Privacy Impact Assessment Update
for the
Global Enrollment System
DHS/CBP/PIA-002(c)
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Contact Point
Cheryl C. Peters
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(202) 344-1707

Reviewing Official
Jonathan R. Cantor
Acting Chief Privacy Officer
Department of Homeland Security
(202) 343-1717
Abstract

The Global Enrollment System (GES) is a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) centralized information technology (IT) system that facilitates enrollment and security vetting for trusted traveler, registered traveler, and trusted worker programs. Program participants volunteer to provide personally identifiable information (PII) to CBP in return for expedited transit at designated U.S. border ports of entry (POE) and for access to sensitive CBP-controlled areas or positions. CBP is updating this Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) to include new trusted traveler and trusted worker programs, to migrate the Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS) Registered Traveler Pilot Program to the operational phase, and to leverage GES as a mechanism to initiate recurrent vetting of individuals participating in various CBP programs.

Overview

The Global Enrollment System (GES) allows U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers to facilitate enrollment of and vetting processes for trusted traveler, trusted worker, and registered traveler programs\(^1\) in a centralized environment. It serves as the primary repository for enrollment, application, and background investigation data and supports over one million enrollees. Enrollment in these programs enables CBP to expedite the inspection and security process for lower risk travelers and workers and allows more scrutiny for individuals who present an unknown risk.

The previously published GES PIA\(^2\) described CBP’s trusted traveler programs, which include: Global Entry (GE), NEXUS, Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection (SENTRI), and Free and Secure Trade (FAST). It also described the Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS) Registered Traveler Pilot Program and the Decal and Transponder Online Procurement System (DTOPS) registered traveler programs. The previous PIA also discussed potential growth of these programs through future changes and improvements. This PIA update should be read in conjunction with the previous GES PIA, last published on January 10, 2013.\(^3\)

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1 Trusted travelers and registered traveler programs typically require the same or similar types of personally identifiable information to be submitted by an individual; the difference between these programs is the level and frequency of vetting and screening conducted on individuals who apply to participate. For example, trusted traveler programs require recurrent vetting of individuals for the full duration of the benefit; while registered travelers do not.


3 Id.
Reason for the PIA Update

This PIA update describes CBP’s efforts to recognize the U.S. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Business Travel Card Program (ABTC) as a CBP trusted traveler program and leverage GES to facilitate enrollment and vetting through its framework. This update also includes CBP’s plan to migrate the SVRS Registered Traveler Pilot Program to a fully operational program. Additionally, the update includes an expansion to trusted worker populations. The initial trusted worked populations that will rely on GES screening and vetting include: (1) the eBadge trusted worker program, operated in conjunction with the DHS Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and commercial service providers that process airport badges and credentials; (2) the Bonded Worker program; and (3) the CBP Licensed Broker program. Lastly, CBP is updating this PIA to describe the recurrent vetting of trusted traveler and trusted worker populations through the Department of Justice (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Criminal Justice Information Service’s (CJIS) National Crime Information Center (NCIC) through an interface with the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (NLETS).

Expanded Trusted and Registered Traveler Programs

1. U.S.-Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Business Travel Card (ABTC) Program

The U.S.-Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is an economic forum comprised of twenty-one members including the United States and Canada, with the primary goal of supporting sustainable economic growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. One of APEC’s initiatives is the U.S. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Business Travel Card (ABTC) Program. The U.S. ABTC Program is a voluntary program that enables qualified U.S. business travelers or U.S. Government officials who are engaged in APEC business or business in the APEC region the ability to gain access to fast-track immigration lanes at participating airports in the 20 foreign APEC member economies.

On November 12, 2011, the President of the United States signed the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Business Travel Cards Act of 2011 (APEC Act). The APEC Act authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to issue U.S. ABTCs through September 30, 2018, to eligible persons. To participate in the program, individuals must be a U.S. citizen, must be an existing member in good standing in a CBP trusted...
traveler program, and must be a bona fide business person or U.S. Government official who is actively engaged in APEC business. The APEC Act also authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to prescribe and collect a fee for U.S. ABTC issuance. ABTC applicants may apply for the U.S. ABTC electronically using the Global On-Line Enrollment System (GOES) website as described in the previous GES PIA.

