

FIRST RESPONDER HEALTH SURGE CAPACITY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

This memorandum is in response to the Action Directive issued on January 28, 2009 that directs the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) to review first responder health surge capacity and our Nation's current state of medical readiness. Specifically, this Action Directive directs OHA, in collaboration with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), other appropriate DHS Components, state and local emergency management officials and other Federal agencies to:

- 1) Review plans and activities underway to strengthen and coordinate medical readiness preparedness;
- 2) Conduct a review and assess any shortcomings of the National Response Framework (NRF),
- 3) Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8,
- 4) Review the capacity for communities to handle large scale health emergencies, including first responder capacity and the ability to surge beyond existing bed space at local hospitals,
- 5) Review any overlaps and inconsistencies in medical readiness plans and activities; review ongoing grant making efforts and assess their effectiveness, and
- 6) submit any possible restructuring or consolidations for these plans and activities that are necessary and identify areas where state and local emergency management agencies can provide input.

This is a complex issue to review in a short period of time and to present in a brief report. Recommendations provided by OHA are based on meetings conducted and on experiences which have occurred over the past 2-3 years. These recommendations have not been vetted with interagency partners and we have not obtained their concurrence.

Summary of Recommendations

Based on our review and discussions with other DHS Components, our Federal interagency partners and select state and local public health and emergency management colleagues, we propose the following changes in four areas: 1) Consider options for strengthening coordination of ESF 8, 2) Restructure our Nation's grants programs, 3) Increase DHS (and OHA) presence in the states and regions to augment engagement with state and local governments and the private sector and to promote regional approaches to medical surge capacity enhancement, and 4) Develop strategies to improve public risk communication.

The Nation's Current State of Medical Readiness

Despite incremental advances in our Nation's capacity to respond to major disasters, most evident with anticipated events such as hurricanes, there still remain gaps in our ability to respond to a large-scale medical emergency. Threats such as a pandemic, a large-scale biological attack or a nuclear detonation would produce casualties beyond current local, state and Federal capacities. With new leadership, there is an opportunity to review large-scale medical response issues with renewed vigor.

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Federal Roles and Responsibilities for Medical Response

HHS is the lead agency responsible for Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8 of the National Response Framework. ESF 8 responsibilities are wide-ranging and split between various agencies and Departments. While the responsibility for overall response coordination lies with DHS through FEMA, the lead for medical response is delegated to another Department, HHS.

The Office of Health Affairs (OHA) plays a critical role for DHS during response activations. As the statutorily designated principal medical advisor to the Secretary and FEMA Administrator, OHA provides medical and health subject matter expertise during a National response in a variety of ways. These include: collection and analysis of incident information; working with representatives from HHS, under ESF 8, to refine needs and assist in crafting appropriate mission assignments; provision of a liaison to the HHS Secretary's Operations Center (SOC); provision of subject matter experts in medical operations to provide FEMA assistance with evaluation of state and local medical resource needs and requests; assistance to FEMA with coordination of medical assets to affected areas; assistance to FEMA and the OPS Division with crisis action planning; integrating with FEMA Safety and Occupational Health during incidents to ensure appropriate force health protection measures are in place; provision of medical personnel to the FEMA Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT); and medical oversight of DHS Emergency Medical Services Care.

Activities Underway to Strengthen and Coordinate Medical Readiness

There is a wide range of activities within the Federal government and the private sector to strengthen and coordinate medical readiness. Most of the activities reside within DHS and HHS.

Department of Health and Human Services

HHS has a number of public health and medical system initiatives intended to strengthen medical readiness. Many of these programs are effective and are moving the Nation closer to being ready to handle catastrophic mass casualties. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether certain programs are successfully progressing toward readiness. Challenges to progress include declining or variable funding, rapid expansion of responsibilities of the primary HHS office leading the Federal medical response, shifting leadership priorities, and structural issues with some of the funding mechanisms. HHS programs that support medical readiness include: National Healthcare Preparedness Program (NHPP), Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement, Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) and Emergency System for Advanced Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP), the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), Federal Medical Stations (FMS), and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality's (AHRQ) Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program.

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Department of Homeland Security

OHA, through its Office of Medical Readiness, is working on a number of initiatives to improve the medical readiness of the Nation. Almost all of the activities of OHA are in support of or in collaboration with other DHS Components and/or other Federal Departments and agencies. DHS programs that support medical readiness include: Medical and Health Disaster Planning, OHA Incident Management Operations, Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS), Clearinghouse of Medical and Public Health Preparedness Allocation, Skill Development, and Standards, Knowledge Development and Dissemination, and Strategic Partnerships/Infrastructure Protection.

Review and Assessment of Shortcomings of the National Response Framework, ESF 8

HHS is designated the primary agency responsible for ESF 8 and is also designated as the ESF 8 coordinator. There are 16 support Departments and agencies as well. ESF 8 provides assistance in 17 core functional areas. This is the most important ESF within the NRF as it deals with ensuring the public health and safety of our citizens. It is one of the broadest in scope and interdependencies, involving 17 Departments and agencies. Coordination of all of the functions and agencies with responsibilities to this ESF is a huge challenge.

Some of the core functional areas are addressed very well during a response while other functions need improvement. Areas in need of improvement include: situational awareness for FEMA, patient evacuation, mass fatality management, coordination with other ESFs, activation process, and emergency medical services

Review of Capacity for Communities to Handle Large Scale Health Emergencies

Since 9-11, billions of dollars have been spent on emergency preparedness activities. It is easy to determine how much the Federal government is spending for preparedness activities that are intended to help communities become ready, but it is not really known how capable communities are to handle large scale health emergencies. The Nation's ability to provide medical surge capacity is not known because we do not have agreed upon definitions or methods to measure preparedness. Some of the roadblocks to better community capacity include: decreased healthcare system capacity, constraints on surge capacity, inadequately funded non-hospital resources, and lack of personal preparedness

Review Ongoing Grant-Making Efforts and Assess Their Effectiveness

Medical readiness is not defined and there are no universally agreed upon expectations with regard to how ready the Nation needs to be to handle large scale casualties. In order to appropriately plan and prepare for mass casualties and determine resources required, expectations for numbers of casualties that can be managed need to be determined. Not knowing what we are preparing for makes assessing readiness difficult if not impossible.

Most of the medical and public health specific grants programs that provide surge capability reside within HHS. Often cited issues from state and local officials include Federal grants cycles

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that are one year, disrupting state and local planning efforts; grants that are not synchronized and aligned with one another; and grants that are not risk-based but rather allocated by population density. Grantees have expressed that multi-year cycles would improve their capability for planning. These programs would also benefit from better evaluation plans created at the front end of program development so that DHS may better assess the effectiveness of these programs. Also, communities would benefit from regionalization and grants programs could be used to drive regionalization by instituting requirements in grants guidance.

Identify Areas Where State and Local Emergency Management Can Provide Input

State and local emergency management and public health agencies should be engaged with Federal agencies in a variety of activities. State, local, territorial and tribal governments and the private sector should be involved with determination of requirements and in providing input into Federal guidance and also should be more involved in the establishment of standards for medical readiness and in target capabilities list development. Another area where state and local emergency management should provide input includes Federal planning. OHA could more effectively facilitate state and local engagement by developing a regional presence. Regional personnel from OHA could provide technical assistance to states and assessment of needs during incident activations.

Recommended restructuring or consolidations

Based on discussions with our interagency partners, DHS Components and state and local emergency management colleagues, we have found common themes that inform our recommendations. These recommendations include: consider options for strengthening coordination of ESF-8; restructure our Nation's grants programs; increase DHS presence, specifically OHA, in the states and regions to augment engagement with state and local governments and the private sector and to promote regional approaches to medical surge capacity enhancement; and improve public risk communication by creating risk communication strategies with the public for management of expectations during large scale catastrophes.

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ES WH/Interagency Summary - 811103 -
This workflow is OPEN and assigned to (b)(6)

Status: OPEN
Priority: 9

Created On: 1/27/2009
Created By: (b)(6)

Closed On:
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General Info: User-Defined Fields, Codes and Notes

ES Case: 09.0006.49
Document Name: ACTION DIRECTIVE - First Responder Health Surge Capacity
Document Date: 02/24/2009
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Document Classification: Unclassified
Read-Ahead Received:
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Materials Distributed: OHA, PLCY, OGC, I&A, MGMT, FEMA, NPPD, ESEC

Meeting Attendees:

Date Attendees Cleared:

Materials Due to ES: 02/19/2009

Task: Sec Tasker

Method Received: Email

Type: Request

Category: Information Memo

Summary of Document: Given the ongoing threat of a pandemic, biological, or nuclear attack improving the capacity to deal with large-scale medical emergencies is paramount. While the Department of Health and Human Services serves as the lead Federal agency, the Department of Homeland Security plays a critical role in enhancing emergency medical response capabilities at all levels of government. DHS also oversees the health aspects of contingency planning for all chemical biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards.

Given the Department's all-hazards response mission, it is essential to determine the current state of medical readiness, including local first responder capabilities, hospital bed capacity, and the ability to surge existing capacity in an emergency, as well as any gaps and current efforts to address them.

To this end, the Office of Health Affairs, working with FEMA, State and local emergency management officials, and other Federal agencies shall:

- Review plans and activities underway to strengthen and coordinate medical readiness preparedness
- Conduct a review and assess any shortcomings of the National Response Framework (NRF) Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8 - Public Health and Medical Services.
- Review the capacity for communities to handle large scale health emergencies, including first responder capacity and the ability to surge beyond existing bed space at local hospitals.
 - Review any overlaps and inconsistencies in medical readiness plans and activities.
- Review ongoing grant making efforts and assess their effectiveness.
 - Submit any possible restructuring or consolidations for these plans and activities that are necessary and identify areas where state and local emergency management agencies can provide input.

Action to be Taken: Provide Information Memo

If other:

Date DHS Response Sent:

Action Taken

If other:

Follow Up Action: Brief by Feb 10.

Date DHS Response Sent:

*Signed By:

Workflow Codes:

Workflow Codes:

Agency Contacts: No possible agency contacts.

People: 0 people directly associated.

Calendar Info: 0 events.

Current Step: Initial Entry **Assigned:** 1/27/2009 **Started:** 1/27/2009

(b)(6) 1/28/2009 7:45 AM
Attached to Workflow Record - '811115', ST2 Workflow.

(b)(6) 3/10/2009 6:17 PM
Attached File -

Fact Sheet

February XX, 2009
Contact: DHS Press Office, 202-282-8010

FIRST RESPONDER HEALTH SURGE CAPACITY ACTION DIRECTIVE

BACKGROUND

Despite advances in the nation's capacity to respond to major disasters, there still remain gaps in the ability to respond to a large-scale medical emergency. Threats such as a pandemic, a large-scale biological attack, or a nuclear detonation would produce casualties beyond current local, state and federal capacities.

Over the last 10 years, the number of hospital beds in the U.S. has substantially declined and several hundred emergency departments have closed their doors. Medical first responders, most of whom are in the public sector or are volunteers, are woefully under-resourced and therefore potentially unprepared to handle truly catastrophic events.

FEDERAL ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MEDICAL RESPONSE

Emergency Support Function-8: While the responsibility for overall incident response coordination lies with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the lead agency responsible for Emergency Support Function-8 (Health and Medical Services) of the National Response Framework.

Within DHS, the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) plays a critical role during response activations. As the statutorily-designated principal medical advisor to the Secretary and FEMA Administrator, OHA provides medical and health subject matter expertise during a national response in a variety of ways. These include:

- Collection and analysis of incident information;
- Working with representatives from HHS, under ESF-8, to refine needs and assist in crafting appropriate mission assignments;
- Liaison to the HHS Secretary's Operations Center (SOC);
- Subject matter experts in medical operations to provide FEMA assistance with evaluation of state and local medical resource needs and requests;
- Assistance to FEMA with coordination of medical assets to affected areas;
- Assistance to FEMA and the OPS Division with crisis action planning;
- Integrating with FEMA Safety and Occupational Health during incidents to ensure appropriate health protection measures are in place;
- Medical personnel to the FEMA Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT); and

- Medical oversight of DHS Emergency Medical Services Care.

PLANS AND ACTIVITIES UNDERWAY TO STRENGTHEN AND COORDINATE MEDICAL READINESS

There are a wide range of activities within the federal government and the private sector to strengthen and coordinate medical readiness. Most of the activities reside within DHS and HHS.

Department of Health and Human Services: HHS has a number of public health and medical system initiatives intended to strengthen medical readiness. HHS programs that support medical readiness include:

- National Healthcare Preparedness Program (NHPP)
- Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement
- Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) and Emergency System for Advanced Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP)
- National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)
- Federal Medical Stations (FMS)
- Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality's (AHRQ) Public Health Emergency Preparedness Program

Department of Homeland Security: OHA, through its Office of Medical Readiness, is working on a number of initiatives to improve the medical readiness of the nation. DHS programs that support medical readiness include:

- Medical and Health Disaster Planning
- OHA Incident Management Operations
- Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS)
- Clearinghouse of Medical and Public Health Preparedness Allocation, Skill Development, and Standards, Knowledge Development and Dissemination
- Strategic Partnerships/Infrastructure Protection

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NP 001

ES WH/Interagency Summary - 810819 -
This workflow is OPEN and assigned to (b)(6)

Status: OPEN
Priority: 9

Created On: 1/26/2009
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Materials Due to ES: 02/18/2009
Task: Sec Tasker
Method Received: Email
Type: Request
Category: Information Memo

Summary of Document: The department is leading an interagency effort to develop plans at multiple levels to address eight scenario sets, which are based on the 15 National Planning Scenarios crafted by the Homeland Security Council. DHS and the federal interagency are utilizing the Integrated Planning System to develop and adjudicate interagency plans for each scenario.

- Â· What is the status of each of these plans and the anticipated timeframe and actions needed to complete the process?
- Â· Are there any recommendations for restructuring or consolidation?
- Â· Where can state and local emergency management agencies provide input and assistance?

Action to be Taken: Provide Information Memo

If other:

Date DHS Response Sent:

Action Taken

If other:

Follow Up Action: Brief S1 no late than 2/9.

Date DHS Response Sent:

*Signed By:

Workflow Codes:

Workflow Codes:

Agency Contacts: No possible agency contacts.

People: 0 people directly associated.

Calendar Info: 0 events.

Current Step: Initial Entry Assigned: 1/26/2009 Started: 1/26/2009

(b)(6) 1/28/2009 11:29 AM
S&T has no equities in this tasker.

(b)(6) 3/10/2009 6:15 PM
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Fact Sheet

February XX, 2009

Contact: DHS Press Office, 202-282-8010

NATIONAL PLANNING ACTION DIRECTIVE

Background

- In 2006, the Homeland Security Council's Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned Report identified the federal government's lack of a standardized planning "process" to guide the execution of coordinated operations as a critical shortcoming. As a result, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was tasked with developing and implementing an operational planning and execution system.
- Initially, the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning developed the National Planning and Execution System (NPES), which was based on two widely known and well-tested doctrinal references: the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Department of Defense Joint Operations and Planning System (JOPES), which the Department of Defense relies on for all major contingency planning. DHS proceeded to use NPES as the core planning doctrine to train department and interagency planners. Since its inception, more than 1,000 people from multiple federal departments and agencies have been trained on the use of NPES.

