

OBoyle, Randy

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WD0661

From: Randy O'Boyle [randy@ice-ks.com]
Sent: Friday, August 22, 2008 5:06 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Cc: Linda B Weis
Subject: NBAF welcome in Kansas

Dear DHS/Admiral Johnson,

1|24.4 | By now you've probably been able to color code the public sentiment
 regarding NBAF in the various communities. I would hope the impression
 you've received is that Manhattan is GREEN LIGHT -- Good to Go!. There
 just aren't many people against it.

Financially, I'm not involved. I'm not a real estate agent, community
 leader or in retail business. I am the President and CEO of a small
 aircraft electronic controller company, ICE Corp. I'm a retired Air
 Force officer as well.

1Cont.[24.4;
2|8.4 | It is my observation, Manhattan is very much on board with NBAF;
 professionally, psychologically (emotionally and patriotically) as well
 as financially. NBAF needs to be somewhere, Manhattan is a great place
 to live and the vast majority of us want it here.

3|1.0 | The discussions I have with people here, center around the fact the
 Nation needs a new robust and focused NBAF and the community (city,
 state, university) understand the issues. We want to support the people
 doing this kind of work on our behalf. They are interesting, dedicated
 people. We as a community want them to spend their free time enjoying
 what we have -- high quality of life, secure environment at an
 affordable cost. The close association with Ft Riley makes the area
 even more secure and I might add, the people at the Fort will tell you
 they've never been stationed in a more supportive community. We love
 1Cont.[24.4 | the people that love America. When the Vietnam Era, anti-war crowd was
 tearing apart most universities during protests, at K-State, the
 cowboys/VetMed crowd got together and threw horse manure at them till
 they left. It's much the same environment today.

So, take my word for it, we know the risks. We know NBAF needs a new
 home and we're willing to step up. Why not Manhattan.

//signed//
 Randy O'Boyle
 President and CEO
 ICE Corporation
 785 776 6423

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 1.0

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Odil, Barbara**Page 1 of 1**

PD0058

August 13, 2008

Hi,

1| 25.2 | This is Barbara Odil in █████, Georgia, and I would just like to say to the Department of Homeland Security, we do not feel like our town is a good location for you.

2| 12.2 | It is a bad location in that we do not have a good water flow here. It would be on a small
3| 17.2 | road, and we are not interested in having you locate to Athens.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water, an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 17.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern about the traffic congestion in the area of the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative and the future impact of the NBAF operation on the area's transportation infrastructure. A discussion of the planned improvements to the area's primary transportation corridors of South Milledge Avenue and Whitehall Road to alleviate current and future traffic congestion resulting from the NBAF operation at the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative is located in Chapter 3, Section 3.11.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS. All planned improvements are per the recommendations of the Department of Transportation and the Public Works Department.

Odil, Barbara

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WD0859

From: Barbara Odil [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 9:43 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NO TO NBAF IN ATHENS

1| 25.2 | Please don't put NBAF in Athens. The risks are too great to too many;
 2| 4.2 | the benefits too small and for too few. The whole process has been too
 3| 12.2 | secretive; the EPS was not objective science. For example, the drought
 | was not given serious consideration.
 Barbara

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 4.2

DHS notes commentor's statement.

Since the inception of the NBAF project, DHS has supported a vigorous public outreach program. DHS has conducted public meetings in excess of the minimum required by NEPA regulations; to date, 23 public meetings have been held in the vicinity of NBAF site alternatives and in Washington, D.C. to solicit public input on the EIS, allow the public to voice their concerns, and to get their questions answered DHS has also provided fact sheets, reports, exhibits, and a Web page (<http://www.dhs.gov/nbaf>). Additionally, various means of communication (mail, toll free telephone and fax lines, and NBAF Web site) have been provided to facilitate public comment. It is DHS policy to encourage public input on matters of national and international importance.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and DHS acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site alternative would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water, an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes. Section 3.7.3.1.1 describes the potential potable water sources, the Middle and North Oconee Rivers and the Jackson County Bear Creek Reservoir.

Odil, Barbara

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WD0529

From: Barbara Odil [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2008 9:35 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF in Athens

1| 25.2 | I am absolutely opposed to NBAF in Athens. It would be built in an
 2| 6.2 | environmentally sensitive area & destroy a large portion of our
 3| 12.2 | greenspace. In addition we are in a severe drought & cannot spare the
 4| 15.2 | water. Finally, the economic benefits do not begin to outweigh the
 1 cont.| 25.2 | risks. Along with the other citizens of Athens, I will do whatever is
 necessary to prevent NBAF from locating here.
 Barbara