As a member of APEC, the United States recognizes ABTCs from other members and provides fast-track immigration processing lanes, typically allowing ABTC holders to use diplomatic or crew lines at airports. Participating as a transitional member in the ABTC Program, the United States does not offer visa-free travel for ABTC holders from economies that do not participate in the Visa Waiver Program or otherwise have visa-free travel to the United States. Additionally, it does not accept ABTC participation in lieu of a visa application. ABTC holders entering the United States are subject to the inspection process that is applicable to other travelers, including the presentation of valid passports and, when applicable, valid visas. Although the United States requires visas for ABTC holders to travel to the United States (unless the holder is eligible for admission under the Visa Waiver Program), it affords ABTC holders from APEC members expedited visa interview scheduling at embassies and consulates abroad. All U.S. embassies and consulates in APEC member economies have procedures to expedite the scheduling of visa interviews for ABTC holders seeking to travel to the United States.

Pursuant to an arrangement with Canada, DHS will also print Canadian ABTCs for Canadian citizens who are also members of the NEXUS trusted traveler program. NEXUS is a reciprocal trusted traveler program between the U.S. and Canada that allows pre-screened members to leverage crossing privileges at ports of entry between the two countries. See the Characterization of the Information section below for ABTC required data and/or the application process.

2. Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS) Operational Deployment

Background

Vessels arriving in the United States from foreign ports are subject to various regulatory arrival and reporting requirements. Under CBP’s standard vessel arrival procedures, boaters must notify CBP of arrival, undergo a customs inspection, and report in-person for an immigration inspection at the nearest port of entry or other designated location. The enforcement of such requirements presents some unique challenges for CBP in the case of pleasure boaters because such persons may not be aware of all arrival requirements or may find the arrival requirements, in particular the requirement to report in-person to CBP for an immigration inspection, to be

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9 See e.g., 19 CFR 4.2, 4.3, and 148.11; and 8 CFR 235.1.
cumbersome, and thus may fail to comply. Recognizing the challenges involved in regulating such vessels navigating the extensive network of U.S. waterways,\textsuperscript{10} and to reduce risk and increase compliance, CBP initiated the voluntary SVRS Registered Traveler Pilot Program in 2010 (described in the 2013 PIA update) for an expedited passenger processing system for pleasure vessels.

SVRS Program participation was voluntary and will remain so during operational deployment. All U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, and U.S. lawful permanent residents; Canadian citizens and permanent residents of Canada who are nationals of a Visa Waiver Program country; Canadian Border Boat Landing (I-68)\textsuperscript{11} Program holders; and participants of one or more of CBP’s trusted traveler programs, regardless of nationality, were eligible to participate, provided they are in possession of a valid passport or other specified approved travel document and absent any specified disqualifying factors. These eligibility parameters remain in effect during future operational deployment.

**Scope of the Pilot**

The SVRS pilot centralized and streamlined pleasure vessel reporting and immigration inspection processes to facilitate pleasure vessel reporting, while allowing CBP to better target security risks posed by pleasure vessels. In the SVRS pilot, participating pleasure boaters provided CBP with a “float plan” containing advance information about the vessel, voyage, and passengers through an online automated system. This system enabled program participants to fulfill reporting requirements when their vessel arrives in the United States from a foreign location in an expedited manner relative to standard arrival procedures. The SVRS advance float plan submission feature provided law enforcement and national security benefits as it allowed CBP officers to assess risks associated with incoming vessels and passengers prior to arrival based on the vessel, passenger, and itinerary information included in each float plan submission.

**SVRS Registration and Data Collection**

During the pilot, boaters were required to register with CBP to participate in the SVRS program. This registration involved applying to the program through a website and then scheduling and participating in an initial personal interview with a CBP officer before consideration for acceptance into the SVRS program.

\textsuperscript{10} It includes approximately 95,000 miles of shoreline, 300,000 square miles of waterways, 360 ports of call, and 12,000 marinas. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, *DHS’s Strategy and Plans to Counter Small Vessel Threats Need Improvement*, OIG-09-100. September 2009.

Registered traveler programs do not conduct the same type of vetting as the trusted traveler programs. The SVRS program collects the information provided in the Characterization of the Information section below.

