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(MUSIC)

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>>:The deliberate use of
vehicles as a weapon to

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assault large crowds of people
is becoming an increasingly

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common terrorist tactic, in
part due to the ease of access

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to motor vehicles. These
ramming types of attacks have

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occurred recently to disrupt
peaceful protests, interrupt

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large public gatherings or as
part of a larger active

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assailant attack against
civilians and critical

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infrastructure nationwide. To
assess the threat and identify

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what can be done to mitigate
these attacks, we look to

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federal and local law
enforcement, counterterrorism

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experts and the private sector
to learn how they see this

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emerging threat.

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>>:So since last year, when we
saw a truck be used to attack

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pedestrians in Nice, France,
we've really seen a lot of

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additional attacks using
vehicles throughout the world,

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both passenger vehicles and
commercial vehicles. So

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certainly, that's something
that we're concerned with and

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working with the public and
private sector to counter that

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potential threat.

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>>:When we think about vehicle
ramming specifically, it's not

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a new type of incident. It's
something that's been

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happening. We've seen it even,
really, the past decade. But

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when you look at 2014 through
2017, where we've had at least

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17 attacks and, really, 2016
and 2017, where we've had 10

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attacks nationally, it's more
frequent. And the reason there

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is it's easy. It's easy access
to get a vehicle, a truck.

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It's easy access. You're not
scrutinized. In many of the

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old cases that we dealt with,
if people were looking to

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develop a weapon of mass
destruction or build an IED, a

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lot of times, they have to
reach out to other people. To

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get a truck or to get a car,
you need a driver's license or

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the ability to run a truck
possibly. So it's ease of

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access, and with the number of
public events, it's easy to

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plan for, too. We know when
there's going to be a race, a

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Christmas market. It's
publicized in the papers and

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local media because people
want folks to come out for

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their events and also makes it
easy for people to plan for a

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terrorist event, too, and
target those types of events.

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>>:I think there's been, over
the last 15 years, a general

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trend line away from highly
orchestrated, highly

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resource-intensive and
meticulously planned attacks

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to more of a DIY - do it
yourself - kind of violence.

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We have seen a greater and
greater encouragement of

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do-it-yourself violence
beginning really with al-Qaida

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in the Arabian Peninsula,
inspiring the believers to

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execute violence on their own
without organizational command

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and control. And that has been
continued and really

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accelerated through the
propaganda of the so-called

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Islamic State, which also
encourages this do-it-yourself

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violence. In order to
complement their ability to

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conduct organizational
attacks, they've been trying

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to inspire lone individuals or
lone groups of individuals to

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take up the standard of their
cause and attack on their

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behalf, even though they have
never met another person in

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that organization, they have
no physical connectivity to

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the organization. So it's a
way for organizations to

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complement their
organizational inability to

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conduct a campaign of violence
and still get that

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psychological impact of a
campaign of violence, even if

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they're not orchestrating it
or commanding and controlling

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it.

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>>:The threat of a vehicle
ramming seems daunting. With

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millions of vehicles on the
road at any given time, what

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can individuals do to keep
themselves safe and to

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identify behavior that may
enable intervention to prevent

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an attack?

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>>:What people should do, if
they find themselves in that

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situation where a vehicle is
being used as a weapon against

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pedestrians, the first thing
is obviously is to run and get

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out of the way. I mean, you
have to - it's going to happen

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quick. It's going to take you
a few seconds to process

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what's happening. But you have
to react as quickly as

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possible and get out of the
way. You know, get the folks

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with you out of the way as
quick as possible. The next

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thing is cover - trying to get
behind something, something

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heavy. It could be a barrier
to prevent things like

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vehicles from being used as
weapons. There could be one

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close by but not directly
where you're at, so the

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vehicle's able to get access -
so being able to get behind

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one of those barriers. But I
think, secondarily, we want to

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ensure that people get far
enough away in case there is a

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secondary attack after the
vehicle was used as a weapon,

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as we've seen in some of the
cases. Once the vehicles stop,

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for whatever reason, we've
seen a number of people exit

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the vehicles and use edged
weapons or small arms to carry

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on that attack, so getting as
far away as possible and, of

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course, notifying law
enforcement as soon as

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possible. I mean, that's
really key because law

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enforcement's going to be able
to get there quickly and come

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in and stop the actual threat.

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>>:Of course, it's important
to do what you can at the

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point of attack. But, again,
you see, these are impossible

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to predict the exact point and
moment of attack. However,

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when we look at radicalization
of individuals who ultimately

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engage in that violent attack,
that's a process. That process

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takes a very long time
compared to the minutes of

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time that an attack takes to
unfold. When we look, for

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example, at foreign fighters
in the United States, or

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individuals who aspire to be
foreign fighters, we found, on

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average, in 2016, a 10-month
window of opportunity between

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when the person first started
publicly speaking about it or

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doing something about it in an
observable way. Over 85

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percent of the individuals
engaged in some sort of

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observable indicator that this
was their intention, the kind

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of observable indicator that
friends, employers, family,

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soccer coaches would be in a
position to see, not

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necessarily the law
enforcement community. They

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might not have that intimate
relationship where they would

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see these kinds of warning
signs. But the close cadre of

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people around those persons,
they would be observable to

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them. I think it's pragmatic
to try to focus on prevention

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and intervention programs
because the opportunity's just

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so much greater there than
trying to secure every soft

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target, all the time, in a
free and open society that

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values its freedom.