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 6.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding development of the South Milledge Avenue Site which is described in Section 3.2.3. A change in land use would occur; however, current zoning regulations allow for this type of development. The South Milledge Avenue Site is currently zoned as "Governmental", and construction and operation of the NBAF is consistent with this designation. However, the Clarke County Comprehensive Plan designates the South Milledge Avenue Site as "rural", so an amendment to the comprehensive plan may be required. This information has been added to the NBAF EIS in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3. DHS and USDA would ensure that the NBAF operation at the South Milledge Avenue Site will comply with all applicable local, state, and Federal regulations and policies. The visual effects of the NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue Site are also described in Section 3.2.3 of the NBAF EIS. DHS recognizes that the NBAF would be a distinctive visible feature and would alter the viewshed of the area. As described in Section 3.8.3.1.1, 80% of the site consists of pasture, and the adjacent lands consist of forested lands and small, perennial headwater streams. Approximately 30 acres of open pasture, 0.2 acres of forested habitat, and less than 0.1 acres of wetlands would be affected by the NBAF.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 12.2

DHS notes the commentor's drought concerns and DHS acknowledges current regional drought conditions. As described in Section 3.7.3.3.1 of the NBAF EIS, the South Milledge Avenue Site alternative would use approximately 118,000 gallons per day of potable water, an amount that is approximately 0.76% of Athens' current annual average of 15.5 million gallons per day usage. The NBAF annual potable water usage is expected to be approximately equivalent to the amount consumed by 228 residential homes.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 15.2

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is low, but DHS acknowledges that the consequence is high for all site alternatives. Appendix D and Section 3.10.9 of the NBAF EIS presents estimates of the possible economic effect of an accidental release. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety were evaluated in Section 3.14 of the EIS. The economic effects of the proposed NBAF at the South Milledge Avenue Site are included in Section 3.10.3. Labor income during construction is projected at approximately \$150 million while operation of the NBAF would generate approximately \$28 million in wages annually.

Ogden, Lucy

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WD0165

From: Lucy [REDACTED]
Sent: Sunday, August 03, 2008 11:10 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Mississippi cannot handle it

Dear DHS,

I am writing to comment on the proposal of putting a bio research lab in Flora, Mississippi. I live and work in this state and love my fellow Mississippians but have to say they, (we) are not up to the task of managing an operation this sensitive. Even if you plan to bring in people from other places to work here, it won't be long until they are lulled into the relaxed pace of life that is contrary to the strict carefulness this lab requires. The most likely scenario to come from putting the lab here is a bug getting out and causing a big problem to public health. There is a reason we are the most illerate state, have the poorest health, and lowest per capita income and it is because we don't like to be bothered with anything too complicated. It would be most unwise to locate the facility here.

1| 19.5

2| 25.5

Lucy Ogden

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 19.5

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the potential health risks posed by a NBAF accident. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur with the proposed NBAF and consequences of potential accidents, The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.5

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Ogden, Norma

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PD0006

July 3, 2008

1) 24.1 I believe the facility should be left on Plum Island where it is. I think in any other position, it will pose a hazard to the environment.

Thank you.

My name is Norma Ogden. I'm calling from [REDACTED], Georgia.

Good bye.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative.

OGrady, Lauren

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WD0852

From: Lauren O'Grady [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 9:12 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: nabf site in Athens

1/5.2 I would like to state, for the record, my objection to the Athens location as a potential site for the NBAF facility. Put it in your neighborhood. Thanks.

Lauren O'Grady

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 5.2

DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Olean, Lana and Kent

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PD0365

August 25, 2008

Yes.

My name is Lana Olean. I live in [REDACTED] Kansas and I am calling on August 25 in regard to the National Bio and Agro Defense Facility and its location.

1) 24.4 | Wanted to express my strong support for the location of the new facility to be in Manhattan, Kansas, associated with Kansas State University and many friendly and inviting people within the mid-west are eagerly anticipating being able to work with the Federal Government on this very important project.

I have represented this area the past 16 years in the Kansas Senate and in that capacity I have seen the "can do" attitude, as well as the ability for people to be welcomed warmly, made to feel a part of the community very soon in an immediate way, and have attracted many, many people of varying backgrounds and interests, who blend quite well here in the mid-west.

So it is with great enthusiasm that I make this call on behalf of myself and my husband, Kent Olean, in offering our unwavering support, and the open welcome for NBAF to find its home here in the heartland of Kansas.

Thank you. My number should I need to be contacted is [REDACTED] My name is Lana Olean. My husband's name is Kent, that I mentioned, and our home address is [REDACTED] Kansas [REDACTED]

I appreciate this service in order to comment favorably on the site selection and the invitation to come to Kansas.

Thank you.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Olin, Shelley

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WD0736

From: Olin, Shelley [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 2:04 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NO NBAF in Athens!

1|25.2

I am writing to you to express my DEEP CONCERN about the NBAF considering Athens as a location. As a contributor to this community via the arts and public education, I would like to think my opinion counts. I DO NOT SUPPORT THE NBAF AND WILL RE-LOCATE OUT OF ATHENS IF IT IS BUILT IN THIS AREA.