Operational Deployment

CBP affirms that the SVRS pilot operated successfully. Since its implementation in 2010, over 90,000 boaters have joined the SVRS pilot program.\(^{12}\) These participants, along with the public and CBP, have gained significant benefits from the SVRS pilot program. These benefits include but are not limited to:

- Expedited boater processing;
- Enhanced boater traffic tracking to identify high-risk vessels;
- Enhanced boater and vessel data input into CBP systems;
- Enhanced situational awareness;
- Data accuracy improvements;
- Reduced wait times for boaters requiring in-person interviews; and
- Allowing more time for CBP officers to devote to U.S. border and waterway security.

The PII collection, process, and procedural requirements discussed previously in the 2013 GES PIA remain in effect during the forthcoming operational deployment.

New Trusted Worker Programs

The GES trusted worker system is a replica of the GES trusted traveler system used to record, vet, and monitor low risk individuals applying for access to CBP sensitive or secure work areas or positions.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{12}\) Based on historical data through October 2015. Sources: Email correspondence with CBP’s Office of Field Operations on November 1, 2013, and email correspondence with CBP’s Office of Information Technology on November 10, 2015.

\(^{13}\) Trusted Workers are covered by the existing DHS/CBP-010 Persons Engaged in International Trade in Customs and Border Protection Licensed/Regulated Activities System of Records Notice, 73 FR 77753 (December 19, 2008), which permits CBP to collect and maintain records on persons engaged in international trade in CBP licensed/regulated activities. These records include identifying information as well as the results of background checks or official vetting performed to ensure that CBP’s approval of the individuals’ right to perform the licensed or regulated activity is appropriate.
1. The eBadge Program

CBP operates the eBadge program in conjunction with the TSA and commercial service providers that process airport badges and credentials, such as the American Association of Airport Executives. TSA requires name-based Security Threat Assessments (STA) for all individuals seeking or holding airport identification badges or credentials in order to identify potential or actual threats to transportation or national security. The name-based STA involves recurring checks against federal terrorist, immigration, and law enforcement databases. Commercial service providers support airport authorities by channeling airport badge and credential PII to TSA for the STA.

The eBadge program allows CBP to perform additional screening, which includes customs checks against CBP databases of TSA-cleared airport employees seeking access to CBP-controlled Federal Inspections Service (FIS)-restricted areas. The CBP screening includes customs-related checks against CBP databases. CBP officers review the vetting results in order to determine the individual’s eligibility for the eBadge. Upon successful CBP screening, CBP advises the commercial service providers to direct the airport authority to affix a hologram to the individual’s TSA-approved Security Identification Display Area (SIDA)\(^{14}\) badge, which then authorizes the individual access to the FIS restricted areas. CBP receives applicant PII listed in the Characterization of the Information section below directly from commercial service providers through an interface with TECS\(^{15}\) and stores the information in the GES.

All individuals submitting initial applications must appear in person with proper government-issued documents at the CBP Airport Security Program office to establish identity and verify employment eligibility.

See the Characterization of the Information section below for the data requirements pertaining to the eBadge Program.

2. The Bonded Worker Program

The Bonded Worker program\(^{16}\) applies to individuals that work at locations where bonded warehouses, facilities, or designated areas\(^{17}\) operate under CBP supervision. This program applies


\(^{16}\) CBP Bonded Warehouse Program. Available at: https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/371/~/establishing-a-customs-bonded-warehouse.

\(^{17}\) See 19 U.S.C. § 1555. A Customs bonded warehouse is a building or other secured area in which imported dutiable merchandise may be stored, manipulated, sorted, repacked, cleaned, or undergo manufacturing operation without payment of duty for up to 5 years from the date of importation.
only to warehouse proprietors, Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ) operators, officers, and recordkeeping employees of a corporation that have been granted the right to operate the bonded facility. CBP has the authority to vet these individuals under the Bonded Worker program or revoke or suspend the bonded status of a warehouse proprietor, operator, or any officer of a corporation that has been granted the right to operate a bonded warehouse or an FTZ, upon commission or conviction of certain crimes. An applicant seeking to establish a bonded warehouse must submit a written application to the local CBP port director describing the premises, the location, and the class of warehouse under development. Once approved as a bonded warehouse or facility, applicants must complete CBP Form 3078—Application for Identification Card and submit it to a CBP POE for manual entry into GES. See the Characterization of the Information section below for the data requirements pertaining to the Bonded Worker program.

