1 00:00:00,600 --> 00:00:31,398 (MUSIC) 2 00:00:33,500 --> 00:00:35,468 >>:The deliberate use of vehicles as a weapon to 3 00:00:35,468 --> 00:00:38,638 assault large crowds of people is becoming an increasingly 4 00:00:38,638 --> 00:00:41,875 common terrorist tactic, in part due to the ease of access 5 00:00:41,875 --> 00:00:44,844 to motor vehicles. These ramming types of attacks have 6 00:00:44,844 --> 00:00:48,181 occurred recently to disrupt peaceful protests, interrupt 7 00:00:48,181 --> 00:00:51,384 large public gatherings or as part of a larger active 8 00:00:51,384 --> 00:00:53,853 assailant attack against civilians and critical 9 00:00:53,853 --> 00:00:57,257 infrastructure nationwide. To assess the threat and identify 10 00:00:57,257 --> 00:00:59,993 what can be done to mitigate these attacks, we look to 11 00:00:59,993 --> 00:01:02,862 federal and local law enforcement, counterterrorism 12 00:01:02,862 --> 00:01:06,099 experts and the private sector to learn how they see this 13 00:01:06,099 --> 00:01:06,966 emerging threat. 14 00:01:07,767 --> 00:01:11,971 >>:So since last year, when we saw a truck be used to attack 15 00:01:11,971 --> 00:01:15,141 pedestrians in Nice, France, we've really seen a lot of 16 00:01:15,542 --> 00:01:19,379 additional attacks using vehicles throughout the world, 17 00:01:19,879 --> 00:01:23,349 both passenger vehicles and commercial vehicles. So 18 00:01:23,349 --> 00:01:25,618 certainly, that's something that we're concerned with and 19 00:01:25,618 --> 00:01:28,721 working with the public and private sector to counter that 20 00:01:28,721 --> 00:01:29,556 potential threat. 21 00:01:29,789 --> 00:01:33,326 >>:When we think about vehicle ramming specifically, it's not 22 00:01:33,326 --> 00:01:36,930 a new type of incident. It's something that's been 23 00:01:36,930 --> 00:01:40,366 happening. We've seen it even, really, the past decade. But 24 00:01:40,366 --> 00:01:43,937 when you look at 2014 through 2017, where we've had at least 25 00:01:43,937 --> 00:01:49,509 17 attacks and, really, 2016 and 2017, where we've had 10 26 00:01:49,509 --> 00:01:53,613 attacks nationally, it's more frequent. And the reason there 27 00:01:53,613 --> 00:01:58,518 is it's easy. It's easy access to get a vehicle, a truck. 28 00:01:58,852 --> 00:02:01,754 It's easy access. You're not scrutinized. In many of the 29 00:02:01,754 --> 00:02:05,058 old cases that we dealt with, if people were looking to 30 00:02:05,058 --> 00:02:08,661 develop a weapon of mass destruction or build an IED, a 31 00:02:08,661 --> 00:02:10,930 lot of times, they have to reach out to other people. To 32 00:02:10,930 --> 00:02:14,634 get a truck or to get a car, you need a driver's license or 33 00:02:14,634 --> 00:02:17,237 the ability to run a truck possibly. So it's ease of 34 00:02:17,237 --> 00:02:22,442 access, and with the number of public events, it's easy to 35 00:02:22,442 --> 00:02:25,979 plan for, too. We know when there's going to be a race, a 36 00:02:25,979 --> 00:02:29,449 Christmas market. It's publicized in the papers and 37 00:02:29,449 --> 00:02:31,651 local media because people want folks to come out for 38 00:02:31,651 --> 00:02:34,754 their events and also makes it easy for people to plan for a 39 00:02:34,754 --> 00:02:37,957 terrorist event, too, and target those types of events. 40 00:02:37,957 --> 00:02:41,227 >>:I think there's been, over the last 15 years, a general 41 00:02:41,227 --> 00:02:46,799 trend line away from highly orchestrated, highly 42 00:02:46,799 --> 00:02:50,370 resource-intensive and meticulously planned attacks 43 00:02:50,637 --> 00:02:54,274 to more of a DIY - do it yourself - kind of violence. 