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2
DHS notes the commentator's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Oliver, Chris and Sarah

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WD0366

From: Chris Oliver [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, August 19, 2008 3:42 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: bio lab opposition

1|25.3 | I represent a family of four living in [REDACTED], NC, and wanted to express my opposition to
 2|23.0 | placing a lab in butner, or any populated area, for that manner. The environmental impact study
 3|15.3 | did not answer any questions, it just raised more. Never before had the avian flu been
 4|2.0 | mentioned, nor did it acknowledge any of the facilities within miles of the site. We are not
 1 cont. | getting the information we need or that we deserve. We do not trust that homeland security will
 25.3 | tell us everything. This lab also gives the appearance of a biological warfare facility, which
 Sarah Oliver | would make us a target for terrorism. There is great opposition in the majority of this area, and
 | you will have quite a fight if you choose to put the facility here.
 | Thank you for your time

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative based on risks to residents. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated in populated areas. An example is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 23.0

The NBAF's mission is defensive and would not involve offensive bioweapons research or development. The international treaty, known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, to which the United States is a signatory, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling and acquisition of such weapons. DHS's mission is to study foreign animal and zoonotic (transmitted from animals to humans) diseases that threaten our agricultural livestock and agricultural economy. A discussion of the probability of accidents and potential effects to human health and safety is included in Section 3.14 and Appendix E.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 15.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern about facilities close to the Umstead Research Farm Site. The affected environment of the Umstead Research Farm Site with regard to socioeconomic and community services is discussed in Section 3.10.7.1 of the NBAF EIS. DHS is aware of the presence of the health and correctional facilities near the proposed site. These facilities are discussed, either explicitly or implicitly, throughout the NBAF EIS including in Sections 3.10.7.1.2.1, 3.10.7.1.3.4, and 3.12.7.1.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 2.0

DHS notes the commentor's lack of confidence in the DHS.

Olson, Ed and Kae

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WD0715

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 12:16 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: No NBAF in Manhattan

We are 40+ year residents of the [REDACTED] community. We have raised our children here and plan to spend our retirement years in this area. I am afraid I would feel compelled to leave the area if the NBAF were to be located here. It is not popular with older residents in the community because of the possibility of the escape of toxins.

1|21.4;
2|25.4

We are an active tornado area and also an active enough earthquake area that the Corps of Engineers is strengthening the dam at the base of our reservoir (Tuttle Creek Dam) to avoid future problems from breakage and flooding.

This hardly seems an ideal place to put a building with dangerous toxins inside.

Thank you for your concern.

Kae Olson
 Ed Olson
 Ed and Kae Olson

[REDACTED]
 [REDACTED] KS [REDACTED]
 [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 21.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential tornado impacts to the NBAF. The NBAF would be designed to withstand the normal meteorological conditions that are present within the geographic area of the selected site. The basis for establishing the anticipated wind speeds were the International Building Code, ASCE 7 and the local jurisdictions. However, because of code specified building importance modification factors and normal factors of safety incorporated into the structural design, the facility would resist wind pressures up to 170% of the code specified 50-year wind pressures. This means the building's structural system could resist a wind speed that is expected to occur, on the average, only once in a 500 year period.

In the unlikely event that a 500-year wind storm strikes the facility, the exterior walls and roofing of the building would likely fail first, and this breach in the exterior skin would cause a dramatic increase in internal pressures leading to further failure of the building's interior and exterior walls. The loss of these architectural wall components would decrease the overall wind loading applied to the building and therefore diminish the possibility of damage to the building's primary structural system. Even with the failure of these interior and exterior wall systems under an extreme wind loading event, the robust construction used to construct BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 spaces, reinforced cast-in-place concrete walls, would resist these wind forces and the primary bio-containment envelope would not be breached. The containment walls will be designed to withstand a 200 mph wind load, which is equivalent to an F3 tornado according to the FEMA Design and Construction Guidance for Community Shelters standards

DHS notes the commentor's concerns regarding earthquakes. Section 3.6.1 of the NBAF EIS describes the methodology used to assess each site's potential seismic consequences; Section 3.6.4 specifically describes the Manhattan Campus Site. Section 3.6.4.1 discusses the Humboldt Fault system, also known as the Nemaha Fault, and was considered in the analysis of seismic risk to the Manhattan Campus Site. The NBAF would be built to meet or exceed all applicable building codes for seismic safety. Section 3.14.3.2 further addresses NBAF design criteria and accident scenarios associated with natural phenomena events such as earthquakes.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Oppenlander, Ken and Aileen

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WD0632

From: Aileen Oppenlander [REDACTED]
Sent: Saturday, August 23, 2008 10:18 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF - MANHATTAN

1|25.4; We would like to strongly stress our opposition to the NBAF lab being
2|8.4; located in Manhattan, Kansas. It is being promoted by persons and groups
3|15.4; who stand to gain personally or economically from this location. We object
to the cost to the fixed-income taxpayers and to the stress on our
population size, sewer and water service, police and fire protection and
etc.. Last, but not least is our concern over containment of the various
toxins. We are both retired from the Agriculture Research Service. Thank
you for your attention.
Ken & Aileen Oppenlander

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The economic impact and effects to quality of life resources at the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative are discussed in Section 3.10.4 of the NBAF EIS. Adverse effects are not expected with any of the site alternatives.