Integrated Planning System

- Beyond a new planning system, DHS assisted in creating a new permanent body for drafting interagency plans. Between September 2006 and December 2007 this group of interagency planners, called the Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT), developed plans to address a number of catastrophic scenarios, including: pandemic influenza, improvised explosive devices, an improvised nuclear device, radiological dispersal device attacks, cyber attacks and hurricanes.
- In December 2007, President George W. Bush approved Annex I, *National Planning*, to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, which directed DHS to use NPES as a model to develop an *Integrated Planning System (IPS)* that would guide interagency planning.
- IPS does *not* alter existing authorities among federal departments and agencies. The system is a platform to lead to the improvement and execution of interagency planning. It also:

- Establishes a standard federal planning process and format to develop coordinated interagency plans.
 - Identifies the specific federal roles and responsibilities needed to coordinate federal incident management activities for national level domestic incidents.
 - Develops and establishes a framework to coordinate federal support to state, local and tribal entities.
 - Builds upon the process and product framework of the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS).
- The IPS requires the development of specific planning deliverables for each of the national planning scenarios. Those deliverables include a Strategic Guidance Statement, Federal Strategic Plan, Federal Concept Plan, and Department and Agency Operation Plans. Each type of plan is described below:
 - Strategic Guidance Statement: Outlines strategic priorities, broad national strategic objectives, and basic assumptions; describes the envisioned end-state; and establishes the general means necessary to accomplish that end.
 - Federal Strategic Plan: Defines the mission, identifies authorities, delineates roles and responsibilities, establishes mission essential tasks, determines required and priority capabilities, and develops performance and effectiveness measures.
 - Federal Concept Plan: Describes the concept of operations for integrating and synchronizing existing federal capabilities to accomplish the mission-essential tasks, and describes how federal capabilities will be integrated into and support regional, state, and local plans.
 - Federal Department and Agency Operation Plan: Identifies detailed resource, personnel and asset allocation in order to execute the objectives of the strategic plan and turn strategic priorities into operational execution. Contains a full description of the concept of operations, to include specific roles responsibilities, tasks, integration and actions required, with supporting support function annexes as appropriate.

State and Local Participation

- To date, state and local emergency management agencies have provided valuable input in the development of the Integrated Planning System as well as to the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG 101).
- Continuing to incorporate state and local emergency management subject matter experts into plan development activities will ensure that the objectives, priorities, and roles and responsibilities put forth by federal interagency partners do indeed provide state and local emergency management agencies with the support required across the homeland security spectrum of operations (prevent, protect, respond, and recover).

Issues

A number of key shortfalls preventing DHS from fully leveraging IPS at multiple levels of government have been identified:

NONPROFIT COMMUNITY INPUT

The department is still working to improve processes for capturing input and facilitating coordination with the 53 government and non-profit (e.g. American Red Cross) entities that have equities in the IPS planning effort.

PLANNING RESOURCES

- The limited resources that state and local partners can devote to dedicated planning efforts is also a key challenge. DHS is working to identify tools that will increase planning capacity across government, expand and increase the opportunities for additional IPS training for interagency personnel, as well as homeland security partners at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels. Presently there are no federal grant programs in place that specifically address IPS. However, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is coordinating this effort for both IPS and CPG 101. Existing grant programs, such as the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program and the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program, have a strong emphasis on planning and might be leveraged more fully. Additionally, the Homeland Security Grant Program was developed to align to the IPS vis-à-vis CPG 101.

TIMELINESS

- The long-term challenge for both DHS and our many homeland security partners is the ability to accelerate development of IPS planning before we are faced with incidents and sustaining the planning capacity at all levels of government. The most effective way to accomplish both is to train and develop a professional cadre of operational planners within DHS and to encourage other departments and agencies to make the same commitment.

IPS currently includes an existing requirement for a full review in January of 2010. This review will provide federal departments and agencies an opportunity to recommend any other changes for consideration.

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**Homeland
Security**

February 23, 2009

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Janet Napolitano
Secretary

FROM: Roger T. Rufe, Jr.
Director, Office of Operations Coordination & Planning (OPS)

SUBJECT: National Planning

Purpose:

This memorandum responds to your Action Directive on National Planning (Tracking Number 09.0006.38 / 810819).

Background:

In 2006, the Homeland Security Council's Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned Report identified the Federal government's lack of a standardized planning "process" to guide the execution of coordinated operations as a critical shortcoming. The 2006 Nationwide Plans Review (NPR) additionally noted in the Phase 2 report that "...planning is unsystematic and not linked within a national planning system...and reflects a systemic problem: outmoded planning process, products, and tools..." The NPR further identified 24 recommendations for the Federal government and 15 for State and local governments to improve planning efforts.

As a result of these reports, DHS was tasked with developing and implementing a planning and execution system. Additionally, as part of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was tasked to engage in improving overall planning efforts, including the modernization of state and local planning guidance.

DHS developed the National Planning and Execution System (NPES), which was based on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Department of Defense's (DOD) Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). DHS OPS then used NPES as the core

planning doctrine to train its interagency Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT). More than one-thousand people from multiple departments and agencies have been trained on the use of NPES following the stand up of the IMPT in August 2006. From September 2006 to December 2007, the IMPT developed draft plans for Pandemic Influenza, Improvised Explosive Device (IED), Improvised Nuclear Device (IND), Radiological Attacks, Cyber, and Hurricanes.

Concurrent with this effort, FEMA led the development of updated planning guidance, the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG-101), to meet the unique requirements of State and local governments. Technical assistance services from FEMA to State and local governments were expanded across a variety of planning activities, with more than 500 deliveries conducted since the beginning of FY 2007.

In December 2007, before any of the above draft plans were approved by the interagency, President Bush approved Annex I, *National Planning*, to Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8. This Annex was developed, in part, because of the need to further formalize efforts to address the shortfalls identified post-Katrina, and as a result of the overwhelming interagency interest in learning NPES.

Among other things, Annex I directed DHS to develop an Integrated Planning System (IPS) that would guide interagency planning and connect with State and local planning efforts. IPS aligned federal planning with State and local planning using the best doctrine from NPES, the National Response Framework (NRF), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and other established planning processes. IPS was developed with full federal interagency participation and included input from State and local subject matter experts. IPS was given Presidential approval on January 15, 2009, and CPG-101 was approved by the FEMA Administrator on January 16, 2009. The details for a joint national roll out of IPS and CPG 101 are being finalized.

IPS is a platform to lead to the improvement and execution of interagency planning.

It also:

- Establishes a standard Federal planning process and format to develop coordinated interagency plans from the strategic to tactical level for any identified scenario.
- Identifies the specific Federal roles and responsibilities needed to coordinate Federal Incident Management activities to national level domestic incidents.
- Adopts CPG 101 for use by State and local officials to ensure consistent planning process at all levels of government.
- Develops and establishes a framework to coordinate Federal support to State, local and Tribal entities.
- Builds upon the process and product framework of the NRF and NIMS.
- Does not alter existing authorities of individual Federal Departments and Agencies.
- Does not convey new authorities upon the Secretary of Homeland Security (SEC DHS) or any other Federal official.

The IPS requires the development of the following planning deliverables for each of the National Planning Scenarios:¹

- Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS): Outlines strategic priorities, broad national strategic objectives, and basic assumptions; describes the envisioned end-state; and establishes the general means necessary to accomplish that end.
- Federal Strategic Plan (SP): Defines the mission, identifies authorities, delineates roles and responsibilities, establishes mission essential tasks, determines required and priority capabilities, and develops performance and effectiveness measures.
- Federal Concept Plan (CONPLAN): Describes the concept of operations for integrating and synchronizing existing Federal capabilities to accomplish the mission essential tasks, and describes how Federal capabilities will be integrated into and support regional, State, and local plans.
- Federal Department and Agency Operation Plan (OPLAN): Identified detailed resource, personnel and asset allocation in order to execute the objectives of the strategic plan and turn strategic priorities into operational execution. Contains a full description of the concept of operations, to include specific roles responsibilities, tasks, integration and actions required, with supporting support function annexes as appropriate.

Additional efforts are underway at the State and local level. Working with FEMA, several large-scale efforts have been launched to address planning for catastrophic events (including the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program, New Madrid Seismic Zone (NMSZ), and others) as well as targeted efforts to increase planning capacity (such as the Task Force for Emergency Readiness initiative).

Discussion

1) What is the status of each of these plans and the anticipated timeframe and actions needed to complete the process?

The current status of IPS scenario based planning deliverables are reflected in the table on the following page.

¹ The National Planning Scenarios were originally developed as a representative set of scenarios for use in resource planning activities under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, which introduced a capabilities-based approach to all-hazards preparedness. The National Planning Scenarios have since been used as a basis for developing operational plans to address each of the individual scenarios.

- Distinguish internal Department planning efforts from the DHS-led interagency IPS planning efforts; integrate and/or synchronize where appropriate.
- IPS currently includes an existing requirement for a full review in January 2010. This review will provide Federal Departments and Agencies an opportunity to recommend any other changes for consideration.
- The IPS must continue to integrate with the capabilities-based, all-hazards preparedness system described in HSPD-8 and PKEMRA.
- The IPS must be linked to Federal department and agency planning, programming and budgeting to ensure IPS plans are executable with current programs and funding.
- Establish a formal evaluation plan to assess the IPS and CPG 101 in Year One and identify the necessary improvements to the planning guidance.
- Develop and implement measures to clarify how plans are implemented when a crisis occurs.
- Based on the information collected, develop a plan for transitioning from the current system of systems (IPS and CPG 101) to a full National Planning System.
- Gap analysis and assessment of Federal shortfalls (as captured in the planning process).

3) Where can state and local emergency management agencies provide input and assistance?

To date, State and local emergency management agencies have already provided valuable input in the development of the Integrated Planning System (IPS) and to the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG-101). It is through the input of a wide spectrum of organizations that the vertical integration and synchronization elements of IPS and CPG 101 were developed. Representatives from these can continue to provide valuable input and assistance in development of all levels of Federal Planning.

We have already begun to incorporate State and local homeland security and emergency management into plan development activities at the Regional level. As that process unfolds, it will ensure that the objectives, priorities, and roles and responsibilities put forth by Federal interagency partners do indeed provide State and local emergency management agencies with the support required across the homeland security spectrum of operations (prevent, protect, respond, and recover) as well as the integration of mitigation with these operations. This includes integrating IPS's Federal planning efforts with the CPG 101-based State and local planning efforts, harmonizing the two systems with grants for enhancing State and local preparedness, and ensuring integrated planning at the regional, State, and local level.

At the National level, we must recognize that it is not practical to ask for permanent detailees to engage in the National-level planning from State and local governments. Consistent with its ongoing PKEMRA implementation, we recommend that FEMA continue its work with the Homeland Security Consortium to develop a process based on Chapter 4 of IPS and CPG 101 for involvement in the processes used to develop National-level IPS deliverables (Strategic Plans, CONPLANS, and OPLANS). Based on this plan, FEMA will work with DHS OPS to ensure production schedules allow for the additional time necessary for comment on National-level products. These agencies can continue to assist with the development through plan validation

during exercises and by increasing awareness and diffusion of IPS and CPG 101 through attending training and educational activities.

Additional Taskers from Acting Deputy Secretary Beers

On February 12, 2009, DHS OPS and the Office of Health Affairs briefed Acting Deputy Secretary (DEPSEC) Rand Beers regarding progress towards completion of the Action Directive on National Planning. During this brief, DEPSEC Beers requested that four additional taskers be completed in the near term. The first two of these taskers have been completed and are included below. The remaining two taskers are also identified below, but require additional coordination. DHS OPS is currently leading an intradepartmental effort to answer these two remaining questions within the next 10 days.

1) Are there any grant programs in place that deal specifically with IPS?

At the present time there are no Federal grant programs in place that specifically address IPS. FEMA is currently coordinating this effort for both IPS and the Comprehensive Preparedness Guidance (CPG) 101. There are grant programs such as the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP) and the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) that have a strong emphasis on planning. FEMA continues to encourage grantees to adopt a planning process (e.g., in RCGPGP FEMA adopted a “fix existing plans, build planning processes, and resource the plans” methodology). The current plan to roll out IPS and CPG-101 concurrently will obviously help both to take root. Additionally, the Homeland Security Grant Program does tie to Annex I, HSPD-8, but in that regard it ties to CPG 101 (as a State and local program). Specific language in current grant packages are not targeted specifically at IPS or CPG. However, all applicants are strongly encouraged to use CPG for plans developed through this program.

2) Please provide a one-page fact sheet that summarizes the timeline associated with IPS development. (See attached document entitled “Fact Sheet - Development of the Integrated Planning System”)

3) What can/should be done to accelerate the current pace for IPS plan development?

In the near term, there are two primary options under consideration that would accelerate the current pace of IPS plan development: procedural changes and organizational changes.

Procedural Changes:

The Secretary could pursue the following courses of action:

- Shorten the current timelines articulated in IPS for the interagency development and adjudication of each of the IPS deliverables, i.e., Strategic Guidance Statements (SGS), Strategic Plans (STRATPLANS), Concept Plans (CONPLANS), and Operations Plans (OPLANS).

- This option is likely to encounter significant interagency resistance given that IPS timelines were just approved and reflect the current level of interagency planning capacity in Departments that previously lacked a robust focus on operational planning. This will also limit our ability to integrate State and local inputs.
- Begin the planning process with a Principals Committee meeting in which the Secretary guides a discussion to set strategic-level planning guidance at the outset.
 - This option would mitigate the number of interagency disputes which currently slow the plan development and approval process.
 - However, it would be difficult to get meaningful engagement at the Principals level on individual plans, especially in the timeframes currently specified by the IPS.

Organizational

The Secretary could also direct certain organizational changes that would increase the ability of the Department to lead the interagency development of IPS plans. These would include, but are not limited to:

- Consolidate all Annex I, HSPD-8 planning requirements (e.g., SGS, Strategic Plans, CONPLANS, and OPLANS) under one organization to facilitate parallel planning and minimize planning resource impacts on Federal partners. The challenge to this option is that it lacks a “check and balance” against plan content.
- Coordinate with Federal partners to ensure complete interagency staffing to support in accordance with the Homeland Security Council’s (HSC) Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT) charter.

In the long-term, the most effective way to accelerate the development of IPS planning deliverables is to train and develop a professional cadre of operational planners with the associated supporting infrastructure within DHS and to persuade other Department’s and Agencies to make the same commitment.

4) What is the best approach to align IPS plan development with responsibility for the operational execution for each of the National Planning Scenarios?