3. Broker License Program

Customs brokers are private individuals, partnerships, associations, or corporations licensed, regulated, and empowered by CBP to assist importers and exporters in meeting federal requirements governing imports and exports. Brokers submit necessary information and appropriate payments to CBP on behalf of their clients and charge them a fee for this service.

Brokers must have expertise in the entry procedures, admissibility requirements, classification, valuation, and the rates of duty and applicable taxes and fees for imported merchandise.

The Broker License program applies to individual applicants, officers, and principals of customs brokerage firms whose primary responsibility is filing required documentation to import goods into the United States. Broker License applicants must be a U.S. citizen at least 21 years of age. Prior to granting a customs broker license, applicants must complete a Broker License examination at a CBP POE and undergo a CBP background investigation. This vetting process adheres to regulatory requirements and verifies that the applicant does not have a history of activity that would make him or her unsuitable to carry out the responsibilities entrusted to a customs broker. Applicants must complete CBP Form 3124—Application for Customs Broker License and submit it to a CBP POE for manual entry into GES. See the Characterization of the Information section below for the data requirements pertaining to the Bonded Worker program.

New Recurrent Vetting Process

The Vetting Center Module (VCM) within the GES system processes a standard series of queries conducted on all applicants regardless of the program for which they are applying. Once GES receives the applicant data, it transfers it to the VCM, creates a Pass ID that is associated with new applicants, and initiates the screening process. The VCM conducts automated queries against
the CBP TECS System\(^{18}\) and the FBI’s National Criminal Information Center (NCIC) databases, including Incident Log Query, Secondary Queries, FBI’s wanted persons file, FBI’s criminal history file, Person Subject Query, Address Query, Traveler history data for airport or land border, and Financial Query. As part of the screening process, CBP also conducts an interview with the applicant and may retain a photograph and fingerprints of the applicant.\(^{19}\) CBP uses VCM information to create a Risk Assessment Worksheet (RAW) in the VCM on the particular individual that enables a CBP officer to either recommend approval or denial of a request. CBP uses GES to complete the applicant’s processing.

Previously, CBP submitted a list of all GES enrollees on a nightly basis to the FBI and NCIC replied with a response for every enrollee. This approach:

- Consumed a large amount of system resources;
- Raised bandwidth issues and delays during normal processing transmissions;
- Prevented real-time responses (24 hour delays on occasions); and
- Increased the privacy and IT security risks associated with transmission of the data.

**Recurrent Vetting Process**

The NCIC/NLETS Recurrent Vetting Service (NNVS) within the TECS Platform alleviates nightly trusted traveler vetting. The new process submits an initial batch containing GES enrollee records (with periodic updates for additions/deletions) to the FBI and NCIC responds in real time with information only pertaining to individuals that have experienced an update in their records or vetting results. This new process:

- Alleviates the need to return the full dataset of trusted traveler records to CBP every evening;
- Provides a real-time response instead of a potential 24 hour delay;
- Uses less processing/transmission resources; and
- Decreases privacy and IT security risks through reduced dataset transmissions and exposure.

This modification does not alter the PII CBP obtains to perform background checks on trusted travelers or workers or the privacy posture of TECS.

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\(^{19}\) Photographs and biometrics of trusted workers are maintained in the IDENT IT system and covered by the existing DHS/CBP-010 Persons Engaged in International Trade in Customs and Border Protection Licensed/Regulated Activities System of Records Notice, 73 FR 77753 (December 19, 2008).
Privacy Impact Analysis

In each of the below sections, consider how the system has changed and what impact it has on the below fair information principles. In some cases there may be no changes and indicate as such.

Authorities and Other Requirements

In addition to the authorities contained in the 2013 PIA that remain in effect, CBP promulgated an Interim Final Rule establishing the ABTC Program pursuant to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Business Travel Cards Program.\(^{20}\)

Pursuant to authorities pertaining to customs broker licensing,\(^{21}\) a person engaged in “customs business” must possess a valid customs broker’s license.

Pursuant to authorities pertaining to rules, regulations, and forms concerning warehousing and handling of merchandise,\(^{22}\) a person who is an employee at a location where bonded facilities operate under CBP supervision must be properly licensed.