Oppermann, Hilary

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CD0103

From: Hilary M E Oppermann [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2008 6:43 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Cc: Hilary Oppermann
Subject: Relocating Plum b Island Disease Center to mainland USA

Dear Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff,

It is my understanding that the U.S. government has circulated proposals to relocate the Plum Island Animal Disease Center to a location on the mainland United States.

1) 24.1 I am writing to you today in support of a National Bio-and Agro Defense Facility that is geographically isolated as much as possible from the environmental, commercial and civic infrastructure of the mainland, such as the Plum Island facility. I strongly oppose the development of an animal disease research facility on the United States mainland that works with live strains of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) viruses as well as other virulent foreign animal diseases (FADs) anywhere near existing concentrations of commercial livestock.

2) 25.0 I believe the economic risks of a potential outbreak of FMD to family farmers and ranchers across the nation with commercial livestock operations will far outweigh the advantages the government has put forth to justify their proposals to bring this critical and sensitive research back to the mainland and away from the isolated island research facility where it has been successfully conducted for more than fifty years.
 3) 5.0 While there are many possible scenarios for the outbreak of animal diseases that would pose a significant economic risk to family farmers and ranchers as well as to their surrounding rural communities and their natural environments, few come close to the nightmare of an outbreak of FMD in dramatically impacting many aspects of American life.

4) 15.0 cont. There is no known cure for FMD once it has been contracted. Once the disease is loose on the mainland U.S., it could require mass slaughter and disposal of potentially tens of millions of individual carcasses of domestic and wild animals to control the outbreak. It would undoubtedly disrupt the domestic and international sale of meat and meat products throughout the nation for months or even years. The ancillary costs to general commerce, outdoor recreation, and impacts on future investments in the livestock sector by family farmers and ranchers would exceed the conservative USDA estimate of \$60 billion in direct costs by several fold.

Recently Great Britain experienced two outbreaks of FMD that have been attributed to a release from bio-research facilities working with FMD. A 2001 outbreak caused at least \$16 billion in damages, devastated the rural economy, and nearly caused the government to fail. The experience in Great Britain lead the National Grange to conclude that conducting federal research on dangerous animal diseases on the U.S. mainland is a risk we do not have to take.

5) 21.0 cont. Even if an outbreak never occurs, I am concerned that a mainland facility would become an inviting target for espionage and terrorist or criminal attacks aimed at breaching the physical and procedural barrier built into the facility and getting these pathogens out of the laboratory to eventually be released into the environment. My concern is that a facility located on the mainland would attract an extremely broad universe of potential terrorist or criminal organizations to use an attack on the facility to advance their goals.

1) 24.1 cont. As a one-time UK resident I am particularly aware of the huge risk undertaken when incurable and devastating biological or viral diseases hit an agricultural community. This following statement particularly strikes me as the crux of why America should NOT abandon a safe research environment. I believe that geographic isolation at the Plum Island Research facility remains a prudent, cost effective means of adding additional security to the facility and the vicinity. I also strongly believe that the selection process for a research facility of this nature has under appreciated the need for geographic isolation of a facility like this as a prudent, reasonable, and cost effective security measure that will assure our nation a world class bio- and agro research facility and the assurance that this facility will not pose accidental or incidental risk to rural communities in which potentially tens of thousands of family farmers and ranchers live. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Hilary Oppermann [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CO [REDACTED]

Your e-mail address

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Plum Island Site Alternative. Other locations to construct the NBAF were considered in Section 2.4.3 of the NBAF EIS. These alternatives were considered but eliminated from detailed study in the EIS based on the evaluation criteria calling for proximity to research programs that could be linked to the NBAF mission and proximity to a technical workforce. These alternatives included remote locations such as an island, desert, or arctic habitat distant from populated areas or inhospitable to escaped animal hosts/vectors.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 25.0

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 5.0

See response to Comment No: 2.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 15.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the possible effects would be significant for all sites. As noted in Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS, the major economic effect from an accidental release would be a potential ban on all U.S. livestock products until the country was determined to be disease-free. The mainland sites have similar economic consequences regardless of the livestock populations in the region.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 21.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the safe operation of the NBAF on a mainland site. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS investigate the chances of a variety of accidents that could occur and consequences of those accidents. Accidents could occur in the form of procedural violations (operational accidents), natural phenomena accidents, external events, and intentional acts. Although some accidents are more likely to occur than others (e.g., safety protocol not being followed), the chances of an accidental release are low. The specific objective of the hazard identification, accident analysis, and risk assessment is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low.

