National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC)

The Framework for Dealing with Disasters and Related Interdependencies Working Group

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Overview

Objective

Approach & Status

Questions
Objective

This study focuses on the United States’ ability to respond to and recover from a major disaster that could result in a prolonged loss of infrastructure services expanding beyond a local area.

The Desired Outcome is to identify areas that are impediments to:

- Private sector and local/state government recovery of critical infrastructures, and
- Deploying needed federal resources.
Applicability of Results

The findings of this Study are intended to have applicability in three areas:

- Federal and State government legislative, regulatory and policy improvements;
- Private Sector business continuity planning and risk mitigation efforts; and
- Cooperation efforts between Federal, State and Local governments and the Critical Infrastructure Sectors.
Approach

Foundation is a facilitated one-day workshop (13 November 2008) that brings together key stakeholders from the private sectors, legal community, and government to exchange views and information from their unique perspectives.

Two hypothetical scenarios have been developed to stimulate and guide the Workshop discussions:

- Scenario 1 – Accident; 2 week duration; D.C. Area
- Scenario 2 – Terrorist; 3 week duration; greater DC Metropolitan area, adjacent counties & beyond.

Both scenarios:

- Initially impact the electric sector with secondary cascading impacts to telecommunications, water and other sectors.
- Are centered on the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area
- Were developed to allow for insight into significant differences that could be encountered as a result of event duration, geographical scope and initial cause

To assist in the planning of the workshop, a series of interviews with CEOs of select infrastructure companies are being conducted.
Scope

Includes most of the sectors identified as Critical Infrastructures and Key Resources (CIKR) by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Since we are only able to examine two scenarios as part of this study, further analysis / examination will likely be required.
CEO Interviews

Purpose:

Gain feedback how the different infrastructure sectors coordinate in planning for disaster recovery;
Identify infrastructure interdependencies that occur as a result of a disaster event, and the manner in which they affect response and recovery efforts; and
Identify how legal, regulatory and policy issues can hinder or enhance these activities.

A set of questions has been developed to guide these interviews.

Eight have been scheduled, five completed.
Time Line / Next Steps

Interviews with Critical Infrastructure CEOs and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) – September and first half of October 2008.


Post Workshop results briefing to CEOs and Workshop Participants - December 2008.

Draft Results and Recommendations presented to NIAC – January 2009 NIAC Business Meeting

Questions?
Backup
Scenarios

Scenario #1: Accident
Impact – Significant power outage occurs in the National Capital Region (NCR)
Root Cause
Primary – Critical Equipment Failure in electrical distribution system
Secondary – Damage to electrical distribution system due sudden power outage
Total Number of People Impacted – 750,000
Total Time to Repair – 14 days

Scenario #2: Terrorist Attack
Attack Method
Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (Car Bombs)
Attack centered on key components of the Electric Infrastructure.
Homeland Security Advisory Level Elevated to RED for first few days following the attack and then lowered to ORANGE.
Presidential Disaster Declaration signed.
No further attacks reported
Impact
Primary – Significant power outage occurs in NCR
Secondary – 300 mile radius of Washington, DC. This includes parts of Delaware, Pennsylvanian, West Virginia, Virginia and all of Maryland
Root Cause
Primary – Physical attacks on various Power Generation Stations, Substations and major transmission line.
Secondary – Damage to electrical distribution system due sudden power outage
Total Time to Repair – Minimum of 24 days
Other Supporting Events

The Study Group received several presentations, including:
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC);
ChicagoFIRST;
CDEP
The Water Sector; and
National Incident Management System (NIMS).