44 00:02:54,507 --> 00:02:58,311 We have seen a greater and greater encouragement of 45 00:02:58,311 --> 00:03:02,649 do-it-yourself violence beginning really with al-Qaida 46 00:03:02,649 --> 00:03:06,152 in the Arabian Peninsula, inspiring the believers to 47 00:03:06,152 --> 00:03:09,222 execute violence on their own without organizational command 48 00:03:09,222 --> 00:03:12,025 and control. And that has been continued and really 49 00:03:12,025 --> 00:03:15,128 accelerated through the propaganda of the so-called 50 00:03:15,128 --> 00:03:18,364 Islamic State, which also encourages this do-it-yourself 51 00:03:18,631 --> 00:03:21,167 violence. In order to complement their ability to 52 00:03:21,167 --> 00:03:23,069 conduct organizational attacks, they've been trying 53 00:03:23,069 --> 00:03:27,407 to inspire lone individuals or lone groups of individuals to 54 00:03:27,407 --> 00:03:30,109 take up the standard of their cause and attack on their 55 00:03:30,109 --> 00:03:33,179 behalf, even though they have never met another person in 56 00:03:33,179 --> 00:03:36,316 that organization, they have no physical connectivity to 57 00:03:36,316 --> 00:03:38,618 the organization. So it's a way for organizations to 58 00:03:38,618 --> 00:03:41,955 complement their organizational inability to 59 00:03:41,955 --> 00:03:44,991 conduct a campaign of violence and still get that 60 00:03:44,991 --> 00:03:47,760 psychological impact of a campaign of violence, even if 61 00:03:47,760 --> 00:03:49,896 they're not orchestrating it or commanding and controlling 62 00:03:49,896 --> 00:03:49,963 it. 63 00:03:50,930 --> 00:03:54,100 >>:The threat of a vehicle ramming seems daunting. With 64 00:03:54,100 --> 00:03:57,236 millions of vehicles on the road at any given time, what 65 00:03:57,236 --> 00:04:00,073 can individuals do to keep themselves safe and to 66 00:04:00,073 --> 00:04:03,142 identify behavior that may enable intervention to prevent 67 00:04:03,142 --> 00:04:04,110 an attack? 68 00:04:04,611 --> 00:04:06,879 >>:What people should do, if they find themselves in that 69 00:04:06,879 --> 00:04:10,683 situation where a vehicle is being used as a weapon against 70 00:04:10,683 --> 00:04:14,354 pedestrians, the first thing is obviously is to run and get 71 00:04:14,354 --> 00:04:16,856 out of the way. I mean, you have to - it's going to happen 72 00:04:16,856 --> 00:04:20,526 quick. It's going to take you a few seconds to process 73 00:04:20,526 --> 00:04:24,330 what's happening. But you have to react as quickly as 74 00:04:24,330 --> 00:04:27,500 possible and get out of the way. You know, get the folks 75 00:04:27,500 --> 00:04:30,370 with you out of the way as quick as possible. The next 76 00:04:30,370 --> 00:04:33,306 thing is cover - trying to get behind something, something 77 00:04:33,306 --> 00:04:36,275 heavy. It could be a barrier to prevent things like 78 00:04:36,275 --> 00:04:39,479 vehicles from being used as weapons. There could be one 79 00:04:39,479 --> 00:04:41,914 close by but not directly where you're at, so the 80 00:04:41,914 --> 00:04:44,684 vehicle's able to get access - so being able to get behind 81 00:04:44,684 --> 00:04:48,454 one of those barriers. But I think, secondarily, we want to 82 00:04:48,454 --> 00:04:51,858 ensure that people get far enough away in case there is a 83 00:04:51,858 --> 00:04:56,195 secondary attack after the vehicle was used as a weapon, 84 00:04:56,195 --> 00:04:59,265 as we've seen in some of the cases. Once the vehicles stop, 85 00:04:59,265 --> 00:05:02,435 for whatever reason, we've seen a number of people exit 86 00:05:02,435 --> 00:05:06,973 the vehicles and use edged weapons or small arms to carry 87 00:05:06,973 --> 00:05:10,677 on that attack, so getting as far away as possible and, of 88 00:05:10,677 --> 00:05:12,712 course, notifying law enforcement as soon as 89 00:05:12,712 --> 00:05:15,114 possible. I mean, that's really key because law 90 00:05:15,114 --> 00:05:17,684 enforcement's going to be able to get there quickly and come 91 00:05:17,684 --> 00:05:19,552 in and stop the actual threat. 