBAF as provided in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS include Foot and Mouth Disease virus, Classical Swine Fever virus, Vesicular Stomatitis virus, Rift Valley Fever virus, Nipah virus, Hendra virus, and African Swine Fever virus. Should the NBAF be directed to study any pathogens not included in the list of pathogens included in the NBAF EIS, DHS and USDA would conduct an evaluate of the new pathogen(s) to determine if the potential challenges and consequences were bounded by the current study. If not, a new risk assessment would be prepared and a separate NEPA evaluation may be required.

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1 accountability nor oversight.

2 It is a simply a way of awarding expensive
3 no-bid contracts to favorite companies, and
4 giving national security reasons to avoid
5 legislative oversight and accountability.

6 According to the environmental impact statement,
7 it would be either operated directly by the
8 government or by contractor with strict
9 government oversight.

10 But Representative John Bingle needed to
11 threaten the Department of Homeland Security
12 with subpoenas for not providing the
13 Environmental Impact Statement to the Government
14 Accountability Office and the Congressional
15 sub-committee.

16 And Representative Bart Stupak, Chairman
17 of the Energy and Commerce Committee, also had
18 difficulty. Is there any transparency? A BSL-4
19 rating means the lab is equipped to study the --
20 study exotic pathogens that pose a high risk of
21 life-threatening disease in humans and animals
22 through the aerosol route, and for which there
23 is no known vaccine therapy.

24 Yet, Senators Hillary Clinton and Charles
25 Schumer are opposed to adding the Level 4 lab to

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1 the current Plum Island site. What do they
2 know, and where are our leaders in North
3 Carolina?

4 Think of it. Now, they can import a
5 foreign pathogen, release it, expend tremendous
6 taxpayer funds to clean it up, fight it with
7 vaccines, whose manufacturers have no liability.

8 A maelstrom could be created in our state,
9 causing enormous dangers, privatizing profits
10 and socializing our risks. There are an
11 estimated additional \$100,000,000 required to
12 fund infrastructure, like, electrical, gas,
13 water, sewer and roads for which the state and
14 localities, i.e., you the taxpayers, will have
15 to pick up the costs.

16 This is not an offer that is too good to
17 refuse. We can refuse it. In the nearly 230
18 years since the founding of our country, we've
19 never had a Department of Homeland Security.
20 And we've been attacked before at Pearl Harbor,
21 and we've never needed a Department of Homeland
22 Security.

23 So, like so many titles used by this
24 administration, it's a misnomer. It should be
25 entitled The Department of Homeland Insecurity,

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 because it only adds additional burdens to
 2 taxpayers and rewards private contractors with
 3 little or no oversight.

1 cont. | Having worked for a federal contractor,
 25.3 | and knowing someone who has Lyme Disease, this
 6 | is a risk we cannot afford to take. Thank you.

7 MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Jane
 8 Hoppenworth is next.

9 MS. HOPPENWORTH: While I agree that
 10 these particular animal diseases need to be
 11 studied, and we need to find preventions and
 12 cures for them, Butner, North Carolina is a poor
 13 choice to do this. Butner is a poor choice
 14 | because the water and sewage capabilities are
 15 | insufficient to support it.

16 The southeastern United States is still in a
 17 | serious drought. We've been hearing reports for
 18 | the last couple of years that there is not
 19 | enough water to support the current level of
 20 | population growth in this area, let alone the
 21 | large amount of water that this bio-disease lab
 22 | is going to need.

23 We look at local water supplies. Water
 24 would come from Holt Lake. Anybody that lives
 25 around Holt Lake can tell you it's down. All

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's water quality concerns and DHS acknowledges the current regional drought conditions. Described in Section 3.7.7.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Granville Water and Sewer Authority has 3 to 4 million gallons per day of excess potable water capacity and could meet NBAF's need of approximately 110,000 gallons per day, currently less than 0.4% of the Authority's total current capacity. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 210 residential homes.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The impact from the proposed operation of the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site on the local sanitary sewage system capacity and infrastructure is discussed in Section 3.3.7.3.4 of the NBAF EIS. The design and operation of the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site would prevent negative impact to the Sewage Treatment Facility infrastructure and treatment capabilities. Specifically, as summarized in Section 3.15 of the NBAF EIS, pre-treatment of liquid waste streams would be implemented as necessary to meet treatment facility acceptance criteria, therefore avoiding potential impacts.

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1 cont. | the creeks feeding Holt Lake, they're dry.
12.3 | Within five days after the rain we've had this
3 | year, those creeks are dry.
4 | That water supply is not what it should
5 | be. In addition, a bio-lab is going to need a
6 | lot of water, and I think it's more water than
7 | Butner can supply. In addition, Butner's sewage
8 | treatment facilities are not sufficient to
9 | support a bio-disease lab.

2 cont. | Several times a year, the Butner sewage
8.3 | treatment facility fails, and raw sewage is
12 | pumped into Falls Lake, and that lake is the
13 | source of water for Raleigh. Now, you've told
14 | us, "Oh, we're going to have, you know,
15 | state-of-the-art sewage treatment before it ever
16 | goes to the Butner treatment."

17 | You also cited the hoof and mouth
18 | outbreaks in England as part of your study. You
19 | don't -- you didn't tell us the rest of the
20 | story about those hoof and mouth outbreaks.
21 | Less than one year ago, August, 2007, a hoof and
22 | mouth outbreak happened in England.

23 | It was not a spontaneous and natural
24 | outbreak of hoof and mouth. It was traced back
25 | directly to a strain of hoof and mouth under

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1 study at a state-of-the-art bio-disease facility
2 where they had all the proper containment
3 facilities in place.

4 Furthermore, the vector of that outbreak
5 was waterborne. It happened after heavy
6 flooding and rains that occurred in England,
7 very similar to what we have here in this area.
8 People who live here can remember Hurricane Fran.

9 They can tell you that creek that goes by
10 the area where you're going to put that plant,
11 it was under water. The road was closed. It
12 was flooded. So, because of the hazard for
13 hurricanes, because of the insufficient supplies
14 of water, because of the insufficient sewage
15 containment facilities, I say, Butner, North
16 Carolina is not the proper place to site this
17 facility.

18 MS. COGHILL: Thank you. The next
19 three people that have signed up are Minnie
20 Lyon, Susan Dayton and John Monroe. Ms. Lyon,
21 you're first.

22 MS. LYON: Yes, ma'am. My name is
23 Minnie Lyon. I live here. I've been here more
24 than 80 years. I was away in other places a
25 few years, so that's me 88 years old. But

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Comment No: 3Issue Code: 5.3

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 anyway, this has really had my mind going.

2 A lot of the questions that I would have
3 asked have been answered, but they were not what
4 I would want to hear. This area is densely
5 populated, and I was here before Camp Butner
6 came here. Camp Butner, they left, and they
7 left a lot of surplus stuff that's getting in
8 our water.

9 We have a great amount of cancer people,
10 cancer deaths and cancer people in this area.
11 And I'm sure that it comes from some of this
12 stuff. We have live ammunition still being
13 found from the '40s in this area -- right in
14 this area, and I guess more in the outer areas.

15.3 | But this is -- is a very, very -- well, I
16 | think it's a unique place, because we have so
17 | many people that are incarcerated, and some
18 | that's in the hospitals and things like that.
19 | And we need to think about 'em. I'm not
20 | thinking about myself. I'm okay.

21 I had cancer surgery Thursday, and so, I'm
22 one of a whole lot of the people in this area
23 that's been getting cancer. And what I -- one
24.3 | of the things that bothers me is where -- where
25 | were you -- what will you do with the corpses?

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS is aware of the presence of the mental health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the mental health and correctional facilities, are well aware of the proposed action. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 18.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Section 3.13.2.2 in Chapter 3 of the NBAF EIS addresses the technologies being considered for the treatment and disposal of animal carcasses and pathological waste. Burial of animal carcasses is not being considered as a disposal alternative. Table 3.13.2.2-4 provides a brief description and comparison of the three most likely technologies being considered (i.e., incineration, alkaline hydrolysis, and rendering). As discussed in this section, the final design for the NBAF will probably include more than one technology for the treatment of these wastes. Factors that may be considered in making this technology decision include individual site requirements and restrictions, air emissions, liquid and solid waste stream by-products, and operation and maintenance requirements. Because the method of carcass and pathological waste disposal has not yet been determined, Section 3.4. of the EIS (Air Quality) assumes that the treatment technology with the greatest potential to negatively impact air quality, incineration, will be used to assess the maximum adverse effect. Similarly, because alkaline hydrolysis would have the greatest impact on sanitary sewage capacity, Section 3.3 of the EIS (Infrastructure) assumes that alkaline hydrolysis will be used to assess the maximum sanitary sewage impacts.

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2 cont.
18.3

These animals will be injected with incurable diseases, and they're going to die. If you bury them, it will be some more in the water system. If you burn them, it will be in the atmosphere. I've said this many times, because I've been talking to a lot of people about this.

315.3

I am very, very hurt about not just myself but other people, that this area is not a suitable place. Why would you want it? As many things -- places that are isolated, why would you want to be in such a densely populated place?

I can't say all I want to say.

MS. COGHILL: Thank you very much.

Susan Dayton, you're next, please.

MS. DAYTON: Thank you. My name is

Susan Dayton, and I am the staff person with the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League. The League represents several hundred members, and we have about 40 chapters along the southeast coast of the United States.

I prepared some comments tonight, but I want to ad-lib a little bit. And I'm going to refer to them back and forth in my three

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Comment No: 3Issue Code: 5.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative. As described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's site selection process including site selection criteria that included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

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1 minutes, because I had a nice conversation with
 2 Bill White and the gentleman from the
 3 Agriculture Research Facility. Thank you very
 4 much.

5 First of all, I want to say that 20
 6 minutes is not enough for a question and answer
 7 period when it comes to a project of this
 8 magnitude that does (interruption by audience
 9 applause) -- may not only affect Butner and
 10 other sites around the country, but the entire
 11 nation and perhaps the world.

12.0 I think one of the problems, as I see it,
 is this project is being run by Homeland
 14 Security. And under the current administration,
 15 as you all know, and everyone in the room knows,
 16 the whole -- there's been a lot of problems with
 17 Homeland Security, and many people do not like
 18 Homeland Security and are skeptical of the
 19 activities that take place surrounding Homeland
 20 Security.

1 cont. So, that's one of the problems as I see it.
 2.0 Another problem is that this -- this same
 23 facility was proposed for two of the nation's
 24 nuclear weapons labs. By -- just by chance,
 25 they were interested in being a host for this

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the mission of the NBAF. Chapter 1, Section 1.1 of the NBAF EIS identifies DHS's mission as the study of foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The goal or benefit of NBAF is to prevent these animal diseases from spreading in the United States through research into the transmission of these animal diseases and the development of diagnostic tests, vaccines, and antiviral therapies. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen.

DHS also notes the commentor's statement that the NBAF will be exempt from the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The information used in the preparation of the NBAF EIS will be included in the Administrative Record. NBAF could be subject to FOIA and any exemptions that might apply to a given document. The DHS FOIA office will respond to all requests for documents.

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1 cont.
2.0

facility, Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos.

And so, I happened to be in New Mexico at the time of this proposal for Los Alamos where we build our nuclear bombs, which we're not really supposed to be doing either, but we still do. And the -- the people in New Mexico fought this vehemently, specifically because they believed that it was a biological weapons lab facility, as many people do here tonight.

So -- which brings up another question about the exemption from the Freedom of Information Act. This is very troubling. And this should be a very transparent process, and it's unclear to me why this project is exempt from the Freedom of Information Act.

Finally, we -- I think that my request to you would be to remove the exemption and bring this out in the open, because if this is truly what you say it is, the public -- the people of Butner and the rest of the country need to know about this; no secrets.

Get rid of the cloak of secrecy, and I think that this whole process will be much further along. And also, you need to look at pigeons, pigeons as a biological transport

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1 mechanism. Thank you very much.

2 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, Susan. John

3 Monroe, Sarah Oliver and Caroline Dyer-Gonn,

4 G-o-n-n, are the next three people to speak.

5 John, it's your turn.

6 MR. MONROE: Thank you. These are

7 three brief questions that I have about the

8 draft Environmental Impact Statement. The

1|23.0 state- -- the document refers to the possibility
of the government's consulting firm running the
11 facility under, quote, "strict government
12 oversight."

2|26.0 Could you make sure that in the final
document, you say a little bit more about what
15 that would actually look like. I think, as
3|2.0 you've heard tonight, people don't trust the
government nor the contractors.

Two, there's a mention in the document of
2 cont. |
26.0 a trolley capable of moving a 2000 pound carcass
from the necroscopy room. I'm assuming that
21 this is a bio-contained area. And I was just
22 curious, is there any -- there's no mention
23 whether -- this probably is going to be
24 redundant, with lots of other assurances that
25 everything will be redundant.

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. However, it is not possible to determine in advance who might be responsible for an incident. DHS will follow applicable local, state, and federal law, whether in asserting or defending against a claim for damages should a pathogen be released from the NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentors concern. As discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, modern biosafety design includes as a goal an adequate level of redundant safety and biocontainment that would be integrated into every componen of the building.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government or contractors.

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2 cont. | But I just had this thought, I wonder if
26.0 | this machine broke, what would you do? And so,
3 | if that could also be addressed, I'd appreciate
4 | it.

4|23.0 | Thirdly, you talk about -- I think in some
| of the Homeland town hall meetings, at least,
| there was some mention of the community
8 | involvement committee. And sometimes community
9 | is not thought to be the citizens but actually
10 | local officials who are appointed or the --
11 | their cohorts are appointed to these oversight
12 | committees.

13 | And so, if there could be some more
14 | information, since we know through liability
15 | engineering that it doesn't see oversight, our
16 | two mechanisms to reduce problems. If there's
17 | really an effective oversight committee, who's
18 | going to be on this committee?

19 | You want the most suspicious citizens
20 | involved on that committee, and you want to give
21 | them power and authority to have incentives and
22 | penalties. And there's none of that in the
23 | document. Thank you.

5|13.3 | Oh, one last thing. There's also been
| mention to the significant benefit to wildlife,

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Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's question regarding whether oversight of NBAF operations would include representatives from local municipalities. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include the Institutional Biosafety Committee, which will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS. Should a decision be made to build NBAF and the site selected, DHS would begin transition and operational planning which would include consideration of policies and procedures for public participation, education, and also public advisory initiatives. After DHS determines the viability and nature of such a public advisory and oversight function, appropriate roles and responsibilities would be defined.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 13.3

DHS acknowledges the commentor's concern regarding wildlife impacts at the Umstead Research Farm Site. The susceptibility of native wildlife to foreign animal diseases necessitates additional research to further evaluate the potential adverse effects of foreign animal diseases. Research will enable the preparation of response plans that focus on species that are likely to be affected, and the development of vaccines for wildlife would be part of the NBAF mission. Introduction of a foreign animal disease into the U.S., whether unintentional or intentional (as an agent of bioterror, for example), might go undetected for a relatively long period of time. Once detected, the necessary time required for response mobilization would further delay containment of the outbreak. Delays in detection and response would increase the potential for a widespread outbreak among wildlife populations. In the event of a widespread outbreak, the availability of effective vaccines for wildlife could prevent devastating impacts on wildlife populations and could be the only means of preventing the extirpation of endangered or otherwise vulnerable native species. The development of response plans and vaccines that focus on susceptible species would enhance the capability to protect native wildlife against the foreign introduction of diseases such as Foot and Mouth disease and Rift Valley fever.

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5 cont.
13.3

and that was -- I really -- you really didn't list what you said about what the significant benefit of wildlife was. I'm not sure if you're talking about vaccinating the deer, or squirrels or chipmunks at some point or what.

That's just something that in reading the documents it was hard to tell what you mean by the significant benefit to the wildlife. Thank you.

MS. COGHILL: Thank you, John. Sarah Oliver.

MS. OLIVER: The following groups have withdrawn their support or become neutral or have spoken against the NBAF: the City of Raleigh, the City of Creedmoor, the City of Stem, Granville Non-Violent Action Team, the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League, Clean Water for North Carolina, Upper Neuse River Keeper, The Neuse River Foundation, Durham Democratic Party, Granville Democratic Precincts for Butner, Tally Ho and Creedmoor; Durham's People Alliance, Granville Environmental Action Team, Granville Residents Opposed to Waste, Granville County Commissioners, North Carolina Psychological Association; Eno River

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 cont.
25.3

Association, Old Oxford Community Association,
Coalition for Persons Disabled by Mental
Illness, National Association for the Mentally
Ill, Murdoch Center Human Rights Committee;
Brunswick Environmental Action Team, John
Umstead Hospital Human Rights Committee, Butner
Town Council, 4th Congressional District
Democratic Party, the National Grange; the
Butner-Creedmoor News.

My name is Sarah Oliver. I've been a
member of this community for 30 years. I'm a
wife, I'm a mother of two beautiful little
girls, and I'm also a nurse at one of the
psychiatric facilities, which you have failed to
acknowledge in -- in the EIS.

Also, these new things keep coming up,
like, the Avian flu has been brought up now.

2|23.0 What about aerial pesticide spraying? Well, I
have to tell you, I'm not letting you spray
anything in the air that my children breathe.

1 cont.
25.3

And we will not see this coming here. We
will not let you bring this here.

23 MS. COGHILL: Caroline Dyer-Gonn would
24 like to speak.

25 MS. DYER-GONN: Thank you. My name is

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Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding an accidental release of pathogen from the NBAF, the establishment of that pathogen in native wildlife or vectors such as mosquitoes, and the potential need to eradicate the vectors through aerial spraying. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for outside insect vector penetration, laboratory-acquired infections, vector escape and accidental releases. A discussion of insectary operations is contained in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 and elsewhere in the NBAF EIS. Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1.1 (Biosafety Design) of the NBAF EIS, also provides a discussion of the biosafety fundamentals, goals and design criteria for the NBAF operation. In addition, information has been added to Chapter 2 regarding operations and containment of arthropod vectors. Chapter 3, Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts each of which has the potential to release a vector. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release of a vector are low. DHS would have site-specific Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (APHIS). An analysis of potential consequences of a pathogen (e.g. Rift Valley fever virus) becoming established in native mosquito populations surrounding the Umstead Research Farm Site is specifically addressed in Chapter 3, Section 3.8.9 and Section 3.10.9.5 as well as in Section 3.14.4.5 (Health and Safety). Section 3.10.9.5 discusses the relative suitability of the regional climate of the Umstead Research Farm Site to promote mosquito survival and virus spread based on the extensive discussion contained in Section 3.4.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. As such, the RVF response plan would include a mosquito control action plan, and the potential consequences of pesticide use in mosquito control would be evaluated during the preparation of a site specific response plan.

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1 Caroline Dyer-Gonn. I have spent 20 years
2 working in the area of public and private
3 relationships. And my question arises from two
4 -- two things that I'm aware of. One is that I
1|4.0 didn't see it -- I didn't see my question
6 addressed in the DEIS.

7 And secondly, because of the record of
2|2.0 mishaps that has been publicly acknowledged in
8 many instances on the part of DHS, I -- I have
9 a question about -- well, I have the following
10 question about what happens in the event of an
11 emergency, or a non-emergency mishap.

13 In the event that there is some kind of a
14 mishap in NBAF functioning, or an escape of
15 pathogens affecting the area, how will DHS and
16 the government insure that all losses on the
17 part of residents and businesses in the area
18 will be compensated, and those affected
19 individuals taken care of such that they do not
20 suffer financial or physical damage?

21 That's the end of my question. And I
22 really would like to see an answer to that.

23 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, Caroline.
24 Ginny Knoop, K-n-o-o-p, B.J. Lawson and Jesse
25 Wilkins. Ginny, could you, please, come to the

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 4.0

DHS assumes the commentor is referencing a comment made during the public scoping process for the NBAF EIS. Section 1.6 of the NBAF EIS summarizes the conduct of the public scoping period for the NBAF EIS. DHS considered all scoping comments received in preparing the NBAF Draft EIS. Scoping comments were evaluated and summarized in a separate document, the NBAF EIS Scoping Report (DHS 2008), which is available online at <http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf> (click on Public Involvement).

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 2.0

The determination of criminal or civil liability arising from an accidental or intentional release of a pathogen is beyond the scope of this EIS. It is also not possible to accept or reject a claim for damages until the specific facts of an incident are known and the applicable local, state or Federal law is applied.

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1 microphone?

2 MS. KNOOP: Hi. I've worked for years
3 as the Granville County Hospice Chaplain. I
4 feel I know the people of this county, their
5 lifestyles, their standards of living across a
6 broad range. This informs me as I -- I
7 mentioned a precautionary principle.

8 This is a new idea with the ecological
9 work, where instead of a big corporation or
10 something coming in, and then the little people
11 like looking out and working for years and years
12 and years in the courts to try to prove they
13 could get it thrown out, instead more and more
14 were working to get legislation so that people
15 -- the consumer -- the people who live there get
16 to decide whether or not something is going to
17 come in.

18 And you've heard lots tonight about why
19 we're not happy about this. And one of the --
20 one of the things -- my particular concern is
21 that -- I think it's a terrific waste and
22 endangerment to put this all in a huge mountain,
23 a big building.

24 I want them to be in different labs. This
25 work should be in different labs in different

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's suggestion. However, as described in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS, the purpose and need for the proposed action encompasses the need for integrated, BSL-4 laboratories in the United States necessary to conduct research and develop countermeasures for zoonotic and foreign animal diseases. Other locations to construct the NBAF were considered in Section 2.4.3 of the NBAF EIS. These alternatives were considered but eliminated from detailed study in the EIS based on the evaluation criteria calling for proximity to research programs that could be linked to the NBAF mission and proximity to a technical workforce. These alternatives included remote locations such as an island, desert, or arctic habitat distant from populated areas or inhospitable to escaped animal hosts/vectors.

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1 cont.
5.0

countries. We need to pull our allies, make
this a work of peace for global -- for -- for
the healing of these diseases globally, not a
Department of Defense or a Homeland Security
project.

There should not be more than one deadly
disease per lab to insure that you are prepared
for any outbreak. This -- the international
focus of the project would take care of almost
all your -- particularly terrorism problems that
-- one, single lab could take care of so much
of the guess work and the invisibility of a --
of an escaped pathogen that can do such damage
before it's found.

This is a particular concern in this county
because we're agricultural. I, myself, have 25
sheep that I love, and I don't want them to get
sick. I appreciate that you're listening to us.
And I hope you're hearing clearly, that even
though we're upset and excited -- and
over-excited sometimes, we have a good point
here.

23
2|25.3

This is our home. This is a county of
farmers. Farmers can't just go up and move to
another suburb. And we had no part whatsoever

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Comment No: 2Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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2 cont.
25.3

in the choosing of this site. You know, I found
out the day before the first hearing last
September.

And we -- we basically -- you know, I
don't know who endowed all the thousands and
thousands and maybe millions of dollars to the
-- to the Consortium that sought us out, but
there's a terrific failure of justice here.

And the lack of inclusion in -- in any
process in any way -- even in the stuff online,
our county -- we're not mentioned. All the
other counties are mentioned for their -- their
exciting resources to tempt you. And we're just
not there. Am I done?

MS. COGHILL: You've got 30 seconds.

MS. DYER-GONN: I'm done. Thirty
seconds -- anybody? I'm glad we're having this
process. I really do think I'm done. I'm just
trying -- did you have a question?

UNIDENTIFIED: Oh, no.

MS. COGHILL: William Lawson.

DR. LAWSON: Thank you. My name is Dr.
William Lawson. I'm a 15-year area resident and
congressional candidate for the neighboring 4th
district. I'll start by asking a rhetorical

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1 question that I was going to pose interactively,
 2 but I think gets to the heart and some of the
 3 credibility issues that we're facing here.

19.0 The first is, in this draft EIS, on page
 8, we attempt to assess the effects of this
 6 laboratory on air quality; yet, within that,
 7 there is a paragraph, "We say if incineration
 8 will be used."

9 How can we begin to assess the impact on
 10 air quality if we do not know how we are going
 11 to be disposing of the waste, the immense amount
 12 of waste that will be generated from this
 13 facility.

25.0 The second thing I'll note, one of my --
 as one of my fellow citizens noted, Senator
 16 Clinton has expressed concerns about this
 17 facility being located on Plum Island; and
 18 likewise has New York's District 1
 19 Representative, Tim Bishop, also instructed and
 20 advised his constituents to rail against this
 21 laboratory being on Plum Island.

22 Why is it that our leaders are failing to
 23 stand up for this obvious case of corporate
 24 welfare gone wild in the 13th District? And
 25 this is (interruption by audience applause) --

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 9.0

DHS notes the commentor's air quality concerns. Section 3.4.1 of the NBAF EIS describes the methodology used in assessing potential air quality consequences at each site. Based on the state of facility design, a potential bounding case condition was described using primary emission sources including boilers, emergency generators, and an incinerator as the refuse disposal method. For operations, the U.S. EPA dispersion modeling program, SCREEN3, was used to predict potential pollutant concentrations at each site. Should a decision be made to build NBAF and following site selection and final design, a complete emission inventory would be developed and refined modeling performed as necessary in accordance with state-specific air quality permitting requirements

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's question regarding the position of Senator Clinton and Representative Bishop of New York. Both the Senator and Congressman support maintaining the existing level of BSL-3 research being performed at PIADC and oppose the addition of BSL-4 research and facilities.

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2 cont. | again, I'm a physician by trade. I respect the
5.0 | value of research and the necessity of research.

3|2.0 | But the thing that matters the most is
| transparency and accountability. And in that
5 | tradition, how can we ignore the expression of
6 | discontent that was voiced by Dr. Roger DeVrees,
7 | who is a former director of the Plum Island
8 | facility, who's on the record stating that he
9 | doesn't understand the initiative to move Plum
10 | Island and its hazardous research onto the
11 | mainland of the United States.

12 | The final observation I would make, and
13 | this is really for my fellow citizens, is we
14 | have a crisis in government right now. As the
15 | physician noted previously, the study of Foot
16 | and Mouth Disease on the mainland of the United
17 | States was prohibited, maybe still -- maybe it
18 | should still be prohibited on the mainland of
19 | the United States.

20 | And I've tried -- and I've tried to
21 | determine if, in fact, the legislation that
22 | prevented Foot and Mouth Disease from showing up
23 | on the mainland of the United States has been
24 | repealed; but the bottom line is, is that just a
25 | few weeks ago, buried deeply within a 600 plus

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Comment No: 3Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Consideration of mechanisms for the public to serve in an advisory or oversight capacity of NBAF operations is not within the scope of the NBAF EIS, which presents the need for and evaluates the environmental impacts of the alternatives for constructing and operating the NBAF. However, should a decision be made to build the NBAF, DHS would begin transition and operational planning which would include consideration of policies and procedures for public participation, education, and also public advisory initiatives. After DHS determines the viability and nature of such a public advisory and oversight function, appropriate roles and responsibilities would be defined. The information used in the preparation of the NBAF EIS will be included in the Administrative Record. NBAF could be subject to FOIA and any exemptions that might apply to a given document. The DHS FOIA office will respond to all requests.

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3 cont. | page farm bill was the authorization to transfer
20 | authorization to bring Foot and Mouth Disease to
3 | the mainland of the United States from the U.S.
4 | Department of Agriculture, presumably under
5 | emergent circumstances in the event of an
6 | emergency, to the Department of Homeland
7 | Security.

8 | That is a big change buried within a 600
9 | plus page bill that is not getting any scrutiny
10 | by the American people. So, I would ask you,
11 | politely, to consider what you're doing to our
12 | country, how you're spending your time and who
13 | you're really serving as you advance this
14 | agenda. Thank you very much.

15 | MS. COGHILL: The next person to speak
16 | is Jesse Wilkins, followed by Deborah Ferriccio
17 | and Joe Melamed.

18 | MS. WILKINS: My name is Jesse
19 | Wilkins. And I retired from IBM in the
20 | mechanical engineering department in '96. Since
21 | that time, I've been working with John Umstead
22 | Hospital for maintenance of the hospital, and
23 | now recently have started in maintenance with
24 | the Central Regional Hospital.

125.3 | During that more than 40 years of time,

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1 I've learned one thing. Things will happen.
2 Machinery will break. People will make
3 mistakes. Murphy's law is true, if it can
4 happen, it will happen. You can't sit there and
5 say redundancy will take care of everything,
6 because that redundant piece of equipment will
7 break just like the rest of the equipment.

8 I was going to stand here and read the
9 symptoms for that Rift Valley Fever Virus, but
10 when I was sitting out there, I looked back, and
11 there's kids in the back of the room. They
12 don't need to hear that, let alone live with it.

13 I'm sure that you people had the right
14 intentions in mind when you started out saying,
15 let's protect our food supply. Let's build a
16 lab to protect that food supply. But you was a
17 little near-sighted. You only saw with tunnel
18 vision what you wanted to see.

19 You didn't see that if you brought those
20 diseases here to study them; and you let them
21 out, you yourselves are becoming the terrorists,
22 because all they have to do is sit back on their
23 behinds and smile while you let the virus out
24 here. They don't need to do it.

1|25.3 | After reading your draft EIS and seeing

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 cont. | what some of the symptoms to some of the things
25.3 | that you're planning on studying, and that I
3 | know will get out, and you know it if you'll
4 | admit it -- I'm willing to stand in front of
5 | your bulldozers and keep 'em off of that
6 | property for -- (Interruption by audience
7 | applause.) I would rather die than --
8 | (Interruption by audience applause) -- citizens
9 | to die from those diseases that you're bringing
10 | here.

11 | MS. COGHILL: Deborah, you're next.

12 | MS. FERRICCIO: Hello, I'm Debra
13 | Ferriccio. And I'd really rather stand here and
14 | speak to the people as well as to you. I've
15 | spent 30 years of my life --

16 | MS. COGHILL: Ma'am, ma'am, would you
17 | turn around and speak in the microphone?

18 | MS. FERRICCIO: I've spent 30 years of
19 | my life living near a landfill at least, a
20 | landfill that the State of North Carolina
21 | guaranteed us would not leak, guaranteed would
22 | be safe, guaranteed was state of the art. I've
23 | been on a citizens state working group for 10
24 | years to try to get the landfill cleaned up.

1|20 | You can't guarantee us anything. You can't

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 2.0

DHS acknowledges commentor's statement that safety at the NBAF is not guaranteed. DHS also notes that the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen from the NBAF is extremely low. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee.

DHS also notes the commentor's concern that carcass disposal practices will be limited to incineration. Section 3.13 of the NBAF EIS describes the processes that would be used to control and dispose of liquid and solid waste from the NBAF and Sections 3.3 and 3.7 of the NBAF EIS describing standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential effects of spills and runoff. Since the method of carcass disposal has not yet been determined, the effects of alkaline hydrolysis, rendering and incineration were included in the analysis presented in Section 3.13 of the NBAF EIS. Incineration has the potential to affect air quality, so the evaluation in Section 3.4 (Air Quality) assumed only incineration would be used to assess the greatest adverse effect. Alkaline hydrolysis and rendering would have the greatest effect on sanitary sewage capacity, Section 3.3, so the sanitary sewage effects were determined using these method.

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1 cont. | guarantee us safety of the lab, but you can
 2.0 | guarantee us one thing, and that's for sure.

1cont. | The waste from this facility -- and one of the
 2.0; | reasons that you didn't speak, sir, about the
 2|18.3; | envir- -- the environmental impact of the waste
 3|9.3 | is because you dare not tell this community that
 6 | you're going to burn it.

8 | This is a community that fought an
 9 | incinerator, and my community and communities
 10 | all over this region have fought landfills, and
 11 | you cannot do anything without waste --
 12 | (Interruption by audience applause.)

13 | And when you burn that waste, there will
 14 | be no oversight. You can say there's going to
 15 | be community involvement, but the community
 16 | can't do anything about that water that's going
 17 | to be contaminated underground. The community
 18 | can't do anything about the air emissions that
 19 | are going to come out of the landfill and the
 20 | incinerator.

21 | No wonder you don't address whether --
 22 | whether you're going to burn the waste or bury
 23 | it. You're going to have to do both. You're
 24 | going to have to do something with huge amounts
 25 | of -- of not just bio-hazardous waste but

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Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 18.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern for the potential environmental degradation that could result from improper management of the waste generated at the NBAF. Section 3.13.2.2 of the NBAF presents detailed information on the liquid and solid waste streams that could be generated by the operation of the facility, proposed onsite pretreatment methodologies, and the types of offsite waste management facilities where additional treatment and disposal could occur.

DHS notes commentor's concern regarding the possibility that DHS would build an incinerator at the NBAF. As discussed in Section 3.13.2.2, however, onsite incineration is only being considered for carcass/pathological waste disposal, and it is only one of the technologies being considered. Other types of waste solids will be autoclaved, decontaminated, or disinfected onsite with additional treatment (if necessary) and disposal occurring at offsite facilities.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 9.3

The potential effects of NBAF operations on air quality are discussed in Section 3.4 of the NBAF EIS and includes the potential effects from incineration. Site-specific effects at the Umstead Research Farm Site are discussed in Section 3.4.7. Air pollutant concentrations were estimated using SCREEN3, a U.S. EPA dispersion modeling program. Conservative assumptions were used to ensure the probable maximum effects were evaluated. Carcass/pathological waste disposal, including incineration, is discussed in Section 3.13. Once the final design is determined, a more refined air emissions model will be used during the permitting process. The final design will ensure that the NBAF %does not significantly affect% the region's ability to meet air quality standards.

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2 cont. | hazardous waste.
18.3

When you have a facility that's the size
3 of five Wal-Mart's, you're going to create a lot
4 of waste. And in our society, everything that
5 we have is hazardous. You're going to put in
6 this community one of the most contentious
7 things that has never been solved in America
8 today.

9 Where can we put our nuclear waste? Where
10 are we going to put our bio-hazardous waste?
11 Where are we going to put this waste? And
12 what's going to keep us from having this
13 facility, a waste facility, for other
14 bio-hazardous waste.

We won't know what comes into or what goes
2cont. | into this facility, but we will know one thing.
18.3 |
3 cont. | We will know what will come out of it. It will
9.3; |
4|19.3; |
19 be hazardous. It will be bio-hazardous. It'll
20 be in the groundwater. It'll be in the surface
21 water.

22 It'll be in the air. It'll be in our
23 children's lungs and in their bodies. And I can
24 guarantee you, as John just said before, we are
25 sick of it. We are tired of this region being
picked on because of its -- its vulnerability

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 4Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern about the risk to health and safety from the NBAF operation. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art biocontainment features and operating procedures to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, 3.14, and Appendices B, D, and E of the NBAF EIS, provide a detailed analysis of the consequences from a accidental or deliberate pathogen release. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

DHS also notes the commentor's concern regarding the proper treatment and disposal of the wastes generated from the NBAF operation. Disposal and decontamination (killing or inactivation of bacteria and fungi and viruses, respectively) procedures have a long and proven history of effectiveness when facilities are well maintained and procedures followed. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art biocontainment features and operating procedures to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, identifies the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. Section 3.13 of the NBAF EIS describes the processes that would be used to control and dispose of liquid and solid waste from the NBAF and Sections 3.3 and 3.7 of the NBAF EIS describing standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential effects of spills and runoff. Since the method of carcass disposal has not yet been determined, the effects of alkaline hydrolysis, rendering and incineration were included in the analysis presented in Section 3.13 of the NBAF EIS. Incineration has the potential to affect air quality, so the evaluation in Section 3.4 (Air Quality) assumed only incineration would be used to assess the greatest adverse effect. Alkaline hydrolysis and rendering would have the greatest effect on sanitary sewage capacity, Section 3.3, so the sanitary sewage effects were determined using these method.

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3 cont.
19.3

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politically.

2 cont.
18.3

We have a governor that passed a waste management act that has said that the governor could override any kind of local ordinance to bring in hazardous waste. And sure enough, it took police force to bring it into North Carolina.

And that's what it's going to take to bring this facility into this community. You need to know that. Because I don't know about the other five -- five facilities that you're looking at -- the other five communities, but this community is the brightest community in this whole region.

5|25.3

We have been tested. We've been through the fires, and we will not accept this facility.

MS. COGHILL: John Melamed, Jan Harris and Larry Petrovik are the next three speakers up. Mr. Melamed.

DR. MELAMED: I've already introduced myself. I'm Dr. Melamed. I'm a local

physician. And I'm here to speak on behalf of 43 other local physicians who practice in this area who oppose NBAF. The -- I think it's important to go back and look at the -- the

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 5Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 predecessor facility.

2|21.1 We've been talking a little bit about Plum
 3 Island. And in 1971, representatives from the
 4 USDA proclaimed that, quote, "Plum Island is
 5 considered the safest in the world on virus
 6 diseases. As proof of this statement, there has
 7 never been a disease outbreak among the
 8 susceptible animals maintained outside the
 9 laboratory on the island since it was
 10 established."

11 Well, as we know, that changed in 1978, as
 12 I described before, with the release of the Foot
 13 and Mouth Disease Virus into the
 14 pre-experimental animal holding facility. And
 15 in 1982, the Federal Review Board found that
 16 there was a dangerous situation that was due to
 17 management's inclination to expedite programs,
 18 resulting in compromising safety.

19 In 1991, the federal government decided to
 20 privatize Plum Island. And the New Jersey
 21 company, which was the low bidder on the
 22 contract, took over. And in order to cut costs,
 23 they reduced expenses for safety and security
 24 measures.

25 In 1991, following that change, there was

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Comment No: 2Issue Code: 21.1

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

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2 cont. | underground cable supplying lab 257 at the Plum
21.1 | Island facility, which some of you have read the
3 | book about -- about lab 257 and will know about
4 | this.

5 | And following that, in -- in -- in August
6 | of 1991, Hurricane Bob hit Plum Island and
7 | knocked over the overhead power box, which was
8 | the back-up power for the facility.

9 | And as a consequence, the freezers
10 | containing virus samples defrosted. Air seals
11 | on the lab which were -- were breached in the
12 | animal holding facilities where the vents
13 | failed. The fail-safe mechanism of air dampers
14 | sealing off the facility to the open air also
15 | failed.

16 | Melted virus samples mixed with infected
17 | animal waste on the floor, and swarms of
18 | mosquitos filled the facility. This took place
19 | in what the USDA called the -- the safest
20 | facility in the world on -- on viruses. In 1991
21 | in September, the USDA denied that any system
22 | failures had occurred during the hurricane.

23 | And the lab workers that were occupying
3|19.1; | the lab at the time of the blackout were fired.
2 cont. |
21.1 | In 1992, OSHA and EPA cited the Plum Island

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Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 19.1

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

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3 cont. | facility with hundreds of safety violations.
19.1: |
2 cont. | OSHA returned five years later and found that
21.1 |
3 | the violations had not been corrected.
4 | At that time, 124 new violations were
5 | found. In 2000, July, the New York Departments
6 | -- New York State Department of Environmental
7 | Conservation found very troubling hazardous
8 | waste violations at the Plum Island facility,
9 | prompting the New York State Attorney General to
10 | sue USDA.
11 | In July of 2001, a court approved consent
12 | order forced the USDA to admit serious discharge
13 | violations. August of 2002, Plum Island workers
14 | went out to strike to protest unsafe working
15 | conditions. And in December of 2002, the
16 | National Resources Defense Council named Plum
17 | Island Number 2 of the 12 worst polluters in New
18 | York and New Jersey.
19 | And a state senator on the task force was
4|2.0 | quoted as saying, "What disturbs me is the
22 | consistent flow of mis-information. I feel that
23 | some of the mis-information borders on a
24 | cover-up. It shakes the foundation of our very
25 | form of government."
MS. COGHILL: Mr. Melamed, your time

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Comment No: 4

Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

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1 is up.

2 UNIDENTIFIED: Let him finish.

3 (Interruption by shouting from the audience.)

4 DR. MELAMED: I'll try to wrap it up

5 briefly, if I may. May I wrap it up briefly?

6 MS. COGHILL: Is it something that you

7 can provide to us, what you're reading? What

8 I'd like to do is --

9 UNIDENTIFIED: Let him speak.

10 UNIDENTIFIED: I will give him my three

11 minutes.

12 DR. MELAMED: I'll try to wrap it up

13 briefly.

14 MS. COGHILL: What we'd like to do,

15 sir, is keep the three minute limit. And if

16 there's time at the end, we'll open up the floor

17 for people to finish. Okay. Thank you very

18 much. Ladies -- (Interruption by shouting from

19 the audience.)

20 MS. COGHILL: Ladies and gentlemen, I

21 would really appreciate everybody working

22 together on this.

23 Clearly, this is a very important issue for

24 everybody. I still have a long list of folks.

25 There's folks that are here that are staying up

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1 past their bedtime. If we could move through
 2 that, then we'll get back to people that would
 3 like to finish. Jan Harris is next.

4 MS. HARRIS: My name is Jan Harris,
 5 and I live in Butner. Not only do I live in
 6 Butner, my family owns two farms in Granville
 7 County. The reason I'm mentioning this is that

1|25.3 I would like for you to know, the North Carolina
 Consortium does not speak for me, my family and
 10 my many, many friends.

11 We don't want you here. Next, I would
 2|12.3 like to comment on the DEIS. According to the
 DEIS, there is 6,900 linear feet of streams and
 14 creeks running through the site. These streams
 15 feed into the Knapp of Reeds Creek, which flows
 16 into the Neuse watershed; including Falls Lake,
 17 Raleigh's drinking water supply.

18 The Neuse River is the first major river
 19 in North Carolina to receive special regulations
 20 designed to protect it, enacted by the North
 21 Carolina State Legislature. Storm water run --
 22 storm water runoff is the largest polluter of
 23 our area waters.

24 Nowhere in the DEIS did I find any
 25 consideration for storm water runoff. The DEIS

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's stormwater runoff concerns. The NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.7.7 describes the water resources associated with the Umstead Research Farm Site alternative. The NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Sections 3.7.7.1.2, 3.7.7.2.2, and 3.7.7.3.2 describe stormwater affects, permitting and planning options for the Umstead Research Farm Site alternative.

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2 cont. | states that there will be incineration, which
12.3 | will result in fallout residue. The DEIS states
3 | that there will be areas sprayed of pesticides.
4 | What preparations are you going to -- what
5 | preparations are you going to make to control
6 | storm water runoff? Are you going to maintain
7 | it on site? If so, how? Butner is not an
8 | acceptable location for a bio-level 4 lab.

1 cont. | And once again, we do not want you here.
25.3 | MS. COGHILL: Larry Petrovik, Chris
11 | Jackson and Kathryn Spann.
12 | MR. PETROVIK: Thank you for the
13 | opportunity to speak tonight. My name is Larry
14 | Petrovik, and I'm a Granville County landowner.

1 |25.3 | I am opposed to the Department of Homeland
17 | Security's plan to site the National Bio-Agro
18 | Defense Lab in Butner, North Carolina.
19 | It will create significant public health
2 |21.3; | and safety hazards for not only Butner but also
3 |15.3 | the entire Triangle region. Here are some of my
21 | concerns. According to the EIS statement, page
22 | 2-42, "Should a release of a certain vector
23 | borne pathogen occur, impacts such as aerial
24 | spraying of insecticides could directly affect
25 | minority and low income communities and other

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.3


Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site-specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies. DHS would have site-specific Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. RVF and FMD SOPs and response plans would likely include strategies that are similar. However, the RVF response plan would also include a mosquito control action plan. The potential consequences of pesticide use would be evaluated during the preparation of a site specific response plan.

As described in Section 3.1 of the NBAF EIS an analysis was conducted to determine if the proposed



project alternatives would have a disproportionately high and adverse impact on low-income or minority populations under normal operations. The analysis determined that no disproportionately high and adverse effects to environmental or human resources are evident with any of the alternatives.

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3 cont. | populations immediately adjacent to the site."
15.3

- This is simply not an acceptable risk. I
3 think you understand that low income communities
4 have the same rights to a healthy environment as
5 high income communities.

2 cont. | Two, "A viral or bacterial release from
21.3 this facility could contaminate Falls Lake," a
8 water supply for -- that serves over 380,000
9 people in the region.

10 This possibility is simply not worth the
11 risk. "A viral or a bacterial release from the
12 facility could contaminate local insects,
13 rodents, bird, deer -- or deer populations that
14 could be impossible to control." As the EIS
15 says, in the case of Rift Valley Fever, this
16 disease could be established in North Carolina
17 by mosquitos and biting flies.