Orazem, Thomas

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WD0275

From: Tom [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, August 15, 2008 8:43 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF location

1|24.4 | I cannot imagine a better location for the NBAF than Manhattan, Kansas! Manhattan offers the researchers and resources of Kansas State University, a reliable workforce and a fantastic place to live, work and play! I returned to [REDACTED] 20 years ago to start a consulting engineering firm for those reasons!

Thomas C. Orazem, PE

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative. The decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.

Owen, Stephen

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WD0193

From: info@athensfaq.org on behalf of Stephen Owen [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, August 06, 2008 8:52 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: NBAF in Athens, Georgia

Dear NBAF Program Manager,

1|25.2 | As a lifelong resident of the [REDACTED], GA [REDACTED] County area, I am vehemently opposed to the installation of the
2|6.2 | proposed bioterror facility. I have enjoyed the State Botanical Gardens for years and have found them to be a source
of inspiration and solace, but if this facility is built nearby, I will NEVER go to the Botanical Gardens again because
I do not want to be any closer to deadly viruses than I already am, being an hour away from the CDC in Atlanta.

1 cont. | Heidi Davison, Athens mayor, did NOT ask me or any other [REDACTED] community members that I am aware of if we
25.2 | would be interested in having this facility in our area when she sent a letter to you inviting the NBAF to bring the
facility to this area. I, along with EVERYONE else I know personally in [REDACTED] GA am OPPOSED to this facility,
no matter what it entails. WE DO NOT WANT IT HERE. I will be spreading the word to any other residents I
come in contact with to voice their opposition as well.

Sincerely,
Stephen Owen
[REDACTED] resident

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 6.2

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

O'Conner, Susan

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PD0146

August 21, 2008

^{1|245} This is Susan O'Conner. I live in [REDACTED] Mississippi and work in Jackson, Mississippi and I am in favor of the facility being built in Flora.

So, count this as a vote in favor of building it in Flora.

Thank you, bye.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Pace, Lanny

Page 1 of 1

WD0309

From: lpace [lpace@mvrld.msstate.edu]
Sent: Sunday, August 17, 2008 6:36 PM
To: nbafprogrammanager@dhs.gov
Subject: support NBAF in Flora, MS

1|24.5 | I am writing this message to provide my full support of locating the NBAF in Flora, MS. I have oversight of the 4 Veterinary Diagnostic Labs that make up the Mississippi Veterinary Research & Diagnostic Laboratory System, College of Veterinary Medicine, Mississippi State University. Our laboratories are fully accredited by the American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians and are part of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN). As part of the NAHLN we participate in High Path Avian Influenza testing and Classical Swine Fever testing and are proficiency tested in Foot and Mouth Disease testing.

The main purpose of this message is to substantiate the fact that we are able to recruit and retain well qualified veterinary professionals and researchers to Mississippi. In my role as Executive Director of this laboratory system I have oversight of a staff of approximately 80 people, including over 20 Faculty members. In the past 7 years we have been very successful in recruiting highly qualified veterinary professionals to Mississippi and have survived attempts by several other universities to recruit some of these faculty members away from Mississippi. Within the group recruited to Mississippi we have DVM + PhD microbiologists/molecular diagnosticians, virologists, anatomic pathologists, and clinical pathologists; DVM + MS poultry diagnosticians; DVM + MS pathologists; and PhD microbiologists/molecular diagnosticians. During the last five years we have recruited faculty from Texas A&M University, the University of Pennsylvania, Cornell University, Michigan State University, and the University of Georgia.

1 cont. | I hope your team will continue to give Flora, MS full consideration as a legitimate site for the NBAF.
24.5

Thank you.

Lanny W. Pace, DVM, PhD, Diplomate ACVP
Executive Director
MS Veterinary Research & Diagnostic Lab System
College of Veterinary Medicine
Mississippi State University
P.O. Box 97813
Pearl, MS 39288

Ph: 601-420-4700
Email: lpace@mvrld.msstate.edu

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Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.5

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Flora Industrial Park Site Alternative.