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>>:But that awareness is
really critical. If you see

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something, say something. If
you see something suspicious,

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if you see a suspicious person
or persons, if you see a

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suspicious vehicle in an area
where it really doesn't belong

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or something just doesn't look
right, don't be afraid to

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report that. I mean, that's
really key. You know, the law

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enforcement officers can't be
everywhere at every time - at

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any given time. So I think
really being able to notice

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something suspicious and look
out for it, you know, and then

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report that, I think is
critical and really crucial in

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trying to prevent those types
of attacks from happening.

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>>:Individuals should not have
to be alone in facing a

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potential attack. What
policies or proactive measures

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can organizations take to
mitigate threats to the

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public?

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>>:When you engage multiple
people, as I mentioned, to

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build an IED or something
that's a little more

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intricate, you're more likely
to hit a trip wire that's

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going to alert somebody. But
if somebody just walks into a

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shop to rent a van, there's
typically little trip wire for

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them to be noticed. So it's so
important for people obviously

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in the trucking industry to
know who they're renting their

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trucks to but to establish
some sort of trip wires as

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well, to be alert for
suspicious behavior if they

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see anyone making
modifications to vehicles or

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asking for modifications to
vehicles which seem unlikely

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to be used in regular
transport, that is a trip wire

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and something they should
alert the federal authorities

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or the local police to. But
once again, just because of

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the ease of it, that's why the
frequency has arisen.

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>>:For soft targets and
facilities and buildings,

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they're certainly going to
start looking at using

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barriers and bollards and
other type of equipment to

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maintain that distance between
vehicle access to those

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facilities and to those
buildings. One of the other

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things that we've done to work
with some of the commercial

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industries is having a
partnership between private

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companies that maybe could
supply heavy vehicles like

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trucks or buses to use in a
community to protect soft

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targets around events that are
going on in the community. It

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can be around parades. It
could be around other type of

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events, maybe sporting events
and things like that, where

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companies are willing to step
up and help out their

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community, use those vehicles
for barriers to protect

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pedestrians so people can go
about their daily business and

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enjoy their, you know, their
daily life and not have to

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worry about that potential
threat.

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>>:And, obviously, it's not
pragmatic to put bollards on

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every single street, but when
there are critical

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infrastructures or places
where there are going to be

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crowds, there are certain
commonsense things that can be

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done, whether it is police
presence or barriers that can

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be moved and put into place. I
think we have a responsibility

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as government to put those
mitigation strategies into

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effect. If I had a building
that was glass, I might

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consider some sort of
bollards, planters outside

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that, once again, are
aesthetically attractive that

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might not look like a standard
bollard, but it has the

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capacity to stop a truck from
getting through. If you were

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to look around the U.S.
capital, they might have some

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sort of portable sally ports
that go up and down so you can

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let vehicles through when
necessary. But there has to be

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some type of strategy. We
can't do nothing.

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>>:While it's important that
we've identified both the

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nature of this emerging threat
as well as countermeasures

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that individuals and
organizations can take to

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mitigate an attack, it's
important to ask one final

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question - how can we maintain
this awareness of our

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surroundings without living
our lives in fear?

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>>:I think it is about being
mentally prepared for these

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things to happen but not
allowing ourselves to be

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intimidated by things that
actually happen very, very

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infrequently. That doesn't
mean the professional

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counterterrorism community and
law enforcement community and

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emergency response community
shouldn't prepare for these

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incidents, shouldn't
prioritize measures that can

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keep people safe and reduce
vulnerabilities. Of course, we

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should do that, but I think we
can complement that with

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working on our sort of
societal resilience and our

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political resilience, not
allowing ourselves to be held

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hostage by the potential that
maybe one day someone will

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engage in this kind of
violence.

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>>:This video highlights the
emerging threats associated

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with vehicle ramming attacks,
which have targeted various

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large crowd gatherings
throughout the United States

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in recent years, including
attacks in New York,

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Charlottesville, Va., and
Columbus, Ohio. Additionally,

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this video provides examples
of actions that can be taken

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by individuals and
organizations alike to

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prevent, mitigate and respond
to these attacks. The first

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step is to coordinate with law
enforcement, educate yourself

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and your employees on
suspicious activities to

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promote vigilance so that when
somebody sees something,

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they're able to say something.
Be aware of behaviors that

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indicate a pathway to violence
and promote mechanisms that

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encourage reporting of
suspicious behaviors. Look at

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opportunities to implement
physical security measures,

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both passive and active.
Examine architectural

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solutions to provide
separation between vehicles

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and pedestrian spaces.
Finally, should the worst

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occur, prepare yourself to
respond decisively and remove

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yourself and others from the
scene. In many cases, attacks

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do not conclude when the
vehicle has stopped. For more

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information, visit the
following links that contain

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additional tools, information
and resources to prepare

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yourself and make your
community a safer place.

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(MUSIC)