One of the fundamental challenges identified in the IPS planning effort to date is how to develop comprehensive contingency plans for the National Planning Scenarios (NPS) that require the integration of interagency expertise across a wide variety of potential scenarios. This is especially challenging because the current set of fifteen all-hazards NPS ranges from catastrophic terrorism events to natural disasters. In addition, the full-spectrum of operations for each of these unique scenarios spans prevent, protect, respond, and recover phases.

An additional reality that further complicates matters is the fact that certain Departments and Agencies possess primary responsibility and expertise in specific phases of a specific scenario (i.e., prevent/protect), but have little or no involvement in other phases for the same scenario (i.e., respond/recover). For example, the Department of Justice plays the lead role in many prevent/protect activities for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) scenarios, but plays a lesser

role than the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, or FEMA for the respond/recover missions for the same WMD scenario.

In addition to the fact that the above challenges impact plan development, they also have a similar impact on the operational execution of any plan that requires activation. In this regard, DHS OPS is coordinating with its intra and interagency peers to assess whether or not it is more effective to rotate lead agency responsibility by phase or to just create capacity and architecture in one location to be able to manage a scenario across the prevent, protect, respond, and recover phases.

In sum, the homeland security environment is not directly analogous to the military environment, which includes a relatively direct chain from planning to execution. In the homeland security environment, centralized national planning can only go so far before it needs to be distributed across Federal departments and agencies and State and local governments, who will actually execute the plans. Determining how best to align IPS plan development with responsibility for operational execution is a continuing challenge for DHS.

SUBJECT: Fact Sheet – Development of the Integrated Planning System (IPS)

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this memorandum is to provide information on the development of the *Integrated Planning System (IPS)*.
2. **Facts. Chronology of IPS Development.** The table below reflects the key events in the development chronology of the IPS.

Date	Event	Remarks
26 AUG 06	Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT) Charter approved by the Homeland Security Council (HSC)	Approved based on two of the 125 Hurricane Katrina lessons learned which recommended the development of a national planning process and activation of a group of senior interagency planners
06 SEP 06	IMPT activated and publishes the National Planning and Execution System (NPES) as an interim national planning process	NPES is developed based on the National Incident Management System (NIMS), DoD Joint Operations Planning Execution System (JOPES) and DoD's emerging Adaptive Planning Process
15 OCT 06 to 30 NOV 07	IMPT develops draft Concept Plans for the Improvised Nuclear Device (IND), Improvised Explosive Device (IED), Pandemic Influenza (PI), Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD), Hurricane and Cyber scenarios.	Each of these plans were reviewed and commented upon by various elements of Federal departments and agencies but were never approved by the interagency or signed off on by Sec Chertoff due to approval of Annex I, HSPD-8 which realigned federal planning requirements for these scenarios
04 DEC 07	Annex I, National Planning, HSPD-8 approved by the President	Establishes the requirement for the Integrated Planning System (IPS)
27 DEC 07	DHS IPS In-Progress Review assigns development of IPS to FEMA and DHS OPS	DHS OPS and FEMA establish working group and begin developing IPS using the National Planning and Execution System (NPES) as the foundation to deliver IPS NLT 04 FEB 08 to the HSC
11 JAN 08	Interagency Domestic Readiness Group (DRG) IPS and DHS OPS Orientation	
11 JAN 08	Initial Interagency IPS Development Conference	Over 125 participants from 40+ Federal, State, local, and tribal organizations; Established development framework for IPS
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01 FEB 08	Initial Draft of IPS version 1.4 Delivered to HSC	Development continues until JUN 08
25 JUN 08	DRG approves IPS version 2.3 as the interim national planning process	IPS v 2.3 functions as the interim solution to enable FEMA opportunity to synchronize IPS with the Interim Comprehensive Preparedness Guidance (CPG 101) and address State, local and tribal equities
09 SEP 08	FEMA completes coordination/ synchronization of IPS with CPG 101	IPS v 2.4 sent to Federal departments and agencies for review and comment
15 DEC 08	Final version of IPS submitted to HSC for President	DRG assumed configuration control of document from IMPT
15 JAN 09	President approves IPS	FEMA Administrator approves CPG 101



Homeland Security

Press Release

Secretary Napolitano Receives Report on National Planning

WASHINGTON- Today, in response to her January 27, 2009 Action Directive, DHS Secretary Napolitano received a report on the current state of National Planning, an essential capability for DHS and its partners in securing America.

In 2006, the Homeland Security Council's Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned Report identified the federal government's lack of a standardized planning "process" to guide the execution of coordinated operations as a critical shortcoming. As a result, DHS was tasked with developing and implementing an operational planning and execution system. Initially, the DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning developed the National Planning and Execution System (NPES), which was based on two widely known and well tested doctrinal references – the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Department of Defense Joint Operations and Planning System (JOPES), which the Department of Defense relies on for all major contingency planning. DHS proceeded to use NPES as the core planning doctrine to train Department and interagency planners. Since its inception, more than one thousand people from multiple federal departments and agencies have been trained on the use of NPES.

Beyond a new planning system, DHS assisted in creating a new permanent body for drafting interagency plans. Between September 2006 and December 2007 this group of interagency planners, called the Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT) developed plans to address a number of catastrophic scenarios, including Pandemic Influenza, Improvised Explosive Devices, an Improvised Nuclear Device, Radiological Dispersal Device Attacks, Cyber Attacks, and Hurricanes. Before these draft plans could be finally approved – and due in large measure to the overwhelming interagency interest in learning NPES – President Bush approved Annex I, *National Planning*, to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8. Among other things, Annex I directed DHS to use NPES as a model to develop an *Integrated Planning System (IPS)* that would guide interagency planning. President Bush approved IPS in January, 2009. IPS does *not* alter existing authorities among Federal Departments and Agencies. The system is a platform to lead to the improvement and execution of interagency planning. It also:

- Establishes a standard Federal planning process and format to develop coordinated interagency plans.
- Identifies the specific Federal roles and responsibilities needed to coordinate Federal Incident Management activities for national level domestic incidents.
- Develops and establishes a framework to coordinate Federal support to State, local and Tribal entities.

- Builds upon the process and product framework of the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS).

The IPS requires the development of specific planning deliverables for each of the National Planning Scenarios. Those deliverables include a Strategic Guidance Statement, Federal Strategic Plan, Federal Concept Plan, and Department and Agency Operation Plans. Each type of plan is described below:

- Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS): Outlines strategic priorities, broad national strategic objectives, and basic assumptions; describes the envisioned end-state; and establishes the general means necessary to accomplish that end.
- Federal Strategic Plan (SP): Defines the mission, identifies authorities, delineates roles and responsibilities, establishes mission essential tasks, determines required and priority capabilities, and develops performance and effectiveness measures.
- Federal Concept Plan (CONPLAN): Describes the concept of operations for integrating and synchronizing existing Federal capabilities to accomplish the mission essential tasks, and describes how Federal capabilities will be integrated into and support regional, State, and local plans.
- Federal Department and Agency Operation Plan (OPLAN): Identified detailed resource, personnel and asset allocation in order to execute the objectives of the strategic plan and turn strategic priorities into operational execution. Contains a full description of the concept of operations, to include specific roles responsibilities, tasks, integration and actions required, with supporting support function annexes as appropriate.

To date, State and local emergency management agencies have provided valuable input in the development of the Integrated Planning System and to the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG-101). Representatives from these agencies can provide valuable input and assistance in development of all levels of Federal Planning.

Incorporating State and local emergency management SMEs into plan development activities will ensure that the objectives, priorities, and roles and responsibilities put forth by Federal inter-agency partners do indeed provide State and local emergency management agencies with the support required across the homeland security spectrum of operations (prevent, protect, respond, and recover). These agencies can also assist development through plan validation during exercises and by increasing awareness and diffusion of the IPS through attending training and educational activities.

A number of key shortfalls preventing DHS from fully leveraging IPS at multiple levels of government have been identified. For example, the Department is still working to improve processes for capturing input and facilitating coordination with the 53 government and non-profit (e.g. American Red Cross) entities that have equities in the IPS planning effort. IPS currently includes an existing requirement for a full review in January of 2010. This review will provide Federal Departments and Agencies an opportunity to recommend any other changes for consideration.

The limited resources that State and local partners can devote to dedicated planning efforts is also a key challenge. DHS is working to identify tools that will increase planning capacity across government, expand and increase the opportunities for additional IPS training for interagency

personnel, as well as homeland security partners at the Federal, State, local, and Tribal levels. Presently there are no federal grant programs in place that specifically address IPS. However, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is coordinating this effort for both IPS and the Comprehensive Preparedness Guidance (CPG) 101. Existing grant programs, such as the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program and the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program, have a strong emphasis on planning and might be leveraged more fully. FEMA continues to encourage grantees to adopt a systematic planning process. Additionally, the Homeland Security Grant Program was developed to align to the Integrated Planning System vis-à-vis CPG 101.

The long-term challenge for both DHS and our many homeland security partners is the ability to accelerate development of IPS planning before we are faced with incidents and sustaining the planning capacity at all levels of government. The most effective way to accomplish both is to train and develop a professional cadre of operational planners within DHS and to persuade other Department's and Agencies to make the same commitment.



Homeland Security

February 18, 2009

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Janet Napolitano
Secretary

FROM: Roger T. Rufe, Jr.
Director, Office of Operations Coordination & Planning

SUBJECT: National Planning

Purpose

Response to questions from Action Directive on National Planning (Tracking Number 09.0006.38 / 810819).

Background

In 2006, the Homeland Security Council's Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned Report identified the federal government's lack of a standardized planning "process" to guide the execution of coordinated operations as a critical shortcoming. As a result of this report, DHS was tasked with developing and implementing a planning and execution system.

In response, DHS OPS developed the National Planning and Execution System (NPES), which was based on the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Department of Defense's (DOD) Joint Operations and Planning System (JOPES). DHS OPS then used NPES as the core planning doctrine to train its interagency Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT). More than one-thousand people from multiple departments and agencies have been trained on the use of NPES following the stand up of the IMPT in August 2006. From September 2006 to December 2007, the IMPT developed draft plans for Pandemic Influenza, Improvised Explosive Device (IED), Improvised Nuclear Device (IND), Radiological Attacks, Cyber, and Hurricanes. In December 2007, before any of the above draft plans were approved by the interagency, and due in large measure to the overwhelming interagency interest in learning NPES, President Bush approved Annex I, *National Planning*, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8.

Among other things, Annex I directed DHS to use NPES as a model to develop an Integrated Planning System (IPS) that would guide interagency planning. In June 2008, the resulting IPS received interim approval by the interagency in order to adapt existing contingency plans to the more comprehensive IPS requirements. President Bush approved IPS in January 2009. IPS is a platform to lead to the improvement and execution of interagency planning. It also:

- Establishes a standard Federal planning process and format to develop coordinated interagency plans.
- Identifies the specific Federal roles and responsibilities needed to coordinate Federal Incident Management activities for national level domestic incidents.
- Develops and establishes a framework to coordinate Federal support to State, local and Tribal entities.
- Builds upon the process and product framework of the National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS).
- Does not alter existing authorities of individual Federal Departments and Agencies.
- Does not convey new authorities upon the Secretary of Homeland Security or any other Federal official.

The IPS requires the development of the following planning deliverables for each of the National Planning Scenarios:

- Strategic Guidance Statement (SGS): Outlines strategic priorities, broad national strategic objectives, and basic assumptions; describes the envisioned end-state; and establishes the general means necessary to accomplish that end.
- Federal Strategic Plan (SP): Defines the mission, identifies authorities, delineates roles and responsibilities, establishes mission essential tasks, determines required and priority capabilities, and develops performance and effectiveness measures.
- Federal Concept Plan (CONPLAN): Describes the concept of operations for integrating and synchronizing existing Federal capabilities to accomplish the mission essential tasks, and describes how Federal capabilities will be integrated into and support regional, State, and local plans.
- Federal Department and Agency Operation Plan (OPLAN): Identified detailed resource, personnel and asset allocation in order to execute the objectives of the strategic plan and turn strategic priorities into operational execution. Contains a full description of the concept of operations, to include specific roles responsibilities, tasks, integration and actions required, with supporting support function annexes as appropriate.

Discussion

1) What is the status of each of these plans and the anticipated timeframe and actions needed to complete the process?

- Distinguish internal Department planning efforts from the DHS-led interagency IPS planning efforts; integrate and/or synchronize where appropriate.
- IPS currently includes an existing requirement for a full review in January 2010. This review will provide Federal Departments and Agencies an opportunity to recommend any other changes for consideration.

3) Where can state and local emergency management agencies provide input and assistance?

To date, State and local emergency management agencies have already provided valuable input in the development of the Integrated Planning System (IPS) and to the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG-101). Representatives from these agencies can provide valuable input and assistance in development of all levels of Federal Planning.

Incorporating State and local emergency management SMEs into plan development activities will ensure that the objectives, priorities, and roles and responsibilities put forth by Federal inter-agency partners do indeed provide State and local EM agencies with the support required across the homeland security spectrum of operations (prevent, protect, respond, and recover). These SMEs will also be able to provide suggestions for enhancement of the plan and its direction.

We recommend that subject matter experts (SMEs) as designated by the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) and the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) be involved in the processes used to develop IPS deliverables (Strategic Plans, CONPLANS, and OPLANS). These agencies can also assist development through plan validation during exercises and by increasing awareness and diffusion of the IPS through attending training and educational activities.

4) On February 12, 2009, DHS OPS and OHA briefed Acting Deputy Secretary (DEPSEC) Rand Beers regarding progress towards completion of the Action Directive on National Planning. During this brief, DEPSEC Beers requested that four additional taskers be completed in the near term. The first two of these taskers have been completed and are included below. The remaining two taskers are also identified below, but require additional coordination. OPS is currently leading an intra-departmental effort to answer these two remaining questions within the next 10 days.

Additional Taskers from Acting Deputy Secretary Beers

1) Are there any grant programs in place that deal specifically with IPS?

At the present time there are no federal grant programs in place that specifically address IPS. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is currently coordinating this effort for both IPS and the Comprehensive Preparedness Guidance (CPG) 101. There are grant programs such as the Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program (RCPGP) and the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) that have a strong emphasis on planning. FEMA continues to encourage grantees to adopt a planning process (e.g., in RCGPGP FEMA adopted a “fix existing plans, build planning processes, and resource the plans” methodology). The current plan to roll out IPS and CPG-101 concurrently will obviously help both to take root.

Additionally, the Homeland Security Grant Program does tie to Annex I, HSPD-8, but in that regard it ties to CPG 101 (as a State and local program). Specific language in current grant packages are not targeted specifically at IPS or CPG. However, all applicants are strongly encouraged to use CPG for plans developed through this program.

2) Please provide a one-page fact sheet that summarizes the timeline associated with IPS development. (See attached document entitled “Fact Sheet - Development of the Integrated Planning System”)

3) What can/should be done to accelerate the current pace for IPS plan development?