Packer, Idelle

Page 1 of 1

WD0699

From: Idelle Packer [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 11:20 AM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: proposal to build National Bio- and Agro- Defense Facility (NBADF) n NC

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
 Science and Technology Directorate
 James V. Johnson: Mail Stop #2100
 245 Murray Lane SW, Building 410
 Washington, DC 20528

Dear Sir:

1|25.3 I am writing to voice my opposition to the proposal to build a new National Bio- and Agro-
 2|12.3 Defense Facility (NBADF) in the Durham, NC area. I am concerned about potential
 3|21.3 contamination of Falls Lake and other drinking water sources with dangerous pathogens,
 4|13.3 lack of transparency of operations or monitoring for disease releases, massive potential impacts
 5|19.3 on livestock, wildlife and public health, with economic consequences up to \$50 Billion, and
 inability to manage more than 6,000 local hospital patients and prisoners in the event of
 evacuation or quarantine.
 Added to these concerns is a personal concern: my daughter lives in Greensboro and attends
 College in the area, an area of numerous colleges and universities with young people in
 attendance. We must not risk a disaster of disease and/or pollutants in our State.
 Thank you for registering this opposition view of your proposal.
 Sincerely,
 Idelle Packer
 [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.3


DHS notes the commentor's watershed and water contamination concerns. The NBAF EIS Section 3.13.8, Waste Management describes the process that would be used to control and dispose of liquid wastes and Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describes standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spill and runoff affects.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 21.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. Section 3.14 and Appendix E of the NBAF EIS state that the specific objective of the hazard identification is to identify the likelihood and consequences from accidents or intentional subversive acts. In addition to identifying the potential for or likelihood of the scenarios leading to adverse consequences, this analysis provides support for the identification of specific engineering and administrative controls to either prevent a pathogen release or mitigate the consequences of such a release. The NBAF would provide state-of-the-art operating procedures and biocontainment features to minimize the potential for laboratory-acquired infections and accidental releases. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low. Appendix B describes biocontainment lapses and laboratory acquired infections. Laboratory-acquired infections have not been shown to be a threat to the community at large. Should the NBAF Record of Decision call for the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF then site-specific protocols would be developed, in coordination with local emergency response agencies that would consider the diversity and density of human, livestock, and wildlife populations residing within the local area. DHS would have site-specific standard operating procedures and response plans in place prior to the initiation of research activities at the proposed the NBAF. Procedures and plans to operate the NBAF will include community representatives as described in Section 2.2.2.6 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 13.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding potential wildlife impacts at the Umstead Research Farm Site. Section 3.8.9 provides a detailed analysis of the potential impacts of an accidental release on wildlife. Although the NBAF EIS acknowledges the potential for significant impacts on wildlife in the event of an accidental release, the risk of such a release is extremely low (see Section 3.14). It has been shown that modern biosafety laboratories can be safely operated in populated areas and in areas with abundant wildlife. State-of-the-art biocontainment facilities such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, employ modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF. Furthermore, the purpose of NBAF is to combat diseases that could have significant effects on wildlife. Research at the NBAF would include the development of vaccines for wildlife that could prevent adverse impacts from a foreign introduction.



Comment No: 5

Issue Code: 19.3

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the possible economic effect would be significant for all sites. The potential economic effects of an accidental release at the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative are discussed in Section 3.10.9.5 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS.

DHS notes the commentor's concern. A site-specific emergency response plan will be developed and coordinated with the local Emergency Management Plan regarding evacuations and other emergency response measures for all potential emergency events including accidents at the NBAF. The risks and associated potential effects to human health and safety are evaluated in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS. The risks were determined to be low for all site alternatives, and the probability of a release requiring a quarantine or evacuation is very low. DHS would offer coordination and training to local medical personnel regarding the effects of pathogens to be studied at the NBAF. Emergency management plans will also include training for local law enforcement, health care, and fire and rescue personnel.

Pagen, John

Page 1 of 1

KSD016



National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Draft Environmental Impact Statement Comment Form

Personal information is optional as this document is part of the public record and may be reproduced in its entirety in the final National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement.

Name: John Pagen

Title: Director, Economic Development

Organization: Manhattan Area Chamber of Commerce

Address: 501 Rynne Avenue

City: Manhattan State: KS Zip Code: 66502

Comments: As a member of the Kansas Economic Development Association, a resident of Manhattan, and a parent, I wanted to convey my 100% support for placing the NBAF in Manhattan. It would be a perfect fit for this community and the region.

John Pagen
7/31/08

(Continued on back for your convenience)

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.4

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

1124.4

Paliouras, James

Page 1 of 1

PD0049

August 7, 2008

Good morning,

1|24.4

My name is James Paliouras, live in [REDACTED]. I would like to express my unequivocal support for this facility. I think it will be a huge, huge, plus for the area. I know that a lot of people have concerns about the safety. I do not. The Center for Disease Control has been in Atlanta for years and years and we've never had a problem.

I think that unfortunately we have some people who do not have all the information available to them and obviously have no faith in our officials. I'm not that way. The information that I have does not concern me about the safety of the project, and again, hopefully this project will come to our area. Any other area in the country would love to have it, and I'm just dismayed at the opposition that has come forward which is...it has no real basis.