18 "And Rift Valley Fever could establish a
19 continuous ecological cycle in the United States
20 if it escapes from a research laboratory."
21 That's on page 3-37. Further, according to the
22 DEIS, the Rift Valley Fever -- Rift Valley Fever
23 working group developed a Rift Valley Fever
24 release scenario that estimated 114 human deaths.

25 And the economic impact in the United

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2 cont.
21.3

States could exceed \$50,000,000,000 due to the losses in livestock and related industries.

3 Most nations would certainly ban export of U.S.
4 meat products in 2000- -- which in 2006 totaled
5 more than \$4,000,000,000.

6 And that's part of your Environmental
7 Impact Statement on page 3-306. This is not
8 acceptable. A release of Foot and Mouth Disease
9 could quickly spread to the deer population.
10 The Butner Falls and Neuse game land vicinity
11 contains one of the largest deer populations in
12 the state, with more than 45 deer per square
13 mile, according to the North Carolina Wildlife
14 Resources Commission.

15 And an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease
16 could devastate all the hoof animal industry
17 along with deer populations. According to the
18 DEIS, on page 3-481, "The wildlife and livestock
19 in the vicinity of the State -- of the site are
20 prime candidates for acquiring and transmitting
21 Foot and Mouth Disease and Rift Valley Fever,
22 and to some extent Nipah Virus when pigs are
23 present.

24 "The location of the NBAF site in North
25 Carolina provides a significant opportunity for

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2 cont| the spread of the virus via vector infected
21.3 | wildlife. In addition, the atmospheric modeling
3 | indicates that downwind transport is a credible
4 | scenario, given sufficiently large enough
5 | pathogens."

1 cont| Today, the public would never allow NBAF
25.3 | to be sited over at Research Triangle Park or
8 | one of the nearby university campuses. Do not
9 | put NBAF in Granville County either.

10 | MS. COGHILL: Chris Jackson.

11 | MR. JACKSON: I first would like to
12 | say, thank you very much, ma'am. I appreciate
13 | your time. Your time and mine are pretty much
14 | the same.

15 | Butner, North Carolina, as pretty much
16 | everybody well knows, has facilities that both
17 | represent the state and federal levels of
18 | government.

19 | The foundation of this very small village
20 | was baptized in the fire of World War II. With
21 | respect to everything that this young lady has
22 | already talked about, year after year, we turn
23 | over unexploded munitions. There is serious
24 | problems with our groundwater.

25 | There is a high level of bacteria that a

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1 lot of people believe here locally, is directly
2 impacting the safety, the cancer rate is up. I
3 think that needs to be seriously considered when
4 you take into consideration everything that
5 you're talking about here.

6 I mean, this is our home. You know, would
7 you all be wanting to put this thing in your own
8 back yard? I guess that's my first question to
9 you all. And if not, why not? You know, why is
10 Granville County better a placement than your
11 own back yard?

12 I think these things need to be
13 considered. That young lady there, a lot of --
14 a lot of age, a lot of wisdom, a lot of time
15 spent in this community (indicating Ms. Lyon).
16 Take a listen to these people, the older
17 populations here, they mean a lot to us. It's
18 a big history.

19 Their voices need to be heard. Thank you.

20 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, sir. Kathryn
21 Spann is next, followed by Glenda Whitefield.

22 MS. SPANN: Hi. I have both a comment
23 and -- since I was asked to stand down earlier
24 during the question period, I have a brief
25 procedural question that relates to your

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Comment No: 2Issue Code: 5.3

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 presentation that I'd like for you to answer
2 tonight.

3 My neighbors and friends have spoken
4 tonight about a lot of things that are missing
5 from the DEIS. They're just not there. One of
6 those things is a lack of any itemization of the
1|8.3 infrastructure that the host community is
v expected to pay for.

9 And we've certainly seen in other
10 publications by Homeland Security such as the
11 feasibility study that -- those are significant,
12 but we need to actually see what the actual list
13 is and what the cost of those items are, so
14 that, for example, our Council of State, when it
15 decides about the land, we'll have that
16 information for it.

17 We also need to see information about the
2|23.0 failure rates of this facility in 25 years, in
50 years; not just when it's new. So, we don't
20 have any of that that we can comment on now. A
21 lot of -- as well as a lot of these other
22 things that were said.

23 If this information does actually,
3|4.0 hopefully show up in the final EIS, it's my
experience that NEPA does permit the decision

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 8.3

DHS notes commentor's concern. A listing of infrastructure and traffic improvements required for the construction and operation of the proposed NBAF at all site alternatives is located in Section 3.1.2, Table 3.1.1.1 - Infrastructure and Traffic Improvement Required for Construction and Operation of the Proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Consideration of mechanisms for the public to serve in an advisory or oversight capacity of NBAF operations is not within the scope of the NBAF EIS, which presents the need for and evaluates the environmental impacts of the alternatives for constructing and operating the NBAF. However, should a decision be made to build the NBAF, DHS would begin transition and operational planning which would include consideration of policies and procedures for public participation, education, and also public advisory initiatives. After DHS determines the viability and nature of such a public advisory and oversight function, appropriate roles and responsibilities would be defined.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 4.0

DHS notes the commentor's opinion regarding the length of the public comment period. Council on Environmental Quality regulation 40 CFR 1506.10(c) requires that a minimum of 45 days be allowed for public comment on the NBAF Draft EIS. A period of 60 days was provided for public review and comment on the NBAF Draft EIS, which spanned from June 27 through August 25, 2008. During this comment period, public meetings were held in the vicinity of the NBAF site alternatives and in Washington, D.C. DHS also accepted comments submitted by mail, telephone and fax lines, and online through the NBAF Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). All comments, both oral and written, received during the comment period were given equal consideration and were responded to in the NBAF Final EIS.

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3 cont. | maker to hold an additional public comment
4.0 | period. We ask that you provide an additional
3 | time for the members of the community to comment
4 | on this information, which will be new.

5 | Otherwise, the purpose of NEPA to give the
6 | public a chance to really have input into the
7 | process, it's going to be thwarted. Do you have
8 | an answer as to whether you will do that?

9 | MS. COGHILL: As I stated earlier, all
10 | your comments we will have to address throughout
11 | the process. And we have them on the record.

12 | MS. SPANN: I'm afraid that's not
3 cont. | something can be effectively answered in the
4.0 | DEIS, which is why I've asked that it be
15 | answered this evening. I believe it's pretty
16 | much a yes or no, or we'll get back with you --
17 | at least publicize the answers so that our
18 | elected officials and the members of the public
19 | can know that.

20 | MS. COGHILL: We appreciate your
21 | comments. If -- I just want to let you know
22 | that you do have a minute left. And we -- like
23 | I said, we have to address everything that you
24 | said.

25 | MS. SPANN: Well, one of the other

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1 things that I have noted is that -- well, we
 2 heard a lot during the presentation about how
 4|21.3 the maximum economic impact of a Foot and Mouth
 release in the U.S. would be around 3.5 billion.

5 And that's simply not borne out by USDA's
 6 own May, 2008 publication, which says that, "The
 7 potential losses from a Foot and Mouth outbreak
 8 in California" -- hello -- "are estimated to
 9 range between 8.5 and 13.5 billion." I have a
 10 really hard time reconciling those numbers with
 11 what you're telling us publicly. Thank you.

12 MS. COGHILL: Thank you very much.
 13 Glenda.

14 MS. WHITEFIELD: I'm back again. I
 15 just want to make sure that you hear us, because
 16 sometimes I don't want to go home and think that
 17 you might have been deaf. I want to make sure
 18 you get it loud and clear.

1|25.3 And I have a question for you that I would
 like for you to address in the DEIS. It is
 21 what part of no don't you understand? And I'd
 22 also like to ask you if you remember David in
 23 the Bible. He was small. He was all alone. He
 24 had plenty of time to practice.

25 We've had a lot of time to practice, and I

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 21.3

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

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1 want to tell you again that we are your David,

1 cont. | and you are our Goliath, and we will bring you
25.3 | down. And you will not come to Granville

4 County. We have drawn our line in the sand.

5 It's there. You need to know it. And I

6 want you to address it in the Environmental

7 Impact Statement. I want you to give more

8 weight to public comment. I want you to give

9 more weight to what the citizens think. We

10 weren't asked about this.

11 We had people in Raleigh and God knows

12 where, D.C. wherever, they decided, oh,

13 Granville County would be a great place to put

14 this, because there's nobody that lives here,

15 nobody lives near this site. I live closer to

16 the site than the people in Butner do. Okay.

1 cont. | There's a lady that lives 800 yards from
25.3 | where it will -- would be. It ain't coming. I

19 can guarantee you that. I, also, am one of

20 those people that will stand with the other

21 people who have said that you will have to

22 bulldoze over us to bring this facility here.

23 And I can tell you, there are a whole lot

24 more people that will stand with us.

25 MS. COGHILL: The next folks that we

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1 have to speak are Chris Tiffany, Louise Jackson
2 and David Ball.

3 MR. TIFFANY: I'm from Durham and not
4 Granville County. But this proposed site is
5 between Durham and the Town of Butner. Go to
6 Google and study Rift Valley Fever Virus.
7 That's Rift Valley Fever Virus, a virus similar
8 to Ebola -- Ebola, E-b-o-l-a.

10 Then go to nobio.org and click petition.
11 Write it down. In the audience, write it down.
12 Go to nobio.org and click petition. You can
13 also go to a bookstore or library and get the
14 book, Lab 257. See why they want to replace
15 the labs at Plum Island.

16 Remember, go to nobio.org and click
17 petition. Write it down. Tell your friends and
18 neighbors. Go to nobio.org and click petition.

19 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, sir. Louise
20 Jackson and David Ball are the next two people
21 to speak.

22 MS. JACKSON: Here I am again. I was
23 up here this afternoon. And to my surprise, I
24 was asked to come back tonight. So, I have
25 been in this building since 12:30 today and went
home, re-dressed and eat dinner. And I'm a

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 little tired.

2 But I'm not too tired to stay here and
3 fight this thing. We love one another. We love
4 Granville County. We love Butner. Butner is
5 everything that no one else wants. Would you
6 want a federal prison in your town? Would you
7 want institutions in your town?

8 Would you want this here for your children
9 at schools? We've got two new schools. We've
10 got after school. Do we want this for our
11 children and all these sick people? And if
12 they're sick, how are you going to get 'em out
13 of a facility?

14 You can't just walk in there and get a
15 crazy person out of the bed, or you're going to
16 have a fight. He's going to hurt you. It's
17 not easy. Would you want this in Washington?
18 Would you want it in your hometown? We don't
19 hate you people.

20 You have nothing to do with it. You're
21 just doing your job that somebody higher up than
22 you sent you here to Butner to irritate us
23 again. I've got a pacemaker, and this isn't
24 helping my pacemaker at all, because I am very
25 upset, I am very angry; and I'm just -- I'm not

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. A site-specific emergency response plan would be developed and coordinated with the local emergency management plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF. The type of, duration, and geographical extent of quarantine would be determined by the appropriate authorities depending on the pathogen released and contamination level.

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2|25.3 | angry at you guys; but, please, take it back to
 3 | wherever you came from and tell 'em this is not
 4 | the place for it in Butner, North Carolina or
 5 | Granville County.

6 | It is not suited for us. We don't have the
 7 | facilities. We don't have enough water. They
 8 | say, "Don't flush your commode, the water is
 9 | low." Use your commode all night and don't
 10 | flush the water. What are you going to do if
 11 | we get a bio here?

12 | I'm not one that makes speeches. But when
 13 | I'm angry, I'm angry. And this thing -- and God
 14 | knows I'm angry for a good reason. And he's
 15 | going to forgive me and all of my friends that
 16 | are in here and have spoken and poured their
 17 | hearts out with how they feel, because this is
 18 | their home.

19 | This is where they live. This is where
 20 | they raise their children, and we don't need it.
 21 | Please, don't bring it here, please.

22 | MR. BALL: Hi again. My name is David
 23 | Ball. One of the things I do a lot of is study
 24 | safety failure. And, boy, are we looking at a
 25 | big one. Perhaps, you folks have noticed over
 26 | the course of the evening that there's a certain

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement regarding lack of trust relative to DHS and greater openness. Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program and has been as forthcoming as possible in disseminating information about NBAF as program planning has matured over time. The primary objective of the EIS is to evaluate the environmental impacts of a range of reasonable alternatives for locating, constructing and operating the NBAF. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. State-of-the-art biocontainment facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF. A period of 60 days was provided for public review and comment on the NBAF Draft EIS, which spanned from June 27 through August 25, 2008. During this comment period, public meetings were held in of the vicinity of the NBAF site alternatives and in Washington, D.C. DHS also accepted comments submitted by mail, toll-free telephone and fax lines, and online through the NBAF Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). All comments, both oral and written, received during the comment period were given equal consideration and were responded to in the NBAF Final EIS. Decisions on whether to construct and operate the NBAF and, if so, where, will be based on the analyses presented in the NBAF EIS and other factors such as cost, engineering and technical feasibility, strategic considerations, policy considerations, and public input. A Record of Decision (ROD) that explains the final decisions will be made available no sooner than 30 days after the NBAF Final EIS is published.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 cont. | lack of trust when it comes to the Department of
2.0 | Homeland Security.

3 And I'd just like to say, "Well, bless
4 your heart," because there's not a person in
5 this room who would trust Homeland Security in
6 place of the people you really trust to keep us
7 safe, the people who are really out for our
8 benefit.

9 The cop standing here on my right, they're
10 -- they're a lot more trustworthy than what you
11 folks are doing.

12 But you did come here tonight to tell us
13 that when it comes to this project, you're going
14 to do a heck of a job. And I'd like to give
15 you, in all seriousness -- I'll try to keep my
16 snide tone out of it, which is hard -- some
17 suggestions: first, a little bit more truth and
18 openness about what y'all are doing, about the
19 basis for your decisions, which we know we're
20 not hearing any of in this room, none of -- very
21 little of.

22 | Second, a word to the wise when it comes to
23 | monitoring a situation like this, the only way
24 | you can safely monitor a facility like this is
25 | with adversarial safety monitors; that is,

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Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 21.0

Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Additionally, A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety.

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2 cont. | safety monitors in whose interest it is to find
21.0 | the safety problems.

3 And I'm afraid that is just one hundred
4 percent out of the culture of Homeland Security.
5 It is not an organization that could possibly do
6 it. We need to look very carefully as the
7 budget for Homeland Security goes up and down
8 over the years, that there is an advance
9 arrangement to cut back the work the lab is
10 doing so that it can stay within the budget it
11 has to properly monitor it.

12 That is neither the way Homeland Security
1 cont. | ever operates, and it's barely the way the
2.0 | United States government ever operates. And if
15 you're sensing distrust in the room, it's not
16 distrust born out of dark suspicion, and we
17 don't know what we're looking at, we hear it on
18 the news every day.

19 And finally -- finally, I really ask you
20 folks -- I think you're good people here. I
21 think that the folks that I heard are decent
22 people. I think you believe that what you're
23 doing is the right thing. But finally, you and
24 I both know that there are at least two or
25 three hundred safer locations for this project

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1 in this country.

3|5.0 | We're somehow bamboozled into thinking,
 4 | are we one of the six, and -- and are we the
 5 | most safe of the six? No, the six isn't
 6 | relative. There are so many more places that
 7 | would be safer for this facility. This -- this
 8 | study didn't even address that. They weren't
 9 | allowed to, anymore than the study addressed the
 10 | most dangerous of the things that are going to
 11 | be there.

12 | Please, look at those other spaces before
 13 | you come back and tell us it has to be here.

14 | MS. COGHILL: Thank you, Mr. Ball.
 15 | Next is David Krabbe, Mary Daniel and Attila --
 16 | I'm probably going to pronounce this
 17 | incorrectly. I apologize ahead of time --
 18 | Nemezc, N-e-m-e-c-z, if I'm reading correctly.
 19 | David.

20 | MR. KRABBE: Thank you. My name is
 21 | David Krabbe. I'm just going to read a
 22 | statement from (unintelligible) who is out of
 23 | town and regrets that he could not be with us
 24 | tonight. His statement, "We must focus on our
 25 | most precious and valuable -- vulnerable
 26 | resource, our water. If this was a chemical

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's watershed and supply concerns. The NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.13.8, Waste Management describes the process that would be used to control and dispose of NBAF's liquid and solid wastes. The NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.7.7 describes the Umstead Research Park Site alternative's water resources affects including permitting and planning options available to prevent and mitigate potential spill and runoff affects.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS held a competitive process to select potential sites for the proposed NBAF as described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. A multi-disciplinary team of engineers, scientists, lawyers, academics and communicators from the departments of Homeland Security, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Defense reviewed the submissions based primarily on environmental suitability and proximity to research capabilities, proximity to workforce, acquisition/construction/operations, and community acceptance. Ultimately, DHS identified five site alternatives that surpassed others in meeting the evaluation criteria and DHS preferences, and determined that they, in addition to the Plum Island Site, would be evaluated in the EIS as alternatives for the proposed NBAF.

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1 cont. | being considered for siting at this location,
 12.3 | close to Falls Lake, we wouldn't think twice.
 3 | It would never happen.
 4 | "We have no business planning to study
 5 | some of the world's deadly diseases upstream
 6 | from a water supply for 400,000 people. On
 2 | 25.3 | behalf of the Neuse River Foundation and the
 | people of Raleigh, no, to NBAF." Those are from
 9 | Dan.
 10 | I have a couple of comments for myself.
 3 | 2.0 | Mr. Johnson, when we began tonight, you referred
 | to -- trying to make a comparison between this
 13 | facility and the CDC in Atlanta, you know and
 14 | other mainland facilities.
 15 | I think you were severely admonished in
 16 | the House Energy and Congress committee
 17 | meetings. They said it was completely
 18 | disingenuous of you to make that comparison.
 19 | And I -- we resent you coming here still using
 20 | that comparison.
 21 | Also, addressing the Foot and Mouth
 3 cont. | Disease study that you all did, it's very
 2.0 | curious that at the USDA website, all the
 24 | previous studies are no long available.
 25 | You go to 'em, and you can't get 'em

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Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement regarding lack of trust relative to DHS and greater openness. Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program and has been as forthcoming as possible in disseminating information about NBAF as program planning has matured over time. The primary objective of the EIS is to evaluate the environmental impacts of a range of reasonable alternatives for locating, constructing and operating the NBAF. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. State-of-the-art biocontainment facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF. A period of 60 days was provided for public review and comment on the NBAF Draft EIS, which spanned from June 27 through August 25, 2008. During this comment period, public meetings were held in of the vicinity of the NBAF site alternatives and in Washington, D.C. DHS also accepted comments submitted by mail, %toll-free telephone% and fax lines, and online through the NBAF Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). All comments, both oral and written, received during the comment period were given equal consideration and were responded to in the NBAF Final EIS. Decisions on whether to construct and operate the NBAF and, if so, where, will be based on the analyses presented in the NBAF EIS and other factors such as cost, engineering and technical feasibility, strategic considerations, policy considerations, and public input. A Record of Decision (ROD) that explains the final decisions will be made available no sooner than 30 days after the NBAF Final EIS is published.

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3 cont. | anymore. So, that's the transparency we can
2.0 | expect from you all. You're -- you know, you're
3 | living up to your track record there. I'd also
4 | like to know why Merck was involved in the
5 | feasibility study?

6 | Why is a pharmaceutical company studying the
7 | feasibility of this facility? I -- I left -- my
8 | mind went blank for a second. The last thing
9 | I'd like to say is, in the old days, a lot of
10 | the farms around here -- people used the Sears
11 | and Roebuck catalog out in the privy.

12 | And we've still got the original privy on
13 | our farm. But I can tell you, for your DEIS
14 | document, is going to be residing at our privy.
15 | Thank you.

16 | MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Mary Daniel.

17 | MS. DANIEL: How can one sum up in
18 | three minutes how you've felt for the past nine
19 | months since the scoping session was held in
20 | Creedmoor. There's no way. The anger, the
21 | frustration, the time, the energy, the finances
22 | out of our own pockets, there's just no way to
23 | describe it.

14.0 | In the scoping session, you said part of
| the decision would be public acceptance of this

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 4.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern about public input to the NBAF decision making process. Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program, and it is DHS policy to encourage public input on matters of national and international importance. To date, DHS has provided two opportunities for the public to provide comment and input to the environmental impact analyses presented in the NBAF EIS. DHS gave equal consideration to all comments, regardless of how or where they were received. All comments received during the public comment periods have been considered in this NBAF EIS. Several factors will affect the decision on whether or not NBAF is built, and, if so, where. The NBAF EIS itself will not be the sole deciding factor. The decision will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment. The DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Jay M. Cohen, with other Department officials, will consider the factors identified above in making final decisions regarding the NBAF. A Record of Decision (ROD) that explains the final decisions will be made available no sooner than 30 days after the NBAF Final EIS is published.

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1 cont. | facility. I think you got a mild feeling at the
4.0 | scoping session how some of the residents feel.

2 | 25.3 | You had the town meeting. I think you got a
| more resounding, no, from us.

5 | You've had comments that have been
6 | forwarded to you, first, via e-mails or letters
7 | and those kinds of things. You didn't put that
8 | in the draft of the EIS report either.

3 | 2.0 | Recently, you stated in Washington, D.C. that
| you would not go where you are not welcome.

11 | So, in this afternoon's break I went home
12 | and looked on the computer to see Webster's
13 | definition of no, because I think we have a
14 | gross misunderstanding what no means. So, no is
15 | spelled n-o. Okay. Webster says, "Not in any
16 | degree or manner, not at all."

17 | Another definition is, "a denial or a
18 | refusal." Another definition is, "to reject,
19 | refuse approval or express disapproval of."

20 | I feel like Aladdin's lamp with three
2 cont. | wishes. If I had three wishes, it would be for
25.3 | you to go away, you to go away; you to go away.

23 | No.

24 | MR. NEMECZ: I've seen this story
25 | unfold a lot before, where small communities are

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Comment No: 2Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's viewpoint and statement.

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1 taken by powerful interests. And sometimes it
2 works out well; sometimes it doesn't. Over the
3 past year, massive food recalls and e-coli
4 outbreaks have taught me that the greatest
5 threats to our food safety are not terrorists
6 overseas, but the sprawling complex and
7 completely unaccountable for our food supply
8 chain, and people who put profit before the
9 health and safety of un- -- unsus- --
10 unsuspecting consumers.

11 This disease lab represents the same
125.3 problem. We are supposed to allow a completely
unaccountable lab, tinkering with deadly
14 diseases into our region. We get hemorrhagic
15 fever, and a few people far away get Homeland
16 Security handouts.

17 They call us uneducated and emotional. I
18 think we've about got all the facts that we
19 need. We are not here to ask for a better or
20 safer lab. We are not here because this fits in
21 with the political agenda. We have nothing to
22 gain and everything to lose.

23 We are here fighting for our lives and for
24 the lives of the animals that will be
25 unnecessarily subjected to these diseases and

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1|25.3

for the survival of the streams you will be
dumping into. We are not just trying to stop
you.

3

4

We will stop you. And we will do whatever
it takes. We will do what people defending their
communities have done. At first, we will speak
at hearings. And when we are not heard, because
rarely are we heard at these hearings, we will
protest.

10

11

When our protests are ignored, we will take
our fight to the next level. And this is a
farming community. Farmers don't have to stand
in front of bulldozers; they understand how
bulldozers work, and they can take bulldozers
apart.

15

16

17

Some of us will get arrested. Some of us
will lose our jobs. But this fight is too
important to lose. In the end, we will win. I
am one. I have a posse of ten. If you bring
your posse, we will stop this.

21

22

MS. COGHILL: Paula Cox Fishman, Vicky
Cates and May Hight.

23

24

25

MS. COX FISHMAN: My name is Paula Cox
Fishman. I'm a volunteer advocate for persons
with mental retardation and mental illness. My

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1 sister lives at Murdoch Center and has been
 2 there for 42 years. I have questions and
 3 requests.

4 Please supply us a chart of the flow of
 5 dollars, including political fund raisers,
 6 between the members of the Consortium, elected
 7 officials in favor of NBAF in Butner, lobbyists
 8 and everyone else who spear-headed the push to
 9 bring NBAF to Butner.

10 Why were some state employees given
 11 permission to endorse NBAF in Butner, while
 12 other state employees who work here were under a
 13 gag order? In the event of a breach of
 14 containment of micro-organisms, will the
 15 taxpayers be responsible for the remedy, or will
 16 the Consortium members and their contract
 17 employees, elected officials and Homeland
 18 Security employees pay for the damage to humans
 19 and livestock?

20 Why is Butner still under consideration for
 21 an NBAF facility when other sites want it? I
 22 think that fits under the what -- what part of
 23 no don't you understand? Thank you so much for
 24 having this hearing.

25 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, Paula. Vicky.

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern that State employee's participation in public comment process is not equitable. DHS is committed to free and open public involvement during development of the NBAF EIS and welcomes comments. DHS's decisions on whether the NBAF should be built, and, if so where, will be based on environmental analyses, public and agency comments, mission requirements, national policy considerations, life-cycle costs, site characterization, security, and other programmatic considerations.

The determination of criminal or civil liability arising from an accidental or intentional release of a pathogen is beyond the scope of this EIS. It is also not possible to accept or reject a claim for damages until the specific facts of an incident are known and the applicable local, state or Federal law is applied.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 MS. CATES: My name is Vicky Cates. I
 2 am a member of the Butner Town Council. I have
 3 read many articles concerning the NBAF lab, and
 4 including the EIS executive summary. I have
 5 exchanged information among our town residents
 6 and also around the community.

1|25.3 The majority of our local residents have
 9 voiced to oppose the lab either by individual
 10 comments or by placing a No-Bio Lab sign in
 11 their yard. As an individual of the Butner Town
 12 Council, I oppose the lab.

12 MS. COGHILL: May Hight and John
 13 Schwade.

14 MS. HIGHT: My name is May Hight. And
 15 I've been living here in Butner 35 years. I
 16 work at Murdoch Center with the mentally
 17 retarded residents for 35. And I want to ask
 1|26.0 either one of y'all, have y'all worked at a
 18 bio-lab? Raise your hand if you have. Nobody?

20 MS. COGHILL: Just to reiterate, we're
 21 -- we're here to listen to your comments, and --

22 MS. HIGHT: Well, I just want to know
 23 if y'all have had the chance to work at --

24 MS. COGHILL: And they are for the
 25 record, and we're -- they will all be processed.

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS is aware of the presence of the health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are aware of the proposed action. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated and are presented in Section 3.14. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives.

A site-specific emergency response plan would be developed and coordinated with the local emergency management plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF. The type of, duration, and geographical extent of quarantine would be determined by the appropriate authorities depending on the pathogen released and contamination level.

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1 cont.
26.0

MS. HIGHT: How do you say off the
record? Have you worked at the lab? Have you
had any experience when a mishap occurred? How
did they evacuate? How did they do that? Have
you seen that happen?

How did you get all this information?

MS. COGHILL: They are all very
important questions.

MS. HIGHT: I'm not -- yeah, they're
important to me.

MS. COGHILL: They are very important.
And that's why we're here listening, and that's
why we're going to take all of them, and make
sure we respond to all of them. That's how
important they are.

MS. HIGHT: Is it against the law for
me asking these questions?

MS. COGHILL: No, ma'am. I just want
to let you know that that's where we are.

MS. HIGHT: I mean, why will you not
answer 'em? I don't get an answer.

UNIDENTIFIED: Answer the question.

MS. HIGHT: I was a technician. I had
to go through training to work with the
residents -- the residents. I had to learn how

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1 cont.
26.0

to feed 'em, do -- care for 'em. So, anybody
that brings -- presents a bio-lab here should
have worked there. You have to get your
experience, and I don't know how y'all get all
this information.

You don't seem to tell us nothing. So,
how do you know this is all true if you don't
know what to say?

MS. COGHILL: Thank you very much.
Bill McKellar and Elaine McNeill and Judy
Winters are the next three speakers, please.

MR. SCHWADE: My name is John Schwade.
I'm a staff psychologist at Polk Correctional
Institution. I've worked in Butner for 24
years, including ten and a half years with the
Murdoch Developmental Center and five years at
the C.A. Dillon Youth Development Academy, which
borders the proposed site.

In my spare time, I regular contribute
guest columns to the Durham News and the
Saturday section of the Raleigh News and
Observer. On July 26, this past Saturday, I
published a critique of the draft Environmental
Impact Statement, which I called a comedy or
errors.

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1 In fact, it would be funny except for the
 2 part that I'll quote, "Handling exotic pathogens
 3 that pose a high risk of life threatening
 4 disease in animals and humans through the
 5 aerosol route, and for which there is no known
 6 vaccine or therapy."

7 But as I wrote Saturday, quote,
 8 "Describing the site as" -- and these are the
 9 words from the DEIS -- "surrounded primarily by
 10 agricultural activities and forests, while
 11 ignoring thousands of vulnerable persons nearby."

12 It's not just bad modeling. It's
 13 unconscionable. Your biological hazard accident
 14|19.3: direct risk model deals with many uncertainties
 15|15.3 but ignores this certainty. In the event of a
 16 release of exotic pathogens, a possibility
 17 acknowledged in the draft EIS, while lab
 18 employees are donning their personal protective
 19 equipment, and residents of Butner and nearby
 20 communities are evacuating, over 6,500
 21 vulnerable residents of Butner institutions,
 22 along with those state and federal employees
 23 manning those posts will be incapable of
 24 evacuating and unable to protect themselves and
 25 others.

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the impact of an accident and subsequent potential evacuation on the institutionalized population. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. The chances of an accidental release are low. Appendix B to the NBAF EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections in the United States and world-wide. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site then site-specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of populations, including institutionalized populations, residing within the local area. The need for an evacuation in response to an accident is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS is aware of the presence of the health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are well aware of the proposed action. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives.

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1|19.3; Of course, most of those institutions were
2|15.3 not named in the draft EIS and were omitted from
3 the map of the proposed site. What would
4 someone in Washington or Kalamazoo know? To
5 them, the draft EIS might appear quite
6 reasonable.

7 But we, in Butner, know different. We
8 recognize the cynicism in, for example,
9 reporting that the proposed site is not on any
10 Native American ancestral grounds, while
11 ignoring the living Native Americans residing
12 and working in Butner's institutions.

13 A proponent of locating the NBAF in Butner,
14 Warwick Barden, Dean of the N.C. State
15 University College of Veterinary Medicine, was
16 quoted in the News and Observer yesterday
17 suggesting that opposition is based on, quote,
18 "an initial knee-jerk reaction."

19 "Its," quote, "an emotional decision and is
20 a reaction to," quote, "scare tactics." First
21 of all, Butner's residents and employees don't
22 scare easily. Residents don't blink when the
23 Old Oxford Highway is lined with U.S. Marshals
24 armed with A2K, MP5 submachine guns welcoming a
25 particularly dangerous inmate to the Federal

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1 Correctional Complex.

2 And most of the thousands of state and
3 federal employees in Butner have dangerous jobs.
4 Some have extremely dangerous jobs. Butner is
5 the home of the state's super max prison. And
6 the Federal Medical Center treats inmates of all
7 custody levels, including those with very
8 dangerous friends.

9 If we were at all hysterical, we could not
10 do our jobs. Moreover, there is higher need
11 than Homeland Security emphasizing the danger of
12 the pathogens they propose to study at the NBAF,
13 in emphasizing the need for the lab while
14 proponents simultaneously demean objections as
15 knee-jerk reactions and emotional decisions.

16 Were the directors of the EIS acting
17 emotionally when they considered, for example,
18 the possibility of an earthquake in Butner? The
19 NBAF should be located far, far away from
20 vulnerable persons who could neither evacuate
21 nor be protected in the event of a release of
22 exotic pathogens. Thank you.

23 MS. COGHILL: Elaine McNeill, Judy
24 Winters and Joan Wyatt.

25 MS. MCNEILL: Hi, I'm back. I spoke

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Comment No: 3Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated in populated areas such as Butner. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta.

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1 earlier this afternoon about a friend of mine
2 who is a quality -- an air quality expert with
19.3 EPA, and with whom I consulted regarding the air
quality section of the draft Environmental
5 Impact Statement.

6 His responses, you may recall, was there
7 was not enough hard data for him to draw any
8 sorts of conclusions. I wonder how you were
9 able to draw conclusions from that lack of data.
10 Incidentally, he mentioned one other thing I
11 didn't have time to say this afternoon.

12 Ozone has been monitored in Butner. And
13 that was included in your draft EIS, but Butner
14 is part of the Triangle area. And he hadn't
15 moved to Denver a few years ago, two -- three
16 years ago, didn't realize that just in December
17 26 of 2007, the Triangle Area came -- was
18 frantic, non-attainment to maintenance.

19 Just a few months ago, we have come into
20 maintenance from non-attainment. But he
21 reminded me that the standard changed in
22 February from .08 parts per million to .075
23 parts per million. And this is -- this change
24 was made under the old standards.

25 When the new standards have been enforced,

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 9.3

DHS notes the commentor's ozone attainment concerns. The potential effects of NBAF operations on air quality are discussed in Section 3.4 of the NBAF EIS and includes the potential effects from traffic and NBAF operations. Site-specific effects at the Umstead Research Farm Site alternative are discussed in Section 3.4.7. Air pollutant concentrations were estimated using SCREEN3, a U.S. EPA dispersion modeling program. Conservative assumptions were used to ensure the probable maximum effects were evaluated. Once the final design is determined, a more refined air emissions model will be used during the permitting process. The final design will ensure that the NBAF %does not significantly affect% the region's ability to meet air quality standards. The NBAF EIS Section 3.4 describes both the 1997 and the 2008 ozone 8 hour standard.

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1 cont. | he said more than likely, the Triangle Area will
9.3 | be a non-attainment again. That's not in the
3 | EIS. The Triangle Area is not mentioned. All
4 | of Granville County is part of the Triangle area
5 | as far as the EPA air quality is concerned.

6 | I just have to read you something, "The
7 | emission rates were determined from existing
8 | emission estimates from similar facilities."
9 | Well, where are those estimates in your draft
10 | EIS? They're not in it. So, how -- are we
11 | supposed to just trust that you used these, that
12 | -- that they valid?

13 | What about this? Traffic -- vehicle
14 | traffic generated from the construction and
15 | operation of the NBAF, operation of boilers,
16 | emergency back-up generators and either
17 | incineration or tissue that you get from all the
18 | sources of polluted emissions, the potential for
19 | air emissions can only be estimated. That's
20 | right here on page 382, estimated. You say that
21 | the air quality is not a significant factor in
22 | this presentation of yours. How can you do
23 | that? It's unconscionable.

24 | The next lie, that NBAF can contribute to
25 | air emissions in the region, although the amount

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1 cont. | of contribution is not known at this time.
 9.3 |

Well, you know, at the -- at the risk of being

3 | redundant --

4 | MS. COGHILL: Elaine, your time is up.

5 | MS. MCNEILL: -- the DHS was called

2|2.0 | incompetent, arrogant and secretive by a House
 committee. And I just want to second the motion.

8 | MS. COGHILL: Judy Winters, Joan Wyatt

9 | and David Krabbe.

10 | MS. WINTERS: Hi. My name is Judy

11 | Winters, and I'm a resident of Butner. I'm not

12 | going to go into a lot of the things that I

13 | found wrong with the DEIS. I'll -- I'll present

14 | that in formal comment. But some of the things

15 | that concern me, I think, concern a lot of

16 | people.

And it, basically, started from day 1 with

1|4.3 | our process. When the Consortium put this

19 | particular site up for the bid proposal, they

20 | held no public meetings here. They got no

21 | public input. When members in the community

22 | started, basically, saying they no longer wanted

23 | the -- didn't think the facility was -- was a

24 | good thing for the community, they called us

25 | names.

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 4.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the openness of the public input process. Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program. DHS has conducted public meetings in excess of the minimum required by NEPA regulations; to date, 23 public meetings have been held in the vicinity of NBAF site alternatives and in Washington D.C. to solicit public input on the EIS, allow the public to voice their concerns, and to get their questions answered DHS has also provided fact sheets, reports, exhibits, and a Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). Additionally, various means of communication (mail, telephone and fax lines, and NBAF Web site) have been provided to facilitate public comment. It is DHS policy to encourage public input on matters of national and international importance. DHS is committed to free and open public involvement during development of the NBAF EIS and welcomes comments. DHS's decisions on whether the NBAF should be built, and, if so where, will be based on environmental analyses, public and agency comments, mission requirements, national policy considerations, life-cycle costs, site characterization, security, and other programmatic considerations.

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

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1 cont. | They just received \$262,000 to -- to
 4.3 | forward a political campaign. I think it's a
 3 | political campaign. They call it the
 4 | educational campaign. They're saying that we
 5 | deserve accurate information. And yet, so far
 6 | the only things that we have been told, the EIS
 7 | is wrong, and what you have said today is --
 8 | some of it is really wrong -- the Avian flu, the
 9 | Newcastle.

10 | Every element of this entire process has
 11 | basically exposed something else that we were
 12 | either misled on or something new that's never
 13 | been discussed before. And so, the level of
 14 | distrust in the community has grown.

2|8.3 | The -- the cost of the infrastructure, for
 17 | instance -- the majority of the people that live
 18 | in Butner are on a fixed, or low income. And
 19 | the central utility, the estimate for the
 20 | central utility quote for the NBAF is 85 to
 21 | \$90,000,000.

22 | And yet, the Consortium has never informed
 23 | the community that they expect the host site to
 3|23.0; | the dis-information that is continuing. We --
 4|18.3 | we're here tonight to comment on the draft

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Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.3


DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the infrastructure improvements and associated costs required for the NBAF operation at the Umstead Research Farm site. Sections 3.3.7 and 3.11.7 of the NBAF EIS include an assessment of the current utility and transportation infrastructure at the Umstead Research Farm Site, the potential impact and effects from construction and operation of the NBAF, and the planned utility and transportation improvements to meet the operational requirements of the NBAF. While the potential costs of proposed actions are not a factor in the environmental impact analysis presented in the NBAF EIS, cost information of the NBAF alternatives is summarized in Section 2.5, Table 2.5.1-1, to provide pertinent information to the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology so that he may make a more informed decision with respect to the alternatives presented in the NBAF EIS. Infrastructure costs were analyzed and included in the final costs provided in the NBAF EIS. Additionally, the Site Cost Analysis Report, available on the NBAF Web Site for public review and discussed in Section 2.6, is one of several reports that will be considered in addition to the NBAF EIS, in selecting the Preferred Alternative for the Final EIS and ROD. Funding for the design, construction, and operations for the NBAF will come from the Federal Government. Proposals for offsets to the site infrastructure (part of the construction costs) were requested by the Federal government. The decision as to what to offer (land donation, funding, other assets) is solely as the discretion of the consortium, state and local officials as part of the consortium bid site package. The amount of funding and how the funding is paid for (bonds, taxes, etc) is determined by the state and local government officials and not the decision of the Federal government.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Section 3.13 of the NBAF EIS describes the processes that would be used to control and dispose of liquid and solid waste from the NBAF, with Sections 3.3 and 3.7 of the NBAF EIS describing the standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential effects of spills and runoff. Since the method of carcass disposal has not yet been determined, therefore, the facility design has not yet been finalized, the effects of alkaline hydrolysis, incineration, and rendering were included in the analysis presented in Section 3.13 of the NBAF EIS. Incineration has the potential to affect air quality, so the evaluation in Section 3.4 (Air Quality) of the NBAF EIS assumed only incineration would be used to assess the greatest adverse effect. Alkaline hydrolysis would have the greatest effect on sanitary sewage capacity, Section 3.3, so the sanitary sewage effects were determined using this method.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 18.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. As discussed in Section 3.13.2.2 of the NBAF EIS, several different technologies are being considered for carcass and pathological waste disposal. Table 3.13.2.2-4 provides a brief description and comparison of the three most likely technologies being considered (i.e., incineration, alkaline hydrolysis, and rendering). As discussed in this section, the final design for the NBAF will probably include more than one technology for the treatment of these wastes. Factors that may be considered in making this technology decision include individual site



requirements and restrictions, air emissions, liquid and solid waste stream by-products, and operation and maintenance requirements. Section 3.13.1.2 of the NBAF also presents information on the origins of, pretreatment requirements applicable to, and disposition of wastes that will be discharged to the sanitary sewer or sent offsite to a solid or hazardous waste management facility. Burial of animal carcasses and pathological wastes is not discussed in Section 3.13.2.2 because this method of waste disposal is not being considered for the NBAF.

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3 cont. | Environmental Impact Statement that does not
 23.0; | include incineration or tissue digest or the --
 4 cont. |
 18.3 | the alkaline hydrolysis.

4 | We do not know how you will get rid of
 5 | thousands of carcasses or thousands of pounds of
 6 | daily waste. And for us to be called names
 7 | because that is a concern is just disingenuous,
 8 | and it's outrageous. And that's why the -- the
 9 | level of anger is growing. And it's continuing
 10 | to grow.

5|25.3 | So, I guess a lot of the anger here, in my
 | opinion, is just toward the Consortium. But if
 13 | you believe them for one second, that they have
 14 | community support, you are just being misled
 15 | completely. Thank you.

16 | MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Bill
 17 | McKellar is next, followed by Joan Wyatt.

18 | MR. MCKELLAR: I'm Bill McKellar, and
 1|25.3 | I speak at this time representing the Granville
 | Non-Violent Action Team and 4,300 other people.
 21 | Last week we presented this petition to you in
 22 | Washington. We want to formally, or for the
 23 | record, present it to you in Butner from the
 24 | citizens of Butner, Creedmoor, Stem, Bahama,
 25 | surrounding counties and towns, who are opposed

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 5Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 cont. | to the NBAF facility proposed location for
25.3 | Granville County

3 | We must point out that the elected
4 | officials express their views and opinions, but
5 | they take an oath to represent their
6 | constituency. They do not take oaths to
7 | represent the Department of Homeland Security
8 | and the Consortium. Thank you.

9 | MS. COGHILL: Thank you, sir. Joan
10 | Wyatt.

11 | MS. WYATT: I don't have anything
12 | really to add to all the negative comments. I
13 | agree with everything bad and negative that's
14 | been said. I hope that you people will take
15 | this seriously and not try to bring this lab to
16 | this community.

17 | Beyond that, I don't know what to say.
18 | We're -- we're not going to be nice anymore. I
19 | think not. We've been nice up until now.

20 | MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Wendy Myier
21 | Goodwin. Thank you for your patience.

22 | MS. GOODWIN: I actually have a
23 | question, but I guess it can become a comment.
24 | My concern is the type of enclosure that you
25 | will have. And I didn't read the whole

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the NBAF. The purpose and need for the proposed action is discussed in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS can not guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident. However, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, modern biosafety design substantially diminishes the chances of a release as the primary design goal is to provide an adequate level of redundant safety and biocontainment that would be integrated into every component of the building. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14. Once delivered to the NBAF, animals would be contained within inside holding areas, and only non-infected animals would be kept in this area. The indoor holding facility would reduce the possibility of an animal escaping, and experimented animals would be contained in the biosafety holding areas until decontamination and disposal. As described in Section 2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, based on 70% utilization of the design maximum projected research demands resulted in a facility design that could house approximately 200 to 300 animals at any given time.

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1 cont. | statement, but how many animals, and how are
23.0 | they going to be enclosed?
- | And if they are not, if they are outdoors
4 | in an open environment, how do you control for
5 | all kinds of flying vectors that will carry
6 | their diseases anywhere? That's my main concern.
7 | MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Suzanne Moody
8 | Smith, Taylor Betts and then Eddie King.
9 | MS. MOODY SMITH: I drove all the way
10 | to Washington. I spoke with you at the last
11 | meeting when you were in Creedmoor. I've been
125.3 | trying to tell you, bless your hearts, you don't
| have community support. And one thing I have
14 | learned in my experience with you is that you
15 | value redundancy.
16 | So, in order to be perfectly safe, I want
17 | to be redundant. You do not have community
18 | support. And I'll get back to that just in case
19 | that wasn't redundant enough.
20 | I would like to take this opportunity to
21 | tell my community how absolutely proud and
22 | thrilled I am to be a part of this community.
1 cont. | You have underestimated our community. We
25.3 | will stand up to you. And, oh, I want to thank
| Attila for saving my life. I didn't even think

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 cont. | about dismantling the bulldozers. Thank you.
25.3 | We will do that first. If not, as I told you in
 | Washington, I will not be alone standing in
4 | front of the bulldozer.