92 00:05:19,986 --> 00:05:21,320 >>:Of course, it's important to do what you can at the 93 00:05:21,320 --> 00:05:24,857 point of attack. But, again, you see, these are impossible 94 00:05:24,857 --> 00:05:29,195 to predict the exact point and moment of attack. However, 95 00:05:29,195 --> 00:05:31,831 when we look at radicalization of individuals who ultimately 96 00:05:31,831 --> 00:05:34,667 engage in that violent attack, that's a process. That process 97 00:05:34,667 --> 00:05:38,571 takes a very long time compared to the minutes of 98 00:05:38,571 --> 00:05:41,274 time that an attack takes to unfold. When we look, for 99 00:05:41,274 --> 00:05:43,409 example, at foreign fighters in the United States, or 100 00:05:43,409 --> 00:05:46,212 individuals who aspire to be foreign fighters, we found, on 101 00:05:46,212 --> 00:05:50,383 average, in 2016, a 10-month window of opportunity between 102 00:05:50,383 --> 00:05:52,985 when the person first started publicly speaking about it or 103 00:05:52,985 --> 00:05:56,122 doing something about it in an observable way. Over 85 104 00:05:56,122 --> 00:05:59,525 percent of the individuals engaged in some sort of 105 00:05:59,525 --> 00:06:03,896 observable indicator that this was their intention, the kind 106 00:06:03,896 --> 00:06:07,867 of observable indicator that friends, employers, family, 107 00:06:08,634 --> 00:06:12,138 soccer coaches would be in a position to see, not 108 00:06:12,138 --> 00:06:14,674 necessarily the law enforcement community. They 109 00:06:14,674 --> 00:06:16,642 might not have that intimate relationship where they would 110 00:06:16,642 --> 00:06:19,612 see these kinds of warning signs. But the close cadre of 111 00:06:19,612 --> 00:06:22,615 people around those persons, they would be observable to 112 00:06:22,615 --> 00:06:26,252 them. I think it's pragmatic to try to focus on prevention 113 00:06:26,252 --> 00:06:29,122 and intervention programs because the opportunity's just 114 00:06:29,122 --> 00:06:32,925 so much greater there than trying to secure every soft 115 00:06:32,925 --> 00:06:36,129 target, all the time, in a free and open society that 116 00:06:36,129 --> 00:06:36,863 values its freedom. 117 00:06:37,163 --> 00:06:39,866 >>:But that awareness is really critical. If you see 118 00:06:39,866 --> 00:06:42,969 something, say something. If you see something suspicious, 119 00:06:42,969 --> 00:06:46,105 if you see a suspicious person or persons, if you see a 120 00:06:46,105 --> 00:06:49,675 suspicious vehicle in an area where it really doesn't belong 121 00:06:49,675 --> 00:06:52,445 or something just doesn't look right, don't be afraid to 122 00:06:52,445 --> 00:06:54,947 report that. I mean, that's really key. You know, the law 123 00:06:54,947 --> 00:06:59,552 enforcement officers can't be everywhere at every time - at 124 00:06:59,552 --> 00:07:02,355 any given time. So I think really being able to notice 125 00:07:02,355 --> 00:07:05,925 something suspicious and look out for it, you know, and then 126 00:07:05,925 --> 00:07:08,828 report that, I think is critical and really crucial in 127 00:07:08,828 --> 00:07:11,297 trying to prevent those types of attacks from happening. 128 00:07:11,864 --> 00:07:14,634 >>:Individuals should not have to be alone in facing a 129 00:07:14,634 --> 00:07:18,037 potential attack. What policies or proactive measures 130 00:07:18,037 --> 00:07:20,439 can organizations take to mitigate threats to the 131 00:07:20,439 --> 00:07:20,873 public? 