In the near term, there are two primary options under consideration that would accelerate the current pace of IPS plan development: procedural changes and organizational changes.

Procedural Changes:

The Secretary could pursue the following courses of action:

- Shorten the current timelines articulated in IPS for the interagency development and adjudication of each of the IPS deliverables, i.e., Strategic Guidance Statements (SGS), Strategic Plans (STRATPLANS), Concept Plans (CONPLANS), and Operations Plans (OPLANS).
 - This option is likely to encounter significant interagency resistance given that IPS timelines were just approved and reflect the current level of interagency planning capacity in Departments that previously lacked a robust focus on operational planning.
- The Secretary could initiate future IPS planning efforts by meeting with her interagency cabinet peers in order to provide strategic-level planning guidance designed to mitigate the number of interagency disputes which currently slow the plan development and approval process.

Organizational

The Secretary could also direct certain organizational changes that would increase the ability of the Department to lead the interagency development of IPS plans. These would include, but are not limited to:

- Consolidate all Annex I, HSPD-8 planning requirements (e.g., SGS, Strategic Plans, CONPLANS, and OPLANS) under one organization to facilitate parallel planning and minimize planning resource impacts on federal partners.
- Coordinate with federal partners to ensure complete interagency staffing to support IAW the Homeland Security Council’s (HSC) Incident Management Planning Team (IMPT) charter.

In the long-term, the most effective way to accelerate the development of IPS planning deliverables is to train and develop a professional cadre of operational planners with the associated supporting infrastructure within DHS and to persuade other Department’s and Agencies to make the same commitment.

4) What is the best approach to align IPS plan development with responsibility for the operational execution for each of the National Planning Scenarios?

One of the fundamental challenges identified in the IPS planning effort to date is how to develop comprehensive contingency plans for the National Planning Scenarios (NPS) that require the integration of interagency expertise across a wide variety of potential scenarios. This is especially challenging because the current set of fifteen all-hazards NPS ranges from catastrophic terrorism events to natural disasters. In addition, the full-spectrum of operations for each of these unique scenarios spans prevent, protect, respond, and recover phases.

An additional reality that further complicates matters is the fact that certain Departments and Agencies possess primary responsibility and expertise in specific phases of a specific scenario (i.e., prevent/protect), but have little or no involvement in other phases for the same scenario (i.e., respond/recover). For example, DOJ plays the lead role in many prevent/protect activities for WMD scenarios, but plays a lesser role than EPA, HHS, or FEMA for the respond/recover missions for the same WMD scenario.

In addition to the fact that the above challenges impact plan development, they also have a similar impact on the operational execution of any plan that requires activation. In this regard, DHS OPS is coordinating with its intra and interagency peers to assess whether or not it is more effective to rotate lead agency responsibility by phase or to just create capacity and architecture in one location to be able to manage a scenario across the prevent, protect, respond, and recover phases.

SUBJECT: Fact Sheet – Development of the Integrated Planning System (IPS)

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this memorandum is to provide information on the development of the *Integrated Planning System* (IPS).

2. **Facts. Chronology of IPS Development.** The table below reflects the key events in the development chronology of the IPS.

Date	Event	Remarks
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15 DEC 08	Final version of IPS submitted to HSC for President	DRG assumed configuration control of document from IMPT
15 JAN 09	President approves IPS	

Executive Summary

Northern Border Security Action Directive

Introduction

Canada and the United States of America share the longest common border between any two countries that is not militarized, spanning approximately 5,500 miles of land and maritime border (including 1,500 miles shared with Alaska). Along the Northern Border, U.S Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processes over 70 million international travelers and 35 million vehicles each year. Trade with Canada is vital to the U.S. economy. Supplying 15 percent (\$339 billion in FY 2008) of all U.S. imports, Canada is our largest trading partner.

Three DHS operational components—CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)—lead the effort to secure the Northern Border. They apply a strategic approach at and between the ports of entry, in the air, land, and maritime domains. Other DHS organizations, such as the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), the National Protection and Programs Directorate, and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) play supporting roles in Northern Border security efforts.

Threat, Operating Environment, Vulnerabilities and Challenges

At present, the primary threats along the Northern Border are terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. A variety of Sunni, Shia, Tamil, and Sikh terrorist affiliate and extremist groups have sympathizers in Canada who are likely involved in fundraising and ideological support; many of these groups and individuals have openly expressed their hostility toward the United States. Moreover, Canada's generous immigration system is vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists seeking a path to Canadian citizenship. Drugs flow in both directions across the U.S. and Canadian border. Illegal immigration along the Northern Border occurs at approximately one percent of the rate observed along the Southern Border according to CBP estimates, though limited situational awareness makes Northern Border alien smuggling difficult to quantify.

The terrain, which ranges from densely forested lands on the west and east coasts to open plains in the middle of the country, is composed of many sparsely populated lands with limited Federal, State, and local law enforcement presence along the immediate border area. The vast maritime border with Canada and the open access small vessels have in the Great Lakes provides an additional conduit for potential exploitation by terrorists, alien and contraband smuggling, and other criminal activity. With more than 5 million registered boats operating on or within 100 miles of the Great Lakes, the Great Lakes region presents unique border enforcement challenges.

Because the Northern Border operating environment differs appreciably from the Southwest Border, it requires a different law enforcement and security approach. For example, while information sharing, intelligence and partnerships between our neighboring countries as well as other Federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement, are important everywhere, they are particularly critical along the Northern Border. Also, due

to challenges with climate and geography, many of the technology tools and assets (e.g., boats) used in other areas of the country are not suitable for use along the Northern Border. Accordingly, specialized technologies and assets need to be developed or modified to operate effectively to secure the Northern Border.

The current gap between the type and amount of information U.S. and Canadian law enforcement agencies can share is another concern for DHS. Canadian law enforcement entities are far more restricted by legislation, policy, and its citizen's charter of rights.

(b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E)

Steps Being Taken to Address Northern Border Threats and Vulnerabilities

DHS currently dedicates nearly \$2.5 billion annually to secure the Northern Border:

- CBP - \$1.13 billion
- USCG - \$935 million
- ICE - \$430 million

Since the establishment of DHS, a number of steps have been taken to improve security along the Northern Border, while still facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. Since October of 2003:

- More than 3,000 additional ICE and Border Patrol agents, CBP officers, and Coast Guard personnel have been deployed to the Northern Border.
- 281 additional Radiation Portal Monitors have been deployed to Northern Border Ports of Entry providing CBP with the capability to scan approximately 96 percent of all commercial truck and 88 percent of all personally owned vehicles entering the United States from Canada.
- 5 new CBP Northern Border Air Branches have been established
- 90 additional CBP and USCG aircraft and vessels have been deployed along the Northern Border

Dozens of initiatives and partnership are also underway in support of Northern Border security efforts. These are described in some level of detail in the full report, but some key efforts include:

- The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs), which bring together DHS and Canadian law enforcement agencies to share information and work with other Federal, state, local, and provincial enforcement agencies on issues related to national security, organized crime, and other criminal activities along the U.S.-Canada border.
- Negotiations regarding a U.S.-Canada bi-lateral Shiprider Agreement, which, when in force (expected to occur this year) will authorize joint maritime patrols

and law enforcement and security actions by cross-designated RCMP and USCG personnel.

- The end of oral declarations as proof of citizenship and identity along the Northern Border and the move toward instituting standard and consistent travel document requirements for entry under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
- Air Security Studies along the Northern Border that will establish and leverage partnerships through Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), National Labs and Military Service Labs, DoD and other R&D programs. These initiatives will develop and test technology solutions. One such example is the Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Lincoln Laboratories air security study providing a roadmap to secure the border against new and diverse threats.
- Deputy Secretary Level Correspondence between DHS and DoD. Working with DoD, S&T seeks to identify which DoD technologies have DHS application. It is proposed that a DoD-DHS SES-level working group will update draft Joint Capability Technology Demonstration Technology Implementation Directive and report progress through the Capabilities Development Working Group.

Technology is also being used to support DHS's operations, with projects such as the Northern Border Testbed, to develop new technological tools and the SBInet Northern Border Project that will begin addressing certain needs and vulnerabilities along the Northern Border.

Summary

DHS has made great progress since it was established in 2003 to improve security along the Northern Border while still facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. Steps have been taken to increase staffing and assets, leverage partnerships, develop improved intelligence, deploy available technologies, and develop new technologies to address various gaps and vulnerabilities. As detailed in this report, the collaborative efforts of DHS, other federal agencies, and state, local and Canadian partners will be required to build on this foundation.

DHS will continue to use a layered, strategic approach to secure the Northern Border. The dozens of programs discussed in this report will target the greatest threats to the United States along the Northern Border -- terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. Our current strategies and plans will continue to guide our efforts and, using this document and the Technological Baseline as a foundation, we will further coalesce our Northern Border security strategies and programs in the report requested by former Deputy Secretary Schneider that is to be provided in March 2009.




U.S. Customs and
Border Protection

Deputy Commissioner

February 17, 2009

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: Janet Napolitano
Secretary

FROM: Jayson P. Ahern 
Deputy Commissioner

SUBJECT: Improving Northern Border Security

Purpose

This memo responds to your Action Directive of January 30, 2009, to prepare an Information Memorandum on Northern Border security. Specifically, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) worked with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components to prepare this memo which discusses:

- Current vulnerabilities and threats along the Northern Border
- The overall strategy and programs and initiatives underway for reducing those vulnerabilities
- High level summary of the budget and assets deployed for improving security along the Northern Border

Introduction

The Northern Border of the United States has become, since 9/11, more important to our national security. As we have designed programs to afford greater protection against the entry of dangerous goods and people at all of our borders, we have also focused increased attention on specific needs along the Canadian border.

Three DHS operational components – CBP, ICE, and USCG – lead the effort to secure the Northern Border. Accordingly, this memo focuses on their strategies and operations. Other DHS organizations, such as the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) play supporting roles in Northern Border security efforts.

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CBP is responsible for preventing the entry of dangerous people and goods into the U.S. from Canada while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. Between the ports of entry (POE), CBP leverages technology and partnerships to detect cross border incursions and, due to distances or challenging terrain, uses a wide array of technologies and response platforms to detect and interdict them. At the POEs, CBP uses information and state-of-the-art technology to screen the heavy volume of passengers and cargo transiting the U.S.-Canada border to help ensure that no illicit goods or travelers cross into the United States. In the trade environment, this is augmented by robust pre-entry and post-release activity, such as verification and audit, commensurate with cargo risk.

The USCG is the lead federal agency for maritime security. DHS has delegated a number of specific maritime security responsibilities to the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard. As such, USCG acts as the lead DHS agency for maritime security, coordinating as appropriate at all levels with other agencies having maritime security responsibilities. USCG's operational strategy is to leverage multi-mission capability with interagency, and international partnerships throughout a layered security architecture. The goal is to meet threats offshore in order to avoid hostile persons, vessels, or cargoes entering our ports. U.S. Coast Guard maritime security missions include Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security, Defense Operations, Illegal Drug Interdiction, Undocumented Migrant Interdiction, Other Law Enforcement (Foreign Fishing Enforcement), Living Marine Resources Law Enforcement, and Marine Safety.

ICE, the largest investigative arm of DHS, protects national security and upholds public safety by targeting transnational criminal networks and terrorist organizations that seek to exploit vulnerabilities along our borders. ICE works closely with foreign, federal, tribal, state and local partners to conduct trans-border investigations targeting the illicit movement of people, money and materials. ICE leverages this comprehensive, multi-jurisdictional investigative approach domestically and internationally, including along the Northern Border of the United States. Information gleaned from investigations is also used to inform the screening of arriving international travelers by officers at the POEs. As the DHS agency responsible for investigating cross-border criminal activity, ICE identifies, disrupts and dismantles criminal organizations who seek to exploit vulnerabilities in DHS's border security framework. ICE's strategy to combat these criminal organizations results in significant additional information from investigative intelligence, results, confidential sources of information and cooperating defendants that is in turn fed back to CBP through intelligence reports, direct communication, statistics, and through information added to law enforcement databases (e.g., TECS¹), that significantly enhances interdiction capabilities.

¹ "TECS" was formerly known as the "Treasury Enforcement Communications System", but has recently been re-named to its acronym, "TECS".

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Threat Assessment

At present, the primary threats along the Northern Border are terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration.

Terrorism:

Canada, because of its proximity and the high volume of cross-border traffic, presents an attractive option for terrorists to gain access to the United States. While there is currently no credible intelligence or other evidence indicating that terrorist groups in Canada are planning an attack on U.S. soil, there is a significant concern that terrorists can enter the United States undetected at or between the POEs. DHS regularly encounters individuals with terrorist-related watch list records at Northern Border land POEs and Preclearance facilities at Canadian airports—most of whom are U.S. or Canadian citizens or residents. However, watch list encounters between the POEs are very rare. A variety of Sunni, Shia, Tamil, and Sikh terrorist affiliate and extremist groups have sympathizers in Canada who are likely involved in fundraising and ideological support; many of these groups and individuals have openly expressed their hostility toward the United States. Canada's ethnic and religious communities are susceptible to internal and external radicalizing factors that could give rise to homegrown extremism. Moreover, Canada's generous immigration system is vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists seeking a path to Canadian citizenship—and to Canadian documents used to enter the United States. The refugee system in Canada, and its associated social benefits, serves as a pull factor to draw immigrants into the country without going through the security screening that visa applicants receive overseas.

Drug and Contraband Trafficking:

Canada is the primary source country for MDMA (ecstasy) smuggled into the United States. Canada is also a major source of high-potency hydroponic marijuana, such as that commonly known as "BC Bud". Cocaine, currency, and tobacco are the major forms of contraband smuggled from the United States into Canada. Drugs moving through the POEs are primarily delivered via private and commercial vehicles, while the drugs moving through remote regions between POEs are transported via low flying aircraft, small boats, snowmobiles, and human carriers. The Akwesasne Native American reservation in New York, with its unique position astride the border, is the principal corridor for untaxed tobacco smuggled into Canada.

Illegal Immigration:

Illegal immigration along the Northern Border occurs at approximately one percent of the rate observed along the Southern Border according to DHS estimates, though limited situational awareness makes Northern Border alien smuggling difficult to quantify. Apprehensions of smuggled aliens entering the United States from Canada along the Northern Border dropped sharply and have remained at low levels since the September 11, 2001 attacks. There continues to be no established link between Northern Border alien smuggling activity and terrorism, with most apprehensions consisting of economic migrants. Migration research has revealed that legal and illegal immigration are predominantly driven by the presence of favorable economic conditions and a belief that an improved quality of life exists in the destination country. The

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United States and Canada are among the world leaders in accepting refugees and immigrants, each possessing open societies with laws that protect citizens, legal residents, and visitors.