Pursuant to authorities pertaining to “employment investigation[s], including a criminal history record checks (CHRC) and a review of available law enforcement data bases and records,” TSA may conduct STAs on individuals who have “unescorted access” to the secure areas of airports and aircraft.\(^{23}\)

Pursuant to the Presidential Executive Order\(^{24}\) authorizing federal agencies to conduct activities that involve personal identifiers, individuals may provide their Social Security number voluntarily to facilitate participation in the CBP Bonded Worker or Broker License programs.

CBP’s information collection in conjunction with trusted worker programs receives coverage from Privacy Act System of Records Notice DHS/CBP-003 Global Enrollment System\(^{25}\) and DHS/CBP-010 Persons Engaged in International Trade in Customs and Border Protection Licensed/Regulated Activities.\(^{26}\) The purpose of this system is to collect and maintain records on persons engaged in international trade and in CBP licensed/regulated activities. These records include identifying information as well as the results of background investigations and vetting that

\(^{21}\) 19 U.S.C § 1641 and 19 CFR Part 111.12.
\(^{23}\) 49 U.S.C § 44936.
\(^{24}\) Executive Order (E.O). 13478.
\(^{26}\) DHS/CBP-010 Persons Engaged in International Trade in Customs and Border Protection Licensed/Regulated Activities, 75 FR 77753 (December 19, 2008), available at www.dhs.gov/privacy.
leads to CBP’s approval or disapproval of the individual’s right to perform the licensed or regulated activity.

The information collected from applicants for the Bonded Worker and Broker License trusted worker programs receives coverage under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control numbers 1651-0008 and 1651-0034. There are no changes to the PRA posture of previous trusted traveler and trusted worker programs.

**Characterization of the Information**

In addition to the processes and data elements listed in the previous GES PIA, CBP will use the following processes or collect the information described below for the new trusted traveler and trusted worker programs:

*ABTC Application Process*

CBP generates the ABTC number and collects a digital signature directly from the individual. CBP uses the ABTC number for administrative purposes to identify each ABTC applicant and card holder. CBP uses the digital signatures to certify that a U.S. applicant is a bona fide business person or U.S. Government official actively engaged in APEC business or operating in the APEC region. After the ABTC applicant pays the fee through Pay.gov, the process generates a tracking number that links to the ABTC application in GES. In summary, ABTC applicants must:

1. Be a U.S. citizen;
2. Become a member in good standing in a CBP trusted traveler program and initiate a GOES account;
3. Be a bona fide business person engaged in business in the APEC region or U.S. Government official actively engaged in APEC business;
4. Voluntarily undergo a background investigation, which includes checks against law enforcement, customs, immigration, intelligence, and terrorism databases;
5. Undergo a 10-fingerprint law enforcement check;
6. Complete a personal interview with a CBP officer; and
7. Provide a digital signature.

*Canadian Citizen ABTC Participants*

DHS will print Canadian ABTCs for Canadian citizens who are also members of the NEXUS trusted traveler program. Canadian NEXUS members enter their information into GOES and pay a fee to obtain a Canadian ABTC. As part of the NEXUS program, authorized Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) officers with limited read-only access to GES may review Canadian NEXUS applicant information and determine an applicant’s eligibility for the ABTC. The Canadian government notifies CBP whether it is authorized to print the ABTC for the Canadian citizen. With the exception of the “pass/fail” notification, the Canadian government does not provide CBP any additional information about the applicant. A “fail” decision from the Canadian government does not affect whether the Canadian individual can participate in any other CBP trusted traveler or registered traveler program.

**SVRS Data Collection**

- Full Name;
- Gender;
- Date of Birth;
- Place of Birth;
- Country of Citizenship;
- Address;
- Contact Telephone Number;
- Alternate Telephone Number;
- Contact Email Address;
- Password;
- Document type & number (e.g., U.S. Passport, Permanent Resident Card, Birth Certificate), place of issue, and expiration date of document; and
- Vessel information including registration number, hull ID number, decal number, registered name, location where vessel is registered, and vessel description (e.g., length, type, manufacturer, model, year, hull colors).