132 00:07:21,607 --> 00:07:24,710 >>:When you engage multiple people, as I mentioned, to 133 00:07:25,144 --> 00:07:28,014 build an IED or something that's a little more 134 00:07:28,014 --> 00:07:30,883 intricate, you're more likely to hit a trip wire that's 135 00:07:30,883 --> 00:07:34,487 going to alert somebody. But if somebody just walks into a 136 00:07:34,487 --> 00:07:39,425 shop to rent a van, there's typically little trip wire for 137 00:07:39,425 --> 00:07:44,463 them to be noticed. So it's so important for people obviously 138 00:07:44,463 --> 00:07:47,633 in the trucking industry to know who they're renting their 139 00:07:47,633 --> 00:07:51,137 trucks to but to establish some sort of trip wires as 140 00:07:51,137 --> 00:07:54,140 well, to be alert for suspicious behavior if they 141 00:07:54,140 --> 00:07:57,043 see anyone making modifications to vehicles or 142 00:07:57,043 --> 00:08:01,480 asking for modifications to vehicles which seem unlikely 143 00:08:01,480 --> 00:08:06,152 to be used in regular transport, that is a trip wire 144 00:08:06,152 --> 00:08:08,154 and something they should alert the federal authorities 145 00:08:08,154 --> 00:08:10,957 or the local police to. But once again, just because of 146 00:08:10,957 --> 00:08:13,826 the ease of it, that's why the frequency has arisen. 147 00:08:14,126 --> 00:08:16,896 >>:For soft targets and facilities and buildings, 148 00:08:16,896 --> 00:08:19,065 they're certainly going to start looking at using 149 00:08:19,065 --> 00:08:22,401 barriers and bollards and other type of equipment to 150 00:08:22,401 --> 00:08:26,072 maintain that distance between vehicle access to those 151 00:08:26,072 --> 00:08:28,574 facilities and to those buildings. One of the other 152 00:08:28,574 --> 00:08:31,010 things that we've done to work with some of the commercial 153 00:08:31,010 --> 00:08:34,413 industries is having a partnership between private 154 00:08:34,413 --> 00:08:37,650 companies that maybe could supply heavy vehicles like 155 00:08:37,650 --> 00:08:41,554 trucks or buses to use in a community to protect soft 156 00:08:41,554 --> 00:08:44,457 targets around events that are going on in the community. It 157 00:08:44,457 --> 00:08:47,693 can be around parades. It could be around other type of 158 00:08:47,693 --> 00:08:51,063 events, maybe sporting events and things like that, where 159 00:08:51,063 --> 00:08:53,366 companies are willing to step up and help out their 160 00:08:53,366 --> 00:08:56,702 community, use those vehicles for barriers to protect 161 00:08:56,702 --> 00:09:00,106 pedestrians so people can go about their daily business and 162 00:09:00,106 --> 00:09:02,875 enjoy their, you know, their daily life and not have to 163 00:09:02,875 --> 00:09:04,243 worry about that potential threat. 164 00:09:04,810 --> 00:09:07,947 >>:And, obviously, it's not pragmatic to put bollards on 165 00:09:07,947 --> 00:09:11,851 every single street, but when there are critical 166 00:09:11,851 --> 00:09:14,120 infrastructures or places where there are going to be 167 00:09:14,120 --> 00:09:16,622 crowds, there are certain commonsense things that can be 168 00:09:16,622 --> 00:09:20,493 done, whether it is police presence or barriers that can 169 00:09:20,493 --> 00:09:23,362 be moved and put into place. I think we have a responsibility 170 00:09:23,362 --> 00:09:27,566 as government to put those mitigation strategies into 171 00:09:27,566 --> 00:09:30,036 effect. If I had a building that was glass, I might 172 00:09:30,036 --> 00:09:33,472 consider some sort of bollards, planters outside 173 00:09:33,472 --> 00:09:36,075 that, once again, are aesthetically attractive that 174 00:09:36,075 --> 00:09:39,512 might not look like a standard bollard, but it has the 175 00:09:39,512 --> 00:09:42,615 capacity to stop a truck from getting through. If you were 176 00:09:42,615 --> 00:09:45,217 to look around the U.S. capital, they might have some 177 00:09:45,217 --> 00:09:48,754 sort of portable sally ports that go up and down so you can 178 00:09:48,754 --> 00:09:51,490 let vehicles through when necessary. But there has to be 179 00:09:51,490 --> 00:09:54,427 some type of strategy. We can't do nothing. 