Other Threats:

Additionally, DHS is concerned with threats that are not directly associated with border security issues but that may have significant impact on overall border control. For example, threats also exist to intellectual property rights and import safety, which are among DHS's priority trade issues. These threats occur both in direct trade from Canada and in the high volume of transshipped goods. Other threats also include illegal fishing along the shared maritime border, as well as along the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) maritime boundary.

Operating Environment and Vulnerabilities

Canada and the United States of America share the longest common non-militarized border between any two countries spanning approximately 5,500 miles of land and maritime border including 1,500 miles shared with Alaska. There are several major Canadian cities proximate to the United States; in fact, 90 percent of Canada's population lives within 100 miles of the border. The terrain, which ranges from densely forested lands on the west and east coasts to open plains in the middle of the country, is composed of many sparsely populated lands with limited Federal, State, and local law enforcement presence along the immediate border area. As such, the Northern Border operating environment differs appreciably from the Southwest Border and requires a different law enforcement and security approach.

There are a number of ways in which the Northern Border is operationally distinct from other environments.

Geography & Climate

Along the Northern Border, there are large expanses of rural and agricultural areas with ready road access, as well as large, open public spaces. Overall, a solid transportation infrastructure exists which facilitates ease of access to and egress from the border area. These areas present easy border crossing points. Thickly forested, mountainous areas with recreational trail networks also provide avenues and cover for those seeking to cross the border illegally.

Our maritime border with Canada extends into the Gulf of Maine, through the Straits of Juan De Fuca, and across the Dixon Entrance, south of Ketchikan, AK. We have longstanding disputes with Canada over the locations of these maritime borders in Maine, Washington, and Alaska. Coast Guard enforcement posture remains closely aligned with United States claims. The vast maritime border with Canada and the open access small vessels have in the Great Lakes provides an additional conduit for potential exploitation by terrorists, alien and contraband smuggling, and other criminal activity. The Great Lakes region consists of several large bodies of open water, including the Great Lakes themselves and rivers along the border, such as the St. Lawrence River. With more than 5 million registered boats operating on or within 100 miles of the Great Lakes, the Great Lakes region presents unique border enforcement challenges

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In the winter, sub-zero temperatures and significant snowfall provide a natural barrier along some portions of the international boundary between the POEs. While pedestrian and vehicle traffic are reduced, illegal entries utilizing snowmobiles are not unusual. When rivers, lakes (including Lake Erie), and streams freeze along the U.S.-Canada border, it may become easier for smugglers and others to cross the border on foot or use snowmobiles or other modes of transport. However, other areas such as Lake Ontario and Lake Superior become treacherous with ice flows and become less traversable.

Travel

Along the Northern Border, DHS processes over 70 million international travelers and 35 million vehicles each year. The close ties between our countries have resulted in a high volume of cross-border travel, with unique characteristics that present both challenges and opportunities. For example, unlike Mexican and many other (non-Visa Waiver Program) visitors, Canadian citizens and lawful permanent residents are exempt from most visa requirements; this includes crossing into the United States for temporary visits for business or pleasure (B visas). Nor are Canadians or others traveling through land POEs subject to the same advance notification requirements that are imposed on air carriers in the air environment. Consequently, many Canadian visitors are not subject to the same vetting that is applied to most other visitors to the United States. While these circumstances present some unique security challenges, these must be balanced with the importance of continuing to facilitate lawful travel from Canada, our largest tourism partner.

Trade

Trade with Canada is vital to the U.S. economy. Supplying 15 percent (\$339 billion in FY 2008) of all U.S. imports, Canada is our largest trading partner. These goods arrive via three main ways: truck (45 percent), rail (23 percent), and pipeline (20 percent).

This enormous volume of commerce means that the trade concerns at the Northern Border are complex, even with the close relationship between the two countries. The trade environment at the Northern Border is largely defined by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a trilateral agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico that is now entering its tenth year. Since its passage, trade between the three countries has increased dramatically. The implementation of the agreement has also made trade processes more complex, while increasing the opportunities to trade unlawfully. Finally, current trade flows include many commodities that are transshipped from other parts of the world in order to take advantage of the NAFTA trade preferences. Approximately 89 percent of the imports from Canada claim NAFTA preferences (\$303 Billion in FY 2008). All of these factors increase the trade risk to DHS.

The Northern Border trade environment is also characterized by several perennially contentious issues, such as the need to ensure smooth and predictable customs processing through land border POEs. Trade in softwood lumber and goods considered to be intellectual property also present ongoing challenges. The Trade versus Security debate has given rise to consideration of "alternative" or innovative inspection solutions, such as the land-preclearance proposal to place

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U.S. inspection facilities on Canadian soil, which would result in significant additional degradations of our national security and enforcement capabilities.

Cross-Border Crime

While legal trade is and continues to be the norm, sophisticated illicit criminal networks exist in Canada and the United States specializing in smuggling drugs, currency, people, weapons and other contraband across the Northern Border. These networks also pose a threat to U.S. and Canadian security, for they possess a significant infrastructure that could be used to smuggle terrorists or terrorist weapons of mass effect (WMEs). Additionally, ICE Special Agent in Charge (SAC) offices notice that criminal organizations often base themselves in Canada to avoid the more significant prosecution penalties in the United States. Extradition from Canada of criminal violators prosecuted in the U.S. continues to be a significant impediment and limits on information sharing imposed by Canadian authorities since the "Arrar rendition case" is another challenge to overcome.

Illegal crossings between Northern Border POEs do not present the same problem in terms of volume that they do on the Southern Border: the estimated number of illegal entries along the Northern Border is less than one percent of illegal entries on the Southern Border. However, detection and interdiction of such crossings on the Northern Border currently present great challenges due to the nature of the environment, as described above.

Unguarded Roads

The Northern Border is also characterized by a large number of unguarded roads that run adjacent to the border and in some cases through border communities. While this reflects the close relationship between our two countries, and although most uses of these roads are benign, unguarded roads represent a significant vulnerability. Specifically, they provide readily available routes to criminal organizations, allowing them to bypass the POEs and the formal entry and inspection process. Solving this complex issue, like many along the Northern Border, will require coordinated and sustained cross-border cooperation.

Canadian/U.S. Law Enforcement Information Sharing and Differences

Canada and the U.S. each have a similar number of manned ports of entry along the border. However, unlike the United States, Canada has no dedicated full time law enforcement presence between the ports of entry.

There is also a gap between the type and amount of information U.S. and Canadian law enforcement agencies can share. As a basic rule, U.S. law enforcement is able to share almost any information with Canadian law enforcement agencies for law enforcement purposes. Canadian law enforcement entities are far more restricted by legislation, policy, and its citizen's charter of rights. These limitations have negatively impacted DHS efforts along the Northern Border.

The U.S.-Canada Shiprider bilateral agreement currently under negotiation contains obligations that, after entry into force, will make it easier for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to

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share information regarding threats across the maritime border. Signature and entry into force of the U.S.-Canada Shiprider agreement is expected in 2009.

The proximity of U.S. maritime critical infrastructure and key resources (MCI/KR) to the Canadian border leaves these assets vulnerable to gaps in not only in U.S. maritime security posture, but gaps in the posture of Canada as well. Canadian MSI/KR policy is not necessarily the same as the U.S., despite the close geographical location of some critical assets (e.g., the Welland Canal and some dams across the St. Lawrence River). The lack of coordinated efforts to patrol the transportation system over waterways and across the border; U.S. dependence on the Canadian infrastructure (i.e., the Welland Canal); and U.S. dependence on other government entities as it relates to maritime safety (i.e., the St. Lawrence Seaway Development and Management Corporations) result in vulnerabilities to direct operational control.

Community Reaction to Security Improvements

As DHS implements new policies, such as changing travel documents requirements, and increases resources and staffing, there has been increased public concern in some communities on the Northern Border. For example, concern has been expressed regarding Border Patrol transit node operations at bus stops, train stations, and ferry terminals as well as checkpoint operations. Many Northern Border communities have strong ties with Canadian counterparts and challenges have been presented by unique situations such as cross-border golf courses and libraries. Because some Northern Border residents, especially in areas with small ports, feel that the officers know them and live in the same community and that they should be just "waved through." DHS will continue working with local communities and the trade to balance our security efforts with the need to facilitate legitimate trade and travel.

Existing DHS Strategic Approach to Address Threats

While DHS does not currently have a formal, integrated Northern Border strategy at this time, DHS Components continue to take a strategic approach in addressing the threats and vulnerabilities on the Northern Border. These efforts support the DHS Strategic Plan. Additionally, across DHS, there are a significant number of formal strategies in place and planned to improve security on the Northern Border, including: the CBP Strategic Plan; the Northern Border Counternarcotics Strategy; the DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy; the National Strategy for Maritime Security; the Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship; and the CBP Northern Border Strategy which is undergoing final clearance.

DHS's strategic approach to securing the Northern Border is guided by the following six goals:

1. Improve intelligence and information sharing
2. Enhance or expand national and bilateral partnerships
3. Deploy the appropriate type and amount of technology, rapid response capability, and tactical infrastructure in the land, air and maritime domains

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4. Facilitate the movement of lower-risk people and goods to enable focus on detection and inspection of higher and unknown risks
5. Increase the number of personnel deployed along the Northern Border and provide adequate facilities and infrastructure, support personnel, training and equipment
6. Enhance investigations of transnational criminal organizations and exploit information developed from investigations to further improve targeting and interdictions

Work is also continuing on the development of a comprehensive U.S. government strategy for controlling the Northern Border. On September 8, 2008, former Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Paul Schneider executed a memorandum charging CBP with providing a summary of the major challenges and a recommended plan to demonstrate and acquire capabilities, that when combined with intelligence, queuing and specified concepts of operations is achievable and supports a strategic approach to securing the Northern Border. As an initial part of this effort, a task force comprised of representatives from DHS and other U.S. government departments, in consultation with Canadian agencies, provided an analysis of existing programs, tools, technologies and techniques used (or which could be modified for use) in securing the United States' Northern Border. (b)(2) High

(b)(2) High

This report outlines existing technologies and programs; summarizes the significant findings related to those technologies and programs, and provides initial recommendations regarding potential technology-related courses of action DHS might consider adapting, developing, and purchasing or deploying in support of Northern Border security efforts.

Programs/Initiatives

There are numerous efforts underway or being leveraged for use across the country in support of operations to secure the Northern Border. Below is a summary of some of the programs and initiatives that DHS has undertaken in support of our Northern Border goals:

1. Improving Intelligence and Information Sharing.

Information Sharing with Canada

Information sharing between the United States and Canada occurs through a number of working groups, agreements, and official reports. In June of 1984, the United States and Canada signed an agreement to exchange information to administer and enforce customs laws as provided for under the *Agreement between the United States of America and Canada Regarding Mutual Assistance and Cooperation between their Customs Administrations*. This agreement remains in force and provides the basis for sharing certain border-related information between the two countries.

Expansion of Intelligence Coordination Teams

CBP developed the Intelligence Coordination Team (ICT) concept on the Southern Border, bringing together analysts and operators from all components of CBP to access classified information and conduct long-term analysis. This concept has proven extremely valuable in a

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wide range of missions, and CBP will deploy similar teams along the Northern Border. CBP has recently deployed the Detroit ICT and is continuing to plan for additional teams.

Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers

DHS has at its disposal multiple sources of information and intelligence. To pull these sources of information together and facilitate operational cooperation, CBP is establishing Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (IOCCs), where agents, officers and analysts from across operational and intelligence offices can be co-located and access and act upon a common operating picture (COP). An ICT with HSDN access will be located within the IOCC, providing field leadership with the latest intelligence and analysis. CBP plans to deploy an IOCC in the Detroit area by the end of FY 2009 and envisions that IOCCs will have a mutually supporting relationship with State and Local Fusion Centers (SLFCs) and other coordination entities along the Northern Border.

(b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E)



Expansion of Homeland Security Data Network

The DHS Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN) provides access to classified information at the Secret level. HSDN is currently deployed to several DHS locations and there are plans to install it at additional sites as well. By expanding the number of facilities with HSDN capabilities, more DHS analysts and operators will be able to leverage national level classified information and systems to accomplish the full range of their missions.

DHS/USCG Interagency Operations Centers / Command 21

USCG/DHS is building Interagency Operations Centers (IOC) that will provide interagency command, control, and communications interoperability at high-priority ports at Coast Guard Sectors nationwide. Funding has been committed for the completion of a new command center at Sector San Francisco. Command center build outs are also planned for Sectors Jacksonville and New Orleans in 2009-10. The initial funding received will also cover Facility Planning Proposals for Sectors Honolulu, Detroit, St. Petersburg, and Houston. Facility upgrades for other sectors are contingent on future funding.

USCG Watchkeeper Software

Watchkeeper software is an information management tool to enhance situational awareness and automatically detect anomalies, for use at USCG/DHS IOCs. Watchkeeper will become the national standard for USCG/DHS IOC information management.

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Operation Last Call

In an effort to capture and exploit the intelligence value of detainees in ICE custody, ICE Office of Detention and Removal Operations (DRO) created Operation Last Call (OLC). This is a comprehensive intelligence collection strategy designed to maximize information gathering through the systematic debriefing of ICE detainees. OLC is a coordinated effort between the Office of Intelligence (INT), DRO, and the Office of Investigations (OI). It establishes standardized procedures to collect and report intelligence originating from DRO facilities, provides relevant, accurate and timely intelligence to ICE operational components, expands the pool of viable sources of human intelligence/criminal informants, and provides an extensive network for collecting and developing strategic level information. In 2007, DRO-Intelligence Operations selected two areas for OLC expansion in the Northern Border area. The DRO Field Office in Buffalo, New York, was selected for the next phase of OLC expansion; training and implementation began in FY 2007 and will be completed in early 2008. Additionally, DRO Field Office Detroit, Michigan, is being considered as the next location for OLC expansion in 2008.

2. Enhancing or Expanding National and Bilateral Partnerships

CBP and ICE Attachés

Both CBP and ICE have Attaché offices in Ottawa to support in-country agency programs and personnel and provide direct liaison and expertise to U.S. and Canadian government offices, law enforcement components, local commercial organizations, private businesses and the traveling public. ICE Attaché also has subordinate offices in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver.

Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET)

The IBET program, encompassing 15 regions along the Northern Border, is a multi-faceted law enforcement initiative comprised of both Canadian and American partners. The IBET is considered a "best practice" by both the Canadian and United States governments and is a model for binational collaborative efforts in securing our shared border. The IBET core agencies include, from the United States, CBP, USCG, and ICE, and from Canada, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). This longstanding, bi-national partnership has enabled the participating law enforcement partners to share information and work together daily with other local, State, and provincial enforcement agencies on issues related to national security, organized crime, the vulnerabilities associated with unguarded roads, and other criminal activities along the U.S.-Canada border at and between the POEs.

Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs)

DHS developed the BEST concept to coordinate the efforts of ICE, CBP, and DHS Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) personnel working cooperatively with foreign, Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to take a comprehensive approach to disrupt and dismantle criminal organizations. In early 2008, the first Northern Border BESTs initiated operations in Blaine, Washington and Buffalo, New York, with participation from ICE, CBP, DHS I&A, USCG, FBI, ATF, DEA, IRS, U.S. Postal Investigative Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, CBSA, RCMP, Ontario Provincial Police, Niagara Regional Police Service,

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Toronto Police Service, New York State Police, Niagara Falls Police Department, and the Buffalo Police Department. The BESTs complement and increase the effectiveness of the IBETs by augmenting their investigative capability.

Joint DHS/Department of Defense (DoD) Advisory Group on UAS

CBP coordinates the use of DoD assets, USCG assets, and the sharing of other strategic and tactical assets, to support CBP's homeland security Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) missions. This close relationship between DHS and DoD provides opportunities for efficiencies in training, acquisition, and facilities.

Cross Border Crime Forum

Cross Border Crime Forum (CBCF) is a high-level, bilateral forum chaired by the Canadian Public Safety Minister, the U.S. Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Project North Star

Project North Star (PNS) is a bi-national forum that provides U.S. and Canadian law enforcement managers a mechanism to enhance existing communications, cooperation, and partnership between agencies and personnel operating within the border area. PNS consists of one National Coordination Group and five Regional Coordination Groups to coordinate efforts between federal and local law enforcement agencies and personnel. Regular meetings are held to focus discussion on relevant issues within the regions and to disseminate "best practices". All Coordination Groups are led by a "Quad Chair" concept, which consists of a Canadian and a U.S. representative responsible for federal matters, and U.S. and Canadian representatives to work state/provincial and local matters. This structure gives state/provincial and local representatives equal footing with the Federal entities within the Quad Chair groups. Working groups are tasked with identifying local problems or issues to present to the national level of PNS and the Cross Border Crime Forum. Project North Star is a wide-ranging policy forum for leaders that complements the field-level coordination conducted through the IBET and BEST structures.

(b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E)



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International Anti-Smuggling Partnerships

Select DHS air assets have been used in coordination with other nations since the late 1980's to conduct anti-smuggling operations beyond the borders of the United States. These partnerships address threats that, while international in nature, have a direct effect on our own national security. In furtherance of the DHS's extended border security doctrine, DHS continues those missions, targeting criminal organizations that originate in foreign locations at their source or in transit toward National borders. The AMOC maintains an operating relationship with the appropriate Canadian entities to coordinate such air operations along the Northern Border. To further strengthen the operational effectiveness of this relationship, discussions are currently underway with Canada to permanently place Canadian personnel at the AMOC. Additionally, an Air Enforcement Strategy is being developed in close coordination with the Canadian government and is expected to be completed in the spring of 2009.

DHS Joint Small Vessel Strategy

CBP, ICE, and USCG have jointly developed a Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS), approved by DHS in April 2008. The major goals of the SVSS include maximizing interagency cooperation on the small vessel threat, increasing maritime awareness capabilities regarding small vessels, and partnering with the small vessel community. Given the heavy volume of recreational boat traffic on the Great Lakes, the potential impact of the SVSS on overall Northern Border security is significant.

Senior Guidance Team

In June 2006, CBP and USCG signed a Charter establishing a Senior Guidance Team (SGT), which oversees current and future joint initiatives designed to improve the overall near and long-term efficiency and effectiveness of both agencies. ICE joined the SGT in January, 2008. The SGT assigns agency executives to operational issues at the Headquarters Policy level. Examples of these issues, which are typically addressed in work groups, are Joint Boardings and Joint Operations Centers.

Community Partnerships

CBP created Border Security Evaluation Teams (BSETs) to gather information and establish relationships with state and local law enforcement agencies, local civic leaders, and the public to determine if suspected cross-border activities and intelligence indicate a need for deployment of Border Patrol resources in those areas. These State, local, and community partnerships will continue to provide vital information to help secure our Northern Border. BSETs are the principle means of maintaining situational awareness between the POEs on the Alaska-Canada border.

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)

C-TPAT is a voluntary public-private sector partnership program and a key part of DHS's layered enforcement strategy. Members agree to incorporate agreed upon supply chain criteria into their business practices and in return, DHS offers trade-based incentives for participants. For example, these include reduced cargo examinations and other benefits, such as access to the FAST lanes on the Canadian border. DHS has opened a C-TPAT Field Office co-located with

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the CBP Field Office in Buffalo, New York, that will focus on outreach and validation activities involving Canadian entities.

DHS and CBSA signed a mutual recognition arrangement on C-TPAT and Partners in Protection (PIP) in June 2008. The mutual recognition arrangement will enhance the ability of the two programs to share information, recognize the findings of the validation visits conducted by each program, and provide participating businesses with a standardized set of security requirements, as well as a reduced number of validation visits.

C-TPAT is working with the PIP program to create a unified and sustainable security posture that can assist in securing and facilitating cargo trade between the United States and Canada. By aligning the two programs under the principles of mutual recognition, C-TPAT and PIP have created a system whereby all participants in the international trade transaction are approved as observing specified standards in the secure handling of goods and relevant information. This cooperation allows for greater security of trade between both countries while also reducing redundant validations for members of both programs.

Shared Border Accord Coordinating Committee (SBACC)

Under the U.S.-Canada Shared Border Accord (SBA) framework, the SBACC is composed of leaders and working groups from CBP, CBSA, ICE, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada. CBP and CBSA coordinate and implement ongoing joint initiatives and develop new initiatives to strengthen security at the shared border and combat the threat of terrorism. The goals of the SBA are to promote international trade, facilitate the movement of people, provide enhanced protection against drugs, smuggling and the illegal and irregular movement of people, and reduce costs for the government and users.

Border Wait Times

At the October 2007 SBACC meeting, DHS invited CBSA to participate in a Border Wait Times Advisory Group for the purposes of taking steps towards reducing border wait times following the delays experienced in the summer of 2007. Since then, working group meetings have been held to address delays at the border. The group developed an 8-Point, multi-year plan which focuses on wait time measurement, processing times, modernization of facilities, staffing, throughput, policy, trusted traveler programs, and outreach. DHS and CBSA will conduct research and development efforts this year that will guide implementation of the staffing and infrastructure improvements outlined in the multi-year plan.

U.S.-Canada Joint Priorities

The Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) is a major initiative that was implemented in June 2005. The SPP was agreed to and launched by former President Bush, then-President Vicente Fox of Mexico, and then-Prime Minister Paul Martin of Canada. DHS is working under the SPP with its Canadian and Mexican counterparts to address a wide array of issues, including increasing the enforcement of intellectual property rights and ensuring the safety of imports.

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Working groups dedicated to these issues are tackling action plans developed to identify and apply collaborative efforts to these trade issues.

As a direct result of implementing a number of SPP action items, DHS and CBSA have jointly improved the flow of commerce across the U.S.-Canada border. Among the notable achievements included advancements in the C-TPAT program and the rollout of the FAST and NEXUS programs.

Additionally, DHS works closely with the CBSA to develop new priorities within the scope of the SPP agenda and supports Ministerial and Presidential priorities that extend the cooperative spirit of the Security and Prosperity Partnership into new goals.

DHS-Canada S&T Agreement

Under the framework of this agreement, DNDO has entered into a Cooperative Activity Arrangement with the Defense Research and Development Center – Canada. The seven technical annexes outline specific project areas of expanded cooperation on nuclear and radiological detection and forensics.

Importer Self Assessment Program

Through the Importer Self Assessment (ISA) Program, DHS works with importers to improve their internal customs controls and systems to support compliant trade. This program leverages the expertise and resources of the U.S. trade community to protect U.S. consumers, protect intellectual property, reduce unfair trade practices, and collect Federal revenues, while providing various facilitation benefits for low risk trade.

Shiprider Agreement

This agreement will allow for RCMP and USCG personnel to embark the law enforcement vessels of either nation during maritime patrols of our shared waterways. Once in force, the agreement permanently will authorize maritime patrols, and law enforcement and security actions, by vessels on which are embarked cross-designated USCG and RCMP Shipriders, on either side of the shared maritime border. The cross-designation of foreign law enforcement officers would be unique among the more than thirty bilateral maritime law enforcement bilateral agreements to which the United States is party.

ICE will conduct all U.S. follow up investigative activities on interdictions and leads developed from Shiprider activity. USCG will also plan, train for, and execute Shiprider operations with the RMCP in support of security for the Vancouver 2010 Olympics.

Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force

ICE is a leading member in the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program that was established in 1982. This program was developed as a vehicle to promote close cooperation and coordination among Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies engaged in narcotics and money laundering investigations. ICE has permanent full-time managers

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(OCDETF Coordinators) located in each of the nine regional OCDETF core cities, a national program manager in headquarters, and an ICE Supervisory Special Agency currently serves as Associate Director of the OCDETF Executive Office at the Department of Justice. ICE receives approximately \$44 million in funding to support its participation in the OCDETF Program.

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

ICE is actively involved in the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) program, which is a geographically oriented anti-drug support program, administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). HIDTA regions are comprised of specific designated counties that have been identified as high risk for narcotics smuggling and trafficking. Currently, ONDCP has designated more than 25 HIDTAs throughout the United States. ICE's involvement in the HIDTA program ensures a coordinated effort in U.S. drug enforcement efforts.

41K Project

The 41K Project is a bi-lateral information sharing initiative between the CBSA and ICE. The purpose of the project is to determine how many of the approximate 41,000 persons ordered removed from Canada have absconded to the U.S. and to develop ICE criminal investigations from that data.

National Child Exploitation Center (NCECC)

ICE has recently assigned personnel to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police - National Child Exploitation Center (NCECC). Both entities maintain relationships and collaboration with domestic and international partners to raise awareness and combat criminal activity targeting the exploitation and abuse of children.

3. Deploying the appropriate type and amount of technology, rapid response capability, and tactical infrastructure.

Aviation Platforms for Detection and Interdiction

Air assets are an important part in achieving security along the Northern Border, particularly its remote areas. To support DHS's Northern Border security expansion efforts, CBP has established five strategically located Northern Border primary air branches: Bellingham, Washington (August 2004); Plattsburgh, New York (October 2004); Great Falls, Montana (September 2006); Grand Forks, North Dakota (September 2007); and Detroit, Michigan (August 2008).

(b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E)



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The first DHS Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) for Northern Border operations arrived at the North Dakota Air Branch in December 2008. The UAS will contribute to situational awareness in areas that are difficult to reach by other operational elements—a critical capability given the difficult terrain on the Northern Border.

DHS will further enhance its UAS capabilities at the Northern Border through the establishment of a centralized command and control capability at the Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) in Riverside, California. The AMOC will become an important component for SBInet integration with the addition of radar feeds, which will continue to fill gaps in air domain awareness. DHS regulatory changes mirroring the Southern Border Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) – with designated airports of first-intended landing, and DHS notification prior to U.S. airspace incursion – will greatly assist AMOC in the identification and sorting of cross-Northern-Border air traffic.

Additionally, the Coast Guard and CBP have established a Joint Program Office to develop a common, land-based, marine-environment-capable UAS for the accomplishment of the Department of Homeland Security's varied mission sets. Operations of this common UAS platform will be supported by both CBP and Coast Guard aircrews as part of an effort to increase joint operational capabilities.

Air Security Study

DHS S&T Special Programs office commissioned an Air Security analysis of alternatives in mid 2008. The work is being performed by Massachusetts Institutes of Technology/Lincoln Laboratory (MIT-LL) and will leverage their expertise with sensors, signal processing, and surveillance systems to quantify and assess the potential benefits of new or improved sensor systems for Air Security. The specific systems that will be assessed will include Over the Horizon Radar, slow moving object & low altitude sensors, advanced ground based radars, as well as airborne radars for tracking the air-to-ground hand-off of contraband. The study will ultimately provide a surveillance technology roadmap for DHS.

Mission Appropriate Maritime Assets

Along the Northern Border, the Coast Guard currently has 10 small boat stations (b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E)
(b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E)

Also along the Northern Border, there are 19 small boat stations (b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E)
(b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E)

(b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E) In order to maximize the tactical utility and operational benefit of the cross-border authority that will exist when the US-CA Shiprider agreement enters into force, the Coast Guard needs to (b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E) (b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E) (plus sustained tactical training), and establish a Marine Safety and Security Team in Detroit.

(b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E)

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In various maritime operating sites along the Northern Border, extreme temperatures and other hazardous weather conditions limit or halt marine operations in the winter. To extend the period during which maritime assets are able to operate and to increase capabilities, CBP started deploying large Safeboat interceptor vessels to the Great Lakes region in May 2007. The combination of mission-appropriate assets and skilled personnel will ensure that DHS extends a responsive marine force into the diverse maritime security domain at the Northern Border.

Unattended Ground Sensors

Unattended ground sensors (UGS) provide the Border Patrol with continuous, low-cost, and covert awareness of cross-border activity. The Border Patrol has used UGS systems to great effect on the Northern Border, and CBP will expand their usage. Work is also underway to mitigate the effects of extreme cold weather on UGS (b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E). Additional arrays of UGS, in conjunction with the aviation platforms discussed earlier, will help provide DHS an increased detection and interdiction capability in remote areas of the Northern Border.

Northern Border Technology Project

In March 2007, Congress directed CBP to redirect \$20 million of the Border Security, Fencing, Infrastructure, and Technology appropriation "to begin addressing needs and vulnerabilities along the Northern Border." With these and other funds, CBP is moving forward with components of a plan for the Northern Border consisting of two parts. The first is the deployment of additional surveillance technology capabilities such as remote video surveillance systems (RVSS) towers in the Detroit and Buffalo Sectors, and Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS) in the Swanton Sector. The second is to test the integration of proven technologies into a Common operating picture (COP) in the Northern Border operating environment. While these efforts will not provide complete situational awareness or enable operational control of the area of responsibility (AOR), they will provide enhanced capabilities to those areas and are critical to our long-term SBInet development strategy.

Tactical Communications

CBP is in the midst of a nationwide Tactical Communications Modernization effort that will modernize communications infrastructure and mobile units for the Border Patrol, Field Operations, and Air & Marine. While this is important everywhere CBP Officers and Agents are deployed, in the remote areas of the Northern Border, robust communications are particularly important. The modernization will provide increased system capacity and expanded communications coverage and will improve interoperability among DHS organizational elements and with federal, state, tribal and local agencies. In parallel with this modernization, CBP is looking into a Global Positioning System (GPS) capability for Blue Force Tracking and possible integration with a Northern Border SBInet system.

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Both CBP and Coast Guard have initiatives to provide tactical protected communications. CBP and Coast Guard have numerous areas where they may leverage processes and infrastructure to meet individual agency communications requirements and still facilitate interoperable communications. Cooperative efforts are already underway with the Coast Guard's use of CBP's High Frequency Customs Over the Horizon Enforcement Network (COTHEN).