5 | I understand that the people that I've met
6 | in Washington, the people I've talked with have
7 | good intentions, the same type that paved the
8 | road to hell. We do not want you to bring hell
9 | on earth to us. Now, my main concern about this
2|23.0 | facility is that in my reading, I have also read
 | exhaustively about biological weapons production.

12 | From what I've learned from Kim Abbott's
13 | book, along with others, is that the type
14 | facility they build is a box within a box within
15 | a box. The Russians -- excuse me -- yeah, the
16 | Soviet Union -- the former Soviet Union used
17 | this type facility very successfully to disguise,
18 | within a maze, after having treated the
19 | inspectors to copious amounts of vodka, I
20 | believe, to get them so confused that there were
21 | levels within in that building they were unaware
22 | of.

23 | I heard earlier in the presentation that
24 | the production of reagents would not be large.
25 | But I had heard from one of your mouths in

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Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 23.0

The NBAF's mission is defensive and would not involve offensive bioweapons research or development. The international treaty, known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, to which the United States is a signatory, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of such weapons. DHS's mission is to study foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The purpose of the NBAF would be to develop tests to detect foreign animal and zoonotic diseases and develop vaccines (or other countermeasures such as antiviral therapies) to protect agriculture and food systems in the United States.

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1 Washington, one liter. You were -- you were --
 2 you -- it was a much smaller amount mentioned
 3 tonight.

2 cont. | I have read in other papers up to 30
 23.0 | liters. This has the appearance of a biological
 | weapons production facility. All it will take
 7 | to start the arms race from hell is the
 8 | appearance of a biological weapons production
 9 | facility.

1 cont. | On a moral ground, I will not stand for
 25.3 | it. I would rather die than allow you to give
 | the appearance of the most horrendous
 13 | abomination we could ever instill on the world.
 14 | I will have no part of it. I will have no part
 15 | of a government that would have a part of it.

16 I will -- it will not stand.

17 MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Mr. Taylor
 18 Betts, you're up next, followed by Eddie King
 19 and then Joe Fister.

20 MR. BETTS: I'm Taylor Betts, and I'm
 21 ten years old. Can you promise me that this
 1|21.3 | facility will not make me sick and all the other
 | animals and dogs? Thank you.

24 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, sir. Eddie
 25 King, if you'd come to the microphone, please.

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding an NBAF accident causing an illness. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies. DHS would have site-specific Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. The likelihood of a member of the public coming down with an illness as a result of an NBAF accident is low.

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1 You're up. Is Mr. King still here? I just
 2 want to double check before we go on to the
 3 next person. (No response.)

4 MS. COGHILL: Okay. Joe Fister, please

5 MR. FISTER: Hi, I'm Joe Fister. I'm a
 6 licensed acupuncturist, and I raise sheep in
 7 Granville County. And the sheep have brought a
 8 message. The lambs say NBAF is a baaaaad idea.

9 MR. FISTER: Can we all say baaaaad?

10 AUDIENCE: Baaaaad.

11 MR. FISTER: But we've heard from
 12|21.3 doctors and engineers about the -- not the
 possibility, not the probability, but almost --
 it's going to happen that accidents will happen.

15 It's a question of how long before
 16 something breaks down, which redundancy goes
 17 when the next one comes. The evidence from Plum
 18 Island, you know, just shows that. It's been
 19 said, but I won't re-state it. So, my question
 20 is, how long -- you know, this is a trade-off.

21 How long is acceptable for safety? What
 22 about five years?

23 AUDIENCE: Baaaaad.

24 MR. FISTER: Would ten be okay?

25 AUDIENCE: Baaaaad.

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 21.3

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

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1 MR. FISTER: How about 15 years? Does
2 that suit you?

3 AUDIENCE: Baaaaad.

2|25.3 MR. FISTER: Well, I don't think that
there is an acceptable thing. And we will fight
6 it. Thank you.

7 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, sir. I'd
8 just like to make sure that Mr. King is -- if
9 he is still here, that he's given an opportunity
10 to speak. Okay. Having said that, you have
11 listened to all the folks that have signed up
12 this evening and this afternoon.

13 What I'd like to do since the meeting is
14 still open, at this time, if there's anyone who
15 feels that they would like to make a comment and
16 did not, we'd like to let those people go first.
17 Then if there is somebody who provided comments
18 earlier and did not feel that they got to
19 finish, then we'll ask those folks to come to
20 the microphone.

21 MS. TRAPSKI: Susan Trapski, again. My
14.3 comment is this. I don't know where the
Consortium is. If this is a hearing for
24 comments, why are all of the comments on one
25 side? Is the answer -- is -- is all of this

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 4.3

DHS notes the commentor's statement. Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program. DHS has conducted public meetings in excess of the minimum required by NEPA regulations; to date, 24 public meetings have been held in the vicinity of NBAF site alternatives and in Washington, D.C. to solicit public input on the EIS, allow the public to voice their concerns, and to get their questions answered DHS has also provided fact sheets, reports, exhibits, and a Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). Additionally, various means of communication (mail, toll free telephone and fax lines, and NBAF Web site) have been provided to facilitate public comment. It is DHS policy to encourage public input on matters of national and international importance.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 cont. | pointless?

4.3

Are you just here on an empty exercise,
knowing that the only people here are the people
opposed? I don't -- I know you're not going to
answer that question. I'm wondering if all of
our words and all of our lives are worthless
against whatever power that Consortium has.
Thank you.

MS. COGHILL: Thank you.

MR. RAY: My name is Kent Ray. I was
born and raised here in Granville County. I've
spent most of my life here. I went to the
first meeting that was held at South Granville
where the Consortium and many others spoke.

Having lived here for over 50 years, it's
the first time in my life that I ever saw
representatives of all levels of government,
from the local all the way to the federal,
represented in the City of Creedmoor and/or
Butner.

That in and of itself is enough to scare
the hell out of me. I heard -- (interruption by
audience) -- having served as a council member
in Creedmoor, and meaning for me with some of
the environmental concerns and the terrain

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1|12.3 around here, then finding out that such a
 2| facility would be placed within a major
 3| watershed for the entire State of North Carolina
 4| was -- I'm not the most educated person in the
 5| world, but our forefathers who founded this, had
 6| enough sense not to put their johnny houses next
 7| to the water supply they were drinking out of.

1|cont. And for such a facility as this to be
 12.3| placed anywhere within a water supply that
 serves over half of the state, and to place the
 11| people that live in that area in such peril,
 12| it's ludicrous, it's nonsense; and it would take
 13| an idiot to place it there.

2|5.0 It's well documented that such a facility
 may be needed, but it is not needed where so
 many people live and so many people's
 17| livelihoods are at stake. The number of
 18| problems that has been spoken of at Plum Island,
 19| if that's not enough to scare the hell out of
 20| each and every one of y'all that are sitting
 21| there, then build it in your backyard.

22| I can help raise money for you to buy the
 23| land so you can put it near you since it's so
 3|2.0| safe. I don't believe it. I haven't believed
 it. You have not been forthcoming with all of

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's water supply concerns. The NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.13.8 describes the potential waste management options available to control and dispose of NBAF's liquid and solid wastes. The NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.7.7 describes potential water resources' affects including permitting and planning options available to prevent and mitigate potential spill and runoff affects.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government.

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3 cont. | the information. You have not followed the
2.0 | truth in lending, so to speak, to correspond or
| answer questions that these people have asked.

4 | And yet, you ask us to sit here blindly
25.3 | and believe that this is good for us. It's not.
| It's not good for anybody. And I stand behind
7 | Suzanne and anybody else in this country that
8 | before such a facility should be built where
9 | people are helpless, or have no say-so about it,
10 | I'll die first.

11 | You're going to kill me if you put it here
5 | eventually anyway. It only takes one human
21.3 | error for it to be devastating. And you want
| to put that off on the citizens who have worked
15 | and helped to build this country to make it what
16 | it was.

17 | Go back to Washington, and build it there.
18 | MS. COGHILL: Thank you. He's next.
19 | If you could wait just a second, that'd be
20 | great. Thank you.

21 | MR. JENKINS: My old feet are holding
22 | me up here. I'm Harold Jenkins. We've been
1 | here before. I don't have statistics and all
25.3 | the things that you need to look at to determine
| whether or not it should be here. We know it

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 21.3

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

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1 cont. | shouldn't.
25.3

What I want to tell you is, we've been
3 here before. Therma-Chem was putting a
4 hazardous waste incinerator out here, and we
5 stopped 'em. They left the state. The state
6 has lost -- it was either 3 or \$4,000,000, but
7 they left the state. And they had the
8 governor's backing on it.

9 I was in the room with the Council of
10 State when it was voted down, and they were
11 voted out. We stood in front of a drill bit
12 coming down like this (indicating) with blades
13 all around it. My wife was one of 'em. She
14 got hauled off in the prison bus -- if you don't
15 think we're serious -- as did a lot of these
16 people out here wearing GNAT shirts and some
17 others also -- and taken to Oxford to the
18 courthouse.

19 I went home and beat 'em there. It was
20 eight -- to be sure they got bailed out. I
21 didn't want to miss dinner. But we've -- we've

1 cont. | been here before. We know what to do and how
25.3 | to do it. And we want to do it the right way,
the American Way.

25 You're on our land. It belongs to the

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1 cont. | State, and we are the State. We ask you to
25.3 | leave. When I approached the building, I
thought it was kind of ironic cause it was two
4 policemen -- bless their heart, they have a
5 tough job out there.
6 Both of them were standing with their hand
7 on this pistol, and I spoke to one of 'em. I
8 said, "Hey, is it going to be tough inside
9 tonight? Both of you have got your pistol." He
10 said, "We use it as a rest." I said, good,
11 because I can remember the time that we followed
12 Therma-Chem and the authorities out to a kind of
13 desolate spot up a little path. The only way
14 to get back on four wheel drive.
15 And we walked up it, and that's where the
16 drill bit was. They wanted to test it. And we
17 were standing there, and my -- a bunch of men
18 said that -- they said, "Here come the Highway
19 Patrol." There were 20 cars out there, I would
20 estimate, when we come up.
21 And the Highway Patrol, they had their
22 masks down. They were in full battle gear.
23 They had -- were fully armed, and they were
24 going to keep the peace -- what they should do.
25 We had no quarrel with them. But I can tell

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1 you now, it's going to be a tough battle.

1 cont| It's going to be a tough battle. And in my
25.3 | opinion, which I have a right to express, you
| will lose. Thank you.

5 MS. QUICK: My name is Stacy Quick. I
6 didn't think I'd be speaking, because I'm really
7 nervous. But the one thing I've observed is
8 that all different types of people came up to
9 speak tonight, intelligent people, people with
10 degrees, normal people like me who don't have a
11 degree.

12 I don't have a job either. I'm a
13 home-school mom of an autistic son and my
14 daughter. But what upsets me is how much money
15 is being poured into this. And there's no
16 guarantee that it's going to be safe. And
17 there's so much other things that -- that need
18 attention and focus in this country.

19 And they can't even fix the environment
20 here as it now. There's already so much stuff
21 going on here depleting the environment. That's
22 what bothers me. The priorities are not right.
23 And until they get the priorities right, people
24 are going to be pretty much sacrificed.

25 MS. COGHILL: Thank you.

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the NBAF. The purpose and need for the proposed action is discussed in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS can not guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident. However, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, modern biosafety design substantially diminishes the chances of a release as the primary design goal is to provide an adequate level of redundant safety and biocontainment that would be integrated into every component of the building. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14.

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1 MR. COMBS: I don't know how many of
2 you people have ever worked in a laboratory.
3 Anybody? No. I've worked in labs for 40
4 years, basic research. Now, let me tell you
5 what can happen. The man said, the engineer,
6 about Murphy's Law. I was in the company and
7 was working with U-235.

8 And what happened was, I was elected to do
9 the first part of the experiment. I was also
10 on the safety committee that approved all this.
11 We had a nuclear regulatory agent there with us
12 to supervise and to see everything was
13 copastetic.

14 They went to eat, probably about from here
15 to the back of the room, in the cafeteria.
16 There was about 120 researchers in there. What
17 happened was, I was operating the experiment,
18 and watching the view and everything, and I had
19 a meter that measured temperature, 2000 degrees
20 Centigrade.

21 Then immediately, it went bang. I walked
22 out of there, and I had full gear on to protect
23 me from radiation. All I saw was smoke. I got
24 scared. I went out, walked over to the people.
25 They knew immediately when I got there something

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1 was wrong.

2 By the time it took me to go to the back
3 of the room and up here, this had gone through
4 ten inches of concrete, three inches of steel
5 subfloor, went into the basement. Now, you
6 could see this. You people can't see viruses.

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1|21.0 The only way you're going to know if a
virus has got out is when people start dying or
animals start dying, or people who shoot deer
and eat the deer and pick up this. That's the
only way you're going to know that you have a
containment problem, because you can't see what
you're working with.

It's in the microscopic -- down into the
nano-liters and lower to get into cells. So,
you're all sitting up here, having no laboratory
experience, and you're telling these people it's
safe. Let me tell you, Murphy's Law happened
with me in that experiment.

There were three other experiments that I
had -- to keep it short, something went wrong.
Two of 'em put me in the hospital. And I want
to say to you tonight, and I know it's going to
go wrong, and it went wrong. Nobody knows.
They even tried to duplicate one of the

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the impact of an pathogen release on the local population, livestock industry, businesses and infrastructure. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. The chances of an accidental release are low. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. The need for an evacuation under an accident conditions is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. Lastly, the Record of Decision would identify detection techniques, monitoring frequencies and enforcement programs for the control and regulation of releases from the facility.

The determination of criminal or civil liability arising from an accidental or intentional release of a pathogen is beyond the scope of this EIS. It is also not possible to accept or reject a claim for damages until the specific facts of an incident are known and the applicable local, state or Federal law is applied.

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1 experiments, and they couldn't. It just
2 happens. So, that's why I don't believe a word
3 you say.

4 MS. MUIR: My name is Melissa Muir.
5 And I live in Durham. Earlier, the gentleman
6 who was talking about the risks in the
7 Environmental Impact Statement -- I'm not a
8 scientist, and I don't know if I mis-heard. I'm
9 hoping he mis-spoke.

10 The Nipah virus is used to look at the
11 risk for all BSL-4 viruses, which y'all say
12 would be studied here -- so Nipah and the Hendra
13 virus. And I would like this answered in the
14 final Environmental Impact Statement. What you
15 said was that the Nipah virus -- "We do not
16 expect it to propagate at Butner because of the
17 lack of vectors."

18 And there's a packet of information that
19 y'all gave us, and I was reading through it as
20 you were saying this. Earlier in the very
21 beginning, when you talked about risks, you said
22 that common vectors were ticks and mosquitos.

23 I looked at this. This virus is -- or is
24 not known to cause disease in humans and pigs.
25 All four of these are things that are in

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentors concern. The fruit bat is the vector for Nipah virus, and fruit bats do not occur in North America. Therefore, the Nipah virus is not expected to propagate at Butner because of the lack of vectors.

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1 abundance around here. So, I'm not -- I don't
 2 understand how that's a low risk. And as if
 3 that -- that was concerning enough, but when I
 4 read further in the packet that you gave us, it
 5 says, "For the Nipah virus, the mode of
 6 transmission between animals and from animals to
 7 humans is uncertain."

1 cont. | So, I would like for you to explain where
 21.3 | you decided -- how you decided this was a low
 risk. Given that we have humans, pigs,
 11 | mosquitos and ticks, and you don't know how it's
 12 | transmitted. Thank you.

13 | MR. RHEW: I just have one simple
 14 | comment. You know, we cannot even trust you
 15 | guys to handle our security in our local
 16 | airports. What in the world makes you think we
 17 | can trust you to handle security for a magnitude
 18 | of this size?

19 | MS. COGHILL: Thank you.

20 | DR. MELAMED: I was a little
 21 | long-winded before, so I ran out of time. I
 22 | just wanted to make a couple of other comments
 23 | to finish what I had intended to say before.

1 | 23.0 | After reviewing some of the problems that have
 arisen in the past with Plum Island, I think

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the pathogens that would be studied in the NBAF. By definition and as identified in Section 1.1 of the NBAF EIS, BSL-4 facilities are specifically designed to safely handle exotic pathogens that pose a high risk of life threatening disease in animals and humans through the aerosol route and for which there is no known vaccine or therapy. It is because of the risks posed that the NBAF is needed in order to provide a modern, integrated high-containment facility to safely and effectively address the accidental or intentional introduction of animal diseases of high consequence into the United States.

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1 cont. | it's important to note that the facility that is
23.0 | planned for Butner is different, as was
3 | mentioned by one of the speakers.

4 | And the important distinction is that it's
5 | -- it's going to be a BSL-4 facility, which --
6 | although the -- it's been stressed that this
7 | facility is studying animal diseases, the -- the
8 | viruses that are studied in a BSL-4 facility are
9 | by definition lethal to humans.

10 | They are zoonotic viruses that can jump
11 | from animals to humans. And according to the
22.0 | National Institute of Biology and Infectious
13 | Disease, the organisms to be studied at the
14 | facility, the proposed Butner lab, would be,
15 | quote, "The most -- the world's most dangerous
16 | microbes; several capable of rapid widespread
17 | human depopulation."

18 | Now, this is a government organization that
19 | has been quoted as saying this. Some of these
20 | -- there's only one that I'm aware of in this
21 | category that has ever existed in the United
22 | States. And that's smallpox, which was
23 | eradicated decades ago.

24 | The others have never existed and never
25 | resulted in any fatalities in this country. So,

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Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 2.0

The NBAF's mission is defensive and would not involve offensive bioweapons research or development. The international treaty, known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, to which the United States is a signatory, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of such weapons. DHS's mission is to study foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The purpose of the NBAF would be to develop tests to detect foreign animal and zoonotic diseases and develop vaccines (or other countermeasures such as antiviral therapies) to protect agriculture and food systems in the United States.

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2 cont.

2.0

it's a little bit difficult to understand how these pose a threat to our food supply, except potentially from bio-terrorism. And I believe it's a bit disingenuous of the people who are proposing this laboratory who claim that this has nothing to do with bio-terrorism.

There are those of us who believe that that is the reason this is under the purview of Homeland Security, and that it concerns us that that information is being denied or diminished. The question of protecting the food supply is one that I think is -- should be of interest to us.

However, organisms such -- viruses such as Nipah and Hendra, which are extremely rare and have never existed in this hemisphere, I think logic will dictate that they pose less of a threat to our food supply than something like stemrust (phonetic), which is a fungus, which I learned about recently; which is the most -- according to the author of this article who's a Nobel Peace Prize Winner, a professor of the International -- International Agriculture at Texas A and M University, Dr. Berlog -- he says it's the most feared of all wheat diseases.

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2 cont. | The reason I bring it up is because
 2.0 | there's a new strain, which has emerged recently
 3 | in Africa and is now propagating around the
 4 | world, and is expected to come here to the
 5 | United States, which is resistant.

6 | And the government -- the State Department
 7 | has recommended ending American support to
 8 | international agriculture research centers that
 9 | will study the resistant strains to wheat rust.
 10 | I'm just wondering why -- if we don't seem to
 11 | care about something we know is coming, why are
 12 | we spending billions of dollars on studying
 13 | something that in all likelihood will never come
 14 | here?

15 | MS. COGHILL: Thank you very much. We
 16 | have about eight minutes before the close of the
 17 | meeting. I wanted to make sure that if there is
 18 | anyone who'd like to make a comment, that they
 19 | have time to do so now. I think we have time
 20 | for about one more person.

21 | MR. MILLER: Yes, ma'am. I just had a
 1|15.3 | question about landowners that have worked
 24 | really hard all their lives out here to have the
 25 | land that they do have now, and was wondering if
 this is going to drop the land value around the

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 15.3

The effects of the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative on housing is discussed in Section 3.10.7 of the NBAF EIS. As stated in the NBAF EIS, the housing market would be able to meet the increase in housing demand (326 employees in total), relative to the estimated growth of the existing population between 2007 and 2012 (188,278). It is possible that with the relocation of highly skilled workers to the immediate area, property values could increase due to an increase in demand, and there is no empirical evidence that a facility such as the NBAF would reduce property values in the study area. Therefore, the overall effect of the NBAF on housing market conditions would be negligible.

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1 cont. | area, you know, or how drastic would the drop --
15.3 | a drop it might be.

2 | And what's the -- what's the problem with
15.0 | sending it to a more remote area, such as, like,
New Mexico where there's already been tests
6 | going on, you know -- just somewhere else like
7 | that. And -- and that's all I have to say
8 | about it.

9 | MS. COGHILL: Thank you very much.

10 | MR. MILLER: Thank you.

11 | MR. COGHILL: At this time, I will
12 | turn the meeting over to Jamie.

13 | MR. JOHNSON: I want to thank you,
14 | again, everyone for coming, your comments,
15 | taking time out of your busy schedules. Many of
16 | you were with us in the afternoon. I have a
17 | lot of admiration and respect. We have heard
18 | you. We've heard your comments. Thank you for
19 | providing comments to help ensure that the
20 | environmental factors in the EIS are considered
21 | when we make a final decision whether or not to
22 | build the NBAF and if so, where.

23 | So, with that, I will leave this screen up
24 | here. And if you haven't made any comments
25 | tonight, you still have till August 25th. So,

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Comment No: 2Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. As described in Section 2.4.3 of the NBAF EIS, other potential locations to construct the NBAF were considered during the site selection process but were eliminated based on evaluation by the selection committee. It was suggested during the scoping process that the NBAF be constructed in a remote location such as an island distant from populated areas or in a location that would be inhospitable (e.g., desert or arctic habitat) to escaped animal hosts/vectors; however, the evaluation criteria called for proximity to research programs that could be linked to the NBAF mission and proximity to a technical workforce. The Plum Island Site is an isolated location as was suggested while still meeting the requirements listed in the EOI.

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1 if you think of more comments, feel free to make
2 them before August 25th. So, thank you, again,
3 for coming.

4 And with that, we will officially adjourn
5 the meeting. Thank you.

6 (Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned at 9:55
7 p.m.)

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NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY
DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (NBAF DEIS) MEETING
AFTERNOON SESSION
BUTNER, NORTH CAROLINA

PRESENTERS:

Mr. James Johnson, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Dr. Steve Kappes, U.S. Department of Agriculture
Mr. Chuck Pergler, Tetra Tech, Inc.

Moderator: Catherine Coghill

At Butner, North Carolina

Tuesday, July 29, 2008

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
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1 the mechanisms you see here on the slide, as
2 long as we receive them by August 25th. Thank
3 you.

4 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, Jamie. At
5 this time, that does conclude the presentation.
6 What we would like to do now is start the
7 question and answer portion of the meeting.
8 It's a 20-minutes portion of the meeting, and
9 it's for anyone that has one question regarding
10 the information that was presented.

11 So, if there's something you need
12 clarified that would help put your comments
13 together in a more clear manner, that would be
14 great. I want one very clear, direct question.
15 There are a lot of people who would like a lot
16 of information, and we want to make sure that
17 everybody gets that opportunity.

18 So, at this point in time, if there is a
19 question, and you'd like to be heard, please
20 state your name for the record, if you'd like;
21 and go ahead.

22 MS. SMITH: My name is Suzanne Smith.
23 I'm a resident of Creedmoor here in Granville
24 County. I understood that you'd like to have
25 some misinformation and oversights pointed out

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1 to you.

2 I notice that you still haven't updated the
1|23.0 list of diseases that will be studied here. I
4 notice that Avian Flu and Newcastle's Disease,
5 both level 4 diseases, are still not on your
6 chart even though I inquired about those at your
7 Washington meeting on Thursday.

8 I was wondering if you were going to
9 correct that oversight before tonight's meeting.

10 UNIDENTIFIED: I'd like to respond to
11 that. Avian Flu and Newcastle's Disease is not
12 a BSL-4. We currently work on those at our
13 Southeast Poultry Research Lab, a USDA facility
14 down in Athens, Georgia. We will use those
15 pathogens in training exercises --

16 MS. SMITH: So, you're saying --

17 UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible) --
18 they're not BSL-4; they're BSL-3.

19 MS. SMITH: So, the feasibility study
20 is incorrect then, and --

21 UNIDENTIFIED: No.

22 MS. SMITH: -- this will not be used?

23 UNIDENTIFIED: The feasibility study is
24 correct that we have will have no facility --
25 only for training purposes, not for research

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern that all possible pathogens to be studied at the NBAF are not listed in the NBAF EIS. The pathogens to be studied at the NBAF as provided in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS include Foot and Mouth Disease virus, Classical Swine Fever virus, Vesicular Stomatitis virus, Rift Valley Fever virus, Nipah virus, Hendra virus, and African Swine Fever virus. Should the NBAF be directed to study any pathogens not included in the list of pathogens included in the NBAF EIS, DHS and USDA would conduct an evaluate of the new pathogen(s) to determine if the potential challenges and consequences were bounded by the current study. If not, a new risk assessment would be prepared and a separate NEPA evaluation may be required.

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1 purposes.

1 cont. | MS. SMITH: So, there will be
23.0 | Newcastle Virus and Avian Flu Virus at the NBAF?

4 UNIDENTIFIED: Yes.

5 MS. SMITH: Thank you.

6 DR. PULLIE: My name is Dr. Dave

7 Pullie. I own a farm which happens to be the

8 nearest farm to the proposed facility. My

9 question is, you've operated from Plum Island

10 | for 54 years. Can you tell us what the rate of
11 | biocontainment failure was during those 54 years?

12 MS. COGHILL: Sir, I'd like to just
13 clarify that the questions are now just
14 pertaining to the presentation.

15 DR. PULLIE: Well, which part --

16 MS. COGHILL: Well, the presentation
17 we just --

18 DR. PULLIE: The presentation said

19 cont. | you'd been operating on Plum Island for 54
21.1 | years, and I'm asking how often biocontainment
20 | failed during those 54 years. It seems like a
21 | reasonable question.

22 UNIDENTIFIED: We'll turn this over to
23 Larry Barrett.

24 DR. BARRETT: Do you want me to speak

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 21.1

DHS notes the commentors question. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections for the Plum Island Animal Disease Center as well as from other facilities.

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1 at the microphone? (Addressing Court Reporter)

2 COURT REPORTER: I'm having a hard time
3 hearing either way. There's a reverberation or
4 something.

5 DR. BARRETT: I'm the Director there
6 at Plum Island, and we have had -- in the 54
7 years of operation, in 1978 we had an incident
8 -- one incident where animals were outside the
9 facility. (Unintelligible) For 35 years we had
10 no transmission during that time, but about 30
11 years ago in 1978, there was one incident where
12 it was transmitted, carried from the building.
13 So, we had one release in that facility in 54
14 years.

15 DR. PULLIE: It says the likelihood
16 (unintelligible).

17 DR. BARRETT: I'm sorry. I couldn't
18 understand you.

19 DR. PULLIE: The book says the
20 likelihood of biocontainment failure was about a
21 one in a hundred year event.

22 DR. BARRETT: What you've also got to
23 understand at the time, 30 years ago, the
24 filters and the different things we have today,
25 and the different things that will go in this

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 23.0

See response to previous comment. Also, see response in transcript by Dr. Barrett.

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1 new facility are completely different. So, it's
2 comparing something 30 years ago to today.

3 And at the same time, at that time, the
4 facility had animals outside of the facility.
5 So, you had staff going back and forth between.
6 In the new facility and in our current facility
7 at Plum Island, all the animals are maintained
8 at bio-level 3. So, there would be no animals
9 outside the facility which greatly reduces the
10 chance of transmission.

11 MS. COGHILL: Next question. What I'd
12 like to do is repeat the question after it's
13 asked. We're having a hard time hearing up
14 here. Thank you.

15 MR. MCKELLAR: My name is Bill
16 McKellar, and I have a question concerning the
17 Clarksville, Virginia location of a Department
18 of Homeland Security facility. I'd like to know
19 what is being done as far as what goes on at
20 that facility.

21 MS. COGHILL: The question is about the
22 facility in Clarksville and what is being done
23 in that facility.

24 MR. JOHNSON: Clarksville, North
25 Carolina?

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1 MR. McKELLAR: Virginia.

2 MR. JOHNSON: I'm not -- can you give
3 me any more details on --

4 MR. McKELLAR: It's a DHS facility in
5 Clarksville, Virginia. It has been under
6 construction more than year, and it is operating
7 under the Department of Homeland Security. And
8 out of curiosity, we'd like to find out what is
9 being planned at that facility?

10 MR. JOHNSON: I'm not familiar with
11 that facility.

12 MS. COGHILL: What we do -- this is on
13 the record, an if there's a question directly to
14 the presentation, we can address that in this
15 forum. Thank you, sir.

16 MR. McKELLAR: Thank you.

17 MS. COGHILL: Does anyone else have a
18 question at this point?

19 MS. HILL: My name is Rhonda Hill.
1|15.3 I'd like to know once and for all just how many
21 jobs are there going to be in this facility.
22 Everything I read -- the study says 250 to 350.
23 What you had up here on the screen just a few
24 minutes ago had up to 500 jobs. Where are in
25 the world -- I mean, you've danced around all

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's statement. The additional 200 jobs above the 250 to 350 jobs at the facility would be expected from new businesses which chose to locate in the community specifically because of NBAF operations.

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1 cont. | over the place. Don't you know how many people
15.3 | are going to be employed there? And as far as
3 | the Plum Island -- (unintelligible.)

4 | MS. COGHILL: The question to the
5 | panel is do you how many jobs will be involved.
6 | There seems to be different numbers. If that
7 | can be clarified, please.

8 | MR. JOHNSON: Yeah. The EIS has said
9 | 326 jobs. We've been given a range of 300 to
10 | 350 jobs for the facility. We don't know how
11 | many people from Plum Island -- no matter where
12 | the site, whether it's next door to Plum Island
13 | or on the mainland, we don't know how many
14 | people will actually transfer.

15 | We did try to estimate that, but no matter
16 | where it's sited, we have to fill a lot of the
17 | jobs from local communities. Currently, the
18 | scientists will be recruited not from the
19 | community but nationally. So, 326 jobs, as was
20 | said in the EIS for the facility.

21 | We suspect once the site is chosen, other
22 | small businesses may relocate to the area, and
23 | kind of piggyback off of that, and that's where
24 | you see the higher number. I think as Chuck
25 | said, 500 jobs, and that would be additional

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1 jobs.

2 MS. HILL: You're making the

1 cont| 15.3 supposition, then, that there's going to be an

4 additional 200 jobs that are ancillary jobs?

5 But you're going to have a cafeteria, so there's

6 not going to be people going to restaurants, you

7 know. I mean, that doesn't make any sense and

8 there's no explanation given, and I think it

9 should be clarified in your literature.

10 DR. HOLLAND: I have a question. My

11 name is Dr. Michael Holland. My question is,

12 where will science be in 20 years? I guess I

13 should ask the gentleman from the USDA or the

14 gentleman from the animal facility. Do you

1|23.0 gentlemen know where science will be in 20 years?

16 Twenty years ago when I was in school, I

17 don't think there's anything left in my science

18 book from school that still holds true. We

19 don't have the same perception of DNA. We don't

20 have the same perception of how it's a part of

21 our life on this planet that we had 20 years ago.

22 I think you both will agree with me that

23 you don't know where science will be in 20

24 years. The main reason for this lab is to study

25 -- in your words and in this report -- and I

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. As described in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's mission is to study foreign animal, zoonotic and emerging diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy.

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1 appreciate your presentation -- to study
2 diseases in animals. This research that is
3 being done here is creating life in a test tube.
4 The first chromosomes have been put into the
5 first bags of jelly and you're making life.

6 In 20 years there may be no need for animal
1 cont. | research of this kind; and, yet, this is a
23.0 |
8 50-year laboratory. Tell me where in this
9 presentation it says where science will be in --
10 I'm not even asking for a copy of the design.
11 I don't need to see a copy of your design for
12 that. You don't have it.

1 cont. | But tell me where science will be. Will
23.0 |
15 there be in your estimation a need for this
16 animal research in 20 years? If you can tell
17 me, yes, definitely, then you need to go right
18 now and start this lab because I'll fully back
19 you. If there's any hesitation on your part, I
20 think you need to reassess the need for this
21 facility 20 years out. So, that's my question
22 about the presentation. I look forward to the
23 comments here today.

23 UNIDENTIFIED: I can answer that
24 question. The answer is yes. One of the things
25 that we know, despite science changing very

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1 much, is that there will always be a need to
 2 study diseases -- emerging diseases. So, I can
 3 say with complete confidence that there will be
 4 a need for this lab in 20 years.

5 DR. HOLLAND: Thank you.

6 UNIDENTIFIED: Thank you.

7 MS. COGHILL: Thank you very much.

8 The next question, please? Just as a reminder,
 9 we are halfway through the question and answer
 10 period.

11 MR. KRABBE: My name is David Krabbe.

1|15.0 In appendix C when y'all refer to 600
 researchers, am I correct it's two to one ratio
 14 of support staff to researchers? That told me
 15 you will have 1,800 people in this facility?
 16 And in some of the drawings, there was reference
 2|26.0 to a head count. Is this another one of the
 mistakes in the EIS, or are you just not
 19 leveling with us and planning on, you know,
 20 tripling it?

21 MS. COGHILL: The question is to
 22 verify -- your question is --

23 MR. KRABBE: Are there going to be
 1 cont. |
 15.0 | 1,800 people working at this facility in the
 25 | future?

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 15.0

DHS notes the commentor's observation regarding the number of researchers but the commentor's conclusion is not accurate. Appendix E, Section E.4 of the NBAF EIS includes discussion of a scenario which in part considers a figure of approximately 600 NBAF staff. This conservative scenario was used to provide for bounding case results in demonstrating failure probabilities over the life of the NBAF rather than to reflect proposed staffing levels. As noted in Section 2.2.2.1, the proposed NBAF would employ between 250 and 350 workers at the facility once it becomes operational.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. The actual number of permanent NBAF jobs has not yet been determined; however, the number used in the socioeconomic analysis (326) was used by DHS to estimate operating costs for the NBAF.

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1 MS. COGHILL: Okay. What is the
2 number of people that will be working in the
3 NBAF facility in the future.

4 MR. JOHNSON: The EIS says 326 actually
5 employed in there, and we give a range of 300
6 to 350. The EIS says 326.

1 cont. | MR. KRABBE: In appendix C you refer
15.0 | to 600 researchers.

9 UNIDENTIFIED: Have you read the DEIS?

10 MS. COGHILL: Sir, we appreciate your
11 comments, but --
12 (Members of the audience interpose and everyone
13 talks over one another.)

14 MR. KRABBE: If you have the
15 information, I'd like for you to address it.

16 MR. JOHNSON: We can do that.

17 MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Yes, ma'am.

18 MS. HOULIK: My name is Lisa Houlik, a
19 statement was made before that there was only one
20 incident in 1978 at Plum Island. And we
21 actually went to the DEIS, and in appendix B
22 under release incidents, there are listed nine.

1|21.1 | Could you explain to me why only one in 1978 is
25 | considered a release incident, and the nine in
appendix B have not been included?

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 21.1

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the number of incidents of pathogen release from PIADC operation on Plum Island. Appendix B of the NBAF EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections in the United States and world-wide. Of the nine FMD incidents at PIADC since 1954, only the one accident in 1978 resulted in the release of FMD from the biocontainment facility. The remainder of the incidents at the PIADC were cases of cross-contamination and did not result in the release of a pathogen outside the containment of the laboratory.

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1 MS. COGHILL: The question for
2 clarification purposes is there's one accident
3 that was noted in 1978 that was considered, and
4 there are nine in appendix B that were noted as
5 a release.

6 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, I think as Dr.
7 Barrett indicated, we had one release in 1978.
8 In the other cases, I think they were referred
9 to as cross-contaminations. They never got out
10 of the laboratory. They stayed in the
11 laboratory. They're not considered a release in
12 the laboratory. Dr. Barrett, do you want to
13 clarify that?

14 DR. BARRETT: Yes. There were
15 actually seven cross-contaminations in the
16 laboratory. This would be a situation where you
17 had an animal in one room, and then through a
18 leak or something it was released across the
19 room or something like that. That's considered
20 a cross-contamination. You know, the agent was
21 released within the facility, but we didn't have
22 a release out of the facility there. That's the
23 importance about the facility of a box in a box.
24 So, this occurred in a containment area, and
25 they had a take another shower and go to another

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1 room and get out of that room, and then get out
2 of that room.

3 So, there were seven of those that
4 occurred over the last 50 years.

5 MS. HOULIK: You're saying there were
6 cross-contaminations, and they did not at least
7 find another alternative route outside of the
8 lab? So, this was one in '78 that was an
9 outside release.

10 UNIDENTIFIED: (Unintelligible.)

11 MS. HOULIK: And is there any way to
12 categorize this as a human error from a
13 technical error? Well, I can go back and look
14 at the DIES. Thank you.

15 MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Folks,
16 there's just a few minutes left for Q and A, so
17 please go ahead and pose your question and be
18 respectful of the person behind you.

19 MS. HUTCHBY: My name is Elizabeth
20 Hutchby. I'm from Cary, North Carolina. And my
21 story is that when my son was doing a Boy Scout
22 project, he decided to be a beekeeper. And you
23 should have seen the mail carrier the day that
24 the bees came to our house in a box.

1|17.3 | And my question to you is this: how

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 17.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the handling and transport of packages containing pathogens. The regulations governing the required NBAF handling and transport of packages containing pathogens and a discussion of the low risk associated with the shipment of infectious materials is provided in Section 3.11.9 of the NBAF EIS. Additionally, an analysis of accidental releases during transportation is provided in the NBAF EIS under Section 3.14, Health and Safety. Information regarding the existing road conditions and potential effects to traffic and transportation from the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative is provided in Section 3.11.7 of the NBAF EIS.

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1 cont. | exactly will the packages be handled as they are
17.3 | transported, and who signs off for these? How
3 | are they received?

4 | MS. COGHILL: The question is how will
5 | the packages be handled.

6 | UNIDENTIFIED: I'll turn that over to
7 | my USDA colleague. He's senior veterinarian at
8 | Plum Island -- Bill White.

9 | DR. WHITE: Were they overseas
10 | shipments of these bees or --

11 | MS. HUTCHBY: I don't think it matters
1 cont. | whether it's overseas or not. I mean, how is it
17.3 | handled? If I'm not properly trained, and I
13 | don't know what's in the box, and I'm the postal
14 | -- is it actually coming through the mail, or --
15 |

16 | DR. WHITE: No.

17 | MS. HUTCHBY: -- or is it via
1 cont. | airplane? You know, let's just be very specific
17.3 | about who signs off on it and who is responsible
19 | for it.
20 |

21 | DR. WHITE: Agents that we get from
22 | overseas, they are shipped by international
23 | airlines that are approved. They have to go
24 | through this International Transport Association
25 | regulations in order to be packaged. So, the

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1 contents have to be described, and then they are
2 sent only to a few -- first of all, you're
3 issued an import/export permit by the USDA, and
4 it can only be shipped to a few international
5 airports mainly in the New York City area.

6 So, when we issue the permit, we know when
7 the plane is coming in. We're there to greet
8 the package and take it through Customs and
9 Border Patrol. From that point on, the package
10 which is very safely packed -- you know, it's a
11 combination of a very sturdy box with the sample
12 inside a container, inside a secondary
13 container, inside the primary container.

14 Anyway, this package is put inside one of
15 our courier vehicles and is transported by
16 certified couriers from, say, JFK Airport to
17 Plum Island. Now, these courier vehicles are
18 hardened. These vehicles actually have cages
19 inside. So, no one can just reach through the
20 window or open the door and take a box. Okay?

21 Number two, these vehicles all have GPS
22 units in them. So, whenever a courier goes to
23 JFK to pick up a box, they are monitored in
24 real time by GPS and also by cell phone.

25 MS. HUTCHBY: So, if you bring 'em to

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1 North Carolina, how -- how do you get --

2 DR. WHITE: How do we get them to North

3 Carolina?

4 MS. HUTCHBY: Yes.

5 DR. WHITE: Well, they'd be flown into

6 Raleigh to the airport, and then in the same way

7 as at JFK with courier vehicles with certified

8 drivers. There would be no difference here as

9 is now currently being done in New York.

10 MS. HUTCHBY: Thank you very much.

11 DR. WHITE: Yes.

12 MS. COGHILL: Last question.

13 MS. AUSTIN: Mary Austin, and I'm from

14 Butner and also with GNAT. In looking at your

15 presentation, you said you looked at air

16 quality, infrastructure, traffic and

17 transportation and visual. In your draft and in

18 your presentation, you did not note public

19 support. At the scoping session that you

1|4.0 conducted, part of your decision reads public

support.

2|26.0 I think that is a very major part that was

overlooked in your EIS draft, sir. Do you have

24 any reason why that was not commented on in the

25 five sites that you're looking at, including

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 4.0

Community acceptance (public support) is addressed in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. Several factors will affect the decision on whether or not NBAF is built, and, if so, where. The NBAF EIS itself will not be the sole deciding factor. The decision will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commenter's concern that DHS has not considered public support in preparation of the NBAF EIS. Several factors will affect the decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where. The EIS itself will not be the sole deciding factor. The decision will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in section 2.3.1; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment. While public support will be part of the decision making process, the NEPA process requires that the public be informed of the proposed action and is provided with a mechanism to provide comments. DHS is committed to providing public access to pertinent information. To date, DHS has provided two opportunities for the public to provide comment and input to the environmental impact analyses presented in the NBAF EIS. An initial scoping comment period of 60 days followed the issuance of a Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS. Once a draft of the EIS was published, another notice was issued that provided 60 days for comment. DHS accepted comments submitted by various means: mail, toll-free telephone and fax lines, NBAF Web page, and public meetings. DHS gave equal consideration to all comments, regardless of how or where they were received. All comments received during the public comment periods have been considered in this NBAF EIS.

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1 cont. | Plum Island?
4.0 |

2 MS. COGHILL: The question is the EIS
3 looked at the all of the resources like air
4 quality, and the question was posed as to where
5 does public support for that facility fall into
6 the analysis.

7 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you for the
8 question. We -- it's part of the process that
9 we tracked all the comments and input as part of
10 the scoping period at all the sites. And it's
11 not just comments made at these meetings. We
12 also get comments from other mechanisms, from
13 members of the public, stakeholders, local
14 political boards, state and local officials and
15 universities.

16 We look at all of the comments, and
17 certainly we look at the comments that are for
18 and against, but it's much more than that. We
19 also want to understand what people are thinking
20 in terms of the facility and the EIS, itself.

21 So, it was not an intentional thing to
22 omit that, and that is part of the ongoing
23 process. I will say that North Carolina has
24 been one of the more active sites, and I
25 personally appreciate getting peoples' input in

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1 meetings such as these.

2 So, it's something that we track very
3 closely, and we're going through the process
4 now. It's a consideration, along with other
5 factors like safety and health, cost and public
6 input. It's all considered as part of the
7 overall decision making process.

8 MS. AUSTIN: Thank you.

9 MS. COGHILL: All right. That --

10 UNIDENTIFIED: I have another follow-up
11 question. This lady had to sit down. She was
12 running out of energy. I respect your time and
13 I respect your patience. Let me ask a follow-up
14 question for this lady.

15 | She'd like to know from the good
16 | veterinarian about what happens if that plane
17 | that's flying into RDU crashes?
18 (The audience applauds and the remainder of what
19 the speaker said was unintelligible.)

20 UNIDENTIFIED: Maybe she will come and
21 ask herself. Yes, here she is.

22 MS. HUTCHBY: About the packages, it
23 is very much a concern, obviously, as to what
24 would happen. All of you should be concerned
25 about it too. And since you are -- (audience

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 17.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding accidents that occur during the handling and transport of packages containing pathogens. The general regulations governing the required NBAF handling and transport of packages containing pathogens, and a discussion of the low risk associated with the shipment of infectious materials is provided in Section 3.11.9 of the NBAF EIS. Section 2.2.2.3 provides detailed information on the handling and transport of packages containing pathogens. Additionally, an analysis of accidental releases under several different transportation scenarios is provided in the NBAF EIS under Section 3.14, Health and Safety.

