



# Privacy Impact Assessment

for the

## DHS Data Services Branch

**DHS Reference No. DHS/ALL/PIA-046**

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**Homeland  
Security**



## Abstract

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Data Services Branch (DSB) (previously known as Data Framework) is a Departmental program that offers data hosting, data analytics and advanced data services. The DSB provides capabilities to support advanced data architecture, data management and governance processes, and customized data services to DHS Headquarters (HQ) and operational Components to support priority missions and operational management. The DSB is chartered to establish, operate, and maintain an online analytical processing platform called Neptune. Neptune provides controlled access to DHS data in the unclassified environment across the Department. Neptune allows approved users to host, link, analyze, or share data securely and confidently across the Department.

DHS is updating and re-issuing<sup>1</sup> this Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) as a result of the DHS Data Framework Act of 2018.<sup>2</sup> This PIA covers the overall approach and use of the program, and consolidates DHS/ALL/PIA-046 DHS Data Framework and *subsequent updates*; DHS/ALL/PIA-046-1 Neptune and *subsequent updates*; DHS/ALL/PIA-046-2 Common Entity Index Prototype and *subsequent updates*; and DHS/ALL/PIA-046-3 Cerberus and *subsequent updates*. As DHS further develops the DSB, this PIA and its Appendices will be updated.

## Overview

Section 101 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (Nov. 25, 2002), as amended, established DHS as an executive department of the United States. The mission of DHS is to prevent terrorism and enhance security; secure and manage our borders; enforce and administer our immigration laws; safeguard and secure cyberspace; and ensure resilience to disasters. To enable DHS to carry out this missions, the Homeland Security Act sought to eliminate information firewalls separating data held by government agencies by consolidating multiple agencies under DHS.

In spite of consolidating the various Components to establish the Department, the existing architecture of DHS databases had not been conducive to effective implementation of the “One DHS” policy.<sup>3</sup> Access was cumbersome, time-intensive, and required personnel to log on and query separate databases in order to determine what relevant information DHS systems contain.

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<sup>1</sup> The Data Framework previously ingested data into the Neptune unclassified “data lake” that DHS used to receive, store, and tag data from unclassified DHS IT systems. Once tagged, the unclassified DHS data sets from Neptune were transferred to Cerberus, which was the classified data lake that DHS used to perform classified searches of unclassified DHS data sets. The Common Entity Index was an unclassified correlation engine that allowed DHS to connect disparate DHS data sets to view all available information about an identified individual. Both Cerberus and the Common Entity Index hardware have been repurposed for use in other DHS projects.

<sup>2</sup> Data Framework Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-331 (Dec. 19, 2018).

<sup>3</sup> In February of 2007, the Secretary issued the DHS *Policy for Internal Information Exchange and Sharing*, referred to as the “One DHS” memorandum, to further mandate open information exchange within DHS.



As a result, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security developed the DHS Data Services Branch through the Common Vetting Task Force with collaboration among the Office of the Chief Information Officer (OCIO); the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY); the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A); the “oversight offices” (i.e., the DHS Privacy Office (PRIV), the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), and the Office of the General Counsel (OGC)); and operational components.

The work of the Data Services Branch was reauthorized by the DHS Data Framework Act of 2018,<sup>4</sup> which directs DHS to:

1. Develop a data framework to integrate existing DHS datasets and systems for access by authorized personnel in a manner consistent with relevant legal authorities and privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections;
2. Ensure that all information of a DHS office or component that falls within the scope of the information sharing environment, and any information or intelligence relevant to priority mission needs and capability requirements of the homeland security enterprise, is included; and
3. Ensure that the framework is accessible to DHS employees who have an appropriate security clearance, are assigned to perform a function that requires access, and are trained in applicable standards for safeguarding and using such information.

### **Program Description**

The DSB’s primary objective is to provide a single platform for users to host, link, analyze, or share data securely and confidently across the Department. It enables the implementation of analytic capabilities and advanced data searches across DHS. The DSB provides significant benefits to DHS and its component mission operators allowing mission owners to define and develop nimble, flexible analytic capabilities to look across DHS data in the unclassified environment.

The DSB provides dynamic access controls to safeguard information from multiple sources while enhancing sharing, near real-time movement of data for operational decision-making and centralized access to data across DHS Components, as required. It also enables the effective, and efficient use and sharing of available DHS information across the DHS enterprise and, as appropriate, the U.S. Government, while protecting privacy. The DSB includes the unclassified platform Neptune which can be accessed by approved users in a manner consistent with relevant legal authorities and privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties policies and protections. Currently, the DSB is in the process of onboarding additional priority operational datasets, creating a metadata

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<sup>4</sup> See *supra* note 1.



catalog to be shared across the enterprise, and developing analytical capabilities relevant to mission and business operator end-users.

## **Data Services Branch Structure**

The goal of the DSB is to provide capabilities to support advanced data architecture, governance processes, and customized data services on the unclassified network (Neptune) in a clear and accessible format.

When sharing data, the DSB defines four elements through which to control data:

- 1) **User attributes** — identity characteristics about the user requesting access such as organization, role, and status of required training. The DSB incorporates a role-based access control (RBAC) model, which dynamically evaluates a system user's attributes for determining fine-grained access control.
- 2) **Data tags** — label the data, the authoritative source system from which it originated, and the date it was ingested into Neptune. Data tagging preserves the lineage of the source data and the purpose and intent for its collection even when it is not resident in its source system. Tagging data by type allows Neptune to determine whether to grant or deny access to specific data elements and to provide the ability to release the data (i.e., data about persons who receive additional protections, such as certain special protected classes of aliens who are subject to the non-disclosure provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1367).<sup>5</sup>
- 3) **Context** — combines the type of search and analysis (i.e., the type of query that could be performed) that can be conducted (function) with the authorized purpose for which data (i.e., core biographic, extended biographic, or encounter information – outlined below on page 4) can be used.
- 4) **Dynamic access control policies** — evaluate user attributes, data tags, and context to grant or deny access to DHS data in the repository based on legal authorities and appropriate policies of the Department and/or Components.

The four elements assist the DSB in creating a systematic repeatable process for providing controlled access to DHS data across the Department. As a result, the DSB ensures access to the most authoritative, timely, and accurate data available in DHS to support critical decision-making and mission functions while maintaining the authoritative source of data at the source system.

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<sup>5</sup> Special protected classes include individuals whose information is protected by Title 8, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 1367, confidentiality and prohibited source provisions (relating to applicants for and beneficiaries of Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), T visa, or U visa protections in accordance with 8 U.S.C. 1367(d) and Section 810 of the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, including VAWA self-petitioners and VAWA cancellation or removal applicants.