**eBadge Program Application Process and Required Information**

- The applicant must receive a TSA-approved SIDA Badge;
- Must appear in person with proper government-issued documents at the CBP Airport Security Program office to establish identity and verify employment eligibility;
- Submit Name;
- Date of Birth; and
- Employer name and address.

**Bonded Worker Application Process and Required Information**

- Complete CBP Form 3078 (entered manually into GES by CBP);
- Name (and other names used);
- Photographic Image;
- Date of Birth;
- Type of Activity Requiring an ID Card;
- Social Security number (voluntary);
- U.S. Coast Guard or U.S. Merchant Marine Card Number;
- Place of Birth;
- Date of Birth;
- Height;
- Weight;
- Eye Color;
- Hair Color;
- Visible Scars or Marks;
- Employer name and address;
- Former Employer’s name and address over the previous 10 years;
- All Residences During the Last 5 Years;
- Previous U.S. Military Service (if applicable);
- Branch of Service;
- Military Service Serial Number;
- Type of Military Discharge;
- List of Criminal Convictions or Offenses; and
- Narcotic Drug Use History.
Broker License Application Process

- Complete CBP Form 3124 (entered manually into GES by CBP);
- Name (and other names used);
- Date of Birth;
- Social Security number (voluntary);
- Type of License Applied For;
- License Suspension/Revocation Information (if applicable)
- Place of Birth;
- U.S. Citizenship status;
- Home Phone Number;
- Business Phone Number;
- Home Address;
- List of Criminal Convictions or Offenses;
- Bankruptcy, tax lien, debt legal judgment status;
- Name, Addresses, and Phone Number of References; and
- Name, Addresses, Dates of Birth, Place of Birth of all Corporate Officers or Principals (if applicable).

There are no additional data requirements for the NCIC/NLETS recurrent vetting process.

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that inaccurate data input into GES by either the individual applying for the trusted traveler, registered traveler, or trusted worker program or by the CBP officer may result in an erroneous decision to approve or disapprove enrollment in a particular program.

**Mitigation:** CBP mitigates this risk by conducting personal interviews of applicants for trusted traveler, registered traveler, and trusted worker programs. If there are doubts concerning whether the individual applying for the program is the same individual of record in a law enforcement database, or if that database record raised accuracy concerns, CBP may use the personal interview and the application data to verify the information. CBP offers the applicant an opportunity to reapply and clarify the potential inaccuracy.
Uses of the Information

CBP collects voluntary information from applicants in order to assess their eligibility for enrollment in its trusted traveler, registered traveler, and trusted worker programs supported by GES. CBP conducts recurrent vetting on trusted traveler and trusted worker applicants and enrollees to ensure that they do not pose threats to law enforcement or national security and to determine their eligibility to receive expedited processing at the border or access to sensitive CBP-controlled areas or positions. CBP also vets these individuals to ensure that they either meet or remain eligible for program participation. CBP will not use the information to conduct recurrent vetting or assess further eligibility of registered travelers.

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that applicants and enrollees may not know how CBP may use their information submitted to the GES.

**Mitigation:** CBP mitigates this risk by providing Privacy Act notices stating the purpose for the data collection on the forms provided to applicants for the Bonded Worker and Broker License programs. CBP also mitigates this risk by the publishing a series of GES PIAs and the applicable SORNs, which provide transparency into GES information usage.

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that information used to enroll individuals in a trusted traveler, registered traveler, or trusted worker program will be used for a purpose inconsistent with the original collection.

**Mitigation:** This risk is mitigated by the manner in which CBP collects and stores information for trusted traveler, registered traveler, and trusted worker programs. CBP manages the various programs in separate environments, which can interface when an applicant applies for a separate GES-managed program. The data segregation also supports software management for the various programs. Additionally, all system users are trained to use information strictly for determining program eligibility. Access to GES is granted to users by a limited number of system administrators and access level varies based on a need-to-know and the user’s role. Users are also required to take annual privacy training to ensure that they know and understand the importance of managing sensitive PII.