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1 applauds and the remainder of what the speaker
2 said was unintelligible.)

3 MS. COGHILL: We're having a hard time
4 hearing. So, if you can be very direct with your
5 question, we can get to that.

6 MS. HUTCHBY: Do you have a question
7 about the question? (Audience laughs.)

8 MS. COGHILL: I'm sorry?

1 cont| UNIDENTIFIED: What happens if the
17.3
10 plane or the truck crashes?

11 MS. COGHILL: Okay. The question is
12 what if the vehicle that's transporting -- truck
13 or plane -- what if that crashes with a package.

14 MR. JOHNSON: Bill White will take
15 that.

16 DR. WHITE: Thank you, ma'am. If the
17 vehicle crashes, inside the vehicle in the trunk
18 are disinfectants and cleanup things. So,
19 that's one mitigation. If an airplane crashes,
20 boy, as far as what we would do? If it's out
21 at sea, of course, it's not a real risk; but if
22 it happens here, then you have to go through a
23 risk assessment process.

24 MS. COGHILL: We have people signed up
25 for 2:30, so we do need to open it up to the

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1 formal comment process. At this point in time,
 2 ladies and gentlemen, we are at the formal
 3 comment portion. And I have with me the sheet
 4 of folks that signed in with the time that they
 5 would like to speak. It's very important that
 6 we respect the person speaking, and also that
 7 you respect the folks that are listening. What
 8 you have to say is important, so respect one
 9 another.

10 Again, each person has three minutes to
 11 speak. And what we'll do is when there's two
 12 minutes and 30 seconds lapsed, I'll hold up the
 13 yellow card just to help the person who is
 14 speaking; and at the three minute mark, the red
 15 card.

16 So, at this time, would Christopher Tiffany
 17 come to the microphone?

18 MR. TIFFANY: I'm Chris Tiffany. I'm
 19 from Durham. Have you been bitten by a mosquito
 20 yet this year? Many bio-weapons agents like
 21 yellow fever, dengue, hemorrhagic, whooping
 22 cough, all used by U.S. para-military to infect
 23 African Americans can be spread by mosquitoes;
 24 and practically all modern biological weapons
 25 agents are or were animal diseases.

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentors concern. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

DHS notes the commentor's views on risk. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen.

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the NBAF. The purpose and need for the proposed action is discussed in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS can not guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident. However, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.1, modern biosafety design substantially diminishes the chances of a release as the primary design goal is to provide an adequate level of redundant safety and biocontainment that would be integrated into every component of the building. A discussion of human health and safety is included in Section 3.14.

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1 cont. |
21.3

Highly contagious Swine fever and diseases
like Syphilis used in the infamous Tuskegee
experiment can infect the brain. Experiments
indicate that animals other than pigs can be
infected. Symptoms include sudden death with
few prior signs.

North Carolina with the densest pig
population in North America -- more pigs than
people -- with various mosquitoes breeding most
months of the year means North Carolina is the
most dangerous of the proposed sites to bring
airborne and insect-spread disease agents which
like Swine Flu can kill pigs and/or people.

The Japanese Encephalitis Virus causes brain
swelling, and may progress to paralysis,
seizures, coma and death. Approximately
one-third of human cases die. A human death
rate of one-third is described as only a
moderate death rate. And another one-third
develop long-term neurologic disease.

Foot and Mouth Disease Virus, the most
infectious agent known to modern science, can be
spread by -- can be carried by air for 40 miles
or more. Economic costs of an accidental
release of this virus from the North Carolina

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1 cont.]
21.3

site are estimated in the billions of dollars,
more than other proposed sites.

3 The release of Foot and Mouth Disease
4 stolen from the U.K. National Bio-Agro facility
5 cost \$16,000,000,000, more than the U.S. and
6 South Africa anthrax attacks.

7 Far more dangerous than the accidental,
8 oops, spread of West Nile Virus from New York is
9 another disease spread by mosquitoes, Rift
10 Valley Fever Abortion Virus which results in
11 abortion of virtually 100% of fetuses and nearly
12 that level of mortality in newborns and young.
13 Often an RVF, Rift Valley Fever Virus outbreak
14 is presaged by a sudden increase in unexplained
15 abortions.

16 Durham with a population of about a
17 quarter of a million is walking distance from
18 the Umstead site. In addition, other animals
19 such as squirrels and field mice help -- could
20 help spread the Rift Valley Fever Abortion
21 Virus, which like pneumonic plague, Foot and
22 Mouth Disease, Anthrax and Smallpox can be
23 spread by air.

24 And with Rift Valley Fever, there is a risk
25 of it becoming established in the environment;

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1 cont. and the proposed North Carolina site being more
21.3 prone to epidemic and endemic spread of Rift
3 Valley Fever Virus than any other site according
4 to the Environmental Impact Statement.

2|2.0 The other problem peculiar to the proposed
North Carolina site is the fact that if built
7 here, knowing our history and current secret
8 abuse of prisoners, the entire world will
9 reasonably suspect that the U.S. para-military
10 and other agencies will again be tempted to use
11 adult and under-age, mostly black captives as
12 human guinea pigs.

13 Why else would a bio-terror R and D lab be
14 built at the highest risk site surrounded by
15 thousands of mostly non-Aryan prisoners and
16 mental patients? That is the feature peculiar
17 to this particular site.

18 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, sir. Terry
19 Turner?

20 MR. TURNER: My name is Terry Turner.
21 I live down the street. I'm glad to see the
1|4.0; whole town of Butner. You've been tooting your
2|26.0 own horn of what a good job you've done with
24 your impact statement, but it fails miserably to
25 answer the central questions.

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 4.0

DHS notes the commentors statements.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS prepared the NBAF EIS in accordance with the provisions of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and CEQ's regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1500 et seq.). The primary objective of the EIS is to evaluate the environmental impacts of the no action and site alternatives for locating, constructing and operating the NBAF. As summarized in Section 3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS analyzed each environmental resource area in a consistent manner across all the alternatives to allow for a fair comparison among the alternatives. The proximity of institutionalized populations to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative was considered in the preparation of the NBAF EIS as was the potential effects of a release of foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus at all sites (see Section 3.8.9, Section 3.10.9, Section 3.14, and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS for economic, biological, and health and safety effects of FMD virus release). Section 3.3.7 of the NBAF EIS evaluates the baseline infrastructure and effects of the proposed NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative that identifies infrastructure upgrades needed to support the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. As described in Chapter 1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's mission is to study foreign animal, zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) and emerging diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. The NBAF would enable research on the transmission of these animal diseases and support development of diagnostic tests, vaccines, and antiviral therapies for foreign animal, zoonotic and emerging diseases. By proposing to construct the NBAF, DHS is following policy direction established by the Congress and the President.

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3|20.3 For instance, it fails to even address the
 institutional population that lives near the
 3 proposed site. And coming up here today, I had
 4 a doe -- a deer run in front of us. They're
 5 that plentiful around here.

4|23.0 So, why do you want to go against the
 time-tested wisdom of doing Foot and Mouth
 8 research with added layers to protect us?
 9 Denmark and Germany do theirs on an island.
 10 Australia contracts theirs out to a foreign
 11 country, and Canada does theirs where there are
 12 no susceptible animals. And early on, I asked
 4 cont| how you will contain the mosquitoes. Well,
 23.0| apparently, you do it with aerial spray of
 15 insecticides; and I'm sure those insecticides
 16 are as safe as DDT was and Agent Orange.

5|8.3 And, finally, other sites have been
 rejected due insufficient infrastructure and
 19 lack of community support. Well, from your
 20 DEIS, Butner's infrastructure is in last place
 21 among your sites; and contrary to what the
 6|25.3 Consortium tells you, we do not want the NBAF in
 23 our community.

24 MS. COGHILL: The next speaker -- is
 25 Mike here -- Mike Holland.

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Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 20.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14 of the Draft EIS. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding safe facility operations. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. All animal holding areas would be inside the facility and all infected animals would be maintained in the appropriate biosafety level containment areas.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 8.3

DHS notes the commentor's statement. As summarized Section 3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS analyzed each environmental resource area in a consistent manner across all the alternatives to allow for a fair and objective comparison among the alternatives. DHS has identified its Preferred Alternative in Section 2.6 in accordance with Council on Environmental Quality regulations (40 CFR 1502.14(e)) for implementing NEPA. The Preferred Alternative is one that an agency believes would best fulfill its statutory mission and responsibilities, giving consideration to economic, environmental, technical, and other factors. Several factors will affect the decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where. The NBAF EIS itself will not be the sole deciding factor. The decision will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment. The DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology Jay M. Cohen, with other department officials, will consider the factors identified above in making final decisions regarding the NBAF. A Record of Decision that explains the final decisions will be made available no sooner than 30 days after the NBAF Final EIS is published.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 DR. HOLLAND: Thank you, ma'am. Thank
2 you all for being here. My degree is in
3 environmental toxicology and oncology in cancer
4 research, but I'm a father in Alamance County,
5 and that becomes much more important.

6 I'd like to see from this crowd a show of
7 hands all who are against the location of this
8 bio-disease lab in this area. Get your hands up
9 in the air. (Audience responds.) And I'd like
10 the press to get a photograph of that. Thank
11 you very much.

12 I spoke with Randy Janke on the DEIS
13 committee -- I appreciated this time very much
14 -- scientist to scientist. I also spoke with
15 Chuck, and I thank you for your time. We all
16 agreed that long-term management is the key risk
17 factor in this facility with complex systems
18 like this and any system like this.

19 Lack of diligence over time by managers is
20 what causes the accidents like the releases at
21 Los Alamos and Plum Island's releases. The
22 space shuttle falls out of the sky every 50
23 flights, not because of the lack of diligence of
24 the astronauts. It's the lack of diligence of
25 managers, not the people who put the glue in but

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement regarding the importance of long term management to the safety of the NBAF operation. DHS would maintain the NBAF and ancillary facilities in compliance with applicable environmental, safety, and health requirements and provide adequate funding for safe operation, long-term management and long-term maintenance.

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1 the people who inspect it.

2|2.0 And who oversees those managers in this
 3 situation? Who oversees the private
 4 contractors? DHS, Department of Homeland
 5 Security. So, we both agree as scientists that
 6 management gets lax, and management is in charge
 7 of oversights, and oversight in this case is
 8 politicized.

9 DHS is a new agency. It is at the mercy
 10 of the political winds. They will change very
 11 soon. Your window of opportunity is closing at
 12 DHS.

13 Jamie, you've about what? To January?
 14 Make it happen between now and then. And I
 15 know that this selection process is basically
 16 just a sham. The site selection has already
 17 been done. This is the site that you have
 18 selected. You've proved it by coming here first
 19 and -- just a moment. (Addressing Ms. Coghill.)

20 cont. |2.0 DHS, we do not trust you. It's not
 21 individually. Individually, you are good
 22 people. The scientists have done a great job.
 23 Thank you for your time and your commitment to
 24 doing this process, and I know you've got other
 25 sites to go to.

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Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS state that the specific objective of the hazard identification is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Appendix B describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF then site-specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed the NBAF. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS.

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1 But we don't trust the organization DHS.

2 That is the key issue in this argument, trust.

2 cont. | As a scientist to another scientist, I trust Mr.
21.0; | Janke. I trust Chuck, and I trust you, Jamie,
3|25.3 | as an individual. I don't trust the
6 organization. Stay out of my state.

7 MS. HOLT: My name is Betty Holt and
8 I'm from Franklinton, North Carolina. I'm a
9 retired senior planner and have worked with
10 sites of different kinds for quite some time.

11 My main theme for being here is -- I'm not
12 a scientist, and I don't have all the knowledge
13 that many people that's spoke does have. I am

1|19.3; | concerned about Murdoch, the children that are
2|15.3 | there and -- (interruption by audience applause).
14

16 If you all have never experienced working
17 with mentally handicapped people, if there is a
18 hazardous spill or something, those children --
19 and they are children to us -- they do not
20 understand. They're a group of people that
21 cannot be hurried and moved to anywhere, and it
22 would be total chaos.

23 I'm also concerned about the prisons, the
24 youth center and so forth that's here. Has
25 anybody made a survey of the number of people

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS is aware of the presence of area's the health and correctional facilities, as described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are well aware of the proposed action. Should the NBAF Record of decision call for the design, construction and operation of the NBAF, a site-specific emergency management plan would be developed that would be coordinated with the local emergency response agencies and would include contingency plans for potentially affected residents and institutions.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS is aware of the presence of the health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are well aware of the proposed action. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 cont. | that are here that absolutely cannot get away?
 19.3; |
 2 cont. |
 15.3 | And another thing that bothers me is that
 3 | working in any program that I worked in, the
 4 | environmental impact study always seem to lean
 5 | to the people who want it, and I'm saying that
 6 | from a planner's view, and it -- it's bothering
 7 | me; but I've seen that for 25 years. And I do
 8 | hope that you would take this into consideration.
 9 | Another thing is if you go out west,
 3|5.0; | there's millions and millions of acres of land
 2 cont. |
 15.3 | out there where there's nothing that it can
 12 | affect. Why not consider something like that
 13 | than putting it here with a group of people that
 14 | can't help themselves?
 15 | I just pray that you all will think about
 16 | this. And, again, this is not scientific. This
 17 | is from the heart. Thank you.
 18 | MS. COGHILL: Garland Walker?
 19 | MR. WALKER: My name is Garland
 20 | Walker. I live here in Butner. My wife and I
 21 | have lived here approximately 33 years. We both
 22 | have retired from the State and working directly
 23 | and indirectly with the patients.
 1|20.3; | This has been mentioned already, but I'd
 2|19.3 | like to give some numbers on this. The number

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 20.3

DHS notes the commentor's statement. DHS is aware of and has considered the presence of the health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern about the human health and safety of the surrounding institutional residents. Chapter 3, Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. A site-specific emergency response plan would be developed and coordinated with the local emergency management plan and individual facility plans regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF, and which would include stipulations for all special-needs populations.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 cont. | of residents that are institutionalized in
20.3; |
2 cont. | Butner are approximately 7,500, seven thousand
19.3 |
4 | five hundred. This will be the approximate
5 | number when the patients from Dorothea Dix in
6 | Raleigh are brought to the new facility here --
7 | 7,500 patients.

7 | Two of the major institutions, Murdoch and
3|25.3 | John Umstead Hospital, the patient advocates
10 | there have already sent letters in opposition to
11 | this facility being built in Butner.

11 | I think that there's been more interest or
12 | more importance put on animals that it has been
13 | human beings. We live here. We've lived here
14 | for many years, as I mentioned. It's a loving
15 | community. It's a working community, and we
16 | don't want to see it here. We don't really want
4|5.0 | to see it anywhere, but definitely we do not
17 | want it here.

17 | We've got these people that could not be
2 cont. | evacuated, and it's not if there will be a
19.3 | spill; it's when. That always comes about at
21 | some point in time. So, we've got 7,500 people
22 | that we couldn't do anything with.
23 |

3 cont. | Also, my final question is, how many of
25.3 | you would like to have it in your neighborhood?

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Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 Let's see your hands.

2 MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Sandra Batey
3 is next to speak.

4 MS. BATEY: Hello. My name is Sandra
5 Batey, and I just moved here from California.
6 We picked Butner because it could be a nice,
7 little community where we could buy a house, put
8 down roots and see my grandchildren grow.

1|25.3: But if y'all put this facility here, we
2|21.3 won't buy here. We don't want to put the
11 children in the path of something that you
12 cannot guarantee will not cause total fatalities
13 to everybody here. You could wipe out the major
14 food source for the whole United States. It's
3|5.0 on an island where there are no people. You
need to leave it there. Thank you.

17 MS. COGHILL: John Pike.

18 MR. PIKE: Hello. My name is John
1|25.3 Pike. I live in Mecklenburg County in the State
of Virginia, and we don't want you near us
21 either. I assume there's nobody else from
22 Virginia, so I'm speaking for the entire state.

23 I practice law in Oxford. I live in
24 Virginia. I love Granville County; and, again,
25 I'd like to -- I spoke to you at the first

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the consequences from an NBAF accident. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

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2|19.3; meeting, the scoping meeting, I think is what
3|20.3 you called it. And I mentioned to you that
3 Murdoch Center is -- I'm going to be repetitive,
4 but that hospital is about six blocks this way
5 and about a mile or maybe a mile and a half
6 downwind of your facility.
7 Now, again, these patients can't be moved;
8 and, yet, you said -- you said, number one, that
9 you were going to listen to us in the scoping
10 meeting; and you apparently just ignored that
11 reality.
12 There's absolutely nothing -- none of you
13 gentlemen addressed the issue of what would
14 happen if a rumor of a spill or a release
15 started. That's all it would take for these
16 people to die. And I'm not exaggerating.
17 They can't be moved. The employees
2cont.| wouldn't come to work justifiably because they
19.3; would be in fear, and you have done nothing to
3 cont.| address that. You need to correct it. You
20.3 need to emphasize it. It is the -- those
4|26.0 patients at Murdoch are the most important, most
significant issue, and you have ignored it
24 during this entire process. Correct the problem.
25 You say there's been no favoritism. I

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Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS is aware of the presence of the mental health facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the mental health facilities, are well aware of the proposed action. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14 and Appendix E. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site, specific protocols and emergency plans would be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would include stipulations for any special-needs populations, including institutionalized populations. The need for an evacuation under accident conditions is considered to be very low probability event. An evacuation would not be necessary if FMDV were accidentally released from NBAF, since FMDV is not a public health threat. An FMDV release would not impact the health and safety of special-needs populations.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 20.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern that NBAF operations could result in an accident. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Once the ROD has been signed and prior to the initiation of NBAF operations, a site-specific emergency management plan will be developed that will be coordinated with the local Emergency Management Officer and will include contingency plans for potentially affected residents and institutions.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns. The NBAF EIS was prepared to provide a thorough analysis of the aspects of NBAF construction and operations at the six site alternative locations. The potential impacts of NBAF operations on environmental resources, health and safety, and on local transportation are discussed in Chapter 3 of the NBAF EIS.

DHS is aware of the presence of the health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are aware of the proposed action. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated and are presented in Section 3.14. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives.

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1 don't recall any of you gentleman calling me.
 2 It appears in your Environmental Impact
 3 Statement that you called every economic
 4 development type in the entire free world, and
 5 -- (Interruption as audience applauds.)

6 I'm a lawyer. I own several businesses.
 7 I'm a developer. I'm also an organic farmer,
 8 and you can't sit here and tell me that that
 9 facility will not adversely -- terribly,
 10 significantly, extraordinarily adversely affect
 11 the value of economic situation; and, yet, you
 12 didn't even ask.

13 cont. | You didn't ask about health and safety for
 14 19.3 | Murdoch. You say you're not prepared for
 15 unexpected pathogens; and, yet, as this one
 16 gentlemen said, in the next 20 years, there will
 17 be many unexpected pathogens, zoonotic and
 18 otherwise. And you will be restricted in your
 19 invitation of those pathogens only by your
 20 mission.

21 In other words, if it's something that
 22 President whoever wants to study, this is where
 23 it's going to be studied; and, yet, you failed
 24 to tell that to us also.

25 You told us finally after we demanded that

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Comment No: 5

Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's statement regarding economic effects. The number of short-term and permanent jobs that would be directly and indirectly created by NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site are discussed in Section 3.10.7 of the NBAF EIS. DHS is not aware of any historical evidence that a biological research facility adversely affects the local economy. On the contrary, operations and maintenance of the facility and household spending by its employees generates a positive economic impact. In addition, research facilities typically stimulate the formation of other high tech establishments in the surrounding region and can serve as engines of economic growth.

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6|20 |there are 55 pathogens at Plum Island; and, yet,
 | you still will not identify them. You are
 3 | limited only by your mission, and your mission
 4 | will include zoonotic, deadly human pathogens.

1 cont. |
 25.3 | Go away.

6 | MS. COGHILL: John Monroe.

7 | MR. MONROE: My name is John Monroe.

8 | I live in Bahama which is a town a couple of
 | miles from the site. I read the DEIS and found
 1|26.0 | the following omissions. I'd like to see them
 11 | addressed in the final document.

12 | There's an omission of any analysis of the
 1 cont. | economic impact of local businesses closed who
 26.0; | choose to relocate, the loss of sales tax
 2|15.3 | revenues, reduction of purchases from local
 15 | vendors and local businesses and a negative
 16 | impact as the employment pool degrades as the
 17 | most qualified employees choose to accept jobs
 18 | without the additional risk of working near the
 19 | NBAF.

21 | As less qualified workers assume these job
 22 | positions, work productivity declines which is a
 23 | force of economic loss. In addition, there is
 24 | no analysis of how many companies may choose not
 25 | to locate their company in a nearby corporate

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns. The NBAF EIS was prepared to provide a thorough analysis of the aspects of NBAF construction and operations at the six site alternative locations. The potential impacts of NBAF operations on environmental resources, health and safety, and on local transportation are discussed in Chapter 3 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's statement regarding economic effects. The number of short-term and permanent jobs that would be directly and indirectly created by NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site are discussed in Section 3.10.7 of the NBAF EIS. DHS is not aware of any historical evidence that a biological research facility adversely affects the local economy, including business development and retention. On the contrary, operations and maintenance of the facility and household spending by its employees generates a positive economic impact. In addition, research facilities typically stimulate the formation of other high tech establishments in the surrounding region and can serve as engines of economic growth.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government.

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1 cont. |
26.0; | park, Treyburn, due to its close vicinity to the
2 cont. | 15.3 | lab.

1 cont. | Number two: the omission of any mention
26.0; |
3|23.0 | of the 50 plus exotic viruses and diseases that
J | represent the government's repository of
6 | hazardous biological material that would be
7 | transferred from Plum Island to North Carolina.

8 | The impact of the release of any of these
1 cont. | viruses is not included in the document, nor any
26.0; |
4|21.3 | mention of how these additional viruses increase
the attention and attraction to the lab to a
12 | potential terrorist or rogue employee.

1 cont. | Thirdly, the omission of any analysis of a
26.0; |
4 cont. | worst case scenario if there was a release and
21.3 | the long-term impacts on the economy and
16 | property values in this area. Besides the
17 | initial impact, there would be a permanent mark
18 | on this area that would not disappear.

19 | There is no met- -- there was no mention
1 cont. | of any mechanism to close the lab in the case of
26.0; |
5|2.0 | accidents, just no matter how poorly run the lab
turns out to be, it will continue to operate.

23 | Thank you.

24 | MS. COGHILL: Thank you, sir. Mr.
25 | French? Is John French here and would still

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Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern that the NBAF would be a prime terrorist target. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS address accident scenarios, including external events such as a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) (designated as For Official Use Only) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process.


Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns. The NBAF EIS was prepared to provide a thorough analysis of the aspects of NBAF construction and operations at the six site alternative locations. The potential impacts of NBAF operations on environmental resources, health and safety, and on local transportation are discussed in Chapter 3 of the NBAF EIS.

Chapter 3, Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. DHS cannot guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident; however, the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen from the NBAF is extremely low. The economic impact of an accidental release, including the impact on the livestock-related industries, is presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. The major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a potential ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS state that the specific objective of the hazard identification is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Appendix B describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF then site-specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that



would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed the NBAF. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS.

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1 like to make a comment? No? Okay. We'll move
2 on to Elaine McNeill.

3 MS. MCNEILL: Where to start? Well, I
4 have a friend who worked in air quality for EPA
5 in the Research Triangle Park for many years.
6 And so, I thought, I'll concentrate on the air
7 quality part of this draft Environmental Impact
8 Statement; and I can use Bruce Sokowski's
9 expertise. He received a commendation from the
10 EPA for his work with the Grand Canyon air
11 quality.

12 And so, I called my friend; and I said,
13 "Please -- I downloaded -- told him how to get
14 to the draft Environmental Impact Statement, and
15 I said, "Please study this and give me your
16 input. I need this."

17 Well, two weeks later, Bruce e-mailed me
18 and said, "Elaine, I'm really sorry, but there's
19 not enough hard data in this DEIS for me to give
20 you any information to go on. There's not
21 enough hard data in the DEIS to tell what the
22 air quality effects will be either from
23 construction or from operation of this facility."

24 You compared the construction emissions --
25 air quality emissions to the Galveston site, but

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns. The NBAF EIS was prepared to provide a thorough analysis of the aspects of NBAF construction and operations at the six site alternative locations. The potential impacts of NBAF operations on environmental resources, health and safety, and on local transportation are discussed in Chapter 3 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 9.0

DHS notes the commentor's air quality concerns. The potential effects of NBAF construction and operations on air quality are discussed in Section 3.4 of the NBAF EIS. Section 3.4.1 describes the methodology used in assessing potential air quality consequences at each site. Potential construction emissions were extrapolated from a similar facility's construction approach to ozone precursors, nitrogen oxide, and volatile organic compounds. For operations, the U.S. EPA dispersion modeling program, SCREEN3, was used to predict probable maximum effects at each site based on the current state of facility design. Should a decision be made to build NBAF and following site selection and final design, a complete emission inventory would be developed and refined modeling performed as necessary in accordance with state-specific air quality permitting requirements.

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1 you failed to say that this is going to be three
2 cont. times larger, and that the footprint of that
9.0 facility was right beside another facility.
. You didn't have to clear off land. You
5 didn't have graders. You didn't have equipment
6 going back and forth. You didn't have dust.
7 You didn't have all of those things for this.
8 You didn't mention the fact that it's
9 three times larger for the emissions for
10 construction. And then you go on and your
11 emissions for the operation of the facility, and
12 there are words like cannot be confirmed at this
13 time, were derived from projected activities,
14 potential factors, numerous assumptions,
15 cursory, proposed, estimated, conceptual,
16 extrapolated.
17 Heavenly days, how can you tell what the
18 emissions are going to be when you don't know?
3|18.0 How are you going to get rid of the carcasses
for crying out loud? (Interruption by audience
21 clapping.) Burn them, make 'em into some mushy,
22 mushy ooze that goes down the drain into the
23 waste water treatment plant.
24 They can't even keep a permit --
25 (interruption by audience applause) -- they

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Comment No: 3

Issue Code: 18.0

Carcass and pathological waste disposal methods being considered for the NBAF are discussed in Section 3.13.2.2 and compared on Table 3.13.2.2-4 of the NBAF EIS. As discussed in this section, incineration is one of the technologies under consideration. Burial of carcasses and pathological waste is not under consideration.

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violate the standards so often. What an oversight this is. What a sham, what

4|25.3 |desperation for the citizens of this county. Go
 . |away.

5 MS. COGHILL: Chris Jackson.

6 MS. JACKSON: I didn't come prepared
 7 for this, and I didn't bring no notes. I'm
 8 Louise Jackson, and I live in Butner, and I've
 9 been living here 39 years. I raised my children
 10 here, and it's a fine, little town. It's a
 11 wonderful place to live. It's a wonderful place
 12 to raise your children -- small children.

13 Now, you all want to come in here and ruin
 14 our town, the sweetest little place anybody ever
 15 wanted to live in. We don't have a lot of
 16 crime. Why? Why did you all choose our sweet
 17 little precious town?

18 We've got prisons, mental hospitals --
 19 everything, and why do we need anything else in
 20 this precious town with all these people here?
 21 It's not a big place. Why did you choose
 22 Butner? Why of all of the places in the world?
 23 Would you all want to be here living near it?

1|25.3 |Why don't you come live with us? We'll be glad
 |to have you, but we don't want it. Go away and

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 4Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 cont. | don't come back.
25.3

MS. COGHILL: Louise Jackson.

3 MS. JACKSON: That was me.

4 MS. COGHILL: That was you, okay.

5 Thank you very much. Jaclynn Bowling?

6 MS. BOWLING: Hi. I'm Jaclynn

7 Bowling. And, first, I just want to thank you

8 all for giving me the opportunity to stand up

9 here, make my comments and give you my concerns.

10 As a mother of two small children, it's my

11 job at their age to take care of them, and to

12 look out for them and keep them safe. And I

13 don't believe that I can do that living in this

14 community if you build your facility here.

15 I have a lot of concern that this facility

16 |21.3 is going to endanger me and my family on many

levels. I'm concerned that this facility will

18 be a target for terrorist activity. I'm

19 concerned over the potential for human error

20 resulting in leakages of diseases into the

21 wilderness around our homes.

22 I'm concerned over the possibility of

23 potential mutations of these diseases resulting

24 in human infection. I'm concerned about the

25 economic burden that this is going to put on the

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the risk of a potential accident or terrorist event. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. As described in Chapter 3 and summarized in Section 2.5 of the NBAF EIS, the impacts of activities during normal operations at any of the six site alternatives would likely be minor. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies, that would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Section 3.14 addresses accident scenarios, including external events such as a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process. Security would be provided by a series of fencing, security cameras, and protocols. In addition, a dedicated security force would be present on-site. Additional security could be provided via cooperation with local law enforcement agencies.

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1 cont. | taxpayers of my community, of the damage it's
21.3 | going to do to our drinking water that my
3 | children drink and bathe in every day.
4 | And, you know, I have all these concerns;
5 | and based on what I've seen from your DEIS
6 | report, I'm not convinced that you can properly
7 | address these issues, or that you have, or that
8 | you care to. It's not your backyard; it's mine.
9 | It is my firm belief that the only place
25.0 | that a facility of this type should be is on
 | somewhere like Plum Island where you said that
12 | any problems would be a lot less. That it
13 | would be contained because of the location of it.
14 | Lastly, I just want to tell you that my
15 | seven year old wanted to get up and speak, but
16 | he's a seven year old so he can't do that. So,
17 | he asked me to tell you -- these were his words
18 | -- that he thinks it's a bad idea to move the
19 | lab to a populated area when it is already on a
20 | remote island, and that it's his opinion that it
21 | will not hurt the scientists to take an
22 | hour-long boat ride to get to the lab; but it
3|25.3 | could hurt him. So, please don't put it here.

MS. COGHILL: Fay Rich.

25 MS. RICH: My name is Fay Rich. I've

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS show that even though the Plum Island Site Alternative has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all site alternatives.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 been living in Butner since 1966. I've worked
 2 at John Umstead Hospital for 30 years. I've
 3 been living here approximately 42 years. And
 4 I'm like the others about the people at Murdoch.
 5 I bet none of you have been over there.

11|19.3 Suppose you had a relative or somebody in
 your family or a friend has a child that is
 8 retarded? How would you feel about that, that
 9 they couldn't help themselves at all? Would you
 10 want to put that near them?

11 And you want to put this near them? You
 12 think about that. Every one of you think about
 13 that. It's mighty hard if it's somebody in your
 14 family. It could be your grandchild. Who
 15 knows, strange things happen.

16 And I'm retired. I built here in '72, me
 17 and my husband. We have a daughter. My
 18 husband works at Murdoch. My mother worked at
 19 ARC. I have a sister that works at -- she's
 20 dietary, and I had another sister that worked at
 21 Murdoch. So, it's family-related thing here,
 22|25.3 and we still want to remain here; but we don't
 want y'all here.

24 We want our health. We want to live as
 25 long as we can. And y'all are probably not

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents,, external events, and intentional acts. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site, specific protocols and emergency plans would be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area and would include stipulations for any special-needs populations.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 aware of how many people here in the Butner area
2 has got cancer, and has died over the years.

3 And I don't know why you want to put it
4 there at -- I don't know if y'all are aware that
4|18.3 this was a farm. I was here when they had
animals over there. The cattle -- my husband's
7 daddy worked and milked cows over here at this
8 farm, and you are talking about putting it over
9 here? What about the land? It's already
10 contaminated. You want to put more here for us,
11 and then it gets in our water supply? We're
12 already having water problems.

13 Anyway, I know people where the water
5|12.3 people has come to the house to do samples.
They have went to my mother's house and done
16 water samples. They've been to the care giver
17 that I've been taking care of for water samples.
18 The water was discolored, and it took 'em a
19 month to get some help.

20 And I'm concerned that all of the
6|17.3; residents with the traffic -- they'll tell you
1 cont. all the time who live in this area how bad the
19.3 traffic is. You can't get out, and what plans
23 do you have for emergency situations if anything
24 occurs in this area? What do we do? How do we
25

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Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 18.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. All of the candidate sites were evaluated for the presence of existing hazardous, toxic, or radiological waste contamination as discussed in Section 3.12 of the NBAF EIS. Section 3.12.7 specifically addresses evidence of contamination at the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative due to use by the Department of Defense during World War II and concludes that no construction or operational impacts are anticipated due to existing hazardous, toxic, or radiological waste contamination. This conclusion is based on a review of drinking well sampling data, the absence of unexploded ordinance (UXO) found at the site, and the fact that the closest former firing range to the site is more than 1.5 miles away.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's watershed concerns. As described in the Section 3.7.7.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Granville Water and Sewer Authority has 3 to 4 million gallons per day of excess potable water supply and could meet NBAF's need of approximately 110,000 gallons per day, less than 0.4% of the Authority's total current capacity. The NBAF potable water usage is comparable to 210 residential homes annual potable water usage. The Section 3.13.8 describes the process that would be used to control and dispose of liquid wastes and Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spill and runoff affects.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 17.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the reported potential for a large increase in average daily traffic volume from NBAF operations at the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative. This projected large increase in traffic volume from NBAF operations, as reported in Section 3.11.7.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, was based on incorrect values for average daily traffic (ADT) on the primary traffic corridors servicing the NBAF. The corrected values for average daily traffic volume on Range Road of 381 vehicles per day (impact to traffic of 2.6% increase) and on Old Highway 75 of 5,500 vehicles per day (impact to traffic of 0.2% increase) demonstrate low projected impact to the traffic and transportation infrastructure from the NBAF operations at the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 know about it?

1 cont.
19.3

Will you have a bell or some kind of alarm system to go off or what, I mean? I ain't heard nothing about that.

Also there are a lot of residents who have lived in this city since 1950, and they're still living. My mother is 87 years old, and she's in a wheelchair -- (timer goes off.)

9 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, ma'am.

10 MS. RICH: Okay.

11 MS. COGHILL: Ms. Houlik.

12 MS. HOULIK: My name is Lisa Houlik,

18.3 and the comment I'd like to make is specific to the infrastructure and the costs to our community. Here in Butner we're a brand new community, newly incorporated in August of 2007 before we were presented with this wonderful present of the opportunity to have this NBAF.

19 In the DEIS, it actually states that five foot from the building, the host community, county or state -- basically all built into one
21
22
23
24
25
1 cont.
8.3 -- is responsible for providing infrastructure support and contributing to the actual construction of the infrastructure.

25 My concern is that five foot from that

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 8.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern that infrastructure at the Umstead Research Farm Site is not adequate for NBAF construction and operation. Section 3.3.7 of the NBAF EIS provides an assessment of current infrastructure, evaluates the potential impacts from the proposed operation of the NBAF, and includes planned improvements to infrastructure required per design criteria. Should a site be selected for NBAF, any additional infrastructure improvements to ensure safe and reliable operation would be identified in accordance with the final facility design.

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1 cont.
8.3

facility, there is no infrastructure on this land. There is no gas line. There are no water lines, electricity, help communications -- any of that that actually exists on this land.

4
5 If we are responsible for that type of
6 infrastructure in North Carolina, that's
7 hundreds of millions of dollars that we will be
8 responsible for, not only for the actual lab
9 infrastructure and bringing that up to five foot
10 from your building; but also my concern is that
11 we as the taxpayers of Granville County and the
12 residents of Butner will be responsible for
13 insuring that the infrastructure that leads to
14 this facility is going to be continuing up to --
15 up to -- well, I guess the required standards.

16 And that is also going to cost us for the
17 lifetime of this facility, and that -- and we
18 can factor in as you have in your -- in some of
19 your statements that, oh, there will be growth
20 and some of that will be systemic.

21 But the initial infrastructure is not
22 there, and I'm very concerned that as long as
23 I'm living in Butner, we're going to have to pay
24 for that. And I do not see any reason that we
25 should have to get the bill.

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2|2.0 And in the DEIS no where does it actually
 say that the federal government will be
 3 providing assistance in building and providing
 infrastructure towards this facility. And I
 3|25.3 don't want you here.

6 MS. COGHILL: Bill McKellar.

7 MR. McKELLAR: My name is Bill
 8 McKellar. I'm a pharmacist, and I've been
 9 living here in Butner for 35 years. I live a
 1|25.3 hundred yards right over there, and I have been
 11 against this project from day one.

12 And recently, our concerns have been
 13 verified by Congressional reports, the GAO, and
 14 now the draft EIS. The draft Environmental
 2|21.3 Impact Statement written for the Department of
 Homeland Security has been NBAF's opponents'
 17 best supporting document.

18 Human errors or mechanical malfunctions,
 19 deliberate or accidentally, could economically and
 20 environmentally devastate Butner, Granville
 21 County, North Carolina and beyond.

22 The draft EIS is incomplete citing the
 23 protocols and site specific details or
 24 procedures for security will be established with
 25 the approval of the host community. What

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3


DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.3

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the infrastructure improvements and associated costs required for the NBAF operation at the Umstead Research Farm site. Section 3.3.7 and Section 3.11.7 of the NBAF EIS includes an assessment of the current utility and transportation infrastructure at the Umstead Research Farm Site, the potential impact and effects from construction and operation of the NBAF, and the planned utility and transportation improvements to meet the operational requirements of the NBAF. While the potential costs of proposed actions are not a factor in the environmental impact analysis presented in the NBAF EIS, cost information of the NBAF Alternatives is summarized in Section 2.5, Table 2.5.1-1 of the NBAF EIS to provide pertinent information to the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology so that he may make a more informed decision with respect to the alternatives presented in the NBAF EIS. Infrastructure costs were analyzed and included in the final costs provided in the NBAF EIS. Additionally, the Site Cost Analysis Report, available on the NBAF Web Site for public review and discussed in Section 2.6, is one of several reports that will be considered in addition to the NBAF EIS, in selecting the Preferred Alternative for the Final EIS and ROD.



Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 25.3
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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2 cont. happens if the host community and DHS does not
25.3 25.3 agree? The project will proceed with the host's
3 support, and the communications will be
4 strained, and it will be too late for the host
5 to uninvite DHS.

6 The lack of transparency is another issue
7 that the draft EIS confirms. Prior to the draft
3)2.0 EIS at the hearing last week, we knew nothing of
9 the eradication of the deer population by
10 shooting and poisoning. We knew nothing of the
11 production of millions or billions of insects.

12 We knew nothing of the 3,000 plus sizes or
4)23.0 animals -- all size animals. At the town hall
14 meeting last winter, we were told there would be
15 100 to 200 animals present at the NBAF.

16 We knew nothing of the aerial spraying of
17 insecticides over the land surrounding the NBAF.
18 These lands include hospitals, prisons,
19 detention centers, all their staff, animals,
20 farms and watersheds and the water supplies for
21 Raleigh, Wake County, Durham, Butner, Stem and
22 Creedmoor.

23 Now, we have confirmed facts that the NBAF
24 will be studying the Avian Flu. That's a
25 \$3,000,000,000 business that supports over 5,000

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
Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS state that the specific objective of the hazard identification is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Appendix B describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF then site-specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed the NBAF. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the safe operation of the NBAF. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur and consequences of those accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding an accident at the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. An analysis of potential consequences of a pathogen (e.g. Rift Valley fever [RVF] virus) becoming established in native mosquito populations was evaluated in Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, and 3.14 of the NBAF EIS. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures (SOP) and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the NBAF. RVF and foot and mouth disease SOPs and response plans would likely



include strategies that are similar. However, the RVF response plan would also include a mosquito control action plan. The potential consequences of pesticide use would be evaluated during the preparation of a site-specific response plan.

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1 families in North Carolina and produces 37
2 percent of North Carolina's farm income.

3 The draft EIS -- we were told at the town
4 cont| meeting that the draft -- that the
23.0
5 aerosolization use would be minimal. The draft
6 EIS states that in seven of the eight selected
7 agents, aerosolization would be a method of
8 dispersion.

9 Aerosolization is also the -- in one of
10 the steps of weaponization of select agents. We
11 are deeply concerned with the use of outside
12 contractors to maintain and operate the facility
13 and to operate it for a profit.

14 We are concerned about the dumping of the
5|18.3 waste in our waste system and contributing to
the chronic pollution of Knapp of Reeds Creek
17 and Falls Lake. (Timer sounds) Okay. I'll
18 finish tonight. Thank you.

19 MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Jane Frost
20 is next on her list, but I understand she may
21 not be here. Are you here?

22 MS. FROST: I'm here.

23 MS. COGHILL: Very good. Thank you.

24 MS. FROST: And I'm not leaving.

25 MS. COGHILL: Okay.

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 5Issue Code: 18.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. As discussed in Section 3.13.8.3 of the NBAF EIS, sanitary wastewater will be discharged to the South Granville Water and Sewer Authority (SGWASA) if the NBAF is built at the Umstead Research Farm Site. Section 3.3.7.1.4 of the of the NBAF EIS addresses the capacity of the SGWASA to handle NBAF discharges. The NBAF would be designed and operated as necessary to prevent negative impact to SGWASA treatment capabilities resulting from flow rate or potentially harmful wastewater constituents.

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1 MS. FROST: First of all, I want to
 2 thank you ladies and gentlemen for coming. I
 3 want to thank my fellow citizens for their
 4 concerns. They are valid concerns. However, I
 5 have a question that I never received a
 6 satisfactory answer to.

7 I am a Butner resident. I am a nurse. I
 8 still work occasionally at the hospital. I am
 9 wondering why anyone in any government facility
 10 would even consider locating an NBAF in an area
 11 where there is a federal prison complex, a
 12 central regional hospital for people with
 13 psychiatric illness, and a center, Murdoch, that
 14 has individuals with mental and physical
 15 impairments.

16 In the event that the NBAF is located
 17 here, who will be responsible for evacuating
 18 these individuals? I was told in another
 19 meeting that Butner Public Safety would be
 20 responsible for evacuating. We don't even have
 21 enough public safety officers to adequately
 22 service the population of Butner and the
 23 surrounding area.

24 How long do you think it would take to
 25 evacuate not only these people but local

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.3


DHS held a competitive process to select potential sites for the proposed NBAF as described in DEIS Section 2.3.1. A multi-disciplinary team of engineers, scientists, lawyers, academics and communicators from the departments of Homeland Security, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Defense reviewed the submissions based primarily on environmental suitability and proximity to research capabilities, proximity to workforce, acquisition/construction/operations, and community acceptance. Ultimately, DHS identified five site alternatives that surpassed others in meeting the evaluation criteria and DHS preferences, and determined that they, in addition to the Plum Island Site, would be evaluated in the EIS as alternatives for the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS is aware of the presence of the mental health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the mental health and correctional facilities, are well aware of the proposed action. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the impact of a pathogen release on the local population, livestock industry, businesses and infrastructure. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. The chances of an accidental release are low. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, site specific protocols would



then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations, including institutionalized populations, residing within the local area. The need for an evacuation under an accident conditions is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

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3 cont. | residents as well? Please think about that.
19.3 |

4 | Please make plans for it. And please put your
25.3 | facility somewhere else. Thank you.

4 | MS. COGHILL: Kathryn Spann.

5 | MS. SPANN: Hi. I'm Kathryn Spann,
6 | and I'm a resident of Rougemont, North Carolina
7 | right across the county line in Durham.

8 | I was pleased to see that the DEIS does
9 | actually indicate for us that only about
1 | 15.3 | one-sixth of the jobs at the facility will
11 | actually go to local residents. On the other
12 | hand, I was concerned as a lawyer who has
13 | practiced in the field of NEPA, that -- I think
14 | I was shocked not to see any designs here aside
15 | from some rather generalized conceptual designs.

16 | That lack of designs and the lack of any
2 | 26.0 | examination of the protocols that are supposed
19 | to insure actually the only human operations
20 | side really impedes the ability of the public
21 | and our local elected officials to evaluate the
22 | true safety or lack of thereof of this facility.