Blue Force Tracking

Currently, CBP has installed the Coast Guard's Encrypted AIS (EAIS) solution for short range tracking of Blue Forces ^{(b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E)}. This installed capability allows vessels to communicate Blue Force Tracking (BFT) information to other EAIS equipped vessels, and also leverage the Coast Guards Nationwide AIS network to distribute BFT information to both shore and mobile forces.

Biometrics

Biometric identifiers such as fingerprints (using an inkless fingerprint scanner) and photographs (using a digital camera) are being used in trusted traveler enrollment programs to ensure that all participants are subject to and have passed stringent security requirements. The Arrival-Departure Card (Form I-94) issuance process also incorporates a biometric check. Both the trusted traveler and those applicants for admission requiring an I-94 have their fingerprints and photograph captured and sent to US-VISIT's Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) for checking against the biometric lookouts. CBP has deployed 10-print IAFIS scanners to most POEs and all Border Patrol stations, including those on the Northern Border, and all deportable aliens are screened through criminal and immigration databases during processing for removal. There is a need for additional mobile print scanners and upload capability to enhance CBP and ICE's capabilities to quickly identify and process aliens as well as to support State and local law enforcement along the Northern Border with alien interdictions.

Development of New Technologies for Northern Border Security

In 2007, CBP, S&T, and USCG partnered with Ohio's Department of Natural Resources and others, in a proof-of-concept project that tested a multi-sensor system in a region along the U.S.-Canada border. This intelligence-driven operation, which sought to identify, classify or deconflict, track, intercept, and resolve suspected illegal cross-border activity in a Northern Border maritime environment, both generated information on cross-border activity and demonstrated the challenges and opportunities for new sensor technology in the Northern Border environment. It also enhanced the maritime domain awareness capabilities of various DHS, State, and local agencies responsible for law enforcement at the Northern Border and will continue to do so in the future.

DNDO also initiated an architecture study of the Great Lakes region maritime domain to lay groundwork for enhancing the layered maritime preventative and nuclear detection capabilities.

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Border Surveillance Technology Roadmap

S&T formed a Border and Surveillance Working Group (2007-2008) and commissioned the development of a Border Technology Roadmap (in final draft). The Roadmap development engaged participants from Army and Navy Research Labs, MIT-LL, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), and Science and Engineering Technical Assistance (SETA), organizations with expertise in radars, imagery, unattended ground sensors, communications, acoustics, marine engineering, and signal processing. The report addresses the differing border scenarios (Northern and Southern) and recommends technologies to be evaluated and the pros and cons of each.

JASON's Summer Study

In mid-2008, S&T Special Programs Office managed a JASON study to evaluate technology options for securing the Northern Border. This is an independent look the Northern Border problem by academics and Industry personnel with technology expertise. A report was issued in September 2008 which provides background on the Northern Border and innovative ideas about technologies to be pursued.

Emergency Communications

In July of 2008, the DHS Office of Cybersecurity and Communications, within the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), released the DHS National Emergency Communications Plan. Through this plan, guidance on best practices and lessons learned was provided to the Canadian emergency response community for use in developing their Canadian Communications Interoperability Plan.

In May of 2009, the DHS Office of Emergency Communications (also within NPPD), in coordination and collaboration with Public Safety Canada, will host the first U.S.-Canada Cross Border Interoperable Communications Workshop in Niagara Fall, NY, to enhance and expand the relationship between U.S. and Canadian counterparts with mutual cross border communications interests.

The DHS Office of Emergency Communications is also developing the 2010 Olympics Integrated Interoperable Communications Plan to help facilitate effective interoperable communications in Washington State and across the Canadian border during the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games.

Northern Border Test Bed (NET-B)

DHS S&T is establishing the NET-B on the Vermont and New York borders. Swanton Sector was chosen by CBP because of its terrain diversity. Installation has begun and initial capabilities will be available June 2009. Maritime and terrestrial surveillance technologies and Command Center automation technologies and tools will be developed and tested to understand their utility and performance. Sensor performance in winter conditions in forested, mountainous, riverine, cropland and urban environments will be analyzed.

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Operation Neptune Shield (ONS)

ONS is the Coast Guard wide policy for conducting maritime security and response operations. It represents the service's most operational set of activities linked to, but independent of, maritime domain awareness. Operation Neptune Shield sets forth a diverse set of maritime security and response operations that include: boardings, patrols, inspections, vessel escorts, and security zone enforcement. Primarily antiterrorism focused, it provides an important measure in the protection of the National borders and awareness of maritime activity along them.

Operation Northguard

Operation NorthGuard was a CBP led multi-agency, homeland security and law enforcement operation conducted in the western basin of Lake Erie, specifically the area surrounding the Erie Islands archipelago. NorthGuard took place during the 2007 boating season. This effort assessed maritime domain awareness, increased awareness of the Pleasure Boat Reporting System and increased operational control in certain border areas.

USCG Rescue 21 system

Rescue 21 (R21) replaces the Coast Guard's obsolete National Distress System communications network with new, state of the market digital VHF-FM and UHF communications and highly accurate VHF-FM direction finding capabilities. Overall this system provides improved communications quality, coverage, security and interoperability. R21 is an ongoing project and is currently installed at 18 Coast Guard Sectors, providing communication coverage for over 25 thousand miles of coastline. R21 will be installed on the Great Lakes by FY12.

The Phased Deployment Implementation Plan (PDIP)

PDIP is a cooperative effort between DNDO and CBP to develop a strategy for deploying a radiation detection capability with the Border Patrol that is focused on those areas of the border between the official ports of entry (the non-POE border). Specific efforts under the PDIP are to validate both selected radiation detection equipment and the concept of operations for their use in an operational environment.

West Coast Maritime Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detection (PRND) pilot program

An effort to design, field and evaluate a radiation detection architecture that reduces the risk of radiological and nuclear threats being illicitly transported on recreational craft or small commercial vessels in Puget Sound and San Diego. The pilot explores methods of getting more human-portable and boat mounted rad/nuc detection equipment into the hands of public safety forces for use during routine public safety and enforcement operations. Puget Sound effort is being coordinated through the Coast Guard Sector AMSC with participants from USCG, CBP and 15 State, local, and Tribal public safety agencies.

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4. Facilitating the movement of lower-risk people and goods to enable focus on detection and inspection of higher and unknown risks.

Automated Commercial Environment (ACE)

While ACE facilitates trade, in doing so it enhances security by enabling CBP Officers to focus on detecting dangerous or illegal shipments. Prior to 9/11, CBP did not receive advance manifest information on trucks crossing through our Northern and Southern Borders. Any decision regarding the truck's status (release into the commerce of the United States, examination, detention, etc.), had to be made as the truck idled at the primary booth. As of November 2007, all of land border ports are capable of receiving and processing electronic manifests as part of ACE. Officers are now able to make crucial decisions prior to the truck's arrival at the border—in most cases a full hour ahead of its arrival. Additionally, all e-manifest information of driver and cargo are passed through the Automated Targeting System (ATS) and CBP's law enforcement database TECS further enhancing decision-making ability at the border.

Trusted Traveler Programs

With a membership now exceeding 328,000, NEXUS and the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) programs enable CBP Officers to expedite legitimate cross-border travel and trade. Both programs' credentials will be compliant with the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) by June 1, 2009.

Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative

In partnership with the Department of State (DOS), DHS is working to further secure our homeland by strengthening our ability to accurately identify all persons—U.S. citizens and potential visitors alike—before they enter the United States. DHS is accomplishing this by tightening policies relating to oral declarations on the Northern Border and instituting standard and consistent travel document requirements for entry into the United States.

Specifically, as of January 31, 2008, DHS no longer accepts oral declarations alone as proof of citizenship and identity along the Northern Border. U.S. and Canadian citizens aged 19 or older who are traveling by land or sea must present government-issued photo identification, such as a driver's license, along with proof of citizenship, such as a birth certificate or naturalization certificate.

DHS is also working to fully implement, along with DOS, the WHTI. WHTI will require all persons seeking to enter or depart the United States to present a passport or one of a limited number of other approved travel documents that denotes the bearer's identity and citizenship.

DHS has executed memoranda of agreement (MOAs) on the development of RFID-enabled enhanced driver's licenses (EDLs) with the States of Washington, New York, Michigan, Arizona and Vermont. DHS has also worked with Canada to develop an EDL MOA for provinces and an approved MOA for data and information sharing related to province-issued EDLs.

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Vicinity Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)

DHS continues to install infrastructure and technology required to read vicinity Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)-enabled travel documents in vehicle primary lanes at the 17 highest-volume land POEs on the Northern Border, which combined process over 90 percent of the Northern Border land traffic. RFID-enabled travel documents allow CBP to access traveler information from its databases prior to the traveler's arrival at the processing booth. This information will be pre-positioned for the CBP Officer to verify and authenticate document information upon arrival. The speed of vicinity RFID will enable CBP Officers to quickly read the advance information on all travelers carrying RFID-enabled cards and allow terrorist watch list checks to be performed. In addition, vicinity RFID permits multiple cards to be read at a distance and simultaneously, allowing an entire car of people to be processed at once.

Scanning Technology

An integral part of the comprehensive strategy to combat nuclear and radiological terrorism is the scanning of all arriving conveyances and containers with radiation detection equipment prior to release. Accordingly, DHS will continue to deploy radiation detection technology to POEs along the Northern Border, with the goal of scanning 100 percent of all commercial truck and privately owned vehicles for illicit radiation/nuclear materials. As of January 24, 2009, DHS had deployed 335 Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) to Northern Border commercial truck and personally owned vehicle crossings to scan for illicit radiological and nuclear materials. These systems provided DHS with the capability to scan approximately 96 percent of all commercial truck and 88 percent of all personally owned vehicles entering the United States from Canada. CBP has set a goal of completing the deployment of RPMs to screen all commercial truck and personally owned vehicles crossing along the Northern Border by the end of Calendar Year 2009.

DHS is continuing efforts to support deployment of advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) and human portable radiation detection systems (HPRDS) as soon as these systems become available. Over the long term (beyond two years), DNDO will work to develop technologies and systems that CBP can use to scan oversized or extremely densely packed materials which can shield or mask radiation signatures (e.g., bulk or break-bulk cargo in reinforced steel conveyances).

To compliment and augment the RPM deployment, CBP uses Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) Technology (e.g., large-scale X-ray and gamma ray imaging systems) to perform thorough examinations of cargo without having to resort to the costly, time-consuming process of unloading cargo for manual searches or intrusive examination of conveyances by methods such as drilling or dismantling.

On September 11, 2001, a total of 64 large-scale NII systems were deployed to our nation's ports of entry - none of which were deployed to the Northern Border. As of February 2009, a total of [REDACTED] NII systems are deployed, including [REDACTED] on our common border with Canada.

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Pre- and Post- Entry Processing

CBP is continuing to refine its trade targeting and risk analysis protocols to identify those shipments that cause the greatest risk to the American public, and to ensure that enforcement efforts are targeted towards high risk traffic. These programs are complemented by working with the trade community and foreign counterparts to ensure shipments are compliant before they enter the United States and by conducting verification and audit work after shipments are entered into the U.S. so that we reduce the impact on shipments at the physical border.

5. Increase the number of personnel deployed along the Northern Border and provide adequate facilities and infrastructure, support personnel, training and equipment

Personnel

Although the use of technology, aircraft and vessels, and partnerships are explicitly designed to maximize the effectiveness of law enforcement personnel, they do not replace the law enforcement officer's abilities and responsibilities. Since the establishment of DHS, CBP, USCG and ICE have all increased their officer and agent staffing levels along the Northern Border. Current plans call for further increases in Northern Border staffing levels and there will be a continuous process of assessing staffing needs based on threat assessments, operational needs, and gains in situational awareness and control.

Additionally, CBP is exploring new ways to deploy personnel cover remote locations. These may entail temporary duty assignments to areas that will require the stationing of Border Patrol Agents remotely from their assigned stations.

Land Port of Entry Modernization

The success of DHS's mission depends heavily on the health and effectiveness of its physical infrastructure and inspection facilities that support its operations. Due to the rapid evolution in , coupled with years of inadequate funding, these vital assets now require essential modernization efforts. Most of the inspection facilities housing CBP operations today were designed to accomplish legacy missions from decades before. Approximately six billion dollars in repairs, enhancements, and replacement projects across the entire land port inventory, of which nearly half is for Northern Border facilities, has been identified. CBP has plans to execute prioritized Northern Border projects utilizing funds provided through the proposed economic stimulus package.

6. Enhancing Investigations of Transnational Criminal Organizations

By bringing together customs and immigration enforcement authorities under one roof, ICE can fight crime and terrorist activity in ways not possible prior to the founding of DHS. Investigators on immigration cases can track the money trails that support smuggling and document fraud operations; financial investigators have additional tools in using immigration violations to build cases against criminals; sexual predators that prey on the innocent are more readily targeted than ever before.

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Moreover, ICE has a sizable international presence, with more than 50 offices around the globe coordinating activities with partners in foreign governments on a wide range of investigative matters, including visa security, illegal arms trafficking, document and identity fraud, drug trafficking, child pornography and sex tourism, immigration and customs fraud, intellectual property rights violations, financial crime, human smuggling and trafficking, and much more.

ICE regularly responds to CBP POEs for investigative follow up. Currently, there is limited technology to assist in the tracking and monitoring of targets of investigation. Additional technology would further enhance these capabilities, as would additional support for new and cutting edge technology.

The programs and initiatives identified below support this strategic goal:

- Operation Frozen Timber
A joint ICE and RCMP investigation regarding narcotics smuggling via aircraft along the Washington State- British Columbia border.
- Project COLT
A joint CANADA/US operation targeting international telemarketing fraud.
- Project E-PATCH and OBOY
Joint ICE and RCMP human smuggling organization investigations.
- Project ELDEN
A joint ICE and RCMP financial investigation involving the operation on an undercover storefront offering controlled financial services for subjects seeking unlawful international movement of financial instruments.
- Project Gunrunner
A weapons smuggling investigation being conducted by ICE and other US and Canadian law enforcement agencies.
- Project Wickerman
Child exploitation investigation being conducted jointly between ICE, RCMP, Toronto and Edmonton Police.
- Visa Security Units (VSU)
The VSU complements traditional screening with proactive law enforcement vetting and investigation, with the goal of identifying not yet known terrorist or criminal suspects attempting to enter the United States.

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- Shadow Wolves

The ICE patrol officers, also known as Shadow Wolves, were established by Congressional mandate in the early 1970s to remedy the rampant smuggling occurring through the Tohono O'Odham Indian Nation in Southern Arizona. The primary mission of the Shadow Wolves is the interdiction of smuggled narcotics utilizing both technology and the ancient art of tracking. In FY 2007, the Shadow Wolves seized nearly 50,000 pounds of marijuana on the Tohono O'Odham Indian Nation.

ICE is exploring the feasibility of expanding the Shadow Wolves program to the Northern Border. In 2007, the Shadow Wolves traveled to the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana for a 30-day temporary deployment (TDY). Shadow Wolves and special agents conducted valuable outreach efforts by meeting with local ranchers, farmers, community leaders, and residents. In 2008, the Shadow Wolves traveled to Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan and conducted a 30-day temporary deployment.