## Neptune

DHS uses the unclassified Neptune platform to receive, store, and tag the data from unclassified DHS IT systems. This data is sourced from multiple unclassified DHS component source IT systems which remain the authoritative standard for their data. The datasets approved for ingest into Neptune are listed in Appendix A to this PIA.

Once tagged, the unclassified DHS datasets from Neptune can be searched on the unclassified network. The DSB allows approved users the ability to access, search, and use the DSB's unclassified data within Neptune through analysis, reporting, and visualization tools, such as Tableau and Power BI, that interface with Neptune. The availability of the various searches will be limited based on need-to-know, appropriate clearance levels, and user/roles with the full range of search methodologies not necessarily authorized for each user type and/or role. These approvals are governed by the DSB oversight bodies, including PRIV, OGC, and CRCL.

Neptune currently ingests data as collected by unclassified DHS systems within a common schema that includes core biographic data, extended biographic data, and encounter data related to individuals. Core biographic data is basic biographic information that includes name, date of birth, gender, country of citizenship, and country of birth. Extended biographic data is additional biographic information about an individual that is not considered core biographic information and includes information such as address, phone number, email address, passport number, and visa number. Information, other than core or extended biographic data, that derives from a DHS law enforcement or immigration related event/process and which is collected in accordance with DHS authorities and regulation is called encounter data. The term 'encounter' is used to describe a face-to-face meeting, an electronic or paper-based transaction (such as an application for a DHS administered benefit), or information provided to the United States by a domestic or foreign government agency, aircraft operator, or other private entity. Detailed encounter data may contain DHS derogatory information, screening/vetting results, or information pertaining to third parties who help administer government programs, such as program points of contact. Derogatory information can include such information as application numbers or numbers identifying a police report.

Neptune also collects metadata, which is descriptive information characterizing the data such as name of the source system, source system identifier to allow the specific data element to be traced back to the source system, applicable retention rule along with any original system creation date, contact information for the component data provider, and date the information was ingested into Neptune. Expansion of common schema elements and refinement of data controls and tagging may occur in accordance with the governance onboarding process as approved by the Data Framework Working Group (DFWG).



The DFWG is an executive committee with a charter approved by the Secretary of Homeland Security; it is made up of the component mission operators, system owners, data stewards, other stakeholders as needed, and offices with oversight authority over the DSB to include PRIV, CRCL, and OGC. The charter defines the mission, authority, membership, responsibilities, and operating principles of the DFWG. The mission of the DFWG is to provide effective governance, oversight, coordination, and direction to the DSB and all related projects and initiatives. The DFWG also ensures the DSB's successful and timely delivery of data is in compliance with all policy requirements. The DFWG is actively involved in approving datasets for ingestion into Neptune as well as uses and user groups for the DSB.

The DSB, with the approval of the DFWG, can share data within Neptune to grant access to users who have been approved by the DFWG. The DSB allows sharing of information through secure, automated connections rather than delivering data through ad hoc transfers of portable media (e.g., discs or hard drives). The DSB plans to offer data cleansing and tagging services, within Neptune, to assist DHS components that do not have these capabilities developed.

### **Data Updates, Corrections, Deletions, and Refresh**

The DSB relies on the source IT systems for timely notification of updates and corrections to the datasets. Updates and corrections to the datasets will be incorporated into Neptune after all required updates to data format and structure, data tagging workbook (DTW), Neptune-hosted table schema, access control rules, and related artifacts have been completed and the updated dataset has been tested and verified through a manual data refresh in collaboration with the source IT system owner. Since such updates and corrections to datasets are not automated, there is an inherent delay in the manual propagation of such updates or corrections from the source IT system to Neptune. Any corrections or changes to the data will happen at the source IT system and will be incorporated into Neptune during the subsequent data refresh.

If a source IT system changes any of the rules, policies, or guidelines for a dataset, then the source IT system owner will be responsible for communicating those changes to the DSB so that the DSB access control rules can be updated accordingly. DSB will communicate those changes to the DFWG for its awareness.

Until the Department establishes, with approval of its oversight offices, a near real-time data refresh capability, DHS personnel will not use data from Neptune without verifying the data in the underlying source IT system. This extra step is a privacy protection that ensures data quality and an operational protection to ensure that DHS personnel are using accurate information in DHS operations.

Data will be maintained according to the retention, use, and handling provisions of the respective System of Records Notice (SORN) for those mission systems of records. Because DSB is relying on the source IT systems to notify the DSB of changes, deletions, or corrections to data,



DSB will not delete data until it receives a deletion notification from the source IT system. (Note: “Deletions” will be applied as defined by the source IT system. This may mean that data is overwritten, masked, fully removed, marked as “inactive,” or archived). As part of the metadata tagging process, DHS tags each dataset with a retention period, and therefore DHS can remind the underlying source IT system of the upcoming retention expiration date if the DSB has not already received a deletion notification. Additionally, the DSB can use this retention period tag to delete data in Neptune that is from IT systems that are unable to send automated delete request notifications due to a number of constraints (e.g., resources, legacy systems, disruptions to operational support).

### **Uses and Users**

Neptune can be accessed only for approved uses. To add new uses, an existing user or potential user will present a new use request to the DSB through a new mission use-case supporting such request. If the DSB approves and can accommodate the new potential use, the potential user must present to the DFWG and justify the new use and demonstrate that the use is permitted under existing PIAs and SORNs. All uses must be approved by the DFWG and are listed in Appendix B to this PIA. Furthermore, the DSB will permit no new use for any dataset without specific approval for the new use from the original source IT system owner.

The Neptune system can only be accessed by approved users. While the DSB is potentially available to all DHS data users, only user groups approved by the DFWG may access the unclassified Neptune system. Approved user groups are listed in Appendix C to this PIA.

DHS provides mandatory privacy training to all employees and contractors who have access to or use personally identifiable information (PII), and all users are required to complete mandated information security training that addresses privacy as well as the proper and secure use of DHS applications. In addition, PRIV offers role-based training for agency employees involved with information sharing and users are required to take training specific to datasets within the Neptune system. Neptune users are trained to verify information at the source system before completing any final analysis or using the information operationally. CRCL also offers several training products.

### **Data Sources**

Data ingested into Neptune comes from multiple sources across DHS components. To provide greater transparency as to which DHS datasets are approved for ingestion into Neptune, Appendix A to this PIA lists all datasets approved for ingestion into Neptune.