23 | That is a shocking omission to me. I'm
24 | also shocked -- given that this DEIS explicitly
25 | contemplates an expanded mission both in the
25 | number of diseases and in the size of the

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's statement regarding employment. The economic effects of the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site are included in Section 3.10.7 of the NBAF EIS. The proposed action will create temporary jobs during the 4-yr construction phase and permanent jobs upon completion of the facility. Section 3.10.7.2 states that the majority of the construction workers would be drawn from the study area or would commute from the surrounding counties. Upon the facility's completion, permanent employees will include scientific and support staff as well as operations, maintenance and security staff (Section 3.10.7.3). Household spending by these new residents and the operations of the NBAF are expected to create job opportunities that would be filled by the local labor force.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 26.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding safe facility operations. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. As described in Chapter 3 and summarized in Section 2.5 of the NBAF EIS, the impacts of activities during normal operations at any of the six site alternatives would likely be minor. DHS would maintain the NBAF and ancillary facilities in compliance with applicable environmental, safety, and health requirements and provide adequate funding for safe operation and maintenance.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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2 cont| facility as it grows, and given the time of the
26.0| anticipated life span of this facility, I'm
3| really surprised that there's no examination of
4| the full impact of that possible expansion.

4|21.0 And it also appears that the risk analysis
is done for a new facility. It does not take
7| into account failures in maintenance over time,
8| being short-changed with budgets or poor
9| administration of the facility.

10| Those Plum Island accidents that were
11| referenced earlier weren't problems with the
12| design of the facility. They were problems with
13| the maintenance of that facility when filters
14| weren't changed or when humans made errors.
15| That's the true problem here.

16| I notice the concerns as a farmer in the
17| area that the numbers for Foot and Mouth Disease
18| really seemed to be designed to obfuscate and
19| not to actually tell people what the real risk
20| is there economically.

21| The number \$5,000,000,000 in the event of
22| an impact is bandied around, but if you go to
23| the source documentation that USDA, itself,
24| produced in May of 2008, you see that the Foot
25| and Mouth outbreak in the United Kingdom, which

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Comment No: 4Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the safe operation of the NBAF. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur and consequences of those accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release.

DHS cannot guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident; however, the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen from the NBAF is extremely low. The economic impact of an accidental release, including the impact on the livestock-related industries, is presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. The major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a potential ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free.

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4 cont. | is a much smaller agricultural presence than we
21.0 | have here, cost \$17,000,000,000 in 2001. My
3 | time seems to be running out. Thank you.

4 | MS. COGHILL: David Krabbe.

5 | MR. KRABBE: My name is David Krabbe,
6 | and I just want to comment on -- you know, y'all
7 | are patting yourselves on the back about the
8 | thorough job you've done on the DEIS. If you
12.0 | consider that a thorough job, then you are
 | completely and totally incapable of running this
11 | facility safely.

12 | This is the most lame, absurd piece of
13 | work I can imagine. Now, you (interruption by
14 | audience applause.) You have repeatedly
15 | minimized the effects of outbreaks. You've
16 | completely ignored issues. A classic example in
17 | the DEIS is airplanes. You claim only small
18 | planes could crash into this facility.

19 | This facility is in the landing path of RDU
20 | Airport, but you ignore that issue. You talk
21 | about having vets come in and do -- (child in
22 | the audience begins to scream and speaker could
23 | not be understood). And, you know, I know that
24 | your protocol is a minimum of five vets not
25 | being exposed to any livestock.

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS state that the specific objective of the hazard identification is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Appendix B describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF then site-specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed the NBAF. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS.

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1 Are we trusting these vets under Boy
 2 Scout's honor that they're not going to go out
 3 and go back to work. You're talking about
 4 approximately a 150 vets a year going through
 5 this facility, and you're hoping that they're
 6 just going to promise and keep their promise not
 7 to go out into the public and, you know, start
 8 working with animals again.

3|8.3 Another -- I -- this boggles my mind, the
 sewage capacity of SGWASA. You contacted the
 11 Consortium. That is the group that wants to
 12 bring this facility here. You contacted -- you
 13 contacted the Consortium about what -- what --
 14 how much capacity does SGWASA have.

15 Wouldn't it have maybe made sense to call
 16 SGWASA? I can't imagine how you can possibly
 17 rationalize that. You called the Granville
 18 County Chamber of Commerce about, you know,
 19 water capacity. Again, why not call SGWASA?

20 The other comment I'd like to make is the
 4|15.3 study did not address the issue of the resale
 -- value of our homes. I mean, there's going to
 23 be economic impact on our farms and on our
 24 homes, and this is so inadequate that it's
 25 absurd.

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Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 8.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern that South Granville Water and Sewer Authority (SGWASA) personnel were not contacted or utilized as a data source for sanitary sewage system and potable water system infrastructure specifications, treatment / delivery capabilities, and planned or required system improvements in the preparation of the NBAF EIS. Section 3.3.7.1 and Section 3.3.7.3 provide a multitude of citations for sanitary sewage system data and potable water system data resulting from direct communications with SGWASA personnel. Specifically the SGWASA wastewater treatment plant capacity, current utilization and excess capacity data was validated in a January 24, 2008 phone conversation with SGWASA Director of Utilities.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's viewpoint. The economic effects of the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site are included in Section 3.10.7 of the NBAF EIS. DHS is not aware of any historical evidence that routine operations of a biological research facility adversely affect the local economy. On the contrary, operations and maintenance of the facility and household spending by its employees generates a positive economic impact. In addition, research facilities typically stimulate the formation of other high tech establishments in the surrounding region and can serve as engines of economic growth. As stated in the NBAF EIS, the overall effect of the NBAF on housing market conditions would be negligible. The housing market would be able to meet the increase in housing demand (326 employees in total), relative to the estimated growth of the existing population between 2007 and 2012 (188,278). It is possible that with the relocation of highly skilled workers to the immediate area, property values could increase due to an increase in demand, and there is no empirical evidence that a facility such as the NBAF would reduce property values in the study area. Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS presents a profile of the agricultural industry in the eight-county area surrounding the Umstead Research Farm Site. It is not expected that the agricultural industry would be negatively impacted by the construction or operations of the NBAF.

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1 Well, I could go on all night. And, by
 2 the way, an earthquake is not a weather related
 5|11.3 event. An earthquake, you know, is geological.
 And, also, you minimize the effects of an
 5 earthquake saying it won't be windy when there's
 6 an earthquake.

7 Is that some presidential directive that
 8 indicates it is not allowed to be windy when
 9 there's earthquake? I mean, this study is so
 10 absurd that you ought to be ashamed of
 6|25.3 yourselves. And you know what? You're not
 wanted here.

13 MS. COGHILL: Lib Hutchby.

14 MS. HUTCHBY: Thank you again for the
 15 opportunity to speak and to be listened to. I
 16 am a patriot -- a patriotic American, a member
 17 of Women's International League for Peace and
 18 Freedom, a native North Carolinian, a mother,
 19 and a grandmother.

20 I am committed to the public process and
 21 appreciate the time you are taking to listen
 22 carefully to our concerns and questions
 23 regarding the proposed National Bio and
 24 Agro-Defense Facility.

25 I am also a person of faith who agrees

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Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 11.3

DHS notes the commentor's point. The NBAF EIS Section 3.4.7.2.1 denotes examples of construction standards potentially applicable to NBAF that would be met or exceeded.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 with Titus Burchhardt's essay, "The Symbolism of
2 Water" where he states, "When the balance of
3 nature is not disturbed, the earth's waters
4 themselves continually re-establish their
5 purity; whereas, when the balance is lost, death
6 and pollution are the result. It is thus not
7 merely a coincidence that the life of the waters
8 is a symbol for the life of our souls."

9 Clean drinking water is basic to life while
10 weapons of mass destruction come in many forms.
11 Every August we remember the dropping of the
12 atomic weapons that killed over 180,000 humans.
13 One bomb was of uranium and the other of
14 plutonium.

15 Scientific curiosity was certainly a
16 factor for the mass slaughter of the Hiroshima
17 and Nagasaki communities. The U.S. had a huge
18 investment in time, mind and money.
19 \$2,000,000,000 in 1940 dollars to produce the
20 bombs, and there was no inclination and no guts
21 to stop the momentum.

22 After World War II, Admiral William Leahy,
23 the top military aide to President Truman, said
24 in his war memoirs, "It is my opinion that the
25 use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and

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1 Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our
2 war against Japan.

3 "My own feeling is that in being the first
4 to use it," he said, "we had adopted an ethical
5 standard common to the barbarians of the Dark
6 Ages."

7 What will Homeland Security do for public
health in North Carolina? I have no reason to
1|25.0 believe that a biological defense facility is
needed anywhere in this state or in this
10 country. According to the EIS, quote/unquote,
12 "Once the NBAF reaches its life expectancy, DHS
13 may choose to decommission the facility and
14 transition the property for future use.
15 Standard decontamination protocols would be
16 performed and so it goes.

2|23.0 Understanding that this is to be a research
facility dealing with viruses with no known
19 cures leads me to ask how DHS has developed
20 standard decontamination protocols for the
21 unknown results of research. (Timer rings.)

22 Clean drinking water is simply a basic
3|12.3 necessity. North Carolina doesn't seem prepared
for such challenging research. Did you know
25 that 64 percent of the North Carolina facilities

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the future decontamination protocols for NBAF decommissioning and the effectiveness of decontamination on pathogens with no known cure. Disposal and decontamination (killing or inactivation of bacteria and fungi and viruses, respectively) procedures have a long and proven history of effectiveness for pathogens studied in both BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratories. Section 2.2.3 of the NBAF EIS discusses the types of laboratory procedures and decontamination protocols to be developed for the decommissioning of the NBAF. Such plans would include decontamination methodologies, disposition of used equipment, disposal of site materials, and post-decontamination monitoring.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's watershed concerns. The NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.13.1 describes the methodologies used to assess NBAF's solid and liquid waste management options. EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.3.7.3.4 and Table 3.3.7.3.4-1 describe potential NBAF wastewater loads and the SGWASA technically based treatment plant receiving load limits. EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.7.7.1.1 describes 5.2 miles of the Knap of Reeds Creek that is considered biologically impaired. As of 2004, contaminant sources have not been determined and TMDLs have not been established.

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3 cont. | in significant violation of the Clean Water Act
12.3 | for the period of 15 months included Butner on
3 | that list.

4 MS. COGHILL: Thank you for your
5 comments. Hope Taylor.

6 MS. TAYLOR: Thank you. I speak to
7 you as the statewide Director of Clean Water for
8 North Carolina. I'm a long-time biomedical and
9 public health researcher and the owner and
10 operator of a small dairy goat herd within about
11 seven miles of the site. So, there's a whole
12 range of concerns that I bring to this.

13 My professional organization members align
14 ourselves with the most vulnerable populations
15 about which you've heard today, so I will not go
16 into more factual details; but we have been
17 pretty amazed that those vulnerable,
18 institutionalized populations were so little
19 considered in any of the potential impacts here.

20 We'll provide more detailed technical
21 comments to the agency later, but today I want
22 to talk about that issue of trust, and what kind
23 of neighbor this facility and its management
24 would bring to this community.

25 About a year ago, I remarked that my first

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. DHS is aware of the presence of the health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are well aware of the proposed action. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS state that the specific objective of the hazard identification is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Appendix B describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF then site-specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed the NBAF. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS.

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1 concerns before any of the details of the
2 facility or what would be managed here was for
3 our democracy here and what would happen to our
4 very way of life. And those concerns reference
5 all of the mainland sites in every region who
6 share those concerns.

7 Let me give you a personal example of the
22.0 kind of lack of transparency and negligent
9 behavior that I personally experienced in the
10 process of just trying to get documents from the
11 agency.

12 After the town hall meeting that occurred
13 in February, I pulled out the standard request
14 for documents form. There were two more spaces
15 available so I asked two of my colleagues from
16 Granville County to add their names to that
17 form. I put it in a standard business envelope
18 printed with my organization's return address
19 and mailed it.

20 Because there was a history of a lack of
21 responsiveness, I mailed it certified to the
22 agency.

23 This is the envelope as it was returned to
24 me six weeks later clearly marked that it had
25 been x-rayed. There's a neat semi-circle that's

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1 split at the bottom so it's been checked for
 2 Anthrax or other particulate matter.
 3 Furthermore, the address that I took off of
 4 DHS's website, part of it has been crossed
 5 through, and a yellow label saying that there
 6 was insufficient address was added. I never got
 7 a response to my request for documents.

8 This is emblematic, I fear, of what we can
 9 expect from this agency as a neighbor from the
 10 facility that's -- (interruption by audience
 11 applause.)

12 There should not be a mainland site
 13 anywhere for this facility, and they should not
 14 be allowed to manage this facility. We call on
 15 DHS to withdraw its proposal for any mainland
 16 site, to revisit the whole concept of the NBAF

2 cont. and to talk with Congress to overturn the
 2.0 President's Directive to Homeland Security for
 19 such a facility, and re-evaluate the need for
 20 such a mission and the appropriate agency to
 21 manage it. Thank you very much.

22 MS. COGHILL: Evan Bolick.

23 MR. BOLICK: Hi. I'm a second-year law
 24 student at UNC-Chapel Hill. Thanks for taking
 25 the time to listen. There are two types of

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Comment No: 3

Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to any mainland site.

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1 citizens here. Those are ones who are angry
 2 because they don't want this lab, and those who
 3 plain just do not want this lab here.

4 I was hoping to do a quick cost benefit
 5 analysis on the cost of bringing this here
 6 compared to the benefits. According to the
 7 impact statement, this would be the only site
 8 that is completely new infrastructure out of all
 9 the proposed sites. You will need new power
 10 lines, and new gas lines and new sewer lines,
 11 new water lines.

12 We're the only site that has such a unique
 13 condition. Furthermore, besides the energy
 14 structure that's not here, there's a -- they
 15 have said that there is going to be a 500
 16 percent increase in the traffic. Even if I take
 17 their word that there's only two cars a day that
 18 drive down the road currently, 500 percent would
 19 make that about a thousand cars driving back and
 20 forth every day.

21 And then the traffic statement went on to
 22 say that the impacts on our air quality would be
 23 negligible. I find that hard to believe.

24 Another cost that I found would be that of
 25 the property and the growth and development of

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 8.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns about the improvements to infrastructure required for NBAF construction and operation at the Umstead Research Farm Site. Section 3.3.1 through Section 3.3.8 of the NBAF EIS provides an assessment of current infrastructure at each site, in addition to the potential effects from construction and operation of the NBAF at each site, to include required infrastructure improvements. All sites will require some level of infrastructure improvements for NBAF construction and operation as identified in Sections 3.3.1 through 3.3.8 of the NBAF EIS. Should a site be selected for NBAF, any additional infrastructure improvements to ensure safe and reliable operation would be identified in accordance with the final facility design.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 17.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the reported potential for a large increase in average daily traffic volume from proposed NBAF operations at the Umstead Research Farm Site. This projected large increase in traffic volume from NBAF operations, as reported in Section 3.11.7.3.1 of the NBAF Draft EIS, was based on incorrect values for average daily traffic (ADT) on the primary traffic corridors that would service the NBAF. The corrected values for average daily traffic volume on Range Road of 381 vehicles per day (traffic increase of 2.6%) and on Old Highway 75 of 5,500 vehicles per day (traffic increase of 0.2%) demonstrate that the projected impact to the traffic and transportation infrastructure from NBAF operations at the Umstead Research Farm Site would be low.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 9.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding affects on air quality from increased traffic. Section 3.4.3.3.2 of the NBAF EIS describes the traffic emission estimates developed from the Emissions Factor 2002 Burden Model for California Air Resource Board. Should a decision be made to build NBAF and following site selection and final design, a complete emission inventory would be developed which would account for predicted vehicle trips and refined modeling would be performed as necessary in accordance with state-specific air quality permitting requirements

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's statement regarding employment. The proposed action will create temporary jobs during the 4-yr construction phase and permanent jobs upon completion of the facility. The estimated number of jobs and tax revenues that are expected to be created by the construction and operations of the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site are presented in Section 3.10.7 of the NBAF EIS. The employment and tax estimates were produced with IMPLAN, a widely used economic impact assessment modeling system which is described in Section 3.10.1.

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4 cont.
15.3

Butner. The two sites that you listed as a moderate -- that this would have a moderate effect on were Texas and Mississippi, and only after researching the entire sections on those two, what I found they have in common was that there was a respective large residential and commercial growth in those two areas.

This leads me to suggest that that is a negative thing to have near this sort of facility.

11
5|21.3

Finally, while I do agree that the safety precautions will be the most advanced that you can develop, and that the risk of a release amongst the population is very small, as we've seen in England, should a release occur, the effects are just dire and unacceptable.

17
4 cont.
15.3

As for the benefits, the claimed benefit is that it will bring jobs. As far as I can see, the most -- the largest supply of jobs will be temporary at most in construction. And it shows it's to be constructed by an out-sourced firm from another state.

Another proposed benefit would be to -- to help the local government for their taxes; but once again, of course, spending all that on

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Comment No: 5Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding an accident. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies, that would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

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4 cont. | infrastructure, as someone else mentioned for
15.3 | all this infrastructure, there's been no pledge
3 | of federal money to build energy, or expand the
4 | roads or anything like that.

5 | I feel that that would be negligible at
6 | least for quite some time. So, just to sum up
6 | 25.3 | what you've already heard, I don't believe that
8 | we need this facility in Butner. I don't
9 | believe we need it in North Carolina.

10 | And I certainly don't believe we need to
7 | 5.0 | move it off a self-contained island with no
 | appreciable agri-business such as we have here
13 | in North Carolina.

14 | Please keep this off of mainland America.
15 | Thank you.

16 | MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Ladies and
17 | gentlemen, at this time, we are going to take a
18 | brief ten-minute break. Our court reporter
19 | needs to step away for a few minutes. We will
20 | resume in ten minutes.

21 | (SHORT BREAK 3:25 - 3:40 P. M.)

22 | MS. WHITEFIELD: My name is Elaine
23 | Whitefield, and I'm an original GNAT member.
24 | GNAT was formed back in 1990, I think, or '91
25 | when we fought against the waste incinerator.

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Comment No: 6Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 7Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentators preference for an island location and opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 We beat it, we beat the Super Collider, and we
2 will beat this.

14.0 | And my concern with this document that you
| have created here, and I was wondering how
5 | accurate is all this. So, what I'm telling you
6 | is I really think this statement is pretty much
7 | a bunch of crap.

8 But I'm not a scientist. I'm a country
9 | girl. I grew up in the country, and I don't
10 | care what you say. I know this thing is wrong.
11 | We're David and you're our Goliath, and we will
22.5.3 | stop you. We will bring you down, and you are
| not coming to Granville County.

14 MS. COGHILL: Amy Poole, would you
15 | please come to the microphone.

16 MS. POOLE: Good afternoon. My name
17 | is Amy Poole, and I'm a life-long Wake County
18 | resident. I'm also part owner of Rolling G
19 | Marina on Falls Lake. Our facility was a family
20 | dream of my parents, Mary and Macon Gooch.

21 It was our dream to run a family business
22 | and serve the public at the same time. Next
23 | year, we will be lucky enough to celebrate our
24 | 25th year, which is a milestone for any small
25 | family business.

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 4.0

DHS notes commentor's concern that the NBAF EIS lacks sufficient site specific information for purposes of public evaluation. DHS prepared the NBAF EIS in accordance with the provisions of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and CEQ's regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1500 et seq.). The NBAF EIS was prepared to provide a thorough analysis of the aspects of NBAF construction and operations at the six site alternative locations.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 However, in the last 24 years that we have
2 been on Falls Lake, we have noticed changes in
3 -- that are continuing and that are hurting the
4 lake every day. Over the last four years, I've
5 been involved with two organizations which has
6 worked to protect Lick Creek and Little Lick
7 Creek, which are both on the endangered list.
8 It's a 303D list.

9 Now, Knapp of Reeds Creek, which Butner
10 flows -- that one flows into has already been on
11|12.3 that list for quite some time. It is -- it is
12 my understanding in talking with some of the
13 environmentalists that I work with, that Falls
14 Lake itself is on the brink of being also put on
15 this 303D list as being impaired.

16 The water quality is suffering because of
17 too much nutrients and excessive algae growth.
18 Just this May, Falls Lake had a fish kill that
19 was reported by state officials in the News and
20 Observer that said there was a few hundred fish
21 killed.

22 In reality, it was thousands of fish, and
23 these weren't just Crappie, Brim, Bass; they
24 were Catfish.

25 Catfish are one of the sturdiest fish in

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's watershed concerns. As described in Section 3.7.7.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Granville Water and Sewer Authority has 3 to 4 million gallons per day of excess potable water supply and could meet NBAF's need of approximately 110,000 gallons per day, less than 0.4% of the Authority's total current capacity. Section 3.13.8 describes the process that would be used to control and dispose of liquid wastes and Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describe standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spill and runoff affects. Section 3.7.7.1.1 describes 5.2 miles of Knap of Reeds Creek that was determined in 1998 by NCDENR as partially supporting biological activity.

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1 cont. | the Falls Lake area because they feed on the
12.3 | bottom. But these fish floated to the top, they
3 | died, they decayed. According to a an
4 | Environmental Impact Statement from the U.S.
5 | Army Corps of Engineers in 1984, it stated that
6 | Falls Lake had become moderately eutrophic, and
7 | that the only way to keep that from happening
8 | was to reduce nutrients from the import sources.

9 | To allow this facility to be built is truly
2|25.3 | not in the best interest of the 240,000
-- | residents who depend on Falls Lake for water.

3|21.3 | Do we really want to sit by and wait for some
| kind of accident to happen? I don't think so.

14 | Along with this, after the long history of
4|12.3 | violations from the Southern Granville Water and
| Sewer Authority that has contributed directly to
17 | the decline in water quality in Falls Lake.
18 | From the very beginning of my experience with
19 | Falls Lake, all I've wanted to do is share the
20 | lake with my grand kids.

21 | I don't have any grand kids yet, but one
22 | day, I would like to share it with them. And
23 | it is -- it is my fear that before too much
24 | longer, I'm not going to have that opportunity.

25 | In closing, you talk about major

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Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.3

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's watershed concerns. The NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.13.8 Waste Management, describes the process that would be used to control and dispose of liquid wastes and EIS Chapter 3 Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describes standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spill and runoff affects. EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.7.7.1.1 describes 5.2 miles of Knap of Reeds Creek that was determined in 1998 by NCDENR as partially supporting biological activity. EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.14 describes the hazard and accident analysis and site-specific consequences.

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1 catastrophes. I was on Falls Lake when
2 Hurricane Fran hit. I know how much sewer that
3 Butner put into Falls Lake. My daughter, that's
4 sitting behind me, was swimming in the lake, and
5 we found out that all the shots that we needed
6 for Hepatitis A and B had been sent downstream.
7 As a -- as a parent, I had to sit back and wait
8 for my child -- to find out if she was going to
9 be sick. Thank you.

10 MS. COGHILL: John Wimbush, you're up,
11 sir.

12 MR. WIMBUSH: First, we want to thank
13 y'all for coming out here. I am John Wimbush.
14 I am one of the town pastors here in Butner.
15 I'm not sure that I'm speaking for the Town
16 Council, but I might be speaking for John
17 Wimbush.

18 When I first heard about this facility
19 coming here, it sounded good to me. I thought
20 to myself, the people are going to be proud when
21 old John Wimbush come back here with 1.65
22 billion dollars to be brought here to Butner to
23 build this facility.

24 But after waiting awhile and we all got
25 together, and they brought up some things that

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1 John Wimbush didn't know about. In the first
2 place, they asked me -- they said, "Did you do
3 your research?" I told them, "Yes, I done my
4 research."

5 "Well, just how did you do it?" I said,
6 "That Homeland Security people told me how it
7 was going to be, and someone have already
8 explained that we" -- I think y'all are some of
9 the nicest people. I wish you would move here
10 to Butner with us. We have a good town.

11 We have a town -- what we call a loving
12 town. We love each other, but this facility is
13 beginning to divide us. I was sitting up there
14 in my town meeting, even after trying to -- to
15 reverse my vote, and it looked like I could feel
16 something, and the man had his finger so close
17 to my face, it was making my hair stand up from
18 my eyebrows.

19 They're saying for me to sit down now;
20 but, anyway, I want y'all to come, and I'm glad
21 to have you to come here and explain these
22 things to us. But I think if I had to say
23 something, I'm beginning to hope and trust that
15.0 you will find some other good place to have this
research lab.

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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2|25.3 I believe we need it, but the people in
 Butner just simply don't want it. And as a
 3 representative of the people, I'm going to have
 4 to go with the majority of the people. If my
 5 people say they don't want it, I don't want it.

6 MS. COGHILL: Ms. Linda Wilkins? Very
 7 good, thank you.

8 MS. WILKINS: I'll try not to take
 9 that long.

10 MS. COGHILL: Not a problem.

11 MS. WILKINS: I'm Linda Wilkins. I
 12 live here in Butner. I was fortunate enough
 13 that back during the fall of last year when
 14 Butner incorporated, I got incorporated into the
 15 town. I was not in the Butner proper for a
 16 while, but I am now.

17 And so, I found out I have a voice in what
 18 goes on at the Town Council Meeting, and I'm
 19 more than happy to use it, pros and cons. I
 20 have just a couple of comments.

21 I understand that Plum Island does not
 1|8.3 have any infrastructure needed for the NBAF.
 Neither does Butner. I understand there was a
 24 need for a power station costing millions of
 25 dollars.

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 8.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern that infrastructure at the Umstead Research Farm Site is not adequate for NBAF construction and operation. Section 3.3.7 of the NBAF EIS provides an assessment of current infrastructure, evaluates the potential impacts from the proposed operation of the NBAF, and includes planned improvements to infrastructure required per design criteria. Should a site be selected for NBAF, any additional infrastructure improvements to ensure safe and reliable operation would be identified in accordance with the final facility design.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 Butner residents do not have the money to
 2|25.3 pay that kind of tax. Contrary to what the
 Consortium man told you, we don't want it. I
 4 work at a facility in Butner that houses adult
 and mentally unstable children, as I heard it
 3|15.3 said today. They're my friends. They're more
 7 than just children. They're adults. Their
 8 minds are like children.

9 I'm astonished that you don't give
 10 incarcerated people, whether voluntary or un,
 11 more consideration in this draft EIS. You
 12 stated the educational levels for all the
 13 various sites, and I saw where I was. I'm one
 14 of those with some education.

15 And, you know, my daddy used to tell me
 16 that some education could be a dangerous thing.
 17 It must be, because it makes me more radical.
 18 I'm more apt to speak out. I'm not a Ph.D.
 19 I'm not a doctor. I'm not a vet. I'm not a
 20 social worker. I'm a secretary.

21 I'm a grandmother, and a mother, a wife;
 22 and I live right here. And I don't think y'all
 23 -- I don't think you have adequately addressed
 24 public comments for your selection of sites if
 25 you pick Butner.

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern about the human health and safety of the surrounding institutional residents. Chapter 3, Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. A site-specific emergency response plan would be developed and coordinated with the local emergency management plan and individual facility plans regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF, and which would include stipulations for all special-needs populations.

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4|19.3 | And as far as the aerial spraying goes,
 | where I work, I know that my friends have
 3 | breathing difficulties in our beautiful, humid
 4 | weather. Understandably, it kind of stifles
 5 | those that aren't used to it.

6 | I can't help but wonder what's going to
 7 | happen to their breathing if you go to aerial
 8 | spraying to kill anything at the NBAF. I don't
 2 cont. | want you here, as you can see by my shirt.
 25.3 |

Thank you.

11 | MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Bernard
 12 | Holliday.

13 | MR. HOLLIDAY: Good afternoon. I
 14 | stand here in the prophetic tradition with the
 15 | words of Micah. "What doth the Lord require,
 16 | but to do justly, to love mercy, and to walk
 17 | humbly with thy God."

18 | The Homeland Security agency delivered
 19 | recently this detailed summary of responses from
 20 | six different locations in the United States
 21 | based on spoken reports, comments by 1,350
 22 | citizens.

23 | This enterprise is a level 4 facility
 1|21.3 | designed to deal with virulent viruses. The
 | immediate impact on the citizenry within this

Hightower Reporting Service

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the impact of a pathogen release on the local population, livestock industry, businesses and infrastructure. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. The chances of an accidental release are low. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations, including institutionalized populations, residing within the local area. The need for an evacuation under an accident conditions is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF.

Comment No: 4Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding aerial spraying resulting from an accident at the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. An analysis of potential consequences of a pathogen (e.g. Rift Valley fever [RVF] virus) becoming established in native mosquito populations was evaluated in Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, and 3.14 of the NBAF EIS. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures (SOP) and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the NBAF. RVF and foot and mouth disease SOPs and response plans would likely include strategies that are similar. However, the RVF response plan would also include a mosquito control action plan. The potential consequences of pesticide use would be evaluated during the preparation of a site-specific response plan.

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1 cont. Piedmont region would be disastrous according to
21.3 official reports from Homeland Security.

3 The projected cost from an accident, 3.5
4 billion. Example 8, within a 30-mile radius,
5 1.2 million persons adversely affected and
6 required to evacuate or be quarantined for an
7 indefinite period. Persons living within a
8 50-mile radius, 2 million citizens; similar
9 impact.

10 This project in Butner intends to use 195
11 acres of land. The soil in this zone is clay.
12 Clay loam, 50 percent iridial in composition.
13 The Triassic age is directly related to the
14 ancient Jonesboro fault line of mud and clay red
15 beds. The geology in North Carolina lends
16 itself to earthquakes of various magnitudes and
17 intensities.

18 The water and sewage disposal plant for this
19 facility is a crucial phase. The whole
20 reservoir now supplies water to Butner
21 institutions and Creedmoor. SGWASA would be
22 expected to supply all of the water and process
23 the waste. Butner now releases 5.5 million
24 gallons to 7.5 NGD into the Neuse Estuary.

25 This stream flows, eventually, into Falls

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1 Lake, a major water supply for Raleigh. Public
 2 Safety Management, utilities for the following
 3 sources would come from the town of Butner,
 4 Granville County, and the State of North
 5 Carolina, and the Consortium.

2|2.0 Will the funding for this facility be based
 on an annual federal budget? Will the Homeland
 8 Security Agency be immune from lawsuits filed by
 9 citizens? What is the time line for making the
 3|4.0 final decision regarding location of this
 facility in one of the six locations in the
 12 country?

13 As I conclude, most of us are aware of a
 14 recent grant from Golden Leaf Foundation. I
 15 would hope that we would be mindful of that and
 16 understand that that was a waste of the
 17 taxpayer's money. A foundation that was set up,
 18 originally, to help distressed communities, such
 19 as Granville County. Thank you for your time.

20 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, sir. Suzanne
 21 Moody Smith.

22 MS. SMITH: Hello again, Suzanne Moody
 23 Smith, Granville County resident. I think
 24 everybody who has spoken before me has pretty
 25 much summed up that we find your draft

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Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns about the sustainability of funding for NBAF to ensure safe and secure operations. The U.S. Congress and the President are responsible for determining funding priorities for government programs. DHS spends funds in accordance with congressional intent. DHS would maintain the NBAF and ancillary facilities in compliance with applicable environmental, safety, and health requirements and provide for safe operation and maintenance. As regards commentor's question regarding legal action, DHS prepared the NBAF EIS in accordance with the provisions of NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and CEQ's regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR 1500 et seq.). DHS therefore believes that the NBAF EIS is legally compliant, but DHS professes no immunity from litigation.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 4.0

DHS notes the commentor's questions regarding the criteria and timing for final site selection. Several factors will affect the decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where. The EIS itself will not be the sole deciding factor. The decision will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS and support documents; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable Federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the Federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment. A Record of Decision that explains the final decisions will be made available no sooner than 30 days after the NBAF Final EIS is published.

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1 Environmental Impact Statement lacking. I'm a
2 fiddle player, and I can tell you that it's not
3 possible to judge air quality issues if you
4 don't even know whether or not you're going to
5 include an incinerator.

6 That's about all -- that -- that about
7 sums it up right there. It's just common sense.
8 I have spoken with many of you in Washington.
9 I enjoyed meeting you five people. I understand
10 you are provincial. You're intelligent, and it
11 kind of reminds me of when I was a senior in
12 high school and I dated a guy that was top of
13 the class. He was brilliant, absolutely
14 brilliant, not an ounce of common sense.

15 As my grandfather put it most succinctly,
16 "Bless his heart. He couldn't pour pee out of a
17 boot if the instructions were written on the
18 bottom." I'm afraid that that's what you folks
19 remind me of.

20 Each one of you has an area of expertise
21 where you are brilliant, but as far as seeing
22 the overall picture -- as far as seeing it
112.3 absolutely defies logic and common sense to put
a facility such as this in the middle of every
major water supply of every major community in

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's water quality concerns. The NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.13.8 describes the waste management options available to control and dispose of NBAF's liquid and solid wastes. The NBAF EIS Chapter 3 Section 3.7.7 describes the Umstead Farm Research Site alternative's potential water resource's affects including permitting and planning options available to prevent and mitigate potential spill and runoff affects.

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1 cont. | this area.

1|12.3

A stone's throw from Knapp of Reeds Creek,

3 | which is already compromised, that feeds into

4 | the Raleigh, Falls of the Neuse water supply,

5 | that is in the close proximity of people that

are so fragile, as Mr. Pike so succinctly put

2|19.3

it, just the threat -- just the rumor of an

8 | outbreak would literally kill them. It defies

9 | logic.

10 | But anyway, that's already been covered.

11 | Y'all are nice folks, like I said. You've got

12 | another meeting coming up this afternoon. We

13 | get another opportunity to point out to you that

3|25.3 | you, in fact, do not have community support.

We're going to hold you to that.

16 | But in interest of all of these fine

17 | people, as y'all were so nice about letting us

18 | meet in Washington, let me make a suggestion

19 | that in the future, when you have people that

20 | are signed up to speak, read out two or three

3 cont. | names so that we all have time to be waiting at

25.3

the microphone so that we can continue to tell

23 | you how much community support you lack; how

4|2.0 | your department does not have the public's trust.

The track record of the Department of

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Comment No: 2Issue Code: 19.3

Chapter 3, Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. DHS cannot guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident; however, the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen from the NBAF is extremely low. The economic impact of an accidental release, including the impact on the livestock-related industries, is presented in Chapter 3, Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. The major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a potential ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free.

Comment No: 3Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 4Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of confidence in the DHS and concerns regarding safe facility operations. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Chapter 3, Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, then site-specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the area.

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4 cont.
2.0

Homeland Security is abysmal. We know it. If you would like to regain this country's trust in the abilities of the Department of Homeland Security, read your own conclusions. Read the conclusions in your own reports that state, "No action is the best option," or "Plum Island is the best site."

5|5.0

Please, read your own -- take this opportunity to convince the people of the United States of America that the Department of Homeland Security does, in fact, expand beyond color codes, duct tape, plastic, and other insulting things that they come up with to supposedly keep us safe.

5 cont.
5.0

Give us our confidence back in our government by admitting that this is an abysmal idea; that this does not belong anywhere -- anywhere on the mainland.

And it's questionable whether the level 4 belongs anywhere. As it's my understanding, Plum Island won't have it. I strongly think that's part of why you're looking. If it's money, you could have taken the 88 million you spent -- had spent up to a year ago just looking into it to offset the cost of ferrying

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Comment No: 5Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

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1 equipment and workers onto Plum Island.

2 To bring it inland where you have a site

5 cont. that has prevailing winds that go out to sea is

5.0

a great disregard of the population. You're

5 supposed to keep us secure. I'm an American

6 Citizen. I demand that you do it.

7 MS. COGHILL: Thank you, everybody.

8 It's 4:00, and we're --

9 MR. PIKE: I think we have another 30

10 minutes.

11 MS. COGHILL: Sir, I'm not finished.

12 If you can please sit down.

13 MR. PIKE: Ma'am, we have 30 more

14 minutes. You can't leave us until 4:30.

15 MS. COGHILL: That's correct. If

16 you'll let me finish speaking, what I was going

17 to say was it's 4:00. A lot of folks who have

18 spoken -- who have signed up have spoken. We

19 are here to listen to you. At this point in

20 time, we would, therefore, like to open it up to

21 folks who may have just shown up from work who

22 haven't had an opportunity to speak, or anyone

23 else who feels that they didn't finish their

24 comments from earlier.

25 We're asking that the same process be

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1 followed, that you come up to the microphone,
2 state your name, and each person is given three
3 minutes. So, having said that, is there anyone
4 here that showed up from work or wasn't able to
5 speak earlier who is here right now who would
6 like to talk?

7 (No response from audience.)

8 MS. COGHILL: Okay. Is there anyone
9 who did not feel that they finished some things
10 that they said earlier, or would like to come up
11 to the microphone to provide some more comments?
12 Now is the time. Yes, sir, you have a question?

13 UNIDENTIFIED: I have a comment. I
14 would like to say this. Our elected officials
15 that agreed to bring this here -- this lab here
16 to begin with, I can promise you that we will do
17 everything in our power to help you look for a
18 new job come election time.

19 MS. SPANN: This is Kathryn Spann once
20 again. I also noted that the Draft EIS does
21 not include any comprehensive listing of all of
22 the items of infrastructure that the host
23 community and state would be expected to fund,
24 and the estimated cost for that infrastructure,
25 state by state.

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 8.0

DHS notes the commentor's concerns. While the potential costs of proposed actions are not a factor in the environmental impact analysis presented in the NBAF EIS, cost information of the NBAF Alternatives is summarized in Section 2.5, Table 2.5.1-1 of the NBAF EIS to provide pertinent information to the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology so that he may make a more informed decision with respect to the alternatives presented in the NBAF EIS. Infrastructure costs were analyzed and included in the final costs provided in the NBAF EIS. Additionally, the Site Cost Report, available on the NBAF Web Site for public review and discussed in Section 2.6, is one of several reports that will be considered in addition to the NBAF EIS, in selecting the Preferred Alternative for the Final EIS and ROD .

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1cont|
8.0

As stated by one of my fellow GNAT members, the community is expected to fund the infrastructure starting from five feet outside the lab; and in fact, elsewhere in the feasibility study, it is my understanding that the community must fund the pad upon which the lab is built.

Those costs, the cost of the central utilities plant, which the host site is also expected to fund, all of those must appear in the draft EIS in order to be adequately considered in the Record of Decision by the ultimate decision makers. Thank you.

MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Yes, ma'am.

15

MS. MCNEILL: My name is Elaine McNeill. Kathryn, that -- the demolition inspection 5.2 page one, assumes that the building pad will be provided by the host site. That's in the feasibility study, and that's the reference.

18.3

It also states that in addition to the CUP, which will cost millions of dollars, there's even some question that it might require some in-kind project contributions for the CUP. The mobile non-fixed program-specific scientific

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 8.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the cost of the utility infrastructure to support the NBAF operation at the Umstead Research Farm site. Section 3.3.7 of the NBAF EIS includes an assessment of the current infrastructure, a discussion of the potential effects from construction and operation of the NBAF, and the identification of any infrastructure improvements necessary to meet design criteria and insure safe operation. Funding mechanisms for identified utility improvements or upgrades are beyond the scope of the NBAF EIS. However, while the potential costs of proposed actions are not a factor in the environmental impact analysis presented in the NBAF EIS, cost information and the scope of the cost analysis performed is summarized in Section 2.5 of the NBAF EIS to provide pertinent information to the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology so that he may make a more informed decision with respect to the alternatives presented in the NBAF EIS.

DHS notes the commentor's concern that the number of parking spaces on the facility drawings will not accommodate the projected number of jobs at the NBAF. The drawings shown in the NBAF EIS are conceptual design drawings. If the decision is made to build the NBAF, a site-specific building design will be completed and adequate parking will be available for NBAF employees and visitors.

DHS notes commentor's concern that fuel oil will be stored in underground tanks for NBAF emergency generator operation at the Umstead Research Farm site. The current design of the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm site specifies only above-ground tanks for fuel storage. No underground tanks are included in the NBAF design.

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1 cont.
8.3

equipment, for example, the CUP, all the site utilities beyond the 550 buildings, and in section 5.23, based upon the selected site, a portion of these CUP services may be provided by the Consortium.

Well, I'd like to tell you that the Consortium is out begging for tobacco money to fight GNAT. They're not going to have money to fund your portion of the CUP services. So you can forget that.

I also have a question regarding the auxiliary energy -- the auxiliary power to be provided. Fuel oil, I understand, is what's going to be used. You're going to have to have a 30-day supply. That's 500,000 gallons of fuel oil you're going to store on site.

The largest commercially available tank is a 30,000 gallon tank, and according to the feasibility study, you're going to have to have 16 and two thirds 30-gallon, underground tanks filled with fuel oil on site.

And we remember what the soils of this site are, don't we, from the draft Environmental Impact Statement? I'd also like to ask why, when you're going to have up to 236 jobs -- why

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1 cont. | does your parking place only have 150 spaces? I
8.3 | don't understand it.

3 | MS. COGHILL: Yes, sir.

4 | MR. MCKELLAR: My name is Bill

5 | McKellar, and I'd like to finish my previous

6 | comments, please. As I was mentioning earlier,
1|19.3;
2|15.3 | one of the most blatant deficiencies is the lack
o | of emergency plans for the institutions outside
9 | the three-kilometer perimeter, such as Murdoch
10 | Center.

11 | As a member of the Human Rights Committee
12 | of Murdoch Center, which is home to 575 of North
13 | Carolina's most admittedly complicated,
14 | developmentally disabled, I would just love to
15 | invite you to visit Murdoch Center so you could
16 | see the individuals that cannot be evacuated.

17 | I promise you that you would never forget
18 | what you saw. To move some of these people in
19 | the condition that they're in, would be fatal.

20 | In conclusion, I would like to thank Mr. Johnson
21 | for responding to our request for the listening
22 | of the comments.

23 | We felt like, earlier, that it was not done
24 | properly, and some of our people were hesitant
25 | about speaking because of the long wait; and I'd

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents,, external events, and intentional acts. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF at the Umstead Research Farm Site, specific protocols would be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area and would include stipulations for any special-needs populations, including institutionalized populations.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's suggestion. DHS is aware of the presence of the health and correctional facilities, described in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS has held public meetings and conducted outreach efforts to ensure that the surrounding communities, including officials of the health and correctional facilities, are well aware of the proposed action. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives. Nevertheless, should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, then site specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies, that would consider the diversity and density of human populations residing within the area. DHS would offer coordination and training to local medical personnel regarding the effects of pathogens to be studied at the NBAF. Emergency management plans will also include training for local law enforcement, health care, and fire and rescue personnel.

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1 like to thank you for responding to our request
 2 for a translator for the hearing-impaired. I
 3 appreciate that.

3|21.3 But in conclusion, the possibility of a
 breach of containment is always present. That
 6 is an inherent risk with facilities like the
 7 NBAF, but if there -- there would be absolutely
 8 no risk involved if the lab was not here. So,
 9 why should we ever take that chance?

4|25.3 The people of Butner don't want the NBAF.
 We want the Consortium, we want the Department
 12 of Homeland Security, and the NBAF supporters
 13 who do not live in Granville County to clearly
 14 understand that we don't want the NBAF here; and
 15 that last sentence is not very hard to
 16 understand.

17 And if the NBAF is sited for Southern
 18 Granville County and Butner, we shall not
 19 threaten litigation. We will promise you that
 20 the -- we promise the DHS that we will see you
 21 in court. Thank you very much.

22 MS. COGHILL: Thank you. Yes, sir, go
 23 ahead.

24 DR. PULLIE: I'm Dave Pullie. I have
 25 a lot of sympathy for you guys. I am a

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Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.3

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some "accidents" are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commenter's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 research scientist. I have been a manager of
 2 large organizations. I've had to impose
 3 decisions on people who don't like them. I feel
 4 a lot of sympathy for you.

1|25.3 The DEIS might be more effective than some
 other people think. It gave me, as a scientist,
 7 sufficient information to decide on my position.
 8 I decided I was against it.

9 Had it said what I expected it to say,
 10 which is the probability of a severe accident
 11 means quite a lot, and had it said you had done
 12 everything possible to mitigate the possible
 13 damages, I might have said, "Okay. I'll buy
 14 it." But it doesn't. It says that the
 15 likelihood of a severe problem is like a hundred
 16 years out. It's going to happen in my lifetime
 17 or my children's lifetime.