180 00:09:54,894 --> 00:09:57,129 >>:While it's important that we've identified both the 181 00:09:57,129 --> 00:09:59,966 nature of this emerging threat as well as countermeasures 182 00:09:59,966 --> 00:10:02,134 that individuals and organizations can take to 183 00:10:02,134 --> 00:10:04,971 mitigate an attack, it's important to ask one final 184 00:10:04,971 --> 00:10:07,673 question - how can we maintain this awareness of our 185 00:10:07,673 --> 00:10:10,376 surroundings without living our lives in fear? 186 00:10:10,943 --> 00:10:15,414 >>:I think it is about being mentally prepared for these 187 00:10:15,414 --> 00:10:17,583 things to happen but not allowing ourselves to be 188 00:10:17,583 --> 00:10:20,886 intimidated by things that actually happen very, very 189 00:10:20,886 --> 00:10:24,490 infrequently. That doesn't mean the professional 190 00:10:24,490 --> 00:10:26,559 counterterrorism community and law enforcement community and 191 00:10:26,559 --> 00:10:31,197 emergency response community shouldn't prepare for these 192 00:10:31,197 --> 00:10:34,934 incidents, shouldn't prioritize measures that can 193 00:10:34,934 --> 00:10:37,803 keep people safe and reduce vulnerabilities. Of course, we 194 00:10:37,803 --> 00:10:40,773 should do that, but I think we can complement that with 195 00:10:40,773 --> 00:10:43,943 working on our sort of societal resilience and our 196 00:10:43,943 --> 00:10:46,479 political resilience, not allowing ourselves to be held 197 00:10:46,479 --> 00:10:50,850 hostage by the potential that maybe one day someone will 198 00:10:50,850 --> 00:10:52,084 engage in this kind of violence. 199 00:10:53,319 --> 00:10:56,422 >>:This video highlights the emerging threats associated 200 00:10:56,422 --> 00:10:59,091 with vehicle ramming attacks, which have targeted various 201 00:10:59,091 --> 00:11:01,794 large crowd gatherings throughout the United States 202 00:11:01,794 --> 00:11:04,530 in recent years, including attacks in New York, 203 00:11:04,864 --> 00:11:08,601 Charlottesville, Va., and Columbus, Ohio. Additionally, 204 00:11:08,601 --> 00:11:11,570 this video provides examples of actions that can be taken 205 00:11:11,570 --> 00:11:13,806 by individuals and organizations alike to 206 00:11:13,806 --> 00:11:17,977 prevent, mitigate and respond to these attacks. The first 207 00:11:17,977 --> 00:11:21,380 step is to coordinate with law enforcement, educate yourself 208 00:11:21,380 --> 00:11:23,883 and your employees on suspicious activities to 209 00:11:23,883 --> 00:11:26,652 promote vigilance so that when somebody sees something, 210 00:11:26,952 --> 00:11:30,222 they're able to say something. Be aware of behaviors that 211 00:11:30,222 --> 00:11:33,159 indicate a pathway to violence and promote mechanisms that 212 00:11:33,159 --> 00:11:36,195 encourage reporting of suspicious behaviors. Look at 213 00:11:36,195 --> 00:11:38,864 opportunities to implement physical security measures, 214 00:11:38,864 --> 00:11:42,134 both passive and active. Examine architectural 215 00:11:42,134 --> 00:11:44,804 solutions to provide separation between vehicles 216 00:11:44,804 --> 00:11:48,340 and pedestrian spaces. Finally, should the worst 217 00:11:48,340 --> 00:11:51,877 occur, prepare yourself to respond decisively and remove 218 00:11:51,877 --> 00:11:56,115 yourself and others from the scene. In many cases, attacks 219 00:11:56,115 --> 00:11:59,819 do not conclude when the vehicle has stopped. For more 220 00:11:59,819 --> 00:12:01,987 information, visit the following links that contain 221 00:12:01,987 --> 00:12:04,623 additional tools, information and resources to prepare 222 00:12:04,623 --> 00:12:07,827 yourself and make your community a safer place. 223 00:12:07,827 --> 00:12:37,723 (MUSIC)