The DSB initially planned to enforce existing source IT system data requirements, including retention rules, by relying on the source IT systems to notify the DSB of changes, deletions, or corrections to data. However, the DSB discovered that some source IT systems are not able to send such delete notifications due to a number of constraints to their systems (e.g.,



legacy systems that are unable to send automated update notifications). To overcome the lack of delete notifications, the DSB reviews all SORNs and PIAs for source systems; extracts a series of business rules, including retention rules; confirms those rules with the source system and the DFWG; and duplicates and enforces those rules in the DSB for those datasets that cannot supply update notifications. By ensuring that this analysis and oversight occurs when alternative retention management changes are needed, the Department will continue to ensure that risks are understood, documented, and mitigated.

The DSB prefers to receive delete notifications from the source system; however, if the DSB internally determines it must manage retention of a particular dataset, an internal retention management request is presented to the DFWG. The DSB, in collaboration with associated stakeholders, prepares and documents an analysis of the compliance rules associated with the internal retention management and presents these rules to the DFWG.

### **Data Queries**

To reduce the need for bulk data exports, the DSB will provide interfaces through which users can query and aggregate data. These queries may be against a single data source or multiple data sources that can be linked through common data fields. Users will typically execute a query by filling values in a web form that executes a pre-defined query against the approved data. When such pre-defined queries are insufficient for mission requirements, a user may request permission from the DFWG to further filter/aggregate/link the data through interfaces that allow the user to specify more advanced logic. In all cases, users' access to data is strictly limited to only data for which they have been approved, and all queries will be securely audited.

### **Data Sharing**

The DSB provides the technical capability to reduce or replace existing information sharing processes internal to DHS and other partners approved by the DFWG. The DSB, with the approval of the DFWG, can share data, including "bulk data sharing"<sup>6</sup> from the Neptune system. The DSB allows sharing of data through secure, automated connections rather than delivering data through ad hoc transfers of portable media (e.g., discs or hard drives).

DSB does not currently share bulk data externally; additionally, DSB does not intend, nor is authorized, to share bulk data externally.

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<sup>6</sup>"Bulk data sharing" is defined as the transmission of large quantities of information, which, due to technical or operational considerations, is transferred without the use of discriminants reasonably likely to exclude information not relevant to the need giving rise to the recipient's request (e.g., specific identifiers, section terms). For example, transmitting a list of all ship arrivals in the US during the first quarter of last year in response to a request for such information would not be a bulk data transfer because the request and response are limited in scope to information reasonably likely to be of value to the recipient. Conversely, transmitting information about an arbitrary list of ships registered in Panama for identifying ships arriving in the United States during the first quarter of last year within that group would qualify as a bulk data transfer.



## Section 1.0 Authorities and Other Requirements

### 1.1 What specific legal authorities and/or agreements permit and define the collection of information by the project in question?

The Department of Homeland Security Data Framework Act of 2018<sup>7</sup> authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security “to provide access for appropriate personnel to law enforcement and other information of the Department, and for other purposes.” Section 2 (a)(2) states, “In developing the framework required under paragraph (1), the Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure, in accordance with all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, the following information is included: (A) All information acquired, held, or obtained by an office or component of the Department of Homeland Security that falls within scope of the information sharing environment, including homeland security information, terrorism information, weapons of mass destruction, and national intelligence; (B) Any information or intelligence relevant to priority mission needs and capability requirements of the homeland security enterprise, as determined by the Secretary.”

### 1.2 What Privacy Act System of Records Notice(s) (SORN(s)) apply to the information?

Data held within Neptune is covered by the source systems’ SORNs. All approved datasets are listed in Appendix A, which includes the relevant SORN for each source system. For users of the DSB, the source system will be identified allowing verification in the source system. Appendix A will be updated as new datasets are added to the DSB.

Neptune will continue to identify the source component for all records, which enables validation in the source system. Data will be maintained according to the retention, use, and handling provisions of the respective SORNs for those source systems.

### 1.3 Has a system security plan been completed for the information system(s) supporting the project?

The DSB operates under an Authority to Operate (ATO) issued on July 16, 2018. Additionally, a system security plan for Neptune has been completed and ratified.

### 1.4 Does a records retention schedule approved by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) exist?

The DSB follows the retention schedule of the source systems. The DSB prefers to rely on update/delete notifications from the source systems; however, when a source system is unable to

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<sup>7</sup> See *supra* note 1.



provide such notifications the DSB will duplicate and apply the same retention schedule as the source system.

**1.5 If the information is covered by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA), provide the OMB Control number and the agency number for the collection. If there are multiple forms, include a list in an appendix.**

The DSB is exempt from the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. § 3510) because it does not pose questions to collect information from ten or more members of the public. However, the information maintained by the systems from which DSB sources information may be subject to the PRA.

## **Section 2.0 Characterization of the Information**

**2.1 Identify the information the project collects, uses, disseminates, or maintains.**

Data entering Neptune is gathered from source systems listed in Appendix A to this PIA. The data elements ingested into Neptune are listed in Appendix A along with references to the source systems' PIAs to allow transparency of both the source systems and how those source systems collect, use, disseminate, and maintain the data. These data elements include core biographic data, extended biographic data, and encounter data.

**2.2 What are the sources of the information and how is the information collected for the project?**

The DSB gathers data from other DHS source IT systems. The information in the DSB is required to come from other source systems rather than the individual because the purpose of the DSB is to remove the stove-piping of DHS IT source systems. The DSB provides centralized data access by aggregating data from multiple DHS systems, rather than being a direct gatherer or user of information.

**2.3 Does the project use information from commercial sources or publicly available data? If so, explain why and how this information is used.**

The DSB does not use information from commercial sources or ingest data from publicly available sources.



## 2.4 Discuss how accuracy is ensured.

The DSB employs a robust data quality process that ensures incoming data is properly validated and cataloged. This data quality process quarantines any data received by the DSB that has incomplete data fields. The DSB can report any anomalies to the source IT system for potential correction in the source IT system. DSB depends on the accuracy and quality of data from each source system.

## 2.5 **Privacy Impact Analysis: Related to Characterization of the Information**

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that Neptune will include more datasets than are necessary to fulfill its authorized purpose.

**Mitigation:** This privacy risk is mitigated. Neptune is designed to reduce the number of copies of datasets across the Department, by creating a long-term Department-wide data solution. The number of system data delivery methods will decrease as the DSB can provide a more controlled release and transfer of information within the Department. Eventually, some data aggregation systems may be decommissioned as their capabilities are replicated and centralized within the DSB.