The Shadow Wolves met representatives of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Sault Tribal Police Department Officials, Sault Conservation Officials and Bay Mills Tribal Police. During their detail they worked in coordination with the above agencies and with the local ICE RAC office, CBP OFO and OBP. They surveyed land based smuggling routes and used snowmobiles to survey the 10 plus mile ice-bridge between the United States and Canada.

Assessing Risk

The complementary efforts of CBP, ICE, and USCG will continue to be implemented in a strategic approach to target key threats and vulnerabilities along the Northern Border through current programs and future initiatives and investments. Many of these programs, such as deployment of technology, are expected to further increase the level of situational awareness. However, the nature of the threat, vulnerabilities, and operating environment, along with a combination of social and political factors, will continue to present a challenge to those charged with securing the Northern Border without unduly complicating the flow of legitimate travel and trade.

CBP uses metrics to evaluate control of the international boundary between the ports of entry. CBP defines the level of control between the ports of entry as follows:

- o **Effective Control** - Agents deployed in any given area are able to (1) Detect an illegal entry; (2) Identify and classify the threat level associated with that illegal entry; (3) Respond to the area of the illegal entry; and (4) Bring the situation to a law enforcement conclusion.

As of September 2008, there were (b)(2) High categorized as "Effective Control" on the Northern Border, an increase of 19 miles since the end of FY 2005. These include areas

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at Peace Arch Park in Blaine, Washington, and Niagara Falls, which are Canadian and U.S. tourist attractions located on the immediate border.

- **Initial Control Capabilities Established** - Situational Awareness is Substantial and Probability of detection is high; however, the ability to respond is defined by accessibility to the area and/or availability of resources.

As of September 2008, there were (b)(2) High categorized as "Initial Control Capabilities Established," an increase of 358 miles since the end of FY 2005.

- **Less Monitored** - Situational Awareness is Low; the ability to respond is defined by accessibility to the area and/or availability of resources.

As of September 2008, there were (b)(2) High categorized as "Less Monitored," an increase of 1,373 miles since the end of FY 2005.

- **Remote/Low Activity** - Situational Awareness is Low; the ability to respond is defined by accessibility to the area and/or availability of resources.

As of September 2008, there were (b)(2) High categorized as "Remote/Low Activity," a decrease of 1,750 miles since the end of FY 2005.

The shift from miles of "Remote/Low Activity" to "Less Monitored" and from "Less Monitored" to "Initial Control Capabilities Established" in FY 2008 demonstrates CBP's success in increasing situational awareness in remote areas where access was limited and alien traffic less active. By working jointly with other federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, Border Patrol was able to enhance situational awareness and thereby improve the border security status of 1,750 miles of the Northern Border. This is a significant effort for CBP because it enabled improved situational awareness in many remote areas on the Northern Border.

DHS does not yet have a comprehensive methodology for determining whether a portion of the border is considered under control from a system-wide, defense-in-depth, and continuously enforceable perspective. The current measure does not reflect the level of control at U.S. POEs or of U.S. air and coastal borders. CBP's methodology for assessing the level of control of the land border between POEs takes into account illegal cross-border activity levels, which are impacted by a variety of factors. In addition to DHS's enforcement efforts at the border, ICE's interior enforcement efforts and the U.S. economy play roles in deterring and reducing the flow of illegal immigration into the United States.

Similarly, there is no current systematic measure quantifying the current or future level of risk on the Northern Border. Ongoing efforts within DHS are focused on developing a more systematic view of border control measurement, to incorporate efforts both at and between the POEs, as well as investigations by ICE and operations by other agencies, such as the U.S. Department of

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Justice. In the future, tools may be available -- including more comprehensive metrics and risk assessments -- to better quantify and evaluate risk levels along the Northern Border.

Budget

The FY 2010 current service level dedicated to Northern Border efforts is nearly \$2.5 billion.

Please note that current service dollars are a rough order of magnitude calculation of operating expenses only. DHS Components do not budget for, nor allocate funding by mission, but rather by congressionally established appropriations and Projects, Programs, and Activities (PPA). The breakdown is as follows:

(Dollars in Millions)	
Budget PPA	2010 Current Services
U.S. Customs and Border Protection	
Border Security & Control Between POE's	302
BSFIT	-
Construction (Between the Ports)	34
Office of Air & Marine	178
Inspections, Trade & Travel Facilitation at POE's	617
Total, CBP	1,131
U.S. Coast Guard	
Port, Waterways, and Coastal Security	334
Drug Interdiction	184
Migrant Interdiction	72
Defense Readiness	92
Other Law Enforcement (Foreign FFVs in EEZ)	19
Marine Safety	112
Living Marine Resources	122
Total, USCG	935
Immigrations Customs Enforcement	
Detention Removal Office	94
Investigations	336
Total, ICE	430
TOTAL, DHS	3,001

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Northern Border Assets

Increase in Personnel and Assets in Northern Border

	<u>End of FY 2003*</u>	<u>Current (2009)</u>	<u>Change</u>
<u>Personnel</u>			
OBP Agents	569		(b)(2) High, (b)(7)(E)
CBP Officers	2,777		
ICE Special Agents	556		
Coast Guard Personnel	2,064		
Air and Marine Interdiction Agents	558		
Totals	6,524		
<u>Assets</u>			
Large Scale X-Rays	24		
Radiation Portal Monitors	54		
USCG HH-65 Helicopters	13		
USCG Helos (icing conditions)	0		
USCG Fixed Wing	0		
USCG 25' PWCS Boats	0		
USCG 33' MLE Boats	0		
USCG 87' & 110' Cutters	11		
CBP Fixed Wings	0		
CBP Helicopters	0		
CBP Marine Assets	0		
Totals	102		
<u>Facilities</u>			
CBP Air Branches	0		
USCG MLE Boat Stations	10		
USCG PWCS Boat Stations	19		
USCG Sectors	5		
USCG Air Stations	3		
Totals	37		

* End of first year of DHS operations

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Summary

DHS has made great progress since it was established in 2003 to improve security along the Northern Border while still facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. Steps have been taken to increase staffing and assets, leverage partnerships, develop improved intelligence, deploy available technologies, and develop new technologies to address various gaps and vulnerabilities. As detailed in this report, the collaborative efforts of DHS, other federal agencies, and state, local and Canadian partners will be required to build on this foundation.

DHS will continue to use a layered, strategic approach to secure the Northern Border. The dozens of programs discussed in this report will target the greatest threats to the United States along the Northern Border -- terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. Our current strategies and plans will continue to guide our efforts and, using this document and the Technological Baseline as a foundation, we will further coalesce our Northern Border security strategies and programs in the report requested by former Deputy Secretary Schneider that is to be provided in March 2009.

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U.S. Customs and Border Protection

February 17, 2009

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Press Release

Secretary Napolitano Receives Report on Northern Border Security

WASHINGTON- Today, in response to her January 23, 2009, Action Directive, DHS Secretary Napolitano received a report on the current state of Northern Border security and key efforts to address threats and vulnerabilities.

Canada and the United States of America share the longest common non-militarized border between any two countries spanning approximately 5,500 miles of land and maritime border including 1,500 miles shared with Alaska. More than 70 million international travelers and 35 million vehicles each year enter the U.S. from Canada through official ports of entry.

Trade with Canada is vital to the U.S. economy. Supplying 15 percent, or \$339 billion, of all U.S. imports, Canada is our largest trading partner. Close ties between the U.S. and Canada result in a high volume of cross-border travel, with unique characteristics that present both challenges and opportunities.

Operations on the Northern Border are characterized by 6 main goals: improving intelligence and information sharing; enhancing national and bilateral partnerships; deploying technology and rapid response capability in the air, land and sea domains; facilitating the movement of lower risk people and cargo; increasing and equipping personnel; and enhancing investigations of transnational criminal organizations.

Presently, the greatest threats to the United States along the Northern Border are terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. One of the most difficult tasks along the Northern border areas is to sort unlawful behavior from legitimate activity. Three DHS operational components – CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) – collaborate in the effort to secure the northern border. Together, they apply a strategic approach at and between the ports of entry, in the air, land, and maritime domains.

The Northern Border operating environment differs greatly from the Southwest Border and requires a different law enforcement and security approach. Partnerships between federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement are critical and act as force multipliers providing situational awareness. Due to challenges with climate and geography, technology tools are being developed or modified to help more effectively secure the Northern Border both at and between the ports of entry.

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Since the establishment of DHS in 2003, a number of steps have been taken to improve security along the Northern Border, while still facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. Notable steps include increases in staffing by CBP, ICE and the USCG, including almost tripling the number of Border Patrol Agents, deploying almost 300 additional Radiation Portal Monitors to Northern Border Ports of Entry, establishing five new Northern Border air branches, and deploying an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) to the Northern Border.

The use of advanced technologies at ports of entry to screen travelers entering the U.S. from Canada has also been expanded to improve our ability to detect, identify, and interdict criminals and potential terrorists. In addition, the strengthening of travel document requirements, including the end to accepting oral declarations as proof of citizenship and the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), has and will continue to further strengthen security and expedite the movement of legitimate travelers across the U.S.-Canadian border.

Dozens of initiatives are also underway to enhance security along the Northern Border ranging from joint task forces and information sharing efforts with our Canadian counterparts and other Federal, state and local agencies to the research and development of new technologies suitable for the Northern Border's climate and terrain.

Going forward, DHS will build upon this foundation to further secure the Northern Border while still facilitating the flow of trade and travel.

Executive Summary

Northern Border Security Action Directive

Introduction

Canada and the United States of America share the longest common border between any two countries that is not militarized, spanning approximately 5,500 miles of land and maritime border (including 1,500 miles shared with Alaska). Along the Northern Border, U.S Customs and Border Protection (CBP) processes over 70 million international travelers and 35 million vehicles each year. Trade with Canada is vital to the U.S. economy. Supplying 15 percent (\$339 billion in FY 2008) of all U.S. imports, Canada is our largest trading partner.

Three DHS operational components—CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)—lead the effort to secure the Northern Border. They apply a strategic approach at and between the ports of entry, in the air, land, and maritime domains. Other DHS organizations, such as the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), the National Protection and Programs Directorate, and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) play supporting roles in Northern Border security efforts.

Threat, Operating Environment, Vulnerabilities and Challenges

At present, the primary threats along the Northern Border are terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. A variety of Sunni, Shia, Tamil, and Sikh terrorist affiliate and extremist groups have sympathizers in Canada who are likely involved in fundraising and ideological support; many of these groups and individuals have openly expressed their hostility toward the United States. Moreover, Canada's generous immigration system is vulnerable to exploitation by terrorists seeking a path to Canadian citizenship. Drugs flow in both directions across the U.S. and Canadian border. Illegal immigration along the Northern Border occurs at approximately one percent of the rate observed along the Southern Border according to CBP estimates, though limited situational awareness makes Northern Border alien smuggling difficult to quantify.

The terrain, which ranges from densely forested lands on the west and east coasts to open plains in the middle of the country, is composed of many sparsely populated lands with limited Federal, State, and local law enforcement presence along the immediate border area. The vast maritime border with Canada and the open access small vessels have in the Great Lakes provides an additional conduit for potential exploitation by terrorists, alien and contraband smuggling, and other criminal activity. With more than 5 million registered boats operating on or within 100 miles of the Great Lakes, the Great Lakes region presents unique border enforcement challenges.

Because the Northern Border operating environment differs appreciably from the Southwest Border, it requires a different law enforcement and security approach. For example, while information sharing, intelligence and partnerships between our neighboring countries as well as other Federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement, are important everywhere, they are particularly critical along the Northern Border. Also, due

to challenges with climate and geography, many of the technology tools and assets (e.g., boats) used in other areas of the country are not suitable for use along the Northern Border. Accordingly, specialized technologies and assets need to be developed or modified to operate effectively to secure the Northern Border.

The current gap between the type and amount of information U.S. and Canadian law enforcement agencies can share is another concern for DHS. Canadian law enforcement entities are far more restricted by legislation, policy, and its citizen's charter of rights.

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Steps Being Taken to Address Northern Border Threats and Vulnerabilities

DHS currently dedicates nearly \$2.5 billion annually to secure the Northern Border:

- CBP - \$1.13 billion
- USCG - \$935 million
- ICE - \$430 million

Since the establishment of DHS, a number of steps have been taken to improve security along the Northern Border, while still facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. Since October of 2003:

- More than 3,000 additional ICE and Border Patrol agents, CBP officers, and Coast Guard personnel have been deployed to the Northern Border.
- 281 additional Radiation Portal Monitors have been deployed to Northern Border Ports of Entry providing CBP with the capability to scan approximately 96 percent of all commercial truck and 88 percent of all personally owned vehicles entering the United States from Canada.
- 5 new CBP Northern Border Air Branches have been established
- 90 additional CBP and USCG aircraft and vessels have been deployed along the Northern Border

Dozens of initiatives and partnership are also underway in support of Northern Border security efforts. These are described in some level of detail in the full report, but some key efforts include:

- The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs) and Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BESTs), which bring together DHS and Canadian law enforcement agencies to share information and work with other Federal, state, local, and provincial enforcement agencies on issues related to national security, organized crime, and other criminal activities along the U.S.-Canada border.
- Negotiations regarding a U.S.-Canada bi-lateral Shiprider Agreement, which, when in force (expected to occur this year) will authorize joint maritime patrols

and law enforcement and security actions by cross-designated RCMP and USCG personnel.

- The end of oral declarations as proof of citizenship and identity along the Northern Border and the move toward instituting standard and consistent travel document requirements for entry under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative

Technology is also being used to support DHS's operations, with projects such as the Northern Border Testbed, to develop new technological tools and the SBInet Northern Border Project that will begin addressing certain needs and vulnerabilities along the Northern Border.

Summary

DHS has made great progress since it was established in 2003 to improve security along the Northern Border while still facilitating the flow of legitimate trade and travel. Steps have been taken to increase staffing and assets, leverage partnerships, develop improved intelligence, deploy available technologies, and develop new technologies to address various gaps and vulnerabilities. As detailed in this report, the collaborative efforts of DHS, other federal agencies, and state, local and Canadian partners will be required to build on this foundation.

DHS will continue to use a layered, strategic approach to secure the Northern Border. The dozens of programs discussed in this report will target the greatest threats to the United States along the Northern Border -- terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration. Our current strategies and plans will continue to guide our efforts and, using this document and the Technological Baseline as a foundation, we will further coalesce our Northern Border security strategies and programs in the report requested by former Deputy Secretary Schneider that is to be provided in March 2009.

Congressional Fact Sheet
Northern Border Security Action Directive

Introduction

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Threat, Operating Environment, Vulnerabilities and Challenges

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Going forward, DHS will build upon this foundation to further secure the Northern Border while still facilitating the flow of trade and travel.