18 And it says you have very, very simple,
 19 obvious mitigation that a seven-year old can
 20 figure out, that you don't want to take. Or at
 21 least, it's not so obvious that you're
 22 considering it.

2|5.0 Putting it on an island seems so obvious
 that anyone could figure it out.

25 You stated on your report what might be

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. As described in Section 2.4.3 of the NBAF EIS, other potential locations to construct the NBAF were considered during the site selection process but were eliminated based on evaluation by the selection committee. It was suggested during the scoping process that the NBAF be constructed in a remote location such as an island distant from populated areas or in a location that would be inhospitable (e.g., desert or arctic habitat) to escaped animal hosts/vectors; however, the evaluation criteria called for proximity to research programs that could be linked to the NBAF mission and proximity to a technical workforce. The Plum Island Site is an isolated location as was suggested while still meeting the requirements listed in the Expressions of Interest.

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2 cont| the best solution of all, put it on a really --
5.0 | really remote island. Why aren't we putting it
3 | on a really remote island? We decided, a
4 | priori, without justification, without
5 | considering the options, that it had to be near
6 | people, near researchers, near workers.

7 | It didn't seem to matter where you decided
8 | to put Gitmo, either, did it? I mean, we just
9 | needed it a long, long way away from the U.S.
10 | Constitution.

2 cont| You need to go back to that option. You
5.0 | need to at least, in order to satisfy your legal
13 | obligations, consider the option of not putting
14 | it near people.

15 | I manage a research group in the Research
16 | Triangle Park. We manage to do research
17 | collaboration not with the people in Butner, but
18 | the people in Beijing, Bangalore, Bellarusse, all
19 | around the world. You don't need to be close
20 | to the researchers.

21 | You don't need to be close to people. You
22 | don't need to terrorize people. These are
23 | terrorized people. You don't need to terrorize
24 | people in the name of protecting them from
25 | terrorism.

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2 cont.
5.0

Put it somewhere a long way away from
everybody. Put in on an island in the ocean.

3 Put it on the surface of the moon or something.

4 Just put it a long way away from the people

5 you're supposed to be protecting, please.

6 MS. KEISO: Hi, I'm Pat Keiso, and I'm

7 a resident of Oxford, North Carolina, just up

8 the pike, so, I guess I'm not as concerned as

9 they are. I understand their concerns, but I

10 just want to say thank you to all of you for

11 coming and listening to their concerns.

12 And I wish you Godspeed that everything

13 will work out for the best for everyone. We do

14 need research, definitely, and I hope the best

15 choice is made for everyone, and for our

16 country. God bless you, and God bless our

17 country, and God bless North Carolina, and

18 Granville County. Thank you.

19 MS. COGHILL: Is there anyone else who

20 would like to make a comment, please? Yes, sir.

21 Go ahead.

22 MR. PIKE: First, let me apologize

23 sincerely about -- I get emotional. I told you

24 before, I love this county. I moved here in

25 1976 and raised my three children and my six

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's support for the NBAF project.

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1 grandchildren are here. I love this county. I
2 love the people in it, and I do get emotional.

3 This is not good for our county, and my
4 apology is directed to you, ma'am, sincerely. I
5 did not mean to jump at you, but I tend to do
6 that; and I may do it again, gentlemen. Please
7 forgive me. I won't assault you, yet.

8 I wanted to point out the reason I'm
9 emotional -- one of the reasons I'm emotional.
10 Again, in 1989, the State of North Carolina
11 tried to put a hazardous waste incinerator next
12 to Oxford, directly downwind of where my
13 children -- no grandchildren at that point --
14 where my children lived.

15 I bought a hundred acre piece of land in
16 the middle of their proposed site, and I sold it
17 to 10,000 people. So, the cost of buying that
18 land would have been three to \$5 million
19 dollars. Their budget was about a half a
20 million dollars. So, they went somewhere else.

21 Again, it meant that much to me, my
22 dedication, and my love for Granville County,
23 and my love for this beautiful way of life, that
24 I would take this stance -- whatever it takes.

25 When I did that, the State of North

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1 Carolina, in their infinite wisdom, and a
2 company called Thermo-Chem, said, "Well, let's
3 move it somewhere else." Guess where they moved
4 it? To the same damn site you people have
5 chosen.

6 Now, that's deja vu all over again.
7 That's why we're so paranoid. That's one of the
8 reasons we're so paranoid. When they did that,
9 ladies gentlemen, and this is what will happen
10 in October if you choose this site, there were
11 2000 people in the street right down there,
12 marching towards the site.

13 It was the number one story in the State
14 of North Carolina in 1990. They didn't come to
15 Granville County. Go away. It won't work, I
16 can just about promise you. You don't know the
17 whole story yet.

1|20 Those people in the suits haven't told you
the truth. When it comes down to you putting
2|25.3 that facility near these disabled, beautiful
human beings, I guarantee you, the uproar will
22 be more than you can imagine at this point.
23 There will be 10,000 people on those streets,
24 and you will not get that piece of land.

25 It's something you haven't considered.

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of trust in the federal government.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 You haven't taken it into consideration because
2 you haven't asked us. Folks, you need to ask
3 us the truth. We'll tell you the truth. You
4 may not like it, but we'll tell you the truth.

2 cont. | You're not going to get that piece of
25.3 | land. So, go away. Come back on vacation.

7 Thank you.

8 MS. COGHILL: All right, folks. Is
9 there anyone else who would like to make
10 additional comments or a new comment?

11 (Gentleman begins speaking in crowd away
12 from microphone.)

13 MS. COGHILL: It would be helpful if
14 you could come to the microphone, sir, and we
15 can hear you, sir. Thank you very much.

16 UNIDENTIFIED: I'm not even from
17 Granville County. I'm actually just a student
18 from N.C. State University doing a little
19 research on the project, and my first concern is
20 with the lack of civil discourse.

21 As a young person, I would hope that
22 people could resolve their issues in a way that
23 was a little bit more charitable to both sides.

24 And I think you get much more across when
25 you're a little bit more calm and patient when

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1 making your arguments through a much more civil
2 manner. My second thing is Atlanta -- Downtown
3 Atlanta has the Center for Disease Control, a
4 major metropolitan area, and a huge
5 international airport there. I don't really see
6 any big outbreaks there either.

7 So, I'm less concerned about that -- I'm
115.0 less concerned about that moving here. My only
9 concern is that I still don't see the rationale
10 for moving it from an island to a much more
11 densely populated area. You have the Triangle
12 really close to that. You also have a huge --
13 there seem to be a population of people who are
14 indigent.

15 So, I don't really think there's going to
16 be a chance of an outbreak if you have sites
17 like this that are close to huge populations of
18 people. That's not my concern. I really don't
19 think it will be that way.

20 I just don't see the logic of moving that.
1 cont. |
5.0 | And I was listening to your research
22 presentation, and there's a lot of pages, but I
23 think the problem this panel has had is they
24 haven't spoken clearly enough to the average
25 citizen about their concerns.

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. As described in Section 2.3.1, DHS's site selection process incorporated site selection criteria that included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or sem-urban areas. It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

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1 I think if both sides do that, you can
2 both come to a resolution that will work in both
3 of your favors. Thank you for your time.

4 MS. COGHILL: Thank you very much. We
5 have time for, like, two more speakers. Yes,
6 ma'am.

UNIDENTIFIED: I want y'all to tell me
15.3 what you think about this question. Would you
9 -- suppose you lived in Butner, how would you
10 feel? Turn it around. Would you want it here
11 if you lived here? All of you?

12 How many would like it here if you lived
13 here? Do I see any hands go up? (Interruption
14 by people talking at once in the audience.)

15 UNIDENTIFIED: See, y'all want to put
16 it here and just up and leave, but we've got to
17 live here. We're on a fixed income. I cannot
18 move. I'm retired. I've been retired 12 years,
19 and I'm still working to pay bills. Me and my
20 husband, he's got medical problems, and I have
21 to still work, and I'm 62 years old.

22 Y'all didn't answer my question. Who
23 wants to -- would y'all want to live here?

24 MS. COGHILL: What's important is that
25 we just need to --

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 5.3

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

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1 UNIDENTIFIED: I mean, how would you
2 feel if you lived here? Well, y'all answered
3 the question then.

4 MS. COGHILL: Thank you.

5 UNIDENTIFIED: Nobody wants to live
6 here, right? And we can't sell our property.
7 We can't afford it. Some people can. Some of
8 'em's got millions of dollars, and I suspect all
9 of y'all can afford to move. It would be no
10 problem for y'all.

11 But for all the elderly people, and all
12 those retarded people, they ain't got nowhere to
13 go. Their family don't care nothing about them.
14 It's only the workers. And they're already
15 short of help at the new hospital right now, the
16 mental hospital. Central Regional Hospital,
17 they cannot find enough help.

18 You need to go visit them. Y'all don't
19 know nothing, and they have -- all of them's got
20 private rooms over there at the Central Medical
21 -- Central Regional Hospital.

22|12.3 And I thought about the water supply, too.
Where's all this water coming from? Are y'all
24 going to build a river around here or what?
25 Butner can't support -- supply everybody. We

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Comment No: 2Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's water supply concerns. As described in the Section 3.7.7.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Granville Water and Sewer Authority has 3 to 4 million gallons per day of excess potable water capacity and could meet NBAF's need of approximately 110,000 gallons per day, less than 0.4% of the Authority's total current capacity. The NBAF potable water usage is comparable to 210 residential homes' annual potable water usage.

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1 didn't ask for the Polk Youth Center. You put
2 it here. The federal prison, they put that here.
3 Now, they've got the federal hospital and
4 something else built over there behind. I don't
5 even know what it is. We had nothing to say
6 about it.

7 So, we're not even citizens of America,
8 are we? We can't even vote against what we
9 don't want.

10 MS. COGHILL: Thank you. We have time
11 for one more person if there's one more person
12 who would like to make any comments. Okay.
13 Having said that, I'd like to turn it over to
14 Jamie.

15 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you. I think most
16 of you know we will back here tonight. The
17 opening reception will begin at 6:00, and we'll
18 be meeting at 7:00. So, if you hope to make a
19 comment, we will be back tonight. We invite you
20 and the rest of the community back. So, we do
21 appreciate your time this afternoon, and giving
22 us these comments.

23 Again, you don't have to make your comment
24 today or tonight. If you think about things
25 after you've left here, you're certainly welcome

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1 to submit those by August 25th, for it to be
2 addressed and responded to in the final EIS.
3 Our folks will be in the back to answer any
4 question that you have about the comment process.

5 So, I really thank you for your comments
6 this afternoon, and with that, we will
7 officially adjourn the meeting and report back
8 here later tonight. Thank you.

9 (Whereupon, the afternoon meeting was adjourned
10 at 4:25.)

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY

DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

(NBAF DRAFT EIS)

DATE: JULY 31, 2008

7:00 p.m.

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

STUDENT UNION-FORUM HALL

MANHATTAN, KANSAS 66502

Catherine Coghill, Moderator

PANEL MEMBERS:

Mr. James Johnson, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security

Dr. Steven M. Kappes, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture

Mr. Charles Pergler, Tetra Tech, Inc.


Reported by:

Donna M. Lytle, CSR, RPR, CRR
OWENS, BRAKE & ASSOCIATES
234 North 7th Street, Suite E
Salina, Kansas 67401

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3	NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY		
4	DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT		
5	(NBAF DRAFT EIS)		
6	INDEX PAGE		
7			
8	WELCOME:	PAGE	LINE
9	Mr. Johnson	4	1
10	Moderator Coghill	5	19
11			
12	PRESENTATIONS:		
13	Mr. Johnson	8	16
14	Dr. Kappes	13	10
15	Mr. Pergler	17	20
16			
17	QUESTION & ANSWER SESSION:		
18	No questions were asked		
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			



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3	Congressman Jerry Moran	35	12
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11	Ron Fehr	75	5
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1 25th, 2008, and there are many ways for you to
2 submit comments. Any comments received by August
3 25th will be addressed and responded to in the
4 final EIS. Please keep in mind you do not have to
5 make your comments tonight. You can provide
6 comments at a later date through any of the
7 mechanisms listed on the slide as long as we
8 receive them by August 25th. Thank you.

9 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, Jamie.
10 At this point in time, we are at the question and
11 answer period of the agenda for this evening and
12 would like to clarify that if you have questions,
13 please make sure it's just one question and you
14 pose it to the panel. Come to the microphone, and
15 state your name, if you'd like, and your
16 organization.

17 Also would like -- if there aren't any
18 questions at this time, we do have over 40 people
19 who'd like to speak this evening so please keep
20 that in consideration so we can give everyone an
21 opportunity to speak.

22 Does anyone have any clarifying questions
23 that they'd like to ask the panel at this time?

24 Having said that, I would like to proceed
25 to the formal comment period so we can accommodate

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1 everyone this evening.

2 The first person to speak is Mark

3 Hatesohl.

4 Please remember that you have three

5 minutes, and at two minutes 30 seconds I'll show

6 the yellow card, at three minutes the red, and if

7 you would please sit down if you're not finished

8 so we can accommodate everyone, it'd be greatly

9 appreciated. Thank you very much.

10 MR. HATESOHL: Good evening, my name

11 is Mark Hatesohl. I'm the mayor of Manhattan and

12 speaking on behalf of the citizens of our

13 community.

14 The City of Manhattan has been and

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15 continues to be very supportive of the National

16 Bio and Agro-Defense Facility project. In

17 February of 2007, Manhattan City Commission passed

18 a resolution of support for the project and

19 pledged up to \$5 million dollars in economic

20 assistance for the project. A copy of the

21 resolution was submitted during the August 27th,

22 2007, NBAF scoping meetings.

23 The City of Manhattan is proud to be one

24 of five finalist sites in consideration for the

25 NBAF. I believe that our community should be

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1 strongly considered for this facility for the
2 following key reasons: First, our community has
3 an excellent track record of cooperation and
4 collaboration between the city, county,
5 University, Fort Riley, other state and federal
6 agencies, as well as our business community to
7 achieve results. The NBAF continues to have
8 strong support from all levels of government in
9 Kansas, and this coalition stands ready to make
10 the NBAF a reality and make the project a success
11 long after the announcement of the site.

12 Second, Kansas State University has
13 outstanding research capabilities and has
14 established itself as a national leader in food
15 safety security.

16 Finally, the existence of the BRI, the
17 Bio Research Institute, a Bio Level 3 facility
18 here at K-State is key because it demonstrates the
19 commitment to the issue of national security and
20 food safety, it shows that we can build a state of
21 the art facility here in the heartland and the BRI
22 is capable of supporting NBAF research today years
23 before the final NBAF is constructed.

24 The City of Manhattan continues to be a
25 strong supporter of this project and look forward

1 cont.|24.4

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1 cont 24.4	1	to assisting the NBAF to become a reality in the	
	2	State of Kansas. Thank you.	
	3	MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, sir.	
	4	The next speaker is David Weyents.	
	5	David Weyents. If I'm not pronouncing	
	6	the last name correctly, the spelled is	
	7	W-E-Y-E-N-T-S. If you're here, please come	
	8	forward.	
	9	What we will do at this point in time,	
	10	we'll move forward, and if Mr. Weyents shows up,	
	11	we'll make sure we accommodate him.	
	12	The next speaker is Senator Pat Roberts.	
	13	SENATOR ROBERTS: This is Senator Pat	
1 24.4	14	Roberts. I wanted to speak to you today about the	
	15	necessity of locating NBAF in Kansas. It is clear	
	16	to me that Kansans know better than anyone	
	17	anywhere the importance of our nation's health and	
	18	food supply, and we understand better than anyone	
	19	else the importance of keeping these things safe.	
	20	If I've said it once, I've said it a	
	21	thousand times, Kansas wins this one on the	
	22	merits. Kansas is centrally located making	
2 17.4	23	transportation and access easy, and we supply many	
	24	of our nations vital food resources. No one knows	
	25	better how to protect our bio and ag industry than	

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4
DHS notes the Senator's support for the Manhattan Campus Site.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 17.4
DHS notes the Senator's statement.

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1 Kansans and no one is better in safeguarding our
2 food supply.

3 What is more, Kansans have already built
4 a similar research facility on K-State's campus.
5 We even did this on time and under budget.

6 The research that will be done at NBAF is
7 as important as any being done in the entire world
8 today. We can build a safe lab that will lend
9 itself to ground breaking research that is vital
10 to our national security, and I believe we, better
11 than any other site, will attract industry experts
12 to accomplish these goals. None of the other
13 finalists can say that.

14 Kansas has a great emergency plan putting
15 safety first, and is a national leader in first
16 response for animal disease outbreaks, and a
17 vaccine for FMD is on the horizon. This vaccine,
18 and others, will be made by companies like those
19 located in Kansas City's Animal Health Corridor.
20 This is the largest concentration of animal health
21 companies anywhere in the world.

22 Like I said, when we began this endeavor,
23 Kansas wins this one on the merits. We have the
24 experts, we have the drive, and we have the
25 experience to keep our country safe.

1 cont.| 24.4

3| 19.4

1 cont.| 24.4

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 19.4
DHS notes the commentor's statement.

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1 I appreciate the chance to go on record
2 this evening with my continued support for NBAF in
3 Kansas. Thank you.

4 MODERATOR COGHILL: As a point of
5 process, I'd just like to clarify, folks, this is
6 a very emotional issue for everybody and we ask
7 everybody to respect to be heard while speaking
8 and to use that same respect while we're
9 listening.

10 The next person to speak is Congressman
11 Jerry Moran.

12 CONGRESSMAN MORAN: Secretary
13 Chertoff, our nation needs a modern bio and
14 agricultural defense facility and Kansas is the
15 right home for it. There's a very strong
16 commitment by the State of Kansas, its people, its
17 industry, and its leaders, for locating the
18 Department of Homeland Security National Bio and
19 Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas.

20 As an agricultural state, Kansans know
21 that protecting U.S. agriculture from
22 bio-terrorist attack must be a national priority.
23 Kansas has a long history to dedication to
24 biosciences and animal health, and its people
25 understand and support NBAF, research that

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the Congressman's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1 benefits their industries and their livelihoods.

2 Thousands of Kansans make a living
3 through farming and ranching across our state.

4 The Animal Health Corridor in Kansas City hosts
5 the largest concentration of animal health
6 companies in our country. Kansas State University
7 is the nation's premier animal health research
8 institution with a state of the art facility
9 standing ready to immediately accept DHS
10 researchers and scientists.

11 Kansas has the central location, skilled
12 work force, the infrastructure, the collaboration
13 capabilities, and the strong citizen support
14 necessary to ensure that NBAF's mission is
15 fulfilled.

16 Mr. Secretary, as DHS continues the site
17 selection process, I want to assure you that
18 Manhattan, Kansas, holds the key to NBAF's
19 success.

20 MODERATOR COGHILL: Senator Sam
21 Brownback.

22 SENATOR BROWNBACK: -- the great
23 State of Kansas, and thank you for allowing me to
24 participate via this recorded statement during
25 your two public meetings on the Environmental

1 cont. | 24.4

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1 Impact Statement for the National Bio and
2 Agro-Defense Facility.

3 I'm sorry I can't be with you in person
4 tonight. I'd love to be there, but there's simply
5 too much going on in Washington. I've been proud
6 to work diligently with my colleagues in
7 Washington and our friends back in Kansas to
8 promote the candidacy of Manhattan, Kansas, for
9 the NBAF facility.

10 I believe Kansas State University, my
11 alma matter, the City of Manhattan, and the State
12 of Kansas, have put together an excellent
13 proposal, what I believe to be a winning proposal.
14 When based on the merits, Manhattan deserves to be
15 the next home of NBAF.

16 We in Kansas, particularly Kansas State
17 University, have a long history with agricultural
18 research. Supporting such research is second
19 nature for us. For example, Manhattan is located
20 within the Animal Health Research Corridor, a
21 stretch of land from Manhattan, Kansas, to
22 Columbia, Missouri, with the largest single
23 concentration of animal health facilities in the
24 world.

25 One third of the \$14 billion dollar

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the Senator's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1 global market for animal health is located within
2 a short drive of Manhattan. This region is also
3 home to 165 life science companies with 37 focused
4 on protecting and securing animal health. I
5 believe this concentration of commercial assets
6 and expertise in animal health near Manhattan will
7 further enable NBAF to succeed in its mission of
8 studying zoonotic and foreign animal diseases.

9 If Manhattan is chosen as the next site
10 for NBAF, you can rest assured it has the full
11 support of the local community, Kansas State
12 University, the State of Kansas, and the Kansas
13 congressional delegation.

14 This high level of cooperation between
15 each group exemplifies what is best about Kansas.
16 We enjoy setting lofty goals and working together
17 to achieve them which benefits and befits our
18 state motto of Ad Astra per Aspera, to the stars
19 through difficulty.

20 The support that NBAF enjoys in the
21 Manhattan and State of Kansas is unanimous and
22 genuine. We live in a dangerous world, and we
23 must remain dedicated to ensuring the safety of
24 our citizens and our food supply. With the
25 existing world class infrastructure already in

1 cont|244

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1 cont. | 24.4

1 place at Kansas State, like the state of the art
2 Biosecurity Research Institute next to the NBAF
3 site, the critical work of NBAF can begin
4 immediately. If chosen, the Manhattan site will
5 be able to start high level research that
6 contributes to NBAF's mission on day one.

7 These are just a few of the reasons why
8 Manhattan, Kansas, is the best site for the new
9 National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility. I've
10 enjoyed working on this project and I look forward
11 to your decision. When based solely on the
12 merits, Manhattan has put together the best
13 proposal and offers NBAF the greatest chance for
14 success.

15 Thank you for allowing me to participate.

16 MODERATOR COGHILL: The next speaker
17 is Teresa Ardery-Minton. If you could please come
18 to the microphone.

19 Miss Lydia Peele follows Teresa.

20 MS. ARDERY-MINTON: I have lived here
21 for 25 years, and I feel a little bit like I'm a
22 salmon swimming upstream, but my comments tonight
23 are coming from my head and my heart.

24 When I heard that the DHS was considering
25 Manhattan as a site for NBAF, I had mixed

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1 emotions. At first, I was excited about the
2 prospect of a sophisticated laboratory locating in
3 our community. The positives are obvious, both
4 financially, professionally and academically.

5 As I thought about it more deeply,
6 however, my enthusiasm waned. Having dangerous
7 pathogens located in the center of our town and in
8 the middle of agricultural America seemed
9 counterintuitive.

10 There is no question that our nation
11 needs a facility of this nature. That is not in
12 question. I came to the conclusion, however,
13 there is just no compelling reason to place such a
14 facility in an area that is surrounded by the very
15 plants and animal species that are most
16 susceptible to the pathogens that will be studied.

17 The accidents that have occurred at other
18 facilities are common knowledge to you and to many
19 others who are attending this meeting tonight. It
20 only takes one individual who's careless, or one
21 who has malicious intent, to make every advantage
22 gained from NBAF seem trivial, meaningless and
23 shortsighted. Professional research scientists
24 and technicians, as we've seen in Europe, are not
25 above hatred and vindictive acts against our

1|5.0

1 cont.|5.0

2|21.4

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0

As described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's site selection criteria included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or semi-urban areas. Nevertheless, it has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding a careless or malicious and criminal act perpetrated by a NBAF employee.. Section 3.14 addresses accident scenarios, including internal and external events, such as, an "insider" criminal act and terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Additionally, Section 3.14 investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

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1 nation.

2 I do not draw comfort from your security

3 measures. There are people and organizations who

4 have made it their full time jobs to circumvent

5 all of the road blocks you have put in their way.

6 As we have seen in the past, people who wish us

7 harm are willing to wait years to realize their

8 glory at our expense.

9 The weather, of course, must be factored

10 in as well. My brother, who works as a

11 firefighter in Oklahoma City, was present when the

12 EF5 tornado hit several years ago. He described

13 to me extraordinary destruction. Asphalt was

14 pulled up off the road and foundations were

15 scoured free of all conduits and pipes down to

16 foundation.

17 I question exactly how one can engineer a

18 facility to withstand such an event unless it is

19 built below ground. So when we add the

20 unpredictability of mother nature to the

21 unpredictability of human nature, the

22 possibilities of failure increase substantially.

23 When you factor in these risks, no matter how

24 small, it begs the question as to why anyone would

25 want to bring these dangerous pathogens from an

2 cont| 21.4

3| 21.4

4| 5.0

3 cont| 21.4

5| 5.0

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commenter's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement. Section 2.4.3 of the NBAF EIS describes other alternatives considered including building the NBAF beneath a mountain. However, this was dismissed from further consideration since the due to the prohibitive cost and feasibility of such construction.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The Plum Island Alternative is evaluated as a reasonable alternative for the NBAF, as described in Section 2.3.5 of the NBAF EIS.

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1 island to the center of the United States.

2 The majority of people who have spoken

3 here tonight have a vested interest in seeing NBAF

4 come to Manhattan, the professional opportunities

6|15.4 5 it will create, the academic partnership, and the

6 money it will bring to our community are all very

7 tempting. Our vision, however, should not be

8 obscured by these gains. Our judgment should not

9 be clouded by the dollar sign set before us.

7|24.1 10 Please keep NBAF on Plum Island.

11 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you. Lydia

12 Peele.

13 MS. PEELE: Good evening. My name is

14 Lydia Peele. I'm a senior in mathematics

15 education and from Olathe, Kansas. I currently

16 serve as the K-State Student Body President.

17 Thank you again for the opportunity to speak in

18 front of you. I would, however, like to share my

19 comments from earlier today for the community.

20 It is my privilege to be the voice of

21 K-State students and as such express our ongoing

22 support of Kansas State University and the State

1|24.4 23 of Kansas in their bid to secure the National Bio

24 and Agro-Defense Facility.

25 On March 8, 2007, our Student Senate

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's opinion. Section 3.10.4 of the NBAF EIS evaluates the foreseeable economic effects of the proposed action at the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative while the potential effects to livestock-related industries are discussed in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 7 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative.

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1 passed Resolution 060743 expressing the support by
2 unanimous consent. Similar to what has been said
3 about the unprecedented cooperation between our
4 state's top political leaders, it is also not
5 often that every member of our student senate with
6 representatives from every college come together
7 to support a cause.

8 Quoting the resolution, it is clear that
9 housing NBAF at K-State would provide students the
10 opportunity for world class internships and part
11 time jobs in cutting edge agricultural research.

12 The unique relationship that exists
13 between our community and K-State students can
14 only be made stronger by a partnership with this
15 facility. Our University already has a history of
16 providing the best and brightest to agricultural
17 research including the Biosecurity and Research
18 Institute, and our highly respected school of
19 veterinary medicine. Our students set high
20 academic goals and are extremely motivated to
21 reach them. It only makes sense to continue this
22 history of excellence by housing NBAF here in
23 Manhattan.

24 Students would benefit enormously, as
25 well as the world class scientists and researchers

1 cont. | 24.4

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1 would will become a part of our community.
 2 Students are excited about the opportunity to work
 3 hand in hand with such esteemed professionals and
 4 welcome the unquestioned impact such work would
 5 have on our undergraduate, graduate or doctoral
 6 education.

7 As an integral part of the Manhattan
 8 community, we also appreciate the positive impact
 9 that would result from the influx of new
 10 scientists, engineers, technology specialists and
 11 construction jobs.

12 K-State students are ready. We see no
 13 better place in America to house NBAF than Kansas
 14 State University and would be proud to respond to
 15 some of our nation's most pertinent security
 16 challenges. Thank you.

17 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, Lydia.

18 Kansas State Representative Nancy Boyda.

19 REPRESENTATIVE BOYDA: While I wish I
 20 could be there in person to speak to you on behalf
 21 of this important cause, my duties in Congress
 22 prevent a personal appearance today. I am
 23 pleased, though, to be able to deliver my message
 24 through the use of technology. In fact, that's
 25 what you're talking about today, technology.

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement regarding employment. The economic effects of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site are presented in Section 3.10.7 of the NBAF EIS. The proposed action would create temporary jobs during the 4-yr construction phase and permanent jobs upon completion of the facility. Section 3.10.7.2 states that the majority of the construction workers would be employed from the immediate area or would commute from the surrounding counties. Upon the facility's completion, permanent employees would include scientific and support staff, as well as operations, maintenance and security staff as described in Section 3.10.7.3. Because many jobs at the NBAF would be highly specialized, it is anticipated that the majority of the employees would relocate to the four-county region from elsewhere in the country. In addition, household spending by these new residents and the operations of the NBAF would likely create job opportunities that would be filled by the local labor force.

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1 For decades there have been concerns
2 about the conditions at Plum Island laboratory and
3 its ability to protect against outside
4 contamination of some of the most dangerous animal
5 diseases.

6 In the late 1990's, Plum Island was
7 insinuated in outbreaks of West Nile Virus and
8 Lyme Disease as well as cases of malaria that even
9 prompted closure of a Boy Scout Camp in Suffolk
10 County on Long Island.

11 The facility was responsible for an
12 accidental release of Foot and Mouth Disease. The
13 consequences from that accidental release could
14 have been disastrous as evidenced by a 2001
15 incident in England. There, an outbreak of Foot
16 and Mouth Disease cost the economy nearly
17 \$20 billion dollars, and led to the destruction of
18 6 million animals.

19 Not only is the current Plum Island
20 facility inadequate to fulfill the mission of the
21 National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, or NBAF,
22 its geographical location is far from ideal should
23 there be a crisis along the Pacific coastline of
24 the United States, and while Plum Island is three
25 miles from shore, these diseases can travel 70

1|25.1

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 25.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Plum Island Site Alternative.

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1 cont. | 25.1

1 miles by air which makes the issue of a poor
2 response time an even greater concern. The
3 shortcomings of Plum Island are self-evident.
4 Meanwhile, the need to prevent and
5 develop counter measures to animal diseases has
6 never been more important. It's imperative to
7 dramatically modernize our animal disease research
8 capabilities.

9 In stark contrast to the 1950's era Plum
10 Island facility, the Kansas State University, it
11 has more than adequate space and security and
12 equipment, and it has the infrastructure to meet
13 modern day requirements.

2 | 24.4

14 Kansas State University is already taking
15 a lead role in creating running specialized
16 training programs that will keep laboratories safe
17 and secure. The National Institutes of Health
18 recently selected K-State's Biosecurity Research
19 Institute to be the host of the National Biosafety
20 and Bio-containment Training Program. The State
21 of Kansas rates this university as our state's
22 highest bioscience priority.

23 NBAF is a critical national investment.
24 Kansas, with its deep agricultural expertise and
25 heritage, stands ready to work with the Department

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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2 cont| 24.4

1 of Homeland Security, as well as the Department of
 2 Agriculture, to tap into our State's rich
 3 concentration of animal health research expertise
 4 and resources to help keep our food supply safe
 5 and our agricultural economy strong.

6 MODERATOR COGHILL: Dr. Sam Graham.
 7 Is Dr. Graham here? I'll make a note that if he
 8 does show up, we'll accommodate him to speak.

9 Dennis Moore.

1|24.4

10 CONGRESSMAN MOORE: I'm Congressman
 11 Dennis Moore. I appreciate the opportunity to
 12 share with you today my support for building the
 13 new National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility here in
 14 Manhattan.

15 I'm sorry I couldn't be with you today.
 16 In thinking about what I wanted to share with you
 17 regarding this important facility and the role
 18 that Manhattan, Kansas, could play, many things
 19 came to mind.

20 I can tell you about the overall
 21 importance of building this new facility so that
 22 we can adequately protect our animals and food
 23 from disease. I can talk to you about our State's
 24 long history and expertise in the fields of
 25 agriculture and animal science. I can go on and

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1 on about the outstanding research facilities, not
2 only at Kansas State University but at colleges
3 and universities around the State that would help
4 supply this new facility with the best and
5 brightest researchers and be excellent partners in
6 their work to protect our nation's food supply.

1 cont. | 24.4 7 I can even talk to you about the
8 outstanding community in and around Manhattan that
9 would provide the necessary support for this new
10 facility and its employees.

11 But instead, I'll simply leave you with
12 this comment. The people of Kansas, my colleagues
13 in Congress and I stand ready to do all that we
14 can do to make this facility a success, and ensure
15 that we have efficiently and effectively protected
16 our food supply and agricultural economy.

17 Thanks very much for the opportunity,
18 once again, to share my strong support for
19 building the NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas.

20 MODERATOR COGHILL: Jennyfer Owensby
21 is our next speaker.

22 Jennyfer will be followed by Jerry Jaax,
23 and then Nancy Jaax.

24 MS. OWENSBY: Hello. As Classified
25 Senate President, and on behalf of the 1,800



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1|24.4

1 classified employees at Kansas State University, I
2 would like to welcome you to the Manhattan
3 community. We believe Manhattan offers an
4 exceptional location for the National Bio and
5 Agro-Defense Facility.

6 Earlier this month, Classified Senate
7 gave all classified employees an opportunity to
8 contact me if they had strong concerns about the
9 possibility of NBAF being located in our
10 community.

11 Not surprisingly, I received no negative
12 comments in response to that request. The
13 comments I did receive were positive and hopeful
14 in regards to what NBAF could do for our work
15 force, our regional community, and most
16 especially, our national security.

17 As you are probably aware, Manhattan and
18 the surrounding communities were built to support
19 a land grant university and a military base. We
20 are fortunate to have two major employers in the
21 area to fine tune and train our work force. Many
22 classified employees have already been trained to
23 provide maintenance and clerical support for BSL-3
24 lab and other secure labs located on the K-State
25 campus.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1 We believe K-State will prove to be an
2 excellent community to recruit scientific support
3 staff from, and provide exceptional work force
4 recruitment and training services for NBAF.

5 As K-State's mission statement states,
6 the mission of Kansas State University is enhanced
7 by symbiotic relationships among the discovery of
8 knowledge and improvement in the quality of life
9 through research applications. Coordinated
10 teaching, research and extension services help
11 develop the highly skilled and educated work force
12 necessary to the economic well-being of Kansas,
13 the nation, and the international community.

14 Classified Senate believes K-State's and
15 NBAF's mission are closely aligned. If you choose
16 to locate NBAF in Manhattan, we think you'll find
17 our work force to be highly supportive of your
18 mission to protect our national food supply.
19 After all, research is what K-State does best.
20 Coordinating with NBAF will allow K-State to take
21 its research mission to a whole new level.

22 Thank you for the opportunity to speak on
23 behalf of K-State's Classified Senate. We
24 appreciate the opportunity to officially welcome
25 NBAF to our community.

1 cont.|24.4

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1 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you,
2 Jennyfer.

3 Jerry Jaax.

4 MR. JAAX: Good evening. My name is
5 Jerry Jaax, and I work at K-State. I'm also a
6 Riley County rancher with economic assets at risks
7 from agricultural diseases. Except for the
8 federal scientists in attendance, I'm also one of
9 the few people here who actually has experience
10 working in BL3 and BL4 facilities, so from the
11 context of my 20 years of experience in
12 bio-containment research and not from hearsay,
13 conjecture, or even well-intentioned
14 misinformation, I'd like to provide my thoughts
15 about some of the questions that are being asked
16 in Manhattan and elsewhere about NBAF and its
17 impact.

18 Some would say we support NBAF, not just
19 here. For most communities, safety concerns drive
20 this issue. I personally believe that our answer
21 should be clear cut. If NBAF cannot be built
22 safely in Manhattan, we should not build it
23 anywhere. We shouldn't build it in Georgia,
24 Texas, North Carolina, Mississippi, not even on
25 Plum Island.

1|50

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

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1 Fortunately, we can build NBAF safely in
 2 all of these sites. Why? Bio-containment works.
 3 The stratified, comprehensive strategies that
 4 comprise modern bio-containment programs, protect
 5 the environment and the surrounding communities.
 6 Decades old BL4 facilities in Atlanta and
 7 Frederick, Maryland, have never had a community
 8 exposure. It is significant that less new major
 9 bio-containment projects, including BL4
 10 laboratories in Galveston, Boston and Chicago, are
 11 all located in populated areas. Not in the
 12 desert, not on a remote island. Bio-containment
 13 facilities work and they are safe.

14 I would like to comment, though, about
 15 the effects of a laboratory release of FMD virus
 16 discussed in the EIS. By design, the EIS process
 17 mandates that all possible negative events,
 18 however remote, are duly considered in the
 19 process. Accordingly, a theoretical release of
 20 FMD virus was evaluated for each of the possible
 21 sites. It's important to understand that this
 22 analysis is based on the statutory requirement to
 23 consider the worse case scenario. For reasons
 24 I've discussed above, the actual risk of a lab
 25 escape is exceedingly remote.

2|5.0

3|21.0

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 5.0

As described in Section 2.4.3 of the NBAF EIS, other potential locations to construct the NBAF were considered during the site selection process but were eliminated based on evaluation by the selection committee. It was suggested during the scoping process that the NBAF be constructed in a remote location such as an island distant from populated areas or in a location that would be inhospitable (e.g., desert or arctic habitat) to escaped animal hosts/vectors; however, the evaluation criteria called for proximity to research programs that could be linked to the NBAF mission and proximity to a technical workforce. The Plum Island Site is an isolated location as was suggested while still meeting the requirements listed in the Expressions of Interest.

Comment No: 3Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's support for the NBAF and understanding that the proposed research would be safely conducted regardless of NBAF location.

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1 Obviously, a lab release would be a
2 national tragedy that would transcend regional
3 impact, regardless of where the NBAF would be
4 located.

5 With that said, the Kansas site fared
6 somewhat unfavorably in this FMD release analysis
7 based primarily on the proximity of the cattle
8 industry. Clearly an outbreak here, as elsewhere,
9 would be exceedingly serious. However, I would
10 like to know if DHS's analysis methodology
11 included assessment for the proximity of both
12 cattle and swine. As an amplification posed for
13 FMD, pigs produced up to 10,000 times the virus of
14 an infected cow. All proposed sites have
15 susceptible populations of cloven-hoofed animals
16 in relatively close proximity.

17 Those in the southeast, however, also
18 have substantial swine production industries
19 roughly comparable to Kansas cattle interests.

20 Additionally, the presence of significant
21 populations of feral, or wild hogs, would pose
22 daunting challenges in the event of a lab release.

23 For clarification, however, I would say
24 that I believe this lab release scenario is
25 largely theoretical, so I raise this issue only in

4|21.4

5|21.4

Comment No: 4Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's question. The presence of wildlife ungulates and specifically wild boar at the Manhattan Campus Site is acknowledged in Section 3.8.4.1.4 of the NBAF EIS. The susceptibility of wild boar to FMD, Rift Valley fever, and Nipah were addressed in Section 3.8.9. This information and additional information on the swine livestock in the Manhattan Campus Site area was used in the risk assessment described in Section 3.14.4.2.

Comment No: 5Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern with the risks associated with a pathogen release and the impact of such a release within wildlife populations. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art biocontainment features and operating procedures to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Chapter 3, Sections 3.8.9, 3.10.9, and 3.14 (Health and Safety), and Appendices B, D, and E of the NBAF EIS, provide a detailed analysis of the consequences from an accidental or deliberate pathogen release. Pathogen release scenarios include for example, an analysis of the potential consequences of Rift Valley Fever (RVF) virus becoming established in native mosquito populations. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF then site specific protocols and emergency response plans would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. RVF and FMD SOPs and response plans would likely include strategies that are similar. However, the RVF response plan would also include a mosquito control action plan.

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1 the context that the report could unduly alarm
2 regional producers, and might ultimately be an
3 unfair discriminator in the site selection
4 process. Thank you.

5 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you,
6 Mr. Jaax.

7 Nancy Jaax is next.

8 MS. JAAX: Thank you. Good evening.
9 My name is Nancy Jaax. I graduated from Kansas
10 State in 1973 and spent the bulk of my
11 professional career as a veterinary pathologist
12 working in medical bio-defense programs at the
13 national and international level.

14 I have over 25 years of experience
15 working in BL3 and BL4 facilities. During my
16 career, I worked with many zoonotic high hazard
17 diseases including Ebola, Marburg, Lassa Fever,
18 Rift Valley Fever, and anthrax, to mention a few.
19 All of these pathogens require special
20 bio-containment facilities.

21 There's clearly a degree of occupational
22 risk that is completely understood and accepted by
23 those of us who choose to do this work. We choose
24 because we believe it is important and for the
25 greater good. Rigorous training, programs, and

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1 specialized facilities combine to reduce personal
2 occupational risks to the lowest possible level.

3 Perhaps most significantly, the safety
4 record over decades of bio-containment operations
5 has demonstrated that occupational risk does not
6 extend to the community.

7 For years, I trusted my life, and the
8 life of my family, to the principals of
9 bio-containment. Despite what many would consider
10 to be extreme occupational risk, I never became
11 infected with any pathogens that I worked with in
12 the laboratory.

13 This fact, and my experience, leads to
14 the main point of my testimony. I find it ironic
15 that contracted West Nile Fever, a newly emergent
16 viral exotic disease from Africa in my own yard
17 when I was routinely working with some of the
18 world's most dangerous hemorrhagic fever viruses
19 in the laboratory.

20 Ten years ago, West Nile Virus was one of
21 exotic diseases that was unimportant and
22 irrelevant to U.S. citizens. This once obscure
23 disease has had a dramatic affect on human,
24 livestock, and wildlife in the United States, and
25 there are dozens of similar diseases, many of

1|27.0

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 27.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

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1 which would be more serious, just waiting for the
2 right circumstances to arrive in this country.

3 My point is that people or livestock in
4 the U.S. are not likely to be infected with
5 disease like West Nile, SARS, Nipah, Rift Valley,
6 FMD, Hendra, African Swine Fever, Exotic
7 Newcastle, or a host of others, as a result of a
8 laboratory release. We are at risk for unexpected
9 outbreaks of disease because of the realities of
10 the shrinking world that we live in.

11 Tomorrow could be the day that another
12 serious emerging pathogen arrives in the U.S.
13 This is the harsh reality of infectious disease.
14 Microorganisms know no borders. For reasons that
15 go far beyond the scope of this discussion,
16 naturally occurring or even intentionally
17 introduced diseases pose increasingly serious
18 threats to our country and to our food supply.

19 We have tremendous agricultural
20 production capability. We must enhance the
21 critical infectious disease research
22 infrastructure necessary to protect it from
23 emerging diseases that can threaten our food
24 supply and our population.

25 It is clear that our strategy cannot be,

21.0

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

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1 "we hope that it won't happen here," or, "not in
2 my back yard."

3 Kansas through the NBAF is committed to
4 helping DHS to accomplish this difficult mission.
5 Thank you.

6 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you very
7 much.

8 Beth Montelone is our next speaker,
9 followed by Fred Fairchild, and then Gary Micheel.

10 MS. MONTELONE: Good evening. My
11 name is Beth Montelone, and I'm a microbiologist
12 and the current Interim Scientific Director of
13 K-State's Biosecurity Research Institute, or BRI.

14 I've previously served for seven years as
15 the Chair of the Institutional Biosafety Committee
16 at K-State which oversees infectious disease
17 research at our campus. K-State's BRI is our
18 state of the art Biosafety Level 3 facility, which
19 you've heard about already tonight, will allow
20 research programs to transition from Plum Island
21 to the NBAF without delay during the construction
22 phase of the NBAF.

23 In the BRI we have the capability to host
24 research being done with important animal, plant,
25 and infectious diseases, that threaten agriculture

Comment No: 3Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1 in this country and around the world.

2 Specifically, the BRI is already working with
3 researchers planning to initiate projects on Rift
4 Valley Fever and Classical Swine Fever, two of the
5 agents that are listed for study at the NBAF. Of
6 the eight listed agents, we can conduct research
7 at the BRI right now on five of them.

8 Our capability to accommodate significant
9 numbers of large farm animals in research, that is
10 32, 800-pound steers, or larger numbers of smaller
11 animals, in a high level containment environment
12 is a resource unmatched at other proposed NBAF
13 locations and means that we could assist in
14 providing authorities with a nimble response to an
15 agro-terrorism threat or foreign animal disease
16 outbreak.

17 Furthermore, the BRI provides a critical
18 mass of researchers from K-State and other
19 institutions with expertise in pertinent fields
20 such as animal and plant diseases, veterinary
21 medicine, and production agriculture. The BRI
22 will be an excellent complement and asset to
23 government scientists at the NBAF.

