

Chemical Sector Security Summit

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After Osama bin Laden

- A victory in the long war against terrorism, but the war is not over
- The United States should
 - Finish the job in Afghanistan and Iraq
 - Continue to hold terrorists accountable
 - Start doing smarter security
 - Provide for the common defense
 - Stay alert on the home front

Terror Trends 1.


- Learn from the past and examine the current and future threats
- This research can better inform U.S. counterterrorism decisions and continue the process of delineating enhanced homeland security policies for the future

Terror Trends 2.

- 1969-2009: almost 5,600 people lost their lives and more than 16,300 people suffered injuries in 2,981 terrorist attacks against U.S. targets
- From 1969 to 1991, despite a few down flows, international terrorism was on the rise, and declined sharply after that
- In 2001 the trend reversed and rapidly increased until peaking in 2005 with 87 incidents

1969-2009

International Terrorist Attacks Against the U.S.



Note: The number of terrorist attacks in 2009 should be interpreted with caution because the reporting of terrorist incidents is incomplete. While the recording of terrorist incidents in the RAND data for 2009 was completed for North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Europe, data collection for Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Oceania, and Central Asia (including the former Soviet Union states in Central Asia) stopped in January 2009.

Source: Calculations by the Heritage Foundation's Center for Data Analysis based on data from the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, at <http://www.rand.org/insrd/projects/terrorism-incidents.html> (April 18, 2011).

Terror Trends 3.

- Directed at U.S. targets:
 - 43 percent of all international terrorist attacks against military institutions,
 - 28 percent of all international terrorist attacks against diplomatic offices,
 - 24 percent of all international terrorist attacks against businesses
- Fatalities and injuries per terrorist attack
 - 2.01 and 5.88, higher than worldwide average
 - Without 9/11, the average falls to 0.97 and 5.07

Terror Trends 4.

- Targets of terrorist attacks against the U.S.
 - Businesses (908 times – 31.5 %)
 - Diplomatic Offices (769 times – 26.7%)
 - Military Institutions (368 times – 12.8%)
- Tactics
 - Bombings (68.3%)
 - Armed attacks (14%)
 - Kidnappings (8.6%)

Terror Plots Foiled

- Most acts occurred outside the nation's borders in Latin America and the Caribbean (36 percent), Europe (23 percent), and the Middle East and Persian Gulf (20 percent).
- Since 9/11, 39 Islamist terror plots were foiled that targeted institutions or businesses inside our borders.

Richard Reid – December 2001

- British citizen and self-professed follower of Osama bin Laden, trained in Afghanistan
- He was caught in the act and apprehended by passengers and flight attendants, when he attempted to blow up the TATP (acetone peroxide) bomb in his shoes
- He was found guilty on charges of terrorism and sentenced to life in prison

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

– March 2007

- One of the most senior bin Laden operatives ever captured and held in Guantanamo Bay
- He helped plan, organize, and run the 9/11 attacks, the 1993 WTC and the 2002 Bali nightclub bombings
- He took responsibility for helping Richard Reid and for involvement in assassination attempts
- In November 2009, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that he will face a civilian trial, however the Obama Administration had to reverse this decision for a military tribunal

The Christmas Day Bomber — December 2009

- Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a 23-year-old Nigerian engineering student living in London, boarded a plane from Nigeria to Amsterdam and then flew from Amsterdam to the U.S.
- He attempted to detonate a bomb hidden in his underwear as the plane began to land in Detroit. The device ignited, but did not detonate, and passengers quickly stopped him.
- He admitted involvement with al-Qaeda in Yemen and waits trial in custody.

Lessons Learned from Foiled Terror Plots

- Terror training camps continue to feed anti-U.S. terror
 - perpetrators in 23 cases of the 39 foiled terror plots, attended or attempted to attend camps, responsible for fundraising, recruitment, and training
 - Safe havens have expanded (AQAP outreach and declaration of an Islamic Emirate in Yemen's Abyan province)

Lessons Learned from Foiled Terror Plots

- Early disruption of terror plots require early intelligence
 - Patriot Act is a key source of investigative and intelligence gathering tools for intelligence and law enforcement officers
- Terrorists fixate on many targets and it is not possible to secure them all
 - Policymakers should tailor tax dollars to the truly critical infrastructure (for instance a more focused Urban Area Security Initiative Program)

Lessons Learned from Foiled Terror Plots

- Public is important but should not be the first line of defense
- Treating terrorism as a standard law enforcement concern underestimates the threat
 - Keeping the successful policies, such as the Patriot Act, is essential to the fight
 - Legal framework needed by which to incapacitate and interrogate terrorists

Lessons Learned from Foiled Terror Plots

- A key to stopping international terrorism is international relationships
 - Information sharing, intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation was essential for preventing many of the terrorist attacks
- The relationship between the intelligence community and federal, state, and local law enforcement is too Washington centric

Lessons Learned from Foiled Terror Plots

- The internet is increasingly used by al-Qaeda and the U.S. must be one step ahead
 - Increased number of self-radicalized Islamists
- Current aviation security is expensive and could be done smarter
 - Information sharing and intelligence are cornerstones of effective counterterrorism - not wholesale screening of all the travelers
 - A need to spend money on new technologies is the wrong lesson to draw from the Christmas Day plot. It rather demonstrates failures by the State Department and DHS to share information and sufficiently connect the intelligence dots. Despite a personal visit from the perpetrator's father to a U.S. consulate office warning of his son's potential plans for terrorism, his son's visa was not revoked nor was there additional follow-up with the National Counterterrorism Center to place him on a "no-fly" list.

Thinking the Future

- Scenario-based planning
- Delphi technique
- Horizon scanning
- Red teaming
- Net assessment

Conclusions

- Maintain counterterrorism tools
- Create a lawful detainment framework
- Rethink the current grant structure
- Examine information sharing gaps
- Stay committed to Afghanistan and hold countries accountable for their support of terrorists
- Future forecasting needed

Thank you!