**Notice**

CBP provides notice for trusted traveler, registered traveler, and trusted worker programs by publishing the GES PIA series and the corresponding SORN. In addition, when a U.S. or a Canadian citizen applies for the ABTC through the GOES website, he or she must certify a Privacy Act Statement that notifies applicants of the information collection required for program

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consideration. Furthermore, CBP provides general notice on the GOES website for applicants that use it for processing purposes.\(^{30}\)

CBP does not require anyone to participate in any trusted traveler, registered traveler, and trusted worker programs. Therefore, consent is implied when an applicant applies to the program. Applicants must certify that they understand any information they provide, including any supporting documentation, biometric data, and statements made during interviews, may be shared among law enforcement and other government agencies as necessary to conduct a background investigation. The data collected in GES is used only for the purposes defined, including border and immigration management, national security, and law enforcement. Once enrolled, individuals have no opportunity to “opt out” of the use of their data for any of these stated purposes.

This PIA also serves as notice to program participants that CBP conducts NCIC/NLETS recurrent vetting on all trusted traveler and trusted worker populations.

In addition, CBP plans to publish a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking related specifically to migrating the SVRS pilot program to a fully operational program.

**Privacy Risk:** Individuals participating in or applying for the new Bonded Worker and Broker License trusted worker programs may believe that they did not receive adequate notice as to the use of their collected information.

**Mitigation:** This risk is mitigated by requesting that the applicant certify the Privacy Act notices in GOES and by including the notices contained on the CBP 3078 and 3124 forms for individuals applying for the trusted worker programs. These notices explain that the application information, including supporting documentation, background information, and biometric data is subject to a check of criminal information databases, immigration and customs databases, and other enforcement databases, as well as shared among law enforcement and other Government agencies as permitted under the Privacy Act and other applicable laws. These notices further remind applicants of the opportunity to decline to provide information for the application and that the programs are all voluntary.

**Data Retention by the project**

No changes.

**Information Sharing**

The information sharing parameters described in the previous GES PIA and associated SORNs remain in effect. CBP may share information, including Canadian citizens’ NEXUS application information, with the Canadian government as a part of the ABTC program. CBSA

agents receive read-only access to GES. The U.S. and Canada do not share PII with APEC or any ABTC international database because they are transitional members of the ABTC international program.

CBP may share GES application information with partnering international countries (excluding vehicle-related information) submitted directly by the applicant undergoing the vetting process. No derogatory information or records are exchanged; CBP only provides a “pass/fail” decision to the partnering international country and receives only a pass/fail for reciprocal programs. All information sharing agreements must be reviewed and approved through an internal CBP process that includes a review by CBP policy and privacy officials, and the CBP Office of Chief Counsel. After CBP approves an information sharing agreement it is forwarded to DHS for final review and approval.

CBP may share GES information pertaining to airport workers with airport authorities through commercial service providers as part of the STA and customs checks process associated with the eBadge Program.

Privacy Risk: There is a risk that GES information may be inappropriately shared with individuals or foreign countries and that these countries would have limited accountability for how they can use and further share this data.

Mitigation: CBP only shares GES application data as authorized by DHS/CBP-002 Global Enrollment System and DHS/CBP-010 Persons Engaged in International Trade in Customs and Border Protection Licensed/Regulated Activities, and as defined in any information sharing agreement pertaining to the data. Access controls such as administrative passwords and restrictive rules regarding database access ensure that only authorized users can access GES and use the information in the system in accordance with authorized activities and the parameters of its information sharing agreements.

Redress

CBP has not changed access, redress, and correction procedures. However, CBP updated the address to which individuals should submit their requests for access, redress, and correction.

DHS allows individuals, including foreign nationals, to seek administrative access under the Privacy Act to certain information maintained in GES. For individuals to request their information about their records in GES, they should mail their request, in the format described in the GES SORN, to:

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Privacy Risk: There is no privacy risk to redress for this information. CBP provides applicants who are denied acceptance into a trusted traveler, trusted worker, or registered traveler program with a personal letter that provides a clear and concise statement of why it denied the application. Individuals may also file for redress using the access, correction, and amendment process described above.

Auditing and Accountability

No changes.

Responsible Officials

Cheryl C. Peters
Office of Field Operations
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(202) 344-1707

Debra L. Danisek
CBP Privacy Officer
Office of Privacy and Diversity
Office of the Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(202) 324-1610

Approval Signature

Original signed copy on file with the DHS Privacy Office.

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Jonathan R. Cantor
Acting Chief Privacy Officer
Department of Homeland Security