24 K-State's renowned educational programs
25 will create a pipeline of highly qualified

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1 technical and scientific employees for the NBAF.
2 The BRI has an 11,000 square foot integrated
3 training suite which is a perfect location for
4 providing these future NBAF staff members with
5 hands-on instruction working in high continuum
6 positions.

7 To summarize the BRI's research
8 capabilities, scientific staff, and unparalleled
9 work force development opportunities will be a
10 huge asset to NBAF, and the BRI is just one of the
11 reasons that it makes sense for Manhattan, Kansas,
12 to be selected as the location for NBAF.

13 Thank you very much for your time.

14 MODERATOR COGHILL: Fred Fairchild.

15 MR. FAIRCHILD: Good evening, I'm
16 Fred Fairchild, incoming President of Kansas State
17 University Faculty Senate, and a professor in the
18 Department of Grain Science and Industry at Kansas
19 State University.

20 The Faculty Senate is a group of some 90
21 plus senators that represent 2,500 faculty and
22 unclassified professionals throughout the
23 University system here at Kansas State University.
24 One of the things that we have in Faculty Senate
25 is a hot floor for debate, and although NBAF has

1 cont| 24.4

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1 been a known issue for a number of years, and we
2 testified last year at the first input information
3 and also are here today, although a few of our
4 colleagues have voiced concerns about NBAF, never
5 once was there a mounted opposition to NBAF being
6 brought to Kansas State University or to Manhattan
7 from the Faculty Senate. And so I would feel that
8 a majority of our Faculty Senate members either
9 did not voice their opinion, or do not appose it.
10 Obviously, there are some who may and they're
11 willing to speak and I'll gladly allow them to
12 speak for themselves.

13 One of the things that you might not
14 realize is some 20 years ago, if you'd come to
15 Kansas State, you'd found a mediocre average
16 University struggling in working like so many
17 others.

18 Over that 20 years, Kansas State has
19 developed into a top 10 university as measured by
20 many different standards. Included in that top 10
21 is research ability, research dollars generated,
22 scholarship ability, scholarships won by students,
23 and the caliber of our students and our faculty
24 and our researchers.

25 With that in mind, you've come to the

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1 place that Kansas State is now ready to be a team
 2 player with the NBAF facility. Although I cannot
 3 speak for our Faculty Senate as a whole, I
 4 personally believe that the NBAF facility is an
 5 asset to the Kansas economy, to the Kansas --
 6 State of Kansas, to the University, and we will be
 7 able to supply you with not only faculty and
 8 researchers to supplement your own, but also
 9 students who can work in your facility and become
 10 members of our facility. Thank you very much.

11 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you,
 12 Mr. Fairchild.

13 Gary Micheel is next.

14 MR. MICHEEL: Good evening, I'm Gary
 15 Micheel with the Kansas Bioscience Authority. I'm
 16 a Registered Professional Engineer with 32 years
 17 experience in structural and civil engineering.
 18 I'd like to address tonight the areas of building
 19 layout, construction and maintenance costs and
 20 site development costs.

1|27.0

21 Building layout, the Draft EIS indicates
 22 a radial floor plan on five of the six sites,
 23 whereas a linear plan is shown for the Manhattan
 24 site. We've shown the radial plan fits very well
 25 on the Manhattan site, makes more efficient use of

Comment No: 1

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While the potential costs of proposed actions are not a factor in the environmental impact analysis presented in the NBAF EIS, cost information and the scope of the cost analysis performed is summarized in Section 2.5 of the NBAF EIS to provide pertinent information to the DHS Under Secretary for Science and Technology so that he may make a more informed decision with respect to the alternatives presented in the NBAF EIS.

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1 the site than a linear plan, would also reduce
2 site preparation costs substantially. We believe
3 all sites should be assessed using this radial
4 floor plan.

5 On the topic of construction costs, area
6 adjustment factors, we contend that the use of
7 area cost adjustment factors from major
8 metropolitan areas far removed from the project
9 sites is not an accurate method. I would site two
10 recent comparable projects near the Manhattan
11 site. One, the \$58 million dollar BRI that we've
12 heard mentioned several times today. The second
13 being the \$150 million dollar Fort Riley BRAC
14 contracts. A large portion of the contract volume
15 for both these projects was performed by
16 subcontractors from smaller, nearby cities, with
17 lower area adjustment factors.

18 On the topic of cost construction
19 escalation, the engineering used record
20 percentages as used by DHS we believe are not a
21 good method for comparing escalation between
22 cities. Using data from the previous five years
23 to predict the escalation for the next five years
24 is flawed in our belief. Only an in-depth city by
25 city comparison is valid for this kind of

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1 forecasting. In the absence of a detailed study
2 such as this, a single national escalation should
3 be applied to all the sites.

4 On maintenance costs, we contend that the
5 same area adjustment factors that we recommend for
6 construction costs should be used for maintenance
7 costs as well, and we believe that a uniform
8 escalation factor should be used for all sites.

9 Finally, on the topic of site development
10 costs, the true cost of the facility includes the
11 in-kind contributions and site specific
12 contributions, and the final cost decision should
13 take all of this into consideration.

14 So in brief summary, we respectfully urge
15 that the DHS first use the radial floor plan for
16 all the sites; secondly, use area adjustment
17 factors from nearby smaller cities; third, use a
18 single escalation factor for all sites; and
19 lastly, consider the entire package that Kansas
20 brings to the table.

21 Thank you for your consideration and your
22 time.

23 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, sir.

24 Michael Beckloff is next, followed by
25 Keith Gary, and Fred... I'm not sure of the last

1 cont.|27.0

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1 name here, I believe it's spelled C-H-I-C-K --

2 MR. CHULICK: C-H-U-L-I-C-K.

3 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, sir.

4 MR. BECKLOFF: Thank you for the
5 opportunity to speak with evening, my name is
6 Michael Beckloff, and I'm chairman of the Kansas
7 Bioscience Trade Organization, and the voice of
8 the bioscience industry in Kansas.

9 Membership of the Kansas Bio fully
10 supports the establishment of the NBAF in
11 Manhattan, Kansas. The selection of Manhattan,
12 Kansas, for NBAF highlights the enormous assets of
13 the biosecurity research in animal health that are
14 present in the State of Kansas.

15 As we've heard this evening, this region
16 is home to more animal health companies than any
17 other region in the world. We are home to some of
18 the world's largest vaccine researchers,
19 developers and manufacturers. We have an
20 established and well-trained research based work
21 force. We have a private sector that understands
22 and supports this effort, and we stand ready to
23 work and assist in further research and ultimately
24 the commercialization of new and important
25 products.

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Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1 An additional and extremely important
2 asset in our region is our rich history of drug
3 development and commercialization of human drug
4 products. We have an establishment and highly
5 engaged scientific community with a track record
6 of success that spans the entire commercial drug
7 development continuum, including pre-clinical
8 testing facilities, biosynthesis facilities,
9 chemical synthesis facilities, analytical testing
10 facilities, scale-up and commercial manufacturing
11 facilities, global regulatory expertise, market
12 and medical needs expertise, and most importantly,
13 we have the second highest concentration of
14 clinical research organizations in the United
15 States to support testing, Phases I through III,
16 as well as Phase IV testing. This group of CRO's
17 in our region has likely conducted more first time
18 managed studies than other any group of CRO's in
19 any other region in the world.

20 This combination of drug and vaccine
21 development assets is unique within the United
22 States and is an extremely important point of
23 differentiation for our region. These assets will
24 allow us to develop and expedite commercialization
25 of vaccines that will have important human

1 cont. | 24.4

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1 applications resulting from the research conducted
2 at the NBAF site.

3 Kansas is supporting a growing bioscience
4 industry that creates a productive environment for
5 the government's work, industry growth, and
6 ultimately significant advances in human and
7 animal health. The Kansas Bioscience community
8 will embrace this opportunity. We will find ways
9 to accelerate the development and research, and we
10 will continue to take pride in being a national
11 leader in this important area of scientific
12 research and development. And, finally, we will
13 find new and innovative ways to partner with the
14 federal government and DHS to ensure success of
15 the NBAF project. Thank you.

16 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you,
17 Michael.

18 Keith Gary is next.

19 MR. GARY: Good evening. I'm
20 Dr. Keith Gary, representing the Kansas City Area
21 Life Sciences Institute. We are a not for profit
22 organization formed in 2000 to lead our region's
23 transformation into a center of excellence in life
24 sciences research, development and
25 commercialization.

1 cont. | 24.4

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1 Specifically, the Institute serves as a
2 convenor to facilitate and foster collaboration to
3 leverage regional assets. We work closely with
4 our research universities, institutes and
5 hospitals, with private sector companies,
6 technology and transfer commercialization
7 entities, and civic leadership organizations.

8 Collectively, our region employs
9 approximately 3,500 scientists in the life
10 sciences research with particular strengths in
11 animal and human health, plant sciences and
12 biodefense. Our state institutions currently
13 exceed 550 million in life sciences research
14 expenditures.

15 The proposed NBAF would benefit from the
16 availability of the regional intellectual capital
17 and facilities aligned with its mission. More
18 importantly, it would find an environment amenable
19 to sharing those resources to build upon the
20 regions' history of successful scientific
21 collaboration.

22 The hallmark of the Life Sciences
23 Institute is collaboration. We recognize and
24 espouse the multiple benefits that can be achieved
25 by collaboration, we work to identify and remove

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DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1 barriers to collaboration, and we celebrate and
2 promote collective victories as ways of building
3 on successes to date. A few examples of those
4 successes, the Kansas City Proteomics Consortium,
5 a group of proteomics researchers that we
6 organized in 2003 secured \$16 million dollars over
7 a three year period to expand this important
8 enabling technology that's in the region.

1 cont.|24.4

9 The current partnership formed by Kansas
10 State University, KU Medical Center and the
11 University of Missouri to provide access to an
12 array of animal hosts for cancer, thus
13 accelerating the rate by which researchers can
14 study this disease and how it affects both animals
15 and humans; our own research development grant
16 program which provides financial incentives for
17 both inner-institutional academic research
18 collaborating and for developing public and
19 private and partnerships between researchers and
20 companies; and in 2006, our organization was the
21 initial identifier of the NBAF's opportunity and
22 worked with Midwest Research Institute and others
23 to form the Heartland Bio Agro Consortium to
24 formulate the initial response.

25 Manhattan is included in the region

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1 extending from here to Columbia, the Region
2 possessing a robust collection of 199 life
3 sciences companies, employing well over 25,000
4 people. Significantly, there are a number of
5 those companies focused on animal health and
6 nutrition that represent the single largest global
7 concentration for this industry, which you've
8 already heard, called the Animal Health Corridor.

9 Importantly, this collective
10 concentration of life sciences companies is
11 supported by an education infrastructure that
12 ensures a work force highly skilled in science,
13 technology, engineering, mathematics across the
14 educational curriculum.

15 Attracting world class sciences is an
16 important regional priority. Our academic
17 institutions are enjoying a high degree of success
18 in recruiting scientific talent. Examples here at
19 Kansas State University include David Franz, you
20 heard from Jerry Jaax, Jim Stack also.

21 And finally, I know the scientists in the
22 region and their respective organizations eagerly
23 anticipate partnering with the NBAF to help
24 achieve its important mission. Thank you.

25 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you,

1 cont|24.4

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1 Dr. Gary.

2 Fred Chulick is next, please, followed by

3 Tom Sack.

4 MR. CHULICK: My name is Fred

5 Chulick. I'm Dean of the College of Agricultural

6 and Director of K-State Research and Extension at

7 Kansas State University, and I really only want to

8 make two points. Nancy Jaax made one of them more

9 eloquently than I can, but it's to compliment the

10 Department of Homeland Security, USDA, and APHIS

11 for the development of this concept.

12 I've had the opportunity to travel

13 internationally for the USDA for a number of

14 years. I've seen the devastation of some of these

15 diseases and I fully understand the ability of

16 these diseases as Nancy, once again, very, very

17 eloquently spoke to.

18 As I've seen that, and I have gotten a

19 greater understanding of the potential of these

20 diseases, that's why I compliment you and

21 encourage you to develop this facility to protect

1|24.0 22 not only our livestock industry but also protect

23 our economy, and also to protect our consumers of

24 our food.

25 The second point I really want to make

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Issue Code: 24.0

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative. The decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.

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1 revolves around a very simple concept, and it's a
2 concept that I call focused areas of excellence.
3 I've had the opportunity to be at K-State for a
4 little over four years now, and one of the first
5 things I learned is that Kansas State University
6 has a focused area of excellence in its food
7 safety and food security.

8 Specifically within the College of
9 Agriculture I want to use some examples. We house
10 the Food Science Institute. The Food Science
11 Institute is a collaborative program that works
12 across five colleges in 14 departments at Kansas
13 State University, but it's more than work
14 collaboratively in that nature. It works with
15 research, it works with teaching, and it works
16 with extension. It develops new knowledge and
17 products. It empowers that knowledge and products
18 with our consumers both within the state,
19 globally, and in the world. For example, next
20 month, we'll have the food safety workshop
21 conducted in Hyderabad, India, looking at some of
22 their food safety issues.

23 But it also engages the students, and
24 that's the point that I probably want to engage
25 you most in this. In our Department of Animal

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1 Science and Industry, we have over 750
2 undergraduate students and over 600 graduate
3 students. That is the human resource that's going
4 to replace all of us some day in our professional
5 roles some day, and now I'm going to quote the
6 President of Kansas State University when he says,
7 we're a student focused research intensive
8 institution. To me, that's very important that
9 human resource development that Kansas State can
10 bring to NBAF to me is absolutely critical.

11 I want to use another example I think
12 that's critical to us, and that's in the focused
13 areas of excellence, and it deals with the entire
14 food system. We work with production, obviously,
15 because you've heard the value of production of
16 agriculture to the State of Kansas and I believe
17 the nation and the world, but we also deal with
18 processing. We also deal with consumer issues.
19 So essentially the entire food chain that we deal
20 with which I think is very critical when you take
21 a look at the consequences and the benefits that
22 NBAF will bring.

23 These are some of the things that Kansas
24 State University, the College of Ag can bring to
25 this endeavor to make it successful. Thank you

2 cont. | 24.4

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1 very much.

2 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you.

3 Tom Sack.

4 MR. SACK: Good evening, my name is
5 Tom Sack, and I'm the Vice President and Director
6 of Midwest Operations at Midwest Research
7 Institute in Kansas City.

8 As we did one year ago at a similar
9 public hearing, MRI continues to express our
10 enthusiastic support for K-State's bid to
11 establish the NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas.
12 Manhattan and K-State are located in the
13 agricultural hub of the United States. Our region
14 has developed numerous businesses, research
15 facilities and academic institutions that make it
16 a world leader in agriculture and animal health
17 research. As a result, the citizens of Kansas and
18 the midwest understand the importance of the need
19 for NBAF and how it will benefit our agricultural
20 industry.

21 K-State, nationally recognized for its
22 expertise in infectious diseases and livestock
23 medicine already manages the BRI and the National
24 Bio-Agricultural Security Center in Manhattan.
25 Having successfully and safely managed these

1|24.4

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1 operations on campus speaks highly of the
2 intellectual capacity, specialized resources, and
3 clearly shows that K-State is prepared to safely
4 operate a high level bio-containment laboratory
5 like NBAF.

6 I am proud to say that MRI and our team
7 of internationally recognized biosafety and
8 biosecurity specialists, played a role in helping
9 K-State to plan, design and commission the BRI.

10 It is our priority not only to protect our
11 researchers but also to ensure the safety of the
12 community surrounding the laboratories. As a
13 member of the team, supporting K-State's bid to
14 win NBAF, we stand united to deliver a state of
15 the art laboratory that meets the highest
16 standards for safety and security.

17 Thank you for allowing me to speak
18 tonight, and accept my recommendation for putting
19 NBAF here in Manhattan.

20 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you,
21 Mr. Sack.

22 I'd like to go back and see if the two
23 gentlemen that were called earlier are here at
24 this point in time. David Weyents, and Dr. Sam
25 Graham. If you guys are here and would like to

1 cont.|24.4

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1 speak, please come forward to the microphone.

2 Okay, we'll continue on.

3 The next person up is Ron Fehr, followed
4 by Linda Weis, and John Mitchell.

5 MR. FEHR: Good evening, my name is
6 Ron Fehr, and I'm the City Manager of Manhattan,
7 Kansas. On behalf of the city administration, we
8 support locating the National Bio and Agro-Defense
9 Facility in Manhattan, Kansas, adjacent to the
10 Biosecurity Research Institute on the K-State
11 campus.

1|24.4

12 The City of Manhattan has been and
13 continues to be a cooperative and collaborative
14 partner with the University on numerous
15 educational, research and other commercialization
16 and child care activities of projects that are of
17 mutual benefit to both of us. The city supported
18 and provided domestic water, sanitary sewer, and
19 transportation improvements for the Biosecurity
20 Research Institute facility which houses 21
21 Biosafety Level 3 and 3Ag laboratories today.

22 Our city staff works very closely with
23 the KSU veterinary services and the BRI officials
24 regarding waste water pretreatment requirements,
25 equipment testing, and sampling, as well as first

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1 responder training.

2 Speaking of first responders, the city
3 and the University collaborated many years ago to
4 construct the city's headquarters fire station and
5 regional training facility on the K-State campus,
6 very near the BRI and proposed NBAF site. The
7 Manhattan Fire Department is a full 24/7 unit
8 operation with four stations and 68 uniformed
9 professional employees providing a certified
10 regional hazardous materials response team with 21
11 hazmat certified technicians.

12 The city has also contracted for the
13 design of two new fire stations, one which will be
14 a relocation of an existing station, and the
15 second which is the addition of a new fifth fire
16 station.

17 In addition, a written mutual aid
18 agreement is in place with Fort Riley fire
19 services which also has a full complement of 24/7
20 professional firefighters in multiple stations.

21 With regard to population estimates in
22 the EIS, on Pages 3-254 and 255, I believe the
23 estimates listed there are substantially low
24 indicating that only 3,555 residents are estimated
25 to be added to the three county area population

2|8.4

3|15.4

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 15.4

Population statistics presented in Section 3.10.4 of the NBAF EIS are from the US Census Bureau and are the official estimates used by government agencies.

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1 between 2007 and 2012. Since this data released
2 this month illustrates the growth in the study
3 area, which is already classified as a
4 micropolitan area, increased from 105,969 to
5 113,629, or 7,660 more persons. In addition,
6 Manhattan's population increased from 50,118 to
7 51,707, or 1,599 persons in that same one year
8 period.

9 Furthermore, Manhattan has now exceeded
10 the 50,000 population threshold in the past two
11 consecutive years, which will result in the city
12 being listed in the Office of Management and
13 Budgets' annual update on statistical area
14 definitions, this year as a new metropolitan area.

15 With regard to housing addressed in the
16 EIS, the city has taken several initiatives over
17 the past several years with the development of
18 numerous subdivisions and infrastructure
19 representing a broad range of housing options.
20 Since 2000, Manhattan has added 3,155 new living
21 units.

22 In closing, I assure you that our team
23 stands ready to partner with the federal
24 government to bring a successful NBAF project to
25 the Little Apple. Thank you.

4|8.4

1 cont.| 24.4

Comment No: 4Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

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1 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, sir.

2 Linda Weis is next.

3 MS. WEIS: Good evening. My name is
4 Linda Weis. I'm the proud chair-elect of the
5 Board of Directors of the Manhattan Area Chamber
6 of Commerce.

7 We are pleased to be a candidate for the
8 location of the National Bio and Agro-Defense
9 Facility at Kansas State University, and I'm
10 speaking in support of this effort.

11 We are obviously interested in the
12 significant economic benefits NBAF will bring to
13 our community, and we are impressed that such a
14 facility would catapult us into greater scientific
15 prominence nationally.

16 However, the Manhattan Area of Chamber of
17 Commerce is about more than money and prestige.
18 We are a dynamic community that provides the best
19 possible quality of life for our residents, and
20 that is what we offer you here today.

21 We also bring to the table a significant
22 asset in our highly desirable Kansas work ethic
23 respected by employers nationwide. This Kansas
24 honor code of honesty, integrity, and dependability
25 forms the foundation for our exceptional levels of

1|24.4

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.4

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1 productivity and satisfaction beyond the paycheck.

2 The people in Manhattan and K-State are

3 team players working as close advocates through

4 the years. They understand that cooperation,

5 collaboration and community partnerships are

6 essential to growth and development. Manhattan's

7 foundation has been built on its goodness as an

8 inclusive community of dedicated citizens with

9 seemingly endless energies.

1 cont. | 24.4

10 Our positive downtown relationships have

11 paved the way for exceptional community progress

12 with visionary leaders who moved forward in faith

13 with the impeccable standards and uncommon wisdom.

14 I submit that Manhattan, Kansas, is without peers

15 in compatibility in competitively serving the

16 needs of NBAF and its 250 to 500 team members.

17 As a real estate specialist, I have

18 facilitated the successful relocation of many

19 internationally recognized scientists,

20 distinguished professors, executive level

21 professionals, and business leaders, all of whom

22 without exception have found the Manhattan

23 community to offer a stimulating and satisfying

24 quality of life that exceeded their family's

25 highest expectation.

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1 I understand the relocation impact
2 personally because I have lived in nine different
3 university communities in eight different states.
4 I was the traveling spouse, quote, of an ivy
5 league science researcher who brought our family
6 across country to Kansas State when both the
7 University and Manhattan were half their current
8 size and population. Little did I realize the
9 amazing opportunities, accomplishments, and
10 relationships that lay in store for me and my
11 family.

12 Indeed, there is a lot more to this
13 community than meets the eye. I soon discovered
14 to my delight that there is great social,
15 intellectual, and business opportunity in
16 Manhattan and that the worthwhile opportunities to
17 which I was attracted often exceeded my energy,
18 time and talent.

19 We extend the hand of welcome as a
20 community partner. Your choice of Manhattan,
21 Kansas, will provide the NBAF team an incredible
22 support system of advocacy, collaboration, and
23 cooperation. Together, we will be an unbeatable
24 and unstoppable team for the national security of
25 the country we all love. We invite you to join

1 cont. | 24.4

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1 us, you will be glad you did. Thank you.

2 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, ma'am.

3 John Mitchell.

4 MR. MITCHELL: Good evening, my name
5 is John Mitchell. I'm the Director of the
6 Division of Environment of the Kansas Department
7 of Health and Environment, and I'm here tonight to
8 share the comments of our agency secretary,
9 Roderick Bremby.

10 I welcome the Department of Homeland
11 Security to Kansas this evening as we begin the
12 discussion of the potential environmental impact
13 of the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility. As
14 outlined in the National Environmental Policy Act
15 process, we are here tonight to respond to
16 information provided in the Draft EIS.

17 Under legislation passed by the Kansas
18 legislature, KDHE is the lead agency in the
19 interagency working group, a group of local and
20 state agencies formed to assist the Kansas
21 Bioscience Authority and the Department of
22 Homeland Security during the EIS. We're the only
23 state among the finalists that has established
24 such an entity. We were formed to ensure when DHS
25 prepared the EIS, we were ready.

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1 Our activities include: One, providing
2 information at the request of DHS for the
3 development of the EIS; two, reviewing specific
4 preliminary Draft EIS sections; three, interfacing
5 with our respective agencies on the development of
6 the EIS, as necessary; and four, serving as a
7 resource as we continue through the EIS process.

8 It is important to note that the EIS
9 identified no negative environmental affects for
10 Kansas. This affirms our belief that Kansas
11 offers an unbeatable site. We are the quickest
12 and most cost effective pathway to success in
13 protecting the American food supply and
14 agriculture economy.

15 Thank you for the opportunity to share
16 with you additional reasons why Kansas should be
17 the home of the NBAF.

18 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you,
19 Mr. Mitchell.

20 Our next speakers are Kent Glasscock, Lee
21 Tafanelli and Bret Healy.

22 MR. GLASSCOCK: Welcome to Kansas and
23 K-State, it's a delight to have you here. My name
24 is Kent Glasscock, representing the
25 commercialization arm of Kansas State University,

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1 an organization called NISTAC, which
2 parenthetically is located contiguous to the NBAF
3 site. NISTAC is part of K-State's technology
4 transfer network, focusing on the out-licensing of
5 university intellectual property and creating
6 businesses which utilize University technologies
7 as their foundation, and I couldn't have been more
8 delighted to hear you speak to the vaccine going
9 into the market. That is exactly why America
10 needs this NBAF facility.

11 Over the years, K-State and its partners
12 have created an outstanding array of
13 commercialization, incubation, and seed capital
14 assets devoted to turn great research into the
15 broadest possible economic and human benefit here
16 at home and around the globe. Because of
17 K-State's research strengths, we have developed
18 very serious and mature relationships with the
19 world's biggest, most dynamic animal health
20 companies, many of which reside in our immediate
21 region.

22 For over a hundred years, K-State
23 technologies have been used to change the animal
24 health landscape, and the results have been
25 remarkable. In Kansas, and at K-State, we

1|24.4

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.4

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1 cont|24.4

1 understand that basic and applied research is
2 essential, but we also understand that getting
3 that research from the lab into the market place
4 to benefit the lives of everyday Americans is
5 equally essential. Getting from here in the lab
6 to there in the market place matters, and we want
7 you to know that this University will engage NBAF
8 in a focused, disciplined effort, to do just that.

9 We believe in the NBAF mission, and
10 Kansas stands ready to help NBAF get from that
11 mission to the market place. We know it's
12 important. We know it's right. And we know it
13 can be done best right here in Kansas. Thank you.

14 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you.

15 Lee Tafanelli.

16 REPRESENTATIVE TAFANELLI: Good
17 evening, and welcome to Manhattan, Kansas. My
18 name is Lee Tafanelli, and I'm a State
19 Representative in the Kansas legislature
20 representing the 47th District in northeast Kansas.

1|24.4

21 Additionally, I'm a 28 year veteran of
22 our armed forces, and I make these comments as a
23 Kansan in support of the NBAF.

24 First of all, I'd like to thank the
25 Department of Homeland Security and USDA for

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1 addressing the critical national security needs
2 for the safety of our food supply and food
3 security. Often we hear that government doesn't
4 listen, or the government fails to plan, or that
5 agencies can't work together, and I think this is
6 living proof that it does, and I certainly do
7 thank you for that.

1 cont. | 24.4

8 The Kansas Legislature unanimously
9 supports the building of the NBAF facility here in
10 Manhattan because we believe it is the best
11 location to meet our national security needs in
12 this critical area. To that end, the Kansas
13 legislature's committed over \$100 million dollars
14 for infrastructure support should Manhattan be
15 selected as the final site.

2 | 19.4

16 Kansas is an agriculture state and as
17 such, we truly do understand the importance of
18 agriculture, not only to our producers, but our
19 nation's food supply, our economy, and more
20 importantly, our national security. Because of
21 this understanding, Kansas has an integrated plan
22 that outlines the activities necessary to handle a
23 foreign animal disease outbreak, and this was done
24 prior to any discussion of an NBAF facility. The
25 plan establishes roles, responsibilities for

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DHS notes the commentor's statement.

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1 local, state and federal agencies to adequately
2 plan for, respond to, and recover from a foreign
3 animal disease outbreak.

4 Also, because of this understanding, all
5 105 counties have plans for how they will
6 specifically address an outbreak of a foreign
7 animal disease in their area. More importantly,
8 state and county plans are exercised on a regular
9 basis to ensure that all partners are trained, and
10 that plans are continually updated.

11 Much has been said about the risk of a
12 facility of this type, as it should be. However,
13 I believe that the benefits of having this
14 facility far out weigh the risk. NBAF will
15 address the risk to our livestock industry, our
16 food supply, our economy, and our national
17 security. The growing threat of agro-terrorism
18 makes NBAF a national priority to protect our
19 nation's food supply.

20 Certainly, there are risks, but those
21 risks can be mitigated to an acceptable level
22 through the checks and balances associated with
23 this type of facility.

24 Kansas is strategically suited for the
25 NBAF facility. We are centrally located. We have

2 cont|19.4

1 cont|24.4



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1 a committed interest in protecting our producers,
2 our nation's food supply and more importantly, our
3 national security. We understand and have
4 successfully demonstrated the ability to
5 effectively partner with local, state and federal
6 academic and private sector entities.

1 cont | 24.4

7 Our newly constructed state of the art
8 Bioscience Research Institute is an excellent
9 partner for NBAF, and will allow research and
10 collaboration to start long before the completion
11 of NBAF in 2015, providing immediate access to
12 researchers, and more importantly, critical
13 infrastructure. Thank you for allowing me to
14 present my views.

15 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, sir.
16 Bret Healy is next.

17 MR. HEALY: Good evening, and
18 hopefully you are still liking being in Kansas at
19 this late hour listening to the many benefits of
20 locating in Kansas.

21 My name is Brett Healy. I'm a Kansas
22 State graduate, spent about six years in Manhattan
23 conducting graduate level research in swine and
24 feedlot cattle investigations, and speaking as
25 somebody who's worked in that research field at

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1 this fine institution, you need to know two
2 things: One, the competence of not only the
3 research but the attraction of graduate level
4 students and the good undergraduate student body
5 is going to provide a real nexus of young talent
6 and intellectual capital that the NBAF can draw on
7 in its mission.

8 Secondly, I think it bears repeating
9 again and again, there are risks of not
10 participating in this mission, of the NBAF not
11 accomplishing its tasks. We might all wish that
12 things were like they were 50 years ago, but the
13 level of globalization in the 21st century and the
14 emerging threats of introduced, intentionally or
15 accidental, foreign animal diseases is just simply
16 too consequential not to accomplish this great
17 mission.

18 In that stead, I think it bears repeating
19 again that there's not been one public outbreak
20 from BSL-4 level labs in these very populated
21 areas, and certainly one that should not fear that
22 in Manhattan, Kansas, with the demonstrated
23 competence that K-State has done with their BSL-3
24 lab and the many, many research areas that they've
25 worked on in these emerging threats.

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1 With that, you've heard again and again
2 what a great place Kansas is. I just add my voice
3 to that effort as well again this evening.

4 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you,
5 Mr. Healy.

6 John Carlin, Linda Schmidt, and
7 Representative Sharp -- excuse me, Schwartz are
8 the next speakers.

9 MR. CARLIN: Good evening, I'm John
10 Carlin, former governor of Kansas and a former few
11 other things, but now teaching here at this
12 University.

13 I come to you as a strong proponent of
14 the project, and a strong proponent of our site
15 here. I acknowledge there are individuals that
16 have questions and are opposed. Personally, as a
17 proponent, I think that's healthy. This is a huge
18 project with a lot of challenges, and having the
19 questions asked and being pushed is only a plus
20 for the ultimate success of this project.

21 In your presentation tonight, you talked
22 a lot about research. In trying to think of
23 something that hasn't already been said, I would
24 say this: I think it's amazing the number of
25 researchers from other states that are very

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1|24.4

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1 interested in talking about specific proposals
2 about joining with K-State and doing research at
3 the existing Level 3 facility. I think it
4 indicates a credibility in terms of our research
5 operation here, and the potential for what can be
6 done to accomplish what you've laid out, the real
7 need for a lot of research in a number of areas.

8 And I would add as a member of the Kansas
9 Bioscience Authority, I think it's a huge asset so
10 that as we talk about research in the future, yes,
11 we'll probably be coming to the federal government
12 and applying for various proposals, but in the
13 Bioscience Authority, we have within the State a
14 huge capacity to support and complement other
15 resources to really get the job done. I think
16 it's one of the main reasons why we've been as
17 successful to this point, and will be successful
18 in the end, not just in convincing you on the
19 merits of coming to Manhattan, but most
20 importantly, delivering a facility that'll be used
21 and carry out the goals that you've laid out so
22 appropriately tonight. Thank you.

23 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you,
24 Mr. Carlin.

25 Linda Schmidt is our next speaker.

1 cont.|24.4

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1 MS. SCHMIDT: Hello, I'm Linda

2 Schmidt, and I'm a resident of Manhattan, and I
3 wanted to make my comments known tonight.

4 Initially, I requested the EIS document
5 so I could make an informed opinion regarding
6 whether Manhattan was an appropriate site for the
7 proposed facility. Having been in the health care
8 profession for a long time, and also being related
9 to people in the agricultural profession, I'm
10 aware of the importance of research to diagnose
11 and treat diseases.

12 I'm also aware that humans are not
13 perfect. Needle pricks occur, people get mental
14 fatigue. I've seen sloppiness in procedures in
15 different situations when people are preoccupied
16 or not feeling well.

17 However, this afternoon, as well as
18 tonight, I have repeatedly heard from various
19 speakers that there is a low or minimal risk of
20 accidental release of pathogens that could
21 accidentally be released into the community and
22 area livestock. Okay.

23 So I then wondered, what is the overall
24 risk rank for the Manhattan site versus the other
25 sites if an accidental release did occur. Nothing

1|21.4

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's position and concern for locating NBAF on a mainland site. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated with a minimal degree of risk, regardless of the site chosen. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art biocontainment features and operating procedures to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

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1 is 100 percent.

2 So in looking at the document on
3 Page 3-359 in the document, it states, and I
4 quote, because of the potential for easy spread of
5 FMDV, or RVFV and Nipah Virus diseases via
6 infected livestock, wildlife and vectors, the
7 overall risk for the Kansas State is designated as
8 risk rank two, moderate. Okay.

9 How does that compare to the other sites?
10 The other mainland sites were designated as risk
11 rank two, also. Okay.

12 So how does that compare to Plum Island?
13 According to your document regarding Plum Island,
14 on Page 3-478 in the EIS it states: Given the low
15 likelihood of infected animals or vectors getting
16 off of the island, thereby significantly reducing
17 the potential for the spread of disease, the
18 overall risk for the Plum Island site is
19 designated three, which is low or none. So, it
20 seems to me that the wisest choice is to put the
21 facility at the lowest risk site, even if it costs
22 more to build there.

2|24.1

23 So my opinion is knowing, and again, I
24 want to emphasize, I know the value of research
25 and vaccines and treatment of disease, but my

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

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2 cont.|24.1

1 opinion is after reading your documents, that this
2 type of research should be kept on Plum Island.
3 You can still get the needed research done at a
4 lower risk rate, which is a win-win situation as
5 far as I'm concerned, even though it might cost
6 more. Thank you for allowing me to express my
7 opinion.

8 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, Linda.
9 Representative Sharon Schwartz, please.

10 REPRESENTATIVE SCHWARTZ: Good
11 evening, I am Sharon Schwartz, and I'm here in two
12 roles tonight. First, as a farmer and rancher,
13 and also as a State Representative representing
14 the 106th District.

15 As a farmer and rancher, I want to speak
16 from that to begin with, as a livestock and grain
17 producer, I know first hand the unique bioscience
18 strengths that the site on the campus of K-State
19 University provides. Expertise in zoonotic
20 diseases, infectious diseases and livestock
21 medicine.

22 My family's livelihood depends on a safe
23 environment to produce food and have a research
24 facility that can provide an accurate and timely
25 diagnosis if a disease outbreak does occur in this

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1 country. We cannot afford to wait several days
2 for samples to be moved to the coast for the
3 results to be determined.

4 Nearly 20,000 head of pigs move from our
5 facilities annually. In fact, one half of the
6 nation's fed cattle, 40 percent of the hog
7 production, and this has been talked about before,
8 20 percent of beef cows and calves are raised
9 within a 250 mile radius in Kansas.

10 We, I'm talking about me and my family,
11 are confident that the safe guards built into the
12 design of the proposed facility are more than
13 adequate to contain any present or future disease
14 that is being studied.

15 In fact, if there's anything we would be
16 concerned about, it's about the integrity of
17 moving samples all across the United States to the
18 coast and having to wait several days to get the
19 results.

20 As a member of the house of
21 representatives, I currently serve as
22 appropriations chair, and as Lee Tafanelli, my
23 Vice-Chair of Appropriations just spoke, he spoke
24 about the unanimous support of the House of
25 Representatives and of our legislature for the

1|17.4

2|24.4

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 17.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1 facility here in Manhattan, and it was unanimous,
2 not one voice. Anything we proposed moved through
3 very fast.

4 I would keep my comments short, but just
5 want to end with this. Because of the Kansas
6 agriculture heritage and its expertise, Kansans
7 understand why this facility is a top priority for
8 the nation and why we need to identify new ways to
9 prevent and treat diseases that affect public
10 health, animal health and our food supply.

11 I strongly encourage the Department of
12 Homeland Security to consider the State's existing
13 building and security infrastructure as well as
14 the human resources already in place that make
15 Kansas a natural fit for the location of the new
16 facility being proposed. Thank you very much.

17 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you very
18 much.

19 Our next speaker is Juergen Richt.

20 MR. RICHT: Good evening, my name is
21 Juergen Richt, and I'm the Regent's Distinguished
22 Professor for the College of Veterinary Medicine
23 here at Kansas State. Before I want to tell you
24 why I believe NBAF is to be built in Manhattan, I
25 want to make the following statement: We

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DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

2 cont|24.4

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1 definitely need NBAF in this country, and we have
2 to build it safe and secure. People like me have
3 to go to Canada, to Winnipeg, north of the border
4 of North Dakota to do research. We don't have a
5 facility here in this country to do it.

1 cont. | 24.4

6 So why is NBAF -- why is Manhattan a good
7 place for NBAF? Number one, the people here, the
8 community is supporting this kind of research.
9 When I interviewed here nine months ago, I was
10 welcomed by the infectious and emerging diagnosis
11 disease research. In welcoming me and family, not
12 only the Professor from the College of Veterinary
13 Medicine went to dinner with me, but the people
14 from the Chamber of Commerce and other people from
15 the State. They are greatly embracing what I do,
16 so my family is welcomed and not questioned.

17 Secondly, what can K-State offer to NBAF?
18 Number one, it's centrally located. You can fly
19 into Manhattan airport. I realize that I'm recent
20 relocation here, you can get direct commute to
21 Denver, great international airport and direct
22 flights to -- many direct flights to Kansas City,
23 national carriers. Very easy, very convenient,
24 five, ten minutes from here.

2 | 17.4

25 The faculty and students here obviously

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 17.4

DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

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1 cont.| 24.4

1 have ability of highly trained staff is very
2 critical for NBAF. College of Veterinary Medicine
3 infectious disease, my own research, which is NIH
4 sponsored prion research, influenza, flu research,
5 and recently we got a contract with CDC doing Rift
6 Valley Fever vaccine research, and the other
7 contender was University of Georgia, Athens, and
8 CDC went with us. That tells you a lot.

9 We have colleges of agriculture, business
10 administration, all that, administrative people,
11 and last but not least, we have the Biosecurity
12 Research Institute, several times mentioned
13 tonight, state of the BSL-3, BSL-3Ag facility, not
14 only accommodates animal research but also plant,
15 exotic plant, and food safety research. A unique
16 facility.

17 Then last but not least, the State of
18 Kansas. The State of Kansas selected me as the
19 first eminent scholar from the Kansas Bioscience
20 Authority. They are committed to bringing
21 scholars in this State to do research which is
22 critical for the State of Kansas, and that's
23 agriculture, veterinary science. And not only
24 this community, but also greater Kansas City
25 community is very well known for their commitment

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1 to this kind of research, to this kind of sites.

2 And one last thing I want to mention,

3 Fort Dodge Animal Health recently committed

4 \$40 million dollars to build a new research and

5 development facility in Olathe, Kansas, and

6 Olathe, Kansas, is a body which is built by Kansas

7 State and private entities to do one health, one

8 medicine research comparative medicine and Fort

9 Dodge Animal Health has committed \$40 million to

10 build a facility there. Thank you very much.

11 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you.

12 Allan Holiday, and Bernard Irvine are our

13 next speakers.

14 MR. HOLIDAY: Wow, this is fantastic.

15 I think our country really needs this type of

16 facility. I think the government's done an

17 outstanding job of presenting its case, as well as

18 an excellent algorithm of how to derive it.

19 I'm from Kansas, I live in Kansas, I'm a

20 Kansas Stater. I'm a person who creates jobs. I

21 own banks, real estate companies, and have a very

22 large cattle ranch producing over 6 to 700 calves

23 a year that are sold in the market.

24 I don't think many people in our audience

25 realize that Kansas is the number one beef

1 cont. | 24.4

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1 producer in the United States of finished beef
 2 cattle. The number one industry in Kansas is the
 3 beef cattle industry.

4 Our academicians, our politicians, view
 5 this from one perspective. As a person in Kansas
 6 who creates jobs, creates wealth, creates an
 7 environment for people to live, I look at it in a
 8 different perspective.

9 I have a lot of common sense, and that's
 10 what I'm looking at here. If I were the
 11 government, why would you want to put a facility
 12 where a rumor of an outbreak or an outbreak would
 13 devastate and destroy the entire beef production
 14 of our government, of our entire country.
 15 Nebraska, Colorado, Missouri, Kansas, and
 16 Oklahoma, produce the vast majority of the beef in
 17 our country. People eat that. It's a big source
 18 of protein. Just a rumor of an outbreak or an
 19 actual outbreak would destroy a very large segment
 20 of the beef industry and the beef production for
 21 our country.

22 I also think that Kansas is so tightly
 23 wound around agriculture that if there was a rumor
 24 of an outbreak, just a rumor, it would jeopardize
 25 Kansas' brand of beef, and it would forever taint

1|5.4

2|15.4

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 show that even though Plum Island has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites. The lower potential effect is due both to the water barrier around the island and the lack of livestock and susceptible wildlife species.

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 15.4

The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the possible economic effect would be significant for all sites. Section 3.10.9 presents estimates of the possible economic effect of an accidental release.

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1 cont. | 5.4

1 our ability to sell beef outside of our State into
2 foreign countries. I think a more reasonable
3 place would be to locate this where there's not
4 much food being produced, so if there was an
5 outbreak, it would have little effect on the
6 ability of Americans to acquire beef or acquire a
7 protein source.

8 That being said, Kansas would be the
9 perfect place for your facility. It has the great
10 University, it wants the money, it wants the
11 prestige, the scientists are here, but from a
12 common sense perspective, it doesn't make any
13 sense to have it here.

14 But I appreciate what you've done and I
15 appreciate your methodology and look forward to
16 the outcome. Thank you.

17 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you.

18 Bernard Irvine.

19 MR. IRVINE: Good evening, my name is
20 Bernard Irvine, and I have a job in town as a
21 lawyer, but my true passion lies in the
22 countryside on my family's farm where I was born
23 and raised, and that's where I learned the great
24 values of agriculture from my parents, who are
25 here tonight. It's a passion that I hope to

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1 instill in my five children some day.

2 I do not oppose NBAF. Much to the
3 contrary, I support research in the area of
4 foreign animal diseases. We need to be prepared
5 to combat the threat of agro-terrorism in this
6 country. A release of foreign animal disease,
7 either intentional or negligent, would be
8 devastating to the livestock industry and to the
9 State of Kansas. I commend DHS and the USDA for
10 undertaking this process.

11 I do, however, strongly oppose the citing
12 of NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas. This laboratory
13 should not be constructed in the heart of cattle
14 country. We've heard many speakers tonight talk
15 about the importance of the Animal Health
16 Corridor.

17 Why is the Animal Health Corridor here?
18 It's because the concentration of animals is here.
19 They want to be located proximate to those
20 animals. That's why they're here, and that's why
21 the facility should not be built here.

22 This facility should be built, however,
23 on Plum Island. Common sense and science must
24 prevail in the decision process of where to locate
25 NBAF.

1|25.4

2|5.4

3|24.1

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 5.4

As described in Section 2.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, DHS's site selection criteria included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or semi-urban areas. Nevertheless, it has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

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4|5.0

1 The government accountability office
 2 released a report on May 22nd, and in that report,
 3 they said this facility should not be built on the
 4 mainland because there's no evidence to support
 5 that it can be done safely on the U.S. mainland.
 6 I hope you folks take that into consideration in
 7 your final draft of the EIS.

2 cont.|5.4

8 There are a couple of other points that I
 9 think you should take into consideration in the
 10 final EIS. One is the proximity of the laboratory
 11 to the purebred beef teaching unit at Kansas State
 12 University. If you look at a map, the purebred
 13 beef teaching unit is just north of this proposed
 14 facility. There's a lot of traffic in and out of
 15 that facility on an annual basis, and the -- there
 16 are animals that are moved in and out of there all
 17 across the U.S., so I think that's something
 18 important to consider.