Thank you for letting me get my input and making it as easy as you've done for input to be heard. My phone number is [REDACTED], and I realize coming from [REDACTED], which opposes everything, this may be a little bit of a surprise, but there are people in [REDACTED] who do want to move forward.

Thank you again.

Bye.

Comment No: 1

Issue Code: 24.3

DHS notes the commentor's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Pardoe, Jr, Robert**Page 1 of 1**

WD0075

From: Robert F. Pardoe, Jr. [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, July 14, 2008 9:12 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Plumb Island

Dear Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff,

I have been reading of an effort to move the Plumb Island Animal Disease Center to a new location on mainland USA.

- 1) 24.1 | Please DO NOT relocate the center. Too great a risk would be had if live foreign animal diseases were studied in a less isolated facility.
- 2) 15.0 | Devastating the livestock industry would cripple the entire economy due to the ripple effect of agricultural commerce.

Thank you.

Sincerely,
Robert F. Pardoe, Jr.

[REDACTED] PA [REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.1

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the five mainland site alternatives in favor of the Plum Island Site Alternative based on risk concerns. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of the NBAF, would enable the NBAF to be safely operated at any of the mainland site alternatives as discussed in Section 3.14 of the NBAF EIS.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.0

DHS notes the commentor's concern. The risk of an accidental release of a pathogen is extremely low, but DHS acknowledges that the possible economic effect would be significant for all sites. Section 3.10.9 and Appendix D of the NBAF EIS presents estimates of the possible economic effect of an accidental release.

Parks, Tammy

Page 1 of 1

WD0197

From: Tammy Parks [REDACTED]
Sent: Wednesday, August 06, 2008 12:02 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Oppose Bio Lab in Butner, NC

1|25.3;
1|12.3

As a citizen of North Carolina and a resident of [REDACTED], I strongly oppose the proposed Bio Lab in Butner, NC. Our water supply is fragile as it is without dumping waste water from the facility into it. I also am concerned about accidents, security, and possible animal and human infection from this facility.

Thank you

Tammy Parks
[REDACTED]

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.3

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 12.3

DHS notes the commentor's watershed concerns. Section 3.13.8, Waste Management describes the process that would be used to control and dispose of liquid wastes and Sections 3.3.7 and 3.7.7 describes standard methods used to prevent and mitigate potential spill and runoff affects. The design and operation of the NBAF at Umstead Research farm Site would prevent negative impact to the sewage treatment facility infrastructure and treatment capabilities.

Parr, Marianne

Page 1 of 1

WD0468

From: marianne parr [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, August 21, 2008 11:33 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Subject: Proposed bio-lab in Athens, Ga.

1| 25.2 | Dear programmanager, or whoever: You've already heard all the arguments against the lab, so I won't repeat them. You know many of us feel this lab threatens the peace of mind of many Athenians, and many Georgians. We don't want it here and I personally want to go on record as letting you know that I don't want it here in Athens. My family has been here since 1792, and as a long time [REDACTED], I don't want my home threatened. To emphasize the statement that "I don't want it here" let me say that if the lab locates here, than I will leave my house and home and leave [REDACTED] forever. Is that clear enough?
2| 15.2 | Thank you for your attention. Marianne Parr [REDACTED]

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Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.2
DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the South Milledge Avenue Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 15.2
DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Parrish, Jim

Page 1 of 1

NCD016

**National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility
Draft Environmental Impact Statement
Comment Form**

 **NATIONAL BIO AND AGRO-DEFENSE FACILITY**
Science and Technology Directorate/Office of National Laboratories

Personal information is optional as this document is part of the public record and may be reproduced in its entirety in the final National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility Environmental Impact Statement.

Name: Jim Parrish

Title: _____

Organization: _____

Address: _____

City: [REDACTED] State: NC Zip Code: _____

Comments: 1|24.3 I want this Lab here. We need the jobs. I am not falling for the fear of G.N.D.T.

(Continued on back for your convenience)

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 24.3
DHS notes the commentor's support for the Umstead Research Farm Site Alternative.

Passarelli, A. Lorena

Page 1 of 3

WD0795

From: Lorena Passarelli [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, August 25, 2008 4:59 PM
To: NBAFProgramManager
Attachments: NBAF.pdf

Attached and comments and questions regarding relocating NBAF in Manhattan, Kansas.

Passarelli, A. Lorena

Page 2 of 3

WD0795

Dear US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate:

I am an Associate Professor in the Division of Biology at ██████████ and I have studied viruses for over 20 years. My work is currently funded by both the National Institutes of Health and the US Department of Agriculture and has dealt mainly with BSL1 and BSL2 agents although I am currently in the process of securing funding to work with BSL3 agents. Given my professional background, I know the risks, the countermeasures, and the probabilities of accidents. As a scientist and a citizen of ██████████ I am for the NBAF, but not in my backyard. I have not spoken before for fear that my opinion may affect my interactions at ██████████ and my ability to obtain intramural funding, but time will be a witness to that.