DHS, through the DFWG, will continue to evaluate new datasets to determine whether they are relevant and necessary to meet the purpose of the uses for the approved users of the DSB. Additional datasets will be published in Appendix A to this PIA after those datasets have been approved by the DFWG for ingestion. Further minimizing this risk, the DSB plans to prioritize the use of datasets approved for ingestion or re-ingestion listed in Appendix A, allowing for a multi-year expansion without the addition of further datasets. Finally, each dataset added to Neptune will require the development of a Privacy Threshold Analysis (PTA) to ensure formal consideration of the PIA and SORN of new source IT systems, as well as an examination of access control rules and DSB users.

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that DSB users will access more PII than is necessary to accomplish their specified purpose.

**Mitigation:** This privacy risk is mitigated. The DSB is designed first and foremost to support DHS users' mission needs while mitigating privacy risk. One of the hallmarks of the DSB is the ability to restrict access to types of data, including PII, within the DSB based on the user's specified purpose. To accomplish this, DSB has tagged elements from each dataset as belonging to one of three categories—core biographic, extended biographic, and encounter information—and users are only able to access the categories that are necessary to perform their function. This use of data tags allows DSB to minimize data access according to specified purpose, which is an improvement in the implementation of data minimization within DHS. The Department plans to



expand the DSB's approved tagging scheme elements (i.e., common information fields used across the datasets) and refine data controls/tagging as the Department operationalizes the DSB in accordance with the governance onboarding process, as approved by the DFWG.

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that the DSB will encourage the replication of datasets across DHS resulting in data proliferation.

**Mitigation:** This privacy risk is mitigated. The DSB reduces the number of copies of datasets across DHS. The DSB provides a DHS-wide data solution for having a single point of sign-on and an environment for having fewer copies of datasets at various components.

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that PII transferred outside of the original IT system and into the DSB will not be accurate, relevant, timely, or complete.

**Mitigation:** This risk is partially mitigated. DHS developed a data quality plan that establishes a feedback mechanism to report data quality issues to source systems. In addition, all data is received unaltered, processed with data anomalies identified, logged, and reported to the source data owners for potential correction, and data quality metrics are produced for performance and compliance reporting. DSB depends on the accuracy and quality of data from each source system.

The privacy risk will not be fully mitigated until DHS develops a near real-time refresh capability. The DSB has identified timelines for manually refreshing each existing dataset and has begun implementation of limited manual dataset refreshes. For each new dataset, DHS will use the onboarding process, described above, to identify and implement manual data refresh timelines. To provide additional mitigation, DSB users will continue to be trained to understand the risk associated with data latency (due to limited refresh capabilities). Users will also be required to verify information in the source system before completing any final analysis or using the information operationally.

## **Section 3.0 Uses of the Information**

### **3.1 Describe how and why the project uses the information.**

As described below, the DSB is approved for multiple uses, which are set forth in Appendix B to this PIA. Approved users, as listed in Appendix C, may only use the DSB for one of these approved uses. Additionally, the DSB can share bulk data with partners for the uses listed in Appendix B.

### **3.2 Does the project use technology to conduct electronic searches, queries, or analyses in an electronic database to discover or locate a predictive pattern or an anomaly? If so, state how DHS plans to use such results.**



No.

### **3.3 Are there other components with assigned roles and responsibilities within the system?**

Yes. The purpose of the DSB is to remove the stove-piping data and to share that data with approved users across components as approved by the DFWG. All users are identified in Appendix C, which identifies those users' component or directorate.

### **3.4 Privacy Impact Analysis: Related to the Uses of Information**

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that DHS will include data in the DSB for a purpose other than the purpose for which it was collected in the original system.

**Mitigation:** This privacy risk is partially mitigated. The SORNs for datasets within Neptune specify the purposes for collection, such as immigration, border security, and operational and situational awareness purposes. Each dataset is reviewed through the PTA process prior to onboarding to ensure this compatibility is sufficient. Any changes to the datasets, users, and uses will trigger a review to determine whether the purpose remains compatible and whether this risk is impacted by the addition of new datasets, uses, or users.

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that approved users will use data for purposes other than those authorized.

**Mitigation:** This privacy risk is mitigated. Only the DFWG can approve new users and uses with input and clearance from PRIV, CRCL, and OGC. Once a user or use is approved by the DFWG, technical controls ensure the user is only able to access data for the use or uses for which he or she has been approved, thus limiting that user's access within Neptune. Access to data is determined by a user's purpose and function, and Neptune's policy-based controls will ensure that a user is only able to access data that is permitted for a particular purpose and function.

## **Section 4.0 Notice**

### **4.1 How does the project provide individuals notice prior to the collection of information? If notice is not provided, explain why not.**

The DSB does not collect information directly from individuals and, thus, cannot supply notice other than through this PIA. Because the DSB ingests datasets from DHS components, individuals are provided notice of collection as outlined in the PIAs and SORNs for those datasets. Those PIAs and SORNs are set forth in Appendix A.



## 4.2 What opportunities are available for individuals to consent to uses, decline to provide information, or opt out of the project?

The DSB ingests data from multiple DHS datasets. Individuals whose data is contained within the DSB have been presented with the opportunity to consent to, or deny consent to, the use of their information when that information was collected by those components and entered into the source systems, as appropriate.

## 4.3 Privacy Impact Analysis: Related to Notice

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that individuals may not be aware their PII is being compared with other DHS information through the DSB.

**Mitigation:** This risk is partially mitigated. The existing PIAs and SORNs for datasets incorporated into the DSB provide notice to the public that the information may be compared against other datasets and be subject to analysis for varying DHS missions. DHS will continue to review its PIAs and SORNs when new datasets, user, or capabilities are added to the DSB. However, because the DSB does not collect information directly from individuals, it is largely reliant on this PIA and the source systems' notice mechanisms.

## Section 5.0 Data Retention by the Project

### 5.1 Explain how long and for what reason the information is retained.

The DSB planned to enforce existing source IT system data requirements, including retention, by relying on the source IT systems to notify the DSB of changes, deletions, or corrections to data. As contemplated, DHS would not delete any data until the DSB received a deletion notification from the source IT system. However, DHS discovered that some source IT systems are not always able to accommodate this request to send such delete notifications due to a number of constraints (e.g., resources, legacy systems, disruptions to operational support).

To address this issue, DHS developed and deployed a data management capability within the DSB that manages the source IT system's data retention rules to ensure and enforce compliance. Specifically, the DSB employs a process to capture and validate the source IT system retention rules and develop the software to enable the DSB to replicate the source IT system rules to be compliant with the rules that govern the source IT system. This process ensures that the DSB continues to follow and comply with the retention periods provided for each source IT system.

