The HSAC has been tasked with creating a subcommittee called the Disinformation Best Practices and Safeguards Subcommittee. They will create a written report for the Secretary's review upon their completion of studying the topic.
The forms below are the Non-Disclosure Agreement and the Gratuitous Services Agreement which will need to be signed in order for a non-parent committee subcommittee member to serve on said subcommittee.
In light of recent attacks against synagogues, churches, temples and mosques, the Secretary of Homeland Security has tasked the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) stand up a subcommittee that is focused on the security of faith-based organizations across the country.
DHS and its partners have a responsibility to look to the future in order to foresee technological advancements that might result in new threats and vulnerabilities. The Department must also put in place the right programs, policies, and procedures to mitigate potential dangers. This subcommittee will do so by: providing an assessment of current state and perceived future advancements in emerging technologies that could pose a threat to the homeland security of the U.S.; analyzing and providing insight into the way such technologies could endanger the homeland, with a focus on those that have the highest likelihood of becoming a threat; lastly, they will provide recommendations that will best mitigate perceived impacts of a threat, and provide an assessment on the opportunities for DHS components to maximize the use of new technological advancements to defend against emerging threats.
The Countering Foreign Influence (CFI) Subcommittee will explore the evolving range of foreign influence threats against the United States and identify additional opportunities to counter them within DHS resources and authorities. They will do so through: identifying DHS entities at Headquarters and Component levels that possess the ability to counter these threats; providing recommendations to DHS on how to handle these situations, as well as how we could enhance preparedness within the nation for possible attacks; lastly, providing recommendations on how DHS should prepare itself to respond to future attacks, how DHS should engage with governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, and how to ensure DHS activities fit in with the wider scale of government architecture relating to countering foreign influence.
The CBP Families and Children Custody Panel is to provide findings and recommendations on the best practices from Federal, State, and local organizations regarding care for families and children in CBP custody. The Panel will be expected to: conduct visits to observe CBP operations and review non-privileged information to understand CBP’s operating environment, as well as the legal funding requirements that relate to individuals held in CBP custody, and all visits will be conducted in a way that protects the privacy of those in CBP custody and privileged information; study relevant aspects of short-term care, particularly for children, through interviews, research, and site visits; identify the best practices from Federal, State, and local law enforcement on short-term intake of families and children, and identify how these best practices are implemented; lastly, provide recommendations for any potential additions or changes to CBP policies, procedures, or training in relation to family and/or child custody, and include metrics as to how CBP would successfully implement said additions or changes.
As cyber and physical systems become more interconnected, the digital attack surface is extending further into our daily lives, with the potential for malicious cyber actors to create dangerous, real-world effects. Federal, State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) entities must collaborate and coordinate extensively with critical infrastructure private sector owners, operators, and stakeholders to identify and address these cybersecurity challenges. This will include: figuring out how DHS can most effectively and efficiently support SLTT agencies and partners in pursuing cybersecurity and the resilience of their IT infrastructure, including response and recovery; finding programs, services, and outreach that would provide the greatest benefit to SLTT stakeholders in reducing IT risks; lastly, measuring how effective the Homeland Security Grant Program has been in addressing risks at SLTT levels, and how the Grant Program could best be structured to address cybersecurity risks.