I attended both public meetings held in Manhattan this summer. As you evaluate the public support in Manhattan, I would like you to address in your report the estimated support from formal organizations versus individual support and how do you weigh each in your final assessment. At the public meetings, I was saddened by the choreographed parade of legislators and administrators that preempted the public from speaking as they reiterated their monetarily- and politically-driven comments. Shame on them! It is not until these last few weeks that the public has had a chance to voice their comments in newspaper editorials and at public meetings in spite of the strong opposition of the already influenced media. I hope you are aware of these new events and consider that it is more difficult for a person living outside of Manhattan and/or with less public speaking experience and resources to voice their opinion than for well-positioned administration groups and organizations.

Kansas State University owes 54 million dollars on the Biosecurity Research Institute or BRI. The BRI has not measured up to what administrators had envisioned in terms of active research and research grants by this time. I think that the situation is worrisome and a lot of money, internal and external, has been committed to attract investigators from K-State and elsewhere to work in the BRI. The situation has escalated in such a way that the entire university was not supported by Office of the Vice President for Research with its usual share for start-up funding to hire new faculty. The Office of the Vice President for Research does not negate that our extramural overhead funding has been devoted to support many BRI initiatives rather than supporting other K-State initiatives including new hires. You are the BRI's way out! It is my understanding that the State will pay the BRI's 54 million dollars if the NBAF comes to Manhattan. You may not be concerned with this at this stage, but I don't think that your coming here would alleviate the situation in a number of years as more funds will be poured into biosecurity-related research, creating a deficit in other areas. Faculty will not be agreeable with this situation and would create significant problems. I am very disappointed that K-State has not been transparent with the K-State personnel and the public, in providing all of the reasons for their support of the NBAF in Manhattan.

Manhattan has many distinguished faculty but top investigators that would interact with NBAF research personnel are limited in contrast to what has been stated by K-State administrators and others. Your review should clearly compare the strengths of scientists at K-State, including credentials and research accomplishments that you think would benefit the NBAF compared to those at the other potential sites.

Manhattan is a relatively small community and an attractive community for new hires. I have been part of multiple faculty and staff search committees during my tenure at K-State. We often have problems recruiting faculty because a candidate spouse cannot find a job in this small community. I am concerned about our future ability to recruit new faculty that is not directly linked to biosecurity-related research. I think many prospective faculty and their spouses may think it is hard to raise their families in a place where the NBAF is located because of perceived safety concerns, regardless of whether these concerns are well founded or not.

I have been a citizen of ██████████ for the past 10 years. What attracted me to the ██████████ was the safe, small, and cohesive community. If I wanted to live in a biotech corridor, which is what this

Comment No: 1 Issue Code: 25.4

DHS notes the commentor's opposition to the Manhattan Campus Site Alternative.

Comment No: 2 Issue Code: 8.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.

Comment No: 3 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement. DHS believes that experience shows that facilities utilizing modern biocontainment technologies and safety protocols, such as would be employed in the design, construction, and operation of NBAF, would enable NBAF to be safely operated regardless of the location.

Passarelli, A. Lorena

Page 3 of 3

WD0795

4| 15.4 | place would become, I would have stayed close to the National Institutes of Health, where I used to work. A biotech corridor will bring more taxes and more crowded schools.

5| 5.0 | I would like you to think beyond the legislators' and administrators' façade and place the NBAF where it belongs, in the best place. The NBAF and its agenda are too important to allow politics to play any role in its future location. Manhattan does not have individual support for the NBAF, does not have many strong scientists in the area, and it is located in a relatively isolated place. The place for the future NBAF is logically not in Manhattan.

Sincerely,

A. Lorena Passarelli

Comment No: 4 Issue Code: 15.4

DHS notes the commentor's concern regarding the Manhattan Campus Site. The effects on the community including schools are discussed in Section 3.10.4 of the NBAF EIS. The effects to schools and other quality of life resources would be minimal, since the number of new employees from the NBAF would be between 250 and 350.

Comment No: 5 Issue Code: 5.0

DHS notes commentor's statement.

Comment No: 6 Issue Code: 1.0

DHS notes the commentor's support for the proposed research that would be conducted within the NBAF. Several factors will affect the decision on whether or not the NBAF is built, and, if so, where. The decision will be made based on the following factors: 1) analyses from the EIS; 2) the four evaluation criteria discussed in Section 2.3.1; 3) applicable federal, state, and local laws and regulatory requirements; 4) consultation requirements among the federal, state, and local agencies, as well as federally recognized American Indian Nations; 5) policy considerations; and 6) public comment.

Comment No: 7 Issue Code: 5.4

DHS notes the commentor's statement.