When the Department determines that it must manage retention of a particular dataset internally, the DSB presents an internal retention management request to the DFWG for formal approval. DSB collaborates with all associated stakeholders, and prepares and documents an analysis of the compliance impacts associated with the internal retention management. This



documentation includes an assessment of potential risks and proposed mitigations, as well as consistency with DSB compliance protections for approval by the DFWG.

## 5.2 Privacy Impact Analysis: Related to Retention

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that data will be retained longer than allowed in the original source IT system.

**Mitigation:** This risk is partially mitigated. DHS has determined that the original retention period in the source IT system will apply to the data that is ingested into Neptune. The DSB uses one of two methods to ensure compliance with retention rules. The first and preferred method is for the DSB to receive notifications from the source IT system for deletion, archiving, masking, updating, or other data changes. The second method is for the DSB to duplicate the retention rules of the source IT system and to apply those retention rules internally, but only for those source IT systems that cannot supply notifications.

## Section 6.0 Information Sharing

### 6.1 Is information shared outside of DHS as part of the normal agency operations? If so, identify the organization(s) and how the information is accessed and how it is to be used.

The DSB does not currently share bulk data externally to DHS. Bulk data sharing involves the transfer of all or portions of a dataset outside of DHS to another U.S. Government partner. Not all external sharing will qualify as bulk data sharing. For example, if DHS shares a narrowly tailored data sample (e.g., a list of ships arriving in US ports in the month of June 2018) with a partner to identify mean time between ship arrivals in peak summer, then the sample would not qualify as bulk data sharing. Whether the sharing is in bulk does not impact the oversight or controls DHS applies to external sharing, but the Department notes the distinction for transparency purposes.

Additionally, contrary to providing bulk data sharing, the DSB may consider support for non-DHS users of DSB data if required, and duly authorized, to do so in support of a mission use case. Non-DHS users will be approved by the DFWG and will be listed in Appendix C to this PIA. These non-DHS users would access the data in the DSB in the same manner as DHS users. They would be limited to using the information in a manner that is consistent with an approved use in Appendix B and only after the DFWG had approved that use.



## **6.2 Describe how the external sharing noted in 6.1 is compatible with the SORN noted in 1.2.**

DSB does not currently share bulk data externally; additionally, DSB does not intend, nor is authorized, to share bulk data externally to the Department. Notwithstanding, if DSB plans to share externally, this PIA will be updated.

## **6.3 Does the project place limitations on re-dissemination?**

Since DSB does not currently share data externally and does not intend, nor is authorized, to, re-dissemination limitations are not required.

## **6.4 Describe how the project maintains a record of any disclosures outside of the Department.**

The DSB does not currently share data externally; additionally, DSB does not intend, nor is authorized, to share bulk data externally to the Department. If DSB is subsequently authorized to share data externally, all such external sharing, bulk or otherwise, through the DSB must be governed by an Information Sharing Services Agreement (ISSA), such as a Memorandum of Agreement. These documents shall be maintained by the DSB and contain an accounting of what records were disclosed to whom, including the date, nature, and purpose of the external sharing and the name and address of the recipient. Furthermore, all bulk data sharing shall be approved by PRIV and documented in privacy compliance documentation. This PIA will be updated if this occurs.

## **6.5 Privacy Impact Analysis: Related to Information Sharing**

Because the DSB does not share data externally, there are no risks to information sharing.

## **Section 7.0 Redress**

### **7.1 What are the procedures that allow individuals to access their information?**

The source system procedures for individuals to access their information are described in the respective SORNs for the source systems. The DSB relies on the accuracy of the underlying Component systems that supply the information. To the extent the current source systems collect information directly from the individual involved, the opportunity is provided for the individual to ensure the accuracy of the data submitted. An additional opportunity exists for individuals to request access to and/or correction of their record(s) in the underlying component systems, as permitted by law, DHS policy, and described in the applicable SORNs.



Individuals cannot access their information directly in Neptune, or seek redress directly with the DSB, because that could result in divergent data in DHS systems.

## **7.2 What procedures are in place to allow the subject individual to correct inaccurate or erroneous information?**

The source system procedures for individuals to address possibly inaccurate or erroneous data are described in the respective SORNs for the source systems. Furthermore, since DSB collects these datasets from source systems that provide such redress, DSB will receive updated records in Neptune when an individual corrects inaccurate or erroneous information through the applicable source systems' procedures.

## **7.3 How does the project notify individuals about the procedures for correcting their information?**

The DSB provides notice of correction procedures through this PIA. Individuals may be provided with notification of the procedures for correcting their information in the source systems as set forth in the PIAs for source systems. DSB depends on the accuracy and quality of data from each source system. The relevant PIAs are outlined in Appendix A to this PIA.

## **7.4 Privacy Impact Analysis: Related to Redress**

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that an individual will not be able to receive appropriate access, correction, and redress regarding the DSB's use of PII.

**Mitigation:** This risk is mitigated. The DSB collects datasets from source systems that provide redress; for such redress, individuals should reference the applicable PIAs and SORNs listed in Appendix A. Further, the Department offers redress opportunities, as appropriate through Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) provisions. Individuals may contact:

Chief Privacy Officer/Chief Freedom of Information Act Officer  
Department of Homeland Security  
2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Avenue, S.E.  
Washington, DC 20528-0628.

Requests for information are evaluated to ensure that any release of information is lawful and does not disclose information that would cause a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or that would disclose techniques and/or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions.

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that changes made to PII in the underlying DHS IT source system as a result of correction and redress will not be replicated in the DSB.



**Mitigation:** This risk is partially mitigated. Any source system that has the technical capability to send update notifications to the DSB can send such corrections through the regular transfer of data to the DSB. For systems without that technical capability to send update notifications, the DSB can accept redress corrections from those systems in any format in which those updates can be supplied.

## Section 8.0 Auditing and Accountability

### 8.1 How does the project ensure that the information is used in accordance with stated practices in this PIA?

A Neptune user may only use the system for an approved use. The DSB has the ability through dynamic access controls to limit access for a specific class of user to a limited set of data that meets the needs of the approved use for that user group. All determinations regarding access and approved uses are overseen and granted by the DFWG, which includes PRIV, OGC, and CRCL. For example, a user group that is approved for a “benefits and authorizations” use might not need access to all the datasets in Neptune. The DSB can limit that user group to accessing only datasets that are required for that group’s approved use. Furthermore, all DSB consumers have “read-only” access. No user may edit, amend, or otherwise change source data in Neptune.