5|21.4

19 Also, we live in the heart of the Flint
 20 Hills, and the importance of that is that the
 21 pasture season for cattle in Kansas is May 1 to
 22 November 1, and part of the importance of stamping
 23 out Foot and Mouth, if it's released, is early
 24 detection, and when you put cattle out into the
 25 pasture, you don't look at them every day. You

Comment No: 4Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opinion.

Comment No: 5Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding the monitoring for pathogen release and the impact of a pathogen on the local population, livestock, businesses and infrastructure. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and the site specific consequences of each accident scenario to human populations, agriculture and livestock and wildlife. The chances of an accidental release are low. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area, to include agricultural livestock. The need for an evacuation under an accident conditions is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. DHS also notes the commentor's concern with monitoring for disease releases.

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5 cont|21.4

1 look at them maybe once a week, maybe less often.
 2 You're not going to get that early detection in
 3 the Flint Hills.

4 I had the opportunity to meet with
 5 Dr. Jaax earlier this week. He's a fine man.
 6 Obviously, an able scientist, and I can see why
 7 K-State wants him on their team. I would like to
 8 quote from him from his testimony before Congress
 9 earlier this decade. In terms of an economic
 10 impact, it would be devastating if Foot and Mouth
 11 were released, and any outbreak of Foot and Mouth
 12 Disease could mean the destructions of thousands
 13 of animals, immediately impact our capacity to
 14 export agricultural products, and create severe
 15 financial losses in only a matter of days and
 16 weeks, he stated.

6|15.4

17 I hope that we do not trade our community
 18 safety for money and prestige. Please do not
 19 build NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas.

1 cont|25.4

20 MODERATOR COGHILL: Janet Klein is
 21 our next speaker, followed by Kathy Wenger.

22 MS. KLEIN: Hi, I'm Janet Klein, and
 23 I realize the importance of NBAF, and I think this
 24 facility is very important, but it bewilders me
 25 why you would want to put it in the heartland.

1|5.4

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 6Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the possible economic effect would be significant for all sites. The potential effects to livestock-related industries is discussed in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. The primary economic effect of an accidental release would be the banning of U.S. livestock products regardless of the location of the accidental release, which could reach as high as \$4.2 billion until the U.S. was declared foreign animal disease free. Other economic impacts were considered negligible in comparison to the foreign trade ban impacts.

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2| 25.4

1 I'm very strongly opposed to this.

2 I reside in Northeast Kansas with my
3 husband, and we have a livestock operation, and
4 we've done that for the last 23 years where we've
5 raised our two daughters who are attending Kansas
6 State, and I should also say that I am a graduate
7 of Kansas State.

8 Before that 23 years, I resided in
9 Manhattan where I grew up on the family farm. My
10 parents worked their fingers to the bone to make
11 sure that all six of their children, myself
12 included, were educated at Kansas State
13 University, and they did that all without
14 scholarships, without student loans, without
15 grants, anything. All hard work on the farm with
16 the livestock industry, cattle and hogs, and they
17 taught us the importance of work on the family
18 farm.

19 I would like to pose this question to
20 you, the supporters of NBAF, what would you stand
21 to lose if there was an outbreak from the
22 facility? As a producer, we would lose our
23 livelihood.

3| 15.4

24 Now, not only that, but if there is just
25 even a scare of this then that would drive the

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the possible effects would be significant for all sites. The potential biological and socioeconomic effects from a pathogen release from the NBAF are included in Sections 3.8.9 and 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, respectively.

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1 prices, plummet the prices down to rock bottom.

2 How many producers could afford to lose that?

3 cont. | 15.4

3 I should also say I'm a banker and we do
4 lots of ag lending. What happens to the banks if
5 those people cannot pay back their loans because
6 their livestock have been taken away from them
7 because they had to be destroyed because of an
8 outbreak.

9 Also recently, I talked to somebody who
10 was living in another country and they are scared
11 to eat our beef right now. What is it going to do
12 to our exports of beef if they're scared right now
13 if we build this facility in Manhattan, Kansas,
14 because that's the heartland of the beef industry.

3 cont. | 15.4

15 Now, I also want to tell you this. I
16 don't know if you know this, but Tuttle Creek Dam
17 is built on a fault line, and as you well know,
18 Los Angeles just suffered from a 5.9 earthquake on
19 the Richter scale. What would happen if that
20 happened to Manhattan, Kansas?

4 | 11.4

21 What would that do to the facility?

22 Also, you remember recently the tornado
23 that just ripped through Kansas State and the rest
24 of Manhattan, and caused millions of dollars of
25 damage to the University as we well know, but how

Comment No: 4

Issue Code: 11.4

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding earthquakes. Section 3.6.1 of the NBAF EIS describes the methodology used to assess each site's potential seismic consequences; and Section 3.6.4 specifically describes the Manhattan Campus Site. Section 3.6.4.1 discusses the Humboldt Fault system and was considered in the analysis of seismic risk to the Manhattan Campus Site. The NBAF would be built to meet or exceed all applicable building codes for seismic safety. Section 3.14.3.2 further addresses NBAF design criteria and accident scenarios associated with natural phenomena events such as earthquakes, high winds, lightning, floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes; and the natural phenomena effects are combined into a single bounding accident analysis.

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5|21.4 1 many of you remember the tornado that went through
2 Manhattan in 1966? I do. It was a half a mile
3 wide. What would that do to the facility?

4 I want to leave you with one last
5 thought. You have security guards here right
6 tonight, just a few, with just a few people in the
7 room. What would it take and how many security
8 guards would it take if there was an outbreak of
6|21.4 9 the pathogens from the facility? And I want to
10 thank you for your time.

11 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, Janet.
12 Kathy Wenger, Debbie Nuss, and Christina
13 Klein are our next speakers.

14 MS. WENGER: Hello, I'm Kathy Wenger,
15 and being's everybody's giving their pedigree, I'm
16 a K-State graduate in animal science and I also
17 have a Master's Degree in adult education and I
18 currently work in the pet food industry, as well
19 as being a livestock producer on the family farm,
20 and I am concerned about this facility.

21 I think everyone agrees that we are in
22 the heartland with all of the livestock. To put
1|15.4 23 it plainly, it will be devastating. I
24 currently -- there's various figures on that. The
25 report said 2 million to 4 million in a current

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 15.4


Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, DHS cannot guarantee that the NBAF would never experience an accident; however, the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen from the NBAF is extremely low. The economic impact of an accidental release, including the impact on the livestock-related industries, is presented in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. The major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a potential ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commenter's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period. In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commenter's concerns regarding the impact of a pathogen release on the local population, livestock industry, businesses and infrastructure. The NBAF would be designed, constructed, and operated to ensure the maximum level of public safety and to fulfill all necessary requirements to protect the environment. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, including releases due to weather events. The chances of an accidental release are low. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release based on human error are low in large part due to the design and implementation of biocontainment safeguards in conjunction with rigorous personnel training. For example, as described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous



infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Appendix B to the EIS describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations, including institutionalized populations, residing within the local area. The need for an evacuation under an accident conditions is considered to be a very low probability event. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated.

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1 article on Foot and Mouth. It said, in England,
2 it cost then \$17.4 billion dollars to contain
3 that, and Nancy Boyda mentioned 20 billion, so the
4 costs vary, but the bottom line is it's going to
5 be expensive, and it's going to be expensive in
6 several ways.

7 Our foreign trade right now, I was
8 talking to a teacher in North Korea, and she said
9 her students ask her all the time about mad cow,
10 so just -- and we haven't had a confirmed case of
11 mad cow, but if we ever did, what would that do,
12 and the same thing with Foot and Mouth. So it
13 would be a major problem.

14 And the USDA animal and plant inspection
15 service did a tabletop mock Foot and Mouth Disease
16 training session and they set it in Iowa, and just
17 for a small town, they said 2,300 head swine
18 operation surrounded by beef and dairy operations,
19 and their first step would be a 6.2 radius from
20 the farm and it would take -- they would have to
21 block 35 intersections.

22 Most rural Iowa counties only have five
23 or six deputies, and when they talk about disposal
24 of the animals, the nitty gritty is they chose to
25 have dump trucks covered with tarps to use carbon

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1 monoxide to dispose of the animals, and this was
 2 their humane disposal of the animals. When you
 3 talk about disposal, you're kind of --

2| 18.4

4 But watching your cattle or your hogs go
 5 through this would be devastating to the families
 6 and to everyone. So anyway, thank you for your
 7 time.

8 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, Kathy.
 9 Debbie Nuss.

10 MS. NUSS: Good evening. I'm a
 11 resident of Manhattan, but by way of disclosure, I
 12 want to state that I am not a research scientist,
 13 although I am married to a research scientist,
 14 someone who is internationally known and well
 15 respected for infectious disease research in a
 16 variety of food animals and other animals.

17 I'm not a university administrator,
 18 although I am married to one, and have worked with
 19 the administrative -- within the administrative
 20 research environment in this University and others
 21 so I well know how universities function and
 22 operate, and how academic and administrators think
 23 and operate.

24 Finally, I am not a local or state level
 25 elected official but am actively involved in the

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 18.4

DHS notes commenter's concern regarding livestock carcass handling and disposal in the event of a pathogen release. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. As set out in Section 3.14.3.4 of the NBAF EIS, employees and contractors will be screened prior to employment or engagement and monitored while working, among other security measures. In addition, oversight of NBAF operations, as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS, will be conducted in part by the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), which includes community representative participation, and the APHIS Animal Research Policy and Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. While the risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operations of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site, site specific protocols would then be developed in coordination with local emergency response agencies and would consider the diversity and density of populations residing within the local area, to include agricultural livestock. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and emergency response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed NBAF. Emergency response plans will include the current USDA emergency response plan for foot and mouth disease (FMD) which includes compensation for livestock losses.

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1 political process at all levels so I come here
 2 this evening with that background and combined
 3 perspectives, all of which form and support what I
 4 am going to say right now.

5 This afternoon, we heard one after
 6 another NBAF proponents boast about how this
 7 area's adjacency to Kansas City and boast that
 8 because of its adjacency, we are now center of the
 9 global animal health corridor.

10 Those same proponents have argued that
 11 this is one of the primary reasons to locate the
 12 NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas. If indeed Manhattan
 13 and Kansas State University are the center of the
 14 global animal health corridor, that alone should
 15 be argument enough to not locate the NBAF here.

16 Co-locating your high level biological
 17 research facility in the middle of, or adjacent
 18 to, the nation's largest food animal population
 19 area you assert you're trying to protect, makes
 20 the area a prime target, intentionally or
 21 unintentionally, for an attack or a disaster.

22 History is full of tragic events that the
 23 public was told would never happen by
 24 self-interested scientists, engineers and
 25 politicians, and we saw that here today. These

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern that the NBAF would be a prime terrorist target. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS address accident scenarios, including external events such as a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) (designated as For Official Use Only) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process.

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

1|25.4

2|21.4

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3 15.4	1	self-interested individuals offer exaggerated	
	2	claims regarding the economic benefit to the area	
	3	should the NBAF be cited here.	
	4	However, these same individuals are	
2Cont. 21.4	5	unable or unwilling to provide any information	
	6	regarding the economic, environmental, or health	
	7	risk of a worse case scenario.	
	8	We hear all the reasons why Manhattan	
	9	should be the site for NBAF, but we never hear any	
	10	reasons why it should not be. What is the old	
	11	adage, hope for the best, but plan for the worst?	
	12	Proponents at this afternoon's meeting	
	13	and those who submitted letters to the local	
	14	newspaper have done their best to communicate	
	15	their belief, their hope, if you will, that NBAF	
	16	is right for Manhattan. However, the skeptical	
2Cont. 21.4	17	public has heard little to no evidence that plans	
	18	for a worse case scenario have been addressed, let	
	19	alone even considered.	
	20	If the NBAF proponents cannot delineate	
	21	the economic, environmental, and health	
2Cont. 21.4	22	consequences of worse case scenarios, how can you,	
	23	the Department of Homeland Security, make an	
	24	informed and unbiased decision that locating the	
	25	NBAF in the center of the global animal health	

Comment No: 3

Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's opinion. The economic effects of construction and operation of the NBAF at the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative are included in Section 3.10.4 of the NBAF EIS.

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2ContJ21.4

1 corridor is worth the risk and does indeed ensure
 2 that our homeland is secure. Thank you.

3 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you.
 4 Christina Klein.

5 MS. KLEIN: Hello, I'm Christina
 6 Klein, and I was born and raised on a dairy farm
 7 and currently my family is trying to expand our
 8 Angus herd which is one of the major parts of our
 9 livelihood.

10 I hear the main pull of this seems to be
 11 money and economic growth, but you have to wonder,
 12 is that all that really matters? The people that
 13 have the power to put this here also have to think
 14 about the faces behind the money, the people it
 15 truly affects. A facility like this has a lot of
 16 probablys. It will probably not affect the
 17 surrounding areas, but there's always going to be
 18 a part missing, the variable equation of a
 19 probably. A facility like this has a magnitude of
 20 problems that could occur, and has no true
 21 safeguard. One small mistake or one disgruntled
 22 employee who doesn't follow the rules safely can
 23 have catastrophic effects.

24 Safety measures can be enforced at work
 25 but what are you going to do when the employees

1|21.4

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding a malicious and criminal act perpetrated by an NBAF employee. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS address accident scenarios, including internal and external events such as an "insider" criminal act and terrorist attack. The risk of an accidental release from NBAF is extremely low. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) (designated as For Official Use Only and not available to the public for security reasons) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety.

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1 are off the clock when they go home at night. You
 2 can't be sure that everything is followed closely
 3 because no matter how many safeguards you have or
 4 how many foolproof controls you think you have,
 5 there is an infinite number of variables that
 6 you'll only find when an outbreak really does
 7 occur.

8 There's no 100 percent way for this to be
 9 taken care of, so let's take a minute to pretend
 10 what would happen if something really did occur,
 11 the affect it would have on the local cattle
 12 industry. It would devastate the reputation that
 13 we Kansans have built our lives on to protect. I
 14 think we should make the preemptive decision to
 15 keep it out of Kansas instead of waiting for that
 16 "what if" affect to occur, and living in fear of a
 17 constant outbreak.

18 Those politicians who say that they have
 19 the total support of the people have obviously not
 20 talked to everyone involved because if that was
 21 true, then this session would not be necessary.
 22 Kansas doesn't have to be martyrs in the name of
 23 science and let our livestock and livelihoods be
 24 at risk when there's a perfectly fine facility
 25 that can be updated where the risk is minimal.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.1

The proposed NBAF requires BSL-4 capability to meet mission requirements (DHS and USDA). PIADC does not have BSL-4 laboratory or animal space, and the existing PIADC facilities are inadequate to support a BSL-4 laboratory. Upgrading the existing facilities to allow PIADC to meet the current mission would be more costly than building the NBAF on Plum Island, as discussed in Section 2.4.1 of the NBAF EIS.

1 cont.|21.4

2|25.4

3|5.1

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1 No matter how convenient Kansas may seem
 2 as a location and how many safeguards there are,
 3 sometimes no matter how good things seem on paper,
 4 that's exactly where it should stay, because
 5 "probably" isn't good enough. Thank you.

6 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you,
 7 Christina.

8 Louise Schultes Randolph.

9 MS. SCHULTES RANDOLF: Thank you. We
 10 don't need to do this to ourselves, this NBAF. In
 11 our area, or this portion of Kansas, should be
 12 left alone. We don't need these sort of factors
 13 and here we are, where people are contemplating
 14 putting the NBAF in Kansas in the middle of the
 15 USA, and in the process, totally ignoring what
 16 could come out of it.

17 I know about crime, people, I worked for
 18 the Army. That's how I spent my life. I designed
 19 a crime prevention system where we could probably
 20 get anybody anywhere and they used it until we had
 21 to go to the standard Army, so I know about this.

22 A site like this NBAF at the very least
 23 should be relatively isolated so that we could
 24 have very good security and protection from those
 25 who are out to make a mark, and there's a lot of

1|25.4

2|5.0

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. As described in Section 2.4.3 of the NBAF EIS, other potential locations to construct the NBAF were considered during the site selection process but were eliminated based on evaluation by the selection committee. It was suggested during the scoping process that the NBAF be constructed in a remote location such as an island distant from populated areas or in a location that would be inhospitable (e.g., desert or arctic habitat) to escaped animal hosts/vectors; however, the evaluation criteria called for proximity to research programs that could be linked to the NBAF mission and proximity to a technical workforce. The Plum Island Site is an isolated location as was suggested while still meeting the requirements listed in the EOI.

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1 them, believe me, by destroying something whether
 2 or not they destroy themselves and others in the
 3 process. More and more, we have more radicals.
 4 This we all know. We can read about it with
 5 regularity. Folks, there are more important
 6 things than prestige, and it wouldn't hurt a bit
 7 to put the NBAF some site away from on campus, not
 8 close to the college, but if you're going to have
 9 it, have it in the area, but not there.

10 The most important thing about college is
 11 our youth and our young people, and we need to
 12 keep them and we need to not destroy them. They
 13 all want to go to a University and they should be,
 14 and this is a good University, but it should not
 15 be tore down or it should not be hurt by this NBAF
 16 because it has a very great potential for
 17 disaster. I hate to tell you, but it's the God's
 18 truth.

19 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, ma'am.

20 Melissa Wahl is our next speaker,
 21 followed by Katheryn Bellinger and Larry Loomis.

22 MS. WAHL: Good evening, and thank
 23 you for giving me the opportunity to speak
 24 tonight. I'd first like to thank the Paul Irvine
 25 family because if it hadn't been for them talking

Comment No: 3

Issue Code: 21.4

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

2 cont|5.0

3|21.4

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1 to me at the Riley County Fair, I wouldn't have
 2 been made aware of this public meeting, so thank
 3 you for the opportunity, and thank you Paul and
 4 Mary Beth and family.

5 As an ag producer, a/k/a farmer, we wear
 6 many, many hats. Please know we're scientists,
 7 we're doctors, we're engineers. You name it, we
 8 can do it on our farm. If not, come up and visit,
 9 and I'll be more than happy to show you.

10 We're not for the NBAF to be located in
 11 Manhattan, Kansas. Kansas alone is one of the
 12 finest ag producing country -- states that we have
 13 in our country. Please don't let it be located
 14 here. Locate it on Plum Island where it belongs.

15 You know, just in my lifetime, I am a
 16 native of Riley County. We have had ice storms,
 17 we've had tornadoes, we've had floods that weren't
 18 supposed to be. We've had a lot of devastation.
 19 Why do we want to locate something that we would
 20 have one more devastation that could be human
 21 error?

22 I also want you to know, being a farmer,
 23 we have to be good stewards of the land and the
 24 livestock, besides the generations, our children
 25 to come. I don't know who benefits. I don't

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concerns. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS, investigates the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, (tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes), external events, and intentional acts. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period. In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado.

As described in Section 2.2.2.1 of the NBAF EIS, all laboratory staff would receive thorough pre-operational training, as well as ongoing training, in the handling of hazardous infectious agents, understanding biocontainment functions of standard and special practices for each biosafety level, and understanding biocontainment equipment and laboratory characteristics. Training and inherent biocontainment safeguards reduce the likelihood of a release due to human error.

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1 think as a producer that it's us. I think it
 2 might be our politicians. It might be the big
 3 money people. It might be our big corporations,
 4 but we need to get back to our hometowns.

5 Please know that one small rumor can
 6 drive our market drastically down, and to recover
 7 from that, it's not an overnight recovery. We now
 8 as producers are final getting some more market
 9 values. Yeah, our inputs are high, our fuel costs
 10 are high, but please know that it's taken us many,
 11 many, many years to get our beef prices back up
 12 where they belong. One small rumor would take it
 13 back down on its knees.

14 But just please note that I do support
 15 you having the NBAF, but I support it for the Plum
 16 Island facility. I think if the money is
 17 available by our government and we as all
 18 taxpayers, I highly support it to be at Plum
 19 Island. Thank you.

20 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you. Our
 21 next speaker is Larry Loomis.

22 MR. LOOMIS: My name is Larry Loomis.
 23 I'm a retired graduate engineer from Kansas State
 24 University, and I'm also a new resident of
 25 Manhattan, Kansas. And I'm also a producer of

4| 15.4

2 cont| 24.1

Comment No: 4Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The potential biological and socioeconomic effects from a pathogen release from the NBAF are included in Sections 3.8.9 and 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, respectively. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the possible effects would be significant for all sites. As noted in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D, the major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free. The mainland sites have similar economic consequences regardless of the livestock populations in the region.

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1 livestock. We background about 150 cattle each
 2 year.

3 That said, I'm very interested in seeing
 4 this facility located here. I was just
 5 recently -- in fact, I got back from New York City
 6 at 2:30 a.m. this morning, so I've been there
 7 recently. I probably talked to 15 or 20 people at
 8 Central Park last week and there wasn't one of
 9 them who knew what a cow looked like, so why would
 10 they want to have that on Plum Island?

11 We need the facility here in Kansas,
 12 where there's cattle. You put a research facility
 13 close to what you're trying to research. It's not
 14 on an island where there's fish. We need it here
 15 for cattle.

16 The need for this facility is such that
 17 if something does break out, the quicker we can
 18 get it stopped is the better thing. Not let it
 19 gradually work from the east coast or the southern
 20 coast to this area. We need it right here. All
 21 the researchers are here and this is where it
 22 needs to be done.

23 With that in mind, please select
 24 Manhattan, Kansas. Thank you.

25 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, sir.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 25.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Plum Island Site Alternative.

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1 Dr. Dee McKee.

2 DR. MCKEE: Good evening, and thank
3 you for the opportunity to testify. I'm a school
4 administrator. I have been a school administrator
5 in Manhattan. Prior to that, I spent 34 years in
6 agriculture in Western Kansas and was a county
7 commissioner in Ford County. Ford County is one
8 of the corners of the triangle of beef production
9 in the western part of the State, and people out
10 there have great respect for the research and the
11 ability of Kansas State University in helping keep
12 cattle industry viable and protect it against the
13 kinds of diseases that NBAF would research.

14 We all forget that this could occur
15 accidentally or because of some sort of security
16 attack, and having the answers is very important
17 in order to solve that particular part of the
18 crisis that can come from an attack on cattle.

19 I think that respect -- the University is
20 very important and the fact that there is
21 extension out there that continues to feed to
22 people makes us, representing western Kansas and
23 still having a farm, eager to see that kind of
24 information developed and be part of it.

25 I want to also say I have five

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

1|214

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1 grandchildren here in Manhattan, Kansas, and three
2 children, and I am willing to have this sort of
3 research in this place so that those children can
4 have the kind of future that they need to have and
5 they can be surrounded by the researchers and the
6 people who are doing the discussion so that in
7 their K-12 education, they are inspired to find
8 answers that help the rest of the country.

9 I think Kansas has been much interested
10 in service to people and I have four nephews who
11 are in the military active right now, I'm willing
12 to give part of my agricultural risk into this
13 because they went over to give their lives, I can
14 give a little bit of risk, a little bit of
15 potential to make sure that every aspect of
16 freedom is served and I think Kansans do that for
17 this country, and so I'm in favor of NBAF and the
18 best way to build the future is to have control of
19 it and take the initiative to get to the answers,
20 so I would encourage its placement here in
21 Manhattan. Thank you very much.

22 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you.

23 Tom McCoy.

24 MR. MCCOY: Hi, my name is Tom McCoy.

25 I was the project superintendent for the BRI built

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

2|24.4

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1 here in Manhattan, and currently I'm a facility
2 engineer there. What I want to talk about a
3 little bit tonight addresses both the board and
4 the community about these types of facilities.

5 As part of construction, a lot of times
6 you want to know what you're building, how to do
7 it right, so as part of that, when I was
8 superintendent, I went to other facilities
9 throughout the country and studied how they were
10 set up, how they were managed, how they were
11 built. And in that, you learn what works and what
12 doesn't and you get to see the technology change
13 as they occur. Over even just the last five
14 years, and in building the BRI, we have top level
15 technology. It's very impressive when you come
16 through. Some people have toured the facility and
17 seen that.

18 And what I want people to understand is
19 that when the original Plum Island was set up, the
20 reason it was on an island is because they didn't
21 have containment, they didn't know what
22 containment was, and over the last 50 years or so,
23 it has -- it's light years, it's like NASA. The
24 technology has increased exponentially. We're
25 still increasing technology eve to this very day.

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1 We get phone calls from people, how can
2 we enhance this, how can we make this safer or
3 better, resolve this problem or that problem, and
4 we do that, so we constantly make a better, safer
5 facility.

6 So with NBAF being in Manhattan, I don't
7 think that you have to be concerned about the
8 release, the outbreak phenomenon. I think you
9 have more concern with the study of bombs and
10 explosives, things that are put up in the air on
11 purpose. And they work on biological agents,
12 they're inside small safety cabinets that are
13 filtered. We filter the air in our building every
14 five minutes, so we clean the air in Manhattan
15 literally in our facility.

16 I've been a resident here for over 20
17 years. I have a family, and I certainly don't
18 want to see any harm come to them or any of you
19 folks, and so I speak to the public on that. I do
20 support the NBAF being built here.

1|24.4

21 To the board, I kind of want to address a
22 few things. Superintendent of construction for
23 eight years, building projects of up to \$150
24 million dollars. I understand cost and skilled
25 labor and how that plays into things, I was very

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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2|23.0

1 surprised to find Manhattan listed so high on the
2 cost for this facility. The BRI, which is BSL-3Ag
3 facility, a lot of similarities to what the NBAF
4 would be, was built for about \$500 a square foot,
5 which is almost half of what it cost to build that
6 type of facility anywhere in the country. I've
7 had many people come in and look at our facility
8 and are astounded that we were able to build it
9 for that price. Certainly I would like to
10 attribute that to lower labor costs here, but also
11 to good construction management and good skilled
12 labor.

13 The people that built that facility
14 obviously are from these areas. There were few
15 specialty contractors that came in from out of
16 state but certainly, that building can be built
17 here for a good cost and safely and be a benefit
18 to the community. Thank you.

2 cont|23.0

19 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you. At
20 this point in time we're going to ask one more
21 time just to make sure that the two gentlemen that
22 signed up, if they're still here, they'd like to
23 speak.

24 Again, that's David Weyents and Dr. Sam
25 Graham.

Comment No: 2

Issue Code: 23.0

DHS notes the information provided by the commentor.

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1 MODERATOR COGHILL: This person here
2 was on your list and you didn't call her.

3 MS. BELLINGER: Katheryn Bellinger.

4 MODERATOR COGHILL: Please come up to
5 the microphone, I apologize.

6 MS. BELLINGER: Thank you. I need to
7 ask you one simple question, if it's all right.

8 First of all, how long do you intend to
9 be using this facility in the Manhattan area, if
10 you choose to put it here?

11 MODERATOR COGHILL: As a point of
12 clarification, we want to be very clear that the
13 panel isn't here right now to respond to the
14 questions because what we have to do is respond to
15 them formally in the final EIS.

16 MS. BELLINGER: Well, I'll have to go
17 through the whole thing to find out, so I'll just
18 let that one go.

19 First of all, I don't have a Ph.D., I'm
20 not a politician, I'm just a simple Kansas farmer
21 who has livestock and grain and is 100 percent
22 dependent on the grain and livestock she raises.
23 I understand that you guys probably have a whole
24 list of things that you can do to protect these
25 bio hazards from getting out into -- getting out

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1 of your facilities, and I'm sure that you guys
2 would be very quick and decisive, and I'm a huge
3 fan of K-State, my kids go to K-State, and I take
4 my livestock to K-State to have them diagnosed,
5 and I work very closely with them because in my
6 opinion, they're just very good. I like them.
7 They've never let me down. But I would like to
8 address the situation of -- several years ago,
9 there was a mad cow, one case of mad cow disease
10 up in the northern states. We went for two weeks
11 with the price plummeting at the sale barn where I
12 take my cattle. Okay.

13 If something like this happens, even a
14 rumor, even a whisper, our price at the sale barn
15 goes down, and we have to deal with that, and I
16 mean, it would be, like, sorry what can we do
17 about it, and that's all -- if you lose our
18 business, if Kansas State University loses our
19 business, if the co-op loses our business, if the
20 sale barn loses our business, then a lot of the
21 economy would be severely damaged.

22 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you very
23 much.

24 At this point in time we have listened to
25 everybody who has asked or signed up to speak.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The potential economic effects including those from an accidental release are discussed in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS. The primary economic effect of an accidental release would be the banning of U.S. livestock products regardless of the location of the accidental release, which could reach as high as \$4.2 billion until the U.S. was declared foreign animal disease free. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated regardless of the location.

1|15.4

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1 However, the meeting is open until 10 o'clock, and
2 what we'd like to do is if there's anyone here who
3 wishes to speak who did not sign up, who would
4 like to do so now, please feel free to come
5 forward and present some comments.

6 Yes, sir.

7 MR. WHITTEN: I'm Don Whitten, from
8 Wamego, and I'm a private citizen and after the
9 testimony I've heard tonight, it appears to me
10 that greed is in the driver's seat. I believe we
11 need to take another look at this, whether it's
12 going to be in Manhattan or any other locations in
13 the United States.

1|5.0

14 On the island, it's confined to that
15 area, and I think that's where it should stay
16 unless Pat Roberts wants to take it to China.

17 And what bothered me was the statement
18 that one of these gentlemen made up here was,
19 we're dealing with pathogens of two and three, I
20 think, was it, and they said, that's what we're
21 doing right now. Folks, what is going to happen
22 after right now? That's what we got to look at.
23 We don't know.

1 cont|5.0

24 From my point of view, I think that this
25 organization should be retained on the island it

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

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2|25.4

1 is on and forget about coming to Kansas because we
2 have a cattle industry that goes from the north to
3 the south, east and the west. We have cattle that
4 come up from Texas that graze on the finest grass
5 available right here in the Flint Hills, and we
6 have some organizations coming up here and putting
7 in what could be a major danger, and we know what
8 that is, we know how the government works, and we
9 know how fast it works, because look at the tomato
10 industry. The tomato industry has gone down hill
11 because the FDA failed the general public.

12 I thank you, and I thank you for inviting
13 me.

14 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, sir.

15 Is there anyone else who did not get to
16 speak?

17 MS. MCVAY: May I speak?

18 MODERATOR COGHILL: Yes, ma'am.

19 MS. MCVAY: I'm Wanda McVay, I'm just
20 a citizen here in Manhattan. I worked at the KSU
21 foundation for 42 years and I have devout interest
22 and love for K-State, but I have some concerns in
23 this respect. I wrote some notes before I ever
24 got the report and this is what I wrote. In fact,
25 I sent it to Mr. Johnson in Washington.

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1 To whom it may concern: I sincerely
 2 appreciate receiving the June 2008 Draft
 3 Environmental Impact Statement. I realize the
 4 economic and scientific impact it would have for
 5 Manhattan and KSU. Naturally, I have many
 6 reservations with respect to locating the facility
 7 in Manhattan. It could be construed that we just
 8 don't want it in our front or back yard. There's
 9 more to it than that.

1|25.4

10 Why not in an area not populated by
 11 people or livestock?

12 The hazard to surrounding population and
 13 research outweighs any perceived advantage of
 14 locating in Manhattan. Years and years of
 15 research by many K-State scientists could
 16 momentarily be destroyed.

2|21.4

17 We are aware of what happened in Britain.
 18 It was worse than we can imagine because we were
 19 not there. The collateral damage to the livestock
 20 industry of Kansas and surrounding states cannot
 21 realistically be anticipated. In Kansas alone,
 22 farmers and ranchers face the possibility of
 23 various natural disasters: Weather, drought,
 24 hail, wind, floods and tornadoes, as well as hot
 25 and cold, so why develop another possible hazard

3|15.4

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commenter's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 21.4

Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but the economic effect would be significant for all sites. As described in Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, the economic impact of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease virus has been previously studied and could result in a loss in the range of \$2.8 billion in the Plum Island region to \$4.2 billion in the Manhattan, Kansas area over an extended period of time. The economic loss is mainly due to potential foreign bans on U.S. livestock products. Although the effects of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever virus on the national economy has not been as extensively studied, the potential economic loss due to foreign bans on livestock could be similar to that of foot and mouth disease outbreak, while the additional cost due to its effect on the human population could be as high as \$50 billion. There is little economic data regarding the accidental or deliberate Nipah virus release. However, cost would be expected to be much lower than a release of foot and mouth disease virus or Rift Valley fever virus as the Nipah virus vector is not present in the western hemisphere.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commenter's concern. The potential effects to livestock-related industries is discussed in Section 3.10. As noted in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D, the major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free. The mainland sites have similar economic consequences regardless of the livestock populations in the region.

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1 for them to face.

2 I would think that an alternate facility
3 could be used to research the capability of a
4 facility to withstand earthquakes and tornadoes.

5 There are wind tunnels used for various types of
6 research. With respect to earthquakes, millions
7 are being spent on Tuttle Creek Dam to, hopefully,
8 withstand earthquakes of a certain magnitude. I

9 imagine there were unbelievable resources made
10 available to provide for nuclear testing in the

11 Yucca Flats. I realize the cost to develop there
12 would be great and take time, but that cost could
13 be possibly be far less than losses we could
14 anticipate to occur by putting a facility in the
15 midst of people, livestock and already existing
16 research.

17 We hear they're protecting the interest
18 of the police department as to a worse case
19 scenario. With respect to radius of

20 contamination, would there be time to leave the
21 area or would it immediately be too late?

22 I am not a scientist, as you undoubtedly
23 realize. I live a half mile from the proposed
24 site. Others live across the street from the vet
25 med complex that adjoins the site. Additionally,

Comment No: 4Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commenter's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed and built to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site (hurricanes, tornados, etc.). Given the nature of the facility, more stringent building codes are applied to the NBAF than are used for homes and most businesses, regardless of which NBAF site is chosen. The building would be built to withstand wind pressures up to 170% of the winds which are expected to occur locally within a period of 50 years. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period. In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the interior BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be expected to withstand a 200 mph wind load (commonly determined to be an F3 tornado). If the NBAF took a direct hit from an F3 tornado, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first. This breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. However, the loss of these architectural wall components should actually decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building, and diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Since the walls of the BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces would be reinforced cast-in-place concrete, those inner walls would be expected to withstand the tornado.

Comment No: 5Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes the commenter's concern. As described in Section 2.4.3 of the NBAF EIS, other potential locations to construct the NBAF were considered during the site selection process but were eliminated based on evaluation by the selection committee. It was suggested during the scoping process that the NBAF be constructed in a remote location such as an island distant from populated areas or in a location that would be inhospitable (e.g., desert or arctic habitat) to escaped animal hosts/vectors; however, the evaluation criteria called for proximity to research programs that could be linked to the NBAF mission and proximity to a technical workforce. The Plum Island Site is an isolated location as was suggested while still meeting the requirements listed in the EOL.

Comment No: 6Issue Code: 19.4

DHS notes the commenter's concern. A site-specific emergency response plan would be developed and coordinated with the local emergency management plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF. The type of, duration, and geographical extent of quarantine would be determined by the appropriate authorities depending on the pathogen released and contamination level.

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1 livestock is equally close.

2 With respect to the present location of
 3 Plum Island, is that area reluctant to lose the
 4 facility, or are they looking forward to that
 5 possibility?

6 For my unsophisticated concerns, I just
 7 cannot be supportive having the NBAF located in
 8 Manhattan. Thanks for your untiring efforts.

9 A couple other things I would like to
 10 mention. In here, it mentioned about surface
 11 water with respect to low income and high
 12 minority, and I don't quite understand that.
 13 There's a lot of surface water here in Manhattan,
 14 and so do low income and high minority not make
 15 any difference as far as surface water might be a
 16 problem in their areas? Thanks.

17 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you.

18 Is there anyone else who'd like to speak?

19 Yes, ma'am, please come forward.

20 MS. KLEIN: I'm Barbara Klein, and
 21 I'm just a farm housewife, dairy and beef, and I
 22 didn't have a chance to do research because I
 23 wasn't aware of this meeting, it wasn't highly
 24 publicized, as far as I know, but -- I understand
 25 you aren't answering questions, but being around

Comment No: 7 Issue Code: 5.1

There were a number of citizens from New York that spoke at the Scoping Meeting, the Public Comment Meeting, and provided written and oral comments regarding the Plum Island Site Alternative as well as the existing PIADC. The commentors expressed opinions such as supporting the Plum Island Site, keeping Plum Island as a biosafety level 3 facility, and having PIADC closed altogether. All comments received during the 60-day comment period, both oral and written, were given equal consideration in finalizing the NBAF EIS, regardless of how they were submitted. DHS's responses to those comments are included in this Comment Response Document.

Comment No: 8 Issue Code: 12.4

DHS notes the commentor's surface water concerns. The NBAF EIS Sections 3.7.4.1.1, 3.7.4.2.1, and 3.7.4.3.1 describe permitting and planning approaches to curtail or mitigate surface water consequences. These permitting and planning stipulations are local, state and federal requirements applicable to all demographics. The EIS Sections 3.10.1 and 3.10.4.1.2.1.1 describe the Manhattan Campus Site socioeconomic methodology.

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1 livestock, I know that there's ways of -- what I'm
 2 saying is, I wasn't told how these animals were
 3 being contained, whether there's a roof, whether
 4 they're completely isolated, birds fly over? A
 5 mouse can get in a crack a fourth of an inch wide,
 6 and I think it should be on Plum Island because
 7 that mouse is going to have a heck of a swim if
 8 something happens.

1|24.1

9 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you very
 10 much.

11 MR. KLEIN: I'm Rick Klein, I'm just
 12 going to kind of wing it here, I wasn't going to
 13 talk, but after listening, I just thought I might
 14 throw my 2 cents worth in. I am a K-State grad
 15 and I was proud of it, but I'm kinda losing that.
 16 It's all about money anymore. I think we should
 17 teach our kids that sometimes money doesn't
 18 matter.

19 We need to use common sense. There's not
 20 a reason in the world that these facilities should
 21 be located in the heart of cattle country. It
 22 just -- you name it, the shuttle, it shouldn't
 23 have happened, I could go on and on of things that
 24 shouldn't happen. Things happen. It's just plain
 25 common sense.

1|54

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives. The conclusions expressed in Section 3.14 show that even though Plum Island has a lower potential impact in case of a release, the probability of a release is low at all sites. The lower potential effect is due both to the water barrier around the island and the lack of livestock and suseptible wildlife species.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

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1 And I am in the high end, not -- it's
 2 just high end dog food business, we ship overseas
 3 to the Asian market, and if that dog food is a
 4 millimeter too long, a millimeter too short,
 5 they'll ship it back. They are that picky, and it
 6 goes towards their meat, you name it, if there is
 7 anything out of line, they will send it back.

8 And as far as the futures market, them
 9 guys, I'm sure they're just waiting for this
 10 facility to get built because anytime somebody's
 11 just a little bit long or short, one little rumor
 12 that there's a leak at the K-State facility, the
 13 market will go down. I mean, I know that'll do
 14 it.

15 There was an incident in a feedlot at a
 16 sale barn where a producer was feeding their
 17 cattle -- their feeder calves were getting soybean
 18 stubble, there was foaming at the mouth when they
 19 went through the sale barn, the market crashed for
 20 several weeks because they thought there was an
 21 outbreak in this area. This was a local area, so
 22 common sense will just show that it shouldn't be
 23 here.

24 Like I say, everyone that's for it, it's
 25 just all about the money, lining their pockets.

2| 15.4

3| 25.4

Comment No: 2Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The potential biological and socioeconomic effects from a pathogen release from the NBAF are included in Sections 3.8.9 and 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS, respectively. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the possible effects would be significant for all sites. As noted in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D, the major economic effect from an accidental release of a pathogen would be a ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free. The mainland sites have similar economic consequences regardless of the livestock populations in the region. It is beyond the scope of the EIS to speculate on reaction of foreign markets to the construction and operation of NBAF.

Comment No: 3Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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4|5.0

1 It's time we stand up and say, hey, let's spend a
 2 little more money, let's put it out away from the
 3 public, and as Nancy Boyda said, there's problems
 4 in New York. People were almost hospitalized or
 5 possibly killed, so gee, let's put it in Kansas
 6 where people can get hospitalized or possibly
 7 killed.

4 cont.|5.0

8 Let's get it out as far away from the
 9 population as we can so everything can be safe.
 10 We have the internet and all information can be
 11 shipped just as quick 2,000 miles as it can be a
 12 hundred miles, so information, like I say, won't
 13 be a problem. Transportation won't be a problem,
 14 but it's best just to keep everything away. Let's
 15 not help the -- everybody talks about foreign
 16 terrorists, but I'm just as skeptical of the PETA,
 17 animal rights people, they will go to no bounds,
 18 and that's just bringing it right close. Just
 19 helping them out that much closer to destroying
 20 what they are trying to destroy, so just leave it
 21 where it belongs, spend the extra money, everybody
 22 will be a lot happier. Thank you.

5|21.4

23 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, sir.
 24 Is there anyone else who'd like to speak
 25 this evening?

Comment No: 4Issue Code: 5.0

As described in Section 2.3.1, DHS's site selection process including site selection criteria that included, but were not limited to, such factors as proximity to research capabilities and workforce. As such, some but not all of the sites selected for analysis as reasonable alternatives in the NBAF EIS are located in suburban or sem-urban areas. Nevertheless, it has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, where such facilities employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF.

Comment No: 5Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern that the NBAF would be a prime terrorist target. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS address accident scenarios, including external events such as a terrorist attack. A separate Threat and Risk Assessment (designated as For Official Use Only)(TRA) (designated as For Official Use Only and not available to the public for security reasons) was developed outside of the EIS process in accordance with the requirements stipulated in federal regulations. The purpose of the TRA was to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses associated with the NBAF and are used to recommend the most prudent measures to establish a reasonable level of risk for the security of operations of the NBAF and public safety. Because of the importance of the NBAF mission and the associated work with potential high-consequence biological pathogens, critical information related to the potential for adverse consequences as a result of intentional acts has been incorporated into the NEPA process.

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1 Yes, sir, please come to the microphone.

2 MR. BROWN: My name is Bill Brown,
3 I'm a veterinarian locally here in Wamego, Kansas.
4 I practiced in western Kansas for 20 years and the
5 last 15 years I've been with a swine genetics
6 company, and my role today is moving live animals
7 across state lines and internationally.

8 I had the opportunity a few years ago to
9 go to Plum Island, to their foreign animal disease
10 diagnosticians course, and saw firsthand that lab,
11 and became instantly aware of the shortcomings of
12 that lab. They do a tremendous service there, and
13 that service needs to continue.

14 Over the years, I've been able to observe
15 several labs, working in the animal health side of
16 the house, and we've seen it, heard a lot of the
17 speakers tonight talk about the increase in
18 technology and we've seen that over and over.

19 The opportunity to go to USAMRIID during
20 the first Gulf War with an equine botulism
21 department check allowed me firsthand to visualize
22 that lab and, again, the technology has just
23 increased over time, so I would support the lab,
24 NBAF lab coming to Manhattan for several reasons,
25 but I think a couple of the most important things

1|24.4

Comment No: 1Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

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1 cont|24.4

1 are, one, it is strategically located, and there's
2 a lot of second and third order effects from being
3 in that strategic location.

4 Kansas is focused, K-State is focused,
5 and there's many benefits and there's many merits
6 in locating that NBAF lab here at this university.
7 Thank you.

8 MODERATOR COGHILL: Thank you, sir.
9 Anyone else at this point in time?

10 All right, at this point, I'd like to
11 turn it back over to Jamie.

12 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you, Catherine.
13 I want to thank everyone tonight for their
14 comments and taking time out of your schedule to
15 be with us this evening. Appreciate everyone's
16 input, feedback and comments. We will take them
17 all into consideration when making our final
18 decision, and when we come up with our Final EIS.

19 If you think of a comment later that you
20 haven't made tonight, please again submit it to us
21 by August 25th where it can be addressed to and
22 responded in a Final EIS.

23 So, again, thank you everyone for coming.
24 I appreciate your time, and with that, we'll
25 adjourn the meeting.