Additionally, the DSB provides for the auditing of end user system activity with the ability to log the searches performed by an end user and to sort those searches by type to better identify how an individual user is using the system.

### 8.2 Describe what privacy training is provided to users either generally or specifically relevant to the project.

Neptune users are required to take annual DHS privacy training. Additionally, users receive mandatory yearly training specific to the DSB and the datasets within the Neptune that they are approved to use. Users are trained to verify information at the source system before completing any final analysis or using the information operationally. To facilitate human review and verification at the source IT system before operational use, the Department included source system contact information in the data tagging.

### 8.3 What procedures are in place to determine which users may access the information and how does the project determine who has access?

An individual user must be a member of a user group or role that has been approved by the DFWG prior to accessing Neptune. Approved users are listed in Appendix C to this PIA. In addition to being a member of an approved user group or role, the individual user must be approved by his or her supervisor. The individual user then must demonstrate compliance with current



privacy training, DSB training, and dataset specific training for all datasets to which the individual user is granted access. Only at that stage can the individual user receive access to the system.

## **8.4 How does the project review and approve information sharing agreements, MOUs, new uses of the information, new access to the system by organizations within DHS and outside?**

All ISAAs, Memoranda of Agreement/Understanding (MOA/Us), and requests for new uses and user accesses by organizations within DHS are reviewed by the program compliance team, the program director, and the DFWG in a hierarchical review and approval cycle. The program compliance team first reviews the request and recommends an approval or denial disposition to the program director. The program director then evaluates the program compliance team's assessment and recommendation and makes an informed recommendation to the DFWG. Uses and users must be approved through this process prior to updates to Appendices B and C being submitted to PRIV for review.

## **8.5 Privacy Impact Analysis: Related to Auditing and Accountability**

**Privacy Risk:** There is a risk that the elements of data access control are insufficiently developed or incorrectly implemented and will fail to limit the use of the data to the authorized purposes.

**Mitigation:** This risk is mitigated. The DSB tests the user attributes and data tags to verify that controls perform correctly. The DSB will continue to audit users to ensure that controls are not circumvented.

### **Responsible Officials**

Eric Charles, Director  
Data Services Branch Program Office  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
(202) 447-5079

Phil Letowt  
Office of Chief Information Officer  
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

### **Approval Signature**

Original, signed copy on file at the DHS Privacy Office.

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Dena Kozanas  
Chief Privacy Officer



**Homeland  
Security**

U.S. Department of Homeland Security  
(202) 343-1717



## Appendix A: Data Services Branch Data Sets

*Last updated: January 5, 2021*

Appendix A includes details and information on approved datasets in the Data Services Branch. The dataset information in this Appendix includes: dataset name, description, relevant compliance documents, populations covered, data elements covered, data retention requirements, data refresh rates within the Data Services Branch. and the date approved to enter the Data Services Branch. As information is updated to these datasets or as datasets are added to the Data Services Branch, this Appendix will be updated accordingly.

The datasets described on the following pages are approved for the Data Services Branch. The Data Services Branch ingests data elements from these datasets. Any future changes to the elements in these datasets will be captured and updated in this Appendix. Other datasets are pending approval for the Data Services Branch. The Data Services Branch will ingest data elements from these datasets, pending approval from the Data Services Branch. governance structure, including the oversight offices and each of the dataset stewards. Any future changes to the elements in these datasets will be captured and updated in this Appendix.

This Appendix accounts for the approval of three (3) datasets for ingestion into the Data Services Branch: Ship Arrival Notification System (SANS), Secure Flight Confirmed Matches data, and Statistical Data Production and Reporting data.

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## Ship Arrival Notification System (SANS)

<b>Component</b>	United States Coast Guard
<b>Status</b>	Approved. The SANS data was approved to enter the Data Services Branch on September 5, 2019.

### Description

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) stores Notice of Arrival and Departure (NOAD) information electronically in the SANS. The U.S. Coast Guard collects NOAD information in order to provide for the safety and security of U.S. ports and waterways and the overall security of the United States. This information allows the USCG to facilitate effectively and efficiently the entry and departure of vessels into and from the United States and assist the USCG with assigning priorities while conducting maritime safety and security missions in accordance with international and domestic regulations. PII concerning vessel owner, crew members and/or non-crew individuals is collected to give an accurate picture of who has overall responsibility for a given vessel and who is onboard that vessel. The information is collected for the purpose of ensuring the safety and security of U.S. ports and waterways and the overall security of the United States. It is used to conduct necessary screening and national security checks.

### Relevant Compliance Documents

#### PIA

DHS/USCG/PIA-006(b) Vessel Requirements for the Notice of Arrival and Departure (NOAD) and Automatic Identification System (AIS) Rulemaking<sup>8</sup>

#### Associated SORN(s)

DHS/USCG-029 Notice of Arrival and Departure System of Records<sup>9</sup>

DHS/USCG-061 Maritime Awareness Global Network (MAGNET) System of Records<sup>10</sup>

### Individuals Covered

Crew members who arrive and depart the United States by sea and individuals associated with a vessel and whose information is submitted as part of a notice of arrival or notice of departure, including but not limited to vessel owners, operators, charterers, reporting parties, 24-

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<sup>8</sup> See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, UNITES STATES COAST GUARD, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE VESSEL REQUIREMENTS FOR NOTICES OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE (NOAD) AND AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (AIS), DHS/USCG/PIA-006 (2008 and subsequent updates), *available at* <https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-documents-us-coast-guard>.

<sup>9</sup> DHS/USCG-029 Notice of Arrival and Departure System of Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 32715 (July 17, 2017), *available at* <https://www.dhs.gov/system-records-notices-sorns>.

<sup>10</sup> DHS/USCG-061 Maritime Awareness Global Network (MAGNET), 73 Fed. Reg. 28143 (May 15, 2008), *available at* <https://www.dhs.gov/system-records-notices-sorns>.



hour contacts, company security officers, and persons in addition to crew who arrive and depart the U.S. by sea.

## **Data Elements Covered**

USCG collects information from vessels' owners, operators, masters, agents or person in charge of the vessel(s). Information is submitted at 96-hours prior to a vessel's arrival to the United States.

Notice of arrival information collected falls into the following broad categories: Vessel and Voyage Details (including arrival/departure), Crew Information, Non-Crew Information, and Cargo Information.

Specifically, the following information is collected:

### Vessel and Voyage Information:

- Name of vessel;
- Name of registered owner;
- Country of registry;
- Call sign;
- International Maritime Organization (IMO) international number or, if vessel does not have an assigned IMO international number, substitute with official number;
- Name of the operator;
- Name of charterer;
- Name of classification society;
- Maritime Mobile Service Identity (MMSI); and
- Vessel(s) gross tonnage.

### Voyage Information:

- Arrival information:
  - Names of last five foreign ports or places visited;
  - Dates of arrival and departure for last five foreign ports or places visited;
  - For each port or place of the United States to be visited, a list of the names of the receiving facility, the port or place, the city, and the state;



- For each port or port or place of the United States to be visited, the estimated date and time of arrival;
- For each port or port or place in the United States to be visited, the estimated date and time of departure;
- The location (port or place and country) or position (latitude and longitude or waterway and mile marker) of the vessel at the time of reporting;
- The name and telephone number of a 24-hour point of contact;
- Duration of the voyage;
- Last five ports of call;
- Dates of arrival and departure in last port or place visited; and
- Estimated date and time of arrival to the entrance of port, if applicable.
- Departure information:
  - The name of departing port or place of the United States, the estimated date and time of departure;
  - Next port or place of call (including foreign), the estimated date and time of arrival; and
  - The name and telephone number of a 24-hour point of contact.

Information for each crewmember onboard:

- Full name;
- Date of birth;
- Nationality;
- Identification information (type, number, issuing country, issue date, expiration date);
- Position or duties on the vessel;
- Where the crewmember embarked (list port or place and country); and
- Where the crewmember will disembark.

Information for each person onboard in addition to crew:

- Full name;
- Date of birth;



- Nationality;
- Identification information (type, number, issuing country, issue date, expiration date);
- U.S. address information;
- Where the person embarked (list port or place and country); and
- Where the person will disembark.

#### Cargo Information:

- A general description of cargo, other than CDC (certain dangerous cargo), onboard the vessel (e.g., grain, container, oil);
- Name of each certain dangerous cargo carried, including United Nations (UN) number, if applicable;
- Amount of each certain dangerous cargo carried;
- Operational condition of equipment required by 33 CFR 164.35;
- The date of issuance for the company's Document of Compliance certificate;
- The date of issuance of the vessel's Safety Management Certificate;
- The name of the Flag Administration, or recognized organization(s) representing the vessel flag administration, that issued those certificates International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) Notice;
- The date of issuance for the vessels international Ship Security Certificate (ISSC), if any;
- Whether the ISSC, if any, is an initial interim ISSC, subsequent and consecutive interim ISSC, or final ISSC;
- Declaration that the approved ship security plan, if any, is being implemented;
- If a subsequent and consecutive interim ISSC, the reasons therefore;
- The name and 24-hour contact information for the Company's Security Officer; and
- The name of the Flag Administration, or recognized security organization(s) representing the vessel flag administration, that issued the ISSC.



## **Data Retention Requirements**

In accordance with National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) Disposition Authority number N1-026-05-011, NOAD information on vessels and individuals maintained in the SANS is destroyed or deleted when no longer needed for reference, or after ten years, whichever is later. Outputs, which include ad-hoc reports generated for local and immediate use to provide a variety of interested parties, for example, Captain of the Port and marine safety offices, sea marshals, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement with the necessary information to set up security zones, scheduling boarding and inspections activities, actions for non-compliance with regulations, and other activities in support of USCG's mission to provide for safety and security of U.S. ports, are deleted after five years if they do not constitute a permanent record according to NARA.

## **Data Refresh Rates within Data Services Branch**

SANS data is refreshed on a near real time basis within Data Services Branch.



## Secure Flight Confirmed Matches Data

<b>Components</b>	Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
<b>Status</b>	Approved. The Secure Flight Confirmed Matches data was approved to enter the Data Services Branch on July 14, 2016. <sup>11</sup>

### Description

The Secure Flight program matches identifying information of aviation passengers and certain non-travelers against the consolidated and integrated terrorist watch list maintained by the Federal Government in a consistent and accurate manner, while minimizing false matches and protecting personally identifiable information. Under the Secure Flight program TSA collects limited Secure Flight Passenger Data (SFPD) from certain U.S. aircraft operators and foreign carriers for the purpose of passenger watch list matching against the No Fly and Selectee list components of the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) or the full TSDB or other government databases, where warranted by security considerations, such as intelligence or law enforcement databases. This PIA only addresses records for individuals encountered by Secure Flight who are confirmed as matches (SF Confirmed Matches) to the TSDB. SF Confirmed Matches data does not include SFPD for passengers selected for screening based on intelligence rules.

### Relevant Compliance Documents

#### PIA

DHS/TSA/PIA-018 Secure Flight Program<sup>12</sup>

#### Associated SORN(s)

DHS/TSA-019 Secure Flight Records<sup>13</sup>

### Individuals Covered

Individuals identified in intelligence, counterintelligence, transportation security, or information system security reports and supporting materials, including but not limited to individuals involved in matters of intelligence, law enforcement or transportation security, information systems security, the compromise of classified information, or terrorism.

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<sup>11</sup> TSA's Secure Flight Confirmed Matches dataset was approved for ingestion into the previous Data Framework and is a carryover or remnant from that prior approval that's now being ingested into Neptune.

<sup>12</sup> See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE TSA SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM, DHS/TSA/PIA-018 (2007 AND SUBSEQUENT UPDATES), available at <https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-documents-transportation-security-administration-tsa>.

<sup>13</sup> DHS/TSA-019 Secure Flight Records, 80 FR 233 (January 5, 2015), available at <https://www.dhs.gov/system-records-notices-sorns>.



## **Data Elements Covered**

- Full name;
- Date of birth;
- Gender;
- Redress number (if available);
- Known traveler number (if available);
- Encounter; and
- Passport information (if available).

To manage the processing of the SFPD, TSA will require aircraft operators to include in the SFPD the following information: Reservation Control Number; Record Sequence Number; Record Type; Passenger Update Indicator; Traveler Reference Number; and Itinerary information.

## **Data Retention Requirements**

Pursuant to the approved National Archives and Records Administration records retention schedule N1-560-08-003-A6, routine and insignificant case files are destroyed after thirty years; significant case files are retained permanently; watch logs are destroyed after thirty years; watchlists are destroyed 99 years after date of entry or seven years after confirmation of death, whichever is sooner.

## **Data Refresh Rates within Data Services Branch**

Secure Flight Confirmed Matches data is refreshed on a near real-time basis within Data Services Branch.



## **Statistical Data Production and Reporting Data**

<b>Components</b>	Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS)
<b>Status</b>	Approved. The Statistical Data Production and Reporting (SDPR) data was approved to enter the Data Services Branch on January 30, 2020.

### **Description**

The purpose of this system is to support Office of Immigration Statistics in fulfilling its mandate to regularly prepare an extensive series of analytical and statistical reports on border security, immigration enforcement activities, refugee and asylum claims, and other immigration requests and events.

### **Relevant Compliance Documents**

#### PIA

DHS/ALL/PIA-071 Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) Statistical Data Production and Reporting<sup>14</sup>

#### Associated SORN(s)

DHS/ALL-045 Statistical Immigration Data Production and Reporting System of Records<sup>15</sup>

### **Individuals Covered**

Individuals and their dependents (and individuals acting on their behalf such as attorneys) interacting with the U.S. Government in its role of implementing and enforcing its immigration system and laws, including those who have applied for immigration requests or received immigration benefits, such as adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, and those who are subject to immigration enforcement actions, including those arrested, detained, or removed from the United States for criminal or administrative violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

### **Data Elements Covered**

The specific data elements are listed below:

- Detention data, including: Location, facility, transportation information, identification numbers, book-in/book-out dates and times, custody recommendation, information about an alien's release from custody on bond,

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<sup>14</sup> See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS STATISTICAL DATA PRODUCTION AND REPORTING, DHS/ALL/PIA-071 (2018), available at <https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-documents-department-wide-programs>.

<sup>15</sup> DHS/ALL-045 Statistical Immigration Data Production and Reporting System of Records, 85 Fed. Reg. 14223 (March 11, 2020), available at <https://www.dhs.gov/system-records-notices-sorns>.



recognizance, or supervision, information related to prosecutorial discretion determinations, and other alerts;

- Immigration enforcement and court case-related data, including: Descriptive information of events involving alleged law violations; arrests and charges; case number; status; record number; case category; proceedings and immigration judge decisions; schedule info; court appointments; bonds; motions; appeals; disposition; case agent; date initiated and completed;
- Immigration status and history (e.g., citizenship/naturalization certificate number, removals, explanations);
- Criminal history;
- Claimed basis of eligibility for benefit(s) sought;
- Port(s) and clearance processing lane or location of crossing, secondary examination status, date(s) and time(s) of entry, status at entry(ies);
- Metadata, including: Original Row, a monotonically increasing unique identifier; Order, an integer indicating the sequential order in which events occurred; Source, the Component from which the data record originated; Dataset, the system or data repository from which the data record originated; Type 1 Variable, indicates the data type of the value stored in the element (field) named "Type 1"; Type 2 Variable, indicates the data type of the value stored in the element (field) named "Type 2"; Type 3 Variable, indicates the data type of the value stored in the element (field) named "Type 3"; Decision Variable, indicates the data type of the value stored in the element (field) named Decision

## **Data Retention Requirements**

OIS has an established NARA-approved retention schedule, N1-563-09-003 (January 1, 2009), which classifies OIS records into several categories of records. Records containing PII that OIS uses to complete its statistical analyses and reporting fall into Section 6: "Research and background material used to produce the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics." The scheduled disposition provides for the data to be evaluated for remaining business need or destruction three (3) years following the end of the fiscal year in which the yearbook is produced. However, the schedule authorizes longer retention periods if records are needed for business use beyond this period. Due to many tables in the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics and accompanying reports containing tabulations of ten (10) years, the need in some cases for OIS to compare new records with records going back several decades, and the unknown nature of future requests and necessary future comparisons, a large portion of the data OIS maintains is kept for longer than three (3) years.

## **Data Refresh Rates within Data Services Branch**



**Homeland  
Security**

SDPR data is refreshed on a quarterly basis within Data Services Branch.



## Appendix B: Approved Mission Uses

*Last updated: January 5, 2021*

Appendix B includes details and information on approved uses for which data in Neptune can be used by DHS components. If the approved purposes or access areas change for the Data Services Branch, this Appendix will be updated accordingly.

The various capabilities delivered by the Data Services Branch will provide value across many DHS mission areas. Authorization to use Neptune is granted by evaluating the authorities and policies relating to that mission as individuals or systems access the data in the Data Services Branch.

1. **Benefits and Authorizations** — Benefits are programs, projects, services, and activities provided by DHS that directly assist individuals or groups of individuals. Authorizations are grants of permission to engage in specified activities that are proscribed by law or otherwise regulated. The Data Services Branch has been approved to assist with Immigration benefits, specifically the conferral, certification, change, adjustment, or extension of any status granted under the Immigration and Nationality Act.<sup>16</sup>
2. **Law Enforcement** — Activities directed toward the preservation of public order and safety, including protection of persons and property (real and other) in accordance with a statutory authority. The Data Services Branch has not added any users for law enforcement purposes.
3. **National Security** — The comprehensive program of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the United States Government aimed at protecting the territory, population, infrastructure, institutions, values, and global interests of the Nation. The Data Services Branch has been approved for the following national security mission uses:
  - a) **Border Security:** The protection of U.S. borders from the illegal movement of weapons, drugs, contraband, and people, while promoting lawful entry and exit, to include the disruption and dismantling of transnational organizations that engage in smuggling and trafficking across the U.S. border.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> 8 U.S.C. § 1572.

<sup>17</sup> 6 U.S.C. § 202.



## Appendix C: Approved Users

*Last updated: January 5, 2021*

Appendix C includes details and information on the authorized users of the Data Services Branch. If the list of authorized users changes for the Data Services Branch, this Appendix will be updated accordingly.

Users are granted access to the Data Services Branch provided they are authorized to access the data for a purpose detailed in Appendix B. The following list identifies the users authorized to utilize the Data Services Branch, by Component and Program. Each use of the data is documented in a detailed Mission Use Case approved by the Data Framework Working Group (DFWG) made up of the DHS Privacy Office (PRIV), the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), and the Office of General Counsel (OGC). The approved Mission Use Cases are summarized below.

### **1. DHS Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS)**

**Organization(s):** Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS)

**Date Approved:** January 30, 2020

**Authorized Purpose:** Benefits Adjudication – Immigration Benefits

**High-Level Mission Use Case:**

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS) is responsible for leading the collection and dissemination of statistical information and analysis on the impact of immigration laws, migration flows, and immigration enforcement to Congress and the public. OIS’s goal is to provide high quality statistical information that is relevant, timely, cost-effective and customer-oriented. OIS provides reporting through The Yearbook of Immigration Statistics and annual OIS Statistical Data Production and Reporting (SDPR) reports and population estimates, which provide details of lawful permanent residents, refugees and asylees, naturalizations, nonimmigrant admissions, and enforcement actions. OIS also publishes additional reports at the request of the White House, Congress, and DHS’ Secretary on an as-needed basis.